Recommendations
1. That Parliament should not
proceed with the Principles of the Treaty of Waitangi Bill.
2. That Parliament endorse the
principles of the Treaty of Waitangi as set out by the Court of Appeal in New
Zealand Māori Council v Attorney-General (1987) (C.A. 54/87), while
acknowledging that the understandings of Te Tiriti o Waitangi and its implications
will continue to evolve organically.
My name is Brian Henry Easton. I
am making this submission in a personal capacity. As an economist and a writer
of New Zealand history I have been engaging with Treaty issues for four
decades. Publications
of Brian Easton Relating to Te Tiriti O Waitangi and Treaty Claims lists publications which
demonstrate my engagement over the years.
There will be many submissions on
the bill to the select committee, some of which with I agree, some of which I
do not. The purpose of this submission is to raise some issues which have not
been prominent in the public discussion but are very important and deserve
consideration by the select committee.
Our Understandings of Te Tiriti O
Waitangi Are Evolving
I have learned many things from
my engagement with treaty issues over the years. The most significant is that
our understandings of Te Tiriti o Waitangi and its implications have evolved
over the 14 decades since 1840.
For instance, there is a widely
circulated commentary by Sir Apirana Ngata in The Treaty of Waitangi: An
Explanation. It was published in 1922. Ngata was a scholar. There is no
doubt his thinking would have developed
had he read, for instance, Ruth Ross’s ‘Te Tiriti o Waitangi: Texts and
Translations’. (New Zealand Journal of History, Oct 1972; v.6 n.2:
p.129-157).
This organic evolution continues
is ongoing. Reputable scholars who have examined the primary material still
disagree – albeit generally in a collegial way.
The danger of the Principles of
the Treaty of Waitangi Bill, among the many other problems that will be pointed
out to the Select Committee, is that it will lock in a particular, fossilised
and anachronistic interpretation of Te Tiriti. On that basis alone, the Bill
should not proceed. It is not the function of a statute to determine general
facts, including historical ones.
Accordingly it is recommended:
1. That Parliament should not
proceed with the Principles of the Treaty of Waitangi Bill.
The Principles of The Treaty
In response to the phrase
‘principles of the Treaty’, which is in the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, the
Court of Appeal set out in 1978 in New Zealand Māori Council v
Attorney-General (C.A. 54/87) (a.k.a. the ‘Lands’ case or the ‘SOE’ case)
what it judged those principles to be. There was no disagreement among the five
judges.
The judgements did not codify the
principles. A common summary of them is:
1. The Crown has the right to
govern. The principles of the treaty ‘do not authorise unreasonable
restrictions on the right of a duly elected government to follow its chosen
policy. Indeed, to try and shackle the Government unreasonably would itself be
inconsistent with those principles’.
2. The Crown has a duty to act
reasonably and in good faith. The relationship is ‘akin to partnership
between the Crown and Māori people, and of its obligation on each side to act
in good faith.’ The judgment draws parallels with ‘our partnership laws’.
3 The Crown has an active duty
to protect Māori interests. ‘The duty of the Crown was not just passive but
extended to active protection of Māori people in the use of their lands and
waters to the fullest extent practicable.’
4 The government should make
informed decisions. The Court said that in order to act reasonably and in
good faith, the government must make sure it was informed in making decisions
relating to the treaty. That will ‘require some consultation’.
5 The Crown should remedy past
grievances. ‘If the Waitangi Tribunal finds merit in a claim and recommends
redress, the Crown should grant at least some form of redress, unless there are
grounds justifying a reasonable Treaty partner in withholding it – which would
be only in very special circumstances, if ever.’
Since 1987, other court cases
have developed the application of the principles. For instance, active
protection of Māori people now extends to other taonga such as te reo. It seems
likely that the courts would also recognise kaitiakitanga – guardianship of the
environment – rights, even if they were not in a statute. Additionally, court
decisions have protected Māori property rights. (They are implicit in the
Court’s third and fifth principles.) These are examples of the organic
evolution that the understanding of Te Tiriti has undergone.
While presenting them a little
differently, both the Waitangi Tribunal and Te Puni Kōkiri have expressed
similar principles. (Appendix I)
In 1989, responding to the Court
of Appeal decision, the Lange-Palmer Government also set out some principles to
guide its actions on matters relating to the Treaty as follows:
1.The government has the right to
govern and make laws. (The kāwanatanga principle)
2. Iwi have the right to organise
as iwi, and, under the law, to control their resources as their own. (The rangatiratanga
principle)
3. All New Zealanders are equal
before the law.
4. Both the government and iwi
are obliged to accord each other reasonable cooperation on major issues of
common concern.
5. The government is responsible
for providing effective processes for the resolution of grievances in the
expectation that reconciliation can occur.
While based on the Court’s
principles, the guide to actions are a more elaborate about the role of Iwi.
Thus far, no subsequent government has modified them, thereby implicitly
endorsing them.
A Thought Experiment
Suppose every Māori was to
disappear from New Zealand (perhaps a virus wiped out everyone with a Māori
gene). Which of the principles would be abandoned or become redundant? Observe
that Article 3 of Te Tiriti applies to all New Zealanders. (See D. Baragwanath
(2024) ‘The Treaty and Essential Freshwater.’ NZ Law Journal, February,
p.8.)
As it happens, every principle is
intrinsic to the governance of a liberal democracy. While they are set as a
restraint on the New Zealand Government of its treatment of a particular
minority (Māori), in a liberal democracy – and under Article 3 of Te Tiriti –
those restraints apply equally to all minorities – including the minority of
one person. They are generally not platitudes; many hardly apply in Putin’s
Russia.
So, even were there no Māori, the
government would still have the right to govern; it would still have duty to
act reasonably and in good faith, to make informed decisions and to remedy past
grievances; all New Zealanders would remain equal before the law.
Conclusion
The Principles of the Treaty of
Waitangi Bill does not propose to repeal the existing treaty principles but, by
not endorsing them, the effect of passing the Bill would be to downgrade
fundamental principles of a liberal democratic state. This would be greatly
regretted and, in a more authoritarian state, dangerous.
Instead, whatever decision it
makes about the bill, Parliament should endorse those principles in an
appropriate way. Accordingly it is recommended:
2. That Parliament endorse the
principles of the Treaty of Waitangi as set out by the Court of Appeal in New
Zealand Māori Council v Attorney-General (1987) (C.A. 54/87), while
acknowledging that the understandings of Te Tiriti o Waitangi and its implications
will continue to evolve organically.
Appendix I: The Principles of the
Treaty; An Exploration
by Brian Easton.
I prepared an earlier version of
this note in May 2024 for myself, when the debate on the ‘principles of the treaty’ (i.e. Te Tiriti o
Waitangi) became intense. This paper concludes that the treaty principles
restrain the New Zealand Government in its treatment of a particular minority
(Māori), but that those restraints apply equally to all minorities in a liberal
democracy including the minority of one person. All they do is make the
restraints more explicit for Māori.
The Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975
Treaty principles were introduced
into the governance of New Zealand by the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 whose
purpose was
‘to provide for the observance,
and confirmation, of the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi by establishing a
Tribunal to make recommendations on claims relating to the practical
application of the Treaty and to determine whether certain matters are inconsistent
with the principles of the Treaty.’
The Act’s preamble goes on that
‘a Tribunal be established to make recommendations on claims relating to the
practical application of the principles of the Treaty and, for that purpose, to
determine its meaning and effect and whether certain matters are inconsistent
with those principles.’ However, the act did not state what those principles
were. Subsequently, various other statutes have references to the principles –
again without defining them.
The Court of Appeal
The inclusion of the principles
in the State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986 led to a Court of Appeal case New
Zealand Māori Council v Attorney-General (1987) (a.k.a. the ‘Lands’ case or the
‘SOE’ case). It forced the Court to define the treaty principles. The
judgements do not codified their principles, but a common summary (numbered
here for reference) of their deliberations is:
1CA The Crown has the right to
govern. The principles of the treaty ‘do not authorise unreasonable
restrictions on the right of a duly elected government to follow its chosen
policy. Indeed, to try and shackle the Government unreasonably would itself be
inconsistent with those principles’.
2CA The Crown has a duty to
act reasonably and in good faith. The relationship is ‘akin to partnership
between the Crown and Māori people, and of its obligation on each side to act
in good faith.’ The judgment draws parallels with ‘our partnership laws’.
3CA Active Crown has a duty to
protect Māori interests. ‘The duty of the Crown was not just passive but
extended to active protection of Māori people in the use of their lands and
waters to the fullest extent practicable.’
4CA The government should make
informed decisions. The Court said that ‘in order to act reasonably and in
good faith, the government must make sure it was informed in making decisions
relating to the treaty. That will ‘require some consultation’.
5CA The Crown should remedy
past grievances. ‘If the Waitangi Tribunal finds merit in a claim and
recommends redress, the Crown should grant at least some form of redress,
unless there are grounds justifying a reasonable Treaty partner in withholding
it – which would be only in very special circumstances, if ever.’[1]
Since 1987, other court cases
have developed the application of the principles. For instance, active
protection of Māori people now extends to other taonga such as te reo. It seems
likely that the courts would also recognise kaitiakitanga – guardianship of the
environment – rights, even if they were not in statute. Additionally, court
decisions have protected Māori property rights. (They are implicit in the
Court’s third and fifth principles.)
The New Zealand Government
Principles
The New Zealand Government set
out principles in 1989 to guide its actions on matters relating to the treaty.
No subsequent government has modified them, thereby implicitly endorsing them.
They were:
‘6NZG The government has the
right to govern and make laws. (The kāwanatanga principle)
‘7NZG Iwi have the right to
organise as iwi, and, under the law, to control their resources as their own.
(The rangatiratanga principle)
‘8NZG All New Zealanders are
equal before the law.
‘9NZG Both the government and iwi
are obliged to accord each other reasonable cooperation on major issues of
common concern.
‘10NZG The government is
responsible for providing effective processes for the resolution of grievances
in the expectation that reconciliation can occur.’[2]
The Waitangi Tribunal
The 1975 legislation establishing
the Waitangi Tribunal charged it with applying the principles without stating
what they were. Presumably the intention was that the Tribunal would identify
them. The Tribunal has described in detail its approach in Principles of the
Treaty of Waitangi. In summary:
‘11WT The principle of
partnership. ‘The Court of Appeal has referred to the Treaty relationship as
“akin to a partnership”, and therefore uses the concept as an analogy,
emphasizing a duty on the parties to act reasonably, honourably, and in good
faith. The Waitangi Tribunal has also emphasized the obligation on both parties
to act reasonably, honourably, and in good faith, but derives these duties from
the principle of reciprocity and the principle of mutual benefit.’
‘12WT The principle of
reciprocity. ‘The Waitangi Tribunal’s understanding of the principle of
reciprocity is derived from Articles I and II of the Treaty and captures the
“essential bargain” or “solemn exchange” agreed to in the Treaty by Māori and
the Crown: the exchange of sovereignty for the guarantee of tino
rangatiratanga.’
‘13WT The principle of mutual
benefit. ‘The Tribunal has found that the principle of mutual benefit or mutual
advantage is a cornerstone of the Treaty partnership. An underlying premise is
that both partners signed the Treaty expecting to benefit from the arrangement.
This principle requires that “the needs of both cultures must be provided for
and compromise may be needed in some cases to achieve this objective”.’
‘14WT The duty to act reasonably,
honourably, and in good faith. ‘The Treaty signifies a partnership between the
Crown and Māori people and the compact rests on the premise that each partner
will act reasonably and in utmost good faith towards the other.’
‘15WT The duty to make informed
decisions. ‘The Courts have found that it is inherent in the Crown’s obligation
to act in good faith that it is obliged to make informed decisions on matters
affecting the interests of Māori.’
‘16WT The principle of active
protection. ‘The principle encompasses the Crown’s obligation to take positive
steps to ensure that Māori interests are protected. The Courts have considered
the principle primarily in association with the property interests guaranteed
to Māori in Article II of the Treaty.’
‘17WT The principle of redress.
‘The Court of Appeal has acknowledged that it is a principle of partnership
generally, and of the Treaty relationship in particular, that past wrongs give
rise to a right of redress.’[3]
It will be evident that the
Tribunal’s principles primarily derive from decisions by the courts. However,
the courts may not necessarily agree with the Tribunal’s interpretation of the
application of those principles. (The Tribunal is not a court and its findings
do not have the standing of a court unless a court endorses them. On the other
hand, the Tribunal must respect court decisions and legislation.)
Te Puni Kōkiri
Te Puni Kōkiri’s He Tirohanga
ō Kawa ki te Tiriti o Waitangi: A Guide to the Principles of the Treaty of
Waitangi as expressed by the Courts and the Waitangi Tribunal identified the
following principles:
The principle of partnership
(11WT);
The principle of reciprocity
(12WT);
The principle of mutual benefit
(13WT);
The duty to act reasonably,
honourably and in good faith (14WT, 2CA);
The duty to make informed
decisions (15WT, 4CA);
The principle of active
protection (16WT, 3CA);
The principle of redress
(17WT).[4]
They are the same principles as
the Waitangi Tribunal.
A Thought Experiment
Rather than provide a
consolidation or synthesis of the above principles, consider the following
thought experiment. Suppose every Māori was to disappear from New Zealand
(perhaps a virus wiped out everyone with a Māori gene). Which of the principles
would be abandoned or become redundant? Observe that it can be argued that
Article 3 of Te Tiriti applies to all New Zealanders. [5]
Surprisingly – at least to me –
every principle is intrinsic to the governance of a liberal democracy. Their
effect is to restrain the New Zealand Government in its treatment of a
particular minority (Māori). In a liberal democracy those restraints apply
equally to all minorities – including the minority of one person. They are
generally not platitudes; many hardly apply in Putin’s Russia.
So, even were there no Māori, the
government would still have the right to govern. (1CA, 6NZG); it would still
have duty to act reasonably and in good faith (2CA, 11WT, 14WT [6]), to make
informed decisions (4CA, 15WT) and to remedy past grievances (5CA, 10NZG,
17WT); all New Zealanders would remain equal before the law (8NZG).
The Tribunal principles of
reciprocity (12WT) and mutual benefit (13WT) also fit into this liberal
democratic framework, although that requires a little more finesse. I am not
providing it here, because I would use a social contract approach but other social
democrats could take a different approach to reach a similar conclusion.
Do Iwi Have Special Status?
With no living Māori, the other
principles that the Crown has an active duty to protect Māori interests becomes
redundant in the thought experiment. (3CA, 16WT) But the Crown surely has an
equal duty to protect the interests of individual non-Māori.
However while they can be
interpreted as applying to all New Zealanders not just conferring a special
right to those of Māori descent, the same conclusion does not apply to‘Iwi’.
(Iwi is capitalised to indicate ‘tribes’ rather than people; hapu are included.)
Do the following principles apply
in similar ways to other voluntary organisations in a social democracy?
3CA ‘The duty of the Crown was
not just passive but extended to active protection of Māori people in the use
of their lands and waters to the fullest extent practicable.’
7NZG ‘Iwi have the right to
organise as iwi, and, under the law, to control their resources as their own.’
16WT ‘The principle encompasses
the Crown’s obligation to take positive steps to ensure that Māori interests
are protected.’ (This combines the two and need not be considered separately.)
So perhaps Iwi are special. For
instance, the Government’s Employment Contract Act 1991 undermined trade
unions. No one questioned the right of Parliament to pass such legislation,
although many questioned whether it should do so. Doing the same thing to Iwi
would undermine a treaty principle. Similarly other organisations at a similar
level in the political/social structure, including churches and local
authorities, have no such guarantees. Perhaps key to the difference is that Iwi
existed as political/social entities before the arrival of the New Zealand Government
in 1840. All others came after.
If this principle gives a special
status to Iwi, the Government has a particular responsibility to listen to
their concerns. However, as the Court of Appeal ruled, that does not give Iwi a
veto. (1CA) Principle 7NZG also suggests that the Government has a duty to
ensure strong viable Iwi. That is a reason that the treaty settlements were
made with Iwi rather than with individual Māori.
What is unclear is the extent of
the obligation on the Government to support a failing Iwi. It seems likely that
were an Iwi’s rohe devastated by, say, an earthquake or volcano there would be
a special obligation towards restoring the Iwi in the post-disaster
reconstruction. But suppose the Iwi failed financially through mismanagement?
We also need to ponder what
exactly an Iwi is. The distinction between Iwi and hapu was fluid in 1840 and
varied by region. The Government has tended to treat hapu as Iwi in terms of
treaty settlements. Moreover, new forms of Māori organisation – such as Urban
Māori Authorities and the Māori Women’s Welfare League – may amount to modern
Iwi. At the heart of such issues is the principle – not mentioned as a treaty
one but fundamental to a modern social democratic state – of the right to Māori
and others to develop.[7]
In summary, the Treaty Principles
do not seem to give individual Māori any particular rights that everyone in a
social democracy does not have. However, the principles seem to give special
rights to Māori organisations such as Iwi, but they are limited; that does not
give those organisations a veto in the governance of New Zealand.
Co-Governance
It is useful to distinguish
between self-government, partnership, co-management and co-governance.
The self-government of Iwi
is mentioned explicitly or implicitly in a number of treaty principles
(especially 7NZG) arising from the second article of Te Tiriti. It is argued
that self-government may be weakened by co-governance, although that depends on
what the latter means which, as we shall see, is uncertain. Many other
voluntary organisations would claim the right to self-government.
Partnership is mentioned in the Treaty
Principles (2CA, 5CA, 11WT, 13WT, 14WT, 17WT). However it is clear that the
Court of Appeal’s was referring to an ongoing relationship between the Crown
and Māori with obligations to act reasonably and in good faith, akin to a
partnership, echoing an earlier phrase, ‘the honour of the crown’.
The Court’s judgement does not
require the partners to be of equal status. It certainly did not have in mind
the institutional arrangement which is the basis of legal partnerships. Indeed,
it explicitly rules that out with its principles of the right of the Crown to
govern and the right of Māori to continue to exercise self-determination.
Of course, the Crown may enter
into a legal partnership on a particular project with an Iwi, as it can with
any other entity, as a pragmatic solution to a practical problem. But this does
not involve any treaty principle.
Co-management arises out of the second article
of Te Tiriti and is implicit in some Treaty Principles (2CA, 5CA, 9NZG, 13WT,
14WT, 16WT). It is a pragmatic solution where the status of taonga/treasures is
unresolved.
For instance, the ownership of
the Waikato River is complicated by Māori and English law having quite
different conceptual frameworks of river ownership. Rather than litigating it
was agreed that the management of the Waikato River would be assigned to a
Waikato River Authority. Half the ten-member management board is appointed by
the Crown and half by local Iwi in a co-management of the resource. The funding
is from the Crown; the accountability of each board member is not to the
institution which appointed them, but to the trust as set out in the
legislation.
The essence of co-management
involves management of resources in the public domain where management is
shared within a trustee framework set out by legislation.
Co-governance There is no definition of
co-governance. As Prime Minister Chris Hipkins said, ‘no one understands what
[co-governance]
means because we’re talking about quite different things’. A
March 2023 survey found that only 17 percent of respondents said that they had
‘a good grasp of the concept’; they are likely to have offered many different
grasps
The notion of co-governance seems
to have arisen out of an attempt to implement the 2007 UN Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples. However, the declaration does not use the word.
It refers to ‘government’ on only three occasions: ‘self-government’ (Article
4); ‘intergovernmental’ (Article 41); ‘good governance’ (Article 46).
The He Puapua report,
commissioned to respond to the declaration, did not define ‘co-governance’, but
it recommended ‘the establishment of a high-level co-governance body comprised
of equal numbers of government ministers and Māori representatives’, including
that consideration should be given to the creation of an ‘upper house in
Parliament that could scrutinise legislation for compliance with Te Tiriti
and/or the Declaration [of Independence]. Various models for the composition of
such a body could include a partnership model (with 50/50 rangatiratanga and
kāwanatanga representation).’
The most prominent example of
co-governance was in the first ‘Three Waters’ proposal, to manage fresh-,
storm- and waste-water by four entities whose boards would consist of half
appointees of the Crown or district councils and half from Iwi, similar to the
co-management of natural resources. This sharing of seats on the board seemed
to be at the heart of the notion of co-governance.
But Three Waters is not
co-management. It is not about water but the infrastructure to manage the water
– up to – $200b worth of it. Water is a Second Article matter, better dealt
with by Māori having a share of the water consents in an approach similar to
fishing quotas. [8] The initial Three Waters proposal would have been like
requiring all holders of fishing quotas to have half their boards consisting of
Māori.
Each water infrastructure entity
would have been a monopoly, with an element of taxation from its powers to
raise revenue by water charges and by area-based rates. Additionally, borrowing
requires an underwriting of the loans in case an entity fails financially. In
principle, if the governance is shared between local authority and Iwi
appointees then the risk should be shared too, although it seems unlikely that
Iwi could guarantee their share of the $200b which is likely to be borrowed.
The financial accountability of the proposed co-governance entities was very
unclear.
There has been no attempt to
relate co-governance to the Treaty Principles nor to any reasonable historical
or contemporary interpretation of Te Tiriti o Waitangi. Unlike partnership,
self-government and co-management, co-governance has not been derived from
treaty principles.
Conclusion
The majority of the treaty
principles are hardly controversial. They are articulated in terms of how the
government should treat those of Māori descent, restraining its majoritarian
powers. We would expect in a liberal democracy that the government would treat
non-Māori in a similar way.
The one group of principles
excluded from the sentiments in the previous paragraph are those which give Iwi
a special status. Such preferences occur in other liberal democracies as when
there is an established church or for some families (e.g. the Windsor
monarchy). It is, however, a restricted special status.
What seems to be happening is
that the expression ‘treaty principles’ is about a larger debate on the
direction(s) New Zealand should/might take. Focusing on the principles fails to
frame this debate in helpful or creative ways.
One concern is that those of
Māori descent have some constitutional rights that non-Māori do not. (I assume
that membership of an Iwi is treated as a question of family.) It is a belief
of some Māori – I recall one who insisted he had rights under Te Tiriti to a
medical treatment which would not be provided to a non-Māori. It is also the
belief of some non-Māori, often with resentment.
While it is a larger task than I
can do here, one could go through all New Zealand statutes (and policies) and
identify those where Māori are differentiated. One example will illustrate the
issue. The Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 establishes a tribunal which can only
hear grievances against the Crown initiated by a person of Māori descent.
Initially the focus was on property rights unfairly taken by the Crown from Iwi
despite Article Two of Te Tiriti, but the scope of the Tribunal’s enquiries has
since widened to other perceived grievances. A fair-minded non-Māori might be
envious.
I shall go no further because we
need the full list of the examples to have a civilised discussion. Yes, there
will be instances when treating Māori differently makes sense. My favourite
example is that one of the first actions of the publicly funded Māori
anti-smoking agency was to recommend smoking be banned on marae. (Māori smoking
rates were, and are still, well above average.) No non-Māori agency nor the
Government would have dared publicly advocate such a course. It makes sense to
provide public services differently to meet the cultural differences of various
groups – but not only to Māori.
Whatever the outcome of such a
review of the statutes, it probably would not address all the public concerns.
At their heart is social change, which is happening perhaps faster than in any
other prolonged period of human endeavour.
Much is generated offshore and
from new technologies. However, there is a domestic driver: the development of
an Aotearoa New Zealand distinctive from the offshore heritage and relevant to
the locality – call it ‘decolonisation’. It has been going on since day one of
the arrival of the proto-Māori, and is very evident in the record of the first
European settlers.
An obvious part of
decolonialisation is ‘indigenisation’ – drawing on the culture of the tangata
whenua – something which would happen even were there no Māori genes left in
the world. (A simple example. A mountain was named after the 1769 First Lord of
the Admiralty who may have been a precursor of Gilbert and Sullivan’s First
Lord –in HMS Pinafore – who ‘never went to sea’. The name has been changed to
‘Taranaki’.)
There is considerable resistance
to such changes, even if with eventual hindsight they seem logical –
understandably so, for individuals get their intellectual foundations from
their early years. (Keynes famously said ‘there are not many who are influenced
by new theories after they are twenty-five or thirty years of age’.) I am often
struck by popular views not unlike those I learned in my childhood in the 1950s
such as most Māori are almost only of Māori ancestry; a treaty in in English
was signed on 6 February 1840 which was unique rather that one of many Britain
signed with natives; ‘we’ fought against ‘them’ in the Māori Wars of the 1860s.
The nostalgia may even extend to a wish that ‘they’ would go back to the pa,
despite today the majority of Māori being in urban centres. (They are good for
New Zealand sport though.)
Managing social change is not
easy. The temptation is inertia; sometimes it happens faster than even the
majority of those with goodwill can cope with. Resistance often ends up with
not very relevant symbols. Thus it seems to be with the objection to the
principles of the treaty.
Endnotes
[1] Based upon
https://teara.govt.nz/en/principles-of-the-treaty-of-waitangi-nga-matapono-o-te-tiriti-o-waitangi
[2]
https://teara.govt.nz/en/principles-of-the-treaty-of-waitangi-nga-matapono-o-te-tiriti-o-waitangi.
[3] https://www.waitangitribunal.govt.nz/assets/Documents/Publications/WT-Principles-of-the-Treaty-of-Waitangi-as-expressed-by-the-Courts-and-the-Waitangi-Tribunal.pdf
(2001)
[4]
wttps://www.tpk.govt.nz/en/o-matou-mohiotanga/crownmaori-relations/he-tirohanga-o-kawa-ki-te-tiriti-o-waitangi
(2001)
[5] E.g. D. Baragwanath (2024)
‘The Treaty and Essential Freshwater.’ NZ Law Journal, February, p.8.
[6] This interprets 11WT – the
principle of partnership – as the Court of Appeal set out: to act reasonably
and in good faith akin to a partnership.
[7] Waitangi Tribunal (1988)
Report of the Waitangi Tribunal on the Muriwhenua Fishing Claim (Wai22)
[8]
https://www.pundit.co.nz/content/trading-water-resource-consents