Te Whakapakari Paapori, Ohanga O Muriwhenua

Submission to the Waitangi Tribunal on behalf of the Ruunanga o Muriwhenua. The views expressed are my own, and should not be taken to reflect those of the Ruunanga, the Muriwhenua Iwi, the Maori, the Tribunal, or the Crown.) Revised 22 June 1993

Keywords: Growth & Innovation; Maori;


1.1 This report has been commissioned to assist the Waitangi Tribunal in its deliberations on the claims of the Ruunanga o Muriwhenua, on behalf of the Muriwhenua Iwi of the Far North of New Zealand, as a part of the settlement for long standing grievances.

1.2 The report reflects the views of its author. While he has consulted as widely as time and resources will allow, the assessments may not, and probably do not reflect in total, the views of the Ruunanga o Muriwhenua, the Muriwhenua Iwi, or the Maori generally, or those of the Tribunal or the Crown.

1.3 Without wishing to preempt the decision of the Waitangi Tribunal, I shall take it that many of the grievances of the Muriwhenua iwi are justified, and that the Crown is obligated to provide remedies, as best as it is able and is possible. I shall treat the remedy issue in two parts. The first involves physical assets – typically land – which will be returned to the relevant iwi or hapu or, where that is not possible, cash or kind is returned instead. I shall have something to say about the conditions under which such returns should be made.

1.4 However the return of these assets cannot be the full reparations since over the years the dispossessed Maori has suffered from not receiving income from the asset. This suffering has not only reduced their wealth, but also reduced their general welfare. (This process is elaborated in Appendix I.) A key feature of the process of economic development is the way in which assets generate beneficial outcomes in other ways, a matter elaborated in section 5.

1.5 Thus reparations which merely return assets wrongfully taken in the past would be to ignore all the injustices which flowed on thereafter. Nor is it a matter of simply calculating the loss of income, and compounding it over the years for loss of interest on that income. Cash cannot fully represent the damage done to Maori society as a result of the past wrongs, nor can any reasonable cash transfer represent a fair compensation, although obviously cash and its close equivalents – has a role in a just reparation package.

1.6 It is evident both from general studies, and from the evidence already presented to the Tribunal of the experience of the Muriwhenua Iwi, that the detriment from the dispossession of the assets went to the very foundations of Maori society. There has been a loss of the tribal independence and autonomy, both collectively and individually, a poorer attainment of the iwi on most welfare measures involving education, employment, health, housing, wealth and general prosperity. In addition, the lands of the Muriwhenua have been unable to sustain all the iwi, and while some may have left anyway, many live outside the Muriwhenua rohe but wish to return in order to take a greater role in the life of their iwi. It is not obvious how any cash sum could simply remedy these outcomes.

1.7 Instead it has been suggested that the reparations for grievances from the past should include an Iwi Development Plan (Te Whakapakari Ohanga, Paapori), in which Crown and Maori in partnership develop the iwi to a social and economic level which would bring them closer to that which would have occurred if the wrongs of the past had not been imposed.

1.8 Because there has been anxiety among some Maori over the interaction between the return of assets and iwi development planning, I need to state at the beginning some salient principles in regard to asset reparations:
– an Iwi Development Plan is not a substitute for the return of the assets. That should happen anyway. Rather the Plan complements the asset return, providing substitutes for that cannot be returned .
-the assets should be returned to appropriate Maori groups such as Trust Boards or hapu, on the same basis as they have in the past. There is no intention that they be returned to some other agency. That would merely continue old wrongs.
– there is no requirement that any of the legal owners of the returned assets need participate in the Iwi Development Plan. The planning provides no threat to their autonomy. However, they may voluntarily choose to participate in the program, if they judge it to be in their best interests. I believe the majority of existing institutions will come to such a conclusion.

1.9 Another group who have expressed some anxiety about Iwi Development Planning is the Pakeha. May I say to those in the region that the plan that is likely to be adopted will have spinoffs to all the region, and so all the people of the region can benefit. A successful Iwi Development Plan will also benefit the nation, in that it will shift people from a dependence on the government, to contributing to the prosperity of the nation as it increases the overall level of social and economic performance.

2. What is an Iwi Development Plan?

2.1 There are a variety of planning which exist in western type economies including asset management plans, business (corporate) plans, sectoral plans, regional plans, and national plans. A separate section deals with the relevance of asset management plans and business plans to the return of assets. Iwi development plans draw more upon regional, and to a lesser extent sectoral and national plans.

2.2 All plans should have some standard features including:
– an overall set of goals ( section 3) ;
– specific targets which reflect those goal (section 4);
– a theory of how the targets may be attained (section 5);
– a strategy to attain the targets, based on the theory (section 6);
– a series of measures to implement the strategy (section 7);
– an account of the sources of resources and finance for the implementation (section 8);
– an institutional framework for the implementation (section 9).
Typically these are summarised in a single document – or set of documents – but that only summarises the spirit and content of the plan. The true significance is in the actions and commitments which arise out of it.

2.3 It is not possible for this report to provide all the details of a plan. Neither it is desirable, for an Iwi Development Plan should involve much more consultation than has been possible here. The task of this report is to show the relevance of the approach to remedying past grievances, and the steps that might initially be undertaken to develop the approach as a part of the settlement.

2.4 While the report is formally to the Waitangi Tribunal it is also addressed to the iwi. Some Maori have said to me that they are not familiar with these European approaches. Others have said that the Maori are quite capable of planning by themselves. And others have said that they do not want to be involved in any European approach.

2.5 There is less conflict between these remarks than at first may appear. Maori have a long history of planning – be it siting a kaianga, building a marae, planting a kumera field, going out on a fishing expedition, preserving a sacred taonga, or planning a toa. There a number of words in Maori about planning including
– “tikanga” (n.) rule, plan, method; (This meaning is given the first place in H. W .Williams’ Dictionary of the Maori Language.)
– “whakatakoto tikanga” (v.) to plan.
– “whakakaupapa” (v.) to plan (abstract)
– “whakamahere” (v .) to plan (tangible)
– “whakahiato” (v.) to plan (policy).
As one Maori scholar said to me “tikanga is tika”.

2.6 Today’s Maori has two needs with their tikanga or whakamahere. First there is a need to develop to their current needs, for the technical issues they face today are rather different from that of two centuries ago. And second they will have to korero with the pakeha, sharing the two approaches. This latter need is especially important in the case of Iwi Development Plans which arise out of the reparations process, since the Crown – who will use European terminology and approaches – will be involved.

2.7 It is not my intention to impose any European framework on the Maori. Rather this is a few faltering ideas – not unlike the first words of a pakeha attempting to speak Maori which I hope will contribute to the dialogue.

3. The Objectives of the Plan

3.1 I suspect all Iwi Development Plans in the context of the reparations will have two major objectives:
– to enhance Te Mana o Te Iwi;
– to provide a durable settlement redressing the wrongs of the past.

3.2 It is not accidental that there are two major objectives, for they symbolise the two partners to the Tiriti o Waitangi. That one objective is in Maori and one is in English does not mean that they should be assigned to each partner. Each has an interest in both. A strong viable independent iwi means less pressure on the government, while it is in the interest of both partners that the settlement be durable, because that means it has to be fair. I have not used here the term “rangatiratanga ” because this is not just a matter of article two of the Tiriti but the treaty in its entirety, which was concerned with the maintenance of the mana of both partners.

3.3 Under the major objectives will be more specific ones. It will be for the Muriwhenua iwi to articulate them, but among those matters to which they wish to give priority, some Maori have mentioned to me:
– the preservation of their land;
– the protection of the special (environmental) and sacred places of their land;
– the restoration of their marae and taonga;
– the protection and promotion of te reo;
– the bringing of their mokopuna back to their turangawaewae, while improving the access of those who have to stay away;
– the giving their mokopuna the same opportunities as others have – opportunities in education, health, housing, and jobs, together with the independence and confidence which goes with those.

3.4 There are many supplementary objectives. It is for the iwi to articulate them. No doubt it will have to give some indication of each’s priority, because all cannot be resolved at once.

3.5 One particular issue which considerable attention will have to be given is the treatment of those of the Muriwhenua iwi who no longer live in or near the tribal lands. They will of course retain their interests in any land they have now, or will be returned. But it will be much more difficult to deliver to them other development benefits.

4. The Specified Targets

4.1 The stage will be to identify specific targets. This cannot be unilaterally done by the iwi, since the targets will be constrained by what is feasible. Moreover it is not possible to give more than an indication of what they may be, and what is involved.

4.2 One target might be to increase the proportion of the iwi who can live in their traditional lands from X to Y percent.

4.3 A second related target might be that of those who live in their tribal lands the unemployment rate will be comparable to the national (Maori and non-Maori) average.

4.4 The effect of these two targets is that a major consideration of the development plan would be the creation of sustainable quality jobs in the region for the Muriwhenua people (although it may be difficult to target any job creation program in a region to one race or tribe exclusively). The jobs need to be sustainable, and not dependent upon the state. The jobs need to be quality in order that the quality human capital in the iwi will be attracted to staying in the region.

4.5 A third group of targets might involve the children of the iwi in terms of specified standard of health and education. e.g.
– that when 12 years old they would have attained a certain competence in the use of the Maori language and kawa;
– that the Maori students leaving school have an achievement which corresponds in attainment to those of the non-Maori from similar locations;
– that at specified ages or stages (perhaps 5, 12, during pregnancy, and at retirement) the standard of health of the Maori corresponds to that of the non-Maori in the same location.

4.6 In addition to such targets, it will be necessary to specify the target population (it would be difficult to meet some targets for those outside the Far North, except as a part of a package aimed at all Maori, and probably impossible for those of the Iwi who live outside New Zealand). One effect of narrowing the target population to tribal lands would be to give an incentive for iwi to return there. Even professional couples may be willing to come home, for the promise of a better deal for their children.

4.7 It will also be necessary to specify a target date. They may often be some distance out, perhaps over generations, reflecting the reality that it will not be possible to remedy overnight the destruction and neglect of 150 years.

4.8 One effect of this is the target needs to be set in terms of the ongoing standards at the target date. Thus the educational standards would be set in terms of the average for non-Maoris at the target date, not those at 1992. Thus as non-Maori standards rose, so would the target. As a consequence it will be in the Maori interest to lift the Pakeha performance, since that will mean more effort will have to be put into their mokopuna.

4.9 The Crown may be a little reluctant to be involved in target dates too far out. It will rightly argue enhancing te Mana o te Iwi involves decreasing dependence of the iwi on Crown initiatives. However while the cash flows and asset returns may occur in a relatively short period, assistance in kind – in education, health, and research and development – is likely to be over a much longer period.

5 Towards a Theory of Development

5.1 This is not a treatise on social and economic development (te whakapakari paapori, ohanga). What is presented here is a framework which the Iwi Development Plan (te Mahere Whakapakari Iwi) can use to guide its strategy.

5.2 The theory involves a resource based approach, but natural resources are not enough. Natural resources provide only the opportunity for development, not the development itself. Moreover, while human resources are key, they do not guarantee development in a particular location, since those with high quality human capital may choose to migrate if there is no local activity and employment to attract them.

5.3 Thus the development of a region such as the Far North involves using the opportunity that the resources create to generate jobs in the region. Thus the issue is not to what extent can any piece of land, say, generate output, but what opportunities there are from the land which adds values and hence jobs. Today the New Zealand farm sector generates more jobs off the farm than it does onfarm. This includes providing inputs for the farm, but also the further processing of the outputs. Because the processing has to generate high incomes the production and processing tends to be technologically specialised.

5.4 Thus a development plan will seek options based on natural resources which are high value and technologically sophisticated. They may be uses which are not obvious and not yet developed. The products which are important.

5.5 The locals of the Far North region may well ask where has been the scientific research effort which precedes this development. The record is that it has not been done. One of the consequences of the deprivation of the land alienation, was that when past governments made decisions about allocating research effort the region was ignored.

5.6 The research effort has to be coupled with marketing development. There is no point in providing products which are not desired by potential purchasers, or at prices which do not generate a fair profit to the producers.

5.7 And totality must recognise that there will be associated structures and investments. Some will be supplied by private business. An example might be the transport to ship the product out. But some -notably infrastructure – will involve public initiatives. An example might be the road network on which the goods are shipped.

5.8 The iwi of Muriwhenua will recognise these issues from their own experiences. In the 1920s they were embarked on a program of dairy farming with little evaluation of suitability of the land for that purpose. On one occasion they planted and harvested potatoes without having evaluated the market prospects for the crop. The local development was restricted by the transport difficulties the farmers faced. Research and Development, Marketing, and Infrastructure are ~ven more crucial in the 1990s than they were in the 1920s and 1930s.

5.9 There are further fundamental lessons which come out of the 1920s and 1930s, captured well in Claudia Geiringer’s Historical Background to the Muriwhenua Land Claim, 1865-1950. There was no systematic planning, and financing in particular was not thought through. Instead it depended on annual injections from the state. Because the state had no comprehensive plan either, it was restrictive on the decisions which were made. The result was those who had the local expertise and were most affected by the decisions had insufficient involvement in the determination of the outcomes. Bad decisions were made because made planning structures were in place. Planning, Financing, and Good Administrative and Decision Structures will be as crucial in the 1990s as they were in the 1920s and 1930s.

5.10 Thus far there has been no mention of the labour force and the human capital, (tangata aa rawa). A quality labour force is crucial for social and economic development, and yet it is no guarantee of that process. Supposing an iwi had a healthy, well educated, highly trained, experienced, and se1f-disciplined labour force, but no local resources on which to base their prospects. There would be no opportunities for it in the region, and the unemployed but able workers would drift off elsewhere, to Whangarei, to Auckland, to Sydney. The paradox of quality labour is that it is internationally mobile, and so the Iwi cannot claim it for its own regional purposes. That is why the resource base of the region must be used as a development base to attract and maintain the tangata aa rawa.

5.11 However, once the resource phase development prospects are there the quality labour becomes crucial, for it will be the labour which will convert crude resources into sophisticated value added products. Some of this will be in the direct processing itself, typically involving complex technologies and workskills on the production floor. But there will also be the ‘staff component, managing the research and development, the marketing, the planning, the financing, the administration, and the labour force. This applies in the wider community as well as in the business firm, in the Iwi ‘s own management structure, in the local authority, in the firms which service the production firms, in the education, health, and social services, in the home, on the Marae, and in voluntary agencies. Iwi development thus involves both upgrading the existing labour force, and developing those of the next generation

5.12 In summary the development process involves
– The potential of resources;
– Means of adding value to those resources;
– A quality labour force.

6. The Development Strategy as a part of the Reparations

6.1 In the following I assume that the Tribunal has identified various specific grievances plus a general one that as a result of events associated with the specific grievances plus general neglect the Iwi o Muriwhenua have experienced a lower standard of social and economic development than was promised by Te Tiriti o Waitangi. At this point I do not discuss the institutional steps to remedy these grievances, but describe the overall outcomes.

6.2 The issues dealt with here cover
(i) Return of specific assets – section 6.3-6.6;
(ii) Activity Development Plans – sections 6.7-6.12;
(iii) Human Capital Development Plans – sections 6.13-6.20;
(iv) Employment Issues – sections 6.21-6.29;
(v) Other – sections 6.30-6.32.
In appendix II, I examine the implications of a specific proposal for the settlement: the establishment of a educational institution committed to the preservation and enhancement of a living Maori language.

6.3 Return to Rightful Owners of Public Assets for which Specific Grievances are Identified There will be a set of assets – typically – land, which will be identified as in public hands as the result of a specific grievance, and which should be returned to the appropriate Maori group as follows.
– Formal ownership (or in the case of (non-commercial) environmental assets) should be returned promptly;
– in addition as soon as possible with each asset there should be developed an appropriate management plan;
– the plan would, where appropriate, identify the immediate measures needed to upgrade the asset, where necessary , to a top quality level. Usually the Crown stewardship has been good, but in some cases the asset has been run down, and actions need to be taken to remedy these. Since there could be some disagreement as to what is a ‘top level’ a rough rule might be that of the top quartile of similar assets in the region. (Practically this might mean that the Crown returning a farm would have to bring the fences, building, pastures, and herds up to a reasonable standard. I appreciate the ‘top quartile’ level is arbitrary. However it is less arbitrary than trying to assess what would be the present standard of resource management had the resource been left in Maori hands.)
– the management plan should also usually include a staff development plan.
– the time horizon and Crown involvement in the plan will depend upon the features of similar assets in the region. (Practically this might mean that the Crown returning a farm would have to bring the fences, building, pastures, and herds up to a reasonable standard. I appreciate the ‘top quartile’ level is arbitrary. However it is less arbitrary than trying to assess what would be the present standard of resource management had the resource been left in Maori hands.)
– the management plan should also usually include a staff development plan.
– the time horizon and Crown involvement in the plan will depend upon the features of the assets. In some cases it could be very long. For instance, return of lands in forestry projects may be two rotations away. The Crown may have to accept some responsibilities when those lands are returned for a management plan at that time, or it may pay a lump sum now in lieu of that future task. What it cannot do is deny that decisions it has already taken place a responsibility on the Crown at the time when the land is returned to develop the land.

6.4 The situation will be broadly the same for non-commercial environmental assets, but in addition – the management plan may include some involvement with the Department of conservation or some other public agency;
– where there has been severe environmental depletion under Crown management (e.g. the shellfish of Te Oneroa-o-Tohe (Ninety Mile Beach) the Crown may be committed to a long term research program which would lead ultimately to an environmental plan;
– while in both these cases their could well be a joint sharing of management of the resource, the agreement might involve a labour and training program for members of the Iwi.

6.5 Return to Alternative Assets for Specific Identified Grievances. This option covers situations where the Crown may not be able to return the specific asset but may offer an alternative, either from elsewhere among the public properties, or by purchase from private interests. The treatment of these transfers will broadly conform to that described in sections 6.3 and 6.4.

6.6 Reparation for Assets which a Transfer is Not Possible. For some assets it will not be possible to return or provide an equivalent transfer. In such cases a cash grant to the relevant iwi, hapu, trust board, or ruunanga may be appropriate, or perhaps some other transfer in kind (e.g. assistance with a currently owned property). Note that this is quite separate from the remedies discussed below which are generally delivered on a general iwi, rather than to specific individuals or groups of individuals.

6.7 Cash Compensation. The return of assets associated with specific grievances is a necessary but not sufficient part of the reparations. As Appendix I explains in general terms the people of Muriwhenua have suffered major losses of income and wealth through a vicious circle precipitated by the past alienation of the assets in the past, and the following neglect of their region by central governments. It is not easy to envisage an appropriate compensation for these event, especially as te Tiriti o Waitangi guarantees the much broader notion of rangatiratanga, and not just ownership, or narrow property rights. A cash reparation would not be a remedy for the loss of all these broader rights, even were it to be sufficiently large. While probably some cash should be included as a part of the compensation, additional involvement by the Crown will be necessary as explained in the rest of this section.

6.8 The Development of Regional Industry Plans. In order to increase the employment and value added of the resources of the Muriwhenua people, as part compensation for the grievances, they and the Crown should develop for the region industry plans in the following activities:
-farm land use, including diversification possibilities and opportunities for further processing;
-forestry and forest processing;
– tourism opportunities;
– small business;
– transport and communications;
– fishing and fish processing, if that is a part of this reparation;
– education and training (section 6.13-6.19);
– an overall employment plan (parts of which are discussed in section 6.23-6.24);
– the environment (discussed in section 6. ).

6.9 Here is the scope of what would be in the farm sector plan, indicative of what might be in the others.
Farm land provides an opportunity for development, by creating jobs on the farm, in farm servicing, and in farm processing. But the land itself is only an opportunity for development. To use that opportunity to create jobs the iwi need to look at the alternatives, including possibilities (such as horticulture) which have not been investigated because the government has failed to commission the research. Possible uses need to be considered, relevant research commissioned, bottlenecks (such as advice services) identified. This also includes processing and marketing. At the end of the day each farm will make its own decision, but they will have better information, and they may co-operate together to exploit new opportunities.
For example, suppose the investigation suggested that the Far North’ s seasonal pattern , climate, and soils made attractive certain sort of cut flower growing to be marketed in Auckland and overseas (this example is entirely hypothetical). It might also show there was a need for a distribution channel and better transport links. The skills and experience might not be available. So a group of farmers might form a co-operative to market their flowers. The local poly tech might train up the skills needed. The collective might arrange better transport arrangement, and so on. The government will have funded the original investigation, and contributed towards the farm advisory service. And so on. the result would be a new industry for the region, more jobs, since the crop is labour intensive relative to current land uses.

6.10 Note that it is unlikely that the benefits of the regional plan will be confined solely to Maori. Indeed it might unwise to draw a line, since some of the beneficiaries would be members of the iwi who were working independently (e.g farming on their own). In any case, the government has neglected everybody in the region and not just the Maori. It may be sensible for the Crown and the Muriwhenua to invite the local authority to participate in the regional industry planning.

6.11 The local government has an important role in regional development, especially where it is involved with infrastructure, and facilitation of industry development. Other agencies have a role to playas well. In many cases the Crown can switch its emphasis or direction of its agencies from their present priorities to those of the Iwi. For instance the business development program could be strengthened in the Far North, with a particular remit to assist those Maori starting up businesses.

6.12 One of the more complicated ones is those government businesses which have been corporatized and later perhaps privatised. Before then they were directed by government to support various regional programs, which sometimes left the most distant regions untouched. Corporatization is not an excuse for the government refusing to compensate for past neglect. Again an example might help.
In the past the DSIR and other government research agencies put their commercial effort into products, processes, and services which benefited some regions and not others. The Far North was not one of the benefited regions. The government cannot say it is tough that the Far North’s turn has come after the corporatization of research (which converted its agencies into Crown Research Institutes). In this case it has the means, either by direct funding or by directing the Foundation on Research Science and Technology, to provide the region with the research it needs and to which it is entitled. (This research would cover environmental concerns such as the shellfish depletion on Te Oneroa-o-Tohe, as well as commercial investigations of land development.)

6.13 The Human Resource Development Program would be different again. With the possible exception of the forestry programs, it will have the longest time horizon of involvement by government. It is simply not possible to remedy overnight the impact of 150 plus years of injustice and neglect on the human resources of the iwi. Perhaps even two generations will be insufficient. Because it takes so long it should be started as early as possible.

6.14 Upgrading human resources usually involve interventions at key points in the life cycle. Most obviously the existence of a comprehensive and compulsory education system makes interventions aimed at school children attractive. These could be aimed at both educational and health attainment (supplemental programs which identify weaknesses and remedy them). Another (regrettably) key intervention point is when young people are on unemployment (benefit) registers. This offers the chance for them to remedy educational inadequacies, and obtain new work skills. A third intervention point is at pregnancy when both the mother and the child come before health specialists. After that point the opportunities for systematic intervention are less obvious, although there remains the possibility of regional wide health campaigns. For instance Maori leaders have expressed increasing concern about such issues as smoking and poor nutrition. If the Muriwhenua Iwi see instances of such health problems, then they may well want to organise (with the assistance of the government) regional wide educational and improvement programs.

6.15 The first step would be for the Iwi and the government to develop educational and health plans not unlike those already developed by Tainui, but at greater detail. The targets of the plan were discussed in section 4. There will need to be some sort of census of the target population to set the base lines and identify the size of the educational and health deficits. The strategy for eliminating these deficits must be primarily from the people, with assistance form experts.

6.16 The resources for the plan will come from the Crown, mainly by redirecting its spending priorities. It will not just be a matter of ensuring that the iwi have the same access to educational and health resources as the national average. The case is that the national average should be supplemented as a means of removing the deficits arising from the past wrongs.

6.17 The Muriwhenua Iwi may be willing for its Crown supported education and health plans to be carefully monitored and evaluated by professional researchers (who of course would do so in co-operation with the iwi, as is required by current research ethic protocols). Theirs would be the first of a number of such Iwi-Crown programs, and the crown and other Maori would benefit if the first could be treated as experimental in order to improve the effectiveness of the later programs. In return the Crown resource commitment and the quality of the interventions would likely to be higher if a major monitoring and evaluation research component was included.

6.18 The human resource development program will probably be targeted on those iwi in the region. It is difficult to see how it could be targeted effectively on those outside the region, other than as a part of a total Maori rawa-a-tangata strategy (its own effectiveness enhanced by the research that could be a part of the Muriwhenua program).

6.19 It will also not be possible to confine the benefits to the Muriwhenua people in the Far North. If an anti-smoking program also affected non-Muriwhenua Maori and Pakeha in the region, that would be a benefit which would make the Crown more able to fund it. Programs targeted at school children are more difficult. Usually education and health ethics would not allow discrimination between children with a similar deficit but different ethnic or tribal origins, if they were to be identified in the same study (e.g. they were at the same school). Perhaps the Muriwhenua iwi will welcome improvements in the education and welfare of the manuhiri, especially as the target set is to bring the tangata whenua up to their attainment.

6.20 One further health issue is the quality of the housing of the iwi. Overcrowding may also disadvantage children’s educational attainment. It is gener:ally thought that Maori housing is inferior to average, and they are more likely to suffer from overcrowding. This may well be true for the Muriwhenua iwi. It would seem sensible to carry out a census of Maori housing in the region, and if it proves to be seriously deficient relative to the average, to take measures to improve the iwi housing. We do not have enough information at this stage to do other than observe there will probably be a need for housing plan of some sort.

6.21 The measures thus far discussed will increase employment opportunities in the region, many of which will be directly taken by members of the Iwi, others for which they and other people will have opportunities to seize, with the iwi having less disadvantage than in the past because of the improvements in their health and education.

6.22 Among those employment opportunities are those arising out of
– land and other resource return and ownership;
– the processing and related opportunities which arise from the resource development;
– tourism;
– additional jobs in education, health, research, and environmental management;
– the additional jobs, typically in the service sector, which arise from increasing prosperity.

6.23 There are two complications to this story:
– the jobs and formal training opportunities will not come on stream immediately, so there could be a period of continuing high unemployment (section 6.24-6.25);
– there is probably a long run tendency for the region to lose jobs, because of higher productivity growth relative and the concentration of service work in cities outside the region (section 6.26-6.29).

6.24 Rather than waiting for employment opportunities in the regional economy to pick up, there should be a conscious program of creating temporary , but useful, jobs. ‘Useful ‘ includes where they contribute to social development such as marae refurbishment, environmental and recreational facilities, and housing, and/or where they contribute to economic development by the adding of infrastructure (transport, communications) or via long-term resource development (e.g. tourist attractions, noxious weeds/pest control, forest planting). At the same time such jobs will provide on hands-on work experiences and skills, and often should be integrated with formal training.

6.25 Obviously such a program needs a plan, identifying opportunities, priorities, and costs. It then needs government funding, the costs of which will not be great since it will reduce the costs of work-schemes, and add to government revenue. The exact form off the program needs to be worked out between iwi and government, but what is proposed here is merely extending a number of existing government schemes into a more comprehensive and directed package. The schemes is that they should be expected to phase out, in order that the workers can be absorbed into commercial work as that expands.

6.26 While it would be wrong to force business in the region to take on workers who were not profitable, for that merely decreases productivity, one might ask to what extent some of the service job losses are necessary .The tendency to concentrate such jobs in the cities may be at the convenience of the city dwellers rather than for productivity reasons. Government departments especially tend to over centralise, taking taxation from a region but not providing comparable jobs in it. As a part of the reparations each government department should be invited to think widely to the extent it can assist the Muriwhenua region by shifting more of its expenditure into the region, especially in terms of placing some of its workers there.

6.27 Two examples from one department – Justice – might illustrate the possibilities. The first might be to ask whether it would be possible to leave more low level judicial decision making in the region. For instance, would it be possible to have some cases settled on the marae presided over by kaumatua and kuia? I leave the details to those more expert than I to work through, but I am mindful that already the small claims court and proceedings under the Children and Young Person and their Families Act make greater use of ‘lay’ people. Moreover there is a tradition in Anglo-saxon law, parallel to that of the Maori, in which three justices of the peace sat as a lower court. Of course the Justice Department would fund such proceedings, but they are likely to prove cheaper and more effective than a full court. It may well be that exploring of such an option in the Muriwhenua region would be an experimental, and beneficial for other iwi. The intention would be that only low level offenses would be settled in these proceedings, and they would be subject to some oversight by a national tribunal.

6.28 A second example which the Justice Department might want to consider is whether its penal policies could be broadened so that mokopuna of the Muriwhenua who have been jailed, could serve part (or all) of their time in their iwi region. This is not a proposal to build a jail in the region. It might be no more than a form of early probation, in which the released would be placed under the control of the marae (who would be paid for that supervision). Again I suggest this in only the broadest outline, and present it as no more than an incremental development in present penal thinking, which could be tested in a region such as that of the Muriwhenua.

6.29 These two examples of how the Justice Department may be able to make a small increase in regional employment via tax revenues retained in the region, can no doubt be multiplied through all the other government agencies. The additional employment need not even go to members of the Iwi. Every additional job adds to the prosperity of the region. And additional jobs which c~nnot be located within the Muriwhenua rohe, but can be located to the near south (e.g. in Kaikohe) can also have some spinover effects on the farthest north. On the other hand the Far North District Council has the same obligation as central government to ensure that it decentralises its activities as much as is practical.

6.30 The above suggestions touch upon issues which while not in the competence of this economist must be mentioned. Economic reparation is a necessary , indeed a central part, of the total package. But there may be non-economic parts which are as important in fulfilling the total spirit of a just settlement which enhances te Mana o te Muriwhenua Iwi.

6.31 Among those non-economic, and perhaps wider, issues are the public symbols of te Mana o te Iwi, including the upgrading of the marae. There may also be a case for a major extension to the Kaitaia Museum to display some of the cherished taonga the Iwi has (and some of the wonderful work that its members are still producing) .The purpose of marae redevelopment and such a museum extension must be as a part of mana enhancement, but it will also create jobs in the short term, and develop skills and tourist attractions in the long.

6.32 A second example is that devolution is related to the wider than economic issues of tino rangatiratanga. It is not for me to comment here further on what undoubtedly is a major issue with which the nation of New Zealand will be struggling, except to say that devolution can enhance local responsiveness and hence contribute to development, and that where that devolution is associated with reduced taxation revenue going outside the region, or it being returned back to the region, that also adds to social and economic development.

7 Implementing the Strategy

7.1 It may be helpful to explain briefly how such a strategy could be implemented. I assume that the Tribunal finds grievances which are of such magnitude that the return of all the assets (even were it possible) will be an insufficient remedy. I also note, but do not detail, that parallel to the process here, but over a shorter time, the Crown will be returning assets to appropriate groups within the Muriwhenua Iwi. There may well be some interaction between these returns and the overall plan as when the upgrading of depleted assets is done as a part of the employment component of the plan.

7.2 I shall assume that the Crown acknowledges the general tenor of the wider nonspecific grievances and accepts that some sort of economic enhancement is an appropriate remedy. It will set up some joint working party (JWP) with the Muriwhenua Iwi to implement the process. The JWP might include officials from key government departments (Justice, Te Puni Kokiri, Labour, the regional development division of the Ministry of Commerce, the Prime Ministers’ Office). There will also be attached those from other relevant departments (e.g. Agriculture & Fisheries, Conservation, Education, Environment, Forestry , Health, Housing, Internal Affairs, Science, Social Welfare, Statistics, Tourism, Transport, Treasury, Women’s Affairs, Youth Affairs). It is unfortunate there is no government agencies with responsibility for a comprehensive oversight of social and/or economic development. To put all the relevant departments on the inner JWP would make it unwieldy. I would also suggest that the District and Regional Councils be invited to contribute to the JWP .

7.3 At an early stage the Iwi will have to appoint consultants to assist it in the JWP .It would be pointless for the Iwi representatives to be all voluntary , while working with full time officials. It is also important that there be much scope for consultation: between the Iwi representative on the JWP and the iwi, and also hui which involves the entire JWP. It has to be stressed, that without adequate consultation there will be many misunderstandings, which could compromise the durability of the settlement. In addition the consultation will enable the better identification of the specifics of te Mana o te Iwi.

7.4 The JWP will then identify the various components of the reparation program and commission reports on each under an umbrella of an overall plan (to ensure the various components fit together). There will be a sequencing of the reports. Earliest will be the overview framework, followed by commissioning a census of the iwi.[#] In all reports there will be a maximum of involvement of iwi at a consultative and paid levels, in order to empower the iwi, and increase their skills and training. (Thus the census of marae, identifying the work needed for redevelopment, may be carried primarily by iwi members.)
[#]The shortly to be released reports on individual iwi based on the 1991 Population Census will be a useful beginning.

7.5 Each component plan (e.g. education, employment, forestry, health, tourism, transport) will identify the need, measures to assess the need, target measures to be attained, a program to meet them, and possible funding options. It would include an implementation schedule, plus intermediate targets to assess progress. The various component plans will have different time horizons both in concept and implementation. For instance the tourist plan may look ten years out, but be primarily concerned with measures over the next five years, while the education plan will look two generations out and contain a program with government involvement over that entire period.

7.6 After a period the government may consciously withdraw from some planning activities, for both Crown and the Maori are anxious that the settlement should reduce the dependence of the iwi on government support. However the Iwi may continue to plan. Thus the government involvement in the tourism plan may be only for the first three years, but the Maori may later want to have a second five year plan.

7.7. It should be stressed that especially in sectoral planning, the approach would typically be indicative and strategic, rather than detailed. For instance the tourism plan would identify the strengths and weaknesses of the region, and the opportunities and threats, and it would contain indicative forecasts. It might contain a regional promotion budget, but it would not contain, say, specific proposals for accommodation, which would be left to private initiatives.

7.8 In may be appropriate here to mention that in my experience the Muriwhenua iwi are already under-resourced for the administrative tasks which they face. Undoubtedly there is considerable voluntarism and goodwill, but they face a very real need for a permanent administrating body. I draw attention to this for two reasons. First, the lack of administrative infrastructure is one of the consequences of the past alienation of the tribal resource base. Second, unless it is remedied at an early stage, both the Iwi and the Crown will experience considerable frustration setting up any process of reparation. In my view the establishment of a properly resourced administration to act on behalf of the Muriwhenua iwi must be one of the immediate priorities. In making this point I am not in any way criticising the work of the Ruunanga or the people who have carried the administrative burden in the past. Rather it is a recognition of the great difficulties with which they had to cope.

8. Resources and Finance

8.1 This topic can only be dealt with briefly .

8.2 In my view the part of the plan which involves the settlement should be funded by the Crown. That means that the Crown may be funding the human resources development program for a couple of generations, while much of the other sectors may be over in only ten or five years. (Environmental recovery may also involve a long recuperation time.) Never-the-less the Iwi would remained entitled to Crown funding after the period on the same basis as any other corporate (or where applicable) Maori body. Thus while there may be a short term boost in work scheme funds into the region (say for ten or five years), there will still be an entitlement to such funds (in the likely event they will still be in existent).

8.3 In the long run, and increasingly, the Iwi will have to depend upon its own funds for its own development. That is a part of maintaining its tino rangatiratanga. At this stage I leave that question unresolved.

9 Structure for Planning

9.1. At the moment the Muriwhenua are five separate iwi. There is a Ruunanga o Muriwhenua, but that has the sole function of pursuing claims related to grievances. There is no overarching representative of the Muriwhenua iwi.

9.2 If the claim was only concerned with the return of individual assets, there would be no need for a plan, although the Crown might find it easier to negotiate with all claimant groups together on some matters in order to avoid repetition and ensure consistency.

9.3 However it would be virtually impossible for the Crown to deliver reparations for the wider grievances on an iwi by iwi (or hapu by hapu) basis. Consequently there is a need for some wider group representing all the iwi o Muriwhenua. It is not for me to describe how this group should be constituted. It might be a federation of the iwi/ruunanga, the hapu, or whanau, or the iwi individually. I think, however, I can say a little about the organisation of this ‘ruunanganui’.

9.4 Because of the complexity of the task there will have to be a structure with different levels and responsibilities. My guess is that they will correspond to the hierarchy of planning identified in section 2.2.
– the kaumatua and kuia will be responsible for the overall set of goals, for te Mana o te Iwi. As is the Maori way they will consult with their people. (section 3)
– there will be a council of some sort which will take the goals of the elders and identify them into specific targets. (section 4) The council will formally be the members of the Joint Working Party with the government, but they will delegate practical operation to
– a committee of the council, which will consist of those concerned with operationalizing the specific targets, that is the planning stage. Probably each member of this committee will be responsible for one component of the plan, and perhaps be involved in one or two others. (e.g. the ‘health’ person is likely to be also involved with education and housing also. ) (section 5)
– each specific component will have its own iwi working group, who will be concerned with articulating and implementing the plan, and whose chairperson will be on the committee of the council. (sections 6 & 7)
– in addition there will be a separate subcommittee of the committee concerned with finance and administration. (sections 8 & 9).

9.5 There will need to be a set of protocols developed for this structure, which is only elaborate because the task is great. It simply attempts to divide the administration of the task into their components and levels. However first there needs to be a commitment by the Iwi o Muriwhenua to a ruunanganui.

9.6 It would be sensible to include a program for training the Maori involved in the complexities of administration Gust as the officials receive as a part of their career development) .

10 Conclusion

10.1 Despite the length of this submission I am acutely aware that it lacks sufficient detail. There are two reasons. Already mentioned is the question of length. In addition there needs to be more consultation with the iwi.

10.2 Never-the-less I think there is an overall conclusion which I summarise as follows.

When recommending reparations for grievances the Tribunal should observe that return or individual assets, even under the conditions proposed in sections 6.3-6.6 (that is at an appropriate performance standard and with a management plan), would be insufficient to remedy all the grievances that arise. Consequently the Tribunal should consider recommending as a part of the reparations for the wider grievances, a social and economic development program which would aim to restore te Mana o te Iwi, and provide a durable settlement. The scope of the plan the Tribunal may want to advocate could cover the issues discussed here, including resource and regional development, the creation of employment opportunities, and the upgrading or the human capital of the iwi. As a rough guide it should aim to raise over a period the social and economic standards of the Muriwhenua to a level not unlike that of the comparable non-Maori, while preserving and enhancing those things integral to their Maoritanga such as language, culture, and taonga. The measures should aim to reduce the dependence or the iwi on the government in the long-term, thus enhancing to the social, economic, and political rangatiratanga of the Muriwhenua.


The presenter of this evidence is not a Maori speaker, but this work is for an iwi who are among the greatest speakers of Maori in New Zealand, something which the writer respects and indeed thinks should be cherished. However there is a problem about the use of Maori in this evidence. My general approach has been to write in English incorporating standard Maori words which have entered the New Zealand/English language in a natural way. This word-processing package which was used to prepared this evidence does not have a macron, and I have spelt the word as would appear in a standard English dictionary .I have also consulted He Korero Waea-Whakaahua (The Maori Language Commission) for the technical economic terms which I used. By doing this, I hope that the Maori speakers of Muriwhenua will be able to use the proper term in their korero. For such words I have used the double letter (e.g. aa) in place of the a-macron. The contents of this endnote may not be acceptable to every (indeed to any Maori) but I hope they will at least be accept that the report is written by Pakeha who celebrates that the Maori language is still a part of the heritage of aIl New Zealanders, and that we should enhance and cherish the taonga.

Appendix I: The Loss of Land, and the Vicious Cycle
Why Returning the Land is not Enough

This is merely a note, substituting for a bigger paper – which perhaps should be commissioned by the Government or Tribunal. It addresses the question as why return of the land would be insufficient to compensate for past grievances concerning that land.

Suppose a piece of land had been unjustly taken, without any compensation, many years ago. Each year the iwi would have received income from that land, and that would be foregone, as far as they were concerned. (The possessor of the land would have received the income instead.) It is quite hard to calculate what that return on the land should have been. One approach might be to assume that the unjustly seized land was paid for at a fair market price, and the principle was invested in some very safe financial bond, with the interest compounding. Thus the loss of the land could be represented by the amount in that imaginary account. This still involves calculating
– the assumed sale price of the land at the time of its seizure;
– a rate of return on the investment.

Because of the long period involved, even small values at the time of unjust alienation would appear as large amounts many years later. For example, suppose a piece of land was taken 100 years ago for the sum of £100, and the interest return over the century averaged 3 per cent p.a. above the rate of inflation. The amount in the account today, including the original investment of £100 plus the retained interest, would amount to around $167,000. On the other hand the unimproved value of the land might be around $8700 today, if land values have increased with inflation.

I do not want to defend these figures, or even this precise method of calculation. But it illustrates that the value of the loss to the iwi of unjustly alienated land is likely to exceed the unimproved value of the land, perhaps by a factor of around 20 (for a 3 percent p.a. return). Restoring the land to the iwi will not cover its loss of income during the time it was taken.

There is a further point to be made here. The calculation of a fair compensation is littered with contestable assumptions. It is not necessary here to explain why I chose 3 percent p.a. for illustrative purposes,[#] but had I chosen 2 percent p.a., the amount in the imaginary account would be only around $63,000, while if it had been 4 percent p.a. the loss would ,have been $440,000. Less fair minded people might argue that if the land had been properly alienated the proceeds from the sale would have been wasted, and so the return should be zero.
[# A first long run approximation to the real interest rate is the real GDP growth rate.]

On the other hand the Maori might argue that if the land had been properly alienated, they would have got a much higher return than a safe financial bond. The alternative they would have in mind is that the money could have been invested in human capital, which seems to have a very high real rate of return, perhaps of around 20 per cent p.a. While all that return would not be saved, the outcome over the years would be a healthier, more employed, and higher earning population (and possibly a larger one, since mortality rates would have been lower – although so too might have been fertility rates).

We have reached an almost intractable point. Calculating a fair compensation this way leads to assumptions so debatable as to leave very wide ranges of uncertainty, to the point that the calculations are interesting but otherwise of little value.

An alternative approach might be to compare the state of the Maori today with the state of the non-Maori. Individual iwi will shortly be provided with material based on the 1991 Population Census which will give a detailed account of much of their socio-economic status. It is likely to show Maori figures substantially below the national averages – spectacularly so for some including, probably, for the Muriwhenua iwi. I shall not be surprised if some of the most deprived iwi are experiencing unemployment rates in excess of 50 percent, and incomes which are below 50 percent of the national average (even if social security benefits are included in income).

Since up to the middle of the nineteenth century , Maori standards of living were similar to the European,[#] we are confronted with the problem as to why Maori economic performance has been so much poorer than the European. There are a number of explanations, some more plausible than others. In all likelihood no single factor explains all the poor performance. However undoubtedly the most single important explanation, probably contributing to more than half the divergence, is the alienation of loss of the resource base which the Maori experienced.
[# As best we can judge.]

To see this consider that while in the middle of the nineteenth century Maori and European settler incomes were (say) numerically equal their derivation was quite different. Essentially the Maori wealth was human capital plus their resources, while the European wealth came from human capital and (imported) physical and technology. The transfer of the resources from the Maori to the European, usually by an unfair means, plus the depletion of other resources (e.g. the fishing resource in the Muriwhenua seas) often as a consequence of the loss of political authority and/or from poverty, lead to the current divergence of economic welfare between the two peoples.

I do not propose to detail this historical process here, although in my view much could be done – and should be done – to describe the process in systematic quantitative terms. However it is useful to summarize the analytics of the process.

The economist’s term is “cumulative causation”, or more popularly “a vicious circle”. That is the loss of some of the economic base led to the loss of further parts of the economic base, and a reduced ability to enhance it. Some mechanisms have already been alluded to. The loss of land meant a loss of income from land. The loss of income limited the acquisition of the education and occupational skills which enhance human capital (as well as contributing to poor health), which in turn meant more joblessness and less income, and so less ability to acquire physical and financial capital. This cycle was then repeated for the next generation. Thus the divergence from the original alienation increased.

In an interesting technical sense, implicit in the early discussion, the poor face high potential returns on their investments (including in human capital) but do not have the resources to invest. This divergence is not only central to the vicious circle, but it is the reason why if the earlier opportunity cost approach is used, high rates of return for lost opportunities should be incorporated in the analysis.

Recognizing that the loss to the Maori from the unjustified alienation was not only land, and consequential financial and physical assets, but also a severe loss of human capital suggests an alternative compensation strategy. As well as returning the land or its equivalent, and making some financial compensation[#] or in kind,[##] the Crown could take up a commitment to take measures to raise the human capital of the Maori to a comparable level equivalent with the non-Maori over a period in the future roughly comparable to that since the unjust alienation occurred (since a significant enhancement of human capital is not a simple matter , and takes generations). The main paper discusses a framework with which this could be pursued in the case of the Muriwhenua.
[# Perhaps based on a low real interest rate (say 1 per cent p.a.) for the number of years since the alienation.]
[## E.g. the improvements on the land being given as a part of the compensation.]

While there is a certain logic to this strategy, it also reflects a basic reality that it is most unlikely that the Crown will be able to afford in a practical sense a fair compensation for past grievances of the Maori if it is in financial terms only. To obtain some idea of the magnitude, the total value of unimproved land in New Zealand is currently around $90 billion. Suppose that only 5 per cent by value were unjustly alienated, for an average of 100 years, and that 3 per cent p.a. was judged to be a real return on the investment over the period. Then the total value of compensation (including any returned land) would also be around $90 billion. By comparison the total value of all government assets (measured in gross terms, ignoring liabilities) is around $50 billion.

Yet that $90 billion of assets which the thought experiment involves transferring to the Maori, amounts to about $200,000 a Maori. This may seem a large sum. Suppose each Maori invested $30,000 in housing,[# ]and invested the rest at 4 per cent p.a. (after benefit abatement). Their annual cash income would be about $7,000 a Maori higher. This would just be enough to bring the average Maori income up from $9000 a year to the non-Maori average of $16,000 ( figures from the 1991 Population Census) .This suggests the Maori needs a $90 billion transfer, which would bankrupt the New Zealand government, to provide (on the above assumptions probably a conservative) compensation for land claims, and yet it which just take Maori incomes up to the non-Maori average.[##]
[# i.e. paying off the mortgage and/or acquiring a better house.]
[## The figures in this paragraph are obviously “order-of-magnitude” ones, but robustly illustrate the enormity of the Maori income deficit.]

The fallacy in the previous paragraph is not the inaccuracy of the data (see the previous footnote) but the focus on financial wealth only, and the ignoring of human wealth. Unless the compensation addresses the enhancement of human capital it will be inadequate or unaffordable, or both.

‘his appendix has been concerned only with economic injustices. Tino rangatiratanga involves much wider issues than just economic ones, and probably involves quite different means of redress the grievances.


The Muriwhenua iwi are proud