Research and Development Spending:

A COMPARISON BETWEEN NEW ZEALAND AND OTHER OECD COUNTRIES. Review NZ Science Review, Vol 50 (1) 1993, p.24-27.

Keywords: Growth & Innovation;

Every economy faces a problem as to how much it should spend on each commodity. In the typical market the decision is made by a multitude of individual purchases. No one person decides on how much bread should be made, but in a rough and ready way, the outcome seems broadly efficient and fair (if the income distribution is fair).

But suppose the commodity cannot be effectively delivered in the market? How then is the decision to be made. One strategy is to privatise the commodity, leaving the demand and supply decision to individual actions. But that does not always give a good answer. and as a result too little or too much is produced, or that which is produced can go to the wrong people.

Reluctantly, perhaps, then, the government has to get into task of creating an artificial demand and possibly supply, usually through some bureaucracy funded from the public purse. This does not solve the query, but transfers the decision to some bureaucratic mechanism.

This is about where we have got to in the science debate. There are still sounds off right who would hand it all over to the market, although it is instructive that despite so sounding for many years they still have not given an intelligible account of the position which relates to the reality of research. Ignoring them, but not forgetting there are effective market solutions in some areas, we are left with the decision of the public contribution to research in level and form.

At this point a fundamental change occurs in the type of the argument. Those who advocate privatisation do not have any vision of what the level of supply should be. Rather they see the establishing of a process through which the level is chosen. It is a perfectly sensible approach given the assumption of a feasible market solution. No one has to say what should be the amount of bread baked. Simply setting up a market process is sufficient.

However once the public mechanism is introduced. there is no such process. although the inept may well seek one, perhaps muttering about “outputs”, and “purchasers”. Instead. the decision has to be made in terms of the outcome. If bread was supplied by the state, then the state would want to directly assess whether it was baking enough. Of course it is rarely easy to decide what is the appropriate level – in the case of bread it might involve nutrition experts, who would certainly quarrel, while economists would have some uneasy doubts about their recommendations paying enough attention to the issue of the opportunity costs. When it comes to research and development, it is even less likely that an expert panel will be convincing. especially as the experts are likely to be beneficiaries of the outcome.

So we might make comparisons. Consider a scatter diagram for 23 OECD countries, relating their real per capita GDP to their spending on R&D as a proportion of GDP. The best fit line shows there is a tendency for rich countries to spend relatively more than poor OECD countries on R&D. Nevertheless. while New Zealand is markedly poorer than the OECD average (82 percent on this 1988 measure) its spending on R&D is not only below average, it is also below the regression line. New Zealand ought to be spending around 1.5 percent of its production on R&D. It is only spending about 0.9 percent. On an international comparison we ought to be spending 60 percent more than we do.

One of the major gaps is in our business spending on R&D. The same scatter diagram with business spending instead of total spending evidently suggests that our business R&D is a disaster. Instead of spending the 0.8 to 0.9 percent of GDP the international comparison suggests, New Zealand is spending about 0.3 percent. That is partly a measurement phenomenon, because there is less incentive for New Zealand firms to report their R&D spending since they are not entitled to tax breaks. However Australian business which gets a 150 percent write-off (New Zealand’s is only 100 percent) reports only 0.4 percent of GDP spending on business R&D.

The problem is not with government spending on R&D, for the scatter diagram of government R&D spending against GDP per capita shows New Zealand is close to (but still below) the best fit line. However we also need to look at the mix of spending.

The other factor is the industry mix. We would expect Switzerland with its strong pharmaceutical industry to be spending more on business R&D than New Zealand. A major contaminant in all international R&D studies is defence spending, where obviously New Zealand has less of an interest. These points are considered further below.

Government Spending on R&D by Activity
Percent of GDP

ACTIVITY New
Zealand
Reference
Six
Defence 0.01 0.07
Agriculture 0.25 0.12
Industry 0.10 0.21
Energy 0.01 0.05
Exploration of Earth 0.10 0.07
Industrial Infrastructure 0.01 0.07
Environmental Protection 0.03 0.03
Health 0.04 0.04
Social 0.03 0.08
TOTAL 0.58 0.72

Table 1 is the best I can construct. although it suffers from the omission of university research spending. The comparison involves six OECD countries chosen by Frank Edwards of the Ministry of Research, Science, and Technology: Australia, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Norway, and, Sweden, small affluent economies, with a bias to resource processing.

While New Zealand spends 0.9 percent of GDP on total R&D compared to a 1.7 percent average for the six reference countries, with Ireland at the bottom (0.8) and Australia (1.2) the next above New Zealand. What the tabulation suggests is that New Zealand government spending is weak on R&D on defence, on social research, and on industry, energy, and industrial infrastructure. It is strong on the agricultural sector, and exploration of the earth.

New Zealand has a larger than average agriculture sector, which might explain about half the difference there. The rest may reflect the tendency for the New Zealand government to provide agricultural R&D, whereas in other countries it may be more an industry responsibility. However there may be definitional differences. (Where is fisheries and forestry? Perhaps food processing manufacturing is in agriculture.)

This definitional effect may explain part of the smaller R&D spending on industry and associated activities. but it also may also reflect our lack of priority ( even faith) in manufacturing as a part of our economic future. The vision seems to be of a sector which is a pale imitation of foreign manufacturers, importing their technology (and perhaps their skilled workers, if the sector needs any). An even bigger worry is the lack of business R&D which is normally concentrated in manufacturing.

The international comparisons suggest that our private sector R&D performance leaves a lot to be desired, although we cannot rule out that by a strange quirk of fate we have an exceptionally low technology industry – in which case successful economic development is probably impossible (without being preceded by major emigration). We need to tease out to what extent this technically impoverished manufacturing is a failure of the private sector itself; to what extent it is a failure of government policies towards the private sector, and to what extent it is that poor government industrial R &D spending means there are not the spin-offs into the private sector.

The relative emphasis of New Zealand government R&D spending on exploration of the earth is a puzzle. It cannot be explained by our relative share of the earth, because both Australia and Norway (among the reference six) have lower population densities (more earth per person – or GDP), while the ratio for Sweden and Finland is similar .Again we have a case for further systematic investigation. In the interim I tentatively suggest that we have an example of the New Zealand establishment’s greater ease with earth than people.

In summary, what the comparisons thus far have suggested is that government R&D spending is not too far off track for the low income OECD country we are, but the product mix is a bit odd, and needs to be reviewed, especially the little we are spending on industry and social issues. I am tempted to recommend an additional government R&D spending of 0.1 percent of G D P, say $80 million, about a fifth of which to be spent on social issues and the remainder on industry including infrastructure and energy.

But the biggest worry is the poor R&D spending by business. Over the last seven years there has been a lot of fluffing around by government – especially its more market advisers. It is time to deliver. Since R&D involves long lead times, I would be inclined to do something urgent, if only to signal the government commitment. A 150 percent deductibility of R&D would bring us into line with Australia (and may improve our statistic merely by improving industry reporting). Because of the imputation regime for corporation tax the fiscal cost would not be great, but it would direct manufacturing towards the high technology where is our future, if we are to have one.

I favour government support for private R&D because of the evidence that a firm, even an industry, is unable to capture all the benefits from its R&D, so it will undersupply if left to itself. Tax deductibility as an interim measure, but there is some common sense in following the Australian practice. Even the finance sector, that bastion of free markets opposed to government intervention. is wont to pursue this argument. Recently the New Zealand Bankers Association called for a government response to the Australian government’s introduction of tax concessions for overseas banking units, fearful they would lose business to Sydney. The bankers are on weaker grounds, because there is not the same externality effects as for R&D. But one must welcome the new pragmatism towards the market which they are exhibiting, assured that they are not merely seeking their own self interest at the taxpayer’s expense, but are recognising that their past anti-interventionist stance was ideological and inefficient.

These musings arose from reading Frank Edwards’s Research and Development Spending, a valuable book In terms of its international comparisons, and hopefully the first of a number of careful MoRSI’ studies which will become increasingly more sector specific. Edwards’s study adds another intriguing insight when it traces the R&D performances over the 1980s. While other countries have lifted their spending – from 1.4 percent of GDP in 1981 to 1.7 in 1989 – New Zealand’s has declined – from 1.4 to 0.9. Especially interesting is his observation that countries poorer than New Zealand have been deliberately accelerating their R&D spending. Only two countries dropped their ratio over the period. The other was the UK from 2.4 to 2.25 percent – now that its oil boom of the 1980s is over we can expect it to be one of the poorest performing economies in the OECD.

The weakness of international comparisons is not the problems of definition and error, nor of the need for careful detailed analysis. More fundamental is the possibility that every one is out of step except us. The rest of the OECD unwisely increased spending on government R&D and subsidised private activities. And how they suffered for such a recklessness: economic growth through the 1980s, overall falling unemployment, with some prospects of growth in the 1990s. If only they had listened to our far-sighted advisers, who ignoring any evidence were able to pontificate on R&D strategy, cramming it into an ideologically committed market framework.

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Prostate Economics

Listener 20 February, 1993.

Keywords: Health Economics

The recent outburst over the relative importance between prostate cancer and cervical cancer has numerous aspects to it, some of which illustrate economic principles. Most people will be aware that women are prone to cancer of the cervix, and that regular examination can identify pre-cancerous conditions which usually can be simply treated to prevent cancer. The prostate gland in men’s lower abdomen – the location is presumably the reason the parallel is drawn – is also prone to cancer. Prostate examination can identify a cancerous condition but, and this is what is crucial for the economic analysis, treatment at this stage is not nearly as effective as treatment made after a positive cervical smear test.

Much was made, in the more hysterical outbursts, about the fact that about four times as many men die of prostate cancer as women die from cervical cancer. But that tells us little. You do not deploy resources, according to how big a problem is: deployment should be based on how effective the resources are at tackling the problem. The difference in mortality between the two conditions may simply indicate that prevention of cervical cancer is more effective than, treatment of prostate cancer.

That we do not have a totally effective treatment of prostate cancer is not even a reason for a massive increase in research on it, or for seeking a test identifying the precancerous condition. Male prostates are much the same throughout the world, so any increase in our efforts would be minuscule in terms of the world effort.

This leads me to medical research strategy. The previous remark might suggest that New Zealand should do no medical research, but bludge off the rest of the world, or confine itself to issues specific to New Zealand – such as where our environment or social behaviour differs, or how the Maori gene pool sometimes appears to leave them more prone to some conditions. However, local research is not for output purposes only. It assists the transfer of findings from overseas By having top-level medical research units in New Zealand we ensure that we have the best (and early) access to research done elsewhere, allowing us to apply it effectively here.

I have very strong views on this matter, because that is what went wrong with economic advice in the 1980s. The Treasury has no research capacity, and naively adopted overseas analysis without any of the moderation and maturity of understanding which research experience gives. This was a major cause of the economic devastation of recent years, but I won’t go on.

Where the public discussion on prostate cancer has been misled is about the failure to distinguish between productive and prudent strategies.

By productive I mean that there is strong evidence that the strategy works, and the resources used are effective, We know that stopping tobacco smoking reduces susceptibility to certain sorts of cancer. Over the years an impressive set of research studies, on different populations, using different methods, collectively confirms this judgement. Potentially then, anti-smoking campaigns prevent cancer. although the resources need to be spent effectively (which explains the recent shift to campaigns targeted at vulnerable groups). Reducing smoking (better still, giving it up altogether) is a productive medical strategy.

On the other hand we don’t have a set of comprehensive studies of the impact of the sun on melanomas (skin cancers). There is research evidence which is suggestive white Australasians, who live in a sunnier clime than their European cousins, suffer more – but the total evidence is not overwhelming in the way that smoking evidence is. However, the personal cost of being careful about sunburn is not great, so it is sensible to be prudent. It is probably also prudent for the country to campaign a little to ensure that everyone knows this, but it it not nearly as urgent a priority as stopping smoking (and preventing the young from starting).

Similarly, there is no great objection to a campaign to increase awareness of prostate cancer, although it is less clear what then happens. The information does not assist prevention, although the earlier the detection, the more likely that any treatment will be successful.

You may think it unfair that we put all the emphasis and public spending on cervical cancer. That may be pretty tough for us men, but mother nature does not always treat people equally: the good news is that not a single man has died from cervical cancer. If a decision was made to spend more equally on men and women’s preventative health (it would be a political decision, for there is no economic logic for or against it) we should not look for the closest male parallel to cervical cancer. After considering all the possibilities, I should not be surprised if we alighted on heart conditions, which kill many more men (and some women) than does prostate cancer. Some sensible measures include stopping smoking (again) keeping one’s weight down, and a bit of exercise. Scientifically, some of that advice is productive: some is prudent.

I had this column checked out by a cancer specialist, and asked him for a (non-hysterical) approach to prostate cancer. He told me it would be prudent to consult your doctor for any continuing urinary problems. And if your GP suggests a rectal examination as part of routine examination, take it like a man.

********

Added in August 2002 Despite there have been considerable advances in our understanding of prostate cancer in the last decade, and some advances in treatment, the basic themes and advice in this column remain as true today as it did when it was written.

For further information visit New Zealand Cancer Society

The Decade Of Greed

Listener: 6 February, 1993

Keywords: Business & Finance;

Retiring BNZ managing director Lindsay Pyne will be remembered for his phrase, ‘The decade of greed’, well after his impressive achievement of turning around the Bank of New Zealand is long forgotten, The expression was used in an advertisement rejecting Winston Peters’s various calls for an inquiry into past actions of the bank. Peters reflects a widespread belief that some actions, before Pyne took over, were immoral, scandalous, or even criminal. There is a public bitterness over the billions of dollars that seemed to disappear, and a deep suspicion that they disappeared into self-enrichment. That much of this money was fictitious, or wound up wasted in untenanted buildings and unprofitable ventures, fails to convince the sceptics that none ended up in private pockets.

The problem the bank faces is that some people will not be satisfied until the probity of every transaction is proved. Take the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI). It operated in 73 countries. In Britain alone there were 100 million transactions, only 2.5 percent of which are being investigated. We know BCCI was corrupt, hence its nickname the ‘Bank of Crooks and Criminals’, but just imagine having to sift through all the paper if the bank had been a little less larcenous.

However, a number of Australian inquiries – usually by royal commissions – found widespread fraud and corruption across the Tasman. Why did events of similar proportion not happen here? That does not mean I think any particular institution here is guilty but as a researcher who draws parallels to generate tentative hypotheses, I am puzzled. What the Australian evidence does suggest is that incompetence was much more widespread than criminality. I am sure that was true on this side of the Tasman too.

But even if it was all incompetence, Pyne and others who leapt in to disabuse the public of Peters’s claims have to explain what was special about the 1980s. Why won’t the 1990s be a decade of greed too? The BNZ advert ‘we’ve addressed what went wrong and put things right’ was short on specifics, except to hint there have been sackings: ‘many former executives have left the bank’. But why are we to assume that the new executives are more competent (or whatever) than the last ones? How do you know that, given the chance, your favourite financial institution will not repeat its incompetence with your funds.

It is all very well saying that greed once dominated business. What has taken its place? Too often the answer is a euphemism for greed, like ‘pursuit of profit’ or ‘self interest’. We should not expect a conversion to a new objective, but the business environment needs to ensure greed/self interest/pursuit of profit is harnessed to the common good. Little has been done to reform that regulation.

There are a few improvements, like the Serious Fraud Office – at the bottom of the cliff. But I would have thought we needed a capital gains tax to stop lax avoidance which explodes into speculation, a new set of auditing standards, restrictions on – or public exposure of – donations to political parties and lobby groups, improvements in accountability to shareholders, the revised Company Act (about to be passed after hanging around for yonks), and a published code of business ethics.

Interestingly, the main lobby group for the pursuit of greed as a driving force in human relations appears uninterested in such reforms. The Business Roundtable has notably failed to address the one thing the chief executive officers on it know something about – business practices. Instead they freely give their opinions on matters on which they lack competence.

Take their study on Constitutional Change in New Zealand, which supported the current electoral system, opposing MMP. The three writers were economists who reported not a single publication of their own on constitutional matters. Two were Americans – an odd choice for a commentary on a British-based constitutional system (the third was an ex-employee of the Roundtable). They seemed unaware that in 1978 and 1981 the party with most votes did not form a government, or that in 1981, 1984, 1987 and 1990 the party that formed the government promptly broke major election promises.

Nor did the writers appear conscious of the public worries about enormous donations which some businesses made to political parties in 1987 and 1990. Allan Hawkins, now languishing in jail, made a $250,000 grant ‘in recognition of the good work’ while a Roundtabler (membership by invitation).

You might ask whether businessmen, who cannot tell the difference between an incompetent economist and a competent political scientist on a subject, are capable of appointing executives who are competent to run their businesses. And if Roundtablers have difficulties with such heady intellectual heights perhaps they should stop commenting on education, health and a variety of other areas well outside their competence. How can the public ‘respect business’, as the Roundtable chief executive officer, Roger Kerr, pleads, when they keep wheeling up uninformed and self-serving reports, while avoiding commenting on that which they know something about?

That is their best chance of dealing with the public worries that Peters articulates. Rather than berate him, they should demonstrate in action and counsel on business policy that they are doing their best to ensure a ‘decade of greed’ won’t happen again.

Asymmetrical Sex

Listener 23 January 1993.

Keywords: Regulation & Taxation;

As with many service industries, there is not a lot written on the economics of prostitution. Yet the activity has a peculiarity well worth reflecting upon in a column precipitated by the official committee inquiring into its relation to Aids.

To simplify, although it is legal to offer money for sex, it is illegal to offer sex for money. I know of no other example of this asymmetry in a market.

Suppose the law applied to refrigerators. Those who wanted fridges could wander the streets seeking potential suppliers, offering money. But woe betide Fisher & Paykel et al if ,they were to advertise or display their wares. Probably, they would set up shops supplying, say, electric stoves, with cubby holes at the back where one would retreat to when – perhaps after a little prompting from the salesperson – you indicated you wanted to preserve your food as well as cook it.

There are some who would be enthusiastic about banning the advertising and display of fridges, and almost every thing else. They take the view that marketing is wasteful, and that we can reduce costs by abandoning it. I have some sympathy with this perception, but it is also true that, when I want a refrigerator, the promotion assists me in choosing the one closest to my needs, and it keeps suppliers on their toes. Without that promotional effort I would almost certainly end up with an inferior product, wasting part of the money outlaid.

But where to draw the line between useful and useless marketing? My impression is that intelligent consumerism has reduced the amount of socially useless advertising. There are also some restrictions on advertising, including truth and information requirements, and to protect less informed consumers – especially children (eg with liquor and tobacco advertising). But, except in extreme cases, it has not been possible to legislate against wasteful promotion without affecting useful marketing.

You might say that an honest man should be able to walk down a street without being hassled by the sex worker’s sales promotion. I would be more responsive to that argument if an honest woman could walk down the street without being hassled by wolf whistles and worse. At least the man is being offered a deal. (Incidentally, I was surprised at the police survey which asked whether we objected to being approached by overtly gay policemen. What about being approached by overtly macho heterosexual cops?)

I guess this would all be a matter of some lightheartedness if, in reality, the asymmetry between client and service provider did not matter. As it happens the vast majority of fridge purchasers are decent people. But suppose a minority had a thing about the salesperson, and in the back room were likely to beat up the provider, or even murder them.

This was well illustrated in Melbourne, where prostitution is decriminalised. (The Victorian government’s 1985 Neave Report on Prostitution is well worth the read although it is interesting rather than salacious.) Until 1987 the lowest level of sex workers – street-walkers – were still subject to violence from their customers. Then the police decided that they had a responsibility to protect the women involved. That option is more difficult under our law, which labels sex workers as criminals and their customers as victims.

It is the asymmetry in the transaction I find offensive. Men – for they form the bulk of parliamentarians and judiciary – have made and enforce laws which increase their power relative to the women involved, for the man in the transaction is not nearly as vulnerable to the law as the woman (although, in making this point, I recognise that there is also homosexual prostitution). It not only symbolises the asymmetry of power we find in society, but it represents a blatant hypocrisy.

It is a hypocrisy far worse than we will experience, say, with the debate on the Health and Disability Services Bill. The bill that has been returned to Parliament no longer has a reference to profitability as a goal of health providers. But its provisions still include that the providers be run as successful businesses. The fact is that successful businesses make profits.

The likelihood is that straight after the 1993 election a profitability requirement will be imposed on our public hospitals, blood transfusion units, et al. Yet parliamentarians will get up there and deny that the bill has anything to do with profit; then they will troop through the lobbies to institutionalise profit-making (sorry, I mean successful business practices) in the health system. It is this sort of hypocrisy that has given Parliament such a bad name, and why so many people rose in wrath to support MMP.

At least the Opposition will oppose the business provisions in the bill. The public silence on the law on prostitution is much more deceitful.

My point here is not necessarily to argue that we should decriminalise prostitution but that the law should treat both transactors on the same footing. Decriminalisation is one solution, but we could make it illegal to offer money for sex. Instead we prefer the hypocrisy of leaving one part of the population vulnerable to the predations of the other – in the name of morality.

Note (added in February 2003): The second paragraph remarks ‘I know of no other example of this asymmetry in a market.’ I have since realised that some transactions involving juveniles are legally asymmetric. It is not illegal for one to buy tobacco products, but it is illegal to sell to them; aq juvenile can purchase many products (other than food and basic sustenence) on credit, but the supplier cannot enforce the repayment. It is not obvious, however, that johns are juvenile.

Of Pigs and People

Listener 9 January, 1993.

Keywords: History of Ideas, Methodology & Philosophy

This is about pigs. It could be in honour of Charles Lamb’s ‘A Dissertation on Roast Pig’ from which I learnt of the art of the essay, but I am not going to write about that. Nor am I going to write about Animal Farm where all animals were equal, but pigs were more equal than others. And, while I am: tempted to write about how pigs might fly and the health reforms might work, I leave that to Minister of Health Simon Upton, who also writes essays. As for ‘to market, to market’ the fate of the pigs involved is too painful to write about.

I could write about a previous minister of finance known as ‘Piggy’ and worse – but won’t. Or write about his successor, who became a pig farmer. The farm became insolvent and, in the ensuing litigation, the farm manager said of our intrepid ex-minister: “All along the figures being given were what Roger [Douglas] reckoned could happen and would like to happen, but wasn’t happening.” By even stranger coincidence Douglas’s equivalent across the Tasman is also a pig farmer, despite being promoted to prime minister. Recently an animal rights group picketed Keating’s piggery, objecting that “the pigs spend their lives locked in tiny pens with concrete floors”. But at least the operation is a going concern, as is Australia – its national output (GDP) rose 20 percent between the March years of 1985 and 1992, while ours rose one percent.

Instead I am going to write about John Stuart Mill (1806-73), who was not a pig farmer but one of the most brilliant 19th-century polymaths. He wrote on ethics, philosophy, scientific method, social policy – and was arguably the last great classical economist, challenged only by Karl Marx (1818-83), for after them came neoclassical economics with its more elaborated theory of market demand.

Mill can be a code word for being a member of the New Right. His On Liberty (1859) is an impassioned plea against the totalitarian state in defence of liberalism and tolerance. But he did not stop there. One of his last works was the pro-feminist The Subjection of Women. In between, in 1867? Mill wrote the definitive work on Utilitarianism, in which he developed the theories of his father James Mill (1773-1836), and his father’s mentor Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832),

Utilitarianism is the doctrine that decisions should promote good consequences with Bentham arguing for the promotion of ‘pleasure’ and the prevention of ‘pain’. Ironically, the neoclassical theory of market demand is based upon utilitarianism, and today economists’ public policy recommendations tend to be justified in terms of ‘the greatest good for the greatest number’ (although ‘greatest’ twice creates a logical problem). This utilitarianism is inconsistent with the extremist libertarianism with which Mill is sometimes associated

However, Mill could see a flaw in the early utilitarian hedonism because it assumed that all pleasures were of the same quality, to be compared on the same scale. This is where pigs comes in for he wrote ‘It is better to be a human dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question. The other party to the comparison knows both sides.’

That raises an acute dilemma for public policy. Is our objective to make pigs and fools happier, or is it to help them become humans and philosophers? Economists might say that is not a question they are competent to answer, and they are not even sure who is. But it remains a practical policy problem.

For instance, the Treasury submissions to the Royal Commission on Broadcasting ignored the issue. Despite commission rejection, its approach drove the following broadcasting reforms, moderated only by the then Minister of Broadcasting, Jonathan Hunt. When people complain of the subsequent fall in broadcasting standards, they are not simply advocating elitism but harking back to John Stuart Mill.

The same thing happened when fundamental science was given lower priority in the research. science and technology reforms. Pigs and fools don’t care about the origins of the universe or whatever, humans and philosophers do, even though the answers may not be satisfying.

It also occurs in the populist versus elitist controversy in art which is simmering in a number of centres.

Again, our very education system is being systematically reprogrammed to give higher priority to a vocational education, with a corresponding downgrading of a liberal one. How many of today’s business graduates have studied philosophy?

So often we avoid the quandary of intellectual quality by ignoring it. It is as if we i are committed to producing the happy pigs of Animal Farm – no wonder there is so much unhappiness. In the 1950s Peter Tomoroy, while director of the Auckland City. Art Gallery, said we were “a land inhabited by 60 million sheep and two-and-a-half million Philistines”. Forty years later we have fewer sheep.

Early colonists commented how well pigs adapted here. J S Polack (1838): “These amiable creatures lead a much pleasanter life in New Zealand than in any other portion of the globe I have seen, except in the principal cities of the United States.” George Chamier (1891): “The pig has some distinguishing qualities of a successful colonialists so the race prospered and multiplied.” Seventy years later James K Baxter added:
Love is not valued much in Pig Island
Though we admire its walking parody.

It’s in the Blood

Listener 19 December, 1992

Keywords: Health;

Richard Titmuss’s The Gift Relationship: from Human Blood to Social Policy is one of the most insightful social-science texts of the 20th century. In it he shows that how a community handles its blood-transfusion service is a paradigm for its handling of overall social relations. Which makes it all the more telling to step back from the current row and place the quality of the blood supply in the context of the total health service.

I want to address two key features about the current situation, First, the Department of Health is undergoing yet another of its reorganisations, (Alan Maynard, a well-known British health economist, describes the British changes as “redisorganisation”.) Can officials in such circumstances focus on providing health advice? Are the new systems sufficiently bedded in to ensure that as a health problem arises it is identified and smoothly dealt with. Or is a problem likely to fall between the raw edges in the new organisation? One bureaucrat recalls it taking more than five years for his department to recover from a single major reorganisation,

Moreover, the changes have favoured the employment of accountants, business managers, economists, industrial relations experts, public affairs advisers, and sociologists at the expense of those with medical training. That means there is an increasing proportion of a diminishing staff (already distracted by yet another reorganisation) who have the competence to recognise a medical problem When some medical issue comes across the non-medic’s desk it is likely to be seen as a political, resource or social issue rather than as a health one. I am not knocking the rolc of the non-medical specialist, of which I am one, But do not forget our limitations.

The tension between health provision and the resources available to fund it has been central to medical policy in recent years as new medical technologies have leapt beyond the means to finance them, Given that the government has been cutting back on health spending (a greater proportion of which is on non-medical components), the tensions in parts of the health service are becoming unbearable, It is surely no accident that one of the last things the Minister of Health said about the issue was: “I have two options. I can raise more money, , , for the vote health. Or I must have a go at some tricky juggling of services to make hepatitis C a screening priority.”

Fair enough, but we must ask whether the current focus on public funding cuts is obscuring consideration of the quality of health care.

Things could be worse, A week or so before our case broke out, a scandal blew up in France over the provision of Aids contaminated serum – more than 5000 haemophiliacs and others could be affected. Reuters reported that one reason given for the failure to withdraw the tainted stocks was that the Natiollal Blood Transfusion Centre “was under Health Ministry pressure to become profitable and competitive in Europe”. The officials used up existing contaminated stocks rather than pay for disinfected imported blood products. Could such a scandal happen in New Zealand?

Currently Parliament has before it the Health and Disability Services Bill, which will corporatise much of the public health system and require each hospital (oops, I mean crown health enterprise) to act as ‘a successful business’ – the government’s euphemism for making a profit.

What is especially dangerous here is that we have few protections against medical malpractice that could arise from a rapacious medical provider, In the US, for instance, doctors are kept in line by the threat of litigation for damages, but that avenue has been all but closed by our Accident Compensation Act. Instead we have a ramshackle collection of professional ethics and self-enforcement, marginal legal remedies and (often impotent) public outrage inspired by the odd journalistic investigation, If there is some doubt about how effective our protections are in the present health system, common sense suggests they will be even less so in a profit-driven one.

The economist’s point is not about punishing the wrongdoer, but rather that we need an incentive system that discourages future wrongdoing, What will be the disincentive to stop medical enterprises ignoring health needs in the pursuit of profit?

The bill tidies up the present legislation on blood (in a supplementary order paper tabled after the public made its written representations to the select committee). It continues the limitations on advertising and the prohibitions on the paying of blood donors. But it also proposes to give the health minister wide discretion to permit competition in the blood-provision industry, including presumably – although the bill coyly does not mention it – competition from profit driven providers, We know the effect of competitive entry on other public-sector agencies. Warding off the threat of private firms has typically resulted in them making themselves more profitable and competitive … Possibly some mechanism is to be introduced to protect the quality of the blood supply and the overall quality of the health service, although none is provided in the bill.

Tltmuss’s insight was that the community’s treatment of blood provides insights into the whole of the health system. Have we not had a grave warning about the effects of the redisorganisation, the burgeoning numbers of non-medical staff, the preoccupation with resource usage, the reduction in funding and the profit line? The country’s health and best medical practice will have difficulties being priorities above that lot.

The 1977/78 Downturn in the New Zealand Economy

This was a part of the (Long) December 1992 version of In Stormy Seas which was never published.
Keywords: Statistics;

The problem of the 1977/78 downturn arose in a different way again. In the late 1980s advocates of the policies loosely called “Rogernomics” were wont to justify their proposals by referring to the poor economic performance in the preceding decade, quoting the GDP growth statistic. We shall see in Chapter 5 their account of post-war growth was confused. Nevertheless, the conscientious had to check out their claims.

It became evident that some of the poor performance occurred by a judicious choice of beginning and end points of the period (leaving out years of high growth), but that there was some truth in the story. It was also evident that the 1977/78 year played a key role in keeping the overall average growth rate down.

In that year the official statistics recorded a 2.7 per cent contraction in the economy, a sharper fall than any other year recorded up to the time of writing. To give some idea of the size of this effect, suppose that for nine years of a 10 year there was a 1 per cent growth rate on average, and the tenth there was a 2.7 per cent contraction. In that case the decade average would be .6 per cent p.a., almost halving the growth rate.

Did the economy experience a record contraction in 1977/78? There is no doubt that some year has to be the record, but I was puzzled about the size of the 1977/78 decline. Especially as employment had risen .5 per cent for the year, somewhat inconsistently with a record decline (NZYOB 1981:679).

A check of the sectoral contribution’s to GDP suggested that manufacturing and domestic trade were key to the contraction. Other smaller sectors also contracted, but the official statistics record manufacturing net output decreased 6.2 per cent, and domestic trade decreased 5.5 per cent. Given that each contributes about 20 per cent of GDP, the two sectors explain 2.4 percentage points of the total contraction.

Frustratingly, the wholesale price index series was terminated in 1978, and a new producers price index series introduced. While there was some overlap, the change of series meant one could not check the change in the following year. Nominal series for manufacturing and domestic trade are available. Checking them suggests the problem was either in the price deflators, or an endpoint problem to be explained below in terms of inventories. The best course seemed to be to examine contemporary accounts.

The first source was the July 1978 budget speech. Here is an extract.
“By early 1975, New Zealand’s terms of trade had declined by 43 per cent as against the peak in 1973. … Since the end of 1975 we have been adjusting to this grave decline in our terms of trade. The present Government on taking office was faced with the fact that business confidence was excessive having regard to our real economic difficulties. It took nearly two years for that confidence to be blunted, and realisation of the situation did not come until the third quarter of 1977. At that time the manufacturers realised that they had been producing in excess of the ability of the economy to absorb their products. A stock overhang had resulted and the downturn in production with consequent laying-off of staff was much greater than it need have been had the real situation been understood sooner.” (1978:5) [1]

The two cyclical indicators – Haywood & Campbell reference cycle, and median manufacturing capacity utilisation (CUBO) peak in March (Kay 1983) – support this view. In neither case is the fall particularly sharp or deep. Indeed CUBO reports a decline in manufacturing capacity utilisation from 88.3 per cent in 1976/77 to 86.4 per cent in 1977/78,[2] a fall of 2.7 per cent in CUBO, which does not obviously tie in with the 6.2 per cent fall in the estimate of manufacturing production. The quarterly survey of retail sales also peaks in the March quarter. [3] There was 5.5 per cent fall between 1976/77 and 1977/78, which is consistent with the sectoral net output estimate.

Another contemporary source is the NZIER Quarterly Predictions. Looking through the forecasts produced each quarter we observe they predict stagnation, or a slight decline of volume GDP (in the 0 to -112 per cent range) for the 1977/78 year up to their November 1977 issue. Then in March they dropped the forecast/estimate to a decline of 1½ per cent, suggesting that the decline was somewhat sharper in the second half of the year. This 1½ per cent decrease was maintained for the June 1988 estimate, but in September 1988 the estimate for the volume GDP was dropped to a 3 per cent decrease, near enough to the actual outcome.[4] (QP Sept 1978:30) The reason for this second dramatic drop was explained:

“The revision was necessary because of the reassessment of company income and the much lower estimate of stock change in the economy. [5] (1978/2: 11) … Stocks increased in value by $490 million to the 12 months to March 31, 1978. … A first comment on these figures is they are considerably lower than estimated in our last issue. ($650m . ..). At that time, wholesale stocks were not yet available for the March quarter. As it turns out, wholesalers were far more successful in reducing their stocks to turnover ratio than we then estimated. Wholesale stocks (as measured in the revised series which has just commenced publication) increased by 13.3 per cent [6] … This alone accounts for a difference of over $100 million. Reasonably up-to-date estimates of manufacturers’ stocks are available for the first time in nearly a year, …” [7] (1978/2:18)

The message is that the data base is in deep trouble, with two of the three inventory series involving a major revision. Moreover, inflation was high, which means that the price effects were complex – especially on stocks levels, and even more so on the change in stock levels adjusted for inflation, which is the relevant national accounting concept.

In fact the evidence now available does not suggest that inventory declines were significant. In the QSBO manufacturers report there were substantial gains in stock levels in the June, September, and to a lesser extent December 1977 quarters, with a steadying in March 1978, while merchants report a slight decline over the year. [8] The Reserve Bank volume expenditure estimates suggest economy-wide inventories rose mildly during the 1977/78 year in volume terms, and it was not until 1978/79 that there was a fall in their level (Grindell 1981: 16). This is consistent with the QSBO reporting.

Given the account in the QP extract over the breaks in two key inventory series during 1977/78, it is possible that the NZIER and the Department of Statistics got their linking wrong, [9] and that the stocks accumulation especially for manufacturers raw materials has been underestimated. A five per cent error on manufacturers inventories would change the GDP volume of over 1/2 per cent. [10]

The RBNZ series suggests the GDP decline was driven by a decline in private fixed investment, which fell 19.5 per cent in volume terms. This is consistent with the QSBO reports of a major cutting back in investment plans throughout this period. Private consumption fell only 2.3 per cent in volume terms. [11]

What then do I think happened in the period from March 1977 to March 1978?

The economy was known to be weakening even in late 1986, with falling investment, slowly adjusting – as the 1978 budget said – to a major decline in the terms of trade, an over expansionary stance a few years earlier, and a weak world economy. But the sharp rise in consumer inflation in the June 1987 quarter cut back private consumption, and left merchants, importers, and manufacturers with rising stock levels. (They were not to regain control of their inventories until 1979.) This led to cuts in production, and a contraction in GDP. My guess is that the contraction was more like 1 to 1½  per cent, than the record 2.7 per cent. [12] That would make it the first contraction since the (recorded) fall of 1 per cent of 1967/68. Thus I have a flatter cyclical downturn in the 1976 to 1978 period than the data records, perhaps also with less recovery in 1979/80. However the contraction would still be deeper and longer one that any time in the post war era. [13]

The outcome of all this? Hopefully the reader has obtained some idea of the complexity of examining a single statistic, and seen that to do so involves a synthesis of statistical analysis, economic theory, and historical investigation.

There is a second, simpler, lesson here. I have suggested that the 2.7 per cent volume decline statistics could be inaccurate by over 1 per cent. Let me share a secret. Having worked with GDP volume statistics for many years, I habitually think they may be accurate to only plus or minus one per cent of the published figure. We must not get too carried away with the exact figure, but make sure any argument is tolerant to such a margin of error. Colleagues in the Department of Statistics would nod in agreement.

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Notes
[1] In fact the decline probably began not later than June 1977, although the account here suggests that the contraction began in the September quarter. For instance according to the Quarterly Survey of Business Opinion, a net 9 per cent of manufacturers and 31 per cent of merchants report a decline in new orders in the June quarter, rising to 40 per cent and 40 per cent respectively for September.

The QSBO data used is tabulated below. All the statistics are in “net respondents reporting increase” form, except CUBO which is the median percent of utilised capacity.

Quarters (M76, 176, S76, D76, M77, 177, S77, D77, M78, 178, S78, D78, M79)
Economy Wide
Expected new building investment approvals (-12, -13, -10, -19, -23, -23, -31, -36, 35, -24, -18, -22, -14) over next twelve months.
Expected new plant and equipment approvals (-14, -3, 1, -2, -5, -12, -28, -31, -31, 18, -7, -2, 0) over next twelve months.
Numbers employed (-6, -8,- 13,- 6,- 7, 8, – 25, -35,-32,-28, -18, -4, 0) overpast three months.
Manufacturers & Builders
Stocks – Raw Materials (-20, -11, -15, 4, 4, 23, 22, 7, -4, -14, -14, 7, 1) experience during the last three months.
Stocks – Finished Good (0, 0, 4, -1, -3,21,39, 22, 9, 8, 3, -9, -3) experience during the last three months.
CUBO (88.9,87.2, 88.0, 88.8, 89.4,87.8,86.5,84.4, 84.6, 84.5, 86.7, 87.2, 87.8) at time of survey.
Merchants
Volume of Stocks (-21, -22, -13, 2, -3, -6, -6, 6, -5, -16, -25, -33, -17, -32) experienced during last three months.
Sources for this data are the original Quarterly Surveys of Business Opinion, but summaries of some of the data are available in Bowie & Easton (1987), with Kay (1983) for CUBO.

[2] As the variables apply to end of the quarters rather than quarter midpoint, the averaging involves a one eighth of the March quarters at either end, and a fourth of the quarters between.
[3] After seasonal adjustment and in constant prices.
[4] The first official provisional estimate was not available until June 1979, fifteen months after the end of the period (and 21 months after the period midpoint). Today a volume GDP figure is available about four months after the quarter ends.
[5] A reduction in the value of stocks would typically be offset in the company balance sheet by a reduction in company profits.
[6] ie. lower than the rate of inflation.
[7] The text goes on “following publication of results from the new quarterly Manufacturers’ Survey up to March 1978. Making some approximate adjustments to link to the old survey, it appears that manufacturers’ stocks (excluding primary processing) increased by about 17 percent from March 1977 to March 1978. The increase looks to have been concentrated in finished goods. (Work in progress is aggregated with finished goods in the new survey, instead of materials as previously, so the old and new series are not comparable).” (1978/2: 18)
[8] A complication is that manufacturers are not specifically asked to distinguish value from volume in their stocks report. Merchants are.
[9] The item about stocks in the 1978 budget speech suggests that the Treasury was having similar difficulties to the NZIER.
[10] .7 percent more precisely.
[11] It is not immediately obvious though how these changes appeared in sector output. The official statistics report a small rise in the construction sector of .6 per cent in volume terms. Private investment is supplied by manufactures and domestic trade, but not enough to depress their sectors as much as reported. On the other hand a major source for investment is imports and they rose (a rise supportive of the likelihood of overstocking). The small fall in private consumption probably fed back onto lower manufactures (particularly durable goods suppliers). Even so I am left with the impression that the estimated sectoral declines in manufacturing and domestic trade are too large, and the error may be attributed to the problems of linkage of old and new inventory figures.
[12] Any sharp contraction was too late in the year to drop GDP as much as the estimate suggests.
[13] And what about the .5 percent rise in employment? Well, weekly hours per worker fell from 36.9 in 1976/77 to 36.6 in 1977/78, or a 1 percent fall, so that total labour hours fell.

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Muldoon

Listener: 12 September, 1992

Keywords: Political Economy & History;

I treasure the Tom Scott cartoon which shows the boiler room of the economy, jam-packed with pipes under great pressure, full of leaking joints, bandages, holes and bulges, and with interest rates bursting away. In the middle of this chaos is a small balding gnome, Robert Muldoon, holding a wrench and saying: ‘Okay, so there’s a little seepage.’ Tom was referring to the wage and price freeze, but the image of an economy under strain, with the Minister of Finance reassuring us, characterises the Muldoon years from 1967 to 1984.

We are only now beginning to understand the transformation of the economy over which Muldoon presided. It is most obvious in the external sector. John Gould has tables in The Muldoon Years which show how New Zealand had one of the least diversified export structures in 1965 but, by 1980, we were average among OECD countries in terms of the diversity of what we sent and where we sent it. No other rich country went through such a rapid change. What made it especially difficult was that we were transforming from what we produce best in the world – pastoral products – to that which we do well — horticulture, fish, forestry, tourism and related manufactures.

The external change was driven by falling relative prices for meat, wool, and butter as northern hemisphere protection squeezed our markets and world demand grew slowly. Exporters responded to depressed pastoral prices by seeking new products and adding value to the old ones. New Zealand’s export sector is closely linked with the domestic economy so the external transformation pressed in on our internal arrangements – forcing us to change the economic rules, demanding we liberalise markets, ‘deregulating’ the economy. You cannot run a progressive, diversifying export sector without a similar vibrancy internally. Protection and inflexibility had to be reduced, although, in my — and Muldoon’s – view, that does not mean the abolition of all social protection.

Muldoon did not recognise the significance of the transformation. He had grown up in a ‘mono-cultural’ New Zealand that specialised in the exporting of processed grass to Britain. Suffering personally from the trauma of the Great Depression, he accepted most of the economic reforms of the first Labour government, which were effective while we could depend upon Britain and grass. This nostalgia for the past pervaded his soul – recall how sycophantic he was over royalty. But his respect for the highly managed economy was reinforced by his lust to be boss, an appetite which was increased by what it fed on.

And so he resisted the changes forced on the economy. Although there was considerable economic liberalisation while he was minister of finance, his grudging gradualism meant there was not enough.

Muldoon was an intuitive man. I doubt he articulated his chief reason for resisting. Economic change generates social change, and ultimately political change. The political coalition that he led was undermined by the changes, which is why by the end of his era he was so out of touch with the Wellington and Auckland establishments (which latched onto the incoming government with alacrity).

In many respects this new coalition doesn’t have the authority of the old one, and certainly it is not trusted by the public in the way that Keith Holyoake’s was in the 1960s. Of course there was a lot of dissent then – especially over Vietnam – but there was not the same anger towards politicians.

It seems likely that because of the economic changes wrought by the great external diversification, plus some crucial social changes, such as those involving women and the Maori, it is no longer possible for any single party to represent the increasingly heterogeneous and restless ‘middle’ New Zealand. And that is probably the best reason for replacing the first-past-the-post election system with proportional representation.

Decades ago the old ways gave us a government which, although elected by a minority tried to represent the community as a whole (although those on the margins always got a poor deal). It is no accident that those in power today are the greatest proponents of first-past-the-post, while the rest of the country feels increasingly alienated. We need a system where the country’s diversity is as explicit in the political process as it is already economically and socially.

The many narrow-visioned and mean-spirited comments on Muldoon after his death were indicative of the man in life. Faced with a national crisis such as the 1981 tour he could only divide rather than unite. Yet his critics could be as narrowminded as he, as often failing to see the wood for the trees. But, in ability, and willingness to command a situation, the tiny man towered over his colleagues and, even in death, many of his critics. No living New Zealander has had so many fictional characters based on him.

In command Muldoon tried to do too much. If he was the engineer with the wrench down below, he was also the purser on the deck reassuring the passengers, and the captain on the bridge steering the ship in stormy seas away from the rocks. Trying to return to the nostalgic past, he headed the ship into the gale. No wonder so many were seasick.

The Challenge of Religion to Economics

<>St Andrew’s Trust for the Study of Religion & Society, 23 July, 1992. (There was a companion lecture in which Richard Randerson looked at the challenge of economics to religion.)

 

Keywords: History of Ideas, Methodology & Philosophy;

 

Adam Smith, often described as the founder of economics, never held a position in economics. He was a professor of moral philosophy, a subject which he divided into natural theology (religion based on reason), together with ethics, jurisprudence, and expediency, which today we would call political economy. He later became a commissioner of customs, on a salary some four times that of a professor, which infrequently involved ‘interruptions to [his] literary pursuits, which the duties of … office necessarily occasion’.

 

He led, a simple life, did not marry, and his absent-minded ness was notorious. On one occasion he put buttered bread in a teapot, and complained about the taste of the tea. But he read and traveled widely, and exhibited a great curiosity about the world, ranging from the Roman empire to new industrial processes. Smith wrote two major books: The Theory of Moral Sentiment, based on his ethics lectures, and An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations.

 

This brief biographical sketch suggests a paradox. Here is a man who was deeply interested in moral issues, and yet is widely associated with the pursuit of self-interest. He is said to oppose government intervention, yet took up a government sinecure in the last 12 years of his life. But he was no hypocrite. Rather, some modern commentators have chosen to interpret him in a manner which could not have been his intention. You can hear this in the most famous quotation from The Wealth of Nations: the individual ‘by pursuing his own interest … frequently promotes that of society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it’. The key word here is ‘frequently’. Smith did not say that pursuing your own economic interest ‘always’ promotes that of society, nor even ‘almost always’. Rather he said that ‘sometimes’ or ‘often’ it did.

 

With the benefit of 200 years’ hindsight, that seems to be a pretty trivial conclusion, hardly the incisive thought to revolutionise society. In fact Smith was more innovative in his time, for he observed the old economic regime breaking up, and foreshadowed the new one in which manufacturing, specialisation, market capitalism, and a less oppressive government would dominate.

 

Adam Smith was rejecting the mercantilism of the 18th century. But he was no supporter of the brutal individualism of the 19th century. While he believed there was an important role for enlightened self-interest, he saw the need for a fundamental link between individual freedom and such moral obligations as kindness, sympathy and justice. That is why we call it ‘enlightened self-interest’. And he did not eschew government intervention. He wrote about how canals could be left in private hands because the owner would maintain them, but roads would need public ownership. In such delicate discrimination we see a practical approach to the ‘expediencies’ of politics and economy.

 

Beneath this pragmatism was a morality described in The Theory of Moral Sentiment. The key notion was ‘sympathy’. He saw each of us equipped with a fellow feeling which makes us share the sentiments of others. From that he developed a notion of an inner conscience which judges the worth of our own actions. I tell you Adam Smith’s story, albeit briefly, to emphasise he had an elaborated morality which he never abandoned, and which pervades The Wealth of Nations.

 

If the founder of economics had a morality underpinning his economic analysis, what happened in the subsequent two centuries? If you said to today’s economists ‘What do you actually stand for?’, what answer might you expect? Without any forewarning, I fear many economists would mutter about free trade, competition, fiscal prudence, and monetary control. But that is the material of The Wealth of Nations. Ask them what is in their Theory of Moral Sentiment, and you would be likely to get a blank, or perhaps a statement that economics was value-free and the first book was unnecessary.

 

Of course it is not. If economists seek value-free conclusions, they rarely attain them. Those conclusions which are value-free, or involve relatively easily accepted values, do not cover most of those matters on which economists wish to pronounce.

 

And certainly economists are anxious to be involved in many matters. If the moral underpinnings of their recommendations are doubtful, there is no question of the zeal invoked in the pronouncements. There is an extraordinary willingness in the majority of the profession to sacrifice, on the altar of free trade, any worker into the unemployment queue. It would be a passion reminiscent of that which drove the Inquisition, except that heaven and hell are more likely to exist than the conditions necessary to rigorously justify free trade.

 

Zeal without morality is a central tension in the economics profession, especially as it is very recent. Adam Smith’s concern with moral issues continues throughout the following 150 years of the economics profession. It was a passion – and compassion – fired by the agonies of the industrialisation of the 19th century. Karl Marx naturally comes to mind, but it also occurs in economists with staider reputations.

 

Alfred Marshall, the greatest English-speaking economist before John Maynard Keynes, wrote a standard textbook which was still recommended reading when I was an undergraduate economist, 40 years after Marshall’s death. Its opening includes:

 

‘The dignity of man was proclaimed by the Christian religion: it has been asserted with increasing vehemence during the last hundred years: but only with the spread of education during quite recent times are we beginning to feel the full import of the phrase. Now at last we are setting ourselves seriously to inquire … whether there need be large numbers of persons doomed from birth to hard work in order to provide for others the requisites of a refined and cultured life; while they themselves are pre-vented by their poverty and toil from having any share or part of that life.’

 

Yes, Marshall mentions religion as a relevant part of the totality of mankind. A few paragraphs earlier he had written

 

‘ … man’s character has been molded by his everyday work, and the two great forming agencies of the world’s history have been the religious and the economic.’

 

It would be an odd economics textbook today which opened with references to religion and to poverty. Add that Marshall’s book is rich with practical illustrations of industry and agriculture, and here is a man who belonged to the same tradition as Adam Smith, even though he is closer to us in time than to Smith.

 

But do today’s economists belong to that same tradition? Rex Fairburn did not think so:

The army of the unliving, the cells of cancer;

small sleek men rubbing their hands in vestibules,

re-lighting their cigar butts, changing their religions;

dabblers ill expertise, licensed to experiment

on the vile body of the State; promoters of companies;

efficiency experts (unearned excrement

of older lands, oranges sucked in;),

scourges of a kindly and credulous race;

economists, masters of a dead language; men

with dry palms and a sense of humour;

hagglers, hucksters,

buyers and sellers, retchings

of commerce, spawn of greed …

 

There is a passion in this extract from Utopia in Fairburn’s The Dominion which Adam Smith

and Alfred Marshall would have respected, even sympathised with, given the Great Depression Fairburn was writing about. His views would not be so readily accepted by today’s business and economists.

 

Yet the fracturing in the profession with that past tradition of moral sentiment began earlier than the 1930s, earlier even than Alfred Marshall. It occurred as a part of a wider process, of which economic change was an integral part. The roots are before the Industrial Revolution. Some involve the rise of natural science, especially with Galileo, who used observation to challenge the literal truth of the Bible, and with Isaac Newton, who provided an order to the universe with a few simple propositions.

 

Newtonian mechanics was crucial to the development of economics. It heavily influenced Adam Smith, and economists still seek the Holy Grail of a few universal propositions which will similarly enlighten economic behaviour. Alfred Marshall was sceptical, writing:

 

‘The Mecca of the economist lies in economic biology) rather than economic dynamics. But biological conceptions are more complex than those of mechanics … ‘

 

This is not the place to trace the internal change in economics, how it went down the easy path of mechanics rather than the complicated path of biology, but the social milieu in which economics existed was also changing. The title of the musical Fiddler on the Roof comes from the Jewish proverb that without tradition, life would have as much meaning as a fiddler on the roof. While its opening song is Tradition, the most moving is Sunrise, Sunset, where the rabbi at a wedding recalls the growing up of the couple as children in the Russian village, illustrating a degree of social solidarity which is destroyed at the drama’s end as the village migrates to America. It is that long-lost social cohesion of the village we look back at with nostalgia.

 

With that loss came a loss of the traditional role of religion, both in social life and in national political life as the state and Church separated. This secularisation of society was one of the great transformations in intellectual, social, and political life in 19th century Europe and its offshoot settlements elsewhere.

 

New Zealand could not escape. There is no established Church, but we argued about such issues, most evidently in the debate over religious education in schools. There is one significant area in New Zealand life which has not yet secularised, and which secular society tolerates in public life in a way which – I think – is more than a formality. The Maori, while heavily influenced by the dominant European culture, has his or her own indigenous holistic roots which have not been totally torn out. Thus we have the irony that almost all Maori events – even those the European would judge as secular – are likely to begin and end with a karakia, while a Pakeha event with a much greater apparent religious content – say a lecture on religion in a church – will not.

 

Economics could not avoid this secularisation, so it sought to describe a universe, as did the post-Newtonians, without reference to religion. And yet modern economics has become a religion of its own, with high priests with marked social status, orders of professionals, a liturgy, and most of all a series of injunctions about appropriate actions which involve making sacrifices – although, as was true in the older religions, it is never the priests or their patrons who suffer the sacrifice.

 

The sacrifices which economics invokes involve precepts presented with the flavour of natural law: inflation is bad, low taxation is good, budget deficits are bad, privatisation is good, government intervention is bad, user pays is good. Observe the pseudo-ethicality of each. If economists have abandoned the passion for social justice, they have not abandoned the temptation to moralise. But what are the foundations of that morality?

 

Economists are likely to start off with some notion such as ‘efficiency’, as if it were some universally valid goal worth pursuing. Just think how many times you have been told that some reform was necessary in the pursuit of efficiency. The usual criticism of the proposition is that the reform does not generate efficiency. That is often true, but there is an even deeper point. Efficiency in economics is not a value-free notion. It is not directly derivable from the laws of dynamics. Rather it is has an underlying social value which, to summarise, is ‘pro-rich’, that is favours the rich over the poor. Next time someone says that ‘a reform is necessary to improve efficiency’, replace the phrase with ‘the reform is necessary in the interests of the rich’. You would be surprised how often a reform proposal, unintelligible in social justice terms, makes sense with a pro-rich ethical standard.

 

Yes, I am saying that subtly over the years economics has shifted from compassion and commitment to the betterment of the poor, and the passion for social justice and prosperity, to the other extreme of supporting the rich.

 

Who then is to speak for the poor, if economists have abandoned them? Almost by definition, those on the margins of society do not speak effectively for themselves, for they lack the necessary resources and political power. That vacuum has been most filled in recent years by the Churches.

 

There is perhaps an irony here, for typically we associate the Churches with the centres of power. Much of European political history, and that of other cultures and nations, is about the relation between Church and state, with the two intimately linked. Even after the secularisation of the 19th century, with Britain at the forefront, it is well to remember that the British and New Zealand Head of State is also the head of a Church. For in so far as religion has any power, the powerful and the rich will colonise it. Christianity began as a religion of the underclasses – the slaves – and yet became the official religion of the Roman empire, and of many more nations beside.

 

Yet, as Marshall acknowledges, the religious message has been so powerful that it has never been possible to suppress it entirely, even when the message creates tensions with the ruling elite. Perhaps the religious message is so complicated that one can select what one needs to justify a

pre-ordained position, just as Adam Smith’s writing is used to justify unregulated capitalism, although it is clear he never had that in mind.

 

Admittedly, the Churches have been sucked into the current debate through their involvement in social services. That function is partly of religious origin, for there are numerous scriptural injunctions to support the poor. As the Churches grew powerful in their symbiotic role with the state, tending the poor was a responsibility they took over. With secularisation and industrialisation the state began to replace the Church, evolving what today we call the ‘welfare state’. But the Churches never fully gave up that role of caring for the poor and needy, and in some areas they remain a major provider.

 

The New Zealand welfare state was undermined as unemployment rose. There has been a consequent withdrawal of the state in provision for the poor. The so-called ‘redesigning of the

welfare state’ appears to be a shift to a minimalist American-style residual welfare state. The voluntary social services have found themselves increasingly under pressures which are pushing them back towards their 19th century role. In both a prophetic and a practical sense it has become necessary for the Churches to speak out against the pressures which govern-ment actions are imposing on the poor and needy whom the Churches serve.

 

Commendable as that action may be, it is only part of the path of the Churches’ concerns. If thus far the religious have been mainly reactive, concerned about the pressures being imposed on their care, they are moving towards the proactive. Already they are mutely calling for a change or reversal in policy directions. But there is an even more fundamental issue which they are approaching.

 

The May 1991 Catholic bishops’ letter on the Employment Contracts Bill may be a bellwether. The message is not primarily about the poor, though it is the poor who have been hardest hit by the industrial relations reform. Rather the complaint was against the theoretical underpinnings – the way the employment law wanted society to be organised, its underlying vision of society.

 

The bill, now an act, was not even about economic efficiency. That may be a side-effect of the legislation; it may not. When the Treasury advocated the measure in its Briefing to the Incoming Government: 1990 it focused on the principle of individual freedom. There was surprising little economics in that chapter, even for the Treasury. In taking this approach it was following a Business Roundtable sponsored study Freedom at Work, by Penelope Brook, which again was short on economic analysis and long on ideology – the ideology of the New Right.

 

My reading of the various papal encyclicals, with which the bishops’ letter is consistent, suggests that the Catholic Church finds this ideology an anathema because by focusing solely on individual freedom the ideology ignores social responsibility. While the Vatican has been railing against the ideology of communism for over a century, it has been as critical of what it calls ‘liberalism’. Today we call it capitalist libertarianism or the New Right. I would expect other Christian Churches to be as profoundly uneasy with this ideology. I would think that the Maori would also be uncomfortable, given their communal traditions.

 

This New Right emphasis on self-service without social service has come to underpin the justification for efficiency in the following way. Suppose each of us seeks individual freedom and our own selfish ends. That leads to economic efficiency and the best outcome for the society as a whole, or so the theory goes. Most economists would deny a commitment to this weird miscellany of logical inconsistencies, which appears to echo Adam Smith. But fewer have resisted the policy conclusions that it generates, while the New Zealand New Right proclaims it is in the mainstream, with hardly any contention from the majority of the economics profession.

 

The Prime Minister went deeper into these treacherous waters when he called us to give hero status to the rich. Heroism was once a matter of self-sacrifice for a wider purpose. The philosophies of the New Right argue that successful self-seeking is rewarded by wealth. Why then should we reward the rich further? It is time to recall Jesus’ remark that it is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of God. It is thought the ‘eye’ was a small postern gate in the city wall, which involved unloading the baggage from the camel to get it through. What Jesus was saying was that in a similar way a rich man would get to heaven on his personal merits, unloaded of his riches. We recognise the heroism of

those who assist society without material reward or, in the case of the rich, those who assist society above what their wealth allows.

 

And so, in the process of secularisation, economics abandoned morality and spirituality. Without anchors or a map, the discipline has drifted around, becoming stranded on the rock of selfishness, of individual freedom without social responsibility. The misinterpretation of Adam Smith allows the fiction that selfishness is socially responsible. Two hundred years of careful economic analysis show it is a nonsense.

 

It is time to proclaim that the New Right economic emperor has no clothes, that black is not white, that selfishness is not socially responsible. But who will say it? Economics has not been able to reform within, for those who have criticised it have been marginalised by the powerful, whose interests so many of today’s economists uncritically serve.

 

As with medicine, it will be outside forces which precipitate the change. For medicine it was a group of women, suffering from the slackness of the medical ethics of the time. Today Otago University has a professor of medical ethics, who is also a theologian, and ethics is an integral part of each medical undergraduate’s training.

 

What will be the outside stimulus which will reform economics? My best guess is that it will be religious. While religion is at present reactive and on the margins, we should see the religious drawn more into the centre of the drama. If I had to predict the next battleground, I would say it will be in health. The current reforms are being promoted by the same officials, the same Business Roundtable, the same consultants, and the same extreme politicians who promoted the industrial relations reform. Underlying those changes is the same ideology, which praises individual freedom and ignores the social responsibility that has been an integral part of our health system. At bottom the health debate, stripped of the technicalities, is whether we are a community, or merely a collection of selfish economic men.

 

Religion must be in that battle. It will be there not because these changes will ultimately be most damaging to the poor and may even benefit the rich, though we cannot rule out that the reforms may well make just about everyone worse off. Nor will religion be there simply because the Churches have a long tradition of care of the sick, and the proposed new system will make heavy demands on its care. Religion will be there because there is a vacuum in Adam Smith’s ‘expediency’, the economic and political arena: a vacuum of morality, and of spirituality.

 

The expedient cannot even identify the issue, and will profess bewilderment as to what it is all about. The religious can, and as long as they still have passion, compassion, and commitment, they must. Slowly, reluctantly, they will be drawn into the arena to fill the vacuum, challenging economics, asking what are its intellectual foundations, forcing it to reform.

 

There is a certain nakedness in admitting that one’s chosen profession is in a certain state of intellectual corruption. But to ignore the deep problems of a profession which has abandoned ethical precept and the humanity of the people is to join in that corruption.

Fences and Ambulances: an Economist Looks at Family Policy

Paper for ‘The Children’s, Young Persons and their Families Act -A Review’, A Public Seminar. Palmerston North College of Education, Friday July 10, 1992

Keywords Health; Social Policy

It is a curious, if instructive, oddity that our most famous quotation about health promotion does not appear in the Heineman Dictionary of New Zealand Quotations. We talk about the need to put fences at the top of the cliff, but the thrust of our social policy is the ambulance at the bottom -although in recent years it has been more like a cardphone from which one can ring a private cab. Fences and ambulances represent quite different ways of responding to social policy problems. The more erudite might refer to holistic social policy versus pathological social policy.

There is a vast difference in headspace between the two approaches. Much of social policy and medicine is essentially about ‘pathology’, that is the study of the diseases and the suffering they generate. I do not want to be critical of this approach, and I well understand its urgency. If someone comes to you in with a heart attack, an overview of the functioning of the heart is not so important just then as cardiac resuscitation.

The difficulty is we may begin to focus solely on the treatment of heart disease, and never look at the conditions of the heart of the whole population. Now of course the Heart Foundation has eschewed such a narrow focused approach and, to its credit, it has been as concerned with the prevention of heart disease as it has with treatment. Nevertheless in my experience realms of health and social policy focus on the pathological, and ignore the totality

Let me give you an example from a recent report which reviews the Children, Young Persons and their Families Act.[1] This Mason report is very thorough but it focuses exclusively on those young persons who are in trouble. You might say that is the focus of the Act. That is exactly my point. The policy framework is about some people in a pathological state – perhaps we call the disease ‘delinquency’ .A total view would be to ask why do some kids end up under the provisions of the Act, and the vast majority do not.

Understandably the report does not pursue this approach, since it was not in its remit. But an indication of the headspace of the report is its recommendation on research. Let me say I am all in favour of research, much of my life is committed to the pursuit of quality research, in an environment which discourages serious intellectual activity. But the research the report proposes involves ‘undertak(ing) independent, longitudinal research to evaluate the outcomes for the young children and their families affected by the Act.’ (p.34)

There is no mention of what happens to the rest of the population, so what the researchers will be looking at is an extreme part of the tail of the distribution of the total behaviour . There will be no scientific controls, except prejudice, on what is more typical experiences, and no attempt to study what are the factors which put some families into the extreme tails.

What did I mean by ‘no scientific controls, except prejudice’? The 1976 Department of Social Welfare study Ex-nuptial Children and their Parents had no scientific controls of those children who were not.[2] The study followed them lip over the years and found various proportions experienced changes of family situation -say from one to two parent families, perhaps and back -and at the age of five when the study stopped certain proportions were still living in single parent homes. I am deliberately not giving you those proportions, partly because by now they may well be out of date, but also because I cannot give you the figures for the comparable children born in wedlock. In their first five years many of those too will have experienced change of family situation, and by the time they are five many of those will now be in single parent homes. What is the use of the data on a subgroup of the population if we do not have comparable data on the whole population? Without it we are likely to feed in our implicit prejudices about normal family life for comparison.

Perhaps the best example I know of pathology dominating the totality is over alcohol use. Now alcohol abuse has appalling outcomes to the drinker’s families, friends, and even strangers, as well as to him or herself. As a result, for over half a decade we controlled everybody’s access to alcohol in an attempt to deal with alcohol abuse. In my experience even today parts of alcohol policy are still dominated by the pathology of the alcoholic, with insufficient consideration given to the majority of drinkers, the mechanisms of how a minority of those users become abusers, or how we can prevent the shift from use to abuse.

Underlying this approach is an account of the population. A simple representation might be a frequency distribution for which the horizontal axis is some behavioural variable whose right hand extreme is pathological. It might be the amount of alcohol imbibed, or an index of juvenile delinquency, or the degree of heart disease or whatever. Figure 1 shows you one such distribution. To keep it simple, the figure shows that above a certain ]eve! the behaviour is deemed pathological. Note that this occurs in a small part of the tail of the distribution, and the social statisticians among you will immediately recognjse that there are grave difficulties characterising the behaviour in a distributional tail. If you are sceptical, consider the plight of the Electricorp statisticians. who on the basis of around sixty years data tell us that we have a one-in-a-hundred-year drought, which appear to occur about every fifteen years.

FIGURE 1: Shifting the tail

The standard pathological approach to treatment attempts to shift those in the tail back into he area of non-pathology. Typically there are gradations of disease so the complete diagram is more complicated than the diagram, but the arrow illustrates the shift. I do not intend this to seem absurd. I am a great believer in the strategy that if you see a child heading tor a fire, you grab them, and afterwards you consider issues of better education, fireguards, and behavioral control and monitoring.

However my point is that there is a second approach, which asks whether we can shift the whole distribution, rather than just the right tail. I have illustrated but one example in Figure 2, where some measure shifts the whole distribution to the left. One little statistical trick in this presentation is that for a small change in the mean of the distribution you get a large fall in the proportion in the disease tale. That is not always true, but it is encouraging that the holistic strategy may place small, if any, impositions on the population as a whole, but make big reductions in those in need.

FIGURE 2:Shifting the Distribution
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Of course there are a number ways the shape of the distribution could move. At this point I merely want to contrast the tail focus of the pathological approach, with the whole of the relevant distribution focus of the holistic approach. For that in social policy is often the choice -pathology versus holism .

I have already indicated this is not a simple dichotomy. Both approaches have a role. My guess is that it will be rare for a holistic approach to move the distribution far enough to the left so there is no-one left in the disease tail. For instance sensible education about life and easier access to contraceptives might reduce a lot of unwanted teenage pregnancies, but some sperm will still slip past the guards. We will still need abortion services, and still need programs to assist those pregnant teenagers who decide not to use them. The pathology program will still be there. The aim is to reduce them.

Moreover holistic programs incur social costs too. The prohibitionists wanted to shift the frequency distribution for alcohol consumption to the point where everyone was up against the zero left hand vertical axis, ignoring the benefits that alcohol appears to give to many moderate drinkers.

What are the intervention instruments which a holistic approach can use? I am just going to look at some economic ones. Figure 3 shows a simple representation of the relationship between the economy and social wellbeing and health including, you will observe, a feedback loop. Among the impacts trom the economy into the health/welfare nexus are information, commodities, employment, income, housing, and status.

FIGURE 3: The economy -welfare interaction.

Because there is limited time, I cannot deal with all the effects, but just examine some main ones of interest to economists, and which have been important in the policy debate. I have mentioned briefly the role of education in information, and I am going to neglect commodities, housing, and status.

We know most about the effects of unemployment on health, and since these also shed some light on income effects, we start there.[3] I have not time here to go through all the international research but to summarise, they show that for many people the health effects of unemployment are disastrous. Individual studies may have interpretational problems, not least perhaps because some causality goes from sickness to unemployment. But when you go through all the different approaches -time series, longitudinal, or cross-sectional; population data bases, random samples, or selected samples, or serendipitous findings, trom case studies through to sophisticated statistical analysis -the conclusion is overwhelming. This is true for physical and psychological health, for morbidity and mortality, and for the person and the rest of their families. Unemployment makes things worse.

There are at least three major gaps in the research. There is little on the effects on unemployed women (and also, because the work is mainly done overseas, little evidence about effects of Maori unemployment). Second the research on unemployment and crime is insufficient. The evidence there is suggests the process is much more complex than a simple theory that unemployment causes crimes against property. One study suggested, for instance, there may be little difference in the criminality of the young unemployed and the young employed in poor quality jobs.

And third there is the relation between unemployment and violence. The research here suffers from a focus on the most pathological behaviour such as murder. It tends to ignore behaviour inside the boundary of extreme misbehaviour. We might hypothesise, as I shall argue later , that unemployment causes increased violence within the family home, but this phenomenon is only indirectly measured. I would hazard the assertion that family violence is a much more serious problem than homicide, because it is more widespread, because it perpetuates itself through generations, and because it leads to homicide. Yet it seems much less a matter of concern either in the popular media or in public policy discussion.

So while there is considerable evidence of the effects of unemployment in industrial countries, the story is incomplete. Nevertheless there is one overwhelming conclusion. In terms of the distributions I showed earlier, in the case for many physical, psychological, and social diseases unemployment shifts the distribution to the left. If small changes in the centre of the distribution can lead to large changes in the disease tail, that means that it is possible that a smallish deterioration in the rate of unemployment, say an increase of a tenth as unemployment rise trom 10 to 11 percent, could increase the need for pathological interventions many more fold. Unemployment is socially expensive.

In drawing this conclusion I am not saying that the population distribution of all diseases we may be interested in are necessarily shifted right by unemployment or (as I discuss below) income deprivation. Some will be unaffected, and others will be shifted left. To be more precise employment increases the likelihood of some diseases (such as industrial accidents), and their are diseases of affluence (such as gout). However the evidence that the distribution of broad measures such as genera! morbidity and mortality are shifted left by increased unemployment – it increases the level of disease. And if someone experiences unemployment their likelihood of general morbidity and mortality goes up too.

There is some evidence about the mechanisms by which unemployment affects health. There is a deterioration in the individual feelings of self worth, plus a loss of normal social contact, which presumably leads to a psychological deterioration. We cannot rule out that this affects the individual’s physical as well as their mental health.

I should mention that while there is good evidence of the effects of unemployment on unemployed adolescents, the material is less comprehensive on the effects of unemployment on the unemployed’s children. There is better evidence on the effect on the unemployed’s spouse. She suffers from the same ill health as her husband, though to a lesser degree. I see no reason for not extrapolating this conclusion to their children, including to their social wellbeing. In some respects this conclusion, that unemployment of the main earner is detrimental to the wife and children is positive news, because it shows that the family remains a functioning social and emotional reality to many people. A breakdown in part of it affects the rest. More positively a well functioning family is beneficial to all its members.

There may well be a material deprivation effect too. It is a matter of record that people with lower incomes tend to have less food, inferior housing, less health care, and so on. There is not a lot of evidence how these reductions affect health except in the most extreme cases of, say, starvation. Lower income might even be beneficial if it reduces overeating or excessive consumption of licit drugs.

The evidence in this latter case is fascinatingly equivocal. Various overseas studies show that the unemployed are more likely to want to use licit and illicit drugs but they may have less financial means to acquire them, so some studies suggest there is an increase in their use. in others there is a reduction. Poverty studies in New Zealand suggest the poor give up drinking, but stick to smoking, although apparently they have suffered so severely in the last year they are giving up smoking too.

The research evidence on the poor is much jess abundant than evidence on the unemployed. That which is available is suggests that all in all the poor are worse off physically, psychologically, and socially as a result of their loss of income.[4] This conclusion may perhaps be obvious to an outsider so let me cxplain that I am not just saying that income deprivation affects material consumption. It also seems likely that there is a reduction in overall welfare above the reduction in consumption of goods and services. For most people poverty is not a blessing, although it is not unknown for the affluent to argue this as they cut the poor’s income.

I have been cautious in stating this because it is easy to make flamboyant statements, but a scientist in honesty must say we simply do not have the evidence. Nevertheless if I had to make an assessment on the basis of that research evidence we have, plus anecdote, plus assuming the parallel mechanisms of demoralisation which apply tor unemployment apply for the poor, I conclude that income deprivation causes mental and physical ill health. The exact outcomes are less clear. For instance we know that the unemployed are likely to suffer markedly higher rate of suicide and parasuicide. We do not have nearly as precise knowledge of the effects of poverty.

If I am right, and the main mechanism is via demoralisation from not being able to participate in and belong to their community, then the worse effects from poverty will arise when there is an increase in income inequality. In a society in which income cuts were shared proportionally, or that there rich were seem to be taking a more than proportional share, there might well be a recognition that the reductions were inevitable, and the pain was being shared fairly about. In such circumstances, we might well expect less psychological distress among the poor, perhaps even some psychological uplift from feeling a part of a community struggling together to face a common problem. The poor’s health might suffer from somereduction in their access to health giving commodities, but the impression r get from the research material is that would not be as damaging as the psychological demoralisation which widening income inequality generates.

And there has been widening income inequality in recent years. The Douglas tax cuts of 1988 which favoured the rich, had to paid tor by the across-the-board GST hike in 1989. The savage Richardson-Shipley benefit cuts of 1991 had no comparable measures impacting on the rich, and the user-pay charges on those of modest incomes merely added to the feelings of injustice. Moreover, unemployment has continued to rise. While becoming unemployed makes you poorer, especially after the recent benefit cuts, it is also true that the poor are more likely to become unemployed and stay unemployed. So the government distributional measures which have been promoting inequality have been compounded by the deteriorating labour market.

We need not be surprised that recent reports such as Neither Freedom or Choice from the People’s Select Committee, and Windows on Poverty from the Council of Christian Services, describe increasing distress among the poor. My guess is that if we were to look systematically we would find a rising incidence of morbidity and even mortality, which we might attribute to the rising poverty and unemployment. Some people may want to attribute the apparent rises in public violence, such as the murder rate, to these factors too. I want to be a little more cautious, for this evidence from the tail. Nevertheless there are anecdotal reports of greater pressure on women’s refuges arising out of domestic violence, so it would not seem outrageous to hypothesis that economic conditions are causing a rise in the tide of violence (and perhaps also offenses against property).

What has employment and income housing deprivation to do with the Children’s, Young Persons and their Families Act? The point is that it is dealing with the disease tail, and not considering the whole of the distribution. It is a pathological, not an holistic, approach to the issue. In some ways it is not even an ambulance at the bottom of the cliff. Perhaps it is only a bandaid.

Now bandaids are needed, especially in emergencies, which is what the Act is about. But as you stand there beneath the cliff, wondering who to bandaid next, you might give a thought to what is happening at the top, as the bulldozers of unemployment and income deprivation remorselessly push more over the edge. And you may wonder to what extent we should be more concerned with the forces at the top rather than the crashes at the bottom.

That would appear to be concern of the Minister of Social Welfare in a speech given to Massey University a week ago. I have only seen the press reports rather. than a whole text, which project an unusually high degree of confusion – even for a Minister of the Crown. Perhaps it is the Minister, perhaps it is the journalist, I cannot tell.

That the speech reports the minister as saying is that ‘the Welfare State itself through its mechanisms produces young illiterates, juvenile delinquents, alcoholic substance abuses, drug addicts and reject people at an accelerating speed.’ The report offers no evidence for this. It goes on ‘the fundamental problem is that we’ – I presume she means the government – ‘are in our own way creating a society where many individual people no longer feel any cohesive purpose, or responsibility to themselves or others.’I am sure many people would agree with the statement that the government is creating a society in which there is social alienation.

However having identified what she believes to be the causes, the Minister goes on to argues that society had become increasingly artificial and artificial society could not produce anything but alienation, indifference, and destructive. Unfortunately I cannot tell you what the Minister meant by ‘artificial’ although the next bit may help for she goes on: ‘More and more is solved through institutions and increasingly less through individual initiative and effort’. I am unclear as to which institutions the Minister has in mind, because the speech lists as institutions the family, church, law, and education. Can she be saying they appear to generate a so-called artificial society. The Minister appears to be saying that we should not solve we have been wrong to attempt to deal with social problems via such institutions, but what we should go back to individualism.

But then there is a problem in her logic. How does individual initiative and effort outside social institutions generate the feelings of cohesive purpose and responsibility to the individuals and others the Minister was concerned about. I would have thought that it was a society without institutions (without institutions) which relied only on individual initiative and effort which generated alienation, indifference, and destructiveness, not a society which ignored social initiative.

Let me say that in all this confused and inconsistent ramblings, there is – perhaps lost – a certain truth. We should look outside the immediate social problem and see it in a holistic context. Sadly the speech fails to contribute no more than that. The Minster’s solution seems to me to be especially inept. If we rip out any fences we have at the top of the cliff, and punish those who fall, then people will be afraid to go near the edge. Those that do, the Minister seems to say, do so out of foolishness. She ignores the great bulldozers of unemployment and income deprivation, which are driving individuals and their families over.

Perhaps she has to because it is the policies of her government which have added to the thrust of the bulldozers. Not only have they increased unemployment but the budget forecasts expect it to continue to rise for at least another three years. The main downward pressure on unemployment today, is that people are giving up looking, judging it to be a hopeless task.

That surely is a major source of alienation, indifference, and destructiveness. And the budget offers little hope t-or those suffering income deprivation. It contains no improvements in the real level of welfare benefits already cut below tolerable levels, reductions in public spending, which will probably affect most the poor, and few employment opportunities.

It is depressing for those working at the bottom of the cliff that there is so little understanding as to why they have to be there, and why the demands for their efforts are increasing, while the resources available to them are reduced. At some stage you may want to consider whether more ought to be done at the top. To be practical, in some particular instances an effective strategy will be for the integration between a holistic and pathological approach. But we should avoid the tail of disease wagging the dog of the distribution.

Endnotes
1. Ministerial Review Team (1992) Review of the Children, Young Persons and their Families Act, 1989: Report of the Ministerial Review Team to the Minister of Social Welfare, Department of Social Welfare, Wellington.
2. Social Welfare Research monograph No 2, Department of Social Welfare, Wellington.
3. I. Shirley, B. Easton, C. Briar, & S. Chatterjee (1990) Unemployment in New Zealand, (Dunmore Press); B.H. Easton, The Epidemiology of Unemployment, The Dean’s Lecture, Wellington Medical School, July 11, 1990.
4. B.H. Easton. (1986) Wages and the Poor (Allen & Unwin) p.12-20.

Selfish Generations by David Thomson

New Zealannd Sociology, May 1992, Volume 7, No 1, p. 98-107.

Keywords Distributional Economics; Social Policy

Inter-generational income distribution is a difficult area, and it is a brave social scientist who would set out to offer a comprehensive account given our state of knowledge. David Thomson appears to have no such qualms.

The policy problem is simple enough. What is there to stop the oldest generation from exploiting younger generations by seizing its income? There is an obvious restraint on a younger generation doing it to their elders, because they then set an example to those younger to repeat the exercise. But the restraint does not exist for the oldest of all, since they will be dead when the younger generations get their turn. When economists explored such issues the model equilibria prove to be technically unstable, and usually some ad hoc restraint has to be added to prevent this inter-generational exploitation. These models are not specifically welfare state ones for they can involve pure capitalist economies. But driving all of them is the assumption that individuals behave selfishly.

Do they though? And even if they do, are there social and political restraint which impede the inter-generational exploitation ? Does the empirical evidence about income transfers over time support the account of selfish generations?

The transfers occur in at least three ways. First, individuals invest their savings and, at a later time, they realise a return on the investment. Second, there family transfers. Parents (and more generally, older generations – grandparents among others – chip in) invest in their children without – as a rule – getting much financial return (except perhaps support in old age). Additionally, the children may inherit family wealth. The details of these two general processes are complicated, but are central to the modern economy. They are largely ignored in this book (but not in this review).

The third major means is that there may be an active government transfers of resources between generations. Most evidently, the young receive education and health services, and family support (and benefit) from the state, while the old receive national superannuation and health services. It follows that those in the middle must be carrying the burden of these additions to the welfare of the young and old (although since the young tend to live with those in the middle, the first transfer is less clear).

It is this third state-generated inter-generational transfer which Thomson’s book focuses on, and even then, it looks only at the transfer to the old. Indeed, Thomson is obsessive about this transfer to the exclusion of all others. He says: ‘the core of all modern welfare states is what I shall call the implicit welfare contract between generations’. He never defends the statement and thus has little to say about vertical transfers between the rich and poor, and horizontal transfers within generations including health services, unemployment, sickness, accident, and domestic purposes benefits. Neither does he write much about the transfer to children.

Let me make it clear that I am not arguing about whether there are welfare state transfers to the elderly. Despite Thomson being described on the book cover as ‘a leading writer on social history…in New Zealand’, he is surprisingly ignorant of the work that has been done in New Zealand on inter-generational issues. If he had, he would have extensively quoted the work of Suzanne Snively (e.g. 1988), and the more recent fiscal incidence study by the Department of Statistics (1990), which demonstrate clearly that the biggest net inter-household transfer in a specific year between the identified social groups is to the elderly (but note that parents and children are in the same household). Quoting this work would have saved the book many pages, improved the level of analysis and made it that much more readable.

That the transfers to the elderly are large is hardly to be contested. But Thomson has a stronger thesis for he argues that the older generations are benefiting more from the welfare state than younger generations.

‘… the big winners … have been … those born between about 1920 and 1945. Throughout their lives they will make contributions which cover only a fraction of the benefits. For their successors the reverse is true.’ (p.3)

Much of the book is a rambling attempt to justify this accusation, based on anecdotal rather than systematic argument. Virtually any thesis about income distribution can be supported by taking a couple of special cases and comparing them. The problem is to provide a comprehensive account. I shall resist the temptation to review anecdote by anecdote, and instead concentrate on the book’s one attempt to argue the thesis coherently. The points made usually apply to the anecdotes as well.

Chapter 5 contrasts the experience of “the Earlys, a ‘typical (sic) couple’ born around 1930, and the Lates, a ‘typical couple’ born 25 years later”. Note first that the Earlys are about 60 at the time the book was written, with another 20 odd years of life expectation, and the Lates are 35 with another 40 odd years left. Thomson’s analysis requires forecasting into a distant future. I would not trust an economist to do that with the required precision the analysis requires.

In fact, Thomson does not appear to be any great shakes at forecasting. Referring to the Labour proposal to lift, by steps, the age of entitlement for the pension to 65, he writes: ‘the choice of the year 2006 came as no surprise -it means that those born before 1945 are to be protected, those born after are not’. I take it that the writer was surprised by the decision announced in the 1991 budget (even before the book was out) to scale the year back to 1992. (The term ‘protected’ is insidious -presumably he means ‘supported between 60 and 65’).

The next problem the analyst faces is to offer a systematic measure of the phenomenon he is considering. Thomson rightly wants to discount the effects of inflation, but did he really mean to eliminate economic growth? In doing so, he ignores that the Lates are typically on a standard of living about 40 percent higher than the Earlys at the same stage in the life cycle. Could not the phenomenon that Thomson claims to exist be merely the Earlys sharing some of this growth?

In terms of the inflation and growth adjusted measure used in the book, Thomson is probably postulating that the Earlys obtain a greater share of GDP (or some such aggregate) than the Lates. However, the indicator used is the median gross earnings for men aged 35-45. Unfortunately, this unit of account is contaminated by the changing income levels of women. Women’s earnings are rising, which means that the Lates are going to have a higher income (in these standards units) compared to the Earlys, which distorts the book’s argument in favour of the Earlys having more resources relative to the Lates.

The study uses a quaint notion of a ‘standard family’, which assumes the couple get married, have children and live together until death do them part. Perhaps the analysis is intended to imply this is as likely for the Earlys as for the Lates. In any case, the assumption is not only unrealistic, but it ignores the fact that taxes are being used from the Earlys and, even more so, from the Lates to support solo parents. (The unemployed also do not appear in this book’s scheme of things.)

The choice of a median income. is another difficulty, since it does not allow changes in the distribution within cohorts. Vertical changes could have been neutralised by using the mean income. A further complication is that the figures used are median male incomes. As well as exacerbating the problem of women re-entering the workforce (Thomson may well exaggerate the financial contribution of the Early women), it obscures important changes going on in youth (the Lates are likely to stay in education longer), and at retirement (where market participation has been reducing probably for the Earlys, although we can be less sure of the pattern for the Lates in 2020).

Unfortunately Thomson does not give his calculations, so I cannot check or adjust them. (A not unimportant consideration given the changes in Census definitions over time, especially following the adding in of social security payments in recent years).

But there is a summary table, which I reproduce here in a slightly condensed form. Note that the income data for each couple is not given. The units are those of the median income for 35 to 44 year males. Suppose that in one year, the median is $10,000, and the spending (or tax or whatever) is $4,000 in that year. That comes to .4 in the standard units.

Table Thomson’s Estimates of ‘Life Time Balance Sheets (sic) for the Earlys and Lates.’

Contributions: Earlys, Lates
Total lifetime income tax contributions (‘more realistic estimate’): 6-7, 15
Total lifetime ‘other taxes’: 14; 14
Total possible life time contributions: 20-21; 29

Benefits
Family benefit: 1.5, 0.5
Old age pension: 12.6; 8.7
Education: 3.8; 2.5
Housing: 1.1; 0.5
Health: 3, 3
General Government Services: 15, 12
Total Benefits: 37, 27

Source: Table 5.1, p.166.

The table postulates that the Earlys pay less tax than the Lates. That is probably correct, because the Late’s relative income is higher (the woman works more), and because income tax rates have been rising. Whether the table’s overall figures are relatively correct, I cannot say, but almost certainly the Lates paid more ‘other taxes’ than the Earlys because their total relative income was higher, and indirect tax levels have also been rising (and are unlikely to fall through the next 40 years).

The benefit side is more problematic. First, it claims that the Earlys received more family benefit than the Lates, which is surprising since the family benefit was not introduced in 1946 after the Earlys turned 16 and became ineligible for it. (There was a minuscule family allowance from 1927). What the figures appear to be saying is that the Earlys received more family benefit for their children than the Lates did. The family benefit was relatively more valuable in the earlier years, and the Earlys would have had more children than the Lates.

This raises (yet another fatal) problem for the analysis. The Lates are (within a year or so) the children of the Earlys. I shall come back to the wider issue of how children should be incorporated in the analysis, but at this stage, note that a benefit provided by the state for the Lates is attributed to the Earlys. The same thing happens with education. The state expenditure on the Lates appears in the Early column. Probably, the same thing happens for part of health spending. An added complication is that education and health have been rising proportions of GDP spending, so the Lates would have received more per capita than the Earlys. (The Earlys would have been lucky to have a tertiary education, the Lates would have been unlucky not to.)

The ‘old age pension’, introduced in 1898 and superseded in 1939, is a rather strange name for the current retirement provision. Thomson has had to make a series of assumptions about what the Earlys and Lates will receive. He thinks that the former will receive about a third more than the latter. He may be right. As I have said economists have no great claims to be reliable forecasters. But there are some problems. The median income assumption is especially dangerous, because there has been (and is likely to be) considerable income redistribution within the age cohort. (Consider the universal entitlement from 60 in 1976, replaced by a super surcharge in 1984, to be raised further in 1992). Thomson also assumes similar longevity of the two generations. Underpinning this is a question of retirement policy with which I deal below.

The social security benefits exclude unemployment, sickness and domestic purposes, all of which would be more beneficial to the Lates than the Earlys. (Note that there is now an early retirement benefit, which while not as generous as national superannuation, mitigates the raising of the difference between Earlys and Lates by the retirement age from 60 to 65.)

Where Thomson gets his general government services figures from is unclear . I suspect he is projecting a relative reduction in government services over the next two decades, but wonder whether he adjusted the tax side as well.

Housing is a muddle in this book. Again it is dealt with below.

Overall, Thomson argues that the Earlys put less into society than they take out, and the Lates put in more. Unfortunately, the data is built upon many peculiar and unreliable assumptions while the forecasts crucial to the analysis are not convincing. A footnote to the table says: ‘the procedure has been conservative, seeking to play down the contrasts between the experiences of the two couples’. In virtually every case -children, benefits, government spending, women working, longevity, capacity to work -the ‘conservative play down’ favours Thomson’s hypothesis of the Earlys doing better than the Lates.

The conclusion may be true, within the narrow frame which Thomson uses, although that is unproven. However, there are some wider issues which also need addressing, even if the thesis were true.

First, can we ignore the inter-generational (but intra-household) transfer between parents and children? The Earlys might reasonably argue that they raised more children than the Lates, so the study overestimates their relative standard of living. Moreover, the investment they put into the kids is returned in part in a better retirement provision. They could not get to university, but they paid for the next generation to do so, and their retirement provision partly reflects the additional economic capacity of the economy as a result of their sacrifice.

A study purporting to cover the inter-generational transfers of the welfare state would contribute little if it ignores the parent-child transfer, and the opposite and hence the offset -of the transfer from the worker to the retired.

Second, there is the problem of what exactly the state retirement provision is for . Thomson argues the welfare state is primarily a cohort social insurance scheme. That is not obvious.

Consider my neighbour, George, who is about a decade older than the Earlys, with myself, a decade older than the Lates. The Very Early left school at 14 and worked to 59 before being made redundant. (He lived on the redundancy pay until he turned 60). George is a good bloke but, frankly, his occupational skills had become redundant before he did. I did not finish university until I was 23, so I shall be 68 before I have done my 45 years. Moreover, it looks as if my occupational skills ( which appear to be predicting doom from incompetent economic management) will still be valuable at retirement. Should I automatically be entitled to a state provided retirement benefit from 60 or even 65? Raising the age of universal entitlement may reflect changing patterns of occupational preparation, skills, ability to work and longevity.

This anecdote shows the retirement age is not set in stone. Nor is it obvious that if George gets more retirement benefits than me, he is better off. It is possible that from the perspective of the university academic, where it is said that retirement begins on the day you get tenure, retirement is an attractive occupation. In my view, one should be able to contribute to society as long as one is capable, and so early retirement need not be beneficial. What we are unsure about is how many Earlys are being forced into an early retirement, which is merely a euphemism for ‘unemployment’.

That leads to the third point of the role of inflation and unemployment. They are more closely linked than may be apparent at first, for each destroys savings. Inflation does this by diminishing the value of fixed interest wealth. It has been especially cruel because income tax is levied on the nominal, rather than the real, return on investment. But unemployment also destroys savings as they are consumed to sustain life when earnings are insufficient. Historically, much of our state provision for retirement has been a response to the destruction of private provision by depression and speculation.

What the Earlys have experienced is the considerable destruction of their savings by inflation from about 1970 to the late 1980s. Now they are being destroyed by the forced unemployment of early retirement. Neither of these processes are addressed in any detail in the book.

The housing inflation nexus is a complex one which the book fails to understand. The estate duly evidence is that wealth plateaus in the early 30s, which seems inconsistent with the known observation that personal savings increase with age (Easton, 1983; NZPC, 1990). What seems to be happening is that the major form of savings is housing, which give significant returns to young adults from the capital gains (including from the fixed value of the mortgage). However, you can only own one owner-occupier housing, so that investment returns are lower later in life, and may well be negative in after tax real terms. Additional savings thus offset the loss of the easy return from housing.

The book simplifies this complexity to tile single aspect of trying to assess the cost of a house purchase (although it is unaware of affordability index studies). The calculations ignore the contribution of women to the purchase, and overlook the way that inflation impacts on the down payment, but wipes out the mortgage costs.

One investment area which the book does not touch upon is government debt. There is some truth in the view that one generation’s public borrowing is the next generation’s tax. The high borrowing in recent decades might well be argued to be pushing liabilities onto future generations. However, much of those liabilities have been reduced in real terms by inflation, once more illustrating the central role it plays in inter-generational transfers. The result of the inflation was that despite heavy public borrowing, the public debt to GDP ratio was relatively constant throughout the 1970s and only really took off (i.e. became less favourable to future generations) in 1984 (e.g. Dalziel and Lattimore, 1991:28).

Fourth, suppose the hypothesis is true (if unproven). If the Earlys can exploit the Lates, then in due time, the Lates can exploit the Very Lates, who in turn can exploit the Very Very Lates, and so on. This could have been built into the tabulation but was not. Moreover, if it were true, then perhaps it is no more than each generation reducing the inter-generational 40 percent inequality from economic growth. We would need a more subtle exposition than that offered in this book to argue that it was wrong or an injustice. (One could equally argue that it parallels the effect of private investment and retirement provision.)

This is a review, not a book, and space is at a premium. The one further point which needs to be impressed upon the reader is how little Thomson knows about New Zealand if his citation record is any indication. 1l1ere is a chapter entitled , A New Poor’ which does not cite a single piece of work on poverty in New Zealand. If it had, the study would not have had to ‘raise doubts about the relative poverty of the elderly’. That they tend to be better off than families has been known since the mid-1970s, and was a major driver of social policy in the 1970s (Easton, 1981). His statement that in New Zealand, ‘there is no ready answer to questions such as ‘how did old age pensioners fare compare with younger families?’ (p.41) is true, if one denies the vast literature which exists on such topics.

Thomson might defend himself by saying: ‘this interpretation is not bolstered by voluminous references at every turn: it must stand or fall as readers judge it to ‘ring true’ , (p.7). Perhaps, although the references seem assiduous enough of overseas sources, giving the ringing a pseudo-scientific plausibility .It is the New Zealand material that is omitted. To be fair to Thomson, as far as I can judge, he is quite indiscriminate, omitting both material which supports or contradicts his thesis and material which would have developed and added rigour to the chatty presentation.

This methodology of testing by ‘ringing true’ seems to me to be a dangerous one. A good number of books promoting racial prejudice and conspiracy theories rest on such insecure foundations. Not surprisingly, the response to this book has been strong public reactions from those who find it confirms or denies their prejudices. The underlying message of the world which has changed little -in terms of demography, women working, family patterns and general social change -but in which one group is now robbing another is likely to ring true to those who wish it were true. Many of those who would hotly deny the underlying thesis would nonetheless be sympathetic to the social assumptions on which it rests. Given its limited description of the role of the welfare state, it is not surprising to see the book being quoted favourably by the New Right (Gibbs, 1991).

This book by, we are told, a leading social historian thus sits uneasily in the category of the pseudo-academic which justifies unthinking prejudice. In doing so, it demeans the sterling work of those who have tried to look at these complex issues systematically, and adds heat to a public debate while pretending to shed light.

Selected Bibliography
Dalziel, P. and Lattimore, R. (1991) A Briefing on the New Zealand Economy: 1960-1990. Oxford University Press.:
Department of Statistics (1990) The Fiscal Impact on Income Distribution 1987/88, Wellington.
Easton, B.H. (1981) Pragmatism and Progress Social Security in the Seventies, University of Canterbury Press.
Easton, B.H. (1983) Income Distribution in New Zealand, NZIER Research Paper No.28, Wellington, New Zealand Institute of Economic Research.
Gibbs, A., 1991. ‘Does the Welfare State Have a Future?’, Economic Alert, 2(8),October
Snively, S.I. (1988) The Government Budget and Social Policy, Paper prepared for the Royal Commission on Social Policy, Wellington.

Stability and Chaos

Listener: 20 January, 1992

Keywords: History of Ideas, Methodology & Philosophy;

Suppose you were lost in the bush, and wanted to find the sea. One strategy would be to follow a river downhill. It may not be the best way but you do get there. Economists portray market behaviour a bit like this. Here, the objective is an equilibrium between supply and demand. Like the run of the water, the price signals lead you to that endpoint.

But do they? Economists study this in general equilibrium theory, which argues that there is an endpoint, and that market prices point to it; this involves special production processes and an endpoint which is rather restricted, not necessarily the nirvana that enthusiasts suggest. In reaching this equilibrium endpoint people may have starved to death; the theory treats humans as narrow individuals who are not overly concerned with the wellbeing of others.

At this point the reader may say, impatiently, that nobody in their right mind lost in the bush follows the course of a river uncritically. The first thing to do when lost is to sit down, get the pack off your back, and think about the problem. Perhaps boil yourself a billy (use any economics text to light the fire); get out the map; make a plan. You may find there is a track which is easier to follow. Or you may get up onto the ridge, or even over the ridge to the next river , which is not riven by cataracts.

Not only may there be better paths than following the river, but there may be different endpoints. Do you want to end up at the Pacific Ocean or the Tasman (it depends on what side of the divide you start)? How do you know there are not sinkholes like the Dead Sea, or Death Valley, or Harwoods Hole, and that the river never takes you to the sea?

Slavishly following gravity need not be a good strategy. Not that you would ignore the laws of nature, but a bit of planning would be helpful. Might that not also be true for economic management? I leave you to ponder on the problem. Note that we have already included assumptions so familiar they go unstated. For instance, what if the ground is subject to continuing upheavals from earthquakes? Perhaps the economic ground is. Following the market – following any strategy – may be like mimicking a demented mouse running about a maze. Those who reach its end may praise their capabilities, but their success may be solely due to luck. If you find this all too disturbing perhaps you should not read on.

Thus far I have described the physical world. Its laws are familiar; we have known them since our beginnings. They were systematised by Isaac Newton, three centuries ago. It is difficult to appreciate the significance of Newtonianism, which is not just the laws of motion, which have proved powerful predictors. It changed the way we thought about the world. His achievement is summarised in Alexander Pope’s epitaph: “Nature and Nature’s laws lay hid in night: God said Let Newton be! and all was light.’

What Newton suggested was that the physical universe was sufficiently well organised that it could be characterised by some simple ideas, expressed in a mathematical form and used to predict the universe’s behaviour. Einstein never challenged this approach. Relativity involves the same basic ideas; it merely changes some of the equations.

This approach was so powerful it was adopted by many other disciplines. Adam Smith was fascinated by Newtonian mechanics, as were many of the early founders of sociology. Economics and sociology tried to model themselves on it. Economics still does; general equilibrium theory is an example. Its theorists have been awarded more Nobel prizes in economics than those of any other school of thought.

Yet in the last decade a number of pure and applied mathematicians have explored a realm which undermines Newtonianism as a general principle (although it remains useful for most practical purposes). The equations are still there but they no longer predict at all well. Once, small errors did not throw you off the path. We now know that, for some mathematical systems, tiny errors can matter. Nature contains many such systems. Weather forecasting is finding that, despite using some of the world’s most powerful computers, its accuracy is restricted to only days ahead.

If you want to read about this new mathematics, called ‘chaos theory’, try Ian Stewart’s Does God Play Dice? or James Gleick’s Chaos. Let me suggest the feel of it. Suppose two people follow some rule of procedure (such as gravity or market signals) and set out from almost the same spot. Despite adhering to the rules, they could very easily end up in totally different places. In the example I began with this would be understandable if, by accident, our lost trampers happened to be straddling the main divide and so each ended up at different seas. But it appears that these main divides may be just about everywhere. Expressed geographically, ours is a world of strange, beautifully organised terrains, but the contours and paths are incomprehensible in terms of traditional global accounts of the universe. Outcomes are not merely dependent upon process and aptitude; initial position or, if you wish, luck is often crucial.

This ‘chaos’ is not generated by the Heisenberg uncertainty principle of quantum mechanics. Even with perfect causality, one can never know with sufficient precision to be able to predict meaningfully for many purposes

In some ways this column is not merely about economics but about the underlying foundations of Western thought. This is not to predict the collapse of the foundations nor its disciplines. There is as yet nothing to replace them. In the interim we might reflect on the old problems of causality, free will, and perhaps even some deep theological issues.

New Zealand’s 51 Best Books

Published in The Dominion in January 1992

Keywords: Literature and Culture;

This selection is a New Zealand response to 101 Best Australian Books, complied by John Arnold and Peter Pierce for November’s Bulletin magazine. Their selection was influenced by the personal inclinations of the compilers. within constraints to produce a representative listing in terms of subject, chronological spread and gender. They were limited to one book per author and appear to have ruled out books with multiple authors such The Dictionary of New Zealand Biography. The Bulletin list is in alphabetical order. This is grouped into loose chronological order by subject (rather than by publication date).

I have added some later thoughts in italics, and some additional books at the end – most of which has been published since the original list. Some current writers have written very good books since 1992, but the general rule has been not to replace their earlier works.

1. George Grey, Polvnesian Mythology (Maori edition 1854, English 1855) The source from which we learned so much of the Maori .mythology which has enriched the culture. The best of modern myths is Patricia Grace’s Potiki, in which the Maori story is fashioned into an account of tbe modern rural Maori and the pressures of development.

2. John Salmon, Native Trees of New Zealand (1980) Trees are the crowning glory of the land. and this richly illustrated book presents the crowd in all its magnificence.

3. Ian Pool, Te Iwi Maori (1991). The social history with the longest sweep from before the Maori arrived here through to 2011. A difficult technical book, but ta tribute to the quality New Zealand work in statistics over the years.

4. Henry Williams, Dictionary of New Zealand Maori (1844 and revised) A book of such significance that it has gone through authos and revisions and still remains the basic reference on the written Maori language. Brigg’s valuable dictionary, suitable for the home library, is based upon it.

5.Raymond Firth, The Economics of the New Zealand Maori (1929, revised 1959) A book whose authority on the early Maori economy still stands today. Important also for inrtroiducing the ‘gift relationship’ into English and so it’s an international milestome in economic anthropology.

6. John Beaglehole, The Discovery of New Zealand (1939 and 1961). Beaglehole’s scholarly work was indefatigable, and the results are now part of every school child’s heritiage. An alternative could be The Exploration of the Pacific, The Life of Captain James Cook or The Endeavour Journal of Joseph Banks.

7. Ann Salmond, Two Worlds (1981) Just published it is the punt of the selection, a book which reminds us that the European was as ignorant, superstitious and primitive as the Maori at the time of first contact. So we have both developed – sort of together. Its underlying message is that it is not just a matter of respecting other cultures but of trying to understand them. A justified punt in retrospect. The second book of this trilogy Between Worlds was published in 1997. We await the third.

8. Patricia Burns, Te Rauparaha: A New Perspective (1980) The Maori Napoleon had a bad press till this book which brings him to life as one of our greatest statesmen for all his turbulent youth.

9. Claudia Orange, The Treaty of Waitangi (1987) The right book on the right topic at the right time, Recording the most important day in the history of New Zealand, 147 years later it became a part of establishing that day into tbe nation’s public conscience.

10. Frederick Maning, Old New Zealand (1862) An exuberant mixture of autobiography, racy anecdotes, and descriptions of Maori history and customs, which also contained a political message of the conflict between the Maori and European world.

11. Mary Barker, Station Life in New Zealand (1870) Enthusiasm for station life found this compilation of letters to a sister provides both documentary and a sort of comedy of manners.

12. Samuel Butler Erewhon (1872) A satirical utopian tract, physiclly set in New Zealand and informed by Butler’s Canterbury aperiences, despite being written in London.

13. Dick Scott, Ask the Mountain: The Story of Parihaka (1975) Perhaps Hazel Riseborough’s Days of Darkness: Taranaki 1878-1884 may be more historically correct but Scott’s book drew Zealand’s attention to one of the worst outrages in a colonial past resplendent with such outrages. Written with all the flair and pasison of our best crusading journalism.

14. Russell Stone, Makers of Fortune: A Business Community and Its Fall (1973) New Zealand’s best business history and a rollicking good yarn. No hagiography, but like it was, as Auckland speculators of the late 19th century destroyed themselves (and the economy).

15. William Pember Reeves Experiments in New Zealand and Australia (1902) That, or The Long White Cloud our first great history book – but history books tend to fade, while State Experiments still has the interest and freshness of the exciting reforms which occurred at the turn of the 19th to 20th century.

16. Miles Fairburn, The Ideal Society and Its Enemies (1989) The historian’s ‘man alone’ and landmark in New Zealand historiography. Almost everyone disagrees with his thesis of the isolated society but no-one will write a history of nineteenth century New Zealand without referring to it. Already the Journal of New Zealand History has devoted an entire edition to the book.

17. Colin Simpkin, The Instability of a Dependent Economy (1951) J.B. Condliffe’s The Making of New Zealand is better known, but Simpkin’s is better economics and better history, confirming its prescient and memorable title. My In Stormy Seas: The Post-War New Zealand Economy can be thought of a sucessor with the advantage of a longer coverage.

18. Harry Holland, Robert Ross, & ‘Ballot Box’ (Francis O’Flynn), The Tragic Story of the Wahi Strike (1913) The only co-authored book in the list – on an industrial dispute which Erik Olssen sees as pivotal in the rsie of unionsim in his The Red Feds.

19 Katherine Mansfeld, Collected Stories (1945) Though she spent her adult years abroad, her best stories recall her New Zealand childhood, and convey a fresh and moving impression of the fragility human experience. Once she seemed our only recognised writer. Frank Sargeson said she “imposed a pattern on our writing. Lots of young women wrote Mansfield stories.” Today we do not hold her in the same awe and she is the better writer for it.

20. John A Lee, Children of the Poor (1934} Lee may eventually be remembered as much as a writer of social realism as a politician. He began this book a day after the Queen Street riot, his childhood memories stirred by the hardship of the 1930s. The Truth newspaper headlined it ‘Sister’s degradation for starving family: a sensational book on vice poverty and misery’.

21. Jane Mander, Story of a New Zealand River ( 1920) A vivid. female (early feminist?) perception of pioneering society.

22. William Guthrie Smith Tutira (1921) A tour-de-force on the ecology of a sheep. station: geology. Maori occupation. original and introduced vegetation. fauna. the Pakeha impact.

23. Robin Hyde, Passport to Hell (1937} Starkie may have been the quintessential New Zealand soldier with a disrespect for danger and discipline, but home after the war was its own hell. This book just pips Archibald Baxter’s We Shall Not Cease.

24. Michael King, Te Puea (1977) A great biography of a great woman possibly the most influential in our history.

25. John Pascoe, Great Days in New Zealand Mountaineering (1958) An affectionate review of the mountains of New Zealand told through the lives of some of the mountaineers who climbed them.

26. John Mulgan, Man Alone (1939} In his essay on the New Zealand novel in The Oxford History of New Zealand Literature, Lawrence Jones makes this the standard model for the New Zealand novel. It has been required reading for all school children. Perhaps the picture of the solo man is not really New Zea1and. but the description of the Queen Street riot and the struggle through the bush are unforgettable.

27. Tony Simpson, The Sugar Bag Industry (1974) Still the best oral history, providing an enduring memory of the Great Depression, which we forget at our peril.

28. Crawford Somerset, Littledene: Patterns of Change (1938, rev. 1974) The story of a small town (Oxford} which combines the wry insights of a sociologist and the lyric observations o[ a poet.

29. Barry Gustafson, From Cradle to Grave: A Biography of Michael Joseph Savage (1986) From a stunning opening about the hardships of Australian life at the turn of the century, develops into a comprehensive biography of a man, that perhaps misses only the political steel behind the famous beatific smile.

30. Keith Sorrenson, Nga To Hoa Aroha, From Your Dear Friend: The Correspondence between Sir Peter Buck and Sir Apirana Ngata (3 Volumes 1986. 1987. 1988) Superbly edited Correspondence of two outstanding and influential New Zealanders commenting on the great matters of the day.

31 Frank Sargeson, The Stories of Frank Sargeson (1973: Written 1935-1970) In these realist narratives of (largely) New Zealand male society, Sargeson captures a local vernacular and idiom while pondering on central preoccupations of gender, cultural, social economic and national identity.

32. Bill Sutch, The Quest for Security (1942 revised 1966) The first edition was a best-selling Penguin Special. The second still provides one of the most comprehensive accounts of the history of the welfare state told around the thesis in the title. His Poverty and Progress in Zealand would be an alternative.

33 Sylvia Ashton-Warner, Spinster (1958) Love her or hate her – her biographer Lynley Hood could not decided either – Ashton-Warner’s combination of a work of fiction and an educational treatise has a strong woman fighting bureaucracy and rural narrow mindedness This contrast to Man Alone gave her an international reputatation.

34 James K Baxter, Collected Poems (1979, edited J E Weir) An eccentric public image throughout his life meant that his poetry was not always appreciated for its qualities: grand rhetoric passion in youth to austere simplicity at the end (at 46). Bill Oliver and Frank Mackay have both written splendid biographies.

35 Marie Clay, The Early Detection of Reading Difficulties: A Diagnositc Survey and Reading Recovery Procedures (1979) It is no accident that New Zealand students recently topped the world in reading attainment. A close second is G.W. Parkyn’s Success and Failure at the University, which underpinned the principle of open university access, being undermined today (but our kids can read),

36 Barry Crump, A Good Keen Man (1960)The best of the humour yarn tradition, whose simplicity conceals a lot of skill.

37 Alan Curnow, Early Days Yet: New and Collected Poems, 1941-1997 (1997) Curnow may well be one of this century’s greatest poet in English as his distinctive talent is increasingly being recognised abroad. An earlier collected works has been replaced with the latest

38 Sonia Davies, Bread and Roses (1984) The autobiography of an ordinary New Zealand woman who was nevertheless one of our most remarkable for what she did and what she achieved. (And she keeps going on!)

39 Gil Docking, Two Hundred Years of New Zealand Pinting (1971, second edition with Michael Dunn 1991) A book which gave us a sense that we had our own vibrant tradition of New Zealand art.

40 Janet Frame, An Autobiography (1989): To the Is-land (1982); An Angel at My Table (1984); The Envoy From Mirror City (1985) New Zealand’s best autobiography, in part captured on film by Jane Campion.

41 Maurice Gee, The Plumb Trilogy; Plumb (1978). Meg (1981); The Sole Survivor (1983} Sustained narrative of a family and society by one of our most modest and most skilled writers of fiction. The jewel or the three is the first book, but the last with the contrast between the third generation’s political thug and wet journalist presaged Rogernomics.

42 Lloyd Geering, God in the New Worls (1968) A book which contributed to the religious debate overseas, and the religious controversy at home, making available the insights of new scholarship to a wider number of people in the community.

43 Keri Hume, The Bone People (1983) Celebrated Booker prize winner, its raw violence and aroha make it an unforgettable landmark account of the deep passions of New Zealand society.

44 Witi Ihimaera, Pounamu, Pounamu (1972) In a series of short stories, of which this is the first collection, Ihimaeraportrays the Maori migration from the country into the city. with an innocence and deftness which belies the profound impact of the transformation.

45 Greg McGee, Foreskin’s Lament (1981 revised) A play which captures the poetry of rugby, and its brutality, from the 1956 tour to the 1981 tour (in revised version) and tackles social issues even more important than rugby.

46 Margaret Mahy, The Haunting (1982) New Zealand’s greatest children’s writer tells a story about the edge of adolescence. Winner of the Carnegie medal.

47 Ngaio Marsh, Died in the Wool (1944) The best of that genre of popular fiction for the international market which uses New Zealand settings to tell a good story.

48 Bruce Mason, Solo (1981) For its “End of the Golden Weather” that marvellous gift which Mason wrote (and acted) of a boy growing up from innocence into the adult world. Pity the collection does not also include “The Pohutukawa Tree”.

49 Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies (1945) The greatest book written in New Zealand. Is it a New Zealand book though? Our credit is that we gave refuge to many middle European refugees when the world was in despair. They in return gave much to us. This firm rejection of extremism of the right and of the left is an outstanding example.

50 Keith Sinclair, A History of New Zealand (1958 and revised) Although like Reeves’ The Long White Cloud this pivotal history with its message of New Zealand as a nation may lose its prominence, there will always be a place for one of Sinclair’s books among our best books: perhaps The Origin of the Maori Wars, or Walter Nash.

51 Ranginui Walker, Ka Whawhai Tonu Matou: Struggle Without End (1990) By a nice coincidence. the last of the 51 books is the first major Maori history of New Zealand. The distinctiveness of its story. contrasting with Sinclair’s history , is a reminder that in our maturity there is diversity.

And some to be added in the dozen years since. The number indicates roughly where they would go in the above list.

(1.5) Trevor Worthy & Richard Holdaway; principal photography by Rod Morris, Lost World of the Moa : Prehistoric Life of New Zealand (2002)
(9.5) Philip Temple. A Sort of Conscience : The Wakefields (2002)
(17.5)Erik Olssen, Building the New World : Work, Politics and Society in Caversham 1880s-1920s (1997)
(23.5) Archibald Baxter, We Will Not Cease (1968 2ed)
(29.5) Clarence Beeby, The Biography of An Idea : Beeby on Education (1992)
(33.5) Ronald Hugh Morrieson, The Scarecrow (1963)
(34.5) Heather Nicholson, The Loving Stitch : A History of Knitting and Spinning in New Zealand (1998)
(35.5) Harry Orsman (ed), The Oxford Dictionary of New Zealand English (1997)
(43.5) Donna Awatere, Maori Sovereignty (1984)
(48.5) Malcolm McKinnon, Treasury: the New Zealand Treasury, 1840-2000 (2003) or should it be Bateman New Zealand Historical Atlas (1977) editor with Barry Bradley & Russell Kirkpatrick?
(49.5) Alan Duff, Once Were Warriors (1999)
(51+) Wira Gardener, Return to Sender: What Really Happened At the Fiscal Envelope Hui (1996)
(51+) Owen Marshall, The Best of Owen Marshall’s Short Stories (1997)
(51+) Bruce Jesson, Only Their Purpose is Mad (1999)
(51+) Bill Manhire, Collected Poems (2001)

There has been such a flowering of young novelists, it is hard to choose one as the novelist. Tentatively, for I may change my mind, Elizabeth Knox, Tawa (1998)

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Economic Instruments for the Regulation Of Licit Drugs

Paper for the Perspectives for Change Conference, sponsored by the New Zealand Drug Foundation and the Alcohol Liquor Advisory Council, 25-27 November, 1991.

Keywords Health; Regulation & Taxation ;

This paper does not pursue the ‘why’ or ‘whether’ policy issues of the additional regulation of licit drugs such as alcohol and tobacco, except insofar as that is relevant to the ‘how’ of regulation. The paper focuses on only one aspect of the how, the use of ‘economic instruments’ of regulation.

The economic instruments of regulation could refer to such policy options as prohibitions and restriction. However in the current broad policy debate, economic instruments are confined to market instruments only, which includes taxes and subsidies, and property rights such as licences and private ownership. In recent years the main debate about the use of such market instruments has been for environmental regulation (Salmon 1991, Terra Nova 1991), but as this paper shows, their modem use for licit drugs precedes that for the environment.

An appreciation of why economists have advocated market instruments can be gained from the chapter heads of Roemer’s review of legislative action with regard to smoking (1982). They include such expressions as ‘control’ (four times), ‘restrictions’ (three times), ‘preventing, and ‘mandatory’. Whatever the civil liberties aspects of such interventions, economists would add that experience indicates that they tend to be less effective than the legislators’ intention, and they tend to generate a variety of economic inefficiencies.

In my view that does not mean a community should not use such direct interventions. If I see a child heading for a fire I am likely to warn and then grab her or him. But ideally there will be an education program, which helps the child make their own decisions, and there may well be a fireguard. In the same way the economic instruments aim to provide an environment in which control, restriction, and mandation are less necessary.

A feature of this paper is that it addresses both alcohol and tobacco. However the two licit drugs have different pharmacological and social impacts, and so the precise application of the market instruments will differ.

Fiscal Considerations

Excise duties on alcohol and tobacco were initially for revenue purposes. In 1839, the British Colonial Secretary, Lord Normandy, confidently advised putative Governor Hobson ‘Duties on the import of tobacco, spirits, wines and sugar, will probably supersede the necessity for other taxation …’, (McLintock 1958:90). Ordnance No.3 of 1841 imposed duties starting from 9d. a pound for unmanufactured tobacco, and 4s. 0d. a gallon for spirits (beer was no initially taxed). There was a brief period from 28 September 1844 to 8 April 1845 in which the duties were repealed, but since then excise duties on imports of tobacco and alcohol, and later on their domestic manufactures, have been an ongoing part of our fiscal reality (Taxation Review Committee 1967: 63).

Normandy’s prophesy proved unfounded however, as the revenue proved insufficient. Admittedly in 1875/76 customs and excise duty made up 91.6 percent of tax revenue, but since then the proportion has been diminishing. Today they are estimated to be 4.1 percent of total tax revenue (for the 1991/92 year). The decline is not so dramatic relative to total output. Customs and excise duties (including some other products) was about 4.1 percent of GNP in l875/76, and alcohol and tobacco taxation (excluding GST) is expected to be about 1.7 percent of GNP (excluding GST) this year. What Normandy under-estimated was the revenue demands of government.

As every first year economics student is taught, alcohol and tobacco are attractive targets for the tax. They are readily identified without easy substitutes, there are few manufacturers and importers,[1] and in each case the demand is price inelastic. This last concept is crucial to the subsequent discussion, so it needs to be explained.

In economics the term ‘elastic’ is virtually interchangeable with ‘sensitive’, so to say the demand for a product is price inelastic is to say that its demand is insensitive to a change in price. Thus if taxes go up, there is little change in demand for the product, and so the tax revenue gain is significant.

A counter-example from Britain in the 19th century may be helpful. There the Chancellor of the Exchequer put up the tax on bubbly wines, without appreciating that champagne was very price elastic, because consumers promptly switched to still wines, and the tax revenue went down. But while individual tobacco or alcohol products may be price elastic, collectively either product is price inelastic. (Easton & Kay 1982 for alcohol; Laugesen & Meads 1990, 1991 for tobacco)

This inelasticity means that when suppliers grump that about exceptional taxes on their products, they are told that the tax is not reducing their output or profit that much, in comparison to highly elastic products. In effect almost all the tax is being passed onto the consumer, and the producer is hardly suffering.

There is actually a deeper analysis in this, which I will not detail. But briefly if the government has to raise taxes then it can be shown that impositions on inelastic products are less ‘distorting’ in the economist’ s sense that they are less damaging to overall economic efficiency. Indeed there is a well established theory of the optimal level of taxation. That theory identifies a product with these characteristics alcohol as ideal for higher rate of excise tax relative to other products.[2]

There is one further characteristic of tobacco and alcohol, which makes them attractive in taxation terms. Consumption of either is thought to be indulgent, if not downright sinful. For this reason the excise duties on tobacco and alcohol are sometimes called ‘sin taxes’.[3]

The Aftermath of 1958

The most famous – or infamous – example of the imposition of sin taxes was the 1958 budget, which with hindsight now appears to be a case of superb fiscal management to a substantial external shock. At the time the ‘Black’ budget was seen as a betrayal of the promises in the 1957 election promise and the punishing of the working man’s pleasure in his ‘beer and baccy’, by a 30 percent rise in the price of alcoholic beverages and a 40 percent rise in the price of tobacco. So dramatic were these hikes that they perceptibly cut consumption despite each product’s price inelasticity of demand (Easton 1967).

The justifications for these hikes are surprisingly thin, given the furore they caused. The budget speech itself simply says there is a need for fiscal action and baldly – as baldly as the head delivering the budget -announced the additional impositions. In the subsequent customs and excise duty bill debate it was argued that even after the increases the duty rates would be lower than in the ‘Old Country’ (Walter Nash) and Australia (Phil Holloway). Arnold Nordmeyer quoted Professor Alan Danks of the University of Canterbury that we are smoking and drinking too cheaply for the times’. Nash hesitantly suggested ‘as for spirits, I do not know whether there are advocates on that side or this side of the House for more to be drunk’. Reading this debate today suggests the Opposition was easily scoring points against the Government right from the beginning. (NZPD 1958:291-5).

The politically traumatic experience of the 1958 budget meant that the subsequent government was loathe to raise the duties. An indication of the state of affairs is the 1967 Report of the Committee on Taxation which hardly discusses excise duties, proposed they be retained, concluding lamely it recognised
‘that excise duties are regressive [ i.e. impose more heavily on the poor] in their effect but in the nature of the commodities taxed, their importance in general to the revenue and the acceptability of excise in the public mind we do not consider that the mere fact of regression in this sector of the tax field is of itself sufficient reason for any change, provided the tax system as a whole is progressive.’ (p.372)

But even as they wrote tobacco duties were hiked, and again in 1970, and 1976. On the other hand alcohol duties were not significantly raised until 1977. It is unclear why the two were treated differently. The following comes from the October 1970 Economic Statement
‘Of all the products at present subject to indirect taxation, it is clear that cigarettes and tobacco can be subjected to additional tax without harming in any way the general welfare of the community. In fact it is increasingly argued that discouraging the consumption of these commodities is likely to make a positive contribution to our general health.’ (Muldoon 1970: 12)

There was no mention of alcohol. One practical political possibility is that smoking is more concentrated in low income groups, in comparison to drinking being more evenly spread across the community. Thus a National government was less constrained by the political impact of a tobacco excise duty hike on its supporters.[4]

The 1970 announcement raises an issue which amounts to a near deception. The purpose of the duty hike was to raise revenue. Insofar that people reduced their consumption of tobacco products as a result, that would reduce revenue. Thus it is not at all clear that the fiscal measure aimed to discourage consumption, despite the apparent meaning of the second sentence of the quotation.

The expression ‘without harming the general welfare of the community’, is probably a reference to the optimal theory of taxation, and the ‘in any way’ probably implicitly assumes the demand for tobacco is totally inelastic.

The 1977 Change

Holding the duty rates at the same nominal level, was becoming increasingly difficult in the 1970s, as inflation galloped along at double digit rates, and specific duties experienced a kind of negative fiscal drag.[5] The real value of the excise duty was diminishing, which reduced the real value of government revenue, and the real price which made the licit drug use cheaper. An interesting coalition evolved of those who merely wanted the government to control and reduce its deficit, and those who wanted the government to control and reduce the use of licit drugs, or perhaps merely punish the drug users. Different objectives, but a common policy prescription was to raise the excise duties.

Probably the 1970 tobacco duty hike was the first reluctant recognition, and in 1979 there was some linkage of specific taxes to inflation via the imposition of specific sales taxes.[6] However in the 1977 budget speech an apparent change in policy occurred. The first paragraph of the section entitled ‘Duty on Alcohol and Tobacco’ says
‘The Government is concerned at the high level of public expenditure caused directly by the consumption of tobacco and alcohol. The adverse effects on health of smoking and drinking have been well publicised. Alcohol is also a major cause of many road accidents. The cost of providing health care and treatment in public hospitals and elsewhere for those affected is very high. (Muldoon 1977:41)’

Having set the new higher duty rates the section concludes that the additional revenue ‘will help sustain the high level on health, including the extension of community health services’ (Muldoon 1977:42). Thus a new principle has been introduced. While the duties may remain primarily for revenue raising purposes their justification is now in terms of the costs that the activities impose on the public.[7]

The Externality Issue

The phenomenon recognised in the budget statement comes from standard economic theory . Usually the individual’s consumption covers all the costs to the community,[8] but for some consumption the costs to the individuals may differ substantially from the social costs.

For instance when I drink milk, I pay for the cost of the land, the farming, the treatment station, and the transport and delivery. In the jargon the costs to society are ‘intemalised’ to the consumer. In comparison while drinking the alcohol I pay for the farming, processing and distribution, I may (or may not) also incur social costs from the need for medical treatment, and perhaps for violence and or/accidents which are also precipitated from the drinking. These additional costs which I impose on society are called “externalities”. (Note there may be positive externalities, if society has its costs reduced, that is society benefits.) All consumption activities probably generate some externalities, sometimes positive, sometimes negative, but for a limited number of products the externalities are considered sufficiently large to require some government intervention. There are two broad reasons for these interventions.

First it might not be considered fair that a consumption activity should impose costs on other without the consumer paying for it. There is a sort of justice if costs are intemalised (and the distribution of spending power is fair) in that you pay for what the costs you incur to society. The tobacco smoker or alcohol drinker who ends up in hospital, or sends others to hospital, without paying for the costs incurred seems to be unjustly favoured.

The second reason is the price system also acts as a signalling device, which tells consumers how much of social resources they are using when they consume the product. Not only do prices signal resource usage, but they are self enforcing, because the consumption activity normally involves giving up income equal to the resources. Thus the consumer sacrifices income for the social resources used. However where there are externalities the self enforcing element no longer applies, and consumers will tend to overconsume the particular product, in the sense that they would use more of it than if they had to pay for it all themselves. In the economist’s jargon this generates inefficiency.

Each of these accounts can be seen in the two economic statements already quoted. In 1970 the duty (and hence prices) were hiked to discourage consumption (so we were told). In 1977 the purpose of the hike was to pay for the additional health costs the consumption was generating. Of course in each case revenue considerations were important.

This would appear to offer a golden opportunity to the tax enthusiast. If the commodity which generates bad externalities is price sensitive, slap on a tax to discourage people consuming it: if it is price inelastic you can still slap on a tax in order to recover the social costs that the consumption generates. There are, however, three caveats.

The first is that treasuries do not like earmarked taxes. They will lecture long on their reasons, (Treasury 1989a,b 1991) but briefly the grounds amount to the Treasury having less control over earmarked taxes and the resulting spending, and having approved one earmarked tax (no matter how justified) the door is opened for a myriad more as every minor externality is taxed (or subsidised in the case of good externalities).

Second, it is not always possible to hone a tax to match the externality. where consumption is directly proportional to public cost a fixed tax is appropriate. Probably for tobacco consumption and some medical costs generated by drinking (i.e. cirrhosis of the liver) that assumption is near enough. But if the social cost is from accidents it matters a lot whether the drink is at home or in the pub just before driving home, and it also matters a lot if it is the first and only drink of the evening or the umpteenth. The scenario for violence is even more complicated, but that raises the further problem that different drinkers generate different social costs in terms of accidents and violence.

One study showed that there was no simple solution to the fair tax problem, even if the community was merely grouped into heavy drinkers, moderate drinkers, and teetotallers. Any duty on alcohol which suited one group was unfair to the other two, and no compromise seemed possible. (Easton, Hunn, & Pryke 1985)

Third it proved quite difficult to measure what was the social cost. What costs do you charge to the individual and what to the community. For instance time off work is a loss of output to the community, but perhaps it is a part of the tradeoff for the pleasures of the drinking binge. How do we evaluate those pleasures?

Moreover consider the peculiar conclusion which arise from early death as a result of, say, smoking. While that may involve the health system in additional smoking related costs, but it saves the social security outlays and further medical costs of in old age.[9] It is possible that the savings to the state from early death may substantially exceed the costs of treating smoking. Should we then subsidise smoking rather than tax it?

The final problem is what do you do when, the revenue from special taxes exceeds the social costs that the activity generates.[12] If the demand is still price elastic the government may still wish to raise tax rates for revenue purposes. In the case of both commodities there appears to be still public pressure to raise taxation on each commodities, because consumption is still seen to be indulgent.[13]

In one sense the use of taxation to either control use of the licit drug or to reduce external social costs (and/or to intemalise them) has been a convenient excuse for the government to raise additional revenue while claiming to be acting in terms of some wider purpose. This is evident in the Minister of Finance 1991 claim ‘the Government is also moving to reduce costs on the health system by discouraging consumption of tobacco and alcohol’ (Richardson 1991: 12), while the main purpose of the hike was revenue. But in a crucial way the legitimation of these reasons in the fiscal debate became part of the leverage that the control lobbies used to justify other measures.

Airspace Rights

How far they progressed can be seen from the remark by the Minister of Health when she introduced the Smoke-free Environments Bill in 1990 she explicitly stated the Government had no ‘monetary self interest’ in the bill, and that ‘international tobacco consumption can be costly for governments, and show that the reduction in revenue from the tax on tobacco might well outweigh the savings in the health vote’ (NZPD 1990: 1635). From the papers released on discussion before the bill was introduced that Treasury did not strongly express these fiscal concerns either.

The bill (now act) is in three sections. The third part involves public education, an issue discussed in the penultimate section. The second involves direct (although partial) prohibition of advertising of tobacco use and sponsorship by tobacco companies, and so belongs to the direct control policy instruments that are not usually classified as an economic instrument. However while the first part also directly controlled smoking via the creation of smoke free zones, it can be thought of as an property right issue (that is the use of an economic instrument) as follows.

There are (at least) two property rights involved: on the one hand there is the right to breathe unpolluted air, a claim which was enhanced by the discovery of the health dangers of passive smoking; on the other there is the right to be able to smoke, and hence pollute the air, on demand. Economists cannot say which of these rights have priority, and the most obvious relevant economic analysis -the Coase theorem (Posner 1986)is inappropriate because the transaction costs of practical enforcement.

What happened was that as smoking penetrated wider social groups the pollution of airspace was accepted by law, since there was no alternative, and so it became increasingly widespread social practice that smoking was given priority over smoke free air. There were protestations, especially from those allergic to the smoke, and numerous practical courtesies, including some social segregation (as the smoking room for men after dinner). However as far is known there was no litigation in New Zealand, over the pollution of air space from tobacco smoking, and it seems likely if there had been the courts would have ruled there was a common law right to pollute other’s airspace. [12]

The effect of the first part of the Smoke Free Act was to give a statutory priority to the right to tobacco-smoke free air, over the right to smoke. Because transaction/enforcement costs of a system based on explicit private property rights would be high the rights are based on designated use. A full private property rights system would have been to give each person the right to smoke free air, which they could pursue in the courts by prosecuting the polluter . Not only would this have been horribly expensive, but it would not have dealt with lingering tobacco residues.

In summary the law change can be analyzed in terms of property rights, especially as it provides a good example of how transaction costs can make the Coase theorem, and its practical policy application infeasible. The change in priority of rights probably reflects the diminishing influence of smokers, plus increasing awareness of the health consequences of tobacco consumption (plus the public costs of smoking), and the recognition of passive smoking as a threat to non-smokers’ health.[13]

A New Right Application of Economic Instruments

The New Right objection to ‘selective’ interventions such as specific taxation, is pursued in a Centre For Independent Studies publication by Rob Cameron (1989). The paper appears to be a revised version of an anonymously authored paper submitted by Lion-Nathan (1989) to the 1989 Review of Excise Duties, which no doubt explains the omission of any reference to excise duties on tobacco in the paper, although one assumes there is a parallel objection by the New Right.[14]

The pamphlet’s one sided arguments include that tax is expensive to collect on alcohol, without noting all these defects apply to almost all other taxes. No attempt is made to provide any quantitative evidence for these costs. One extraordinary contribution in an extraordinary publication is the following item implying that prohibiting the lobbying would apparently result in a significant improvement in economic efficiency.
‘…battling the tax issue has meant a tradition of high public relations budgets. …[15] Further, the cost of lobbying or arguing the liquor industry’s case takes a disproportional large part of corporate budgets compared with other industries without the same burden.’ (1989: 18)[16]

The pamphlet also complains that ‘taxes on alcohol infringe the generally accepted principles of equity’ (1989: 17). It appears the equity ‘infringement’ occurs because people who drink pay more alcohol excise duty than those who do not.[17]

As an alternative to the present taxation arrangements the pamphlet proposes excise taxes should be replaced by a higher GST (that is a tax across all consumption,[18] and not just alcohol), but it does not note that because spending on alcohol rises more slowly than overall spending, so that the proposed switch would be regressive across income groups. There appears to be a certain selectivity of concern for equity.

Moreover there is no hint at all in the paper that the writer is aware of the theory of optimal taxation, which would recommend higher tax rates on price inelastic products such as alcoholic beverages, as a means of raising revenue with minimum loss of efficiency.

The pamphlet then deals with the social cost justification for taxing alcohol. It correctly points out that some of the social costs included in various calculations are not true net social costs, and also that the use of taxation is a clumsy means of differentiating between drinking which generates these externalities, and drinking which does not.[19]

But if taxation is a clumsy means of getting social costs to align more closely to private costs, what is the alternative? The pamphlet makes some brief desultory suggestions: civil remedies so that injured parties may take actions against the negligent; enabling the Accident Compensation Commission to make ‘standard deductions for self-injury through negligence’; charging for health services for any alcohol or accident related illnesses; and the Crimes Act imposing penalties for violent criminal behaviour which may result from drinking (1989: 1415).[22]

These proposals belong to two groups. One is to alter the law to place sanctions on social misbehaviour. Practicality and effectiveness is the issue here, and a matter which can be readily debated. The other is to abandon present policies for medical and related care, without any recognition of the reasons why they were put there in the first place, nor any consideration of the wider implications.

These recommendations involve certain types of economic instruments, typically private property rights which have been removed by the government. We shall not go through the specific analysis of each one, but leave the reader to ponder on to what extent the alternative in each case would be an effective means of resolving the problem, and what were the reasons for that public policy intervened in the first place. The visitor from Mars is likely to conclude on reading this pamphlet there was no alcohol induced negligence or illnesses (and certainly no alcohol induced unfairness) before the Accident Compensation Act and the introduction of the (mainly) free medical service.

In the end the Cameron paper indicated the limitations of using property rights and related instruments to regulate the externalities from alcohol, just as we saw the 1990 Smoke-Free Act was a response to limitations to its use for resolving tobacco issues.[21]

Revisiting the Tax Issue

While health/externality reasons have been used to raise the level of specific taxation of alcohol and tobacco in the last two decades such a justification may be coming to an end. Perhaps there is room for fine tuning, but it seems likely that tobacco duties now exceed the costs to the government of treating the health consequences of tobacco, and this is probably true for alcohol too. There are other externalities, but it is unlikely that they would significantly increase the funding needs.

Yet there remains a strong lobby for hiking these taxes for revenue reasons on the one hand, and because of various objections to the licit drugs on the other. But is it fair to punish users beyond the costs they incur to the state?

I want at this point to introduce a further reason for fiscal impositions, which in economic terms is fascinating because it involves working without one of the most fundamental assumptions economics uses: the rationality of economic behaviour. Abandoning such an assumption is not to be taken lightly but in the case of licit drugs there appears to be some case for doing so. Some work I did earlier this year for the Coalition against Advertising and Promotion illustrates the general phenomenon, although I shall have a little to say about alcohol at the end. (Easton 1991)

Normally economic assumes that the individual consumer has a set of well defined preferences about the options and is able to choose and act rationally to attain the highest preference available. The model works well in most situations, but its applicability when there is addiction is fraught with difficulties.

Addiction is not just a matter of getting hooked on a commodity (or act or event). I occasionally get hooked on international sporting spectacles that before I switched on I knew nothing about. While this change in preferences following on experience has some of the characteristics of addiction it lacks the element of preference inconsistency well illustrated by tobacco consumption.

The estimated proportions vary, but a significant proportion of current tobacco users regret their having formed the habit, and wish to give it up, but are unable to do so. A survey found that most smokers do know that smoking incurs serious health risks, and that 67.5 percent want to give it up. But a majority said they would find it difficult to give up smoking for even a week (N.Z. Cancer Society 1987).

It is difficult to describe this phenomenon in terms of the economic model of the opening paragraph to this section. What the addict seems to be saying is ‘tobacco usage is low among my preferences. I am sufficiently fully informed about tobacco and other issues to be say that among the options available to me, my optimal action excludes smoking. Nevertheless, I smoke.’ Becker and Murphy (1988) offer an account of how addictive like behaviour may occur. But when faced with this sort of behaviour they descend to an extraordinary non sequitur.[23]

There are two obvious points where intervention may be appropriate. The first is for the addict who wishes to cease. The policy prescription might be for government subsidised program to assist the addict to cease smoking. There would be some logic for the funding to be derived from an excise on the addictive product. (However, practically a part of the cost of the cessation program could be borne by the individual).

The second point of intervention is before the individual becomes addicted. There is a problem here. An adult who takes up smoking, aware that he or she may become addicted, may be said to be acting rationally. While retrospectively he or she may regret the decision, and the cessation program in the previous paragraph may be relevant, it is not obvious that intervention before the decision is appropriate, except in so far as to ensure the individual has accurate information about the effects of undertaking smoking.

However, suppose the person is not entirely rational. Economists are loathe to assume irrationality, but there are some exceptions, identified usually on pragmatic grounds. In the smoking case, an obvious exception is the young. Alternatively we might argue that it is more difficult to inform the young. In either case, it would seem sensible to provide measures, which are directly oriented towards the young taking up smoking, until they have reached an age where they may be judged ‘adult’ enough to make a rational decision, given sufficient information.

One already implemented policy is to restrict access of the young at the point of sale. But there would appear to be a need for other policies aimed at informing (including attitude changing) the young. In addition the case for a part user charge for smoking cessation pro~rams seems less appropriate for the young. They should not have been hooked in the first place.

It is at this point that excise duties appear to have a role. At first it might seem not appropriate to raise taxes further, because that would have very little impact on consumption. However, in recent years more detailed econometric studies suggested a more complex story of responsiveness of tobacco demand to price changes. For instance, different ages have different levels of responsiveness. In particular, the demand for tobacco products by the young is much more responsive than by those older.

The most widely quoted estimate from an American study is that the smoking participating elasticity for teenagers is 1.2, and the quantity smoked elasticity is 1.4 (Lewit Coate & Grossman 1981, Lewit & Coate 1982). That means a one percent rise in the price of tobacco products would reduce the number of teenagers who smoke by over one percent (i.e. 1.2%), and a smaller reduction in the amount of smoking per teenage smokers (i.e. 0.2%). More recent figures indicate a participation elasticity of. 76 may be more appropriate for 12 to 17 year olds, and this is the estimate used in the report of the US General Accounting Office (1989).

On the other hand a recent New Zealand study found an elasticity for 15 to 24 year olds of 1.13 (Laugesen & Meads 1990).[24] This figure possibly underestimates the elasticity for teenagers, since it includes the effect of those in their early twenties, who are likely to have a lower elasticity .That this elasticity appears higher than the US, one probably reflects New Zealand society being at an earlier stage in the tobacco usage cycle, more like that of the US of the 1960s.

The implication is that higher tobacco product prices are better at preventing people starting smoking, than at encouraging people to reduce or cease smoking. Indeed it would appear that once teenagers are captured into smoking, they find it as hard to give up as the adult does.

What this seems to suggest that for smoking there is a gate, beyond which smoking is addictive. I defer to the specialists to define the gate in behavioral terms, but practically for smoking it may the point at which the individual becomes a regular smoker. In any case before the gate, demand is very price elastic, after the gate it becomes inelastic. Because the most teenagers are coming up to the gate, their demand is – as the econometric evidence suggests – much more price elastic than the for the average smoker. Conversely they may be discouraged from going through the gate by higher prices. Thus the effect of increasing excise taxes may be small on smoking in the short run, but through the discouragement effect, may be much larger in the long run.

A similar effect probably applies for alcohol, where again teenager demand proves to be much more price sensitive than average (Choate & Grossman 1988). It is however harder to conceptualise the gate between the moderate drinker and the addicted one (a problem not peculiar to the economic analysis). The occasional smoker is quite a different beast from the moderate drink, since we may want to discourage the former, but merely keep in moderation the latter.[25]

Thus we have another reason for hiking the excise duty on licit drugs: in order to discourage individuals taking up addiction. This is fiscally tough on the addicted, who are likely to be with us for many years to come, and to be facing excise duties far above the external social costs they incur. That is why educational programs aiming to discourage the taking up of addiction are important, so as to take the weight of using the excise instrument. In my view there may also be a case in justice for the subsidisation of effective cessation or cure programs.[26]

One other use of the tax instrument which has been looked at, but does not seem promising is taxing advertising and sponsorship.[27] But the original paper for CATAP argues that if there is any relaxation of restrictions on advertising and sponsorship for reasons of – say public liberty, there should be a compensating rise in excise duty to offset the impact of youth who are pulled through the gate by the public displays.[28]

Conclusion

The use of economic instrument of taxation to regulate resource use is not new, but in the 1970s they became more consciously used to regulate the consumption of licit drugs. This was not simply a matter of public concern over the side effects (externalities and addiction) from licit drugs. The public concerns were convenient justifications for raising the excise duties to improve central government revenue.

Conversely, where the taxes are not benefiting its revenue, there is likely to be less enthusiasm from central government. For instance there may well be a justification for giving local authorities the powers to impose a throughput levy on taverns to compensate the neighbours for the noise and other local disturbances. But whatever the economic arguments, such a levy is not on the public agenda.

The next step may be to raise consciously excise duties on licit drugs above that justified by externality considerations. Again the driving force may be revenue needs, underpinned by the theory of optimal taxation which recommends higher taxes on more price inelastic products. There may be a side benefit, in that in each case teenagers and others may be discouraged from going through the gate of addiction.

However such tax increases will be penalising on those already addicted, which illustrates a general proposition that economic instruments may be very clumsy in their impact. We saw further evidence of this in the issue of airspace rights, while a New Right proposal to replace taxation by reduced state interventions which place greater, legally enforceable, obligations on the user of the licit drugs does not look promising.

So while economic instruments may be useful in regulating some features of licit drug use, they cannot efficiently replace entirely such measures as prohibition, restrictions, and controls, nor public education. Those in th~ green movements who advocate the greater use of economic instruments for environmental purposes are likely to come eventually to a similar conclusion .

Endnotes
1. This last point is less true in regard to wine
2. The optimal rate of taxation is inversely proportional to the elasticity of demand for the product. Alcoholic beverages (and tobacco) have a low price elasticity of demand. Thus their optimal tax rate would be higher than average. (e.g. K. W .Clements 1983).
3. As the Ernst & Young report for the Tobacco Institute delicately puts it:
‘It is also noteworthy that tagged taxes are often justified, or at least implicitly “sold” on subjective pseudo moral grounds. Thus for cultural reasons that are not well understood, certain acts or the consumption of certain substances, are widely considered to be a “bad” even when their consequences fall largely on those who choose to participate.’(1991: 9)
This paper takes a totally different approach. The justifications here are consequences of practical and identified characteristics of the commodities involved, and the behaviour they generate (especially as explained later, negative externalities and addiction). It is unnecessary, therefore, to coyly refer to ‘certain substances’. The topic here is licit drugs.
4. The 1976 announcement contains no justification for the hikes, but this time duties raised on spirits as well.
5. ‘Fiscal drag’ is when tax revenue rises faster than nominal GDP or inflation.
6. Another rationalisation of duties, still only partly achieved, has been to stop discrimination between beer, wine, and spirits, and tax on the quantity of absolute alcohol.
7. Although the story which follows has to be traced systematically, the following memoir may be useful. In early 1977 the Minister of Health proposed that a charge be placed on prescription drugs. This caused a political uproar, including objections from the medical and pharmaceutical professions. To mollify them the Minister explained the revenue would be used for spending on further community health services. Having committed himself the Minister found the powerful groups supported the additional spending but still opposed the prescription charges. Meanwhile in Christchurch I was publicly arguing that the Good Samaritan did not charge for his drugs, and that if the government wanted to place a tax on drugs – for that is what a prescription charge is – it should be placed on alcohol. Presumably this approach, perhaps from another source, shifted the government to imposing additional duties on tobacco and alcohol and using the funds for community health. (At the time I was aware that social costs of alcohol exceeded tax revenue, from talking to Dr Robert Crawford, superintendent of Hamner, but not about the social costs of tobacco. (Easton 1978) ) .
8. defined in a specific sense by economists.
9. A bizarre version of this point is that smoking prevents Alzheimer’s disease.
10. Ideally the tax level should be where marginal revenue equals marginal cost, but it is not at all obvious what such an objective means in practical terms. (Easton & Pryke 1985).
11. Non smokers and teetotallers and low drinkers may encourage higher taxes on smoking and drinking respectively because they benefit from the revenue, without bearing the costs.
12. See Ansley (1991) for an example of the difficulties of dealing with air pollution, in this case arising from mushroom farming.
13. This paper does not trace the ALAC levy, which is another example of a user charge.
14. The omission of any reference to the provenance of the paper in the Centre for Independent Studies’ publication is, to say the least, unusual in academic terms. The publication does however say the Centre is ‘independent of an political party or group’.
15. The omitted sentence is “Indeed, debunking some of the myths surrounding ‘the evils of drink’ is a lucrative business in itself”, a phenomenon independent of the level of taxation.
16. One wonders whether the writer had in mind any fee that Lion-Nathan may have paid for the preparation of the submission to the Review on Excise Duties.
17. The evidence is that amongst drinkers, excise taxes do relatively little to change the pre-tax and post-tax distribution of incomes. However, excise duties do subject significant numbers of low and middle income households to a 10 to 15 percent higher total tax burden than people in similar circumstance. (1989: 16)
18. Excluding the financial sector for whom Cameron works.
19. Because the pamphlet is making an emotional appeal it writes of ‘people’ rather than ‘drinking’, giving the impression that some people – no doubt the readers of the pamphlet never cause negative externalities when they drink.
20. Including ‘Offenders, for example, could be forbidden by law to drink’. One looks forward to the libertarian critique of such a proposal if it ever comes before parliament.
21. An aside – but it gives an insight into the bizarre approach of the paper – is the following paragraph, under the head ‘Costs to the Family’:
‘Domestic violence and other forms of social costs to the family cannot be dealt with through hefty taxes, either. When a family is considered as a unit, any costs of this type are not external social costs. They are ‘internal’ to the family. The proper question is whether the rights of the individual family can be identified and enforced against another family member. …’(1989:13)
What the third sentence seems to be saying is that domestic violence is an internal matter to the family, and only a social issue as far as rights are abrogated. It appears to be arguing that domestic violence is a different (and lesser) issue compared to violence between two strangers.
22. In addition there are those who favour duty hikes on products they do not consume.
23. ‘The claims of some heavy drinkers and smokers that they want to but cannot end their addictions seem to us no different from the claims of single persons that they want to but are unable to marry …’(p.693)
24. The 95 per cent confidence interval is (.73, 1.53)
25. On a minor research note, I originally conceived (or read about) ‘the gate’ when working on alcohol issues in the mid 1980s. however it was only when I was working on tobacco in 1991, was I able to see clearly how one might go about defining the gate.
26. Fairness might suggest that those defined as addicted to tobacco or alcohol might be entitled to a ration at a lower price. There would be a revenue loss though.
27. The idea is that the sponsorship generates bads such as additional teenage smoking, and a tax on sponsorship would bring the private decision of the tobacco company more in line with the public good. (But non-tobacco users may also benefit from the sponsorship.)
28. However whatever the theoretical reasons for taxing sponsorship, practically it is likely to be difficult. The Treasury is perhaps more pessimistic than necessary when it remarks that ‘such measures will be difficult to implement and audit. As sponsorship often involves nonmonetary transfers, there will be ample scope for evasion unless a very rigorous and correspondingly expensive auditing system is put in place.’(1991 :2) Nevertheless, its cautions are accepted, and given also that the imposition of an efficient tax system’ on sponsorship would take time and experience to construct, it is judged that a sponsorship tax is not viable at the moment and thus not available as a compensatory policy.

Bibliography
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Becker, G.S. & K.M. Murphy (1988) ” A Theory of Rational Addiction”, Journal of Political Economy, vol 96, no.4, p.675-700.
Cameron, R. (1989) Excise Taxation of Alcoholic Beverages, Centre For Independent Studies.
Clements K.W.(1983) “Taxation of Alcohol in Australia”, in J.G. Head (ed) Taxation Issues of the 1980s, Australian Tax Research Foundation, Sydney.
Coate, D. & M.. Grossman (1988) “Effects of Alcoholic Beverage Prices and Legal Drinking Ages on Youth Alcohol Use”, Journal of Law And Economics, vol XXXI (April 1988), p.145-171.
Easton, B.H. (1967) Consumption in New Zealand 1954/5 to 1964/5, (NZIER Research Paper 10).
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Easton, B.H. & L.B. Kay (1982) The Impact on Alcohol Consumption, ALAC Research Report No 1.
Easton, B.H., N. Hunn, & P. Pryke (1985) A Review of the Fiscal Options for the Regulation of Alcohol Consumption, NZIER Working Paper 85/36.
Easton, B.H. (1991) Offsetting the Effects of Tobacco Sponsorship, a Report for the Coalition Against Tobacco Advertising and Promotion.
Ernst & Young Management Sciences Ltd (1991) Tagged Taxes: The Unforseen and Undesirable Effects, for the Tobacco Institute.
Laugesen, M. & C. Meads (1990) “Cigarette Advertising, Price, Income, Publicity and Smoking Prevalence in Youth Versus Older Age Groups, New Zealand, 1982-1989, Tobacco and Health in 1990, Proceedings of the Seventh World conference on Tobacco and Health, Perth.
Laugesen, M. & C. Meads (1991) “Tobacco Advertising Restrictions, Price, Income and Tobacco Consumption in OECD Countries, 1960-1986”, British Journal of Addiction, 86, p.83-89.
Lewit, E.M., D. Coate, & M. Grossman (1981) “The Effects of Government Regulation on Teenage Smoking”, Journal of Law and Economics, 24, p.545-569.
Lewit, E.M. & D. Coate (1982) “The Potential for Using Excise Taxes to Reduce Smoking”, Journal of Health Economics, 1, p.121-145.
Lion-Nathan (1989) Submission on Review of Excise Duties on Alcoholic Beverages,Submission to the 1989 Review of Excise Duties.
McLintock, (1958) Crown Colony Government in New Zealand, Government Printer.
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New Zealand Parliamentary Debates (various years)
Posner, R.A. (1986) Economic Analysis of Law, 3rd ed, Little Brown & Co Ltd.
Richardson, R. (1991) Financial Statement (The Budget), Government Printer.
Roemer, R. (1982) Legislative Action to Combat the World Smoking Epidemic, WHO.
Salmon, G. (1991) “The Resource Management Bill: First Steps Towards a Green Economy” in Acroyd et al (ed) Environmental Resources and the Market Place, Tasman Institute.
Taxation Review Committee (The Ross Committee) (1967) Taxation in New Zealand,Government Printer.
Terra Nova (1991) “Special Feature: Economic Instruments”, Terra Nova, April 1991.
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The Treasury (1991) Amendment to Smoke-Free Environments Act 1990: Part III, Health Sponsorship Council, letter to the Minister of Finance, signed by C.J. Gould (RP:TS), dated 13 May 1991. T/62/90/4/1 (TGA/1910).
US General Accounting Office «1989) Teenage Smoking: Higher Excise Tax Should Significantly Reduce the Number of Smokers, GAO, Washington DC.

The Economic Relationship Between Australia & New Zealand

Australia-New Zealand: Aspects of a Relationship, Proceedings of the Stout Research Centre, Eighth Annual Conference, Stout Research Centre, 1991, 14pp

Keywords: Globalisation & Trade; Growth & Innovation; Political Economy & History;

The three most important characteristics for property – “position, position, position” – are not so important in international economics, as the close economic link between the United Kingdom and New Zealand for almost a century indicates. Similarly that Australia is New Zealand’s nearest neighbour does not closely link the two economies.

An illustration of how different the two are comes from a recent article by Kenneth FinkJensen (1991). It reports a cluster analysis of 33 countries – 23 from the OECD and 10 emergent economies – based on 37 recent measures of the strength of economic criteria. His tree diagram shows New Zealand is by itself – between the rich OECD countries and the poor OECD countries and the emergent ones – whereas Australia is grouped with Netherlands, Austria, the United Kingdom, and Italy. New Zealand only joins with this cluster, after all the other rich OECD countries – excluding Switzerland are added. The implication is that in regard to this matter New Zealand is no closer to Australia than it is to the rest of the OECD.

Table 1: New Zealand Australian Trade
Percent of Total

Year* Aust Exoports
to NZ
Aust Imports
from NZ
1890D 2.8 5.1
1900D 3.0 4.6
1910D 2.4 2.0
1920J 5.3 1.9
1930J 3.7 1.2
1940J 4.3 0.9
1950J 3.5 0.9
1960J 5.9 1.6
1970J 4.8 2.2
1980J 4.6 3.4
1989J 5.2 3.7

Source: Lougheed (1987).
Notes: * D = December year; J = J year.
This series, while consistent through time, does not overlap with Lloyd (1991).

Year* NZ Exports
to Aust
NZ Imports
from Aust
1860D 27.8 37.6
1870D 45.9 35.7
1880D 21.4 31.3
1890D 16.7 17.4
1900D 14.0 16.7
1910D 09.1 13.8
1920D 05.1 14.0
1930D 03.5 07.5
1940D 02.9 16.0
1950D 02.5 12.0
1960D 04.4 18.0
1970J 08.1 21.0
1980J 12.3 19.0
1989J 17.8 21.6

Source: Department of Statistics.
Notes: * D = December year; J = J year.
The annual series are graphed in the 1990 Official Year Book, p.598-9.

Trade flows across the Tasman do not dominate either countries’ current foreign transactions. In June year 1990, only 4.2 percent of Australian imports were from New Zealand, and only 20.8 percent of New Zealand imports were from Australia (Lloyd 1991: 14). It has been like this for over a hundred years. (Table I) Other economies are much more important in the Australian export world – the European Community, Japan, and the US. The same three countries are about as important export destinations to New Zealand as is Australia. However the really big difference between the two countries’ export structure is that about 29 percent of Australia exports went to Asia in June year 1985 plus the 26 percent that went to Japan. Thus over half of Australian exports go to Asia, compared to a total of 35 percent of New Zealand’s exports – including 15 percent to Japan – in the same year .

This gives Australian business and economics a passionate interest in Asia – particularly East Asia – evident enough in its business journals. There is not the same Australian interest in New Zealand. Nor do New Zealanders show the same interest in Asia. I shall return to this issue.

But before doing so, we need to offset this focus on export markets, by noting there are economic areas where New Zealand is closer to Australia. For some product ranges New Zealand and Australia are each other’s main markets – much general manufacturing for instance. There is considerable common overseas investment: by each country in the other, and by third countries with joint or associated activities in both – although again the investment from outside Australasia is far more important to each country .The labour markets of the two countries are linked through migration. Australia is “the destination it seems, of the overwhelming New Zealand emigrants, Pakeha and Maori ” (Pool 1991:193). And then we should mention the commonality – considered elsewhere in this seminar – of social and cultural issues, of historical experience, and of social institutions such as the distinctive features of social welfare. These are not insignificant in their impact on the economy. Nevertheless, the overall picture is that Australia and New Zealand are not too closely linked economies.

Economics and the Failure to Federate

Let me for a few moments turn to one of the puzzles of the relationship between the two countries: Why did New Zealand not join the Australian federation at the turn of the century? Sinclair (1986, 1988) traces the change in the mind by New Zealanders, from a degree of popularity for joining Australia in the 1880s to rejection at federation in 1901 in the belief they could go it alone. However he offers little explanation as to why the shift in the popular perception occurred.

Let me conjecture an economic explanation for the shift.

First, as Table I shows, up to 1870s Australia was New Zealand’s most important trading partner. However by 1880, this importance was falling off, and the United Kingdom was taking over half of New Zealand’s exports, and supplying over half its imports (a situation which was to remain until the 1960s).

Second, Rankin (1991:356) suggests that in the 1880s the New Zealand economy was stagnating, while the Australian economy was expanding. However in the 1890s the Australian economy was in sharp contraction, while the New Zealand economy was still stagnating, and perhaps beginning to expand. Per capita Australian incomes appear to have been around 20 percent higher than New Zealand ones in the 1880s, but by the time of federation in 1901 Australian incomes were below those of New Zealand.

This suggests the economic linkage between the two countries was fading, and the changing perceptions of relative prosperity determined this crucial divergence in the two countries’ history .I shall have more to say about this hypothesis later .

The Australian federation was in part driven by demands to unify their economy. It is perhaps not accidental that exports from New Zealand to Australia fell further between 1900 and 1910, as Australians sourced from other states. (This is the typical “trade diversion” which occurs with a customs union. The effect is less for a free trade area.) While New Zealand was left out, they were not entirely forgotten. In 1907, 1922, and 1933 preferential trade arrangements between the two countries had been negotiated, although they do not seem to have markedly affected actual trade. It is the NAFTA (New Zealand-Australia Free Trade Agreement) agreement of 1966 and the CER (Closer Economic Relations) agreement of 1982 which are important in lifting trade relations between the two countries. (See Lloyd (1988) for a details of the two arrangements.)

Export Structures

Part of the divergence in the contemporary economies, arises from their export structures. We have to be careful here. It might seem likely that two economies with the same export structure would not trade with each other. However if those exports were manufactures (rather than commodities), there would likely to be considerable intra-industry trade so that they would export and import similar products between them. As it happens, intraindustry trade is rising both internationally, and in the case of Australia and New Zealand (see below).

However in both countries commodities (unprocessed or semi-processed) still playa greater exporting role than manufactures. Thus Australia is an exporter of wheat and other grains, wool and pastoral products, and minerals. Of this list New Zealand only exports the pastoral products in great quantities, with forestry , horticulture, and fishing more important. Even the characteristics of the wool exports of the two countries differ , because Australian fine wools are more used for clothing, New Zealand cross bred wools for carpets. Commodities do not enter intra-industry trade as typically as manufactures (except for seasonal supply of fresh foods). In such circumstances neither country is going to be a major importer of the other’s dominant exports.

However there is a second effect. Commodities experience much wider swings in their world prices, which means that fluctuations in the terms of trade have a significant impact on the business cycle. (Secular shifts also are more important.) Since the two countries have different commodity compositions, and since commodity prices do not move exactly together, this means that the two countries will experience different externally driven business cycles. This effect will be reduced as the countries’ export bases diversify out of commodities, and as the two trade more between each another .

That the two economies were at different stages in the business cycle in the late 19th century is not unique. By the late 1970s their cycles appeared to be moving lock step together. (Bowie & Easton 1987:64) This could be due to the two economies integrating, or they may both have been driven by the same third economy (e.g. US or Japan) or the world economy. But this pattern was broken in the mid 1980s, probably as a result of the two economies embarking upon different economic strategies. (QSBO June 1991: 15) In this case commodity prices do not seem to be the explainer .

An Evolving Trade Relationship

It is evident that there has been greater trade between the two economies. Although the 20 percent share of New Zealand imports from Australia has been relatively constant, the share of Australian imports to New Zealand has risen from 1.6 percent in June year 1965 to 4.2 percent in 1990. A quarter of a century ago Australia used to export three times the value of goods to New Zealand. Today the trade balance is almost equal.

This could be attributed to the NAFTA and CER trade agreements, but while I do not want to undervalue the role of such political factors, I suspect they represent an evolving response to world and domestic economic conditions, rather than being entirely exogenous to economic considerations.

The industrialization strategy New Zealand embarked upon from the 1930s was at first inward looking, concentrating on import substitution. But the intention was – as one of its architects W.B. Sutch explained (1964) – to move to manufactured exporting. The centre of the industrialization debate from the early 1960s was not about the extent of manufacturing exporting, but about the extent and role of border protection and other interventions.

While in the due course the maturation of the manufacturing sector would have generated the exports, the process was forced upon New Zealand from the mid 1960s, following the structural fall in the terms of trade that occurred then (Easton 1982). The manufacturing part of the diversification story is a complex one, but it had two major components. First was added value exporting, in which there was further processing of the commodities already being exported, or coming on stream. (Later this extends to the “cluster” – or “associated” – industries which spin off from the commodity industries.) The second component of export manufacturing was the more stand alone general manufacturing mainly supplying Australia and Oceania.

This second element was an Tasmanization of a process which had been going on within each country. Once every town of importance had a variety of small manufacturing (and service) establishments which supplied the town and the locality with sundry consumer items and production inputs – a town’s own brewery in those days was a marker of importance. But with the increasing importance of economies of scale and scope in production, with better communications, and with lower transport costs and improved transport links, these activities get concentrated into metropolitan centres, and latterly into only one of them – in New Zealand’s case it is often Auckland. The same processes means as trans Tasman transport costs come down, and ease of carriage improves we may see a similar concentration into a single Australasian centre. The relocations heartache which rural people have experienced will not stop at the metropolitan centres, but the concentration need not necessarily be in Australia. Indeed the faster growth of New Zealand exports to Australia demonstrates otherwise.

From this perspective NAFTA, and indeed CER, may be interpreted as response to underlying economic change rather than as leading it, although I hasten to say it requires political vision to identify and respond to economic change rather than to attempt to suppress it. In fact NAFTA was a very limited trade agreement. Essentially it consisted of a limited list of products which could be traded between the countries with a zero tariff. As humorously illustrated by Lionel Bowen in the opening address to the conference, annual negotiations evolved around identifying products which the interest groups on each side agreed could be traded without harming their interest. At one stage both sides were able to obtain agreement that it would not harm either if seawater were to be traded between the countries, and so seawater was solemnly added to the list of tariff free products.

By the late 1970s the Australians were getting impatient with this process. Moreover because the arrangements focussed on tariffs, it did not prohibit subsidies, and in any case an Australian exporting facing a zero tariff still might be unable to enter the New Zealand market because there was no accompanying import licence. New Zealanders had similar complaints about Australia’s particular restrictions and interventions. Out of this impatience grew CER, which was a much broader free trade approach. Whereas in the case of NAFT A there had been a positive list of what could be free traded, in the case of CER the list was of what could not, and from the beginning the negative list contained few items.

For New Zealand CER represented an acceptance – by the manufacturing sector in particular – that the future did not lie in supplying a local market, but that to survive they would have to seek larger, dynamic, markets overseas. That change of perception arose from the confidences of their export successes from the 1960s, not least due to NAFTA.

Behind this was a change in the isolationist perception of New Zealand to a realization that New Zealand was a part of a larger world and an appreciation by an increasing proportion of New Zealanders of the benefits of international travel and the variety and quality of international goods and services. We must await a future Sinclair to document the change, but my impression is that between the 1950s and the 1980s New Zealanders became much more outgoing in international terms.

The same process was probably occurring in Australia, but except for a few stray manufacturers suffering from New Zealand import penetration under CER, which they saw as subsidised, there was little industry or popular interest in Australia. Lionel Bowen illustrated this when he recalled the lack of attention to CER in the Australian parliament. There the official concerns were driven by another agenda, although one which had a parallel among New Zealand officials and their associates.

In each case CER was seen as a step towards full trade liberalization. Both countries had a record of high and erratic protection towards manufactures, although not so much towards primary products. This was seen to be inhibiting the world orientation of the economy. Strategists in both countries were arguing that they had to be more outward looking across all economic activity, and not just in the traditional export oriented industries. If so, they argued, barriers to importing discouraged this orientation.

There are numerous arguments to support this view, not all of which are convincing. For such small countries, the effects of the barriers have as a bargaining tool in global trade negotiations is hardly compelling. There is an argument that the barriers raise costs to exporters, but in my view these costs are over-estimated in quantitative terms, although the quality issues may be underestimated. The real disadvantage of the cosy environment behind trade barriers is that it discourages quality of service, of responding to buyer choice, of seeking new innovations. In short, protection encourages an economic culture and responsiveness which is antipathetic to the business climate which an outward oriented economy requires.

Both countries had experienced the howls of protest from proposals to unilaterally reduce the barriers. So the strategists saw CER as a means of reducing some of the barriers, with the aim of shifting attitudes to a more open economy.

On both sides there was an understanding that free trade areas can be inefficient, if the trade diversion effects outweighed the trade creation effects – if New Zealand ended up importing expensive Australian products instead of Asian ones which would be cheaper but for the tariff. Officials from both sides of the Tasman remarked that they had doubts of the merits of their country hooking up with the second to the world’s most inefficient producer in the world, in each case implying their country was the more inefficient.

From the perspective of re-orientating each country’s manufacturing sector, CER has been a huge success. This is not to deny there has been significant gains from the trans-Tasman trade and rationalization. (Bollard, McCormack & Scanlan 1985). Rather than measure the success just by this, we should note how quickly other trade barriers have been reduced. Compared to a decade ago, New Zealand now has virtually no import licences, and the tariff profile is looking increasingly typical for an OECD country. As its March 1991 tariff reform package indicates, Australia is cutting its general tariff even further. Within both countries the protection debate is generally about the speed at, and circumstances with, which the barriers should be reduced, not whether there should be any change.

The Outcome: Mature Trade

The outcome of these changes – the trade negotiations and the underlying economic, political, and social processes – is evident enough in Table 1. In recent years each country is exporting more to, and importing more from, the other. However the tabulations do not capture the changing composition of the trade flows, and the maturation of the relationship.

TABLE 2: Intra Industry Trade: New Zealand Australia 1964-1987.
Measured by Grubel-Lloyd Index

Year Index
1964 11.2
1968 16.8
1972 20.1
1976 26.1
1980 29.6
1984 33.0
1987 43.7

Source: Bano & Lane 1989.
Notes: The categorisations between Tables 2 and 3 differ, and so the Australian figures are not comparable.

The intensity of intra-industry trade overcome the focus of the levels, and give some insights into the composition. There are a variety of types of such indexes, but Table 2 shows the simplest available – the Grubel-Lloyd index – increasing from 11.2 percent in 1964 to 43.7 percent in 1987, for Australian New Zealand trade, an almost quadrupling. The index usually ranges between 0 and 100 percent, the higher its value the greater the intra-industry trade. So the shift represents a major increase in intra-industry trade. (Bano & Lane 1989)

TABLE 3: INTRA INDUSTRY TRADE: NEW ZEALAND WORLD 1987.
Measured by Grubel-Lloyd Index

Country Index % of All
Trade#
Australia 51.9 17.7
Singapore 28.3 01.3
WORLD 26.4 100.0
Thailand 19.8 0.4
USA 18.5 15.8
Canada 17.0 01.7
Malaysia 13.5 0.8
Fiji 11.6 0.4
Hong Kong 11.5 01.6
Cook Is 11.1 00.1
Denmark 09.2 00.5
Sweden 08.3 00.7
UK 07.8 09.6
European
Community
7.4 22.8
Phillipines 06.3 00.5
Japan 05.5 17.7
Switzerland 04.1 0.7
S. Korea 03.8 02.0
France 03.4 01.8
Italy 03.3 02.2

Index below 2 percent: Belgium-Luxembourg, Brazil, Iraq*, Iran*, Kuwait*, Pakistan, Peru. (Each less than 1.3 percent of total trade. ) In the case of the asterisked countries the index level is zero.
Source: Bano & Lane 1989.
Notes: The categorisations between Tables 2 and 3 differ, and so the Australian figures are not comparable.
# ‘All Trade’ is exports plus imports

Table 3 shows that New Zealand intra-industry trade is stronger with Australia than for another country. Unfortunately the two indexes in the last two tables use different categorizations, and so are difficult to compare. However the index for the country with which New Zealand has the second to most intra-industry intensive trade, Singapore, is half the level of the Australian one, and is probably at the level Australia was at in the late 1970s. In any case, Singapore has a small role in New Zealand’s trade activities. The next significant trader with New Zealand is the US, and today the intra-industry trade intensity is about where it was with Australia over twenty years ago. Most countries are below where Australia was in 1964, when the Bano-Lane series began.

Given the ‘normalcy’ of intra-industry trade between advanced countries, it might be said that only with Australia has New Zealand anything like a ‘mature’ economic relationship. Contrariwise, the specialist nature of New Zealand trade relationships with most countries is evident.

What is happening is a regionalisation of the South Pacific. Auckland shoppers do not worry that they have face the same product perhaps made in Christchurch and Hamilton, as well as locally. They delight in the choice. Intra-industry regional trade is integral part of any country (although rarely are their statistics to measure it). When a Sydney or Bendigo alternative turns up on the shelves next to them it is the same process.

Second Generation CER

The success of CER has moved on to discussing what are called ” second generation issues ” .These include
-Services;
-Investment;
-Trans-Tasman Shipping;
-Quarantine Harmonization;
-Standards;
-Professional Qualifications, Licensing and Certification;
-Passenger Facilitation;
-Statistics;
-Tariff and Industry Issues;
-Business Law;
-Taxation ;
-Currency.

Within each of these heads there can be a number of detailed and complex issues. Rather than pursue the topic that way, we may take the broader brush recently proposed by Peter Lloyd, who drawing on the parallel of the proposed Single European Market favours a “single Australasian market”. He summarises his proposal thus:

[T]here is a strong case that Australia and New Zealand should proceed to form a single market, that is, the two countries should remove all impediments to trade and competition across the Tasman. They should unashamedly emulate in general (though not in all detail) the policies of the Single European Market which will be realised (sic) in 1992. These measures include a common market for all services, a common market for all capital, a common external tariff and a common regime for commodity taxation. (1991:40)

I do not propose here to repeat the details of Lloyd’s proposals, but a couple of omissions, relative to the European proposals must be mentioned.

First Lloyd is equivocal on the question of a common currency, arguing that it “is not conceptually part of a single market” (1991:36). Lionel Bowen would have appeared to have disagreed in his opening address. What Lloyd is saying is that a common currency (in effect a fixed exchange rate between the Australian and New Zealand dollars) is a matter of macroeconomic policy co-ordination. Without wishing to disagree with the underlying economic analysis, I would add that given Australia is six times bigger in economic terms than New Zealand, the co-ordination in practice would mean that Australian monetary and fiscal policy would dominate New Zealand. Given the superior record of economic management by the Australian Treasury and Reserve Bank, compared to their trans Tasman counterparts, this would be perhaps no bad thing.

But Lloyd also points out “that the primary consideration should be given to the extent to which the two national economies are subject to similar or dissimilar shocks from the rest of the world” (1991 :36). Given our different export profiles, I would have thought that issue rules the common currency option out. Practically, it is not obvious that New Zealand would want to respond to a rise in world mineral prices in the same manner as Australia. For the mineral importer such a rise adds to the cost of imports, and its currency should depreciate. For the mineral exporter such as Australia, export revenue rises, and the currency should appreciate. Locked together with a fixed exchange rate, the New Zealand dollar would be dragged up by the Australian dollar to the detriment of the East Australasians. It could well require a fiscal transfer from Canberra to Wellington to alleviate the consequences.

The other omission I deal with more briefly. The European Community is moving towards co-ordination in labour market and social policy. Lloyd hardly mentions this development.

Lloyd justifies his proposal for a single Australasian market as “it is required if the two economies are to realise the full potential gains from the freeing of trade under CER” .I have two comments.

First while there are alleged economic gains from opening up trade with Australia, quantified estimates are prospective. There is a remarkable silence on quantitative gains from past liberalisation. It is a curiosity of the economist’s profession that we are much better at estimating prospective events than we are at quantitatively reviewing past ones. Were we to do so we would find the gains from past freeing up from trade between the two countries are much smaller than were promised at the time. Certainly the quantitative economic evidence does not support major improvements in GDP from the allocative gains from trade liberalization (Easton 199Ia). The promised gains need to be scaled down accordingly.

My second comment is that CER was not about obtaining gains from improved trade for the two countries. I have already argued this, but let me offer two further illustrations.

When in March 1991 the Australian prime minister announced new lower tariff levels for Australia, there was no uproar in New Zealand. The effect of lower tariff levels of one partner in a free trade area is to disadvantage the other partner, by the loss of preference to third parties. That New Zealand did not complain indicated that CER is about something other than preferential arrangements between the two countries.

My second illustration is that in the heat of the CER negotiations in 1983, I attended an Australian conference on Australia’s future international prospects. There was one half afternoon session on CER. At least two days were spent on Australian Asian economic relations, and it was evident that the Australians were pouring money into research into improving their understanding of East Asia. Most Australian business is not really interested in New Zealand any more than they are, say, interested in Tasmania. We are too small. Imagine the giant yawn that would go up if New Zealand were to establish a CER typeagreement with Samoa, and some of the other South Pacific islands.

Indeed Australia is too small too. Together Australasians are a market of just over 21 million people. During the debate about whether Britain should enter the European Community it was argued that an economy of 60 million people was not viable.

If we were really concerned about the inadequate size of New Zealand, I would think that an economic union with the United States would be the sensible option for Australia and/or New Zealand. I shall argue a different course however. In the interim I reaffirm that CER was not primarily about linking two economies to obtain significant gains from trade. What then was it about?

Economic Strategies for Australasians

We can classify general international trade strategies into three categories: isolation, regionalization, and globalization.

The strategy of isolation was popular in both countries after the inter-war depression. But it has become impractical following the post war revolutions in transport and communication. The stripping out of high tariffs and import licences was a signal that this strategy was abandoned. What were the alternatives?

The first was regional integration. At its weakest that involved a free trade area – perhaps like NAFTA. There are numerous examples of such arrangements -with various levels of success – but they do not seem to me to be genuine regional economic groupings, in that there is little progress past this preliminary stage. As I shall explain they are more a part of the second alternative.

The serious form of regional economic integration is the sort of arrangement that the European Community is, and which Peter Lloyd proposes for Australasia. But other than the Community there is no successful instance, and the Community is much more driven by political, social, and emotional imperatives and ideals, rather than by economic ones (Easton 1991b). Economic integration became a vehicle to express these wider matters, not the driving force on its own part. Lionel Bowen reminded us that when he reported the Belgian who preferred the European Community to tanks rumbling through the streets.

The lesson from the European Community’s success, and the failure of other attempts towards wider comprehensive economic integration, is that a “single market” between Australia and New Zealand is unlikely to succeed unless there are some non-economic factors driving it. Economists arguing for increasing economic integration have the wrong end of the stick – again. The two nations – and particularly New Zealand – could waste much time attempting what is essentially an abortive exercise.

Indeed the main economic pressures to Trans Tasman economic integration can be parodied by a story of a son, who having observed his mother consorting with some rather unattractive (to the son’s eyes) continentals rushes off, without much thought, to live with an older brother. The reality is the brother has considerable filial affection for his younger brother , but if the truth be known he is much more interested in the Asian ladies to the north.

For very good reasons. To change the metaphor slightly, at the races always bet on the fast fillies. New Zealand made the mistake in the immediate post-war era of betting on slow commodity exports, and the slow British economy. There is little merit in our switching all our money to an almost as slow Australian economy. The Australians have gone for the East Asian dynamism. That is the sort of strategy New Zealand needs.

That is the alternative strategy. It argues that the world economy is not really regionalizing, but globalizing. It is not a simple path. Tariffs on manufactures are coming down, but non-tariff barriers keep being erected and dismantled. Agriculture and services are only just being added to the barrier-free agenda. Capital flows are being liberalised, perhaps more through the force of the new communications technologies. People still migrate. There is sorts of increasing international co-operation: the BCCL disaster/farce is likely to increase international financial regulation for instance. The list can be lengthened. but at its heart is a steady progress – odd hiccough excluded – towards a more integrated world economy especially among the rich nations, but also now with the emerging rich, and the east-central Europeans.

Free trade agreements are a part of this process. That is why they do not turn into customs unions whereby the participants go a step further, but at the same time exclude more of the outside world. I suspect that historians may see even the European Community as a leader of world integration, for many of its steps – in areas like standards, qualifications, documentation, statistics – probably foreshadow changes to be adopted by the rest of the rich world. When the globalization process falters, there are often threats to form regional groupings, but the reality is that they are only threats and unlikely to be effected – other than in free trade arrangements. The globalization process has a long term momentum of its own.

Where in the global economy does the Australian New Zealand economic relationship fit? In some areas one country will be the chief supplier of certain sorts of manufactures in a common local market. But there is more to the relationship than that. CER provides a model. The two countries can practice for globalization on each other, orienting each economy to the world economy through the relationship. That is what the second stage of CER should be about. It is not a step to a single Trans-Tasman market, but the two countries tackling some issues which are on the world globalization agenda, and by doing so preparing for the eventual change.

For instance, standardization is a part of the globalization agenda. For CER it should be seen as a part of that process, choosing standards which are likely to be the global ones. On the other hand where there is unlikely to be global unification – such as harmonization of business and labour law, uniform taxation, social policy co-ordination – then we should pursue these issues with no great vigour in the Trans-Tasman context.

Ultimately then, the ambition is not to create a single Trans-Tasman market – although reducing unnecessary barriers such as shipping costs must be on any agenda. The real task is for the brothers to go out to the Asian ladies. There are so many opportunities there, they will not be in serious competition.

Envoy

Strictly the paper should end here, but there is one other issue that needs to be addressed. The previous conclusion relied on New Zealand continuing to have confidence in its economic future, of the sort it had when it stayed out of federation in 1901. Understandably, given the appalling performance of the last five years, New Zealanders may be losing that confidence. Between 1985 and 1990 New Zealand volume GDP grew 2.4 percent in total, while Australia grew 15.9 percent, or 2.5 percent a year more. In 1990 Australian real per capita incomes were 24.5 percent higher than New Zealand ones. If the New Zealand dismal performance continues for another decade, then the loss of confidence could well result in New Zealand becoming a state of Australia as it celebrates its hundredth year of federation.

Fortunately the Baldrics who have been running our economy have a cunning plan to prevent Australia out-performing us. They want Australia to adopt our form of economic management.

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Bibliography
Bano, S. and P .Lane (l989) Intra-Industry International Trade: The New Zealand Experience (1964-1987), Economics Department, University of Waikato.
Bollard, A.E. , D. McCormack, and M. Scanlan (1985) Closer Economic Relations: A view from both sides of the Tasman, NZIER & CEDA, Wellington & Melbourne.
Bowie, R. & B.H. Easton (ed) (1987) Business Opinion in New Zealand: The NZIER Survey, NZIER Research Paper No 36.
Easton, B.H. (1982) External Impact and Internal Response: The New Zealand Economy in the 1970s and 1980s, NZIER Discussion Paper No 26.
Easton, B.H. (1991a) Tariffs in the 1980s and 1990s: Evidence, Analysis, and Policy, Report prepared for the Engineers’ Union.
Easton, B.H. (1991b) Europe Without Walls: An Economic Perspective, paper to the 1991 University of Otago Foreign Policy School Conference “Europe Without Walls”, May 1991.
Fink-Jensen, K. (1991) “NZ likely to slip down the world economy ranks”, NBR. August 30, 1991, p.12.
Lloyd, P. (1988) “Australia-New Zealand Trade Relations: NAFTA to CER” in K. Sinclair (ed) Tasman Relations, Auckland University Press, p.142-163.
Lloyd, P .J .(1991) The Future of CER: A Single Market for Australia and New Zealand, Committee for Economic Development of Australia/Institute of Policy Studies.
Lougheed, A. (1987) “International Transactions and Foreign Commerce”, in W. Vamplew Australians: Historical Statistics, Fairfax, Syme & Weldon Associates, p.198-209
Pool, I. (1991) Te Iwi Maori: A New Zealand Population Past Present and Projected, Auckland University Press.
Quarterly Survey of Business Opinion, NZIER, Wellington.
Rankin, K. (1992) “New Zealand’s Gross National Product: 1959-1939” Review of Income and Wealth, Series 38, Number 1, March 1992, p.49-69.
Sinclair, K. (1986) A Destiny Apart: New Zealand’s Search for National Identity, Allen & Unwin with PNP .
Sinclair, K. (1988) “Why New Zealanders are not Australians”, in K. Sinclair (ed) Tasman Relations, Auckland University Press, p.90-103.
Sutch, W.B. (1964) “Some Recent Developments in Manufacture”, address to Ruakura Farmer’s Conference, 18 June 1964, reprinted in W.B. Sutch, Colony or Nation?, (edited M. Turnbull) Sydney University Press, 1966.

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Centesimus Annus: a Theological Challenge to Economists.

Listener 17 June, 1991.

Keywords History of Ideas, Methodology & Philosophy

Roman Catholic theology is much more interesting than Protestant. It is not that Protestants are boring, but Protestantism developed with the rise of the modern industrial economy; expecting an economic theology from it is a bit like asking a fish to give an account of water. Catholicism was thrown in at the deep end; its church and theology evolved before the modern market economy. Slowly and painfully they had to come to terms with it,

Catholicism’s first authoritative confrontation with the issues is the papal encyclical Rerum Novarum: The Condition of Workers, released by Leo XIII 100 years ago. It came after Catholicism had taken an ideological beating through most of the 19th century; Protestants and socialists had been seen as more responsive to economic change.

Now, John Paul II has just released Centesimus Annus: The Centenary of Rerum Novarum. This encyclical rejects “atheistic” Marxism in favour of an economic theology which modifies uncontrolled capitalism. (The rejection may be a diversion, since the spirituality in the early Karl Marx has much in common with theologians such as Martin Buber. And, even if many Marxists insist they are atheists, there are mainline Christians and Muslims who say they are Marxists.)

Catholic theology supports private property, but critically. Centesimus Annus says, ‘Ownership of t he means of production is just and legitimate if it serves useful work. It becomes illegitimate when it is not utilised or when it serves to impede the work of others in an effort to gain a profit which is not the result of the overall expansion of work and the health of society.’

I would use the Biblical term “stewardship” (or the Maori term “rangatiratanga”) to describe this conception rather than the conventional capitalist term “ownership”. The possessor of property does not have unlimited rights to use it. Rather, the use is only justified if it is consistent with some wider social objective.

On labour markets, both encyclicals uphold the principle of a “just wage”, where workers get paid sufficiently for their family needs, An economist has considerable difficulty with this concept, A just wage for a single worker will be inadequate for a worker supporting a family, And what if a just wage means the worker is unemployable?

Could Catholic theology allow the just wage to be replaced by the “social wage”, in which the community pays part of the family income? With the social wage, market wages reflect productivity, but are then modified through community support to reflect people’s needs more closely. Certainly the Catholic parties in the European Parliament have combined with the socialists to pursue harmonisation and extension of the social wage in the European Community.

Indeed, Catholic theology appears most supportive of trade unionism, The New Zealand Catholic bishops made a thoughtful submission criticising the Employment Contracts Act (which was implemented 100 years to the day after Centesimus Annus).

Local bishops would have been heartened by the John Paul II encyclical’s reaffirmation of Leo XIII’s conclusion that the just wage “cannot be left to the free consent of parties so that the employer, having paid what was agreed upon, has done his part and seemingly is not. called upon to do anything beyond … This concept of relations between employers and employees, purely pragmatic and inspired by thoroughgoing individualism, is severely censured as contrary to the twofold nature of work as a personal and necessary reality. … If through necessity or fear of a worse evil the workman accepts harder conditions [than the just wage] because an employer or contractor will afford no better, he is made the victim of force and injustice.”

The 1991 encyclical comments: “Would that these word’s written at a time when what was called ‘unbridled capitalism’ was pressing forward. should not have to be repeated today with the same severity. Unfortunately even today one finds instances of contracts between employers and employees which lack reference to the most elementary justice. …The Pope attributed to the ‘public authority’ the ‘strict duty of providing properly for the welfare of workers, because failure to do so violates justice.” lt is all enough to tempt a Pat Kelly to abandon the Labour party for the Catholic Church.

The encyclicals can be challenging. Centesimus Annus extends the concept of the just wage from one “adequate for the maintenance of the worker and his family” to one including “a certain amount for savings”. As if state involvement in wage setting is not enough, the encyclical appears to be a call to set the poverty line so the worker has opportunity to save.

If the encyclicals can be fascinating reading, some of the theology can be quite obscure. Both the 1891 and 1991 encyclicals use familiar economic and political terms in an unfamiliar way. For instance, in their condemnations of “socialism” they are referring to extremist Marxism and socialism. And the “liberalism” which is equally condemned sounds more like what most of us would call “capitalist libertarianism”.

The 1991 encyclical is very Eurocentric and. being based on the earlier 19th-century lone, it barely touches on the Third World, the environment, or women in the paid workforce. Understandably, John Paul II is concerned with Central Europe. But the political upheavals there are so recent, his encyclical lacks the reflection which is a strength of Leo XIII’s commentary on the industrial revolution.

I struggle with these encyclicals because they challenge economists. Bubbling on the top or the brew, we tend to ignore deeper philosophical issues. The encyclicals are not about whether wages and profits should be up or down; they arc about the fundamental role of wages and profits. You do not have to agree with the popes, but you have to think hard when confronting the economic issues they raise.

The Porter Project

Listener 3 June, 1991.

Keywords: Business & Finance; Globalisation & Trade;

Flavour of the moment is Upgrading New Zealand’s Competitive Advantage, the report of the so-called Porter Project. Its 178 pages (plus appendices) are riddled with badly labelled graphs; portentous diagrams which, on reflection, say nothing; chummy references to “our country”, when two of the three authors are Americans; and platitudes dressed up as ‘deep and meaningful sentiments.

This is unfair to Michael Porter, the Harvard economist, on whose work the study is based. Though his international reputation is less grand than his visiting guru status would imply, he is one of a number of economists who are making useful attempts to bring the theory of international trade more in line with actual practice. We are taught that trade is about comparative advantage -how England traded its cloth for Portugal’s wine. But what goes on is much more complex and such simple stories hold little value.

Porter is no pathbreaker. Many of his insights were already in the standard literature a couple of decades ago. His strength has been communicating these ideas to ‘businessmen and women in their own language. He sounds exciting because of his communication skills, rather than because he has anything new to say.

That may be why much of the book repeats what has been said ad nauseam already. On page 53 (over a quarter of the way through) we are told: “New Zealand exports in a range of structurally unattractive, and therefore low profit industries.” The first economics lecture I ever attended, 30 years ago, was told that. The difference was Dr W B Sutch spoke in plain English, rather than business jargon.

And the book has no sense of history. Take the treatment of why New Zealand has a competitive advantage in international rugby. Yes, I saw it as a po-faced send-up of Porterism -I wished I had thought of the joke first. But they are serious. Complete with a deep and meaningful diagram, they offer an explanation of why we are good at rugby. Read it. Then, try to use the same analysis to explain why we are not as good at cricket, and even less so at soccer . In the end the nonsense reduces to: we are good at rugby, because we are; we are not so good at cricket because …we are not so good.

The cliche arises because they look only at successful industries, or sports, only at a particular time, in freeze frame, identify ing features which appear to explain why the industry is successful. But you can look at failing industries and find similar features or, if you don’t, the feature is missing precisely because the industry is failing. Analysis of a singular instant in time can confuse causality. As the philosophers put it: association does not prove causation.

Sutch identified the weakness in our export composition four decades ago. Since then there have been changes. First it was diversification out of meat, wool and dairying (‘processed grass’ was Sutch’s term) into other commodities: forestry, fishing, horticulture, energy and minerals. You make your profit from using these commodities as industrial inputs, not from selling them -so this encouraged additional further processing. And we diversified markets, away from Britain.

The effort through the late 1960s and the 1970s was a considerable achievement, and may have been part of the reason our economic growth kept up with the rest of the world in the late 1970s and early 1980s. We moved on to the next phase, which was the creation of export-oriented industries linked to these traditional and diversifying industries. (Examples include wool scours, electric fences, ear tags, but in future could include sawmilling and fishing equipment.)

The thrust of the Porter Project is that we have to get into these industries. Agreed: Sutch told us so 30 years ago. But why didn’t all that potential of the early 1980s flower?

There were, after all, any number of exciting prospects. (No, I am not referring to the shonky halfbaked ideas the finance sector was floating.) I leave you to explain why that potential came to so little. But you will not get much help from the Porter Project’s report. You would have to consider such unlikely scenarios as a deterioration in ‘Kiwi Ingenuity’.

It would be easy enough to explain this away as the usual shallowness of a visiting guru passing through; But New Zealand’s. Porter Project spent about $1.5 minion (of taxpayers’ money) on a report which is, largely a recycling of conventional wisdom and material published elsewhere. Even if there were more and deeper case studies, the return on the money expended would still be low. Particularly galling is the book’~ claim that we should improve the efficiency of government spending. The funding of this report would have been a good place to start. It must be a candidate for the lowest productivity research publication ever funded by government.

That is not the impression one might have got from the launch, and the superficial comments that followed. But in this postmodern era fashion replaces intellectual solidity, Do New Zealand economists and business people have a competitive advantage in fashionable analysis relative to sound analysis? I have a case study plus an attractive diagram to demonstrate this proposition (or its opposite, if the conve~tional wisdom says so).

Tikanga and Te Oneroa-o-tohe

Listener 20 May 1991, republished in in J. Gilbert, G. Jones, T. Vitalis, & R. Walker Introduction to Management in New Zealand (1992) p.77.

Keywords: Environment & Resources; Maori;

I was recently involved in a claim to the Waitangi Tribunal by the five Muriwhenua iwi, in the far north, for the return of their rangatiratanga over Te Oneroa-O-Tohe or, as Pakeha call it, Ninety Mile Beach. In the course of preparing my evidence I was struck by the depletion of kaimoana – offshore fish and shellfish – over the period of European involvement. We are so familiar with the destruction of fish, forest, bird and soil in the last 150 years that it is only rarely that we are made to confront the issue as to why it happened.

Consider an account by R C Mat thews, a European who went shark fishing in the 1850s with the Te Rarawa people, one of the five iwi. He reported astonishing returns from the twice-yearly expeditions: “The total number of sharks caught by the fleet …was about 7000, an average of about 65 per canoe for each of the two trips.” The average weight of each fish was about 22.5kg, so the iwi’s total catch was about 160 tonnes.

There has been a similar depletion of shellfish. At the hearing kuia recalled how as children in the 1930s they stood next to piles of shell as tall as themselves.

Now it may be, and the Waitangj Tribunal makes the same point, that these stories have a fishy ring to them, but what is undoubted is the depletion of the fishing stock. If kuia say that they collected tuatua and toheroa up to the high-water mark in the 1950s, I believe them. It is a matter of scientific record that the shellfish ain’t there any more.

What caused that depletion? Turn the question around. How was the fish stock managed at a sustainable yield before the European took over? The answer is that the Maori had a series of tikanga – rules – which managed, preserved and conserved the fish. One of the fascinations of Matthews’s account of the annual sharkfishing expeditions is the ritual he reports:

Fifty years ago shark-fishing was considered, and looked forward to, as a national holiday by the Rarawa and all the surrounding hapu. The traditional customs and regulations were strictly observed and rigidly enforced.

The season for the fishing of kapeta (dogfish) was restricted to two days’ only in a year. The first time was about full moon in January, and by preference during the night named in the Maori lunar calendar rakanui, or two evenings after the full moon. This fishing was always by night.

The second time of fishing, called the pakoki, was two weeks later, just after the new moon (whawha-ata), and was always held in daylight. This closed the season for the year .

Anyone who killed a shark after this would be liable to the custom of muru, and would be stripped of his property. No one was permitted to commence fishing before the signal to start was given; a violation of this rule would lead to the splitting up of the canoes of the offenders. So far as I can ascertain, the two days’ restriction was a local custom.

Today the Maori recall the tikanga, and practise them as well as they can. Anthropologist Joan Metge’s summary to the tribunal included that shellfish would be cleaned away from the beach. Archaeologist John Coster said the shell middens he investigated were all out of sight from the beach, behind the sand hills. This suggests that some of the current tikanga may have existed for hundreds of years. While the rules had a spiritual significance, they also minimised pollution and preserved and enhanced the shellfish beds. Practically, the tikanga acted as a regulatory framework for a sustainable yield.

Alas, central government took over responsibility for fisheries management in the late 19th century, the Maori lost their rangatiratanga over the fisheries and the depletion occurred.

The European perception was that Maori were practising inefficient pagan rituals, instead of dealing with fishing as a practical activity. But these rituals were effective ways of regulating resources. The record is that the tikanga were more effective than the European laws which replaced them.

My submission to the tribunal argued that a form of local and unified management of the kaimoana would be more efficient. In making this recommendation I drew heavily on the literature of property rights, which argues that full allocation of property rights to a private owner will lead to a better management of resources. As I told the tribunal, I am not an extremist for this view, but the theory probably applies in the case of Ninety Mile Beach, subject to some caveats and rem~dies.

If the tribunal were to find that the rangatiratanga over the beach should be returned to the Maori, the outcome of this return to local and unified control could well be a better management of the fishing resource, and a gain in economic efficiency. In effect I was advocating a return to the (suitably updated) management regime which applied before 1840.

It should be emphasised that the Muriwhenua rangatira, while claiming Ninety Mile Beach, insist they will share it with everyone. Hospitality and generosity are central to the tikanga of the Maori, if not to that of the Pakeha.

Stamp Collector Brierly

Listener 6 May, 1991.

Keywords: Business & Finance;

It is a pity that Yvonne van Dongen did not write more about Ron Brierley the stamp collector in her book, Brierley: The Man Behind the Corporate Legend. He took up stamps at an early age, trading them at school – “Buy, sell or exchange stamps in room four during interval” – as the Kiwi Stamp Company. He even sent out reminder notices of debts owing -the headmaster is said to have been furious. “That boy Brierley is using the institution for his commercial gain. This business has got to stop.”

If I judge the story right, Brierley in business was more or less a sophisticated stamp dealer. It went like this. Identify a company which is (like a packet of stamps) badly organised, with various assets (stamps) whose value is not fully recognised. Buy the packet, re-arrange the stamps, sell some to pay for the purchase and have a bit over to purchase the next packet which comes along.

A simple enough strategy. All it requires is that the owners of the packets of stamps do not appreciate the values they are sitting on. In the 1960s and !970s there were plenty such owners, and so Brierley Investments (BIL) was born.

I want to know more about Brierley’s stamp-collecting hobby. Did he just collect, or did he onsell? He probably sits on his best stamps. That was the record for BIL – Brierley would not sell some key assets. They had to be wrenched off him by his younger staff. Sitting on them posed a real problem in financial terms, because the cash flow was not realised.

Van Dongen describes the ingenious solution in her chapter on “Brierley’s Accounting”. It begins, “Accounting is probably the only profession in the world where the word ‘creative’ has pejorative connotations.” {Economics may come a close second.) She then describes various methods which had the effect of making the BIL accounts not what they superficially seemed. Brierley did nothing illegal. The law was not sufficiently precise to prevent his creativity bewildering many onlookers. For those stamps/assets which Bricrley chose not to sell, BIL included in it, profits the diffcrence between what it paid for an asset, and what it thought it was really worth. This “surplus on acquisition” did not itself generate cash, but appeared in the balance sheet as a revalued asset.

Cash was generated by selling some assets, borrowing against those which were not sold, or by selling more shares to the public. And, thus, BIL boomed through the 1970s and much of the 1980s.

Firms also generate cash from the profits assets make from rents, and trading. This does not seem to have been a key aspect of BI L, until the arrival of Brucc Hancox. Van Dongen says, “Brierley tended to ignore investments once he acquired them, and it showed. Most of BIL’s investments [in the late 1970s] were operating at a loss.” See what I mean about Brierlcy being a stamp collector? His concern was the market value of the assets, not the cash they generated. Ultimately, the two are closely related, but Brierly was lucky to be operating at a time when they were not.

Certainly BIL was lucky. Van Dongen reports some close shaves, but there is no detailed of just how close the shave was after the !987 sharemarket crash. BIL was incredibly fortunate to sell NZI just before the crash. And, even then, it was creative accounting and providence that got 81L through !988. By then Brierley was no longer in command of his ship, and the book’s concern is with him rather than the firm. There is a super book to be written about the latter too.

Because the firm fades out of the picture, Van Dongen does not tell the story of the ill-fated purchase of New Zealand News Ltd, that once-proud publishing company (including the Auck!and and Christchurch Stars). Almost every journalist I know remarks bitterly that the firm was brought to its knees by BIL management and asset-stripping.

Assel-stripping: that is the term that most often comes up when abusing Brierley. But, some caution should be used when applying it. Think of a firm in the 1960s sitting on a pile of valuable assets and getting an annual return of, say, one percent. Along comes BIL, buys the firm for a song, and converts the assets into real market uses returning !0 percent. That is assel-stripping, but is not the economy the better off for it? Don’t we want our assets to be productive, giving good returns?

Of course, re-organisation sometimes meant redundancies. In the 1960s, with low levels of unemployment, that was traumatic, but workers usually found new (and more productive) jobs. It is more difficult to justify redundancy in the 1980s and 1990s, because the economy is now distorted by a management regime worse than anything BIL did to NZ News.

But there is also less asset -stripping. Business managers have learnt that if they do not manage their stamp collections wisely, firms like BIL will swoop down, take their firms over, and they will be sacked. Brierley the predator probably lifted the quality of New Zealand management at least one whole class.

So I am not as critical of BIL on the asselstripping charge. Its real damage was the blazing of a trail for the Mickey Mouse operators that followed. They took creativity to the point of accounting. for assets which did not exist, and plundered cash from productive firms in an orgy of takeovers which destroyed so much of our economic base.

**************
INTRIGUING BRIERLEY

Footnote to Listener 26 September 1998 (Not published)

A recent article by the London Economist compared the Brierley share with the kiwi’s inability to fly. It is also a parable for the New Zealand economy.

Brierly’s big $1200m writedown of asset values, making a $900m loss for last year says just how deep the company is in trouble, as it desperately sells assets to rebalance its books.

At the time of the April coup the ratio of the value of each Brierley share was only 87 percent of the net tangible assets (NTA) backing the share. In the Business Roundtable analysis that means the company management was at least 13 percent inefficient. The dismissed Brierley chairman, Bob Matthew, was also chairman of the Business Roundtable.

The outgoing directors did very well. Matthew got a $750,000 redundancy payment, paid by ordinary shareholders, while the retiring Chief Executive Paul Collins got $4,000,000. (What would they have paid if the company had been efficient?) Workers redundant from restructuring will be lucky to get a hundredth of that, even if they are highly productive.

The coup replaced Matthew with Roger Douglas. The logic of a low shareprice-to-NTA ratio is to sell assets, so Douglas seems the right man for the job of downsizing the company. Recall that crass Australian joke of the 1980s. How do New Zealanders get to manage a small company? They start with a big one.

Brierley investors tell me the jokes are a lot better than the return they are getting, as the share price continues to trend downwards to near half the level it was at the time of the coup.

The Hole in the Reserve Bank

Listener 22 April, 1991. This is the first of a sequence of four columns written in the early 1990s about monetary policy, which continue to be significant today. They are
The Hole in the Reserve Bank
What the Reserve Bank Believes
Who Controls the Exchange Rate?
The Meaning of Influence

Keywords Macroeconomics & Money

When I left New Zealand in the mid-1960s there was a large hole where the Reserve Bank building was to be constructed. When I returned in the early 1970s the hole was still there. Apparently, a mistake had been made in the building’s foundations, which had to be ripped out; no easy task with the walls of a money vault. Reserve Bank foundations are like that, whether they are vault walls or the credibility of the bank’s policies.

The policy foundations appear in the Reserve Bank Act 1989 which says, “The primary function of the bank is to formulate and implement monetary policy directed to the economic objective of achieving and maintaining stability in the general level of prices.”

But can monetary policy maintain price stability? It is one thing to write an objective in statute: another to achieve it. (We could ask the Reserve Bank to run its monetary policies to achieve and maintain the supremacy of the All Blacks. Is the current law’s objective any more plausible?) Thus far I have been unable to find any statement to the government, or Parliament, at the time the act was formulated that explains how the objective is achievable.

I am aware of the extreme monetarist view that in the medium term inflation is solely a monetary phenomenon. But even the Reserve Bank doesn’t go that far. One of its explanatory booklets says, “In the medium term monetary policy mainly affects the level of inflation.” There is a big difference between “mainly” and “solely”.

But if the bank apparently accepts that in the medium term its policies will affect other economic variables, it does not say which ones or by how much. My view, and I am not alone, is that monetary policy has a long-run effect on the level of output, employment and foreign debt because, in the short run, it affects the acquisition of capital, technology and human skills.

Achieving the bank’s primary goal is feasible, but it may involve hiking up the exchange rate to the point where it will destroy even more of the capacity of the import-substituting and export sectors, and so our ability to produce, employ and grow. That is what has happened over the last five years and, if the present policies are pursued, it will continue to happen over the next five.

But, whatever the theoretical issues, hardly anybody -survey respondents, forecasters, markets -believes that the Reserve Bank will attain its given statutory objective of a nil to two percent rate of consumer inflation by the end of 1993.

Recall that on March 2, 1990, agreement was signed with the then Minister of Finance, David Caygill, to achieve the stability target by the end of 1992. Almost 300 days later the new Minister of Finance, Ruth Richardson, delayed the target date by 365 days to the end of 1993.

It is no good saying that 1t won’t happen again, because the most recent agreement allows for deviations from the target if there are external price shocks, natural disasters, changes in government levies and taxes or for any other reason that seems a good excuse. There will be such shocks in the next three years, so the target is fatuous. Indeed, on the very day she signed the agreement Richardson announced one such shock cuts to welfare state benefits and user pays for the rich. No one knows the impact these moves will have, but some preliminary estimates by the NZIER suggest they could be equivalent to a price hike of around seven percent.

Even the Reserve Bank’s own statements suggest a certain lack of conviction. Its 1990 post-election briefing draws attention to the need for appropriate fiscal and other government policies to co-ordinate with its monetary policy. I agree. I wish it had said so in the 1984 briefing: perhaps we would be in less of a mess if it had. But the bank did not say even this when its bill was being passed. Raising the matter now suggests that, having been given the ball, the bank doesn’t think it can score by itself.

An even odder excuse is its badmouthing of the official consumers price index (CPI). There were no such complaints about the CPl’s integrity before the bill was passed; it was judged one of the best in the world. But when it became the measure of the bank’s performance, the bank said the CPl’s treatment of housing was flawed (without offering any theoretical justification) and its post-election briefing included a criticism of the CPI’s treatment of cars. To the outsider it all looks like asking for the try line to be moved in 20 metres.

Like the faulty vaults, the bank has to rebuild the foundations of its monetary policy. It is no good trying to do it imperceptibly, step by step. Arguing that the bank’s policies are feasible, while its actions undermine them, is not credible. That is why I support a parliamentary review of the Reserve Bank Act. The objective of attaining and maintaining stability of prices must be tempered by a phrase like “without compromising long-term growth and employment” and the country’s foreign balance sheet”.