Health Reforms: Index

Books
The Commercialisation of New Zealand 1997
The Whimpering of the State: Policy After MMP (Chapters 10-11) 1999.

Critiques
The New Zealand Health Reforms in Context (Chapter 9 & Appendix) June 2002.

The Managerial Revolution
Systemic Failure (December 1995)
Out of Tune: Even the Officials Admit the Health Reforms Were Fatally Flawed. (December 1997)
Money for Jams: the Government Response to Roading Reforms is Commercialisation (January 1998)
Two Styles of Management (July 1999)
The Cult of the Manager: Those Who Can, Do; Those Who Cant, Become Managers (February 2000)

Details
It’s in the Blood (December 1992)
Health Disservice (April 1997)
The Seven Percent Solution: A Background to the Proposed Health Referendum (January 1998)
The Hospital Balance Sheet Crisis (July 1999)
Funding Public Health Care: How and How Much? (March 2002)
Well-health and the Future of the Pharmacist (August 2003)

From Listener 21 November 1998.
THE SORRY STATE OF THE HEALTH SYSTEM
A cartoon published as the Muldoon government was dying claimed “being prime minister means never having to say you’re sorry.” The privilege has been extended to ministers. Consider the international survey which found New Zealanders despairing of their health system. Some 32 percent believed the health system “has so much wrong it needs complete rebuilding”, and their negative views of the recent changes bottomed with the Canadians.

Over half identified waiting times or the level of government funding as the worst problems. Which is not surprising given that the government’s cut back on health funding amounts to over $2.5 billion since 1991. In effect the government closes the public health system for two months every year. No wonder everyone has doubts about whether it working for them.

Rather than acknowledging the public disquiet and apologising for the mess made by his predecessors (Simon Upton, Bill Birch, and Jenny Shipley) and their well paid advisers, Minister of Health, Bill English, blamed the debate on health reforms. But the critics got it largely right. As well as making up the funding deficit, the government might give the public an apology by knighting Sandra Coney, and Drs Alan Gray, Peter Roberts and Alister Scott of the Coalition on Public Health.

Children and Their Parents Are the Largest Group Of the Poor.

Press release for 4th November 2002 from Wellington branch of CPAG Inc

Keywords: Social Policy;

What has long been known to those who work with families, researchers, and social commentators, is now accepted by the Ministry of Social Development. Children and their parents are the largest group of the poor. The exact numbers may remain in dispute, but the orders of magnitude are not. A high proportion of New Zealand’s children and their parents are below any reasonable poverty line.

Nor is it disputed that far too many families are under stress because of their financial circumstances, that their health is being compromised directly or because of their unsatisfactory housing circumstances brought on because they cannot afford decent housing. Their opportunities at school and in the long run are being compromised too.

While the government addressed some children’s issues in its first term – especially in the health area – there was no significant change to assist children and their parents in poor families, despite prices having risen 10 percent since the last significant change to family assistance in 1996. Even then the level of assistance was insufficient.

In its second term the government must tackle the poverty of children and their parents. And it must do so soon. There are a variety of proposals of how it should do this. What is required at this stage is a commitment focused on the following principles.

1. The immediate establishment of an officials’ group to make proposals for a substantial improvement in the incomes of families with children to be announced in the May 2003 budget.

2. Direction to the group as follows:
– While consideration of a universal component is desirable in an overall review, in the short run it may be necessary to target the additional assistance in order to give significant relief to the poorest families, rather than provide a lower level universal benefit.
– While the magnitude of the likely package means it may have to be phased in over the 2003/4 to 2005/6 period, the need for immediate relief is paramount.
– Family assistance should not discriminate by the source of the other family income. (This means that the Child Tax Credit be either extended to benefit families or it be abolished and the revenue savings be used to fund the comprehensive package);
– Given the urgency of announcing an adequate family assistance package in the May 2003 budget, related issues such as benefit and abatement levels, and housing support must not be denied attention even if they have to be part of later budgets.

3. That the Ministries of Education and Health be directed to review their policies to ensure that they give the maximum of support to children in difficult financial circumstances, and that opportunities to add to the financial relief of their families or to improve their health and educational opportunities be sought and reported to their ministers.

4. That the Ministry of Social Development be directed to ensure there be the fullest possible uptake of entitlements to Special Assistance as soon as is practical. That the Revenue Department also review its procedures to ensure that entitlements to Family Assistance are delivered as effectively as possible.

5. That the proposed Commission for the Family include the economic circumstances of families with children in its terms of reference.

To be implemented in sufficient time to have an effective impact on the May 2003 budgeting process this set of directions should be given by no later than December 2002.

Child Poverty Action Group: Wellington branch

Further material from the New Zealand Child Poverty Action Group .

The Bubble Bursts

Will the Recession Be So Severe That it Will Count As the ‘Millennium Depression’?
Listener 2 November, 2002.

Keywords: Globalisation & Trade; Growth & Innovation; Macroeconomics & Money;

There was increasing pessimism about the state of the world economy among the international economic commentators I admire. Those who are paid to talk up the financial markets continue to predict optimistically – so far, four of the last zero economic upturns.

As the serious commentators see it, the issue is how long the recession will continue. By a recession they mean the world economy will grow slower than its capacity, with rising unemployment, falling investment, and business bankruptcies. To the long time pessimism about Japan’s prospects, and increasing nervousness about Latin America which seems to be being dragged down by Argentina, they now see Europe as stagnant. But the greatest worry remains the US economy, whose fundamentals seem deeply problematic.

In the late 1990s, the US economy experienced exceptionally strong economic growth accompanied by what the London Economist has described as its ‘greatest financial bubble’. The bubble has not so much burst, as it is steadily deflating. Even so, sober commentators – but not all the hired financial commentators – considered US share prices still excessively overvalued.

The approach of the great Austrian economist, Joseph Schumpeter helps us understand the boom and bubble. He investigated those business cycles which were stimulated by a major technological innovation. It might be railways or cars, but most recently it has been the revolution in information and communications technology. Schumpeter saw such innovations making genuine contributions to economic output and individual welfare in the long run, but the process through which this occurs causes a speculative boom in the short run and much hardship in the medium run.

Initially the innovation generates new investment and useful products. But nobody is quite sure what their impact will be, and some make wrong guesses. Where they underestimate innovative potential then it arrives late (or the underestimater’s firm goes to the wall). Others try to introduce new products and services for which there is no significant commercial demand. (The dot.com boom is as an example.) Implementing the entrepreneurial ambitions requires borrowing, and investors rush in with their savings. Because everyone is doing it, the financial system expands credit, as it lends to individual investors and businesses. So the technological expansion is associated with a speculative boom – a financial bubble.

Where an investment is a success, the borrowing pays for itself. But success breeds enthusiasms for less viable undertakings, and soon the business sector has myriads of unsound businesses which are being sustained by credit. Lacking cash flow, they eventually collapse. When enough do, the bubble bursts or deflates. Into recession – or worse – goes the economy. Investors lose their savings, and some of them end up with negative equity. Some financial institutions fall over too. And there is usually some collateral damage among sound firms which have unfortunately got exposed to the unsound ones. Schumpeter called this process ‘creative destruction’ since the elimination of the deficient businesses leaves room for the firms with useful technology to grow, albeit after the recession.

Everyone – the gullible aside – seems to be discounting the role of monetary policy. If it could not restrain the bubble it wont be able reflate the burst. However the standard Keynesian remedies have to be applied with care in a Schumpeterian bust . If the additional government spending simply props up the balance sheets of the non-viable firms, it prolongs the recession, since that does not purge the unsoundness.(Muldoon should have taken note.) That is why the Japanese economy was stagnant in the 1990s. The Bush tax cuts of last year also seem to have been spent on failures. (One of their beneficiaries was the bankrupt Enron.) The private sector debt is simply transferred to the government, and the necessary creative destruction does not happen.

The Japanese experience also suggests that any public investment needs to go to improving the productive capacity of the economy. If it does not, the debt servicing goes up, but there is no additional tax revenue to pay for it in the long run. Both the US and the Japanese governments are building up large public debts, with no public assets to match them and, in the Japanese case, without addressing the defective businesses. While any economy always has some, as long as the proportion is high, the post-bubble economy stays in recession.

Will the recession be so severe that it will count as the ‘millennium depression’? The size of the US bubble, its inept government and business responses thus far, and the already rising public debt are not encouraging. On the other hand it is said the US will be more ruthless jettisoning weak firms. I reread my recent Listener columns on the world economy to write this column. They are available, with a commentary, on this website. See if I have got it right so far.)

The Economic and Health Status Of Households

Report by Brian Easton & Suzie Ballantyne, Wellington School of Medicine

Keywords: Distributional Economics ; Statistics;

This report contains the contents and executive summary only. Copies of the report (with its numerous tables) are available on request from Brian Easton. Some tables are in Validation and the Health and Household Economy Project

For an introduction to method see The Economic and Health Status Project

Contents
Executive Summary Below

Chapter 1: Introduction (page 8)
Chapter 2: Measures of Health Status (page 11)
Chapter 3: Adjusting Household Income for Housing Circumstances (page 24)
Chapter 4: The Utilisation of Health Care Services (page 35)
Chapter 5: The Determinants of Private Spending on Health Care (page 44)
Chapter 6:
Choosing Household Equivalence Indexes
(page 52)
Chapter 7: The Household Distribution of Income (page 76)
Chapter 8: The Household Distribution of Income Adjusted for Housing Circumstances (page 84)
Chapter 9: The Location of Health Status in the Income Distribution (page 92)
Chapter 10: Conclusion. (page 97)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Chapter 2: Measures of Health Status.

Chapter 2 examines two measures of health status. One is the reported self-categorisation from the Household Economic Survey, the other is an index based on the reported utilised health services (which is calibrated by using it to predict the self -categorisation status). Both measures are validated in later chapters.

The latter part of the chapter looks at the relationship between the two measures and household income for the elderly. It shows there is a tendency for those in poorer health to be in the lowest income households, but the effect is not strong, because the income distribution of the elderly is very compact.

Chapter 3: Adjusting Household Income for Housing Circumstances

Chapter 3 describes a rigorous procedure for assessing the impact of housing circumstances on income based on the difference between actual housing outlays and predicted housing outlays, where predicted outlays are derived from an econometric equation of the housing spending of households in the rental sector. (Thus those whose housing outlays are more expensive that the average rate in the rental sector for their particular circumstances have the difference deducted, those whose outlays are less have the difference added to their income.)

The econometric equation shows the following characteristics affect housing outlays of households which rent.
– Income (or aggregate expenditure).
– Type of tenancy (HNZ housing was being charged at much the same rate as private market rents, but employer and local authority rents were markedly cheaper, and a rental agency leasing the dearest).
– Region.
– Number of Bedrooms.
– Household composition (although as explained the coefficients are not intuitively correct).
– Age with older households (as measured by the age of the reference person) paying less than younger households (weakly).
– Ethnicity with Polynesians paying less Pakeha and Other (but the total effect is small).

However, whether the dwelling was furnished or unfurnished had little effect on rental outlays. (The text suggests that some of these may be quality of housing effects which are not measured.)

Chapter 4: The Utilisation of Health Care Services.

Chapter 4 pursues the practical problem of the determinants of health service utilisation, by estimating a logit function which determines the probability of utilisation of each service in terms of the household characteristics.

Most of the conclusions are not surprising. If all other characteristics are the same:
– income is not a major determinant of health care utilisation.
– holders of community services cards tend to use most services more than had they not one.
– holders of high use cards utilise all services more intensely.
– holders of medical insurance tend to use most services more intensely.
– those who describe themselves as not being in excellent health use health services more intensely. The exception is for dental care where greater use is associated with excellent health.
– the age and gender effect is much as expected. Young children are lower users of services, but boys more so than girls. In early adulthood women tend to use the services more than men, although this may partly reflect their child bearing and rearing duties. However, young men do use the accident and emergency and ambulance services more than women. In later adulthood there tends to be a diminution of use of health services (with some obvious exceptions such as for opticians), but with perhaps some rise for some services after retirement.
– ethnic minorities tend to use the health services less than the Pakeha majority, even after adjusting for other socioeconomic characteristics.

Chapter 5: The Determinants of Private Spending on Health Care.

Chapter 5 examines what determines the level of spending on private health care by private households. The equations of the individual spending groups are econometrically satisfactory, but they typically have little total explanatory power and the chapter focuses on total private spending.

Income is the single most important variable accounting for 39 percent of the total explained variation in spending. The income elasticity was .24 which means that while those on higher incomes spend more on health care, their health spending decreases as a proportion of their total spending.

Possession of medical insurance was second to income in explanatory power, accounting for 31 percent of the total explained variation in spending. The study also explored the characteristics of households which had medical insurance. Income is not an important determinant, while Maori households are less likely to be holders compared to others with similar socioeconomic characteristics. Household composition and age – but not gender – are factors, but the largest reason may be the health status of the members of the household, especially households with particularly sick members.

The third largest determinant (12 percent) of explained variation is household composition and gender.

Another 8 percent of variation is explained by health status. However the effect is strong one for those who are in poor health. A household which is has a zero probability of excellent health spends over four times as much on health care as one all of whose members are in perfect health.

Additionally, those with community service cards spend 25 percent less than those without (despite, as we saw in Chapter 4, their being higher utilisers of the services), while those with High Use Cards spend on average 15 percent more (but they do spend less on prescriptions).

Chapter 6: Choosing Household Equivalence Indexes

Chapter 6 explains why household income often has to be adjusted for household composition. A means of doing this is a household equivalence scale which divides the income by an index which reflects the relative housing expenditure needs.

There are a number of ways of constructing household equivalence scales.
– Perhaps the least satisfactory method is the delphic where the scale is chosen by judgement with little empirical input.
– Using overseas constructed scales involves the assumption of international comparability.
– Scales have also been constructed on the basis of household budgets consisting of quantities of consumption items (or just food) but these have a judgmental element to them.
– The most rigorous way to construct a household equivalence scale is to use an econometric method, the more sophisticated of which pursued in New Zealand being Claudio Michelini’s explicitly based on utility theory. However Michelini’s work is not complete.

The choice of equivalence scale matters. It is simply not true that they are all broadly the same in terms of actual effects and outcomes.

How then to choose a scale? Until there is a validated one the use of an equivalence scale should be avoided unless it is absolutely necessary.
– One option where scale use cannot be avoided is to use a plausible set of them, and report only results which are robust to the choice of scale.
– Another procedure which avoids the arbitrary use of a scale is to use dummy variables in regression equations, but that is not always possible.
– Where it is not, the generalised Michelini scale seems the best available. The only other with merit might be the Jensen 1978 scale. All others seem unsatisfactory, including the Jensen 1988 and the Square Root scales which are most used for official statistical purposes.

While the generalised Michelini Scale may be the best available, given the importance of an equivalence scale in research and policy, there is a strong case for more effort to improve its estimation, possibly along the lines that Michelini contemplated before his premature death. There is also a desperate need to validate any chosen scale, that is to use evidence external to their construction to demonstrate they are doing what the claim to do.

Chapter 7: The Household Distribution of Income.

Chapter 7 describes how the household (equivalised) distribution is constructed, and some of the difficulties with current applications of the method. It also reports the rankings by socioeconomic characteristics. It suggests they are largely uninfluenced by choice of scale, although precise locations are much less stable. These results must be tentative, because they do not allow for housing circumstance, the subject of Chapter 8.

Chapter 8: The Household Distribution of Income Adjusted for Housing Circumstances

Chapter 8 looks at the location of socioeconomic groups in the household distribution if allowance is made for differing housing circumstances. It finds
– households with children tend to be at the bottom of the distribution, even lower than retired households. Households with working adults tend to be at the top of the distribution.
– men tend to be higher in the household distribution than women (although there is little difference between male and female children).
– the average ranking by age from bottom to top is children, the retired, young adults, middle working age adults, older working age adults.
– European/Pakeha are on average the highest ranked ethnic group, with Maori and then Pacific Island ones below. Other ethnicities at the top of the income distribution rank just above Maori, but at the bottom they rank below Pacific Islanders (presumably reflecting the heterogeneity of this group).
– rent free and owned without mortgage are the high ranked housing tenures, with renting below and owned with mortgage between.

The effect of the housing adjustment is to increase the dispersion in the household income distribution – that is those on higher incomes also tend to have more favourable housing circumstances, so the gap between their adjusted incomes and those at the bottom are even greater than the gap where there is no adjustment. Adjustment also raised the relative ranking of the elderly, because they are more likely to own their housing without a mortgage.

Adjusting for housing also reduces the proportion below the poverty line. This is because average housing circumstances are superior to those who rent. However, the poverty incidence is higher for those who lived in housing which is owned with a mortgage. If the case of the Royal Commission on Social Security’s Benefit Datum line the proportion of the population below the poverty line reduces from 17.3 percent to 14.2 percent.

Chapter 9: The Location of Health Status in the Income Distribution

Chapter 9 confirms that poor health is associated with low incomes, but shows that for the population as a whole the story is complicated by the interaction between age and income. Age is a much stronger predictor of poor health, and because the age groups are not spread evenly through the income distribution, the pattern of low incomes being associated with poor health gets distorted.

Sick children, in particular, are more concentrated in households with incomes below the poverty line (however defined).

Claudio Michelini: 1940-2000

From Chapter 6 of The Economic and Health Status of Households by Brian Easton and Suzie Ballantyne.

Keywords: Statistics;

The authors would like to acknowledge the significant contribution of Claudio Michelini to the development of empirically based equivalence scales in New Zealand, the topic of this chapter. Claudio had worked on the underlying theory (the preference-consistent Extended Linear Expenditure System) as a part of his postgraduate work at the University of Bristol. But in those days the computing power was insufficient to cope with the non-linear estimation that (ironically) the linear theory required.

He put the work aside but returned to it in the late 1990s, using the quasi-unit household data set, which despite each observation being an average of three households (to guarantee respondents’ confidentiality), had been structured to maintain sufficient of the underlying empirical reality to enable the estimation of empirically based household equivalence scales. (Michelini 1998, 2000, 2001) He readily contributed his results to this project and many were the lively sessions the authors had with him as he enthusiastically and cheerfully discussed the development of his work.

What we did not know is that he was visiting Wellington from Palmerston North, where he was a Senior Lecturer at Massey University, to see a specialist about what proved to be a brain tumour. Alas it had advanced too far, and Claudio did not recover from the operation. At 59 he was in the prime of his life as a teacher, as a researcher and as a friend.

The impact of an individual’s life may be thought of as a series of increasing circles beginning with the innermost one of one’s family and then moving out through friends, neighbours, and colleagues to the wider world. It will soon become apparent that this chapter is in part about the impact of Claudio’s last research on the wider world. His interest was primarily about the application of some technical econometrics, but the outcome has practical implications, affecting not just research outcomes as discussed in the next chapter, but through them to the way we understand the income distribution and the way we manage it. Ultimately his work will enable New Zealand to have a more efficient and equitable distribution of the nation’s income.

This chapter makes use of Claudio’s findings, but also discusses its limitations. Claudio would not have objected, for we were discussing them just before he went into hospital. The resolutions we suggest here were those he planned to investigate after he recovered. His work is incomplete. We regret, and the research community and the nation may regret, he was unable to complete it.

Brian Easton and Suzie Ballantyne

**********
A footnote from The Listener column of 29 April 2000.

Claudio Michelini (1940.2000)

One of those wonderfully eccentric immigrants who have given this country so much character.
Massey University econometrician Claudio Michelini, died unexpectedly a month ago He deserves mention in this column as an example of one of economics many trojans. They are rarely in the public eye, but they carry out their professional tasks competently, honestly and, in Claudio’s case. with cheerful enthusiasm. His research, too technical to report here, has a practical importance to our understanding of how households behave.

Two people living separately cost more to attain the same standard of living than if they live together But by how much? Fair treatment of the social security benefit rates for couples and singles depends on the answer Get it wrong, and either some benefits will be paid at too high a rate, adding to the tax burden, or some benefits will be set too low and beneficiaries remain in poverty. In the past. we guessed the relativity. Claudio left behind a body of research that helps assess scientifically this and other important questions about households We only notice the trojans when they are gone.

Household Equivalence Scales

This is Chapter 6, written jointly with Suzie Carson, from The Health and Economic Status of Households. The appendices are not published, and the acknowledgement to Claudio Michelini has been published separately. Even so website presentational requirements have led to some changes – and perhaps infelicities. The full chapter is available from the authors.

Keywords: Distributional Economics; Statistics;

Introduction

The (disposable) income of a household has to be adjusted for the composition of the household, the numbers and ages of those who belong to it, if we want to make useful comparisons of the standard of living of different households, or to predict commonalities of their behaviour such as expenditure patterns. A simple adjustment might be to convert the income to a per capita basis, but that ignores the impact of household economies of scale and for the different characteristics of the inhabitants. It is not true that ‘two can live as cheaply as one’, but two living together are likely to spend less than if they live separately in order to attain the same standard of living. It also seems reasonable to postulate (and the research evidence supports) that different ages have different needs. Other relevant factors might be gender, employment status(for employed people may have outlays that the not-employed do not have, such as on transport to work), and marital status (since a couple may have expenditure savings relative to two singles living in the same house).

This suggests a more sophisticate adjustment to incomes than per capita. In practice the incomes are scaled back by a ‘household equivalence index’ so that instead of dividing the income of a household of two adults by 2.0 (to a per capita) basis, the divisor is, say, 1.8, the lower figure reflecting the notion that, in this case, a couple living together make a savings of, in this case, ten percent on their outlays to attain the same standard of living.

Table 6.1 shows a couple of Household Equivalence Scales for some common households. (Their derivation will be explained shortly.) Following standard NZ practice they are set so that the index for a household with a couple is unity.

Table 6.1: Two Household Equivalence Scales

Household Type Michileni (CM*) Jensen 88
Single Person 0.57 0.65
Single, one child 0.83 0.91
Couple 1.00 1.00
Couple, one child 1.22 1.21
Couple, two children 1.44 1.41
Couple, three children 1.65 1.58
Couple, four children 1.85 1.75
Three adults 1.38 1.29
Three adults, one child 1.59 1.47

While the two look rather similar, and others have eyeballed them and said they were, the extent to which the various scales are broadly the same is a major concern of this chapter.

Table 6.2, with a rearrangement of the Michelini Scale, draws attention to one of their key properties Notice how as the index moves to the right (increasing number of children) or down (increasing numbers of adults), the numerical level increases. This (weak) regularity arises because the more there are, the more it costs to run a household for a given standard of living.

Table 6.2: Michelini Scale(CM*) by Number of Children in the Household (across)

Number
of Adults
0 1 2 3 4
1 0.574 0.826 1.060 1.281 1.494
2 1.000 1.224 1.439 1.646 1.846
3 1.384 1.592 1.795 1.991 2.183
4 1.742 1.940 2.133 2.322 2.507

A Brief History of Equivalence Scales in New Zealand

The modern investigation of the income distribution in New Zealand can said to have been stimulated by the Royal Commission on Social Security, which sat between 1969 and 1972 when it reported. If so, the first New Zealander to address the issue of equivalence scales was Bill Sutch, who quoted a New York Standard to be described below. (1971:87). The Department of Social Welfare also consider the issue, again using the New York Standard, its submission being reproduced in an appendix to the Royal Commission’s report (1972:582-597). It, and the Royal Commission itself, also toyed with an implicit food based one, which will be also be discussed below.

However, the first New Zealander to use an equivalence scale for the sorts of purposes that it will be used in this study – that is to scale incomes to allow comparisons of living standards between households – was probably Peter Cuttance in his pioneering 1974 Masters thesis Poverty Among Large Families in New Zealand. Following Sutch and the DSW, he used a New York Scale, which was based on Community Council of Greater New York estimate of the cost of maintaining individuals in households. For each individual there was a detailed list of commodities that were required for this sustenance, and additionally there was an estimate of the cost of rent and common household requirements for different households. Adding together the amounts for each member of the household and the total household requirements gave an amount (in American dollars) which could be treated at the relativities of an equivalence scale.

Cuttance presumably used this because there was no other available excepting the food based scale which the Royal Commission on Social Security had rejected as unsatisfactory. Its essence was professional dieticians chose a suitable pattern of food consumption for each type of person (typically by age and gender), to value it and to use the quantum as proportional to an equivalence scale (although sometimes there would be a deduction for household groups reflecting some – apparently arbitrary – assessment of the degree of economies of scale in the household food purchasing). The underlying justification for this scale is the ‘Engels law’ that food is a constant proportion of a household budget. In fact the ‘law’ is not empirically robust. This can be seen by a comparison of the food quantums as a proportion of total spending in actual households or in the New York Community Council recommended budget. An even simpler demonstration is that since dieticians recommend a higher food intake for men than women, their expenditure of food is higher. If Engels law was exactly true, all other spending by men would be similarly proportionally higher to attain the same standard of living as for a woman. Thus because a man eats more the scale awards him a larger clothing allowance.

One of the authors used the New York Scale in his early poverty studies, but he also repriced the scale using New Zealand prices of the time. Easton (1973) The exercise taught a number of lessons:

First it indicated there was a considerable element of judgement in the choice of commodities in the budgets.

Second, the resulting New Zealand priced scale was quite different from the New York priced one, in part because housing was relatively cheaper (affecting the household economies of scale) as was health and education (affecting the relative cost of children). The lesson here is that scales from other countries were unlikely to be transferable. Indeed changes in relative prices over time within a country may affect the equivalence scale. As a general rule this is unlikely to be important in the case of inflation, but sometimes policy changes can change relative prices in a manner which impact on the relativities between households. These include the switch on housing assistance from subsidised rents to income supplements, increasing user charges in medicine, and rising tertiary students fees. That these happened in the 1990s means that scales estimated before then may no longer be valid. It is not clear how a Delphic approach discussed below should respond to changes in relative prices.

Third, the application of the scales to the measurement of poverty resulted in very different outcomes, with the numbers below the poverty line considerably greater with the New York scale (because there were lower economies of scale from the higher cost of housing, and children were more expensive). That means the household income distribution (and therefore the numbers in poverty) will be sensitive to the choice of scale.

These latter lessons – the non-transferability of foreign scales, the problems of major price changes, and the sensitivity of the household distribution to the choice of scale – have informed Easton’s subsequent work and critiques although they have hardly impinged on most of the other New Zealand work, some thirty years later. For that reason the subsequent discussion does not pay much attention to attempts to construct a New Zealand scale by drawing on overseas scales.

The first lesson led to an attempt to empirically estimate an equivalence scale using household budget data. The procedure can be seen as an earlier attempt to do what Claudio Michelini did with very much greater sophistication later, using an inferior data base, a more limited estimation method, and a cruder economic theory. (Easton 1980)

Meanwhile John Jensen, at the Department of Social Welfare, proposed a quite different scale, which he updated a decade later, suing a method quite divorced from empirical evidence, using a methodology which might be generously called ‘delphic’. (Jensen 1978, 1988) There was very little justification for the shift in parameters between 1978 and 1988, although as we shall see, there is a major impact on the resulting distribution.

Another delphic scale has been the so-called square root scale, used in overseas studies. Such scales have little empirical justification other than the wisdom of their proposers, and as we shall see – and as foreshadowed in Easton’s earlier work – the shape of the household distribution is sensitive to the one which is used. This is despite a common statement, based on eyeballing the scales, that the various scales are all much the same. (Rochford & Pudney 1984, Whiteford 1988 (which compares possible New Zealand scales with foreign ones without noting that relative prices may matter), Rutherford et al 1990)

Shortly after, Harry Smith at the Department of Statistics attempted to estimate equivalence scales using household data. (Smith 1989), and a year later, showing no awareness of this earlier work, two Treasury officials, Edna Brashares and Maryann Ainsley, reverted to implicit scales based on food budgets despite the defects discussed above and the method’s rejection 18 years earlier by the Royal Commission on Social Security. (Brashares & Ainsley 1990; Brashares 1993; Easton 1995)

In the 1990s the practice has been to use a Jensen scale in both official and non-official studies of the household income distribution. However sometimes users revert to the 1978 scale, and often it is not always clear which they are using. Arguably the Jensen 1988 scale has been used to justify the social security benefit structure. This is despite its lack of empirical underpinnings or attempt to validate it. The validation issue is discussed in the next section. More recently Statistics New Zealand has used the square root scale, again without any justification for the choice other than it is used overseas. (SNZ 1998)

In the late 1990s, quasi-unit records of households became available for a single year. Generally non-government researchers do not have ready access to government survey records because of the statutory requirements imposed on Statistics New Zealand to protect the confidentiality of its respondents. However, they agreed to allow data based on averages of three households to be placed in the public domain. The threes were not selected randomly, but stratified by income, household composition, and household tenure, which retained enough of their relevant economic structure to enable Michelini to estimate household equivalences scales for selected households, assuming their consumption behaviour reflected a particular economic theory (linear consumption expenditure). The method used was comparable to overseas estimation methods of household equivalence scales, although the resulting parameters were different. (Michelini 1998, 2000, 2001; Chatterjee and Michelini 1998) As the introduction reports, Michelini was unable to complete this work because of an untimely death.

Scale values were not estimated for every household type. As the appendix to this chapter explains, it was possible to generalise the scale values by fitting a function to the Michelini estimates, although the fit was not perfect. It is the generalised scale values which were shown in Table 6.2.

Since none of the scales are properly validated we cannot assess directly their relative merits. Burt we can show that the choice of equivalence scale matters.

Validating Equivalence Scales

To validate a household equivalence scale requires some demonstration that household types on the same equivalised income are on the same standard of living, preferably using evidence which was not used to construct the scales. There is a sense that scales derived by econometric methods are internally validated, although typically their construction involves an assumption (say linear consumer expenditure functions) which needs separate validation. Those built up from budget lists also have some internal validation, although the judgements of the composers need separate validation. Delphic scales have not even this possibility of internal validation. There has been hardly any attempt to validate scales.

A practical method of validation involves asking a variety of questions about a household’s living and consumption experiences, and statistically scaling them to give a measure of living standards. It is then possible to compare the equivalised incomes of different household compositions to see to what extent they are associated with similar levels on this measure. (Alternately, an equivalence scale could be constructed by aligning the measure for different household compositions.) By comparing the outcomes for different scales it would be possible to judge their merits, and to some extent validate them.

An preliminary attempt to do this was done in the estimate the economies of scale coefficient for the elderly based on the data in the living standards survey. It ended up with a wide and practically useless, confidence interval. (DSP 2001) The implication may not be merely that the sample size was too small, but possibly income is a poor correlates with living standards. If this is so, it involves a major reevaluation of the methodology of the measurement and interpretation of poverty. However, before that is done there is a need for more empirical investigation of the phenomenon.

The Survey of Living Standards does offer one other insight in regard to the validation problem. It suggests, almost as an aside, that the living standards of the elderly, on its measures, are on average higher than for the population as a whole. Future work will elaborate and probably confirm this finding. In the interim it offers one way of judging the merits of some equivalence scales.

Six Household Equivalence Scales

This section examines eight Household Equivalence Scales, six of which are usable. They can be broadly characterised by two parameters (ignoring a scaling parameter which sets the two adult household at unity):

ES = (A+αC)^(β)

Where
A = number of adults in household;
C = number of children in household;
α = the child adult equivalence parameter;
β = the household economies of scale parameter;

and where
ES is the Household Equivalence Scale which divides household disposable income (which may involve a number of further adjustments) to obtain equivalent income.

If α = 1, and β = 1, the equivalence scale is the per capita scale. However it is generally assumed both parameters are less than unity.

The seven scales we are looking at have the parameters shown in Table 6.3.

Table 6.3: Parameters for New Zealand Household Equivalence Scales

Scale Code Child/Adult
Equivalence α
Economies of
Scale β
Per Capita PC 1.000 1.000
Square Root SR 1.000 0.500
Easton (1973) E73 0.778 0.664
Jensen (1978) J78 0.737 0.781
Easton (1980) E80 0.916 0.606
Jensen (1988) J88 0.632 0.730
Smith (1989) SM 0.713 0.972
Michelini (1999) CM* 0.535 0.801

A brief summary of the characteristics of each table is as follows:

Per capita scale (PC)
The per capita scale is simply the number of people in the household. Equivalent income is calculated by dividing household income by the number of people in the household. No account is taken of the differing needs of adults and children or of economies of scale. As a result, we would expect households with children and larger households to be located nearer the bottom of the distribution when compared to scales that consider economies of scale and the lower needs of children.

Square root scale (SR)
The square root scale has been used internationally by Atkinson et al (1995:19) and by Statistics New Zealand (1998). The scale is the square root of the number of people in the household. The economies of scale coefficient (0.5). This scale has the strongest economies of scale coefficient and so it most raises the equivalised incomes of large households relative to small ones. The square root scale, as with the PC scale, assumes that adult and children have the same needs. The effect of this is to push smaller households with children further down the income distribution.

Easton 1973 (E73)
This is the scale based on the Greater New York Community Council budget requirements. It is shown here to give an indication of what such a scale might look like, even though it is not used in the subsequent analysis. It proves to be a very middling one as assessed by both parameters.

Jensen scales (J78, J88)
The 1978 and 1988 revised Jensen scales, in contrast to the SR and PC scales, allow for the differing needs of adults and children. The adult/child equivalence for the J78 scale (0.737) is higher than that of the 1988 scale (0.632), giving lower needs for children relative to adults in the 1988 scale. The scales use an economies of scale coefficient somewhere in the middle of the scales we looked at.

Easton 1980 (E80)
In contrast to the scales discussed so far, Easton used an econometric approach to estimating the equivalence scales. Using published data from the HES, a savings to income ratio, after tax income, household size and the age of the household head are used to estimate the household equivalence, it being assumed that the same savings ratio on average applied at the same equivalised household income. The Easton scale has the highest child/adult equivalence (0.916) with the exception of the PC and SR scales, which assume that adults and children have the same needs. The economies of scale coefficient is comparatively low at 0.606.

Smith scale (SM)
Smith also uses an econometric approach and uses unit record HES data for the analysis. The scale categorises households by the number of adults and children and the age of the household head. Smith uses two methods to estimate the scales, one based on utility theory and the other on Engel’s law. The scale used in this paper is based on utility theory and uses household disposable income. The adult/child equivalence (0.713) is similar to that of J78. The economies of scale coefficient at 0.972 is far higher than other scales developed in New Zealand and is similar to that of the PC scale which takes no account of economies of scale. The effect of this would be to put larger households, and in particular, those with adults, lower down the distribution. The Smith scale was only calculated for some households, so it cannot be used for comparative purposes.

Michelini scale (CM*)
Like Easton80 and Smith, Michelini uses econometric techniques to estimate his household equivalences. This scale is generalised from the last estimates he made, as described in the appendix to this chapter. The adult/child equivalence for the five household types is the lowest of the seven scales at 0.585. The economies of scale coefficient (0.801) is slightly higher than some of the scales. The scale is labeled CM*, the asterisk to note it has been derived from Michelini’s estimates.

Comparing Household Equivalence Scales

This section has the primary purpose to show that claims that all the household equivalence scales give much the same answers is misleading both in research terms and for policy purposes. To do this we are going to use the method elaborated in the next chapter in which the incomes of households are equivalised, and the characteristics of the resulting distribution are explored.

Comparing the effects of scale is not easy. The method used here is to look at the distribution of the social group relative to the overall distribution. Consider the distribution by deciles. If a group had exactly the same distribution as the population as a whole, it’s distribution would appear as 10 percent in each decile. In practice this rarely happens. If the share of the distribution of the group tends to be in the lower deciles it can be said to be poorer than average, if in the upper ones it can be said to be richer than average. What we shall see is that the shares vary according to the choice of Equivalence Scale, sometimes markedly.

To do this we need to summarise the distribution of equivalised household incomes. The summary measure locates of the median of the social group relative to the percentile of the overall distribution. If the two distributions were identical the median of the social group would be located at the 50th percentile of the overall group. Again in practice this rarely occurs. Subject to various caveats if the median of a group is associated with a higher percentile of the population the group might be said to be richer than the population as a whole, if with a lower percentile it is poorer.

An important caveat is that the distribution of the social group may be wider or narrower in the distribution than the population distribution as a whole. An indication of this is given by the lower and upper quartiles of the social group being located relative to the percentile of the overall distribution. Because there tends to be more interest in the poorer part of the distribution, only the lower quartile is shown.

As will be apparent from the next chapter, we have derived the group medians (and quartiles) for a wide range of social groups. For this chapter’s purposes we look at only those by household type and by age.

The Distribution of Household Type by Equivalence Scale

Table 6.4M: Median Income of Household Type: Relative to Population Decile By Equivalence Scale

Household Type PC SR J78 E80 J88 CM*
Adult not in
Labour Force
58.9 19.9 38.9 53.4 28.7 39.4
Adult in
Labour Force
89.6 65.5 71.0 85.0 72.3 81.4
2 Adults neither
in Labour Force
46.8 33.6 37.9 42.3 39.0 34.5
2 Adults, 1+
in Labour Force
83.6 76.5 79.3 80.7 77.7 79.7
1 Adult with
1+ Children
18.2 13.3 15.8 20.2 15.4 19.3
2 Adults with
1 Child
49.3 50.4 52.6 50.8 52.5 54.2
2 Adults with
2 Children
41.9 52.0 51.1 50.5 52.1 52.6
2 Adults with
3+ Children
20.6 35.7 29.9 23.8 26.5 33.8
3 Adults, no
Children
66.1 71.0 66.3 62.1 67.3 54.3
3 Adults with
Children
30.5 48.9 39.7 31.4 45.2 38.7

Table 6.4L: Lower Quartile Income of Household Type: Relative to Population Decile By Equivalence Scale

Household Type PC SR J78 E80 J88 CM*
Adult not in
Labour Force
53.1 14.0 32.7 44.6 22.7 33.0
Adult in
Labour Force
77.5 49.7 61.1 70.3 53.3 65.7
2 Adults neither
in Labour Force
37.5 24.8 23.5 33.0 23.6 24.8
2 Adults, 1+
in Labour Force
68.1 55.1 59.1 69.1 56.3 58.7
1 Adult with
1+ Children
09.2 06.6 09.4 11.5 08.6 11.3
2 Adults with
1 Child
29.6 28.7 28.8 28.8 28.8 28.9
2 Adults with
2 Children
24.0 29.2 26.3 25.3 30.2 28.2
2 Adults with
3+ Children
11.3 16.6 13.3 13.1 15.4 14.4
3 Adults, no
Children
43.1 46.8 37.3 37.6 44.2 39.1
3 Adults with
Children
12.4 26.2 16.3 13.1 18.1 14.7

There is considerable variation in the location of households types in the household (equivalised) income distribution. To illustrate the point, consider the impact of Jensen’s apparently minor change in his parameters between his 1978 and 1988 scale. Consider households whose sole member is not in the labour force (mainly the elderly). The change in scale reduced the median from the 38.9 percentile to the 28.7 percentile, and the lower quartile from the 32.7 percentile to the 22.7 percentile (in the latter case from above the population quartile to below it).

More generally, the Jensen 1988 and the Square Root scales tend to lower the relative incomes of smaller households, with the policy implication that they should be paid more attention.

Age

Table 6.5M: Median Income of Age Group: Relative to Population Decile By Equivalence Scale

Age Group PC SR J78 E80 J88 CM*
0-14 27.1 37.6 33.4 31.6 37.5 36.3
15-24 54.1 58.2 55.4 51.3 56.2 53.8
25-44 52.6 56.8 56.5 54.6 56.7 56.6
45-64 69.2 63.1 64.5 66.2 63.4 61.7
65+ 55.6 44.7 42.9 42.0 36.9 41.1

Table 6.5L: Lower Quartile Income of Age Group: Relative to Population Decile By Equivalence Scale

Age Group PC SR J78 E80 J88 CM*
0-14 13.3 16.6 14.5 15.0 15.6 16.3
15-24 26.8 32.6 26.9 32.9 30.3 24.1
25-44 25.8 30.6 26.4 26.2 30.6 28.5
45-64 33.2 34.6 28.0 39.4 34.8 35.1
65+ 45.0 22.4 37.1 32.3 40.3 30.8

The same pattern is evident with the impact on age, since generally younger people tend to live in larger households. The scales used by Statistics New Zealand and the Department of Social Welfare and its successors tend to raise the relative incomes at the younger end of the population and to lower them at the older end, relative to the other scales.

So the choice of scale does affect the shape of the household income distribution for research purposes, and it does have implications for policy making involving the income distribution. It is inconsistent with the evidence to argue that the scales are all broadly the same. The choice of scale matters, and implicitly or explicitly the scale so chosen will influence the conclusions.

The next section discusses the choice of equivalence scale. However there is a lemma from the conclusion in this section, of some significance when using an equivalence scale for other purposes. It cannot be assumed that the resulting index will be age independent, since we know that scales are age sensitive. This means that , for instance, the New Zealand Deprivation Scale, which uses Jensen 1988 to equivalise household incomes may have an age bias in it. (Crampton and Salmon 2000) This is a matter for those who have constructed the scale to investigate. Until they have it should be used with caution wherever age has some relevance to the problem being investigated. (This example is chosen not because it is unique, but because epidemiologists go to considerable trouble to adjust mortality rates for age composition. Clearly it could be misleading to associate the age adjusted mortality figures with the potentially age biased deprivation scale.)

The Impact of a Choice of Scale on Estimates of the Numbers in Poverty

Equivalence scales are commonly used in the estimation of the numbers in poverty where an income threshold is used. The most commonly used poverty line – the income below which a household’s equivalised income falls its members are deemed to be in poverty – is the Royal Commission’s Benefit Datum Line (BDL), set in real terms in 1972, as the minimum practical benefit level for a couple for which it was necessary to enable them to participate in and belong to their community. (Easton (1997) notes that an alternative proposed by Stephens et al (1998) is very close to the Royal Commission level.) In the prices at the time of the surveys that this analysis is based upon, that amounted to $15,200 p.a. In order to get the poverty lines for other household types this amount is adjusted according by an equivalence scale, the intention being that reflected the same standard of living.

That means, subject to a caveat to be explained, that while the numbers of couples in households of two adults will be the same for all scales, the numbers will differ for other household types because the poverty levels will vary according to the choice of household. Thus the numbers of poor will vary according to the choice of equivalence scale. Table 6.4 gives an indication of the degree of variation not only for the BDL but for other possible poverty levels.

Table 6.6: Percentage of People Below Given Equivalised Incomes By Equivalence Scale

Income Level of
Two Adults ($p.a.)
PC SR J78 E80 J88 CM*
12200 22.0 07.9 09.9 11.0 07.9 08.6
13200 26.2 10.4 13.0 14.0 09.7 10.6
14200 30.2 13.5 16.4 17.7 12.5 13.5
15200
(RCSS BDL)
34.0 17.8 20.3 21.7 16.6 17.3
16200 37.9 22.8 25.4 25.8 21.3 22.2
17200 41.8 27.1 30.9 29.8 26.7 27.2
18200 44.9 31.3 35.7 34.6 31.5 32.4

The table confirms the conclusion of the previous section. Outcomes are sensitive to choice of equivalence scale. The per capita scale gives higher poverty numbers than others, while the Jensen 1988, the most used in ‘official’ circles gives the lowest levels of poverty numbers for a given poverty line.

A comparison of the Jensen 1978 to the Jensen 1988 equivalence scale is instructive. It reduces the numbers below the poverty line by between 25.4 and 11.8 percent, depending on the poverty line. The difference between them at the Royal Commission BDL amounts to over 130,000 people. Another way of presenting the same point is that the poverty line of $15200 p.a. for a couple using the Jensen 1988 scale is equivalent to $14300 using the Jensen 1978 scale, a reduction in the poverty line of 6 percent.(Given the substantial difference in poverty numbers, it may seem surprising that the difference in effective poverty levels is small. This is because the cumulative frequency distribution of household incomes is steep in this region (or the frequency distribution is dense).

Who among the poor are affected by the different equivalence scales? Table 6.6 shows the figures by household type and the proportions of adults and children for the RCSS BDL. (Easton 1980 gives proportions different from the others in the case of a two person household because it is includes an age of head of household/reference person effect. The remainder are the same because the poverty line is calibrated on an average two person household.)

Table 6.6: Percentage of Household Type Below RCSS BDL By Equivalence Scale

Household Type PC SR J78 E80 J88 CM*
One Adult 04.6 32.5 08.3 05.1 12.2 07.0
1 adult &
1 child
48.1 48.1 33.8 17.9 33.5 17.0
1 adult &
2+ children
93.9 70.2 69.6 60.3 60.5 47.9
Two adults 08.3 08.3 08.3 07.2 08.3 08.3
2 adults &
1 child
29.6 15.9 18.7 19.1 15.6 15.9
2 adults &
2 children
43.2 16.0 21.2 22.6 16.0 17.2
2 adults &
3 children
65.9 21.5 31.1 33.9 21.8 24.7
2 adults &
4+ children
83.5 23.7 46.9 55.8 26.8 34.6
Three adults 14.1 06.7 09.5 11.3 07.9 10.1
Three adults
& children
53.2 20.1 29.6 36.0 23.9 27.7
Other 31.2 08.4 15.3 23.2 11.9 16.9
All children 46.4 20.6 26.2 22.8 20.1 20.8
All Parents 39.3 17.6 22.5 24.7 17.9 19.2
Other Adults 13.2 15.1 10.9 10.9 11.0 10.8

In summary the Jensen 1988 and the Square Root scales tend to favour small households, and thereby underestimate the numbers (relative to the other scales) of children in two adult families, and children and their parents generally. (The Michelini results tend to be towards the lower numbers of poor, because they allow for age of children, and households income tends to increase with older children, as conjectured in Easton (1977).) Nevertheless, all the equivalence scales point the same way. Poverty in New Zealand is centrally a problem of children and their parents. The largest group is in two parent families.

Choosing Between Scales

What is the researcher (or policy maker) to do if he or she wants to avoid the pitfalls that this sensitivity generates? There are a number of options, until systematic validation identifies one equivalence scale as superior to the others.

Use All Scales
This is the strategy followed for some of the underlying analysis of this chapter and the next. We found the difficulty was the massive quantities of data generated, and the resulting enormous task of interpreting the output. Moreover, while some conclusions are robust to choice of scale (e.g. children are always disproportionately among the poor), others which are important are not and these are often very important research and policy questions (i.e. the location in the distribution of the elderly).

Try to Avoid Using Equivalence Scales.
The uncertainties suggest that wherever possible the use of equivalence scales should be avoided. For instance Carson(2000) treated the one and two person households of the elderly separately, rather than combining them by using an equivalences scale. While this is a counsel of perfection, the outcome may be very cumbersome or important questions may be unanswerable – as in the other extreme of using every available equivalence scale.

Select a Scale on a Systematic Criterion
There might be three sorts of selection criteria:

(1) Sophistication of the estimating procedure. This would eliminate delphic generated scales. E73 involves various judgements as to the content of the household expenditure. E80 and Smith are both less sophisticated examples of the generalised econometric estimating which Michelini uses. On this basis CM* is the preferred choice.

(2) Comparisons of parameters. The economies of scale parameters would eliminate the Per Capita scale and Smith, while the child equivalence for Per Capita, Square Root and E80 seems to be too close to that of an adult. (The child equivalence for CM* appears low. This arises because it represents the equivalence for a young child (less than aged 4) rather than the average child who is about 8 years old.)

On the other hand the economies of scale for the Square Root Easton 1980 and Jensen 1988 seem too strong. For instance the last is set so that a single adult household is 65 percent of the two adult household. That implies that the additional adult increases the household spending by about a half (53.8 percent) to maintain the same standard of living.

(3) Judgements based on the impact on location of households in the income distribution. We might think of the scales all being attempts to get at a true scale. In that case one of the middle scales may be close to it. An average would not be appropriate since some of the scales might be thought of as extreme (e.g. per capita). A scale near the middle of all the scales would seem to be more appropriate, where the scales are applied to social sub groups of the population. So we may ask which scale is most commonly in the middle of the seven at each decile and by the three quantiles. This is an ad hoc test, but the results are revealing.

Table 6.7: Frequency in which Each Scale Generate an Estimate at the Centre (Percent)

Scale Measure 1 Measure 2
Per Capita 11.0 06.7
Square Root 05.1 12.0
Jensen (1978) 19.8 22.7
Easton (1980) 07.6 09.8
Jensen (1988) 08.1 15.8
Smith (1989) 08.7 04.3
Michelini* (1999) 21.4 27.8

It would appear that two – Jensen 1978 and the generalised Michelini – are most commonly in the middle. The Michelini scale is ahead of the Jensen 1978 but a slightly different criteria brings them closer. None of the other scales have nearly the same performance, including the widely used Jensen 1988 and Square Root scale. On this measure both would be judged extremist.

On the basis of these three criteria, the generalised Michelini seems to be the most convincing of all the available scales, although were it not delphic, perhaps Jensen 1978 might have some attractions. The ideal would be a scale which had been properly validated.

Allow the Econometrics to choose the Scale

This approach is elaborated in the next section.

The Econometric Approach: With Dummies

Suppose one was estimating the following simple equation

Log X(i)/EQ(i) = α + β Log (Y(i)/EQ(i))

Where X was household expenditure, Y household disposable income and, EQ the equivalence scale value for the household.

Suppose we are not sure what the value of EQ is. We could estimate

Log X(i) = α + β Log Y(i) + (1-β) Log EQ(i)
or
Log X(i) = α + β Log Y(i )+ Σγ(j) D(ij)

where D(ij) is a set of dummy variables which represents the various housing compositions. If the household is of composition j then D(ij) = 1, otherwise it is zero. This means that

Log EQ(i) = + γ(i)/(1-β)

so the econometric equation estimates an equivalence scale.

This is a simplified version of what Michelini was doing, and has the advantage that very little is being imposed upon the equivalence scale structure. However we still require the regularity of a larger household having a larger equivalence scale.

To illustrate the method, consider the estimated equation from Chapter 5.

Table 6.8: Estimates from an Econometric Equation by Number of Children in the Household

Number
of Adults
0 1 2 3
1 0.693 1.065 1.468+ n.a.
2 1.000 1.036 1.177 1.432+
3 1.460 1.765+ n.a. n.a.
4+ 1.882 n.a. n.a. n.a.

Estimated from the coefficients from the Total Medical Spending Equation (See Chapter 5)
+ indicates ‘X or more’ children., 4+ indicates 4 or more adults.

The estimated equivalence scales are horizontally weakly regular: the more children in a household for a given number of adults, the higher the scale value. However, the figures are not vertically regular,: that is for households with children the equivalence scale values fall – rather than rise – from when an extra adult is added to a single adult household.

But the estimates are subject to statistical error, and while it has not been possible to calculate the precise confidence intervals for the equivalence scale values, the irregularity could be explained from this source.

There is another explanation. One could conceive of requiring a different equivalence scale for expenditure from income. The income scaling would give an indication of the general standard of living, while the expenditure scaling would reflect the particularities of the expenditure. The mathematics now becomes

Log X(i)/EQX(i) = α + β Log (Y(i)/EQY(i))

Where X was household expenditure, Y household disposable income and, EQX is the equivalence scale value for the household’s expenditure and EQY for its income. This time we estimate

Log X(i) = α + β Log Y(i) + (Log EQX(i)- β Log EQY(i))
or
Log Xi = α + β Log Y(i) + Σγ(j) D(ij)

where D(ji) is a set of dummy variables which represents the housing composition which the equivalence scale is representing. If the household is of composition j then D(ij) = 1, otherwise it is unity. This means that

γ(i) = (Log EQX(i) – β Log EQY(i)).

This time, however, the two equivalence scales are not identified (that is, they can not be separately measured). The important thing however is while each component may be regular in some circumstances the observed γ(i) will not be.

Thus regularity of the coefficient dummies is not a necessary requirement in this method.

In summary, using dummies in a suitable econometric equation is a means of avoiding deciding on a particular scale. However, the meaningfulness of the dummy coefficients needs to be checked. And as we shall see in the next chapter, equivalence scales are used in contexts where econometric equations are not immediately relevant.

The Michelini Scale(s)

The previous section used a simple ad hoc demand function. Claudio Michelini’s work derived the demand function from an assumed household utility function. His results are therefore more rigorous, and avoid inconsistencies between parameters, such as the individual expenditure items not adding to total expenditure. However, the assumed utility function may be invalid, of course.

While in Table 6.3 we gave a Michelini type scale derived from these assumptions, as explained in the appendix the actual scale he produced was somewhat more limited. with estimates for only four household types. They are estimated separately, and therefore independent of one another.

Table 6.9: Michelini Estimates of Equivalence Scale by Number of Children in the Household

Number
of Adults
0 1 2 3
1 0.573 n.a. n.a. n.a.
2 1.000 1.214 1.448 1.638
3 n.a n.a. n.a. n.a.

The scale meets the criterion of regularity but the sequence for two adult households do not follow a simple function, so it is not possible to interpolate simply the missing values for other household types. The appendix shows how we interpolated by fitting an econometric function across the five observations. This gives different values for the estimated scale values (See appendix table 6.A.2). The estimates of the generalised scale appear to be within the standard errors of the individual estimates.

We can report that Michelini was aware of the problem. Shortly before his death we were discussing how he could remedy the deficiency by a simultaneous estimate of all the scale points together, having them to conform to the equation we used in the Appendix. He was apprehensive about the addition of further non-linear conditions, because that would slow down the convergence of the estimation procedure (possibly so much there was no practical convergence). In the interim he was working on the costs of children, the paper of which was posthumously published

The discussion on Michelini (2001) has not been included.

Summary

The Need for A Scale
For many purposes household income has to be adjusted for household composition. A means of doing this is a household equivalence scale which divides the income by an index which reflects the relative housing expenditure needs. The simplest would be the per capita scale, but it is generally accepted that there are economies of scale so that larger households use less of some resources to attain a given standard of living. It is also accepted that children have a different (lower) relativity to adults, and that while it seems likely that different age groups have different relativities, there is little agreement as to the exact level. Such empirical research there is supports both hypotheses.

Constructing a Scale
There are a number of ways of constructing household equivalence scales.
– Perhaps the least satisfactory method is the delphic where the scale is chosen by judgement with little empirical input.
– Using overseas constructed scales involves the assumption of international comparability. However different relative prices, especially for housing, and different public provision, especially for health and education, means that it is unlikely that foreign scales are particularly relevant to New Zealand. At minimum their usefulness is unproved. An instructive example of international differences is those based on Engles Law of the quantity of food expenditures in total household expenditure. Aside from various weaknesses – such that men consume more food than women – the proportion of food expenditure in household budgets varies internationally, in part because of different price relativities.
– Scales have also been constructed on the basis of household budgets consisting of quantities of consumption items (or just food) but these have a judgmental element to them.
– The most rigorous way to construct a household equivalence scale is to use an econometric method, the more sophisticated of which pursued in New Zealand being Claudio Michelini’s explicitly based on utility theory. However Michelini’s work is not complete.

The Sensitivity of Results to Scales
The choice of equivalence scale matters. It is simply not true that they are all broadly the same when actual effects are compared. The text illustrates a number cases, but one example here will illustrate the problem. While the Jensen 1978 scale estimates that 20.3 percent of the population are below the poverty line (the Royal Commission BDL), the Jensen 1988 scale estimate is 16.6 percent, a difference of 130,000 people. Not only is the numbers of poor affected by the choice of equivalence scale but so is the composition, although the conclusion that the poor are children and their parents remains robust to the choice of scale.

Choosing a Scale
How then to choose a scale? Until there is a validated one the use of an equivalence scale should be avoided unless it is absolutely necessary. One option where scale use cannot be avoided is to use a plausible set of them, and report only results which are robust to the choice of scale. Where that is not possible, then the sensitivity of the conclusion to scale choice needs to be included in the commentary.

Another procedure which avoids the arbitrary use of a scale is to use dummy variables in regression equations, but that is not always possible.

Where it is not, the generalised Michelini scale seems the best available. The only other with merit might be the Jensen 1978 scale. All others seem unsatisfactory, including the Jensen 1988 and the Square Root scales which are most used for official statistical purposes.

Conclusion

While the generalised Michelini Scale may be the best available, given the importance of an equivalence scale in research and policy, there is a strong case for more effort to improve its estimation, possibly along the lines that Michelini contemplated before his premature death.

There is also a desperate need to validate any chosen scale, that is to use evidence external to their construction to demonstrate they are doing what the claim to do.

Rhetoric and Iraq: Arab Brothers and Oil Sisters.

Listener 19 October 2002.

Keywords: Globalisation & Trade; Political Economy & History;

It is easy to argue that US policy on Iraq is driven by its oil interests, especially since its president is from a Texan oil family who has surrounded himself with Texan oilmen. Thus the clever email about how the ‘Seven Sisters’ – the world’s great oil companies – are determining US policy which accompanies this column. If only it were so simple.

Undoubtedly the US is a deeply involved in the Middle East because of its oil (although there is also its loyalty to Israel). America produces 21.5 percent of the world’s output of goods and service, while consuming 22.7 percent of its total primary energy. However it produces only 16.5 of the world’s energy, the rest coming from (mainly) oil imports. So although it is the world’s second biggest oil producer (Saudi Arabia is bigger) – currently the US produces 9.9 percent of the total – it imports 25.2 of all internationally traded oil. Moreover the US has only 11 years of oil reserves. In contrast, the five biggest holders of reserves – all in the Middle East – have over a hundred years of supply at their present rate of production. (These figures are from the International Energy Association, for the 2000 year. Perhaps the US has only 9 years left.)

So the US – and the Seven Sisters – would like to get their hands on Iraqi oil. Not only do they have the second largest reserves in the world, but their fields are underperforming. A major investment will substantially increase the cheap supply. But would that be the outcome from an invasion?

Were it just a matter of overthrowing the Iraqi regime, war might make oil-sense. At worse there would be a prolonged loss of around 5 percent of the World’s traded oil supply. The price of oil would rise – it has been inching its way up and by September it was close to $US30 a barrel in contrast to the $US19 at the beginning of the year. The Seven Sisters would be more profitable, and might even invest in some of the high-cost untapped oil fields (weakening the Middle East dominance of supply).

But an invasion of Iraq would precipitate chain reactions, as other Middle East oil regimes react. While most are dictatorships of one sort and another, even dictators have to manage their public. And, as in the case of Saudi Arabia, the ruling elite may be divided. Its 81 year old King Fahd is failing and while in principle the successor is to his half-brother 79 year old Crown Prince Abdullah, the third-in-line, 78 year old Prince Sultan with a different mother again, must be impatient..

If it were simply a matter of personalities, the issue might be just intriguing to outsiders. But Abdullah and Sultan are on opposite sides of the modernisation/liberalisation versus traditionalism/feudal control spectrum (discussed in The Gulf Between East and West). That generates deep religious tensions in the Islamic world, compounded by a high proportion of the population who are young, restless, often unemployed, and have been brought up to believe the West is the ‘Great Satan’. (Sometimes our behaviour seems to confirm their prejudices.)

An invasion of Iraq could destabilise Saudi Arabia, and other more-pro-Western regimes. The religious fundamentalists who may follow them, could be much less co-operative about supplying oil to the rest of the world. Being of a frugal disposition, they do not have the same demand for international currency, and they certainly have no commitment to following the (Great Satan’s path of) liberalisation and modernisation that the Abdullahs of the Middle East cautiously pursue.

There are so many scenarios, so many possible outcomes, with consequences that are so varied that prediction is nigh on impossible. Meanwhile, each of the Sisters must fear that in the instability they could lose out, even if the Western oil companies win in total. While they may seem a cartel, they are happy to cut each other’s throat. Thus the geo-oil-logic does not seem to favour an invasion, although it would certainly like to settle with Hussein and open up Iraq.

We might even feel safer if US policy towards Iraq was driven by the logic of oil and the demands of the Seven Sisters. For sometimes it hard to hear any rationality in the US rhetoric. Perhaps we are not meant to be listening. Perhaps it is all for an American public whose international instincts are visceral and ill-informed rather than rational and knowledgeable. Of course there are some very capable foreign policy thinkers in the US. But the country is running up to its mid-term elections (November 5th) with a weakening domestic economy and the scandals of corporate corruption. The counsels of the wise and of the Sisters are hard to hear above the clamorous patriotism of scoundrels and bullies.

Listener Columns on Saudi Arabia I and Saudi Arabia II

The Reserve Bank & Related Issues: Index

In Stormy Seas sets out the theory and context (November 1997)

Monetary Policy
* = particularly about the exchange rate. Also an index at Exchange Rate

* The Hole in the Reserve Bank (April 1991)
* What the Reserve Bank Believes (February 1994)
* Who Controls the Exchange Rate? (February 1994)
* The Meaning of Influence (May 1994)
* Parity and Bust: Dollar for Dollar is Not A Good Deal (August 1995)
Governing the Governor (September 1996)
* Ups and Downs: Is The Reserve Bank Managing to Control the Exchange Rate? (September 1997)
Self-Interest Rates (May 2000)
Changing Policy Horses: Should the Economic Reforms be Intensified, or are New Policies in Order (October 2000)
* Inflation and Reputation: Did the Reserve Bank slow the economy down? (June 2002)
* Currency Appreciation (April 2004)
* Dealing with the Monetary Policy Trilemma (Sept 2004)
* Tackling the Exchange Rate (December 2005)
* The High Exchange Rate: What is the Government Doing? What Can it Do Further? (December 2005)

Monetary Unions
In dire straits (October 1996)
When Things Go Bump: Is Monetary Union a Help or a Hindrance? (June 1999)
The Experiences of Monetary Union (September 2000)
Going to the Wall (November 1996)
Waltzing with Matilda (September 2001)
Dont Cry for Us Argentina (February 2002)
Keeping the Australian Dollar at Bay (May 2002)

Measuring Inflation
Measuring Inflation (November 1994)
Measuring Inflation (January 2002)
How Representative of Inflation Are Changes in the CPI? (February 2003)

Some International Financial Issues
When Capital Flees: the Case for Exchange Controls is Not Out of this World (October 1998)
History Repeats: When Will Financial Markets Ever Learn? (November 1998)
The Casino Economy: Using Other People’s Money to Become a Millionaire (December 1998)
A Visit to Poyais (Review) (July 2003)
Yankee Dollar Blues: How Will the US Correct its External Deficit? (March 2005)
Avoiding Global Meltdown: How the IMF Lost Battles But Won the War (October 2005)

The Role of Money
The Pound: A Biography (Review) (February 2000)
Two Great Economists: Raymond Firth (1901-2002) & James Tobin (1918-2002) (January 2003)
For Fear of Allah (Sept 2004)

 

Tractatus Developmentalis Economica

How New Zealand Grows: Some Propositions

VERSION 3: Updated 9 December. Original 17 October.

The following propositions largely reflect my research program on the New Zealand economy. It is summarised in my In Stormy Seas. Page numbers in square brackets refer to that book.

There is additional material in the areas of globalisation, innovation, intra-industry trade, monetary policy, and workforce development. I have also updated New Zealand’s economic performance.

0. The Historic Context

0. New Zealand has grown at broadly the same rate as the rest of the OECD in the post-war era when it has not been subject to severe prolonged external shocks. [p.15-28; p.258-262]
0.1 Thus far the post-war New Zealand economy has shown no ability to grow at rate markedly faster than the rest of the OECD.
…. 0.1.1 The last time New Zealand did was in the decade from 1935 to 1945, where it grew at around 7 percent p.a., doubling output over the decade. No one has investigated how this happened.
0.2 There have been three periods in the post-war era when New Zealand has grown markedly slower than the OECD average. [p.15-28; 73-88; 231-248; 258-262]
…. 0.2.1 In the immediate post-war era to 1955 all OECD economies which were not ravaged by the war (not just New Zealand) grew more slowly than those that were recovering from the destruction.
…. 0.2.2 In the decade after 1967 New Zealand grew more slowly than the OECD. This may be attributed to a marked (and permanent)deterioration in the terms of trade – especially as a result of the fall in the price for cross-bred wool.
…. …. 0.2.2.1 In 1966 the export price of wool, which made up about two fifths of exports, fell about 40 percent. This reduction in the terms of trade has been broadly permanent, and was reinforced by milder deteriorations in the relative price of meat and dairy products. [p.73-88]
…. 0.2.3 The third poor relative growth performance was in the seven years from 1985. This can be attributed to the unusually high real exchange rate, which inhibited the growth of the tradeable sector.
…. …. 0.2.3.1 In the late 1980s and early 1990s the exchange rate was maintained at an overvalued level (exacerbating the withdrawal of export subsidies in the mid 1980s) as a central part of the disinflation strategy. [p.231-241; 258-262]
0.3 The two latter periods are characterised by poor profitability in the export sector.
0.4 In two thirds of the 47 years of the post war recovery, the underlying growth rate of GDP has been much the same – or perhaps slightly higher – than the OECD average. In one third of the period, when the New Zealand economy was subject to severe prolonged external shocks, the economy grew markedly slower.

1-3: Some Fundamental Propositions

1. Every economy is unique . While there is a general growth process it applies to each economy differently. [p.7-14]
1.1 The large, partially closed, US economy grows differently from the small open New Zealand one.
1.2 Too much of the New Zealand economic debate is based on the US experience.

2. Economic growth is about relative change as much as it is about aggregate increase: it is about different sectors growing at different rates, about new products and processes, not just more of old ones.
2.1. Some sectors will grow faster than others.
…. 2.1.1 The focus is on sectors because some businesses will grow faster than the sector average but others will grow slower.
2.2 A better expression than ‘growth’ for the medium and long term process of economic change is ‘development’
…. 2.2.1 Sectors will grow at different rates puts substantial stresses on the political and social system.
…. 2.2.2 Thus economic development requires political management.
…. 2.2.3 These is a danger that the political management will talk the rhetoric of development, but will practice policies which lead to stagnation because of the threat to stability that development poses.
…. …. 2.2.3.1 This was the greatest failure of Muldoon’s economic management regime.
…. 2.2.4 It seems likely that standard measures of economic growth underestimate the significance of quality change and variety expansion, and this lacuna flows into standard economic growth models.

3. The fast growth sectors in an small open economy such as New Zealand are mainly in the external sector . [p.73-88; 139-148]
3.1 There does not seem to be a lot of prospects for significant import substitution, and hence importable expansion.
3.2 Thus the economic growth rate for New Zealand depends upon the growth of exports, the exportable sector.
3.3 Because New Zealand is a small economy it can envisage rapid growth – even many stagnant international markets – by increasing its market share.
3.4 While the arithmetic says the export sector has to grow faster than the economy as a whole, it is also necessary because the rate of import penetration (the ratio of imports to GDP) tends to rise with affluence.
3.5 It would be helpful to have indicative quantitative projections of the potential of the key growth sector.

4-7: The Export Structure

4. Historically New Zealand’s export growth has been dependent upon the growth of commodity exports based on sophisticated (technologically innovative) production processes. [p.41-52]
4.1 The growth of most commodity exports are usually constrained by a biological or physical process.
…. 4.1.1 It seems likely that hydrocarbon energy based exports will decline in the next decade.
4.2 The maximum growth capacity of the commodity export sectors is probably below the economy wide growth rate that is thought desirable.
…. 4.2.1 The main exception is the ‘wall of wood’.

5. When New Zealand could no longer depend upon pastoral exports to sustain the tradeable sector growth rate it diversified to other commodities, to adding value to them, and to general manufactures and services.
5.1 In the long run these other commodities will be unable to sustain the export expansion that is desirable.
5.2 General manufactures and services are overly dependent upon relatively low cost structures.
…. 5.2.1 New Zealand’s success in general manufactures has been largely due to export markets in Australia (which is high cost by world standards). They will get undercut as Australia lowers its external protection and other cheaper countries enter the Australian market. [p.146, 257-259]
…. 5.2.2 The rise of China as an export manufacturer has the potentiality of further reinforcing the East Asian trend of undercutting high wage exporters and forcing them to move towards specialist high quality manufactures for their survival.
5.3 The value added strategy (of increased processing of commodity exports) has had some success, but needs to be progressed.
…. 5.3.1 The prescriptions below for ‘intra-industry trading’ apply to that part of the value added strategy which is not general manufacturing (i.e which primarily depends upon cost competitiveness of routine technologies). [p.144-7]

6. The new phenomenon in post-war international trade is intra-industry trade, that is the phenomenon where countries trade similar products.
6.1 Today about a quarter of world trade is in oil, a quarter is other commodities, a quarter is general and specialist manufactures to destinations which do not produce them, and a quarter is intra-industry trade.
…. 6.1.1 Intra-industry trade is the fastest growing of the four quarters.
6.2 New Zealand economic thinking has largely been around inter-industry trade, that is using pre-war economic models of comparative advantage to explain growth in which trade involves exchange of quite different products.
…. 6.2.1 I cannot recall an official report which uses the term ‘intra-industry trade’, even though the phenomenon has been burgeoning for fifty years and the notion has been in the economic literature for around twenty five years.
…. 6.2.2 Meanwhile, the rest of the affluent OECD has been growing via intra-industry trade.
…. 6.2.3 While New Zealand thinking has been trapped into the framework of a commodity exporter trading with other countries which make sophisticated manufactures and services.
…. 6.2.4 This restricted thinking has occurred even when New Zealand has talked about diversification.
…. 6.2.5 Basically New Zealand has pursued the comparative advantage model introduced by Ricardo, while the rest of the OECD has pursued a competitive advantage approach.
6.3 Intra-industry trade differs from inter-industry trade because it depends upon economies of scale and the falling cost of distance.
6.4 Trade between sophisticated economies is driven by intra-industry exchange.
6.5 Their intra-industry trade is based on technologically sophisticated and complex products.
…. 6.5.1 The sophistication includes high quality design and high standards of quality control.
6.6 That intra-industry traders are under competitive pressure in their domestic market from foreign businesses with which they are also competing in their export markets requires them to be highly innovative.
…. 6.6.1 The vigorous innovation in a tradeable sector based on intra-industry trade spills into domestic producers.
6.7 Intra-industry trade depends on ‘competitive advantage’ and not comparative advantage.
…. 6.7.1 Intra-industry trade explains how a firm like Nokia can have such a dominant role in the world economy despite being based in Finland, where there is no obvious comparative advantage for mobile phones.
…. 6.7.2 Unfortunately the theory cannot predict what will be the ‘Nokias’ in a country like New Zealand. The best advice it (and the Porter approach) offers is how not to stifle such developments.

7. In order to succeed the New Zealand economy is going to have to shift its trading structure so that it has a significant intra-industry trade component. [p.140-147]
7.1 The only economy with which New Zealand has mature intra-industry trade relationship is Australia.
7.2 With the exception of Australia, New Zealand has an immature trading relationship (in terms of intra-industry trade) with all other economies.
…. 7.2.1 There has been little shift towards maturity over the last two decades.
7.3 Outside concern with agricultural protection, New Zealand international trade thinking has tended to focus on its Australian trading relationship and to a lesser extent its US trading relationship, while ignoring the other two thirds of export markets – which are likely to become even more important in the future.
…. 7.3.1 About 30 percent of New Zealand’s exports go to Asia. Australia sends over 50 percent.
…. 7.3.2 Has New Zealand almost entirely abandoned the European market as a growth prospect? It will shortly be the largest single market in the world and is New Zealand’s second largest trade partner (a point disguised by our usually recording the data by individual European country).
…. ….. 7.3.2.1 In the June 2001 Australia took 19.5 percent of New Zealand merchandise exports, and the EU took 17.5 percent, followed by US 14.5 percent, japan 13.9 percent, and China (including Hong Kong) 6.1 percent. (The UK was 4.9 percent.)
7.4 The biggest single trade gain would be from a substantial reduction in world protection, especially of agricultural commodities.
…. 7.4.1 The resulting terms of trade gain would favour a return to an inter-industry trade strategy.
…. 7.4.2 Quick and substantial reductions in international agricultural protection are unlikely.
…. 7.4.3 Even so New Zealand should still keep pressing for reduced protection, while it adopts the realistic strategy that they wont happen soon.
7.5 The test of the success of the government’s structural transformation goal and its growth and innovation framework will be most evident (and most measurable) in the growth of a significant intra-industry trade sector.
7.6 Much of the value adding to commodities will involve intra-industry trade, or akin to it.

8-15: The Supplyside

8. The institutional framework – the national legal and corporate governance – of New Zealand is of high quality.
8.1 Of course it can be improved, but there does not seem to be any major deficiencies.
8.2 New Zealand has a robust efficient tax structure, and there is no evidence that its levels are so high as to inhibit growth.
…. 8.2.1 The effect of the average tax level determines the balance between available public and private goods, rather than the rate of economic growth.

9. New Zealand seemed to be relatively deficient in regard to capital compared to other OECD economies, and seems to use it relatively inefficiently. [p.200-203]
9.1. The capital shortage may reflect no more than New Zealand’s low level of production relative to the OECD average.
…. 9.1.1 International comparisons are difficult and must be done at the sectoral level.
…. 9.1.2 Some reforms of the 1980s should have improved the efficiency of the application of capital, although various statistical effects would obscure this for at least a decade.
9.2 There has been no recent updating investigation of the apparently high capital to output ratios of the post-war era.

10 An important contribution to economic capacity is infrastructure.
10.1 The role of infrastructure implies that there are externalities (non-market interactions) in the growth process.
10.2 Infrastructure has a wide meaning in this context, ranging from the engineering structures (which may be publicly or privately owned), through the skills of the work force and the institutions which create them and the research and development (or innovation) system, to a range of social institutions such as law, measurement, accounting, and the integrity of the public service.
10.3 Because the last two decades have focussed almost exclusively on market mechanisms, New Zealand has tended to under-invest in infrastructure.

11. It is not been to quantify the quality changes in the post-war labour supply (because of data problems). [p.193-200]
11.1 There is some evidence that there has been a dilution from less-market valued labour increasing faster than more-market valued labour.
11.2 The current educational performance meausures place New Zealand 15 year olds near the top of the OECD.
11.3 New Zealand adults (i.e. the population as a whole) are reported to be in the middle of the OECD on literacy measures. However this may reflect some survey response problems, and New Zealand adult literacy is probably in the top half of the OECD.
11.4 The New Zealand workforce appears to be above the OECD average in terms of formal vocational training. However, New Zealand has a lower proportion of high level qualifications (such as degrees), and it appears that the proportion with a formal qualification has deteriorated in recent decades.

12. Innovation (some of which is technological innovation and some social and organisational) is at the heart of a successful intra-industry trade development strategy. [p.203-208]
12.1 Innovation is a pervasive phenomenon and does not only occur in laboratories and head offices.
…. 12.1.1 Twenty percent of patents are taken out by people who are close to the workshop floor.
…. 12.1.2 The statistic is all the more astonishing since most workers involved in the innovation process do not take out patents. They just do it.
12.2 New Zealand has tended to follow the British tradition of an elitist innovation strategy.
…. 12.2.1 This approach pervades management and has resulted in a workforce which is unskilled in comparison to some of New Zealand’s competitors.
…. 12.2.2 The greatest exception is the farm sector, where farmers are proven innovators.
…. 12.2.3 A quality workforce and environment will attract overseas capital and its associated technology – as occurred for Ireland.
…. 12.2.4 In a democracy the elitism threatens innovation insofar as the public is likely to resist novel innovation opportunities because it does not trust (or understand) the relevant science.
12.3 The innovation problem is not to generate innovation but to transmit it. Once there is a a good transmission process underway, upstream innovation in the right places will largely follow.
…. 12.3.1 We have immensely improved the transmission of innovation from the research centres (CRIs and Universities) to business in the last decade.
…. 12.3.2 The transmission of innovation from the business to the shop floor still seems inadequate.
12.4 The research suggests that OECD economies with below average per capita output tend to grow more rapidly than those with above average per capita output. [p.207-8]
…. 12.4.1 This ‘convergence’ is not strong, but it favours New Zealand insofar we are currently below average.
…. 12.4.2 The most likely explanation for the convergence effect is that it is easier to import developing technologies than develop them.
…. 12.4.3 To do this there has to be a capacity to import and apply the new technologies. That involves an increasing sophisticated level of domestic technological competence. Practically, that means New Zealand has to maintain an internationally first rate domestic technological capacity.
…. 12.4.4 Thus while New Zealand is likely to be a net importer of technology, to succeed it will have to be an exporter of technology in its own right.
…. 12.4.5 Additionally, New Zealand has to maintain a considerable technological capacity to transform its particular domestic resources (such as radiata pine, milk based products, sheep meat based products, crossbred wool, fish …).

13. Innovation contributes to productivity growth which is obtaining the maximum output from the available inputs. [p.203-208]
13.1 New Zealand has a poor to average post-war growth productivity record.
…. 13.1.1 We know this as an arithmetical fact. We know little about why.
…. 13.1.2 One contributing factor seems to be that we may be under-measuring output growth from insufficiently allowing for quality change and variety expansion.
…. 13.1.3 New Zealand’s post-war growth record has been more about increasing the labour and capital available than of using the factors much more efficiently.
13.2 Productivity is deeply involved with processes which occur at the level of the shop floor.
13.3 Productivity gains in the domestic sector are important insofar as they release inputs for the tradeable sector to expand.
…. 13.3.1 Thus the redevelopment of the textile clothing and footwear industry is vital for the growth strategy in that it can join the export sector, and its productivity improvements releases inputs to other sectors.
13.4 International comparisons and comparisons over time show that the New Zealand service sector has a poor productivity performance. [p.205, 281-284]
…. 13.4.1 This seems likely to be in part – and possibly entirely – due to measurement error.

14. New Zealanders see distance as an export disadvantage. But the costs of distance are coming down, for that is what globalisation is about.
14.1 The costs of distance may limit what New Zealand can export. As they decline the limitations decline too.
14.2 New Zealand’s economic prospects involve opportunities where the costs of distance are falling, are least unfavourable or even favourable (such as season differences, time differences or where isolation and security is significant).
…. 14.2.1 While New Zealand’s resource base offers important prospects, the falling costs of distance threatens the added value strategy, since it is also increasingly less costly to ship the raw product offshore and process overseas.
14.3 Clusters of excellence are important.
…. 14.3.1 The role of clusters implies that there are externalities (non-market interactions) in the growth process.
…. 14.3.2 The domestic sector also contributes to innovation by providing quality inputs (at low cost) to exporters.
…. 14.3.3 While in the past clusters were seen to have a geographic proximity, under increasing globalisation some future clusters will be highly dispersed, and even involve cross country arrangements.

15. New Zealand is a small economy, which both limits it and offers it opportunities.
15.1 While greater size would provide some advantages, the international research shows that high population growth slows per capita output growth.
…. 15.1.1 The probable reason for this is it dilutes the available capital.
…. 15.1.2 Rapid increases in population size from high general migration will not increase per capita GDP in the short to medium run.
…. 15.1.3 However population increases from selective migration has the potential to accelerate innovation growth by adding to scarce resources such as knowledge, skills and capital.
…. 15.1.4. There are social and political reasons for immigration, even if they diminish (possibly only slightly) the per capita economic growth rate.
…. 15.1.5 It is possible that New Zealand, like much of the Western World, will use immigration of young people as a part of the long term resolution of the otherwise ageing population.
15.2 New Zealand’s small size gives it a political and special coherence, which can be a considerable economic advantage if it is used effectively.

16-20. Macro-management of Growth

16. In a modern market driven economy returns on the factors of production are critical – especially on capital, intellectual property and labour skills.
16.1 In a globalised world almost scarce valuable factors are mobile.
16.2 Economic policy has to take into consideration the absolute and relative prices of factors.

17. Because the performance of the tradeable sector in a small open economy is central to the economy’s growth prospects, the return to the factors in the tradeable sector is crucial. In particular its rate of profit is closely (but inversely) linked to the real exchange rate. [p.231-241]
17.1 The real exchange rate is related to ‘competitiveness policy’ defined by the OECD as ‘supporting the ability of companies, industries, regions, nations or supranational regions to generate, while being and remaining exposed to international competition, relatively high factor incomes and factor employment levels on a sustainable basis.’
17.2 A high real exchange rate mean a low return (low profitability) to exporting and a consequently poor export performance.
17.3 The overvalued real exchange rate in the late 1980s and early 1990s was the single most important reason for the poor economic performance of the period.
17.4 The level of the real exchange rate is greatly affected by the nominal exchange rate and the wage path.

18. The nominal exchange rate has been used as an instrument of monetary policy to control inflation. [p.98-103; 226-238]
18.1 The control of inflation should not be so dependent upon a high nominal (and real) exchange rate, the wage path and fiscal policy have to contribute.
…. 18.1.1. The notion that each policy instrument is assigned solely to a single policy objective is a simplification for teaching. It depends upon particular assumptions about how the economy functions, which do not apply in practice.
18.2 An sustainable aggressive real exchange rate which makes exporting profitable requires a surplus in the current account of the balance of payments which is arithmetically equal to a surplus in net domestic savings.
…. 18.2.1 Since private sector savings have been weak (in the household sector) or average (in the business sector), a surplus on net domestic savings requires a (fiscal) surplus on the government account.
18.3 A macro-economic strategy which uses the exchange rate to control inflation is inimical to economic growth.

19. The wage path sets one of the most important prices. [p.89-106]
19.1 In a globalised world there is a tendency for margins of skills to open up, especially as skilled workers are more internationally mobile than unskilled workers.
19.2 One partial resolution to the consequence of this tendency is to upskill the labour force.
19.3 A second partial resolution is to pay attention to the social wage, that is the market wage less tax, plus the social benefits which arise from government spending.
19.4 This setting of the wage path in the context of the social wage is a central element of any social compact.
19.5 The social wage needs to be designed to favour internationally mobile labour which stays in New Zealand.

20. A key element of the economic growth rate in the past has been long peaks in the business cycle. [p.107-122]
20.1 A macro-economic strategy which restrains the business cycle peak because it threatens inflations therefore compromises the growth process.
…. 20.1.1 Conversely it behoves others involved in macro-economic settings to participate in the restraint of inflation, so that monetary policy does not have to cut off the business cycle peak unnecessarily early.
…. 20.1.2 Business cycle management requires a disciplined approach to fiscal management.
…. …. 20.1.2.1 Counter-cyclical fiscal management is difficult but has a role to play if the managers are competent enough.

21-22. Social Epilogue

21. The task is about transforming the economy.
21.1 In fact an economy is always transforming. At issue is trhe amount of control New Zealands have, and can have, over the transformation.
21.2 Any economic transformation impacts on politics and society.
22. Whatever the growth strategy it has to be integrated with sustainability and improving the quality of life of New Zealanders. That will be the focus of Tractatus Developmentalis Socia [p.263-280]
22.1 The social wage has an important role in the quality of life.

New Zealand’s Economic Performance (index)

The base references is the book In Stormy Seas. (1997) An extract is Capital and Technological Change: Some International Comparisons.

In early 2004 I updated much of In Stormy Seas in a long paper The Development of the New Zealand Economy. There is also a short version of the paper.

A summary of the policies which flow on from the paper is Tractatus Developmentalis Economica. (October 2002)

The following papers update of the growth performance material in In Stormy Seas.
New Zealand’s Post-war GDP. Chapter of Transforming New Zealand, with Appendices. (June 2003)
New Zealand’s Post-war Economic Growth Performance; Comparison with the OECD. (August 2002)
Productivity and Employment: New Zealand’s Post-war Economic Growth Performance (Version II). (May 2003) Version I. (August 2002)
Comparison with Australia
Measuring New Zealand’s Economic Activity. (July 1999)
The Deindustrialization of New Zealand. (November 1998)

The following Listener columns discuss various aspects of the growth performance.
Busting Booms: Unrealistic Growth Targets Could Sink Us Again (March 2003)
Rank and Relativity: Where are we – and where were we – among the OECD economies? (September 2002)
They’re Thinking Big Again: What is Wrong with Foreign Investment (March 2002)
Of Roast Pork: Treasury Debates the Economy (March 2002)
Twenty to Ten: The Emptiness of the Latest Economic Slogan (July 2001)
Productivity Puzzles (September 1998)
Swing Low: A Short Economic History of New Zealand (August 1998)
The End of the Golden Wether(December 1996)
Productivity Puzzle (July 1996)
Slow Growing (December 1994)
Comparison with Australia (April 1994)
Comparison with OECD (March 1994)
Some Hope (January 1981)
1966 and All That (May 1979)

 

Money Well Spent

Review of The Ends and Means of Welfare: Coping with Economic and Social Change in Australia by Peter Saunders (Cambridge University Press, 2002).

Listener 12 October, 2002.

Keywords: Social Policy;

The dispute over the economic reforms of the late 1980s and early 1990s involved two distinct questions. The first was whether they would work. As it happened our reforms were so incompetently managed that their economics failed miserably. But second, had they succeeded, would New Zealanders have liked their outcomes? Similar reforms in Australia, implemented with less ideological fervour and more common sense, resulted in their economy growing slightly faster than the OECD. Had the New Zealand economy succeeded from 1987 like Australian one, it would have grown 1.3 percent a year faster, and it would be in the top 10 of OECD economies.

But did Australia’s economic success also prove a social success? The Ends and Means of Welfare provides a meticulous research-based analysis of the question. Written by Peter Saunders, the widely respected professor of economics and director of the Social Policy Research Centre at the University of New South Wales (who should not be confused with his namesake who was toured by the Business Roundtable recently), the book answers‘probably not’.

Income inequality has been rising. Australia is 16th most unequal of the 21 countries in the Luxembourg Income Study (New Zealand is not a member) and its inequality has risen about average Moreover unemployment was higher in Australia than the OECD in the 1990s. It averaged 9 percent through much of its rapid growth 1990s, and still sits near 6.5 percent, whereas New Zealand’s is closing in on 5 percent. This is partly because Australia has a higher proportion of the population in the workforce. Its prosperity encourages more to look for work.

The book also points out that Australia’s government spending is relatively low by OECD standards. Some would argue this contributed to economic growth, but Saunders is one of a many economists whose research suggests any effect of higher spending is tiny (and even possibly beneficial).

Perhaps it is not surprising that there is much discontent in Australia despite the economic growth. There is considerable financial distress. A report from the government Productivity Commission suggests that ‘quality of life issues … concern a large section of the community.’ Saunders observes ‘what is most striking [from the surveys of happiness and satisfaction with living standards] is the sharp increase in dissatisfaction between 1995 and 1999 – a period in which economic growth was delivering rising real incomes to most Australians.’

The New Zealand reader is left pondering on the relevance of the Australian experience. Adopting the pragmatic more-market economic policy stance that Australia has done, and which the current New Zealand government broadly supports, may stimulate economic growth, but it seems that by itself it will not necessarily promote community welfare. Saunders would probably commend our higher spending on social welfare, but from his discussions of poverty, inequality, social inclusion, and the welfare state, he will not think that enough.

The good news is the book’s evidence against international social policy ‘convergence’, the theory that in a globalised world all countries will be forced to cut taxation and spending to a minimum. Since the level of government spending affects the composition and quality of output, and to whom it is distributed, The Ends and Means of Welfare may convince all but the most prejudiced that there is a strong case for active – but carefully designed – social policy interventions. This is a book which most New Zealanders may hope that the government and its advisers will soon read and take to heart.

Economists & Philosophers: Index

This is not complete. Use the search facility. The list has only major references to the individuals named.

Bernard Ashwin
The Experiences of Monetary Union (March 1996)
Treasury Man: Bernard Carl Ashwin, Secretary to the Nation Building State (October 1996)
Bernard Ashwin: Secretary to the Nationbuilding State (November 1997)
Dictionary of New Zealand Biography (October 1998)
The Nationbuilders Chapter 2 (November 2001)
The Treasury and the Nationbuilding State (December 2001)
Treasury Review (November 2003)

Raymond Firth
Riches without Wealth (November 1979)
Two Great Economists: Raymond Firth (1901-2002) & James Tobin (1918-2002) (January 2003)

Milton Friedman
Free to Choose by Milton and Rose Friedman Review (May 1981)

Bruce Jesson
Bruce Jesson: 1944-1999
in The Nationbuilders (November 2001)
His Purpose is Clear: Reflecting a Life of Thought and Experience (February 1999)
Global Warning: What would have Bruce Jesson have said about APEC (September 1999)
Nationbuilding and the Textured Society (Bruce Jesson Memorial Lecture, October 2001)

John Maynard Keynes (and Keynesianism)
All the Keynes Men (May 1991)
The Wit and Wisdom of Keynes (August 2001)

Karl Marx
Marks of Change (May 1990)
A Pantheon of Seven …. (March 2000)

Claudio Michelini

John Stuart Mill
Of Pigs and People (January 1993)
Government Spending and Growth Rates (January 2002)
Why Economists Dont Understand Education (August 2002)

Rob Muldoon
Muldoon’s Mark (September 2000)
His Way (December 2000)
(Holyoake’s) Two Economic Lieutenants (April 2001)
The Nationbuilders Chapter 15 (November 2001)

Henry Lang
Regarding Henry (May 1987)
The Nationbuilders Chapter 16 (November 2001)

Bryan Philpott
Curiouser and Curiouser (January 1994)
The Model Economist (August 2000)
The Nationbuilders Chapter 13 (November 2001)

Robert Reich
All for One: Robert Reich’s Recipe Living in a Globalized World (July 1998)

Wolfgang Rosenberg
Review of New Zealand Can Be Different and Better (December 1993)
A Wolf in Lion’s Clothing (January 1994)

Joseph Schumpeter
The Year of the Paper Tiger: Asia is in Economic As Well As Financial Crisis (February 1998)

Amartya Sen
In the Midst of Plenty (December 1985)
Some Auld Acquaintances (December 1998)
Development as Freedom (November 1999)
Being and Doing (January 2001)
Why Economists Dont Understand Education (August 2002)

Joseph Stiglitz
In Stormy Seas: Can We Cope When a Wave Broadsides Our Economy? (July 1998)
The Whimpering of the State: Policy After MMP (July 1999), pp. v, 98-99, 102.
Rethinking Economic Policy: The Washington Consensus Turns to Custard (July 1999).
Does the IMF Work? In Another Great Depression the Answer Be No (October 1990)
A Little More Than Kin: Petty Politics and External Threats (May 2001)
Nationbuilding and the Textured Society (November 2001)
Peaches, Lemons, and Elephants: the 2001 Nobel Economics Prize (December 2001)
The Washington Consensus, The: When Facts Get in the Way of Economic Orthodoxies (February 2003)
Globalisation and Its Discontents (Review) (August 2003)

Bill Sutch


James Tobin
Two Great Economists: Raymond Firth (1901-2002) & James Tobin (1918-2002) (January 2003)

The Millennium Depression?

A Listener Sequence

This note prepared in the first week of October 2002. Since then I have published the following columns on the state of the world economy:
The Bubble Bursts: A “Millennium Depression”? (2 November 2002)
Deflating News: Just How Sick is the World Economy? (28 June 2003)
Recovery and Deficit: Where is the US Economy Going? (February 2004)

Keywords: Macroeconomics & Money;

Towards the end of the 1990s I became increasingly concerned that the US boom was not only unsustainable, but the reversal would lead to a severe recession or even a depression. In the early 2000, I wrote in a column Self -interest Rates (27 May 2000) which said
“Any monetary authority in an economy which has its share values so dangerously out of line with reality as in the US, cannot be given a top grade. History will be less generous with Greenspan’s reputation, after the millennium depression.”
With hindsight it reads as a bon mot, but it was almost certainly a careful – if gloomy – judgement following a trip overseas. The following is a commentary on the Listener columns which addressed the world economy since then. It was written in preparation for my planned column of 2 November 2002, probably entitled Will There Be Another World Depression?.

It may be useful to provide a bit of background about the columns. They are usually planned at least four weeks before the ‘publication’ date, and filed about three weeks before. But since The Listener is available almost a week before the publication date or only two weeks after filing. (This time cycle is largely my choice. In principle I could file almost a week later, and sometimes I arrange a late filing.) I try not to be too obsessive, so that while over time a series of columns develops around a theme, it is unusual for three columns in a row to be on the same theme. So even if I am very worried about some economic problem, I try not to assault the reader with repetition, and will hang on until I have a new angle on a topic. Moreover, my analysis develops over time. One of the reasons I am doing this review is to trace its evolution in the case of ‘the millennium depression’. [Added later. It was in fact published as The Bubble Bursts: A “Millennium Depression”? on 2 November 2002.

Note this is not all the macroeconomic columns over the 30 month period. Those focused almost solely on New Zealand are omitted. (Use a search with ‘Macroeconomics & Money’ to find them.)

Actually although the May 27 column is the first in which I mention the ‘millennium depression’, I had set some of the key notions up a fortnight earlier with Delayed Impact (13 May 2000) which describes the underlying mechanisms of a financial boom. I don’t know whether it worked. I worry that most of my readers find even this simple arithmetic a bit of a struggle. It is not they cant do it, but the mixing of calculations in text is always problematic. On the other hand I continually seek simple illustrations to set out the comple analytical models which underpin so many of my columns.

Five months after Self -interest Rates I wrote Does the IMF Work? (28 October 2000) which is still hinting about the possibility of a serious recession. The following column Private (Debt) Worries (11 November 2000) reflects on the possibility of an external debt crisis for New Zealand. (It will be a private debt crisis – the government balance sheet is currently very strong by historical and international standards).

However in March 2001 my fears ‘out’. Bursting Out (31 March) discusses the
“vigorous debate about the current US economy downturn. In the jargon the question is whether it will be a V, U or L – the second half of each letter indicating a quick rebound a slow rebound, or a drawn out depression. It is noticeable that informed opinion is moving towards the more pessimistic end of the possibilities, although most commentators currently reckon on the U rather than the L.”

Perhaps I was slightly misleading. The Economist recently remarked that about 95 percent of commentators were still very optimistic at this time. I should really have said there was a debate among informed overseas commentators. As I have had on occasion to comment, such as in Self-interest Rates, most commentators in New Zealand are unreliable, either because it is they are being paid to talk the market up, or because they are uncritically reporting the unreliable. I regularly read commentators – in overseas periodicals I subscribe to, and also friends pass on major Northern Hemisphere dailies they read via the net – who are of a much higher quality than the conventional wisdom. They use analytical models rather than ideology, grounding them in facts rather than wishful thinking, and have a sense of history rather than ignoring it. Moreover, they are usually cautiously trying to understand the situation, rather than imposing some ideological or client model – all characteristics I admire and try to imitate.

Eighteen months later I am remained pleased with two features of this column. First for its focus on the analysis of Joseph Schumpeter, an economist I much admire. Second, for its identification of the balance sheet problem. While the problem was, obvious a year later it was not then. But I had been through the trauma of the 1986-7 New Zealand boom and bust, an experience which has given me insights that even some of the best informed overseas commentators did not have. Our boom and bust, is a sort of precursor of the US one a decade later, although we do not have the saving grace of a major technological driver.

Six weeks after, returning from an overseas trip, I returned to the balance sheet problem in a recession, illustrating it with some Japanese examples in A Little More Than Kin (12 May 2001). Informed commentators worry about Japan because it has had ten years of severe recession. There is a continual concern that its experience foreshadows the US one. (The standard article compares all the commonalities of America today and Japan a decade ago, finds one feeble difference, and ends up ironically saying ‘it couldn’t happen here could it?’) The Japanese sharemarket boom was in the 1980s, resulting in overvalued assets, non-performing debts, and rort balance sheets. Almost every economic policy has failed to correct this misbalance. Almost every column I mention below is informed by the Japanese experience, even when it is not explicitly mentioned. My column of 2 November 2002 addresses why these policies did not work, although there are hints in the columns between.

(Incidentally, Shakespeare scholars tell me that the Richard Brattigan interpretation of Hamlet with which I begin the column is not anywhere in Shakespeare’s script.)

I remained anxious. A month later I touch on the recession themes again in A Surplus of Imitation (June 9 2001). Actually, the column is about two other domestic matters – our uncritical adoption of American thinking, and the need to prepare fiscal policy on the domestic front– but I use the US recession issue to discuss it. Note I am thinking here that the US needs a fiscal stimulus. While I underestimated the ease with which Bush would get one, I also underestimated its ineffectiveness, for reasons I explain in the 2 November column.

My Going Down (20 October, 2001) is my 9/11 column (everyone had to write one). It progresses the argument a little, but it is also about the silliness of the conventional wisdom which thought the terrorist attack would have major impact on the world economy. Have you noticed how they rush from fashionable explanation to fashionable explanation, while the informed commentators have a medium term view of an unfolding drama?

I have included in the list Corporate Crossfire (3 November, 2001) which reviews a book about a New Zealand company collapse I had been intending to do for ages. (I always have a queue of columns.) It is not only to admire the book – Catherine Handleys’ Receiving Orders– but to explain to my readers about the theory of company balance sheets and corporate collapses using a local example.

For a similar reason I have included Hubris of Managers (17 November, 2001) which is about corporate takeovers going bad. Again general principles illustrated by New Zealand examples.

A fortnight later, back to the world recession in Gloomy Days: What if Japan and the US stagnate? (1 December, 2001) – the title is a pun on the film “Gloomy Sunday” which I had just seen. The progress is attention to balance sheet difficulties in a couple of industries (one must still be deeply worried about the balance sheets of the telecom countries). The remark about the Bush tax cuts is almost prescient – certainly it sets up the 2 November 2002 column.

There is an error when I predict that the US would learn it would be in recession in a month. In fact the ‘official’ announcement occurred in the week of the column’s publication. (Bother.) The announcement placed the recession’s beginning in March 2001 – six months earlier. One of the US conventional wisdom commentators on learning this, said that by then (December 2001) the US was recovering from the recession. (Not, you understand, that they had identified the recession earlier.) The point is their employers and clients are so desperately needing an expansion, that they believe it must happen.

Don’t Cry for US Argentina (9 February, 2002) – the first ‘heavy’ column of the new year – is only about a minor player in the world difficulties, but its lessons are instructive and relevant. Moreover there are third world countries struggling, while the first world fails.

Now I admit that despite my earlier premonitions of poor quality corporate balance sheets, I was nevertheless overwhelmed by the mendacity of the Enron accounting. Perhaps if I had known more accounting theory I would have guessed, but … Anyway, I report it in Guard Dogs That Fail To Bark (6 April 2002). It is integral to my analysis that the current financial troubles are about balance sheet problems – about stocks not flows. That is why Schumpeter is more relevant than John Maynard Keynes this downturn. Unfortunately economic accounts of depressions tend to focus on incomes, expenditures and flows, rather than assets and liabilities – partly because that is all the data we have.

I returned to the theme in Corporate Chaos (27 July 2002). The model I am using in which C→M→C* transforms into M→FP→M+ is founded on some notions of Karl Marx in Das Capital and also underpins Karl Polanyi’s The Great Transformation. It is discussed in In Stormy Seas p.244), but I have added – this is the new breakthrough – that it also requires M→FP→M- somewhere else in the system.

So a fortnight later we have Balance of Power: Are Double-dipping US Corporations Symptoms of a Double-dipper World Recession? (10 August 2002). In the short time between when I wrote the column and when it was published, sentiment among the informed definitely moved towards the notion that the US was in a double-dipper recession. So I could not believe it, when on the day I got my Listener with this column I opened up my daily paper to find its business pages led, under the byline of the business editor, with ‘World Recovery On The Way Soon’, quoting various fund managers (including that of AMP Henderson, a fund that has not done too well since). Dominion Post (5 August, 2002).

Perhaps I should add that I am still cautious as to whether there is a double-dipper recession, that is a downswing followed by a weak recovery, and then another plunge. They are very hard to read, even with hindsight (as in the case of the mid 1970s New Zealand downswing, which was probably a double-dipper). The argument for the double-dipper is that the Bush tax cuts lifted the US economy in late 2001 but not in a sustainable way. The possibility is there was not even a lift.

Incidentally, recall in March 2001 I set out the options for the recession as U, V. and L. Some people describe the double-dipper as a W pronounced ‘Dub-yah’.

That is the last column I have written before the November 2002 one. This note is a part of the preparation of writing it. I add that having finished the draft of the column, I opened up my emails to read three further articles which were as gloomy – or gloomier – than my assessment. (Incidentally it is beginning to look that my hopes in the above columns that the European economy could stabilise the world one, may be too optimistic. They may have caught the disease from the US.)

P.S. My analysis does not pay a lot of attention to share prices, other than as they impact on investor’s balance sheets. The reason we spend so much time looking at them is that they are available almost instantly, and there is a vigorous industry which is dependent upon share transactions, and whose ‘analysts’ are funded to be expert on share prices and talk the market up.

The column that comes out of this is The Bubble Bursts published on 2 November, 2002.

After I wrote the above, I came across even earlier columns discussing the phenomenon:
The Year of the Paper Tiger: Asia is in Economic As Well As Financial Crisis (February 1998)
That Sinking Feeling: On Track to Contraction? (May 1998)
In Stormy Seas: Can We Cope When A Wave Broadsides Our Economy? (July 1998);
Intrigue and Deep Recession: Something Rotten in the State of the Economy? (September 1998);
History Repeats: When Will Financial Markets Ever Learn? (November 1998);

History Repeats (November 1998);
The Casino Economy (December 1998).

Super-fertile Research: How Farmers and Scientists Innovate.

Listener 5 October, 2002.

Keywords: Growth & Innovation;

Thirty odd years ago a Banks Peninsular farmer noticed a ewe who produced 33 lambs in 11 years. Subsequently A281, as she became inelegantly called, was handed over to the Invermay branch of what is now AgResearch, one of the Crown Research Institutes. Painstaking research by a team of New Zealand scientists determined A281 had a gene on her X chromosome which caused high fertility. But it was not until the late 1990s (with help of a Finnish scientist) they identified BMP15, usually called the ‘Inverdale’ gene, which differs from the standard gene by one neutral protein sequence being replaced by an acid protein in the DNA.

The Inverdale gene elevates a sheep’s fertility by about 60 percent, enabling farmers to reduce their livestock over winter when there is a shortage of feed, but still have plenty of lambs in spring when the grass grows. (Over ten years the national flock of breeding ewes decreased 22 percent, but scientific innovations – and informed farmers’ application of them – resulted in higher lambing rates and great lamb weights, so the meat available increased by 14 percent.)

While in principle it is possible to patent a gene, it is often difficult to keep the new knowledge from being exploited by others without payment. What about keeping it a secret? But science involves international interchange, and in any case an Inverdale sheep could be smuggled out of the country. (One means of discouraging smuggling is AgResearch’s commercial arm, Celentis, promotes stud rams with the gene on their sole X chromosome, in Australia and Europe.) Or foreigners could engineer the gene. (However the Inverdale story is not about GE, but selective breeding, something mankind has been practising for thousands of year. The phenomenon is explicitly mentioned in Genesis when Jacob selects his flock.)

Fortunately, the scientists also identified a patentable test which tells whether a sheep has Inverdale genes. Since it speeds up the selective breeding, it is commercially valuable. That a ewe with two Inverdale genes is infertile, further enhances the test’s value.

Eventually the gene will be bred into as many sheep as possible (unless some better super-fertility gene is found), at which point the test will be less valuable, and the return of the gene to farmers will be near zero, as meat prices fall. But in the interim, and that could be a long one, New Zealand science will benefit from the royalties on the test and the stud rams. Meanwhile prices will be higher than the long run equilibrium, and New Zealand farmers with the more fertile sheep will benefit from their innovative edge. (If the increased productivity means the price of lamb falls relative to the price of other meats, farmers will also benefit from the increased sales of lamb.)

Which illustrates a common truth. The competitive mechanism pressures firms to innovate in order to survive, but in the long run it is the consumers who benefit – from lower prices and better products. But our farmers would be worse off if the Inverdale gene had been developed overseas and their foreign competitors got it first.

Because the mammalian gene codes are similar, knowing the location of the fertility genes from the human genome project, speeded up the identification of BMP15. Hence New Zealand was a beneficiary of overseas research it did not fund – but that was because we were funding research which involves our scientists working in an international community. Conversely, since most of our lamb is bought by overseas consumers, the very long run beneficiaries of our research will be mainly foreigners.

Perhaps BMP15 has relevance to human fertility. It is not a matter of replacing the existing gene in a woman who wants to super-ovulate. (The idea is ludicrous, but I heard a journalist make a parallel suggestion.) Genes design organs which trigger hormones. Apparently the Inverdale sterilizing effect takes place after the fifth division of the cells surrounding the maturing egg in the ovary, rather than the twelfth which the current oral contraceptives affect. It is possible that the double BMP15 could lead to a new class of oral contraceptives. However, the notion is so revolutionary that every pharmaceutical company in the world will be after it, and New Zealand cannot afford to defend any patents by itself. AgResearch has teamed up with the New Zealand company Ovita, which arose out of the Meat and Wool Boards, and a consortium of international scientists and companies to advance the original discovery and defend the intellectual property. .

This column shows how farm innovation depends on ordinary farmers; how science is still exciting; how quality research involves team work, international cooperation, and open communication; how it is not always possible to commercialise useful research, but sometimes – almost by accident – it is; how the benefits of research eventually go to consumers, but there is still the scientific and commercial pressure on firms to be there first; and how as a nation we need to understand the underlying biology and the overlying economics. If the populace is ignorant, public policy formation and economic growth is going to suffer.

Tobacco Issues: Index

The Social Costs of Tobacco Use
Up in Smoke (March 1998)
The Social Costs of Tobacco Use and Alcohol Misuse (April 1997)
Up in Smoke, Down the Drain: How Tobacco Use and Alcohol Abuse Cost Us $39b (June 1997)
Economy of Substance: What We Can and Can’t Measure. (April 2001)
International Guidelines for Estimating the Costs of Substance Abuse: (2 ed) (August 2001)

The Regulation of Tobacco Use
Economic Instruments for the Regulation of Licit Drugs (November 1991)
The Economic Regulation of Tobacco Consumption in New Zealand (February 1998)
Eliminating the Tobacco Epidemic the New Zealand Experience (March 2000)

Social and History
The Gulf Between East and West (April 2000)

Rank and Relativity: Where Are We – and Were We – Among the OECD Economies?

Listener 21 September 2002.

Keywords: Growth & Innovation;

People keep going on about our low relative performance in the OECD. How bad is it?
We are 20th of the 28 countries in the OECD measure of output per capita. About 86 percent of the OECD average.

Is output per capita a good measure?
Statisticians value all the production in different countries’ GDP (Gross Domestic Product) in the same prices, and divide by the population. But GDP is not a perfect measure of overall national performance. It’s the best we have.

Have we always been so low?
In 1962 we were 5th in the OECD. Our GDP per capita was 129 percent of the OECD average. So we have fallen 15 places, and our relativity has fallen by a third (from 129 percent to 86 percent) in the forty years. .

What about before then?
The OECD data only goes back to 1950. We were fifth then too.

So after 1962 it has been one long retreat as countries have steadily passed us.?
Not quite. Most of the OECD countries passed us between 1962 and 1980 when we were 19th. The only country to have passed us since was Ireland, in 1996.

Isnt that because it is a sort of race , in which we were plodding along slowly, and the bunch passed us?
The record shows that sometimes we plodded very slowly, sometimes we went as fast as the OECD, for quite a while.

How come? Everyone seems to say that we have been in a steady decline?
Rather than look at the data, they advocate policies which dont have much to do with why the relative decline happened.

What actually happened?
There was a mild tendency for the New Zealand economy to grow slower than the rest of the OECD in the early post-war period (after adjusting for war recovery). It was probably due to our population growing faster than average, and the ‘convergence effect’ where above-average countries tend to grow slower than below-average ones. There is also some evidence that we may be under-estimating our growth rate. But these effects were small. The first big decline happened from 1967.

So it was Muldoon!
That is what the rhetoric want you to believe. But the fall began slightly before he became Minister of Finance. It was a consequence of the collapse in the price of wool. In those days wool made up 40 percent of our exports, and their price fell by about 40 percent. That is a big external blow, and of course the economy’s growth rate slowed down – for about ten years while the economy diversified. By 1977 we were 15th, and the GDP per capita was now at the OECD average.

Are you sure it was not Muldoon?
It is not rocket science that a major collapse in export revenue impacts on an economy. I’ve traced the effect in my book In Stormy Seas .

And after that the relative decline continued?
Actually no. From about 1978 to 1986 the economy grew at about the same rate as the OECD.

That is not what the 1984 Treasury Post-Election Briefing told us?
They had a policy agenda which had little to do with the actualities, didn’t they?

Just a moment. We were growing as fast as the OECD to 1986, and we were average then. How come we are now 14 percent lower?
There was another major decline between 1986 and 1993. For seven years we grew 2 percent p.a. slower than the OECD.

During the period from Roger Douglas to Ruth Richardson? I dont recall the price of wool collapsing then.
It didn’t. The main reason for the poor economic performance was the overvalued exchange rate, so the export sector was inhibited, while imports flooded in. If the external sector is screwed up, the economy stagnates and the rest of the OECD grows faster.

So for the second major decline was caused by wrong policies.
Apparently.

What happened after 1993 when we were down to 86 percent of the OECD’s per capita GDP?
A couple of strong business cycles in the 1990s obscure the trend, but the cautious interpretation is that we have been growing the same as the OECD.

A less cautious one?
We screwed up the external sector again during the Asian crisis, but the New Zealand economy has been growing fractionally faster than the OECD over the last few years.

So we can attribute half the fall in the post-war relativity to the wool price collapse, a third to the policies of the late 1980s and early 1990s, and the residual to some miscellaneous effects.
Very broadly, yes.

Your story is very different from the rhetoric the business pages bombard us with.
It is not my story. It is the story that in the data.

Why dont the business pages tell that story, instead of advocating policies which return to the polices of the late 1980s and early 1990s?
They have a policy agenda which has little to do with the actualities, dont they?

Education & Related Topics: Index

General
Celebrating Educational Achievement (November 2002)
Why Economists Dont Understand Education … but still try to run it (August 2002)
Education Factories (June 2002)
The Whimpering of the State: Policy after MMP Chapters 12,13 (1999)
The Commercialisation of New Zealand Chapters 12,13 (1997)

Economic Growth
Science and Nationbuilding (May 2002)

Education & Skills
Enhancing Income Generation Through Adult Education, A Comparative Study Review (April 2004)

Singel-sex vs Co-ed: Is One Better than the Other? (September 2004)
Working Smarter: Is Our workforce skilled enough to compete globally? (December 2002)

Reviews of Two Books on Labour Skills and Social Progress (April 2002)
Mind Your I’s and Q’s (February 2002)
Literacy and Development (June 1999)

Management & Professionalism
<a
href=modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=33>Does Professionalism Matter? NZIPA paper (June 2002)
Does Professionalism Matter? ‘Listener’ column (April 2002)
Two Styles of Management (1999)

Student Loans
Student Loans and Student Fees (September 2003)
The Sustainability of Student Loans (August 2002)
The Debt Burden of Students (July 1999)
Capital Cattle (March 1997)

Universities
University Financial Statements, Operating Surpluses, and Student Fees (July 2003)
Performance Anxiety: Why Incentive Systems Often Fail (July 2003)
Beyond the Utilitarian University (November 1999)
The Whimpering of the State: Policy after MMP Chapter 13 (1999)
The Commercialisation of New Zealand Chapter 13 (1997)

Family Policy: Index

What are Mothers Worth? (March 1979)
Fences and Ambulances: An Economist Looks at Family Policy (July 1992)
Suffer the Children (November 1993)
Approaching Family Economic Issues: Holistically or Pathologically? (October 1994)
Family Policy: Creative or Destructive? (November 1994)
The External Impact on the Family Firm (March 1996)
Review of Children of the Poor (April 1997)
Household Gods: Whatever Politicians Say, Children Interests Are Ignored (October 1997)
You’re on Your Own: the Nanny State Becomes A Hard Taskmaster (March 1998)
Poor Children (February 2001)
Is This a Healthy Budget for New Zealanders? (May 2002)
Family Policy and Family Support (September 2002)
Notes on a Commission for the Family (September 2002)
Children and their parents are the largest group of the poor (November 2002)
Treat the Kids: Why Michael Cullen Should Blow A Bit of the Budget Surplus (May 2003)
Spending the Public Growth Dividend: Why Was There So Little for Children? (May 2003)

Index of Distributional Economics

Index of The Economic and Health Status of Households Project

Also see the New Zealand Child Poverty Action Group

Footnote for Listener 8 May 1999

DPBs vs MPs

Act leader, Richard Prebble, recently claimed that a sole parent could get a total “package” of up to $38,000 a year, made up as follows (on a weekly basis):

Domestic Purposes Benefit for a parent and two children: $230.24;
Family Support: $79;
Accommodation allowance: $150 (maximum);
Tertiary training incentive allowance: $75 (maximum);
Child care subsidy: $72 (maximum);
Allowable earnings (after tax and abatement) $43.20 (maximum).

However detailed analysis showed that the poor women (and two young children) – with a job, tertiary training, and burdensome housing costs would have only $151.44 a week left for food, clothing, fuel, and other non-accommodation expenses.

Mr Prebble showed extraordinary restraint in his calculations. He ignored contributions from a boarder, unreported wages, investment income, and prostitution earnings, plus subsidies from the Serbian Liberation Front. In total she could have the up to (as the weasel phrase goes) the equivalent of $78,000 a year, or the salary of an MP.

I leave the reader to judge whether the nation is getting better value from its DPBs or some of its MPs.

Notes on a Commission for the Family

There has been much discussion on the proposed Commission for the Family. On 14 September 2002, I emailed note, which was widely circulated. Here it is – a little tidied up.

Keywords: Social Policy;

I am a little nervous about a common view which expresses a lack of enthusiasm towards the proposed Commission for the Family. The fact is it is a fait accompli, as certain as anything is in politics. Thus the approach, I would advise, is how to make the Family Commission as effective as possible.

I am not antagonistic to the notion of a public agency committed to the family. As my paper Family Poverty and Family Support said, we have known quantifiably that child poverty is a serious problem for over a quarter of a century, and in that time the predecessor agencies of the Ministry of Social Development have notably failed to address the problem. Even the MSD report does not give the impression that it is really grasping the issue.

Moreover there are two major difficulties in the current agency structure. Currently the concerns about the family are scattered between too many government departments with little cohesion of policy direction. (try to list all the departments and you’ll see what I mean). Second, the MSD is also administering the income support system and that may bias the focus of its thinking from children to beneficiaries, which is one of the main reasons that is predecessors did so little for family poverty.

I am delighted that Public Health Association has been approached to help think through the development of the Family Commission. It not only represents a vote of confidence in the PHA, but it offers the opportunity to ensure the development is from a widely based perspective. My fear is that the approach to it could be so narrow, that not only will the Commission be ineffective, but that the children will once more suffer. I am appalled at the possibility that the things we were arguing for in the 1970s could be put back another twenty-five years.

In my view we should see any Family Commission as a medium term arrangement to coordinate the various policy thinking of the various departments with, hopefully, the eventual outcome the Commission to be reabsorbed into the standard public service in due course. It could be set up as a commission of enquiry, but I would probably envisage a longer horizon, although probably for not more than three years, by which time it should have focussed the existing agencies, or possibly identified a new structure.

I hope the terms of reference will focus on families with children (the expression ‘family’ can also cover a couple living together). And to put it bluntly, I dont care whether this social group involves one or two ore more parents; living in the same house or separately; legally married, in a defacto relationship, or separated; nuclear or extended; brown, white, yellow, or grey or gay; earning or beneficiaries; criminals or upstanding members of the church, or anything like that. The test is the social grouping that my family meant to me – my parents were (and still are) committed to their children. As I said in Saturday’s paper we must not lose sight of the issue is CHILDREN. I hoped that focus would avoid a lot of the fragging that goes on between the contestants in the family policy area – a fragging, the main effect of which is to damage children further.

What should be the remit of the commission? I have not got around to thinking about that in detail what should be the terms of reference, but I am convinced they must be – as I once argued in a couple of addresses – holistically rather than pathologically. To often we look at extreme behaviour and panic, instead of seeing the phenomenon as part of a broader spectrum which has to be addressed. I have not written on this for almost a decade (in the interim I’ve worked on family poverty), so I need to move it ahead. But I’ll include a couple of references to the holistic-pathological conflict below.

They must include reference to family incomes. It is not just a question of child poverty and its consequences, nor even of equity and social coherence. Currently the nation’s overall strategy is that we need economic growth in real incomes in order to survive in this world. How come that when we get to families we completely ignore this? What sense does this make for integrated policy.

In many ways the terms of reference will not be as important as the membership and the work program.

Anyway, just a few thoughts. I guess my attitude – after 20 years working as a consultant – is when someone comes to see me with a problem, my attitude is how can I help? Some of those involved is coming to the PHA with their problem: We are going to have a Commission for the Family, How can we ensure it has maximum effectiveness? I know that you will rise to the challenge.

Brian.

I added some references which are covered in Articles on Family Policy

Injecting Drug Use and the Projected Costs Of Hepatitis C

Research Report Commissioned by NZ Drug Foundation: Released 8 September 2002

Keywords Health

Executive Summary [1]

The hepatitis C virus (HCV) usually causes chronic liver disease and other morbidities in most of those infected, and death in a minority of cases. The most common means of transmission today is from injecting drug use (IDU) through the sharing needles or other injecting equipment.

Every year about 1300 New Zealanders are newly infected with HCV. Later, after a period of at least ten years – over four-fifths of them will show symptoms of chronic hepatitis C.

This study estimates that infection reduces the life expectation of those infected by about eight months, and in addition they will average almost 25 years of symptoms as a result of the infection.

The paper provides preliminary cost figures, based on synthetic data (there being little epidemiological data, and in any case much of the estimation involves projections into the distant future).

It estimates that the additional costs to the health system of treating the 1300 infected each year amount to $33m (in year 2002 prices) over the lifetime of the cohort (although this estimate is subject to a wide margin of error). This figure could rise dramatically as new technologies and treatment become available in the future. (A very rough estimate suggests that there may be a greater social loss from reduced production due to illness.)

The medical costs figures quoted in the previous paragraph do not include the costs of interferon-α and related treatments. Published studies tend to suggest that they are cost effective, and will reduce the outlays of the health system over the lifetime of the cohort by about 10 percent to around $31m (in year 2002 prices) over a lifetime, together with gains of up to 3 quality-adjusted life years.

The paper estimates that medical outlays – that is the costs to the public and private health systems of HCV amount to around $13.7m in 2002. This includes an allowance for 200 people who are believed to be in receipt of interferon treatment. This amount is likely to increase – more than double – in the next ten years, in part from the rising numbers of those infected, but also as new treatments become more widespread.

The study was not asked to make any recommendations. However it has implications for a couple of salient matters.

First, there appears to be a strong case for taking action to prevent infection in order to increase substantially the quality of life of those involved, and also to reduce healthcare costs (and production losses). It is not possible to evaluate directly the return of a prevention program from these figures, in part because there could well be other benefits.

Second, there is the issue for treatment of those with HCV. The treatment regime is expensive, but it not only increases the quality of life of those successfully treated, but reduces further health outlays (and production losses). The overseas literature tends to suggest that interferon and related treatments are largely cost effective. Sheerin et al comes to a similar, but preliminary, conclusion for New Zealand. Further evaluation work needs to be encouraged, but first a better data base needs to be constructed.

Note: The original valuations were based on estimates of 2001 prices and are given in the main text in these prices. The estimates in the executive summary have been converted to 2002 prices by increasing them by 3 percent (which is a fraction higher than consumer prices to allow for the higher price movements of services and imports).

Introduction

Note: The prices in the main text are the best estimates for the 2001 year.

Infection by HCV – the hepatitis C virus – usually causes chronic liver disease and other morbidities, of varying degrees in most of those infected and death in a minority of cases. The most common means of transmission is from injecting drug use (IDU) through the sharing needles or other injecting equipment. Today the most common source of new infections – around 80 percent – is from the use of injecting drugs. (MoH 2001:5) Other sources are sexual transmission, sporadic cutaneous transmission, transmission in hospital settings, and vertical transmission (from mother to baby). Until the introduction of screening for donated blood in 1992 there was also transmission via blood transfusions.

An ESR study estimated the current numbers of infected New Zealanders was 25,200 in 2000, and projected that the numbers will increase 50 percent in the next decade. (Nesdale et al, 2000) This epidemic will add to the costs to the health system, reduce economic productivity, and decrease the wellbeing of those infected and their families and friends.

Method

This paper calculates the medical, health and some of the other costs of the HCV, using a synthetic method.

There are two broad methods of calculating the costs of an illness. The epidemiological (prevalence) approach involves surveying the community, as to the prevalence of the disease, and the effects it has on the sick (and their associates).[2] As far as is known this has not been done in the case of HCV in New Zealand. Although disease prevalence has been measured in a number of sub-populations (Nesdale et al, 2000) and in a community study (Chapman et al, 2000), comprehensive data on the economic effects is lacking. However the HCV burden is largely prospective. The burden of the disease tends to appear only after 10 or more years. The ESR estimated the infected population was only 15,000 in 1990, of whom 7000 were infected before 1980. It is these people who are currently becoming a burden on the health (and other) systems. (Nesdale et al, 2000)

Alternatively, the synthetic (incidence) approach uses known and estimated epidemiological parameters (often derived from overseas studies) to construct the life history of a cohort. Known or projected health (and other) costs are then applied to these life stages. This gives the life-time social costs of the cohort. This is the only practical method to estimate economic costs in New Zealand until better data becomes available.

It should be noted that this study looks at the costs of the disease using the ‘counter-factual’ scenario of what would be the case were there to be no infection by HCV. This is the relevant scenario if the main interest is the economic effectiveness of prevention. Another common approach is to assume the disease exists, and evaluate the effectiveness of various treatments. The two approaches use a common methodology but, of course, are being applied to very different questions.[3]

Because we have calculated the individual health costs it is possible to estimate future health costs, given a set of projections for the population. This method is not particularly accurate.[4] Even so it gives an order of magnitude and so it has been included in the report.

The Life History of a Cohort.

In a recent paper suggests the following estimates of the natural history of HCV infection. (Seef, 1999, see Figure 1).

– Of 1000 who are infected 850 will experience chronic ill health from symptomatic hepatitis, and 150 will not.

– Of the 850 who experience chronic hepatitis, 170 will go on to develop cirrhosis of the liver, and 680 will remain stable.

– Of the 170 with cirrhosis of the liver, 40 will die, and 130 will remain stable.

– In addition, it is assumed that 25 percent of those with cirrhosis of the liver (i.e. 42) will experience liver failure and another 10 percent (17) will experience heptocelluar carcinoma. (Brown & Crofts, 1998)

( The New Zealand Ministry of Health gives the following estimates (where the infected population has been scaled to 1000, to be comparable with these figures).
– 533 to 800 will develop some liver damage and experience liver damage (on average after 15 years)
– 107 to 266 will develop cirrhosis (on average after 20-40 years)
– 27 to 133 who developed cirrhosis will develop liver failure or liver cancer (five to 10 years after the onset of cirrhosis). (MoH 2002:6)
The Australian National Hepatitis C Strategy gives the following estimates (where the infected population has been scaled to 1000, to be comparable with these figures):
‘if 1000 are affected with the virus the outcome will be as follows:
– about 150 to 350 will clear the virus spontaneously within two to six months of the infection and will neither develop a chronic infection nor risk developing advanced liver disease. These people can, however, be re-infected with hepatitis C if they are re-exposed.
– about 650 to 850 people will develop chronic hepatitis C infection.
– about 50 to 100 people with chronic hepatitis C infection will have progressed to cirrhosis after 20 years of infection (rising to 200 people after 40 years of infection). Among the factors associated with an increased risk of cirrhosis are alcohol consumption, HIV or hepatitis B co-infection, older age at the time of the infection, and being male.
– about 30 to 50 people with Hepatitis C related cirrhosis will be at risk of liver failure or hepatocellular carcinoma after 30 to 40 years of infection. Among people with cirrhosis the risk of liver cancer is 1 to 3 percent a year.
– the majority of people with chronic hepatitis C will probably not progress to advanced liver disease but their quality of life may be diminished.’ (p.6-7))

It is clear from the literature that these are but tentative estimates, and they will also be changed by treatment. ‘The natural history of untreated chronic hepatitis C is controversial.’ (Koff, 1997)

Allowing that it takes time for the infected to move between the different categories, we can model the life experience of a cohort all of whom are infected at the age of 20, as shown in Figure 2. The estimates include mortality from ordinary causes and also elevate mortality in the first decade from other causes related injecting drug use. (Dukes et al, 1992) Note that given only 4 percent are thought to die from HCV (at maximum, because other causes of death overtake many) the main effect on the life experience are of a chronic but stable illness (and, to a lesser extent, cirrhosis of the liver).

<b.Mortality

As noted earlier, only a small proportion (about 4 percent) of a cohort of those infected by HCV are expected to die as a result of the infections. While the non-infected IDUs would have a life expectation of another 51.1 years at the age of 20, those who are infected have an expectation of another 50.4, or 8 months shorter on average.(On the same basis an non-IDU has a life expectancy of another 57.6 years at the age of 20.) [5]

Morbidity

As well as the possibility of dying earlier, those infected with HCV also have a period of illness (morbidity). The model indicates that those who are 20 years old when they are infected will experience an average of 24.7 years of illness before they die (of whatever cause), which amounts to just under half of their life after infection. There is considerable variation. Some 15 percent will experience no HCV related illness; the remaining 85 percent experience just on 29 years of illness.

The more serious disease stage identified here involves cirrhosis of the liver. The average period of experiencing this for the entire cohort is 2.9 years. But only 17 percent of the cohort are affected by the cirrhosis, and so they experience almost 17 years of the disease (including the quarter who die from it).

Economists use quality adjusted life years (QALYs) to evaluate the loss of life from mortality and morbidity. A QALY of 100 represents the quality of life for an average person in good health, while a value of zero represents the state of death. A person experiencing some loss of quality of life through morbidity (or handicap) has the 100 discounted by an amount based on surveys of people’s judgements and objective circumstances.

Dusheiko & Roberts (1995) used the following discounts:
Resolved infection: 10 percent (that is 90 percent of the quality of life of a person in average good health)
Chronic hepatitis : 20 percent
Status of cirrhosis: 50 percent
Severe stage of disease: 80 percent.
while Younossi et al (1999) used
Chronic infection: 10-40 percent ( baseline 18 percent)
Compensated cirrhosis: 10-50 percent ( baseline 22 percent)
Decompensated cirrhosis: 12-70 percent ( baseline 35 percent)
HCC: 50-90 percent ( baseline 75 percent)
Liver transplantation, first year: 30-89 percent ( base line 50 percent)
Liver transplantation, successive years: 13-76 percent ( baseline 30 percent).

The two sets of figures do not differ so much as overlap, indicating the high degree of uncertainty of these estimates.

The Dusheiko & Robers discounts give a morbidity reduction of between 3.6 and 6.6 QALYs, in addition to a reduction from mortality of .7 years. In total the reduction is between 4.3 and 7.3 years, or between 8.4 and 14.3 percent on an expected life of 51.1 years.

The Medical Costs of HCV for an Individual

The costs to the health system are based on a ‘base care’ scenario, with an ‘interferon treatment’ scenario added. Interferon treatment is added in separately.

All the figures are subject to a wide margin of error, but comparisons with overseas studies suggest they give reasonably robust indications of the orders of magnitude. A major problem is that there is no standard classification for costs yet in the literature, so that there is overlapping of categories between different papers, while some studies seem to leave some items out.[6]

It should be noted that sometimes a part or all the costs will be paid for by the patient (or their private medical insurance), with the remainder typically paid by the public sector. This distinction is not made here – that is the report looks at the resource usages in medical care, not the funding of the resource usage, which is virtually impossible to calculate without some community survey.

Basic Care for Chronic Hepatitis
It is assumed that those diagnosed with chronic hepatitis visit their general practitioner for consultations and tests, above that for the average numbers of attendance for the age group. . The recommended rate is three times a year, we have no data to actual practice.[7] An average cost of $250 a year is assumed.

Basic Care for Asymptomatic Cirrhosis
It is assumed that those diagnosed with asymptomatic cirrhosis, have a similar pattern of visiting their general practitioner, and in addition have one visit to a specialist a year. An average cost of $450 per year is assumed (i.e. $200 p.a. more than for primary care for chronic hepatitis). In addition it is assumed that the person averages ten days in hospital (at a cost of $7000), once every five years.

Basic Care for Liver Failure
It is assumed that 40 percent of those who experience liver failure have a transplant, and the remainder do not. (Brown & Crofts 1998). Australian and New Zealand estimates suggest the medical costs (from assessment to three months after) of each liver transplant is in the order of $120,000 to $140,000. (Brown & Crofts, 1998; Sheerin, 2001; Gane Pers.Com. 3 May 2002) The Australian estimate suggests a treatment cost of those who do not receive a transplant of about $200,000, but this needs to be reduced a little to reflect lower bed costs in New Zealand. Combining these figures we get an average cost of $145,000 per episode of liver failure.

Basic Care for Hepatocellular Carcinoma
It is assumed that a third of those who experience hepatocellular carcinoma have surgery, including liver surgery, and the remainder do not. (Brown & Crofts 1998:385) Surgery is considered here as basic treatment because it (substantially) reduces the costs to the health system. The Australian estimates suggest an average of $A88,000 per episode, which is converted to $100,000 for New Zealand, after allowing for lower bed costs but the higher exchange rate.

Interferon Treatment
A treatment for HCV is the administration of a six to twelve month course of interferon-α (IFN α2b). More recently ribavirin has been added to the treatment. (This is called ‘combination therapy’. It is licensed but not yet subsided in New Zealand.) It is thought that combination therapy may be useful to up to 60 percent of those with HCV, for its effectiveness is dependent on a range of clinical factors and disease stage. A recent innovation is peginterferon α2b plus ribaviran. While it is more efficacious, it is not known yet whether it is more cost effective. (Manns et al). These other therapies are currently only available usually in the context of clinical trials or on ‘compassionate use’ grounds.

There have been a number of (largely prospective) economic appraisals of treatment for hepatitis C. (Duisheiko & Roberts 1995; Koff 1997; Wong 1999; Wong et al 2000; Younossi et al 1999; Sheerin et al 2001).

At issue is not what is the current practices, but what is likely to be future practices. Until a better treatment regime arises interferon monotherapy (in combination with ribavirn) is likely to become increasingly widespread. Thus it seems likely that those being infected in recent times will be recipients of this treatment option (or its successors).

Drug treatment with interferon monotherapy for chronic HCV has three main economic effects:
1. There are the increased costs of the treatment regime;
2. Consequentially there is a reduction in other treatments (such as liver transplants), but these occur at a later date (so there is a timing effect).
3. In addition there is an improvement in the quality of life of the recipients. Improvements of up to 2.5 QALYs have been forecast. (Younossi et al, 1999)

The general conclusions of the economic appraisals is that interferon monotherapy reduces expenditure over a lifetime but because of the timing effect, there is still a question about the economic effectiveness. The best estimate suggests that there may be a cost saving of about 10 percent measured on a lifetime basis. (Younossi et al, 1999) This is used in the estimates below.

A caveat about future developments
The above figures project many decades ahead. It would be idle to assume that existing treatment regimes will not be replaced, probably with more expensive but more effective therapies. It is not obvious how to allow for this, other than to make the caveat in all projections, that they are based on known available treatment regimes.

The Lifetime Medical Costs of HCV for a Cohort

The above estimated costs can be combined to give an average lifetime cost per HCV infected person of $24,500 ($22,000 if they are in receipt of interferon type therapies) but subject to some margin of error.[8] The specific amount varies greatly from patient to patient. Those experiencing liver failure or hepatocellular carcinoma, involve far greater expense.

Applied across a population of 1300 infected persons (that is the numbers of new infections each year) that comes to a total of $32m. That means every year new infections generate an extra cost to the health system of $32m in the lifetimes of the people in the infected cohort. (These costs are in the year 2001 dollars.)

If there is extensive use of interferon and related treatments, the cost is reduced by 10 percent of the 60 percent of infected patients who are likely to be treated. This reduces the costs to $30m (but also brings the costs forward in time).

The above estimates are subject to a wide margin or error, probably in the order of plus or minus 20 percent. These are an inevitable consequence of the synthetic estimation approach, and the need to project into the future.

(As already discussed, the above assumes existing treatments. It is likely that as time goes by there will be treatments which are more effective, but also more expensive. Additionally, service sector costs rise faster than average (while goods costs more slowly). It would be extremely speculative to attempt to estimate these effects. Instead these figures should be taken as minima measured in 2001 dollars, and will also increase with general rises in prices.)

The Public Health Costs of Hepatitis C

Shiell (1998) also identifies the Commonwealth of Australia spending $A80,000 a year on epidemiology and surveillance. The New Zealand figure is likely to be much less, even on a per capita basis, because New Zealand has not been as vigorous as Australia in enhanced surveillance of hepatitis C.

The costs of blood screening of the disease is probably about $2-3m, but this is unavoidable, because the screening would continue as long as there was the possibility of infection.

Production Losses

It seems likely that there are other resource costs from HCV infection, most notably that the sick also cause a loss of production. It requires more data than is available here to estimate that loss. To obtain an order of magnitude, suppose those sick with the virus are 10 percent less productive, as reflected in their labour earnings and allowing that only about 70 percent will be working compared to the average worker with otherwise similar characteristics. In this case the loss of production for 1000 infected people comes to around $40m (in today’s prices) over a lifetime (ignoring productivity rises).[9] This is an order of magnitude, but it suggests that productivity losses could exceed health resource costs. The figure includes the loss to tax revenue so the government finances suffer from less revenue and more expenditure in the health budget.

The Non-tangible (Quality of Life) Losses from HCV

In addition there are the non-material costs associated with poorer quality of life. Transit New Zealand currently uses a figure equivalent to $400,000 per QALY (in 2001 prices – it has just been updated). Given the above estimates of a reduction in QALYs from morbidity and mortality of between 4.3 and 7.3 years per person, then the non-material loss of life for a cohort of 1300 infected at the age of 20 is in the range of between $2.2b and $3.8b over the cohort’s life.

Some Projections on the Possible Future Spending on the Medical Treatment of HCV

Had we a census of actual spending on the medical treatment of HCV in a base year, we could project future years, given assumptions about the demographic course of the disease. We have no base year data, so any figures will be subject to a wide margin of error.

The ESR report estimated there were about 25,200 New Zealanders infected in 2000. From the above figures we can estimate that the average spending of the health system per year on someone infected with HCV (including those for whom it is latent) comes to $415. Applied to each of 25,200 people that comes to $10.3m. This is less than the lifetime cost of the cohort, because the numbers requiring treatment are building up.

Additionally it is believed that around 200 people per annum are currently in receipt of an interferon type treatment. This will add around an additional $3.0m to the health system spending (assuming a cost of $15,000 per treatment), to give a total outlay of about $13.3m.

The ESR report projects the total numbers will increase by 50 percent in the following ten years (even though the annual infection rate is expected to remain broadly the same). This means that total spending excluding interferon type treatments on the disease could be $15.5m in 2010 (in today’s prices) in comparison to the $10.3m in 2000. .

However, as explained earlier, the costs of treatment are likely to rise as new technologies and treatments come on stream, and the costs of services rise relative to the costs of goods and commodities. Assume that the proportion who are treated using interferon-treatments by 2010 builds up steadily to 60 percent of each cohort. Under this assumption, which may be conservative because new and probably more expensive treatments will be coming on stream, around 10 percent of the infected will have been treated. The total annual cost in 2010 will be around $27m. This is substantially higher than the figure without treatment, because the benefits from subsequent lower treatment costs take time to phase in. This is not in itself a case for not providing the treatment. Rather it is a warning that the new treatment regime and the rising numbers of infected are likely to result in a doubling (and more) of medical costs of treatment over the next decade.

Implications

This study shows that infection by the Hepatitis C virus causes both resource costs to the health sector and poor quality of life (and it also suggests that losses of production may be important too.) [10]

The study was not asked to make any recommendations. However it has implications for a couple of salient matters.

First, there appears to be a strong case for taking action to prevent infection in order to increase substantially the quality of life of those involved, and also to reduce healthcare costs (and production losses). It is not possible to evaluate directly the return of a prevention program from these figures, in part because there could well be other benefits.

Second, there is the issue for treatment of those with HCV. The treatment regime is expensive, but it not only increases the quality of life of those successfully treated, but reduces further health outlays (and, probably, production losses). The overseas literature tends to suggest that interferon and related treatments are largely cost effective. Sheerin et al comes to a similar, but preliminary, conclusion for New Zealand. Further evaluation work needs to be encouraged, but first a better data base needs to be constructed.[11]

Bibliography
Brown & Crofts, N. (1998) ‘Health care costs of a continuing epidemic of hepatitis C virus infection among injecting drug users’, Australian and New Zeland Journal of Public Health, Vol 22, No 3, p.384-388.
Commonwealth Department of Health and Aged Care (2001) National Hepatitis Strategy, Canberra.
Chapman, B., M. Burt, C. Frampton et al (2000) ‘The prevalence of viral hepatitis (HAVNew Zealand Medical Journal, 113:394-6.
Duisheko, G.M. & J.A. Roberts (1995) ‘Treatment of Chronic Type B and C Hepatitis with Interferon Alfa: An economic appraisal’, Hepatology, December 1995, p.1863-1873.
Dukes, P.D., G.M. Robinson & B.J. Robinson (1992) ‘Mortality of intravenous drug users: attenders of the Wellington Drug Clinic, 1972-89′, Drug and Alcohol Review, 11, 197-201.
Koff, R. (1997) ‘Therapy of Hepatitis C: Cost-effectiveness analysis’, Hepatology, December 1997, p.152S-155S.
Manns, M.P., J.G. McHutchison, S.C. Gordon, V.K. Rustgi, M. Shiffman, R. Reindollar, Z.D. Goodman, K. Koury, M. Ling, J.K. Albrecht, and the International Hepatitis Therapy Group (2001) ‘Peginterferon alfa-2b plus ribavirin compared with Interferon alfa-2b plus ribavirin for initial treatment of chronic Hepatitis C: a randomised trial’, The Lancet, Vol 358, Sept 22, 2001, p.958-965.
Ministry of Health (2002) Action on Hepatitis C Prevention: A Discussion Document, Wellington.
Nesdale, A., M. Baker, E. Gane, R. Kemp, C. Brunton, M. Law, & N. Garrett (2000) Hepatitis C infection in New Zealand: Estimating the Current and Future Prevalence and Impact, IESR, June 2000.
Seef, L. (1999) ‘Natural history of Hepatitis C’, The American Journal of Medicine, Vol 107 (6B) December 27, 1999, p.10S-15S.
Sheerin, I.G., F.T. Green & J.D. Sellman (2001) Future costs of Hepatitis C among injecting drug users in New Zealand, Draft – not for quotation, Christchurch Medical School.
Shiell, A. (1998) Economic Analyses for Hepatitis C: A Review of Australia’s Response, A Report for the Commonwealth Department of Health and Family Services .
Wong, J.B. (1999) ‘Cost-Effectiveness of treatments for chronic Hepatitis C’, American Journal of Medicine, Vol 107 (6B), December 27, 1999, p.74S-78S.
Wong, J.B., G. McQuillan, J.G. Hutchinson & T. Poynard (2000) ‘Estimating future Hepatitis C morbidity, mortality, and costs in the United States’, American Journal of Public Health, Vol 90, No 10, October 2000, p. 1562-1569.
Younossi, Z.M., M.E. Singer, J.G. McHutchinson & K.M. Shermock (1999) ‘Cost Effectiveness of Interferon α2b combined with Ribavirin for the treatment of Chronic Hepatitis C’, Heapatology , Vol 30, No 5, p.1318-1324.

Endnotes
1. I am grateful for assistance from Cheryl Brunton, Bruce Chapman, Ed Gane, Sally Jackman, David Phillips, Geoff Robinson, and Ian Sheeri. Sheerin et al (2001) is not available for quotation, but its preliminary findings have been used to cross check the estimates in this paper.
2. For an example of the prevalence method in Australia see Schiell (1998)
3. A limitation to the prevention evaluation is that it may not include other benefits from a successful program. For instance it is likely to also reduce the prevalence of other diseases IDU transmitted through injecting drug use.
4. Its accuracy could be improved enormously by having an actual estimate of spending in a base year.
5. The longevity estimates do not include the effect of other IDU related diseases such as HIV-AIDS. IDUs are also more likely to be smokers and die from smoking generated diseases. No allowance has been made for this. Gane (Pers. Com. 3 May 2002) suggests that the mortality rate (additional to the normal rate from other causes) may be affected by the age when the diseases was contracted (and hence when it was most virulent). Unfortunately there are no data to be able to allow for this.
6. The approach here follows Brown & Crofts 1998, with interferon treatment added, and some variations to reflect New Zealand circumstances. For US data see Younossie et al 1999.
7. It is likely that actual treatment is less than recommended treatment. On the other hand some will go to specialists, which will compound the costs of the GP visits.
8. The figure is slightly lower than (by about 6 percent) the comparable figure in Sheerin et al (2001).
9. Double that if the annual average productivity increase is 1.5% p.a.(the long term average up to the mid 1980s).
10. Calculation on the effectiveness of a prevention program needs to take into account that preventing infection in one cohort reduces the reservoir of the infected, which further reduces the likelihood of future cohorts being infected.
11. Gane says that because New Zealand has a different proportion of ‘genotype 3 (45% New Zealand to less than 5 % European or North American)’ the progress of the disease and its treatment costs may differ from those assumed here which are based on overseas studies. (Pers. Com. 3 May, 2002) This emphasizes the need for the development of a local data base.