Where is the Left Going?

Paper to NZ Fabian Society, 26 February, Wellington.

The New Zealand Fabian Society has posted my paper Transforming New Zealand: Why Has the Left Failed?, which is a follow-on from my just published book, In Open Seas: How the New Zealand Labour Government Went Wrong: 2017-2023. The paper points out that the Left no longer dominates the economic policy agenda. This paper is a response to Mike’s challenge to me: how to get the Left back to being a progressive force responding to ongoing change, rather than just defending the status quo.

How the Left is Failing

This paper does not spend a lot of time putting the case that New Zealand’s economic agenda is now dominated by neoliberal economics. Typically, the Left’s response to a policy announcement is that it hurts someone and that our side can do it better, implicitly accepting the existing policy framework. You rarely hear that the policy approach is fundamentally flawed with an alternative approach being advanced. Recall Labour campaigned in 1935 on ‘we have a plan’. Remember their slogans in the last three elections? [1] Isn’t each saying ‘in it for us’, the ‘it’ being running the country much the same by a Labour leadership?

Jacinda Ardern said that her government was going to be ‘transformational’ but it was so bereft of policy direction that when it took over in 2017 it set up a series of committees of the worthy and the loyal – but hardly innovative – to tell them what to do. Basically, each accepted the existing agenda and tinkered with it. Transformational the Ardern-Hipkins Government was not. That is why it has been easy for the Luxon Coalition Government to unravel its good intentions.

The Left’s origins go back to a response to the capitalist industrialisation which began in the nineteenth century. Industrialisation had a revolutionary impact on society and the lives of ordinary people, disrupting traditional social networks and the way people lived and worked – often making them worse off.

How to cope with the industrialisation juggernaut? One response was to return to an idealised rural Arcadia. Its best-known advocate was Pierre Joseph Proudhon but many people voted with their feet, including those who migrated from Europe to New Zealand to go farming. A second response was revolutionary – to overthrow the social order and impose a new one. Prominent among the advocates were Marxists and hard-line anarchists.

However, the most successful response was the evolutionary one of adapting the social system so that the economic growth from industrialisation would benefit the masses. Among the most prominent British advocates at the end of the nineteenth century were the Fabians, named after the Roman general Fabius, who won through persistence and wearing the enemy down by attrition rather than in pitched battles. Its logo was a tortoise.

The Fabian approach has been a foundation of social democracy. Their policies had a major impact on the Ballance-Seddon First Liberal Government via William Pember Reeves, New Zealand’s earliest acknowledged Fabian. The influence continued through to the Savage-Fraser First Labour Government. After that, it seemed to the Left a matter of tidying up the unfinished business, as occurred under the Nash-Nordmeyer Second Labour Government and the Kirk-Rowling Third Labour Government.

About this time, there evolved a view that it was possible to manage the economy, ameliorating the business cycle and accelerating economic growth. The Left claimed they could do this better, because they were more pragmatic than the Right about government intervention. However, the New Zealand conservative right is pragmatic too, and there has been a convergence of policies.

One difference was that the Left thought that some groups were being left out of the rising prosperity; the Right disagreed. Government spending patterns through time show the main difference between the two was that Labour governments spent more on social security transfers. (Research sometimes confirms popular prejudices.) But the spending patterns on education and healthcare and so on were similar. (Research does not always confirm popular prejudices.)

However, the traditional Left’s success ceased to be a progressive force and instead became a defender of the status quo its predecessors had created. Its message is that ‘we have made these gains against the capitalist-industrial complex which is trying to reverse them; we are resisting’.

There was a deviation from this Labour tradition when the Lange-Douglas Fourth Labour Government adopted neoliberal (Rogernomics) economic strategies. (They were continued by the Fourth National Government pursuing ‘Ruthanasia-Jennicide’.) Michael Cullen’s memoir Labour Saving explains that the Clark-Cullen Fifth Labour Government was about restoring traditional social democrat approaches.

Post Industrialisation Society

 While the industrialisation phase of modern economic growth may be over, there are other forces transforming the world. Perhaps none is as powerful as was nineteenth-century industrialisation – I wouldn’t know because we are in the middle of it all – but collectively they are as significant. They include

            – increasing affluence and diversity;

            – the shift from the consumption of goods to the consumption of services;

            – rising organisational and intellectual complexity;

            – the globalisation (interconnection) of individual economies (not just trade and investment; labour mobility is a big one). The balance of international power is changing;

            – the rise of the power of the financial sector, generating rising inequality at the top of the wealth distribution with political impacts;

            – the increasing depletion of environmental resources of which climate change – the consequences of using the atmosphere as a sump for carbon emissions – is the big one.

The Left has had some responses to these transformational drivers but frequently they amount to reacting conservatively to preserving a status quo from the past – pretending these changes are trivial. This contrasts with adapting and harnessing the forces to enhance wellbeing for the future, in the way that their nineteenth-century predecessors succeeded in doing. It’s more Proudhon than Fabian. (There are exceptions. Greenies, in particular, are concerned with environmental challenges. The movement is split in the way the nineteenth-century Left was: reversion, revolution, evolution.)

It is perfectly honourable politics to defend the status quo, twiddling some of its settings, promising to manage it better. That is the role of conservatives. The indications are that when Labour takes this strategy, it will be in office about a third of the time. But it will not be in power; it will be neither progressive nor transformational.

It would be a rejection of the great tradition of the Left to be an agent of change and, even more concerningly, that there will be a continuation of the ongoing divergence between the changing world and New Zealand’s response to it. Eventually that leads to an economic and social breakdown.

Thus the neoliberal agenda promoted by the ACT party which is driving some of the most divisive policies New Zealand has faced since Rogernomics. That was their baby too.

Time permits looking at only one of these challenges. (It would take a series of lectures in the nineteenth-century Fabian tradition to deal with all the forces; or you could read In Open Seas.) How to meet the challenge of increasing affluence and diversity.

 The Ardern-Hipkins Government tried to be transformational in a couple of relevant areas, although it failed to get them under way. But there was also an area where the Ardern-Hipkins Government was taking exactly the wrong direction, even though it was pursuing a conventional New Zealand left-wing governing strategy.

The Challenge of Affluent Diversity

It may be that today there is more social diversity – age, class, ethnicity, gender, life experience, occupation, and religious belief among many dimensions – than in the past. It is certainly more challenging. Society can no longer operate on the assumption that what is good for white, middle-class, Protestant, straight men is good for everyone else.

One factor driving this diversity has been affluence. Today someone will, on average, have double the material income of their grandparents. (One chapter of In Open Seas wonders whether that will be true in the future.) Doubling purchasing power does not mean doubling everything. Spending on some things rises by much more, changing the shape of both consumption and society. As In Open Seas explains, affluence generates choice, which generates diversity of consumption, behaviour, opportunity and social display.

The Ardern-Hipkins Government favoured the centralisation of the austere world our grandparents grew up in, where a Wellington-based centre could control just about everything. It did not foster local decision making. It reduced local involvement by its centralisation of health provision under Health New Zealand, under its merged mega-polytechnic and under its Three Waters regime. It did little about the vast, sprawling Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment and Department of Internal Affairs, ignoring the case for smaller single-focused organisations such as a Ministry of Labour, Archives New Zealand and the National Library. It wanted to merge RNZ and TVNZ despite their quite different cultures. It reduced accountability of the public sector to the public and failed to strengthen the Official Information Act.

Nineteenth-century Fabians supported strong local government favouring locals making local decisions. People value control over their destinies rather than leaving decisions to an anonymous Wellington bureaucracy. It is said that Wellington houses a ‘ministry against local government’.

Critical here is ‘subsidiarity’, that decisions should be taken at the lowest possible level. While the notion is familiar to European social democrats, a leading New Zealand left theorist said he was unaware of it; it is not surprising that Labour is insensitive to the case for decentralisation.

 The strongest form of decentralisation is use of the market, so individuals make decisions about what, when and where they will consume. Historically, the Left has been sceptical about the efficacy of the market, a position reinforced by the failure of Rogernomics.

Recall the British Labour Party’s debate over ‘Clause Four’: the social ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange. Even fifty years ago it was argued Clause Four should be replaced by the social control of the means of production, distribution and exchange. Ownership is a means of control but so is a socially regulated market.

When economists advocate ‘more market’, they usually do not mention that their case assumes that the income distribution, which determines the purchasing power of individuals, has to be ‘fair’. If it is not fair, an intervention limiting the market may result in a better outcome. This is the justification for many leftish interventions. Unfortunately, such interventions tend to accumulate until they end up with a Muldoon-type economy, where nobody has the foggiest idea of what is going on – Muldoon certainly did not. Hence the market liberalisation of Rogernomics. But that does not mean we should ignore distributional issues, nor need we increase inequality as the Rogernomes did.

Market delivery does not always work well. That is why pragmatic economists advocated ‘more market’, not ‘all market’ like neoliberals, who even tried to ‘Americanise’ the public healthcare system, despite the American healthcare system being the least successful (and most expensive) among affluent economies.

Going down the path of decentralisation would be transformational. Practical income redistribution and market design are not easy. It is critical if we want to deal with local autonomy and the growing diversity on matters like ethnicity and gender. Not in passing, decentralisation is key to resolving Māori concerns. As In Open Seas explains, that was promised in Te Tiriti o Waitangi.

We need a new policy framework where politicians stop strengthening the centre but instead promote subsidiarity.

Distribution

But decentralisation and subsidiarity will not be successful if the income distribution is not fair. Around a quarter of New Zealanders, especially children and their guardians, cannot be described as ‘affluent’ (having choice) because our redistribution system is not working well. Fairness requires addressing the tax and benefit system.

 At the moment raising tax levels is not a part of the public agenda. The implication is that the current system is efficient – it is not; that the resulting income distribution is fair – it is not; and that it raises sufficient revenue for public purposes – it does not. This neoliberal constraint is so overwhelming that Ardern ruled out tax increases, a captain’s call which crippled her government’s policies.

Including her own. Her 2018 Child Poverty Reduction Act directs the government to halve child poverty over ten years. However, neither she nor, apparently, anyone else involved in passing the act seemed to realise how radical the objective was. The act’s goal was to reverse the impact of the Richardson-Shipley redistribution cuts of 1990 and 1991, which doubled child poverty.

We may not need to restore the pre-Rogernomics tax and benefit levels. In Open Seas reports a simpler more effective regime. However, ultimately the relative incomes of those at the top would be reduced. (One consequence would be to reduce their political power – their ability to control the public agenda, reversing the post-Rogernomics shift of the balance of political power.)

Because they did not understand what they were aiming to do, the Ardern-Hipkins Government accomplished little reduction in child poverty. It fiddled at the margins; whatever the benefits of providing free school lunches, it is not going to do much towards a counter-revolution against the neoliberal income distribution. The reductions during the time of the Ardern-Hipkins Government were minuscule and certainly not on the track promised by the legislation. The actual track was more like that under the Key-English Government.

The Ardern-Hipkins Government also got into a tangle with the proposed Unemployment Insurance Scheme, which involves redundant workers getting short-term earnings-related compensation together with assistance towards finding a new job. Income smoothing would have given redundant workers time to adjust to their new circumstances. The upgrading of their skills would minimise their long-term income loss, and add to the competence of the labour force. Such schemes are not radical on the European continent – some were operating half a century ago.

The sensible approach is similar to our public retirement provision with its base New Zealand Superannuation and top-up earnings-related Kiwisaver. Explained in In Open Seas, it offers a path to amalgamate New Zealand’s two different public income-maintenance systems. Unemployment insurance by itself would be a small change, but it opens up the possibility of extending ACC to sickness, as recommended by the Woodhouse Commission sixty years ago.

Apparently, the officials working on the scheme couldn’t see how to do it, despite it being simple and straightforward – or to even explore the possibility – indicating how unprepared we are for seriously tackling redistribution policy.

There was widespread opposition to the proposal from the neoliberal right, which saw it as government intervention involving a tax increase, downgrading social insurance while supporting private insurance. But there was also opposition from some people on the ‘left’, although their understanding of the background and history was so confused that it was difficult to know what their concerns were.

And so the unemployment insurance scheme was abandoned in the February 2023 policy bonfire. No explanation for the decision was given.

The Left tiptoes around the issue of economic redistribution. Sure, there is a case for a more progressive tax structure, a capital gains tax and a wealth tax – I was discussing them five decades ago, including proposing a negative income tax. But it needs to be tackled in a comprehensive integrated way. Instead, the neoliberal standard of no tax increases, no improvement in the efficiency of the tax system, no addressing the fairness of the tax system and underfunding the public sector dominate the public discussion. Envy is not a part of a social democrat’s policy; fairness is.

We need a new policy framework where politicians stop demanding we keep taxes low but ask about the extent to which equality and opportunity are being promoted.

Economic Growth and Wellbeing

As the opening analytic chapter of In Open Seas explains, in a world of affluence and diversity, GDP per capita is no longer a good measure of wellbeing. The distinction is well captured by the Brazilian colonel who, having taken much Chicago School advice, said that he could not understand when he was told the economy was doing well, why the people were not.

Grant Robertson, the Minister of Finance in the Ardern-Hipkins Government, recognised the issue. In his first budget in 2018, he announced:

We have … signalled our intention to take a wellbeing approach … In the past we have used GDP and traditional fiscal indicators as the only signs of success. And yet, real success means much more for New Zealand and New Zealanders. Of course, a strong economy is important. But we must not lose sight of why it is important. … That is why our Government is making a formal change to move beyond narrow measures of economic growth and broaden the scope and definitions of progress and success.

 The announcement was for a new direction in thinking about government economic management. It reflected a shift within the economics profession away from an excessive focus on material market income towards other influences on wellbeing.

Right from the first systematic estimates of GDP, economists were cautious about the extent to which their measures connected to wellbeing. On the whole, the evidence suggests that above certain income thresholds the connection is tenuous.

That is why the first analytic chapter of In Open Seas is about wellbeing. It warns that the notion is difficult to conceptualise, to measure and to apply. Economists will tell you that GDP and its associated measures are hard to analyse. They are simple compared to wellbeing. But as Keynes said, it is better to pursue the vaguely right than the precisely wrong.

Robertson described all his subsequent five budgets as ‘wellbeing budgets’. His statement introducing the 2023 budget – his last – devoted 16 of its 28 pages to the wellbeing outlook and objectives; the term is used 69 times. Yet the term ‘wellbeing’ was not used much in Labour’s 2023 election campaign.

When the incoming National Minister of Finance, Nicola Willis, presented her first budget policy statement she grumpily footnoted that a ‘2020 amendment to the Public Finance Act requires the government to state the wellbeing objectives that will guide its Budget decisions’ and made but two desultory mentions. Her 2025 Budget Policy statement identifies three traditional (and worthy) overarching goals: building a stronger more productive economy, delivering more efficient, effective and responsive public services, and getting the government’s books back in order. It added that the goals were ‘the Government’s wellbeing objectives, as achieving them is the most important contribution the Government can make to the long-term social, economic, environmental and cultural wellbeing of New Zealanders.’ We are back to judging wellbeing in narrow economic terms.

In her post-2024 Budget speech, Labour’s spokesperson on finance said her focus would be on household costs, small business, climate change and roads. There is a glancing mention of wellbeing, equating it with inter-generational issues. So Labour is back to the same dead end as National, as the Key-English Government, as the Luxon Coalition Government.

After more than a year in office, the current Prime Minister has announced that his government will focus on economic growth. We can take this to mean it wants to increase GDP.

 There is a long history of concern about New Zealand’s economic growth record, going back over sixty years, before the prime minister was born. It does not go back much earlier because there was no official GDP data until the 1950s; that’s when modern economic growth theories began. Before then, the long-time concern was more about employment and unemployment which were considered major influencers of wellbeing.

There is a constant rhetoric in the public debate that New Zealand’s growth and long-term productivity record is poor and that we should adopt new policies which will stimulate and accelerate growth. (It is common rhetoric in other affluent economies too; we are not unique in this respect.) There is never any evidence of how the policies being promoted might work. (Rhetoric replaces research.) Nor is it observed that this claim has persisted over the sixty years and that there is not the slightest evidence that we have been able to increase the economic growth rate. Sure, the New Zealand economy has grown and productivity has risen, but there is no period in which long-term productivity has accelerated – especially as a result of policies. (Rogernomics demonstrates that there are policies which can slow down growth.)

The expectation is that this government’s policies will do little to accelerate productivity. It is likely that many people will go into the 2026 election poorer than they were in 2023, with the growth in GDP going to overseas investors and to new immigrants. A cyclical recovery aside, the government will be looking threadbare on the economic front, although one should never underestimate the ability of a public relations team to temporarily dress up the shabby.

The status-quo Left has submitted to the Luxon Coalition Government’s growth agenda. The progressive Left can challenge it by distinguishing wellbeing from growth, as Robertson was trying to do. Why did he fail, why were his wellbeing budgets not transformational?

One explanation is that there was not time enough to bed in the new approach, but that does not explain the Labour retreat in opposition. Robertson kept the cards close to his chest – just him and Treasury. There was no attempt to build a wider community consensus. I suggested to Robertson that they should have extended the Productivity Commission’s remit to cover wellbeing. (It was the only recommendation I made to him.) Even that was seen as a step too far.

Once more the Left is facing a challenge similar to that which it faced in the nineteenth century. Industrialisation increased GDP, while making many people worse off. Critically, it was necessary for public interventions to reduce those downside detriments. Historically, the Left promoted policies to make industrialisation more beneficial. The lesson remains as true today. Economic change has to be harnessed for the public wellbeing. It does not happen automatically.

 We need a new policy framework where politicians stop asking how we can grow the economy but instead how we can develop wellbeing.

The Fourth Lange-Douglas Government

Rogernomics recognised that New Zealand had to respond to changing circumstances – the era which Muldoon represented was past. It correctly diagnosed that this required decentralisation.

However, the neoliberals incorrectly assumed that decentralisation meant only decentralisation to individuals, ignoring that it also requires getting the economic distributions right. Instead, they made them less fair, markedly increasing income inequality, preserving the incomes of the well-off at the expense of reducing the incomes of those in the middle and bottom. (It took twenty years for some of the poorest to recover their pre-Rogernomic income levels.)

Moreover the neoliberals did not accept that subsidiarity could be to lower-level collective institutions like local government and unions. In many ways the neoliberals strengthened the power of the centre by weakening the intermediate institutions between them and the people – while putting the centre more under the influence of the rich and the corporates. They were seduced by the belief that their neoliberal policies could accelerate the economic growth rate. Instead, the economy stagnated.

And yet the neoliberals were transformational. They were in power for only six years, much the same period as the Ardern-Hipkins Labour Government. But unlike it, they transformed the economic policy framework and the political environment. That was because they knew what they were doing, including sterilising any opposition. They will be long remembered. Meanwhile the Sixth Labour Government, already having had most of its policies reversed, will be a footnote in the pages of history.

Endnote

[1] 1.1. 2017 ‘Let’s do it’ [What?]; 2020 ‘Let’s keep moving’ [Where?]; 2023 ‘In it for you’ [Oh really?].

Commentary

Following the presentation a number of people made contributions. There is no transcript of them, and my notes are brief and (in places) illegible so the responses below are incomplete.

One comment was about the importance of overseas influences on New Zealand. I responded heartily agreeing (that is a central theme of In Stormy Seas and appears regularly in my other writings). We need to follow foreign thinking closely but, crucially, we need to adapt it for New Zealand circumstances. Rogernomics was very imitative of overseas neoliberal thinking of the time, which was one of the sources of its failures.

            The commentator also mentioned the rise of finance capitalism. We are in a very different political economy from nineteenth century industrial capitalism. It poses both new ways of thinking about these issues and different challenges to dealing with them.

It was also pointed out that ‘wellbeing’ is a vague notion and that more tangible terms such as unemployment and homeless should be used. Chapter 2 of In Open Seas elaborates the difficulties of conceptualising wellbeing (and GDP). Using more tangible terms leads to the trap of using the existing paradigm which claims to explain them (it doesn’t really) and resolve them (it hasn’t) or explaining why nothing can be done (we have in the past). If the Left wants to be transformational it has to challenge the existing paradigm directly, and that means articulating a new conceptual frame.

One person drew on her Māori roots to suggest that they may offer insights to the a new way. I commented that I learned much from writing Not in Narrow Seas: The Economic History of Aotearoa including the story of Māori development from a non-market (but exchange) community to today.

I’d like to acknowledge friend and colleague, Jerry Mushin, who read the paper on my behalf in order to preserve my voice. He did it ever so well. As usual Elizabeth Caffin made a huge contribution to the writing and editing.

Trumping Tariffs

A Bully in a China Shop?

It is a mystery what Donald Trump learned when he did his BA in economics at the University of Pennsylvania in the mid-1960s. The Ivy League college has a good economics reputation, but even had Trump been a top student – unlikely or he would trumpet it – his training in international economics would have been primitive by today’s standards (and it was only at bachelor level).

It is likely he would have been taught the Ricardian story of comparative advantage in which Portugal and England produced wine and cloth, and in which despite Portugal being more productive in both activities (i.e. it had an absolute advantage in both), it made sense for it to specialise in making wine and importing cloth (it had a ‘comparative advantage’ in wine). This notion of doing what you do relatively best as valued by exchange is integral common sense in economics.

However today’s international trade is very different from the inter-industry exchange which Ricardo was portraying. Much of it is intra-industry – that is, exchanging very similar products like cars for cars. Much of the trade is in components which get produced in various countries and assembled in a third, often after having crossed many borders. Much of today’s international trade is in services rather than the physical goods which dominated two hundred years ago (and which are hard to tariff).

It may not be simply ‘comparative advantage’. Many industries may have been located in a particular place by chance, but they are still there decades later because their experience and technological innovation gives them a ‘competitive advantage’. A further complication is the ‘economies of agglomeration’ which arise when production is cheaper because of this clustering of economic activity (typically in a larger city – it may be cheaper to do things in Auckland than in Akaroa).

The notion of comparative advantage still holds – do what you do well – but it now exists in a much more complicated environment. Adding to those complications, the standard undergraduate model would not have allowed for internationally footloose capital and technology – labour less so, but migration is still important – which means that industries can now relocate to cheaper sites. They produce paradoxes, like giant – trillion dollar – firms (like Apple) that do not produce anything but outsource the making of the product they design, manage and market to other businesses usually located in other countries.

You may be aware of these complexities and the nuances of behaviour they generate but is Trump? It is very difficult to understand the ‘trade war’ he is prosecuting in terms of the realities and intricacies of today’s international trade.

Perhaps ‘war’ is key to his thinking. Rather than using troops, he thinks he can get his way – America can get its way – by trade threats. War involves economic sacrifices; Trump seems to be aware he is expecting the US to make them when he accepts that there will be inflation as a result of his actions. Perhaps he hopes the threat of his tariff-troops will get him what he wants. (Although sometimes it is unclear what it is; remember the joke about Hitler who wanted ‘peace’ (it works better if you say it) – a piece of Canada, a piece of Greenland, a piece of Panama, a piece of Ukraine …)

My guess is that whatever happens, the Trump initiatives will dramatically change the global economy. Before explaining how, recall an earlier trade war.

The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 raised US tariffs on more than 20,000 imported goods. prompting retaliatory tariffs by many other countries. They were a major factor in the reduction of American exports and imports by two-thirds during the Great Depression, although they did not cause it. The event was so traumatic it would almost certainly have been mentioned in Trump’s international trade class, although he may not have been listening.

In the 1930s and 1960s US goods exports and imports made up about 3-5 percent of total production. Today the figure is more like 10-12 percent, so the impact of a Smoot-Hawley tariff war would be even greater.

Will we see a return to the 1930s trade wars. Hopefully not, although it may require considerable finesse to avoid one. I suppose it depends on how much Trump can get what he wants via bluster, how much he is willing to concede and how much the rest of the world stands up to him. Individually most countries are no match to the US, but there are blocks – like ASEAN and the EU – with collective clout. There are almost certainly already backroom conversations in train about collective responses.

That suggests that the effect of Trump will be to strengthen those blocks whether there is an actual war or just threats. Those outside the blocks will also be trying to work together. New Zealand on the periphery will find it particularly difficult. We will depend upon working with Australia but that country is trying to get a special deal with the US.

Were I a Chinese strategist I could not believe my luck. Sure, it is going to be difficult because of China’s production chains, including those with the US. But Trump has created a medium term opportunity for China to offer an alternative to a US-led global economy, strengthening its sphere of economic influence.

Businesses may take a different lesson, especially as they dislike the uncertainty which will be Trump’s heritage long after he has moved on. Can they rely on cross-country production chains as they used to? I shall not be surprised if there are changes to investment strategies, including postponements of investment decisions which will intensify any economic downturn.

Consumers may also respond, including those outside the US boycotting American products. In some cases – social media, fast food chains – it may not be so easy because there is no significant alternative. For others, we shall see.

Tesla cars face a further challenge. Trump’s tariffs may increase their US market, but Tesla may find it harder to sell elsewhere, as Chinese EVs push into third markets. In addition, it has a factory in China and sources some of its US components from elsewhere. (This is not Ricardo’s world.)

The world economy is not a china shop, although in the short term it could be greatly damaged by trade warfare or threat of war. In the medium-to-long term Trump’s bullying may be inadvertently hand over its leadership to China.

Preparing for the Next Financial Earthquake


Severe geological and financial earthquakes are inevitable. We just don’t know how soon and how they will play out. Are we putting enough effort into preparing for them?

Every decade or so the international economy has a major financial crisis. We cannot predict exactly when or exactly how it will happen. (For what its worth, one is about due; the obvious risk point is the cryptocurrency market – but that is another column – and Trump is clumsy enough to precipitate anything.) The resulting economic distress affects many ‘innocent’ people who are not directly involved in the financial processes which led to the crash. They – with some justification – and those in the financial sector – with less justification but more political influence – turn to their government to help them through the crisis. Given the impact of the crash on the wider economy, we can expect the government to respond.

The prudent may take measures, but it is difficult to take comprehensive ones, especially if their resources are limited. (In contrast a billionaire may suffer a severe financial loss but still live much as they did before the crash – although with less public adulation.) A sensible government will prepare for the collapse.

It strikes this resident of the ‘Shaky Isles’ that there is a parallel ith our planning for earthquakes. Minor ones happen all the time – as do business collapses. But one day there will be ‘the big one’. We don’t know where. We don’t know exactly how – both the Canterbury and Kaikoura earthquakes exhibited unexpected phenomena. And we certainly don’t know when. Seismologists think the big one is less likely to happen than economists expect the next global financial crisis, but they are sure it will. Despite the probabilities, it could happen tomorrow night, before the next financial crash.

Engineers have put a lot of effort into preparing for a major earthquake disaster. You are probably aware of the New Building Standard (NBS – often referred to ‘the code’) which is used to assess how well a building can withstand an earthquake. It may affect directly affect you. You may live in an ‘earthquake prone building’, which means it is vulnerable to much smaller earthquakes than the NBS is set for. Or you may have spent a fortune upgrading your building to the NBS. You may have had difficulty selling your building because of its NBS rating or buying one because your bank is unwilling to advance a large enough mortgage on your chosen building given its code rating. You may have difficulties with your insurer.

A 100% NBS means that the building is thought to be able stand an earthquake which is expected to occur once in 500 years. This is longer than most buildings are expected to last but of course the ‘big one’ could happen tomorrow. In practice it is common to use a 67% rating which should cope with a one in 200-or-so years earthquake. (A 34% rating is about one in 34-or-so years and is sometimes seen as a minimum ambition.)

There is much debate about the realism of these estimates and what is an appropriate policy response. The point is that it is prudent to think about earthquake risk and to take public measures to minimise the damage a major earthquake will cause.

The same applies for financial earthquakes, even though – alas – we have not the same information that engineers have. Public policy has made a number of adjustments. Following the Global Financial Crisis, the Reserve Bank directed the commercial banks to borrow less often for a longer term, which meant they would not have to refinance if international monetary markets seize up, as quickly as they almost did in the GFC. Commercial banks can go to the RBNZ when they are in trouble, in effect pushing their troubles on to the central bank. So it makes sense for the public central bank to reduce the likelihood of the private banks getting into trouble.

The effect of the change has been to raise the cost of domestic borrowing. You can think of the (slight) premium as a form of insurance. You and New Zealand are a bit better protected during the next financial crash.

The same applies for the Depositor Compensation Scheme to be launched later in the year, which safeguards deposits (up to $100,000) in the case of bank (or other deposit taker) failure. The return will be slightly lower because the depositer is paying an insurance to protect their capital.

Probably the biggest single provision New Zealand has against a global financial earthquake is the government keeping its debt low. That means that when the chaos occurs the government has more room for manoeuvre – including borrowing to tide over the crisis. The Minister of Finance has announced a government net debt target as a percentage of GDP (as have at least six of her predecessors). The actual debt level is currently sitting a little above the target, and the date which the target is expected to be attained is being rolled out as the economy performs more poorly than expected. (The next global financial crunch could occur before the target date.)

I am not opposed to some sort of debt target as a part of a suit of measures to judge the fiscal position. (I think it should be somewhat below the average of comparable small open economies because of our heavy overseas private sector borrowing.) However, we may be over-obsessed with it when we evaluate fiscal performance.

Suppose you asked an architect to design you a house and every time you complain about some feature of the proposal – poor access, the kitchen badly designed, the bedrooms too small … – the architect explains it was the consequence of making the building earthquake robust. Isn’t that a bit like how we have designed the fiscal building? It may be small, cramped and uncomfortable but we daren’t do anything about it because of the financial earthquake risk.

I am not arguing that we should completely redesign the fiscal strategy overnight. I can think of changes I might make, but I’d prefer a evolutionary approach. In the interim I agree with the current government’s approach of not being over-obsessed with the debt target (despite what its political enemies and the commentariat say).

And I am certainly not arguing that we should just change the debt definition as both the current and the previous Minister of Finance have done. Fiddling the accounts addresses political perceptions not economic realities; they will not make one iota of difference when the big one hits.

I wonder whether the New Zealand Government has been through a simulation about how they might handle an external shock, just as the RBNZ has stress tests done on the commercial banks to see how financially robust they are. (It went through the real thing during the GFC. I thought the Reserve Bank and Treasury handled it brilliantly, although the Governor of the Bank of Canada said not to discount luck.) Stress testing would suggest that certain assets and liabilities are near irrelevant during a financial crisis, while others are critical and that we should be paying more attention to them.

And yet we must be mindful that whenever we borrow, we require a lender. As we observed earlier, a major determinant of the impact of the NBS is the way that financial institutions use them as a guide of the willingness to advance mortgages (and provide insurance). and insurers use the NBS to set their premiums. The credit rating agencies such as Standard and Poors award a grade to the government, which underpins the cost of borrowing for virtually all New Zealand borrowers. The agencies have a similar role to engineers who give an NBS rating which is then used by insurers and lenders when they make their decisions.

New Zealand economic policy is haunted by occasions when the country was (almost) unable to borrow. During the Great Depression Keynes advised our Minister of Finance, William Downie Stewart (Jnr), to borrow as much as New Zealand could, to offset the downturn, but added that if he were a lender he would probably not be prepared to advance us any more.

TRANSFORMING NEW ZEALAND: Why is the Left Failing?

Fabian Society Website

Writing contemporary history is challenging. New evidence appears; events move on; it is hard to provide thoughtful reflections about events close to the writing. The last chapters of my economic history of Aotearoa New Zealand, Not in Stormy Seas, are no exception. I tried to avoid providing a conclusion in Chapter 55 by offering three alternatives from three different ideological perspectives. Even then, I added a further five chapters in a section called ‘Ongoings’ which took events up to the time of sending the book to the printer in 2020.

But events progressed. I returned to contemporary history almost five years later, in In Open Seas. It was written in a different, more personal, style from a conventional history like Not in Stormy Seas. Writing about options for the future would inevitably be influenced by my own values. I wanted to express my values while encouraging the reader to use theirs. That is where the ‘open’ in the book’s title comes from – it was to open possibilities.

I centred the book on the statement by Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern that her Labour Government would be ‘transformational’. An economic historian seizes on such a notion. Studying history continually reminds how much things change through time. They say the past is another country. Just as it is arrogant to judge another country solely in local terms, it is equally arrogant to judge other times by the present day.

Writing Not in Stormy Seas constantly made me aware that things were different in the past. Much economic activity in the past occurred outside the conventional market – including in the traditional Māori economy, in the home and in subsistence farming. Much of what we call ‘economic growth’ is about activity which shifts from outside the market to inside it. That is how exploitation of the environment and the changing market roles of women are a part of the story.

While such transformations may be obvious, almost all discussions about contemporary issues are based on the static assumption that there is little change going on. For example, many contributions to the debate on the Treaty Principles Bill assume that the participants at the Waitangi Marae 185 years ago thought in similar ways to how we think today; a surprising proportion do not seem to recognise that even in our lifetime being a Māori has changed dramatically.

Keynes said that ‘[t]here are not many who are influenced by new theories after they are twenty-five or thirty years of age’. That is why the young are more alert to environmental, identity politics and ethnicity issues; they were not as prominent when their oldies were growing up.

This inertia means that stasis government tends to be popular. The Key-English National Government may be judged has having administered New Zealand competently. But generally it was stuck in the present with little understanding that society was evolving. Hence, John Key said that one day New Zealand would be a republic and yet he reintroduced titles – he even took one himself.

Transforming New Zealand?

So Arden’s promise to be transformational was exciting. It suggested how my long economic history could be updated by drawing attention to the continuities from the past and yet how there was progression.

Spoiler alert. The Ardern-Hipkins Labour Government was not transformational. Hence the subtitle of In Open Seas: ‘How the New Zealand Government Went Wrong: 2017-2023’.

I should have been alert to the failure much earlier. Labour came into office in 2017 after nine years of intra-party strife which meant that, except in the case of some of ministers, it had done little work thinking about policy directions. Early in office it set up a series of committees of the worthy and the loyal – but hardly innovative – to give the new government policies. Their recommendations were not in a transformational direction.

Another place Labour got static policies was from the public service itself, especially those being timidly progressed under the Key-English Government. In Open Seas highlights the 2020 Public Service Act which was rammed through with the minimum of public consultation and which reduced the accountability of the public service.

Sometimes the public service outsmarted the politicians. The book details how Labour was elected with a manifesto policy of giving independence to Archives New Zealand but how the supervising Department of Internal Affairs outmanoeuvred the ministers. Subsequently, Labour gave the failed minister responsibilities after she lost her seat in 2020. The only acknowledgement of the failure was that the two associate ministers were relieved of their portfolios after the 2020 reshuffle. They were the Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance, each of whom proved less effective than a determined government department.

Consider the following three major initiatives which failed, plus one which was not even started: centralisation, co-governance, the unemployment insurance scheme and establishing a Ministry of Labour.

Centralisation

Frequently when faced with an reorganisational challenge, the Ardern-Hipkins Government chose to centralise. Examples include mergers such as Health New Zealand, for the public sector media, polytechs and three waters. It often treated local government with contempt. I say more about the issue below.

Co-governance

The story of co-governance is detailed in the book. When it was officially abandoned in the ‘policy bonfire’ of February 2023, Prime Minister Chris Hipkins said, ‘no one understands what [co-governance] means because we’re talking about quite different things’. He did not offer any alternative. A March 2023 survey found that only 17 percent of respondents said that they had ‘a good grasp on the concept’; they are likely to have offered many different grasps.

The notion of co-governance haunted the Labour Government. There was little enthusiasm for it in the Labour Party (more among the Greens and Te Pati Māori). But there was a widespread public view that Labour would reintroduce the approach if it was re-elected. It cost the party votes in the 2023 election.

The book tries to untangle the confusion, distinguishing partnership, self-government, co-management and co-governance. Here I want to draw another lesson.

The implications of Hipkins’ statement was that the Labour Cabinet and caucus adopted the co-governance policy without understanding what they were agreeing to. Does this happen often? Perhaps this ill thought-through policy only came to public light because it was so unpopular, especially as it was coupled with the three waters centralisation. It is inconceivable that the Clark-Cullen Labour Government, with its tight control of policy development would have got into such a muddle.

The Unemployment Insurance Scheme

Redundant workers were to get short-term earnings-related compensation and assistance towards finding a new job under Labour’s proposed unemployment insurance scheme. Many workers have fixed commitments – like housing outlays – that cannot be changed the day after they are laid off. Income smoothing would have given redundant workers time to adjust to their new circumstances. The upgrading of their skills – a kind of rehabilitation – would minimise their long-term income loss, and add to the competence of the labour force. Such schemes are not radical on the European continent. I was taught about them when I was an undergraduate – that was a long time ago.

The scheme also offered a path to amalgamating the two different systems New Zealand has for public income maintenance. The first is a contributory scheme with earnings-related support when need arrives. It is the principle underpinning our Accident Compensation Scheme and Kiwi Saver. It might be called ‘Woodhouse’ because it was consolidated by the 1966 Royal Commission on Accident Compensation presided over by Owen Woodhouse, although it goes back to the 1905 Workers’ Compensation for Accidents Act.

The second approach is non-contributory and funded from general taxation. The entitlement to a flat-rate benefit is universal for those who belong to the appropriate category of need. The approach began in New Zealand with the Old Age Pension in 1898 and was markedly extended by the 1938 Social Security Act. Let’s call that approach ‘McCarthy’ after Thaddeus McCarthy, who presided over the 1972 Royal Commission on Social Security which consolidated it.

The two systems do not always interface well. For instance, a disability from an accident results in compensation from ACC (Woodhouse); the same disability from sickness gets considerably less generous support from social security (McCarthy).

In retirement provision, Kiwisaver is a Woodhouse approach which sits on top of McCarthy-approach New Zealand Superannuation. This might be called the (Henry) ‘Lang merger’, because the Secretary of the Treasury proposed something similar in 1974.

Redundancy support is a bit shambolic. The worker might be entitled to the unemployment benefit (McCarthy) and there may be some earnings-related lump-sum payments from the employer, which is a kind of Woodhouse scheme.

There was widespread opposition to the proposal from the neoliberal right which saw it as government intervention including a tax increase. But there was also opposition of some people on the ‘left’ (who in at least one case advised the Minister of Social Development). Their understanding of the background and history was so confused that it was difficult to know what their concerns were. It may have been that the policy was not targeted directly on the poor – if so, why not wind back other parts of the Woodhouse approach, like ACC and Kiwisaver? There was a hint that they feared the new scheme would undermine the existing McCarthy benefit system.

This need not happen. Consider a Lang-type scheme, as for the retirement provision, in which there would be a base-tier entitlement of flat-rate social security benefit (McCarthy) topped up with a contribution-based second tier (Woodhouse). This would have strengthened support for the base benefit because any reductions would have led to outrage from workers.

When I put it forward, I was told that the designers had already gone down the pure stand-alone approach analogous to ACC. It would be too difficult to merge the two schemes. If such a merger was beyond the officials’ competence, they should not have been working on developing the scheme.

The Lang-type proposal was marginal change, but it opened up the possibility of extending ACC to cover sickness, as recommended by the Woodhouse Commission sixty years earlier. That would be transformational. Instead the scheme was abandoned in the February 2023 policy bonfire. No explanation for the decision was given.

A Ministry of Labour?

The fourth example is a case of the dog not barking. Why did the Labour Government not establish a Ministry of Labour?

In 2012 the Key-English Government merged the century-old Department of Labour into the newly established mega-agency, the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MoBIE). The logic, presumably, was the neo-liberal one that the labour market is like any other market. It is not. The labour market is greatly fragmented. Labourers do not easily substitute for brain surgeons even when they are of the same age and living in the same locality. A substantial chunk of the potential labour market hovers offshore, so immigration policy has to be integrated with domestic labour market policy. As does skills development policy. There are work and safety aspects in workers’ lives. Any system of wage determination is clunky, while workplace relations offer many regulatory challenges. Paid work is integral to the wellbeing of many adults.

This is the practical case for a separate Ministry of Labour, integrating the policy development and implementation of the various facets of the market. But the Labour Government took no action. Instead, the various components of labour market management were left scattered through MoBIE and other government agencies with little integration. Usually the immigration and workplace relations portfolios were held by the same minister, even though the two were administered separately, but Labour’s Cabinet reshuffle in June 2023 separated them (as has the succeeding Coalition Government).

The Transformational Ambition of Child Poverty Reduction

Labour promised policies which would have been transformational if they had been implemented. Consider the 2018 Child Poverty Reduction Act, which directs the government to halve child poverty over ten years.

Those involved in passing the act could not have realised how radical it was. Its goal was to reverse the impact of the Richardson-Shipley redistribution cuts of 1990 and 1991 which doubled child poverty.

While it need not be necessary to restore the pre-Rogernomics tax and benefit levels – a simpler more effective regime could be designed to halve child poverty. The relative incomes of those at the top would have been substantially reduced and that would have reduced their political power, reversing the post-Rogernomics balance of political power. Which is why the elite agrees to cutting child poverty, but does nothing about it.

Because they did not understand what they were aiming to do, the Ardern-Hipkins Government accomplished little, fiddling at the margins – whatever its benefits, providing free school lunches is not going to do much towards a counter-revolution against the neoliberal income distribution. The reductions in child poverty during the Ardern-Hipkins Government were minuscule and certainly not on the track promised by the legislation. The actual track was more like that under the Key-English Government.

The poverty lobby has been captured by warm-hearted people. It is strong on anecdotes and weak on analysis, bereft of the skills to hammer out practical policies. Anecdotes do not necessarily generalise. Focus on Māori poverty ignores that there are more non-Māori among the poor. It is such an elementary arithmetic exercise to demonstrate this, that the lobbyists must be barely numerate.

A statistic such as the proportion in poverty is not the end of an argument; it is the beginning of an investigation which ends with a policy. If there is not a causal account of poverty, it is not possible to respond effectively to it. Labour failed.

The Transformational Ambition of Focusing on Wellbeing

In his first budget in 2018, the new Labour Minister of Finance, Grant Robertson announced

We have … signalled our intention to take a wellbeing approach to Budget 2019. … In the past we have used GDP and traditional fiscal indicators as the only signs of success. And yet, real success means much more for New Zealand and New Zealanders. Of course, a strong economy is important. But we must not lose sight of why it is important. … That is why our Government is making a formal change to move beyond narrow measures of economic growth and broaden the scope and definitions of progress and success.

The announcement was a new direction in thinking about government economic management. It reflects a shift within the economics profession away from an excessive focus on material income as measured by the market towards other influences on wellbeing.

It is such a fundamental issue that the opening analytic chapter of In Open Seas is called ‘Wellbeing’. It warns that the notion of wellbeing is difficult to conceptualise, to measure and to apply. Economists will tell you that GDP and its associated measures are hard to analyse. They are simple compared to wellbeing. Still, as Keynes said, it is better to pursue the vaguely right than the precisely wrong.

It is a trap to assume that increased measured GDP is inevitably a good thing. Insofar as GDP growth is the result of technical innovation, there is no certainty that the innovation will be beneficial. Virtually every significant change has had downsides. Later I shall discuss nineteenth-century industrialisation which increased material incomes. It burnt coal for energy which generated air pollution damaging people’s health and living conditions. Critically, it was necessary for public interventions to reduce the downside detriments. The Left promoted interventions to make industrialisation more beneficial. The lesson remains as true today. Economic change has to be harnessed for the public wellbeing.

Robertson described all his subsequent five budgets as ‘wellbeing budgets’. His statement introducing the 2023 budget devoted 16 of its 28 pages to the wellbeing outlook and objectives – the term is used 69 times. Yet the change was not ultimately transformational. The term ‘wellbeing’ was not used much in Labour’s 2023 election campaign.

When the incoming National Minister of Finance, Nicola Willis, presented her first budget policy statement she grumpily footnoted that a ‘2020 amendment to the Public Finance Act requires the government to state the wellbeing objectives that will guide its Budget decisions’ and made but two desultory mentions. Her 2025 Budget Policy statement identifies three traditional (and worthy) overarching goals: building a stronger more productive economy, delivering more efficient, effective and responsive public services, and getting the government’s books back in order. It added that the goals are ‘the Government’s wellbeing objectives, as achieving them is the most important contribution the Government can make to the long-term social, economic, environmental and cultural wellbeing of New Zealanders’. We are back to judging wellbeing in narrow economic terms.

Labour also seems to have lost the wellbeing plot. In her post-2024 Budget speech, Labour’s spokesperson on finance said her focus would be on household costs, small business, climate change and roads. There is a glancing mention of well-being, equating it with inter-generational issues. So Labour is back on the same dead end as National, as the Key-English Government, as the non-transformational conventional wisdom.

Why were Robertson’s wellbeing budgets not transformational? One explanation is that there was not time enough to bed in the new approach, but that does not explain the Labour retreat in opposition. Robertson kept the cards close to his chest – just between him and Treasury. There was no attempt to build a wider community consensus. I suggested to Robertson that they should have extended the Productivity Commission’s remit to cover wellbeing. (It was the only recommendation I made to him.) Even that small start was seen as a step too far.

What Is Happening to the Left?

While the Ardern-Hipkins Government was strongly aspirational in a way other recent governments have not been, it failed to deliver on its aspirations.

You might argue it was not in office long enough. How long is ‘long enough’? (In recent decades Labour has been in power for only about a third of the time. It is odd that when it is in office, the Left gives little thought to being out of power.)

You might argue, especially if you were from the right, that the aspirations were impractical. Perhaps, but perhaps they are just ahead of their time. Sixty years ago CND was demanding that New Zealand should withdraw from ANZUS and become nuclear free. Almost two hundred years ago, Chartists were demanding universal (male) suffrage, the secret ballot, equal population constituencies, the abolition of a property qualification for MPs who would be paid a salary to enable ordinary people to be representatives. Conservatives resisted the demands as impractical.

You might say that there was a failure of the Labour politicians. (This reason is popular from those who are certain they would do better.)

Critically, the Left no longer dominates the economic agenda. (Except Greenies on environment issues; the Left also remains influential in identity politics.) Nor does the traditional Right, which only claims competence to govern.

Today the economic agenda which dominates the public economic dialogue is set by neoliberals. It involves a minimisation of state involvement, including a resistance to the use of taxation and spending. Jacinda Ardern, for instance, ruled out tax increases while she was in power, a captain’s call which crippled her government’s economic policies.

Neoliberal lobby groups such as the New Zealand Initiative (born out of the Business Roundtable), the Taxpayers Unions and the Free Speech Union are extremely well organised, well funded with a wide membership base including many younger members. They are represented in Parliament by the ACT party which won a quarter of a million voted in the 2023 election,

Why are neoliberals currently so successful? The rise of the Left was a response to structural change in the nineteenth century. What has been happening in recent time to generate this vibrant movement of the right?

A Brief History of the Left

The origins of the Left go back to the capitalist-industrialisation which occurred in the nineteenth century. Industrialisation had a revolutionary impact on society and the lives of ordinary people. People working in factories meant urbanisation – often in squalid living conditions; it meant disrupting traditional social networks and the way people lived and worked. (It also changed the balance of world power.)

How to cope with the industrialisation juggernaut? One response was to return to an idealised rural Arcadia. Its best-known advocate was Pierre-Joseph Proudhon but many people voted with their feet, including those who migrated from Europe to New Zealand seeking to go farming.

A second response was revolutionary – to overthrow the social order and impose a new one. Prominent among the advocates were Marxists and hard-line anarchists.

However, the most successful approach was the evolutionary one which favoured adapting the social system so that the economic growth from industrialisation would benefit everyone. Among the most prominent in Britain at the end of the nineteenth century were the Fabians named after the Roman general Fabius, who won through persistence and wearing the enemy down by attrition rather than in pitched battles. Its logo was a tortoise.

Like those of the Chartists and CND, the Fabian demands were thought impractical. Yet they were the foundation of social democracy, becoming the conventional wisdom and their policies were largely implemented. Fabianism had a major impact on the Ballance-Seddon First Liberal Government via William Pember Reeves, New Zealand’s earliest acknowledged Fabian. Its influence continued through at least to the Savage-Fraser First Labour Government.

After that it seemed a matter of tidying up the unfinished business, as occurred under the Nash-Nordmeyer Second Labour Government and the Kirk-Rowling Third Labour Government.

About this time there evolved a view that it was possible to manage the economy, ameliorating the business cycle and accelerating inflation. The Left claimed they could do this better, because they were more pragmatic than the Right about government intervention. However, the New Zealand right is pragmatic too, and there was a convergence of policies.

One difference was that the Left thought that some groups were being left out of the rising prosperity; the Right disagreed. An examination of government spending patterns through time shows the main difference between the two was that Labour governments spent more on social security transfers. (Research sometimes confirms popular prejudices.) But the spending patterns on education and healthcare and so on were similar. (Research does not always confirm popular prejudices.)

The result of the traditional Left’s success has been that it has ceased to be a progressive force and instead became a defender of the status quo. The message is that we have made these gains against capitalist-industrialisation; they are being threatened; we are resisting.

There was a deviation from the Labour tradition when the Lange-Douglas Fourth Labour Government adopted neoliberal (Rogernomics) economic strategies. (They were continued by the Fourth National Government pursuing ‘Ruthanasia-Jennicide’.) Michael Cullen’s Labour Saving explains that the Clark-Cullen Fifth Labour Government was about restoring traditional a social democrat approach.

Post-Industrialisation Society

While the industrialisation phase of modern economic growth may be over, there are other forces transforming the world. Perhaps none is individually as powerful as nineteenth-century industrialisation – I wouldn’t know because we are in the middle of it all – but collectively they are probably as significant. They include

– increasing affluence and diversity;

– the shift of the economy from the consumption of goods to the consumption of services;

– rising organisational and intellectual complexity;

– the globalisation (interconnection) of individual economies (not just trade and investment; labour mobility is a big one). The balance of international power is changing. (While New Zealand remains on the fringes, it has to accommodate to the change.);

– the rise of the financial sector, generating rising inequality at the top of the wealth distribution with political impacts;

– the increasing depletion of environmental resources;

– climate change.

The Left has some responses to these transformational drivers but frequently they amount to the reactive aim of preserving the status quo, rather than adapting and harnessing the forces to enhance wellbeing, in the way that their nineteenth century predecessors succeeded in doing. There are exceptions. Greenies, in particular, are concerned with environmental challenges. (The movement is split in the way the nineteenth century Left was: reversion, revolution, evolution.)

The Challenge of Affluent Diversity

How to react progressively to each of these forces is beyond the scope of a single article. Here I explore but one issue: growing affluence and diversity.

I am not sure whether there is today more social diversity – age, class, ethnicity, gender, life experience, and religious belief among many dimensions. But it is more challenging than in New Zealand’s past. Society can no longer operate on the assumption that what is good for white, middle-class, Protestant, straight men is good for everyone else.

One factor driving this diversity has been affluence. Today someone will, on average, have double the material income of a grandparent. (One chapter in In Open Seas wonders whether that will be true in the future.) Doubling purchasing power does not mean doubling everything. Spending on some things rises by much more, changing the shape of both consumption and society. As In Open Seas explains, affluence generates choice which generates diversity of consumption, behaviour, opportunity and display.

There is a similar story on the supply side. New physical and social technologies create new products and new ways of supplying them. No central planner can deal with the complexity.

Meanwhile, while New Zealand management may be good dealing with small organisations, it does not seem to cope well with large ones: the larger the (private and public) organisation the poorer the management (and the more serious the consequences). The solution to administering these large organisations has been generic management. In Open Seas explains why the cult has failed. As well as returning to the tradition of professional managers, perhaps no organisation should be larger than, say, 480 people – the size of a cohort in a Roman legion. That is about the number a well-embedded senior manager can know.

The Ardern-Hipkins Government was still thinking in terms of the world our grandparents grew up in, where the centre could control just about everything. It did not foster local decision making. It made centralised decisions which belonged to localities.

My Fabian background, and growing up in Christchurch, means I favour locals making local decisions. Sure, they will make mistakes – so does central government – but people value control over their destinies rather than leaving decisions to an anonymous Wellington bureaucracy. The joke is that Wellington houses a ‘ministry against local government’.

A key notion here is ‘subsidiarity’, that decisions should be taken at the lowest possible level. While it is familiar to European Social Democrats, a leading New Zealand left theorist said he was unaware of it. So it is not surprising that Labour is insensitive to the case for decentralisation.

So the Ardern-Hipkins Government reduced local involvement in its centralisation of health provision under the Health New Zealand, its mega-polytech and its Three Waters regime. It did little about vast sprawling MoBIE and the Department of Internal Affairs, ignoring the case for smaller single-focused smaller organisations such as a Ministry of Labour, Archives New Zealand and the National Library. It wanted to merge RNZ and TVNZ despite their different cultures. It reduced accountability of the public sector to the public and failed to strengthen the Official Information Act.

The strongest form of decentralisation is use of the market, so individuals make decisions about what, when and where they will consume. Historically, the Left has been sceptical about the efficacy of the market, a position reinforced by the failure of Rogernomics.

Recall Clause Four: the social ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange. Ove fifty years ago it was argued it should be replaced by the social control of the means of production, distribution and exchange. Ownership is a means of control but so is a regulated market.

When economists advocate more-market, they do not mention that their case assumes that the income distribution, which determines the power of individuals to purchase, has to be ‘fair’. If it is not fair – a difficult concept – then an intervention limiting the market may result in a better outcome – thus the justification for many of the leftish interventions. Unfortunately, such interventions tend to accumulate until they end up with a Muldoon-type economy, where nobody has the foggiest overview of what is going on – Muldoon certainly did not. Hence the market liberalisation of Rogernomics.

The Lange-Douglas Government was captured by neoliberals who denied the importance of getting the income distribution right. Rogernomics markedly increased income inequality, preserving the incomes of the well-off at the expense of reducing the incomes of those in the middle and bottom. (Some of the poorest never recovered their incomes for twenty years.)

There is another, more subtle, requirement. Market delivery does not always work well. That is why pragmatic economists advocate ‘more-market’, not ‘all-market’ like neoliberals, who even tried to Americanise the public healthcare system, despite the American healthcare system being the least successful (and most expensive) among affluent economies.

Market design is tricky. Even modelling private markets using ‘pure competition’ may not work in New Zealand because of the size of the economy. It may be more a matter of regulating monopolistic and oligopolistic competition.

Practical income redistribution and market design are not easy. Going down that path would be transformational.

How to be Transformational

It would be misleading to blame the failures of the Ardern-Hipkins Government on the people involved. Their failures reflect the failures of the traditional Left as it has changed from being a progressive force to defending the status quo.

It had more continuities with the Key-English Government and the Luxon-Coalition Government. In opposition Labour says it will challenge the performance of the current government. It was not setting the agenda for transformation.

While we should acknowledge that there is much it has done in the past worth defending, the world has moved on. Has the Left? In Open Seas is riddled with policy directions. But they need to be put in the wider perspective of its predecessor, Not in Narrow Seas.

My economic history of Aotearoa New Zealand demonstrates that a conventional history does not make much sense if it ignores the economy as, so sadly, most of our general histories do. There is a parallel situation on the Left. It avoids engaging with economic thinking which is why it is so ineffective, why it failed to resist Rogernomics and why the Ardern-Hipkins Government has had so little impact.

I was recently rereading Fabian Essays in Socialism published in 1889; it sold 27,000 copies. I read a lot of end-of-the nineteenth-century Fabian literature in my late adolescence, but had forgotten the details – although not the general principles – after I went to university.

Rereading those essays after a long career in economics, I was struck how good the economics was. It was, of course, thoroughly out of date, because economics has advanced over the following century (as have other sciences such as medicine and physics). But it was using the frontier economics of its time. How many social democrats do today?

Much of the Left’s economic theory is embarrassingly behind economics. It commonly claims that economics is unaware when measuring GDP of the significance of the non-market sector such as household production by women. From the beginning, economists were aware; their difficulty has been that it has not been possible to resolve the technical measurement problems (which is why although it is easy to make the criticism by ignoring the economists’ dialogue, the critics have been quite unable to progress the resolution either).

A similar thing happens with environmental depletion. Critics overlook that Thomas Mathus, the first ever professor of economics, raised it in 1798. (It why economics was called ‘the dismal science’.)

Both my books, Not in Narrow Seas and In Open Seas, make some contributions to these issues. The point here is that being dependent on a wrong and out-dated account of the economic paradigm is not going to result in transformational policy. In the nineteenth century the Left was up with the existing paradigm, today that is much less common. One of the reasons both my books set out bits of contemporary economic theory is because I want to get readers closer to the frontiers of economic thinking.

In contrast, the neoliberals are in charge. They adapt the best available theory for their ideological purposes, diminishing or omitting the bits that gets in the way of their political objectives. (This is why an economist can easily follow their analysis.) Meanwhile the majority of the neoliberals’ critics have been outmanoeuvred because they did not know the underlying theory.

I conclude with the following observation. Neoliberals were in power for only about six years, much the same period as the Ardern-Hipkins Labour Government. But unlike it, the neoliberals were transformational. That was because they knew what they were doing, including sterilising any opposition. They will be long remembered. Meanwhile the Sixth Labour Government, already having had most of its policies reversed, will be a footnote in the pages of history.

The Yes Prime Minister

This transcript of a recent conversation between the Prime Minister and his chief economic adviser has not been verified.

We’ve announced we are the ‘Yes Government’. Do you like it?
Yes, Prime Minister.

Dreamed up by the PR team. It’s about being committed to growth. Not that the PR team know anything about the economy. So how do we go about it?
You mean growth of GDP, sir?

The Minister of Finance – what’s her name? – said in her 2025 Budget Policy that there would be three overarching goals – let me see, where did I put it? ah, yes – ‘building a stronger more productive economy, delivering more efficient, effective and responsive public services, and getting the government’s books back in order’. She added that the goals are ‘the Government’s wellbeing objectives, as achieving them is the most important contribution the Government can make to the long-term social, economic, environmental and cultural wellbeing of New Zealanders’. We are required by law to have wellbeing objectives, you know.
But, sir, wellbeing is not the same thing as GDP.

No ‘buts’, no ‘nos’. This is a yes government.
Yes, sir. I was just pointing out the difference.

My first-year economics dealt with the two in different parts of the course. Never really got my head around the difference. Might as well treat them as the same for my government.
Yes, sir.

So when are we going to get some growth of GDP? The Half Yearly thing-a-me-bob wasn’t too optimistic.
The macro-economic indicators which have come in since we did the forecast have been worse than expected. The business closure rate remains high. We expect the contraction to continue a bit longer, but we havn’t done the next round of forecasts yet. There is a view among the troops that the upturn may be weak – but we have yet to decide. The downside risks will be greater than for December’s ‘Economic and Fiscal Update’. There is increasing concern that Trump’s tariff policies will precipitate a world economy downturn, and we cannot rule out there may soon be another global financial crash. We are due for one. Many of the indicators suggest financial instability, and the upset over Deepseek [the Chinese AI firm whose recent announcement clipped a trillion dollars off share values] warns just how fragile financial markets are. Meanwhile the Chinese economy is still spluttering.

That’s not good enough. We need some growth.
Yes, sir. I should add that the current GDP track is not the same as the growth of production capacity. We are currently a bit below full capacity so there could be a bit of catchup. You may be concerned with the sustainable long-term economic growth.

Actually, what I am concerned with is what will make the Government look good, particularly as we run up to next year’s election.
Understood sir. We can temporarily accelerate the current GDP growth rate by increasing the fiscal deficit. That will mean you will miss your stated budget target. The increase may be inflationary; the Reserve Bank might have to increase interest rates.

We wouldn’t want that. But we could expand the economy just before the election when the inflationary pressure is not obvious. So we’ll focus on increasing long-run capacity.
Yes, sir. Some of those measures may also lift the economy in the short term.

Good. Now I have a list of policies here. What about digital nomads?
They won’t have a big impact and they may not lift New Zealanders’ incomes much. Most of the GDP increase may go to the nomads. That’s an example of why an increase in GDP does not always lead to an increase in support for the government.

Except among the commentariat.
Exactly. Nobody believes them either, except other members of the commentariat.

How about we increase foreign investment?
If they are just buying New Zealand assets, there is not much benefit. New investment creates jobs, which boosts the economy in the short run the way you are wanting. In the long run there are typically fewer jobs than the construction phase and more of the profits go offshore. The exact balance depends on the particular case.

Does that include the fast track projects?
Yes, sir. Most won’t get underway before the election and you’ll have to manage the political backlash. Some of its arguments are valid. But during the investment phase the projects will produce jobs, usually fewer than in the production phase.

Privatisation?
It may not do much for economic growth. The 1980s sales program didn’t make much difference. Many were botches. We had to buy back NZ Rail and Air New Zealand. (I know.) We had to set up Kiwibank because selling off the POSB left a gap in the market which the trading banks ignored. It took us decades to unwind the private monopoly that the privatisation of Telecom created. We’ll prepare a list of possible asset sales. It won’t be long.

Including the government equity in the electricity generation companies?
Yes, they’ll be high on it. There is an argument though, that the sector should be nationalised and the companies merged into a single government-owned and operated entity. Actually, what we would like to do first is design a better regulatory regime for electricity production and supply. Currently, it seems to be price gouging consumers and businesses – some big ones say they are closing down because of it. There’ll be a consumer outcry when there are major price increases later in the year.

Oh dear. You seem to be suggesting there is not much we can really do. We could reduce regulation.
Everyone agrees, sir, that some of the regulation is clumsy and ill-suited for purpose, some bits are badly administered and that we should be trying to remedy these failures. That supervising task is now delegated to the Ministry of Regulation although we shall be monitoring them. But there is not a lot of evidence that our regulatory regime is holding back economic growth more than it is in other countries. A lot of regulations are trying to align GDP growth with improving wellbeing and a sustainable environment.

As I have said, those are not a priority for this government.
They are for some of your voters, sir.

But not all of them. We have to win only a half. The last item on my list is the research sector. We are pumping public money into it. That should make a difference.
The evidence is that technological innovation is crucial to economic growth. But there is not a lot of evidence that subsidising it will have a lot of effect. Some of our most successful innovators like Xero and Fisher and Paykel didn’t get a lot of government funding.
Most technology is developed overseas. The big challenge is to adapt it to New Zealand. We talk as though our public research system is going to develop an international breakthrough technology. We’ve been talking like this for almost three decades and it still hasn’t. It might. But we might have got a better return spending it on Lotto.

Of course, there are areas where we have to be local. It would be a fat lot of use if our geologists depended on Australian research. But generally, the issue is the direction of research. A key channel for importing world-class technology is world class local research. It is ever so important that our medical research keeps up with the frontier. True for other areas like AI and 3D printing.
We also need to upgrade workforce skills so it can adapt smoothly to the new technologies. The indications are that the quality of the management of our large firms is not world cl
ass. Whenever this is discussed – always in hushed tones – no one is sure how to upgrade it.

You seem very pessimistic about our being able to do anything about the growth rate.
New Zealand economists were grumbling about our poor growth record before you and I were born, sir. The grumbling only goes back sixty-odd years when the data first became available, and economists began to better understand the growth process. There is not a skerrick of evidence that the six decades of grumbling has accelerated our economic growth rate. Where is the evidence that the Productivity Commission made a difference? You closed it down because it didn’t. You will find the grumblers can point to our lowish productivity growth rate, as they could back then. But their nostrums are not connected to any causal process backed by evidence.
What we can do is remove impediments to maintaining the growth rate. Like removing the Telecom monopoly which was blocking the broadband rollout. It’s a more humble objective than accelerating the GDP growth rate, but we’ve been pretty successful at that over the years.

I hear all your economics, but I am running a political airline. We need a story that will resonate with the public and the commentariat even if it does not make sense to experts. So we will keep to our ‘yes to growth’ strategy. Got that?
Yes, Prime Minister.

THE EVOLVING LABOUR MARKET

AIRAANZ 2025 Conference, 3 February 2025.

It is perhaps extraordinary that the Ardern-Hipkins Labour Government, which said it wanted to be ‘transformational’, did not establish a Ministry of Labour. In 2012 the Key-English National Government had merged the century-old Department of Labour into the newly established mega-agency, the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MoBIE).

The logic, presumably, was the neo-liberal one that the labour market is like any other smoothly functioning market. It is not. The labour market is greatly fragmented (balkanised). Labourers do not easily substitute for brain surgeons even when they are of the same age living in the same locality. A substantial chunk of the potential labour market hovers offshore so immigration policy has to be integrated with domestic labour market policy. As does skills development policy. Workers cannot be treated like jars of peanut butter; there is a work and safety aspect in their lives. Labour markets do not provide jobs in the way markets provide peanut butter. Any system of wage determination is clunky, while workplace relations offer many regulatory challenges. For many adults, paid work is integral to their wellbeing. Labour economics is an independent part of economics with its own research program and expertise.

However, the various components of labour market management were scattered through MoBIE and other government agencies with little integration. Admittedly, the immigration and workplace relations portfolios were often held by the same minister, even if the two were administered separately. A Hipkins reshuffle in June 2023 separated them (as did the succeeding Coalition Government).

That labour markets do not work like the neoliberals think is the practical case to have a separate Ministry of Labour, integrating the policy development and implementation of the various facets of the labour market. One might have expected a Labour Government to welcome such a creation for political reasons even if it did not understand the economic ones.[1] But it took no action.

The succeeding Luxon Coalition Government has continued the fragmented management with four relevant ministers: Erica Stanford (Immigration), Brooke van Velden (Workplace Relations and Safety), Louise Upston (Social Development and Employment) and Penny Simmonds (Tertiary Education and Skills, outside Cabinet), there are also three associate ministers. Except for ACT’s van Velden, none have distinguished themselves in this area. She repealed Labour’s Fair Work Act and has been delivering for National and ACT business supporters in reviewing the role of WorkSafe, extending 90-day work trials and looking at the Holidays Act.

The Changing Approach to the Labour Market

In many ways today’s labour portfolios have a low profile in comparison to the heady days before 1984. One factor was that Stan Rodger, Minister of Labour 1984-89, refrained from getting too involved (too early) in industrial relations – hence his nickname of ‘Side-line Stan’. Industrial upheaval was curtailed by the undermining of union effectiveness by the Employment Contracts Act 1991. The Employment Relations Act 2000 only partially re-established some union power; it has not led to a marked increase in unionisation levels.

There were other factors which weakened union power, especially in the private sector. A critical one has been the opening of the economy to greater competition, especially from the abolition of quantitative import restrictions. As union power weakened in the private sector, although it has strengthened in the public sector.

One consequence of the weakening of union power has been to push tasks onto the government. Today setting a wage path – traditionally via the Arbitration Court and later by the strong unions leading the wage round – is replaced by the government setting the minimum wage. This is a more political determination than in the past. Unsurprisingly, the Coalition Government has been less generous than its Labour predecessor – raising the minium wage by less than consumer inflation in April 2025.

The government now takes a greater share of the responsibility for workplace safety since workers who are not unionised have to rely solely on it. (The effect of the ECA was to shift personal disputes to the courts, although the employee is frequently supported by a union representative.)

Unemployment

A third major change in the last three decades is an attitudinal one to unemployment. Unemployment seemed to be low in the early postwar era, when it was monitored quarterly by the numbers registered as unemployed with the Department of Labour. In fact the quinquennial censuses showed higher rates. But they were still low, typically below 3 percent and often only 1 percent, indicating a good proportion of the unemployed were not so stressed that they need to register. [2] There was a kind of complacency recalled by the Royal Commission on Social Security which said that ‘it is unlikely that and New Zealand Government will be able to escape the public insistence that it must so manage the economy that there is a market for services of all who are able and willing to work’. (1972:291)

In fact there were indications, even when the Royal Commission began its deliberations, that stressful unemployment was on the rise – but numbers were still low. It was judged transitory as a consequence of the 1966 wool price crash. However, by the end of the 1970s, registrations were rising sharply (so the numbers became a higher proportion of underlying unemployment) and the 1981 census reported an unemployment rate of 4.5 percent.

The Household Labour Force Survey (HLFS) began in 1986. Its levels in March 1986 and 1991 are not too different from those in the Population Census, so now there is a quarterly track within each quinquennium.

It suggests that there has been a step-up of the average (low) level rate of unemployment of the early postwar era. Since 1995 the average unemployment rate has been 5.2 percent fluctuating between 7.8 percent (in 1998 and 1999) and 3.2 percent in late 2007 and mid 2022. [3] This raises a number of issues of which the greatest might be ‘why?’

Curiously and in contrast to the earlier period, the issue of the upward shift is not well debated by New Zealand economists who seem to, broadly, accept a 5 percent unemployment rate as, say, a NAIRU – non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment. [4] With the demise of the Department of Labour there has been no government agency concerned with the issue, while public good funding for a research program does seem to have been forthcoming. The Ministry of Social Development is responsible for unemployed beneficiaries but has no interest in the wider issue.

The Ardern-Hipkins Labour Government charged the Reserve Bank with taking unemployment into consideration in its monetary policy settings. The Luxon Coalition Government reversed the obligation. The consensus among economists seems to be that the RBNZ monetary settings were hardly affected by this direction, nor will its withdrawal make much difference either. It did stimulate the RBNZ to put some research effort into the labour market.

It is also instructive that the public in general appears to accept the higher rate of unemployment with a widespread belief that often it is the fault – at least in part – of many on the unemployment benefit that they are not working. However, there is public concern – especially locally – when there are job losses from factory closures and the like.

For instance, there was hardly any commentariat mention of the Treasury expectation about the employment track when it published its Half Yearly Economic and Fiscal Update in December 2024. The last survey figure had been 4.8 percent in Sep-24. Treasury expected it to rise to 5.4 percent in Jun-25 and then drift down to 4.3 percent in Jun-29 (the end point of the forecast). Covid aside, the last time the economy was about this end-point level was Dec-18. [5]

The commentariat focus was on the government deficit, as it has been for some time. The deficit contributes to public debt. New Zealand’s economic history features many debt crises or near-crises which have been disruptive to the economy.[6] They have been more common than major earthquakes and their impact is less localised. Prudence suggests that they should be minimised; that involves careful management of the debt path.

However, focussing only on the deficit at the expense of other indicators is like awarding an architectural prize to a building judged entirely on its robustness to earthquakes, neglecting its utility and comfort. The purpose of economic policy is more about wellbeing – of which incomes and employment are important dimensions – but it is rare for official documents or the commentariat to give wellbeing much attention. [7]

The Balkanised Labour Market and Immigration

Earlier we noted the view that the higher average unemployment reflected an upward shift in the NAIRU, perhaps of 3 percentage points. Suppose that is correct. Why did the substantial shift occur? Presumably the shift has been a gradual one – which raises the possibility that it is still occurring – obscured by the lack of data and by shocks and business cycles.

The most likely structural explanation for any shift is that the labour market has become more balkanised so that individual occupations have increasingly used specialised skills with much less substitution between them, in contrast to the earlier era when skills were more generic. In the 1950s it was common for schoolteachers to work in freezing works during the summer vacation; that is much less likely today. The leaky building saga illustrates how new technologies in the building industry required upskilling by those with considerable experience in, and traditional skills from, house construction. [8]

More generally, since the early postwar era there has been a rise in both the average skill requirements of the labour force and in its increasing complexity which has meant that the skill in individual jobs has frequently become more specialised. The days where everything could be done using ‘number 8 wire’ are coming to an end.

So when a worker becomes redundant they may not easily find another job because their reservation wage (expectations) is unrealistic. The skills they had are no longer of market value and they may need reskilling to retain the high wages of their previous employment.

The shadow of the need for generic skills still spreads over New Zealand trade training with a bias in the tertiary education system towards professional training. The Ardern-Hipkins Labour Government proposed a Social Unemployment Insurance scheme which would have provided short-term income protection for those who became redundant and a constructive path for redeployment of the redundant including reskilling training. It would have been a small but significant step in a more comprehensive approach towards upskilling the labour force. But in the policy bonfire of February 2023 it was abandoned without explanation.

And so the upskilling issue remains fragmented across three government agencies and three ministers. (In fairness, the record in this area of the Department of Labour is hardly memorable.) Presumably the NAIRU will continue to rise.

Immigration

Traditionally, New Zealand has resolved its skills shortage by importing labour from overseas, thereby reducing the pressures for and costs of domestic upskilling. To an outside observer, immigration regulation (by MoBIE) seems to be inadequate. It is not merely that the implementation seems to be near shambolic with unduly long administration times, slow responsiveness to changes in demand and erratic enforcement – the lapses indicating there are also policy deficiencies.

There appears to be hardly any attempt to integrate the immigration policy with the domestic labour market, which may not be surprising given the fragmentation within MoBIE. Labour force projections were abandoned three decades ago. The issue is well illustrated by the recent public discovery of shortages of healthcare workers despite this being known decades ago. It is a particularly difficult supply issue given long years of training with entry largely set by government policies and funding together with cross-border high mobility.

The neoliberal policy frame of the labour market – almost a reverse Says Law of demand (for labour) creating its own supply – has not worked. The destruction of a centre of government responsibility over a decade ago has left the labour market functioning poorly.

Disappointingly the Sixth Ardern-Hipkins Labour Government did not address the lacuna. It is unlikely the Luxon Coalition Government will do any better.

Endnotes

[1] It consolidated housing policy into a Ministry of Housing and Urban Development a year after it was elected.

[2] The exception was 1936 (8.7%) and 1896 (the first Census which recorded unemployment, 5.9%). There was no census in 1931, when unemployment rates would have been much higher. See Table 14.5 of In Stormy Seas (Easton 1995:196).

[3] Unemployment peaked at 11.0 percent in Sep-1991. Just before Rogernomics-Ruthanasia, it was sitting at a little above 4 percent.

[4] There is a desultory debate about the effect of the minimum wage on employment issues.

[5] The December 2024 NZIER forecast (based on 8 respondents) is sitting about 0.4 percentage points higher. The more recently released GDP figure for Sep-24 – a sharp fall of 1.1% on the previous quarter – suggests the unemployment rate may be even high.

[6] For some salient examples see B. Easton (2011) ‘Great Days in New Zealand Borrowing’

[7] Labour’s 2018 budget announced it on ‘wellbeing’. The notion put forward was clunky and was noticeable by its absence in Labour’s 2023 election campaign.

[8] B. Easton (2012) ‘Regulation and Leaky Buildings’ in S. Alexander (ed) The Leaky Buildings Crisis: Understanding the Issues

The Proposed Regulatory Standards Bill

Do its Property Right Provisions Make Sense?

Last week I pointed out that it is uninformed to argue that the New Zealand’s apparently poor economic performance can be traced only to poor regulations. Even were there evidence they had some impact, there are other factors. Of course, we should seek to administer effectively a system of high quality regulations. However, the proposed Regulatory Standards Bill will not contribute much to this end. It has another purpose.

As a background, consider the Treaty Principles Bill (TPB). The one before Parliament has a fundamental difference from the one which ACT had in its manifesto. There its proposed second principle was that the government should ‘protect all New Zealanders’ authority over their land and other property’.

In the bill before Parliament that principle has been replaced with 

‘Rights of hapu and iwi Maori — the Crown recognises the rights that hapu and iwi had when they signed the Treaty/te Tiriti. The Crown will respect and protect those rights. Those rights differ from the rights everyone has a reasonable expectation to enjoy only when they are specified in Treaty settlements.’

It is a very different sentiment altogether. The minister gave no explanation for the change when he introduced the bill to Parliament. Obviously there must have been a concern within the legal fraternity about how the bill could upset existing arrangements.

But the change is more than a legal twist. The effect of the manifesto version would have been to strengthen private property rights markedly. The effect of the second sentence in the actual bill before Parliament probably strengthens them but not to the same extent.

We see a similar sentiment in the Regulatory Standards Bill (RSB). (Actually, there is no bill currently before Parliament. It has yet to be drafted. I am quoting from the bill which ACT introduced in 2021, but which was not proceeded with.)

The principles of responsible regulation are that … legislation should

… not take or impair, or authorise the taking or impairment of, property without the consent of the owner unless —

(i) the taking or impairment is necessary in the public interest; and

(ii) full compensation for the taking or impairment is provided to the owner; and

(iii) that compensation is provided, to the extent practicable, by or on behalf of the persons who obtain the benefit of the taking or impairment.

Those principles substantially strengthen private property rights.

The notion of regulatory ‘takings’ comes from the US. The American libertarian lawyer, Richard Epstein, who developed the idea, said that ‘[i]t will be said that my position invalidates much of the 20th century legislation, and so it does’ and that ‘[m]ost of economic regulation is stupid…. What possible reason is there for regulating wages and hours? If my takings doctrine prevails, you have no minimum-wage laws. That’s fine. You’d have an [Occupational Safety and Health Administration] a tenth of the size. That’s fine too. You’d have no anti-discrimination laws for privileged employees, which would be a godsend.’ (Epstein was involved with the development of New Zealand’s now repealed Employment Contracts Act.)

While his approach has been described in the US as ‘rolling back the New Deal’, if it was introduced into law today the requirement would merely prevent almost all future change. For instance, had the ACT legislation been in force in 1984 there could have been no Rogernomics, because it expropriated without compensation a lot of private property rights (while creating others).

I don’t think those who developed the 2021 bill have thought through the meaning of property rights. They seem to think of plain old-fashioned property rights similar to those with which Epstein was concerned, colonially adopting his American framework. But, as the TPB implies, property rights in New Zealand are far more complicated.

Iwi and hapu might (or might not) concede that their land was legitimately transferred to others. But they will never concede that their mana whenua rights were transferred. That includes kaitiaki (guardianship) rights over the environment of their rohe. How those rights are exercised is a complicated mix of statute and common law.

Guardianship claims are not unique to Māori. Greenies will campaign on a similar basis for their environmental goals even where they have no direct connection with the land involved. Similarly you may campaign against a proposed building which will block your view.

The Government intends to replace the Resource Management Act with new legislation which will make some changes to property rights. If ACT’s 2021 RSB was law, it couldn’t. It would be hypocritical to pass a revised RMA with the RSB as currently intended pending (although that may not prevent it happening). Even so, ACT could be repeatedly embarrassed by it being insisted that it should vote against any Government legislation (including the TPB) which infringes its 2021 bill.

Given the backdown over the TPB between its manifesto and parliamentary versions, I am expecting some major revisions to the tabled  RSB. It is possible that the Government version will be a set of sensible rules about how it should approach regulation. In its interim regulatory impact statement the Ministry of Regulation said that while it supports the overall objectives, that legislation was not needed. Its preferred option was to build on, and strengthen, the existing regime based on Labour’s legislation passed in 2019.

What is the real purpose of the proposed statute? Epstein may be the clue. Its aim is to stop government economic intervention altogether, which makes ACT the party of the status quo. Its supporters, having got into wealth and power, want to consolidate it.

There is an argument, set out by the libertarian Robert Nozick, that if you start with a just distribution of property rights, then it remains just following voluntary exchange. I leave the reader to decide whether the current distribution has derived from a just distribution at some ground zero with only voluntary exchanges since. (There are other issues involving complete knowledge and technical change which complicate Nozick’s argument, but let’s settle the initial position issue first.)

The main economic issue is that stable property rights are necessary for good economic development. It is a view held by most (Western) economists, including Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson, two of the most radical economists to have been made Nobel Laureates. But most would add caveats.

History has numerous examples where private property rights were over-ruled with development benefits. Most economic historians would accept that Henry VIII’s dissolution of the monasteries wrecked the rights of their inhabitants but laid the foundation for Tudor economic prosperity. Even ACT supporters would add the neoliberal Rogernomics changes to the list of more recent historical examples.

One is left with the conclusion that ACT’s RSB in its 2021 form is muddled. I look forward to someone providing a better explanation.

Oral Submission to Justice Select Committee: Treaty Principles Bill

Tēnā koutou katoa.

Apologies for the limitations of my voice. It is the consequence of surgery on my larynx.

My written submission focuses on two elements of the Treaty Principles Bill which are insufficiently covered in its public discussion.

The first is that the bill is bad history. Our understanding of Te Tiriti has evolved, and is evolving. Any statute such as this bill will fossilise that understanding, restricting its ongoing organic development. It would be better if the bill did not proceed.

My submission’s second point is that the Court of Appeal stated a set of treaty principles in 1987. They are foundational to a social democracy such as Aotearoa New Zealand. It is critical that any statute of Parliament does not override nor downgrade them as the proposed bill might. Parliament should instead separately acknowledge the Court of Appeal’s principles.

I am happy to elaborate on any aspect of my submission. Kia ora. 

Brian Easton.

The Court of Appeal Principles of the Treaty

1. The Crown has the right to govern. The principles of the treaty ‘do not authorise unreasonable restrictions on the right of a duly elected government to follow its chosen policy. Indeed, to try and shackle the Government unreasonably would itself be inconsistent with those principles’.

2. The Crown has a duty to act reasonably and in good faith. The relationship is ‘akin to partnership between the Crown and Māori people, and of its obligation on each side to act in good faith.’ The judgment draws parallels with ‘our partnership laws’.

3 The Crown has an active duty to protect Māori interests. ‘The duty of the Crown was not just passive but extended to active protection of Māori people in the use of their lands and waters to the fullest extent practicable.’

4 The government should make informed decisions. The Court said that in order to act reasonably and in good faith, the government must make sure it was informed in making decisions relating to the treaty. That will ‘require some consultation’.

5 The Crown should remedy past grievances. ‘If the Waitangi Tribunal finds merit in a claim and recommends redress, the Crown should grant at least some form of redress, unless there are grounds justifying a reasonable Treaty partner in withholding it – which would be only in very special circumstances, if ever.’

Source: Adapted from Te Ara

How Important is Regulation to Economic Performance?

The invitation to comment on the proposed Regulatory Standards Bill opens with Minister David Seymour stating ‘[m]ost of New Zealand’s problems can be traced to poor productivity, and poor productivity can be traced to poor regulations’.

I shall have little to say about the first proposition except I can think of a lot of New Zealand problems – actual and fantasised – which don’t seem to have much to do with productivity. I wait for the minister to explain the connection his Treaty Principles Bill has to poor productivity when it is returned to Parliament. (And indeed for his productivity insights on many of the other troubles which beset us.)

As for the second proposition, New Zealand may have a productivity problem – I cannot think of any country where such a claim is not made. But to attribute the problem entirely to ‘poor regulations’ is disingenuous and extravagant.

When a junior minister, Casey Costello, was challenged for empirical evidence to justify policies which rolled back the campaign to reduce tobacco consumption she could only cite flimsy industry-driven opinion from a thin Google search. There was a widespread demand she should resign. No similar demand has been made of Seymour to show his evidence. A Google search will prove just as thin.

To be clear, poor regulation can impact on economic performance. However, it is extremely difficult to measure by how much. For instance, in the late 1970s I was warning of the dangers of the heavy interventionism we associate with Muldoon. In the mid-1980s it was wound back. I spent a lot of effort trying to find out how much this impacted on economic growth. The evidence was that once the economy had come out of the great (seven- or eight-year) stagnation which Rogernomics had induced, it grew at much the same rate as it had been growing before the Rogernomic policies.

There was some evidence of a better quality of output (which is difficult to incorporate in the GDP measure) and more economic resilience and flexibility. But there was no faster economic growth, no measurable productivity gain. That is why it took twenty years for those at the bottom of the income distribution to regain their pre-Rogernomics standard of living. I was surprised by this no-productivity-gain research finding. But I am a scientist, not an ideologue; I learn from the failure of an experiment.

We can ask how damaging is today’s regulatory framework? Is it that much worse than other countries with higher productivity which is the assumption implicit in the minister’s claim? Perhaps a thin Google search will support the minister but on many dimensions elements of our framework are judged world class. For instance, it is not unusual for New Zealand to be judged very highly in the rankings of the ease of doing business. But our aggregate productivity levels are certainly not up there with it.

The government (MED) used to publish a checklist of how we performed. The one area where New Zealand seemed to do very badly was the quality of its management. There was not a lot of evidence one way or the other though. My suspicion is that the culture of New Zealand management, while good for dealing with small organisations, does not cope well with large complex (private and private) organisations. Cynics might add politicians to the management failure list. However, while poor management may explain, in part, New Zealand’s relatively low productivity, it is not a regulatory issue.

Other particularities of the New Zealand situation are that our size and isolation from the rest of the world economies means that we cannot reap productivity enhancing economies of agglomeration. There is not much that a regulatory framework can do about relocating us.

Paul Krugman, famous for his ‘productivity isn’t everything, but in the long run it is almost everything’, has recently modified his generalisation. He conceded that health and safety and environmental regulations could improve living standards, but that they slowed productivity increases. ‘So part of the productivity slowdown during the 1970s probably represented not so much a loss of dynamism as a shift in priorities — deliberate choices to make workplaces safer and skies cleaner, even at the expense of production. … We could have a bigger economy if we were willing to have filthy air and a lot more injured workers, but that’s not a trade-off we want to make.’

They are instances of improving the quality of life at the expense of productivity. Another instance is that nowadays we can measure productivity in terms of output per hour worked. That does not include travel time to work. (It seems likely that were we to include that, New Zealand would do better in the productivity stakes because we spend less time commuting.) So if we ‘waste’ investment resources on reducing congestion and travel times, the cost is lower measured productivity.

In other words, we should not get too obsessed with the notion that economic output as measured by the GDP conventions translates directly into economic and social welfare. It may not especially as a society gets more affluent (and complex), something that the economists who developed the GDP measure almost a century ago pointed out; the measure was developed for much more limited purposes.

I would welcome better administration of the government’s interventions. I have described past failures of leaky buildings and earthquake standards, both of which have been costly in human and economic (productivity) terms. But that is not what the Regulatory Standards Bill is about. I write about its real – subversive – purpose next week.

Why we’re not ready to extend the parliamentary term

Spinoff 23 January 2025.

Even democratically elected dictators try to avoid accountability. Until there is a considerable strengthening of the accountability mechanisms, the parliamentary term should not be extended.

A British Lord Chancellor described the British political system as an ‘elected dictatorship’. Even so, it is meant to act in the interests of the people. Because dictators usually ignore any such responsibility, liberal democracies have accountability mechanisms to restrain them or expose them if they do.

In a democracy there are many accountability mechanisms including the independent media, other private sector agents and the legal system. Perhaps the most important mechanism is ‘free’ (i.e. independent) elections of a parliament which both appoints the political wing of the government and holds the entire government to account between elections.

The term of a New Zealand Parliament is three years. There is some support by those in power for a longer term, although out of power they hanker for an early election. One suspects that the population generally favours a shorter period to keep ‘the buggers honest’. Strong and robust accountability requires mechanisms between elections.

The government has two major wings: a political wing of cabinet ministers who are also Members of Parliament and a public service wing, with the main purposes of advising the ministers and implementing the government’s policies. Parliament has two main means of enforcing accountability: by challenging a minister about something for which they are responsible and by directly challenging a part of the bureaucracy.

Neither channel seems to be particularly effective. MPs prefer to personalise issues so they become too eager to blame a minister, even when it is not the minister’s responsibility, enabling the bureaucracy to hide behind its ministers.

Nor do the select committees seem to work particularly well. An indication of the bureaucracy’s contempt for them was when ‘faceless [Department of] Internal Affairs officials went behind the backs of MPs to make “unauthorised” changes to the bills setting in place the Government’s Three Waters reforms’. The journalist, Jonathan Milne, went on to comment, ‘it’s indicative of the ongoing problem we have in New Zealand, that Parliament is highly dependent on the executive for advice on bills and drafting. The people who are amending the bill don’t work for Parliament, but for the Government.’

The Australian system has two sorts of select committees. One, chaired by a member of the government caucus, deals with the government’s legislation; the other, chaired by someone from the Opposition, scrutinises government agencies. There appears little parliamentary enthusiasm for such an approach in New Zealand.

The arrogance of the bureaucracy is well illustrated by the 2020 Public Service Act. The government gave the public six weeks for public consultation after taking years to prepare the bill. Did it think that the public has little interest in the way the bureaucracy is run and no competence to comment on it? The Public Finance Act was amended in a way which weakened parliamentary control of the public finances; MPs complied.

MMP selects a parliament which is reasonably representative of the population, but Parliament itself selects the Prime Minister on a winner-takes-all basis so that the Cabinet does not reflect the whole of Parliament. Strengthening parliamentary accountability shifts Cabinet’s decisions back towards the political centre.

Criticism is at the heart of the ability to hold the government to account. We need to think about weakening the control central parties have over who gets elected because this limits the ability of MPs to criticise. A particularly onerous control is each party’s election list where a high ranking returns the MP to Parliament even if they lose their electorate seat. It is standard to interpret the ranking as an indication of the degree of favour the central party bestows on the candidate not of competence or ability.

It is not obvious how to reduce the power the central party has over its ranking simply; complexity would cause confusion. One proposal is not to have a ranked list at all. Instead the additional MPs, required to make up the number above those directly elected, would be those candidates in each party who won the most electorate votes despite losing their seats.

Further power comes from the way political parties are funded. Funders are not representative of the population and the funding biases political decisions. Once every three years, Parliament reviews the rules about political party financing. Yet there remain too many loopholes which parties hungry for funds exploit. That makes them vulnerable to (often secret) pressures in which dollars overrule people.

Parliament procedures need to be strengthened. It might be useful if when introducing a bill to Parliament the government distinguished between those which are central to its policies and those which come from the bureaucracy and where it is willing to consider changes if the evidence presented to the select committee suggests them. Ministers do not have to front their department’s ambitions.

Stronger and more independent MPs are not enough. They need to hold the government accountable, which is different from ‘opposition’ – opposing the government. Sadly, the ‘loyal opposition’ (either party) and critics often do not seem to understand the distinction between the two tasks. Too often the issue is presented as if the only failure is failure by a government politician.

The best parliamentary accountability currently comes from officers of Parliament who are appointed by statute with the powers to carry out tasks which the MPs could do but do not have the time or the technical capability to do. Currently there are three officers of the New Zealand Parliament: Auditor General; Commissioner for the Environment; Ombudsman.

There are similar positions in the bureaucracy but they are subordinate to the self-same bureaucracy. They include: Chief Archivist; Commissioner for Children; Health and Disability Commissioner; Human Rights Commissioner; Police Complaints Commissioner; Privacy Commissioner; Retirement Commissioner.

Is the independence of these commissioners compromised? The short answer is that even if it is not currently, it can be. In any case, the effectiveness of independent commissioners can be compromised by under-supplying resources needed for the job, with no appeal for better funding other than to the agency they are monitoring, or by making poor quality appointments. Too often MPs have compliantly agreed to demands of the bureaucracy to reduce the independence and powers of these commissioners. The case is always made in terms of bureaucratic rationalisation – accountability is never mentioned. The logic of accountability is that such positions should become further offices of Parliament. The bureaucracy will fight tooth and nail to prevent the transfer of the commissioners who are under its control. Are you surprised?

The 1989 Public Finance Act set out different responsibilities for ministers and the operational agencies which report to them. The idea was that ministers were responsible only for the directions they gave to their departments, while the departments were responsible only for their operational implementation of those directions. But the distinction, still in the Public Service Act 2020, has never really worked. Neither Parliament nor the public pay much attention to it. The de jure distinction of responsibilities and the de facto practice of ambiguity enables the bureaucracy to escape the rigorous scrutiny that democracy demands of it.

Do not assume that accountability will always be deliberately thwarted. Sometimes who is responsible is unclear. This is particularly true in large, diverse departments, so that even a chief executive may not know what is going on. Hence the need for smaller more coherent government agencies in which the chief executive can know and be effectively responsible for it. Centralisation is a mechanism for avoiding accountability to the public.

A key element of the New Zealand system of accountability is the Official Information Act. The OIA creates a public right to access information. It states that ‘information shall be made available unless there is good reason for withholding it’.

However, since the effect of the act is to increase the accountability of the government – sunlight is the best disinfectant – there has often been a reluctance to release information. Journalists are a central part of the accountability system, using the OIA as an integral part of their responsibility. A 2022 review by the Ombudsman (who is also the Parliamentary Commissioner for Information) found multiple examples of public-sector media teams breaching the section of the law which required reasons. Media teams are failing to give journalists a reason when they refuse to provide information or inform them of their right to complain to the Ombudsman

The incoming Ardern-Hipkins Government promised a review of the OIA in its 2017 election manifesto. In July 2020 the Justice Minister announced that the OIA would be reviewed. Six months later, his replacement minister said that the review would be delayed until ‘later in this parliamentary term’. After six years in office the government had not published a review.

A four-year term strengthens the (elected) dictatorship. A liberal democracy requires that any strengthening be offset by the dictator becoming more accountable. If Parliament proposes a referendum extending the parliamentary term, it needs first to strengthen its accountability mechanisms. An inability to do so would demonstrate that Parliament’s ability to hold the executive to account is too weak to justify a four-year term.

Back on Track?


The state of the current economy may be similar to when National left office in 2017.

In December, a couple of days after the Treasury released its 2024 Half Year Economic and Fiscal Update (HEYFU24), Statistics New Zealand reported its estimate for volume GDP for the previous September 24 quarter. Instead of the expected trivial fall of 0.1 percent on June, the economy appears to have contracted 1.0 percent. There was much consternation because the discrepancy was too big to be explained by noise/measurement error. The outturn was also much weaker than the private sector forecasters anticipated.

The issue is not the single quarter decline. The New Zealand economy has been in contraction since late 2022. (I am using per capita GDP, to reduce the effect of immigration.) That is eight quarters, with a total fall of about 5 percent per person so we are back to about where we were six years ago.* The consensus among forecasters had been that the contraction would bottom out about now. I imagine they now think the upswing will be a bit later – the gloomy may say ‘much later’.

As a consequence, unemployment – which lags the bottom of the production cycle – will be higher. HYEFU24 forecast unemployment peaking at 5.4 percent of the labour force in June 2025. (It was 4.8 percent, September 2024.)

And, of course, the government’s current account is going to show a greater deficit, because the government’s revenue will be below what HYEFU24 anticipated. There will be a need for more borrowing – to be discussed in a later column.

What has caused this contraction? Many people will jump to the conclusion that it is the fault of one politician or another, the choice depending on their political prejudices. I do not want to discount that there has been some poor fiscal management – probably by both parties – but that disguises what may be an underlying structural problem.

I won’t bore you with the details, but the economy seems to have been performing poorly over the last twelve years. It was pedestrian under the Key-English Government. Labour tried to lift its growth by expanding the public sector, but the private sector remained near static. In particular, there was little growth relative to the population in the tradeable sector, which generates and conserves foreign exchange.

There were three main exceptions. The Information, Media and Telecommunications sector boomed. Presumably that was from the broadband rollout. But even it peaked in 2021 and is now stagnating.

There was some growth in consumer spending but that appears to have mainly sourced from products produced offshore. (Retailing contributes to economic activity by paying workers and rents and making profits.) In fact, retailing was sluggish like the rest of the economy until 2019, and then took off, interrupted by the lockdown. It is still humming away (but not everywhere).

The third driver has ben the construction and real estate sectors. Construction grew rapidly after the turn down following the GFC. It peaked in late 2021 and has contracted by about 10 percent since, back to about where it was in 2017. The pattern for the real estate sector (which is very heterogenous including rental and hiring) is a little different. It fluctuated around a rising trend a lot; it still appears to be rising even if estate agent activity is not.

So we have had a weak economy for some time. Labour was trying to stimulate it via the government’s spending, which the Coalition Government is cutting back. There is no part of the private sector which is significantly expanding. Its expansion peaked three years ago; today the construction sector is producing absolutely less than it did then.

It is easy then, and correct, to say that at the heart of the current economic contraction is the construction sector. Its contraction was caused by the Reserve Bank hiking interest rates. OCR went from 0.5% p.a. in August 2021 to 5.5% p.a. in June 2023 – it is currently 4.25% p.a.)

The minutes of the RBNZ Monetary Policy Committee are not published, so we cannot be sure exactly what it was thinking. In November 2022 a select committee of Parliament asked the RBNZ Governor whether the central bank was engineering a recession to combat inflation. He replied, ‘I think that is correct. We are deliberately trying to slow aggregate spending in the economy. The quicker inflation expectations come down, the less work we need to do and the less likely it is that we have a prolonged period of low or negative growth.’

In August 2021 consumer prices (CPI) had increased 5.9% on a year earlier. The rate rose to 7.3% shortly after and has since sunk back to 2.2% today. I leave to another venue whether this inflation reduction is a consequence of RBNZ action or whether it would have largely happened anyway as world inflation eased.

So a major cause of the two-year-plus contraction has been the actions of the Reserve Bank. But it happened in a decade-long weak economy.

Because we hardly focus on the existence and causes of the weakness, the government is hardly addressing it – continuing the Key-English approach. The one exception is Shane Jones and his ‘think big’. You may not like what he is proposing – and it will take some time to be effective – but at least it grasps the nub of trying to deal with the weak tradeable sector.

In summary the state of the current economy as similar to when National left office in 2017. As it promised in its election campaign, we are back on its track.

  • This column looks through the strong fluctuation associated with the Covid crisis.

A Bully of Billionaires

Can we trust the Trump cabinet to act in the public interest?

Nine of Trump’s closest advisers are billionaires. Their total net worth is in excess of $US375b (providing there is not a share-market crash). In contrast, the total net worth of Trump’s first Cabinet was about $6b. (Joe Biden’s Cabinet total was about $118 million and Barack Obama’s second-term Cabinet was about $3 billion.)

A US President’s cabinet is different from ours (or a British one) which has to come from the governing party caucus (or caucuses) and (partly) reflects its political balances – it may even contain members whom the prime minister loathes. The US system harkens back to the days when the kings chose their advisers who did not need to be in Parliament; compatibility need not be a problem unless the president picks a bunch of egoists.

In principle then, the President has a much wider choice, and ought to be able choose a Cabinet of greater competence. However, outsiders may not have a good grasp of the difference between business and politics. To take a simple local illustration, more than one party leader with a business background hasn’t understood that while the CEO appoints the workers, the workers/caucus appoint the party leader – which means that if the polls turn against a bullying or neglecting party leader, he or she will be out (if there is a viable alternative).

There is a tendency by the public to assume that because someone has succeeded in one arena they are expert in many others. In fact, where celebrities give opinions on which they have no expertise, their contributions are usually uninformed, with – at best – content as useful, as comforting and as platitudinous as a horoscope. Yet we listen with unwarranted respect.

In fact, the greater the success in one arena, the greater the confidence in others and the lower the competence. Nor should we assume that the luck that contributed to the success will continue elsewhere.

Before the 2008 Financial Advisers Act, a celebrity would front advertisements for a financial firm to give an impression of its integrity and competence. (A number of the firms collapsed much to the chagrin of their investors; some even had staff prosecuted for fraud-like offences.) Assessing the soundness of a financial business is not easy; auditors have not always been successful, nor have the retired bankers recruited to their boards. Why should uninformed celebrities do any better? Presumably enough of the public were credulous to make it worthwhile for the firm to outlay considerable amounts on a suitable celebrity. (Derek Quigley says he turned down a $150,000 fee to front an insurance company’s TV promotional campaign, at a time when the average wage was about $18,000 a year.)

No doubt among some of Trump’s billionaires there will be some who are competent and some who are not. But that is usual in any cabinet. The bigger concern is the extent to which they will use the opportunity to pursue their personal interests at the expense of the public interest. At his confirmation when being appointed as Secretary of Defense in 1953, the President of General Motors, Charles E. Wilson, said ‘what was good for our country was good for General Motors, and vice versa’. It is widely thought he said that ‘what was good for GM was good for America’, the sentiment implicit in his ‘vice versa’. The implication is that there are no conflicts of interest between business and the government.

You may recall that in his first term as president, Donald Trump signed a ‘historical trade deal’ with his ‘very, very good friend’ Xi Jinping that committed China to purchase $200b of additional US exports before the end of 2021. China bought none of the additional exports Trump’s deal promised.

I have not been greatly impressed by Trump’s international negotiating record. (Remember the cosying up with North Korean president Kim Jong-Un?) But perhaps I was looking in the wrong place. At the time he was doing the deal with China, that country was giving very favourable treatment to the fashion businesses of his daughter, Ivanka Trump.

Will this sort of thing be repeated in Trump’s second term, but tenfold? There will be even fewer checks on him this time, given that Congress is dominated by Trump supporters – for the next two years anyway. These were the concerns of those who designed the American constitution almost quarter of a millennium ago. I doubt they quite expected things to play out as they will over the next two years.

American social psychologist Dacher Keltner has amassed a huge amount of evidence which suggests that the more powerful people become, the more likely they are to act selfishly and ignore the consequences of their actions on others. While the conclusions are based on micro and experimental studies, they may well apply to macro-situations such as being in government. As Lord Acton said in 1887:

Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely. Great men are almost always bad men, even when they exercise influence and not authority, still more when you superadd the tendency or the certainty of corruption by authority.

(Was Jimmy Carter an exception?)

While many may use the opportunities in government to enhance their wealth, the Trump Cabinet may not have ten billionaires (Trump plus nine others) when it steps down in four years time. Some may have left in frustration, either with the president or with the job. (It has been pointed out to Eion Musk charged with cutting government spending, that his new job is not rocket science – it is way much harder.) Some may end up with smaller fortunes – in some cases the current valuations appear to be based on over-optimistic valuations rather than underpinned by solid cash flow.

Moreover, there are concerning assessments that the world financial system is in the ‘Ponzi finance phase’ of the Minsky financial cycle. The last one was 17 years ago in early 2008. One could argue that a bust is more than overdue. As Herman Minsky wrote:

But in truth neither the boom, nor the debt deflation, nor the stagnation, and certainly not a recovery or full-employment growth can continue indefinitely.

The consequences of a bust would impact not only on billionaires but also on ordinary folk; indeed, more so. Providing they are not over-leveraged, the rich have much more cushion to cope with a shock. It is not uncommon for the amelioration measures to be more in the interests of the rich – recall how the financial sector made a pig’s breakfast leading to the Global Financial Crisis, but many of its employees kept their bonuses which were paid as a part of taxpayer bailouts. One would not expect a Trump Cabinet to behave very differently.

Bob Dylan sang ‘money does not talk; it swears.’

Publications of Brian Easton Relating to Te Tiriti O Waitangi and Treaty Claims

Chapters in Books

Not in Narrow Seas (VUP: Ch.8)                                                        

In Open Seas (Kea Point: Ch.12)

Making Aotearoa New Zealand (Forthcoming: Ch.7)

Articles

‘Was There A Treaty of Waitangi?: Was it A Social Contract?’ (Archifacts: April 1997, P.21-49)

‘What the Hell Happened At Waitangi?’ (Newsroom 9 May, 2023)

Treaty Claims

The Maori Broadcasting Claim: A Pakeha Economist’s Perspective (1 September 1990)

Evidence of Brian Easton with Respect to Te Oneroa-o-tohe (26 March 1991)

Te Whakapakari Paapori, Ohanga O Muriwhenua (22 June 1993)

The Maori Geothermal Claim: A Pakeha Economist’s Perspective (1 September 1993)

The Maori Electoral Enrolment Option Campaign: Evidence to the Waitangi Tribunal (10 February 1994)

A Data Base of Iwi: Report for the Waitangi Tribunal (10 May 1995)

The Economic and Social Impact of the Raupatu (10 October 1995)

The Economic and Social Impact on Ngati Irapuaia of the Raupatu (25 May 1996)

Taniwha Springs (15 November 2007)

The Commercial Value of Taniwha Springs (30 June 2009)

Trading Water Resource Consents (8 February 2015)

Listener and Pundit Columns

‘For Whom the Treaty Tolls’ (Listener: 5 February 1990)

‘The Green Maori’ (Listener: 14 May 1990)

‘Tikanga and Te Oneroa-o-tohe’ (Listener: 20 May 1991)

‘Rightful Owners’ (Listener: 23 August 2003)

‘The Public Domain: Who Will ”Own” the Foreshore?’ (Listener: 1 May 2004)

‘Our Treaty: What Can the Treaty of Waitangi Mean Today?’ (Listener: 10 February 2006)

‘Water Rights and Ownership’ (Listener: 4 August 2012)

‘Our Understandings of Te Tiriti Has Evolved Organically’ (Pundit: 2 February 2024)

‘Te Tiriti As A Social Contract’ (Pundit: 9 February 2024)

‘The Principles of the Treaty’ (Pundit: 30 August 2024)

‘Property Rights and the Treaty Principles Bill’ (Pundit: 22 November 2024)

Notes and Lectures

Contract, Covenant, Compact: the Social Foundations of New Zealand Governance (1 April 1994)

Our Understandings of Te Tiriti Have Evolved Organically: Why Try to Stop That Evolution? (9 February 2024)

The Principles of the Treaty; An Exploration (20 May 2024)

What Was the Hikoi Against the Treaty Principles Bill About? (23 November 2024)

Notes on Governance and Te Tiriti (26 November 2024)

Submission to Parliament by Brian Easton on the PRINCIPLES OF THE TREATY OF WAITANGI BILL

Recommendations

1. That Parliament should not proceed with the Principles of the Treaty of Waitangi Bill.

2. That Parliament endorse the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi as set out by the Court of Appeal in New Zealand Māori Council v Attorney-General (1987) (C.A. 54/87), while acknowledging that the understandings of Te Tiriti o Waitangi and its implications will continue to evolve organically.

My name is Brian Henry Easton. I am making this submission in a personal capacity. As an economist and a writer of New Zealand history I have been engaging with Treaty issues for four decades. Publications of Brian Easton Relating to Te Tiriti O Waitangi and Treaty Claims lists publications which demonstrate my engagement over the years.

There will be many submissions on the bill to the select committee, some of which with I agree, some of which I do not. The purpose of this submission is to raise some issues which have not been prominent in the public discussion but are very important and deserve consideration by the select committee.

Our Understandings of Te Tiriti O Waitangi Are Evolving

I have learned many things from my engagement with treaty issues over the years. The most significant is that our understandings of Te Tiriti o Waitangi and its implications have evolved over the 14 decades since 1840.

For instance, there is a widely circulated commentary by Sir Apirana Ngata in The Treaty of Waitangi: An Explanation. It was published in 1922. Ngata was a scholar. There is no doubt his thinking would have  developed had he read, for instance, Ruth Ross’s ‘Te Tiriti o Waitangi: Texts and Translations’. (New Zealand Journal of History, Oct 1972; v.6 n.2: p.129-157).

This organic evolution continues is ongoing. Reputable scholars who have examined the primary material still disagree – albeit generally in a collegial way.

The danger of the Principles of the Treaty of Waitangi Bill, among the many other problems that will be pointed out to the Select Committee, is that it will lock in a particular, fossilised and anachronistic interpretation of Te Tiriti. On that basis alone, the Bill should not proceed. It is not the function of a statute to determine general facts, including historical ones.

Accordingly it is recommended:

1. That Parliament should not proceed with the Principles of the Treaty of Waitangi Bill.

The Principles of The Treaty

In response to the phrase ‘principles of the Treaty’, which is in the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, the Court of Appeal set out in 1978 in New Zealand Māori Council v Attorney-General (C.A. 54/87) (a.k.a. the ‘Lands’ case or the ‘SOE’ case) what it judged those principles to be. There was no disagreement among the five judges.

The judgements did not codify the principles. A common summary of them is:

1. The Crown has the right to govern. The principles of the treaty ‘do not authorise unreasonable restrictions on the right of a duly elected government to follow its chosen policy. Indeed, to try and shackle the Government unreasonably would itself be inconsistent with those principles’.

2. The Crown has a duty to act reasonably and in good faith. The relationship is ‘akin to partnership between the Crown and Māori people, and of its obligation on each side to act in good faith.’ The judgment draws parallels with ‘our partnership laws’.

3 The Crown has an active duty to protect Māori interests. ‘The duty of the Crown was not just passive but extended to active protection of Māori people in the use of their lands and waters to the fullest extent practicable.’

4 The government should make informed decisions. The Court said that in order to act reasonably and in good faith, the government must make sure it was informed in making decisions relating to the treaty. That will ‘require some consultation’.

5 The Crown should remedy past grievances. ‘If the Waitangi Tribunal finds merit in a claim and recommends redress, the Crown should grant at least some form of redress, unless there are grounds justifying a reasonable Treaty partner in withholding it – which would be only in very special circumstances, if ever.’

Since 1987, other court cases have developed the application of the principles. For instance, active protection of Māori people now extends to other taonga such as te reo. It seems likely that the courts would also recognise kaitiakitanga – guardianship of the environment – rights, even if they were not in a statute. Additionally, court decisions have protected Māori property rights. (They are implicit in the Court’s third and fifth principles.) These are examples of the organic evolution that the understanding of Te Tiriti has undergone.

While presenting them a little differently, both the Waitangi Tribunal and Te Puni Kōkiri have expressed similar principles. (Appendix I)

In 1989, responding to the Court of Appeal decision, the Lange-Palmer Government also set out some principles to guide its actions on matters relating to the Treaty as follows:

1.The government has the right to govern and make laws. (The kāwanatanga principle)

2. Iwi have the right to organise as iwi, and, under the law, to control their resources as their own. (The rangatiratanga principle)

3. All New Zealanders are equal before the law.

4. Both the government and iwi are obliged to accord each other reasonable cooperation on major issues of common concern.

5. The government is responsible for providing effective processes for the resolution of grievances in the expectation that reconciliation can occur.

While based on the Court’s principles, the guide to actions are a more elaborate about the role of Iwi. Thus far, no subsequent government has modified them, thereby implicitly endorsing them.

A Thought Experiment

Suppose every Māori was to disappear from New Zealand (perhaps a virus wiped out everyone with a Māori gene). Which of the principles would be abandoned or become redundant? Observe that Article 3 of Te Tiriti applies to all New Zealanders. (See D. Baragwanath (2024) ‘The Treaty and Essential Freshwater.’ NZ Law Journal, February, p.8.)

As it happens, every principle is intrinsic to the governance of a liberal democracy. While they are set as a restraint on the New Zealand Government of its treatment of a particular minority (Māori), in a liberal democracy – and under Article 3 of Te Tiriti – those restraints apply equally to all minorities – including the minority of one person. They are generally not platitudes; many hardly apply in Putin’s Russia.

So, even were there no Māori, the government would still have the right to govern; it would still have duty to act reasonably and in good faith, to make informed decisions and to remedy past grievances; all New Zealanders would remain equal before the law.

Conclusion

The Principles of the Treaty of Waitangi Bill does not propose to repeal the existing treaty principles but, by not endorsing them, the effect of passing the Bill would be to downgrade fundamental principles of a liberal democratic state. This would be greatly regretted and, in a more authoritarian state, dangerous.

Instead, whatever decision it makes about the bill, Parliament should endorse those principles in an appropriate way. Accordingly it is recommended:

2. That Parliament endorse the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi as set out by the Court of Appeal in New Zealand Māori Council v Attorney-General (1987) (C.A. 54/87), while acknowledging that the understandings of Te Tiriti o Waitangi and its implications will continue to evolve organically.

Appendix I: The Principles of the Treaty; An Exploration

by Brian Easton.

I prepared an earlier version of this note in May 2024 for myself, when the debate on the  ‘principles of the treaty’ (i.e. Te Tiriti o Waitangi) became intense. This paper concludes that the treaty principles restrain the New Zealand Government in its treatment of a particular minority (Māori), but that those restraints apply equally to all minorities in a liberal democracy including the minority of one person. All they do is make the restraints more explicit for Māori.

The Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975

Treaty principles were introduced into the governance of New Zealand by the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 whose purpose was

‘to provide for the observance, and confirmation, of the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi by establishing a Tribunal to make recommendations on claims relating to the practical application of the Treaty and to determine whether certain matters are inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty.’

The Act’s preamble goes on that ‘a Tribunal be established to make recommendations on claims relating to the practical application of the principles of the Treaty and, for that purpose, to determine its meaning and effect and whether certain matters are inconsistent with those principles.’ However, the act did not state what those principles were. Subsequently, various other statutes have references to the principles – again without defining them.

The Court of Appeal

The inclusion of the principles in the State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986 led to a Court of Appeal case New Zealand Māori Council v Attorney-General (1987) (a.k.a. the ‘Lands’ case or the ‘SOE’ case). It forced the Court to define the treaty principles. The judgements do not codified their principles, but a common summary (numbered here for reference) of their deliberations is:

1CA The Crown has the right to govern. The principles of the treaty ‘do not authorise unreasonable restrictions on the right of a duly elected government to follow its chosen policy. Indeed, to try and shackle the Government unreasonably would itself be inconsistent with those principles’.

2CA The Crown has a duty to act reasonably and in good faith. The relationship is ‘akin to partnership between the Crown and Māori people, and of its obligation on each side to act in good faith.’ The judgment draws parallels with ‘our partnership laws’.

3CA Active Crown has a duty to protect Māori interests. ‘The duty of the Crown was not just passive but extended to active protection of Māori people in the use of their lands and waters to the fullest extent practicable.’

4CA The government should make informed decisions. The Court said that ‘in order to act reasonably and in good faith, the government must make sure it was informed in making decisions relating to the treaty. That will ‘require some consultation’.

5CA The Crown should remedy past grievances. ‘If the Waitangi Tribunal finds merit in a claim and recommends redress, the Crown should grant at least some form of redress, unless there are grounds justifying a reasonable Treaty partner in withholding it – which would be only in very special circumstances, if ever.’[1]

Since 1987, other court cases have developed the application of the principles. For instance, active protection of Māori people now extends to other taonga such as te reo. It seems likely that the courts would also recognise kaitiakitanga – guardianship of the environment – rights, even if they were not in statute. Additionally, court decisions have protected Māori property rights. (They are implicit in the Court’s third and fifth principles.)

The New Zealand Government Principles

The New Zealand Government set out principles in 1989 to guide its actions on matters relating to the treaty. No subsequent government has modified them, thereby implicitly endorsing them. They were:

‘6NZG The government has the right to govern and make laws. (The kāwanatanga principle)

‘7NZG Iwi have the right to organise as iwi, and, under the law, to control their resources as their own. (The rangatiratanga principle)

‘8NZG All New Zealanders are equal before the law.

‘9NZG Both the government and iwi are obliged to accord each other reasonable cooperation on major issues of common concern.

‘10NZG The government is responsible for providing effective processes for the resolution of grievances in the expectation that reconciliation can occur.’[2]

The Waitangi Tribunal

The 1975 legislation establishing the Waitangi Tribunal charged it with applying the principles without stating what they were. Presumably the intention was that the Tribunal would identify them. The Tribunal has described in detail its approach in Principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. In summary:

‘11WT The principle of partnership. ‘The Court of Appeal has referred to the Treaty relationship as “akin to a partnership”, and therefore uses the concept as an analogy, emphasizing a duty on the parties to act reasonably, honourably, and in good faith. The Waitangi Tribunal has also emphasized the obligation on both parties to act reasonably, honourably, and in good faith, but derives these duties from the principle of reciprocity and the principle of mutual benefit.’

‘12WT The principle of reciprocity. ‘The Waitangi Tribunal’s understanding of the principle of reciprocity is derived from Articles I and II of the Treaty and captures the “essential bargain” or “solemn exchange” agreed to in the Treaty by Māori and the Crown: the exchange of sovereignty for the guarantee of tino rangatiratanga.’

‘13WT The principle of mutual benefit. ‘The Tribunal has found that the principle of mutual benefit or mutual advantage is a cornerstone of the Treaty partnership. An underlying premise is that both partners signed the Treaty expecting to benefit from the arrangement. This principle requires that “the needs of both cultures must be provided for and compromise may be needed in some cases to achieve this objective”.’

‘14WT The duty to act reasonably, honourably, and in good faith. ‘The Treaty signifies a partnership between the Crown and Māori people and the compact rests on the premise that each partner will act reasonably and in utmost good faith towards the other.’

‘15WT The duty to make informed decisions. ‘The Courts have found that it is inherent in the Crown’s obligation to act in good faith that it is obliged to make informed decisions on matters affecting the interests of Māori.’

‘16WT The principle of active protection. ‘The principle encompasses the Crown’s obligation to take positive steps to ensure that Māori interests are protected. The Courts have considered the principle primarily in association with the property interests guaranteed to Māori in Article II of the Treaty.’

‘17WT The principle of redress. ‘The Court of Appeal has acknowledged that it is a principle of partnership generally, and of the Treaty relationship in particular, that past wrongs give rise to a right of redress.’[3]

It will be evident that the Tribunal’s principles primarily derive from decisions by the courts. However, the courts may not necessarily agree with the Tribunal’s interpretation of the application of those principles. (The Tribunal is not a court and its findings do not have the standing of a court unless a court endorses them. On the other hand, the Tribunal must respect court decisions and legislation.)

Te Puni Kōkiri

Te Puni Kōkiri’s He Tirohanga ō Kawa ki te Tiriti o Waitangi: A Guide to the Principles of the Treaty of Waitangi as expressed by the Courts and the Waitangi Tribunal identified the following principles:

The principle of partnership (11WT);

The principle of reciprocity (12WT);

The principle of mutual benefit (13WT);

The duty to act reasonably, honourably and in good faith (14WT, 2CA);

The duty to make informed decisions (15WT, 4CA);

The principle of active protection (16WT, 3CA);

The principle of redress (17WT).[4]

They are the same principles as the Waitangi Tribunal.

A Thought Experiment

Rather than provide a consolidation or synthesis of the above principles, consider the following thought experiment. Suppose every Māori was to disappear from New Zealand (perhaps a virus wiped out everyone with a Māori gene). Which of the principles would be abandoned or become redundant? Observe that it can be argued that Article 3 of Te Tiriti applies to all New Zealanders. [5]

Surprisingly – at least to me – every principle is intrinsic to the governance of a liberal democracy. Their effect is to restrain the New Zealand Government in its treatment of a particular minority (Māori). In a liberal democracy those restraints apply equally to all minorities – including the minority of one person. They are generally not platitudes; many hardly apply in Putin’s Russia.

So, even were there no Māori, the government would still have the right to govern. (1CA, 6NZG); it would still have duty to act reasonably and in good faith (2CA, 11WT, 14WT [6]), to make informed decisions (4CA, 15WT) and to remedy past grievances (5CA, 10NZG, 17WT); all New Zealanders would remain equal before the law (8NZG).

The Tribunal principles of reciprocity (12WT) and mutual benefit (13WT) also fit into this liberal democratic framework, although that requires a little more finesse. I am not providing it here, because I would use a social contract approach but other social democrats could take a different approach to reach a similar conclusion.

Do Iwi Have Special Status?

With no living Māori, the other principles that the Crown has an active duty to protect Māori interests becomes redundant in the thought experiment. (3CA, 16WT) But the Crown surely has an equal duty to protect the interests of individual non-Māori.

However while they can be interpreted as applying to all New Zealanders not just conferring a special right to those of Māori descent, the same conclusion does not apply to‘Iwi’. (Iwi is capitalised to indicate ‘tribes’ rather than people; hapu are included.)

Do the following principles apply in similar ways to other voluntary organisations in a social democracy?

3CA ‘The duty of the Crown was not just passive but extended to active protection of Māori people in the use of their lands and waters to the fullest extent practicable.’

7NZG ‘Iwi have the right to organise as iwi, and, under the law, to control their resources as their own.’

16WT ‘The principle encompasses the Crown’s obligation to take positive steps to ensure that Māori interests are protected.’ (This combines the two and need not be considered separately.)

So perhaps Iwi are special. For instance, the Government’s Employment Contract Act 1991 undermined trade unions. No one questioned the right of Parliament to pass such legislation, although many questioned whether it should do so. Doing the same thing to Iwi would undermine a treaty principle. Similarly other organisations at a similar level in the political/social structure, including churches and local authorities, have no such guarantees. Perhaps key to the difference is that Iwi existed as political/social entities before the arrival of the New Zealand Government in 1840. All others came after.

If this principle gives a special status to Iwi, the Government has a particular responsibility to listen to their concerns. However, as the Court of Appeal ruled, that does not give Iwi a veto. (1CA) Principle 7NZG also suggests that the Government has a duty to ensure strong viable Iwi. That is a reason that the treaty settlements were made with Iwi rather than with individual Māori.

What is unclear is the extent of the obligation on the Government to support a failing Iwi. It seems likely that were an Iwi’s rohe devastated by, say, an earthquake or volcano there would be a special obligation towards restoring the Iwi in the post-disaster reconstruction. But suppose the Iwi failed financially through mismanagement?

We also need to ponder what exactly an Iwi is. The distinction between Iwi and hapu was fluid in 1840 and varied by region. The Government has tended to treat hapu as Iwi in terms of treaty settlements. Moreover, new forms of Māori organisation – such as Urban Māori Authorities and the Māori Women’s Welfare League – may amount to modern Iwi. At the heart of such issues is the principle – not mentioned as a treaty one but fundamental to a modern social democratic state – of the right to Māori and others to develop.[7]

In summary, the Treaty Principles do not seem to give individual Māori any particular rights that everyone in a social democracy does not have. However, the principles seem to give special rights to Māori organisations such as Iwi, but they are limited; that does not give those organisations a veto in the governance of New Zealand.

Co-Governance

It is useful to distinguish between self-government, partnership, co-management and co-governance.

The self-government of Iwi is mentioned explicitly or implicitly in a number of treaty principles (especially 7NZG) arising from the second article of Te Tiriti. It is argued that self-government may be weakened by co-governance, although that depends on what the latter means which, as we shall see, is uncertain. Many other voluntary organisations would claim the right to self-government.

Partnership is mentioned in the Treaty Principles (2CA, 5CA, 11WT, 13WT, 14WT, 17WT). However it is clear that the Court of Appeal’s was referring to an ongoing relationship between the Crown and Māori with obligations to act reasonably and in good faith, akin to a partnership, echoing an earlier phrase, ‘the honour of the crown’.

The Court’s judgement does not require the partners to be of equal status. It certainly did not have in mind the institutional arrangement which is the basis of legal partnerships. Indeed, it explicitly rules that out with its principles of the right of the Crown to govern and the right of Māori to continue to exercise self-determination.

Of course, the Crown may enter into a legal partnership on a particular project with an Iwi, as it can with any other entity, as a pragmatic solution to a practical problem. But this does not involve any treaty principle.

Co-management arises out of the second article of Te Tiriti and is implicit in some Treaty Principles (2CA, 5CA, 9NZG, 13WT, 14WT, 16WT). It is a pragmatic solution where the status of taonga/treasures is unresolved.

For instance, the ownership of the Waikato River is complicated by Māori and English law having quite different conceptual frameworks of river ownership. Rather than litigating it was agreed that the management of the Waikato River would be assigned to a Waikato River Authority. Half the ten-member management board is appointed by the Crown and half by local Iwi in a co-management of the resource. The funding is from the Crown; the accountability of each board member is not to the institution which appointed them, but to the trust as set out in the legislation.

The essence of co-management involves management of resources in the public domain where management is shared within a trustee framework set out by legislation.

Co-governance There is no definition of co-governance. As Prime Minister Chris Hipkins said, ‘no one understands what

[co-governance]

means because we’re talking about quite different things’. A March 2023 survey found that only 17 percent of respondents said that they had ‘a good grasp of the concept’; they are likely to have offered many different grasps

The notion of co-governance seems to have arisen out of an attempt to implement the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. However, the declaration does not use the word. It refers to ‘government’ on only three occasions: ‘self-government’ (Article 4); ‘intergovernmental’ (Article 41); ‘good governance’ (Article 46).

The He Puapua report, commissioned to respond to the declaration, did not define ‘co-governance’, but it recommended ‘the establishment of a high-level co-governance body comprised of equal numbers of government ministers and Māori representatives’, including that consideration should be given to the creation of an ‘upper house in Parliament that could scrutinise legislation for compliance with Te Tiriti and/or the Declaration [of Independence]. Various models for the composition of such a body could include a partnership model (with 50/50 rangatiratanga and kāwanatanga representation).’

The most prominent example of co-governance was in the first ‘Three Waters’ proposal, to manage fresh-, storm- and waste-water by four entities whose boards would consist of half appointees of the Crown or district councils and half from Iwi, similar to the co-management of natural resources. This sharing of seats on the board seemed to be at the heart of the notion of co-governance.

But Three Waters is not co-management. It is not about water but the infrastructure to manage the water – up to – $200b worth of it. Water is a Second Article matter, better dealt with by Māori having a share of the water consents in an approach similar to fishing quotas. [8] The initial Three Waters proposal would have been like requiring all holders of fishing quotas to have half their boards consisting of Māori.

Each water infrastructure entity would have been a monopoly, with an element of taxation from its powers to raise revenue by water charges and by area-based rates. Additionally, borrowing requires an underwriting of the loans in case an entity fails financially. In principle, if the governance is shared between local authority and Iwi appointees then the risk should be shared too, although it seems unlikely that Iwi could guarantee their share of the $200b which is likely to be borrowed. The financial accountability of the proposed co-governance entities was very unclear.

There has been no attempt to relate co-governance to the Treaty Principles nor to any reasonable historical or contemporary interpretation of Te Tiriti o Waitangi. Unlike partnership, self-government and co-management, co-governance has not been derived from treaty principles.

Conclusion

The majority of the treaty principles are hardly controversial. They are articulated in terms of how the government should treat those of Māori descent, restraining its majoritarian powers. We would expect in a liberal democracy that the government would treat non-Māori in a similar way.

The one group of principles excluded from the sentiments in the previous paragraph are those which give Iwi a special status. Such preferences occur in other liberal democracies as when there is an established church or for some families (e.g. the Windsor monarchy). It is, however, a restricted special status.

What seems to be happening is that the expression ‘treaty principles’ is about a larger debate on the direction(s) New Zealand should/might take. Focusing on the principles fails to frame this debate in helpful or creative ways.

One concern is that those of Māori descent have some constitutional rights that non-Māori do not. (I assume that membership of an Iwi is treated as a question of family.) It is a belief of some Māori – I recall one who insisted he had rights under Te Tiriti to a medical treatment which would not be provided to a non-Māori. It is also the belief of some non-Māori, often with resentment.

While it is a larger task than I can do here, one could go through all New Zealand statutes (and policies) and identify those where Māori are differentiated. One example will illustrate the issue. The Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 establishes a tribunal which can only hear grievances against the Crown initiated by a person of Māori descent. Initially the focus was on property rights unfairly taken by the Crown from Iwi despite Article Two of Te Tiriti, but the scope of the Tribunal’s enquiries has since widened to other perceived grievances. A fair-minded non-Māori might be envious.

I shall go no further because we need the full list of the examples to have a civilised discussion. Yes, there will be instances when treating Māori differently makes sense. My favourite example is that one of the first actions of the publicly funded Māori anti-smoking agency was to recommend smoking be banned on marae. (Māori smoking rates were, and are still, well above average.) No non-Māori agency nor the Government would have dared publicly advocate such a course. It makes sense to provide public services differently to meet the cultural differences of various groups – but not only to Māori.

Whatever the outcome of such a review of the statutes, it probably would not address all the public concerns. At their heart is social change, which is happening perhaps faster than in any other prolonged period of human endeavour.

Much is generated offshore and from new technologies. However, there is a domestic driver: the development of an Aotearoa New Zealand distinctive from the offshore heritage and relevant to the locality – call it ‘decolonisation’. It has been going on since day one of the arrival of the proto-Māori, and is very evident in the record of the first European settlers.

An obvious part of decolonialisation is ‘indigenisation’ – drawing on the culture of the tangata whenua – something which would happen even were there no Māori genes left in the world. (A simple example. A mountain was named after the 1769 First Lord of the Admiralty who may have been a precursor of Gilbert and Sullivan’s First Lord –in HMS Pinafore – who ‘never went to sea’. The name has been changed to ‘Taranaki’.)

There is considerable resistance to such changes, even if with eventual hindsight they seem logical – understandably so, for individuals get their intellectual foundations from their early years. (Keynes famously said ‘there are not many who are influenced by new theories after they are twenty-five or thirty years of age’.) I am often struck by popular views not unlike those I learned in my childhood in the 1950s such as most Māori are almost only of Māori ancestry; a treaty in in English was signed on 6 February 1840 which was unique rather that one of many Britain signed with natives; ‘we’ fought against ‘them’ in the Māori Wars of the 1860s. The nostalgia may even extend to a wish that ‘they’ would go back to the pa, despite today the majority of Māori being in urban centres. (They are good for New Zealand sport though.)

Managing social change is not easy. The temptation is inertia; sometimes it happens faster than even the majority of those with goodwill can cope with. Resistance often ends up with not very relevant symbols. Thus it seems to be with the objection to the principles of the treaty.

Endnotes

[1] Based upon https://teara.govt.nz/en/principles-of-the-treaty-of-waitangi-nga-matapono-o-te-tiriti-o-waitangi

[2] https://teara.govt.nz/en/principles-of-the-treaty-of-waitangi-nga-matapono-o-te-tiriti-o-waitangi.

[3] https://www.waitangitribunal.govt.nz/assets/Documents/Publications/WT-Principles-of-the-Treaty-of-Waitangi-as-expressed-by-the-Courts-and-the-Waitangi-Tribunal.pdf (2001)

[4] wttps://www.tpk.govt.nz/en/o-matou-mohiotanga/crownmaori-relations/he-tirohanga-o-kawa-ki-te-tiriti-o-waitangi (2001)

[5] E.g. D. Baragwanath (2024) ‘The Treaty and Essential Freshwater.’ NZ Law Journal, February, p.8.

[6] This interprets 11WT – the principle of partnership – as the Court of Appeal set out: to act reasonably and in good faith akin to a partnership.

[7] Waitangi Tribunal (1988) Report of the Waitangi Tribunal on the Muriwhenua Fishing Claim (Wai22)

[8] https://www.pundit.co.nz/content/trading-water-resource-consents

Quality Ministers

While we may not always have quality political leadership, a couple of recently published autobiographies indicate sometimes we strike it lucky.

When ranking our prime ministers, retired professor of history Erik Olssen commented that ‘neither Holland nor Nash was especially effective as prime minister – even his private secretary thought Nash was ineffectual’. Even so, Olssen ranked the two as 11th and 12th out of 21 (and two other historians ranked them even higher). That means Olssen judged there were nine of our prime ministers who were even less effective. Apparently, ineffective prime ministers presided for roughly half the time since the position became formalised in the early twentieth century (previously they were ‘premiers’). It is a salutary reminder that so many of even our top politicians are mediocre, although often that does not become publicly stated until the cosmetics of office are stripped away.

Not surprisingly then, one ends up reading many biographies and autobiographies (often ghost-written) of politicians as a matter of duty or nostalgia. However, sometimes the subject is a quality politician – one way or another – and the reading becomes a pleasure while providing insights. Earlier columns have reviewed the memoirs of Michael Cullen (here and here) and Chris Finlayson (here). Here follow two more which are worth reading.

Derek Quigley (b.1932) was a National MP from 1975 to 1984 (almost four years as a cabinet minister – mainly housing) where he fell out very publicly with Rob Muldoon. Between 1996 and 1999 he was back in Parliament as an ACT MP. This and much more is set out in Challenging the Status Quo: A Political Memoir.

The book chronicles Quigley’s life as well as giving a thumbnail history of the National Party. Politically he is anchored in National on its rightish side, very committed to private enterprise but not quite a neoliberal. (He does not really have a good grasp on the challenges the New Zealand economy has been facing.) His membership of ACT was as much to redirect National. There is a fascinating account of the ideological tensions within the ACT Party, still playing out today, and a gripping account of the failed ‘Colonels Coup’ against Muldoon in 1980, as well as much political gossip. Those interested in international relations will appreciate his detailed accounts of the role he played in restructuring the military. I greatly valued his account of being a minister.

As I did when reading Steven Joyce’s autobiography. A generation younger (b.1963), Joyce was a National minister from 2008 to 2017. He did not fall out with his Prime Minister. John Key lauds him as ‘the guy who got stuff done’. Called ‘the Minister of Everything’, as the seven major portfolios he held indicates, there is much less politics in his On the Record. He is too busy telling you about what he got done.

As is usual, Joyce starts off with his early life. At university he got involved with student radio, which he built up into the successful network RadioWorks. He learned there how to interact with the public, which led, after he sold his holding, to running National’s election campaigns, and then a list MP jumping immediately to become a minister in the Key-English Government.

One cannot help noticing that he developed his radio network by seizing opportunities from changing government regulation. Quigley’s business success after politics was also dependent upon opportunities created by government actions. One can favour private enterprise, but never escape the symbiosis between it and the public sector.

The public has a shallow understanding of the way a minister works; so have, it would seem, many politicians with ministerial ambitions, who think it is about getting the baubles of office and then do what they think should be done (assuming they think). The two books show it is much harder than that. For that reason alone the books should be read by any aspiring politician, potential policy public servant, or observer of how governments actually work.

Quigley was the Minister of Housing for just under four years but his detailed account of twice restructuring the defence services reinforces the description of the required skills. Marilyn Waring said ‘if every minister ran their portfolio like Quigley runs Housing, we would be in government forever.’ Joyce is even more detailed. I was long puzzled about some features of his creation, the Ministry of Business and Innovation and Employment. I am clearer now – I still think the creation of the mega-department was not a good decision. (Ironically, now out of power, Joyce is likely to argue for greater decentralisation.)

There is an important difference between their presentations. Quigley acknowledges the role of his advisers, even naming a particularly valued Treasury economist. Quelle horreur! The convention is that officials at this level are anonymous. Joyce hardly mentions his advisers.

Joyce certainly deserves credit for, say, the broadband rollout. But the story is more complicated. Work on the rollout was well under way by the Clark-Cullen Labour Government, including taking the first steps to separate Telecom’s value-added services (it became Spark), where the market was potentially competitive, from the monopolistic line operation (Chorus) which Telecom had been using to beat its competitors. Almost certainly, Joyce depended on at least one unmentioned official, probably a specialist network economist.

Could either have been a prime minister? Quigley describes how his prospects of leading the National Party were blocked first by Muldoon and later by Jim Bolger – neither of whom he has much time for. Joyce was a contender for National leadership after Bill English’s resignation. The winner, Simon Bridges, demoted him and he left Parliament – he was 55. (Portfolios are often allocated on the basis of rewards to allies, rather than on ability.)

Each is a reminder that the most able may not reach the top. In Labour’s history, Arnold Nordmeyer would almost certainly have made a better prime minister than Nash. But we should never overlook that ministerial success is dependent upon quality, usually anonymous, advisers – although even the best cannot overcome the limitations of a weak boss.

The Principles of the Treaty: An Exploration

I prepared an earlier version of this note in May 2024 for myself, when the ‘principles of the treaty’ (i.e. Te Tiriti o Waitangi) was a political hotpoint. The most public was ACT’s proposal to have a referendum on the treaty principles.[1] The paper concludes that the treaty principles (with one exception which is explained below) restrain the New Zealand Government in its treatment of a particular minority (Māori), but that those restraints apply equally to all minorities in a liberal democracy including the minority of one person – everyone. All they do is make the restraints more explicit for Māori.

The Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975

Treaty principles were introduced into the governance of New Zealand by the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 whose purpose was

‘to provide for the observance, and confirmation, of the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi by establishing a Tribunal to make recommendations on claims relating to the practical application of the Treaty and to determine whether certain matters are inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty.’

The Act’s preamble goes on that ‘a Tribunal be established to make recommendations on claims relating to the practical application of the principles of the Treaty and, for that purpose, to determine its meaning and effect and whether certain matters are inconsistent with those principles.’ However, the act did not state what those principles were. Subsequently, various other statutes have references to the principles – again without defining them.

The Court of Appeal

The inclusion of the principles in the State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986 led to a Court of Appeal case New Zealand Māori Council v Attorney-General (1987) (a.k.a. the ‘Lands’ case or the ‘SOE’ case). It forced the Court to define the treaty principles. The judgements do not codified their principles, but a common summary (numbered here for future reference) of their deliberations is:

‘1CA The Crown has the right to govern. The principles of the treaty ‘do not authorise unreasonable restrictions on the right of a duly elected government to follow its chosen policy. Indeed, to try and shackle the Government unreasonably would itself be inconsistent with those principles’.

‘2CA The Crown has a duty to act reasonably and in good faith. The relationship is ‘akin to partnership between the Crown and Māori people, and of its obligation on each side to act in good faith.’ The judgment draws parallels with ‘our partnership laws’.

‘3CA   Active Crown has a duty to protect Māori interests. ‘The duty of the Crown was not just passive but extended to active protection of Māori people in the use of their lands and waters ‘to the fullest extent practicable.’

‘4CA The government should make informed decisions. The Court said that in order to act reasonably and in good faith, the government must make sure it was informed in making decisions relating to the treaty. That will ‘require some consultation’.

‘5CA The Crown should remedy past grievances. ‘If the Waitangi Tribunal finds merit in a claim and recommends redress, the Crown should grant at least some form of redress, unless there are grounds justifying a reasonable Treaty partner in withholding it – which would be only in very special circumstances, if ever.’[2]

Since 1987, other court cases have developed the application of the principles. For instance, active protection of Māori people now extends to other taonga such as te reo. It seems likely that the courts would also recognise kaitiakitanga – guardianship of the environment – rights, even if they were not in statute. Additionally, court decisions have protected Māori property rights. (They are implicit in the Court’s third and fifth principles.)

The New Zealand Government Principles

The New Zealand Government set out principles in 1989 to guide its actions on matters relating to the treaty. No subsequent government has modified them, thereby implicitly endorsing them. They were:

‘6NZG The government has the right to govern and make laws. (The kāwanatanga principle)

‘7NZG Iwi have the right to organise as iwi, and, under the law, to control their resources as their own. (The rangatiratanga principle)

‘8NZG All New Zealanders are equal before the law.

‘9NZG Both the government and iwi are obliged to accord each other reasonable cooperation on major issues of common concern.

‘10NZG The government is responsible for providing effective processes for the resolution of grievances in the expectation that reconciliation can occur.’[3]

The Waitangi Tribunal

The 1975 legislation establishing the Waitangi Tribunal charged it with applying the principles without stating what they were. Presumably the intention was that the Tribunal would identify them. The Tribunal has described in detail its approach in Principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. In summary:

‘11WT The principle of partnership. ‘The Court of Appeal has referred to the Treaty relationship as “akin to a partnership”, and therefore uses the concept as an analogy, emphasizing a duty on the parties to act reasonably, honourably, and in good faith. The Waitangi Tribunal has also emphasized the obligation on both parties to act reasonably, honourably, and in good faith, but derives these duties from the principle of reciprocity and the principle of mutual benefit.’

‘12WT The principle of reciprocity. ‘The Waitangi Tribunal’s understanding of the principle of reciprocity is derived from Articles I and II of the Treaty and captures the “essential bargain” or “solemn exchange” agreed to in the Treaty by Māori and the Crown: the exchange of sovereignty for the guarantee of tino rangatiratanga.’

‘13WT The principle of mutual benefit. ‘The Tribunal has found that the principle of mutual benefit or mutual advantage is a cornerstone of the Treaty partnership. An underlying premise is that both partners signed the Treaty expecting to benefit from the arrangement. This principle requires that “the needs of both cultures must be provided for and compromise may be needed in some cases to achieve this objective”.’

‘14WT The duty to act reasonably, honourably, and in good faith. ‘The Treaty signifies a partnership between the Crown and Māori people and the compact rests on the premise that each partner will act reasonably and in utmost good faith towards the other.’

‘15WT The duty to make informed decisions. ‘The Courts have found that it is inherent in the Crown’s obligation to act in good faith that it is obliged to make informed decisions on matters affecting the interests of Māori.’

‘16WT The principle of active protection. ‘The principle encompasses the Crown’s obligation to take positive steps to ensure that Māori interests are protected. The Courts have considered the principle primarily in association with the property interests guaranteed to Māori in Article II of the Treaty.’

‘17WT The principle of redress. ‘The Court of Appeal has acknowledged that it is a principle of partnership generally, and of the Treaty relationship in particular, that past wrongs give rise to a right of redress.’[4]

It will be evident that the Tribunal’s principles primarily derive from decisions by the courts. However, the courts may not necessarily agree with the Tribunal’s interpretation of the application of those principles. (The Tribunal is not a court and its findings do not have the standing of a court unless a court endorses them. On the other hand, the Tribunal must respect court decisions and legislation.)

Te Puni Kōkiri

Te Puni Kōkiri’s He Tirohanga ō Kawa ki te Tiriti o Waitangi: A Guide to the Principles of the Treaty of Waitangi as expressed by the Courts and the Waitangi Tribunal identified the following principles:

The principle of partnership (11WT);

The principle of reciprocity (12WT);

The principle of mutual benefit (13WT);

The duty to act reasonably, honourably and in good faith (14WT, 2CA);

The duty to make informed decisions (15WT, 4CA);

The principle of active protection (16WT, 3CA);

The principle of redress (17WT).[5]

They are the same principles as the Waitangi Tribunal.

A Thought Experiment

Rather than provide a consolidation or synthesis of the above principles, consider the following thought experiment. Suppose every Māori was to disappear from New Zealand (perhaps a virus wiped out everyone with a Māori gene). Which of the principles would be abandoned or become redundant, assuming that they apply to all New Zealanders? After all, it can be argued that Article 3 of Te Tiriti applies to all New Zealanders. [6]

Surprisingly – at least to me – virtually ever principle is intrinsic to the governance of a liberal democracy. Their effect is to restrain the New Zealand Government in its treatment of a particular minority (Māori). In a liberal democracy those restraints apply equally to all minorities– including the minority of one person. They are generally not platitudes; many hardly apply in Putin’s Russia.

So, even were there no Māori, the government would still have the right to govern. (1CA, 6NZG). It would still have duty to act reasonably and in good faith (2CA, 11WT, 14WT[7]), to make informed decisions (4CA, 15WT) and to remedy past grievances (5CA, 10NZG, 17WT). All New Zealanders would remain equal before the law (8NZG).

The Tribunal principles of reciprocity (12WT) and mutual benefit (13WT) also fit into this liberal democratic framework, although that requires a little more finesse. I am not providing it here, because I would use a social contract approach but other social democrats could take a different approach to reach a similar conclusion.

Do Iwi Have Special Status?

With no living Māori, the other principles that the Crown has an active duty to protect Māori interests becomes redundant in the thought experiment. (3CA, 16WT) But the Crown surely has an equal duty to protect the interests of individual non-Māori.

However while they can be interpreted as applying to all New Zealanders not just conferring a special right to those of Māori descent, the same conclusion does not apply to‘Iwi’. (Iwi is capitalised to indicate ‘tribes’ rather than people; hapu are included.)

Do the following principles apply in similar ways to other voluntary organisations in a social democracy?

3CA ‘The duty of the Crown was not just passive but extended to active protection of Māori people in the use of their lands and waters to the fullest extent practicable.’

7NZG ‘Iwi have the right to organise as iwi, and, under the law, to control their resources as their own.’

16WT ‘The principle encompasses the Crown’s obligation to take positive steps to ensure that Māori interests are protected.’ (This combines the two and need not be considered separately.)

So perhaps Iwi are special. For instance, the Government’s Employment Contract Act 1991 deliberately undermined trade unions. No one questioned the right of Parliament to pass such legislation, although many questioned whether it should do so. Doing the same thing to Iwi would undermine a treaty principle. Similarly other organisations at a similar level in the political/social structure, including churches and local authorities, have no such guarantees. Perhaps key to the difference is that Iwi existed as political/social entities before the arrival of the New Zealand Government in 1840. All the others came after.

This gives a special status to Iwi. The Government has a particular responsibility to listen to their concerns. However, as the Court of Appeal ruled, that does not give Iwi a veto. (1CA) Principle 7NZG also suggests that the Government has a duty to ensure strong viable Iwi. That may be a reason that the treaty settlements were made with Iwi rather than with individual Māori.

What is unclear is the extent of the obligation on the Government to support a failing Iwi. It seems likely that were an Iwi’s rohe devastated by, say, an earthquake or volcano there would be a special obligation towards restoring the Iwi in the post-disaster reconstruction. But suppose the Iwi failed financially through mismanagement?

We also need to ponder what exactly an Iwi is. The distinction between Iwi and hapu was fluid in 1840, and varied by region. The Government has tended to treat hapu as Iwi in terms of treaty settlements. Moreover, new forms of Māori organisation – such as Urban Māori Authorities and the Māori Women’s Welfare League – may amount to modern Iwi. At the heart of such issues is the principle – not mentioned as a treaty one but fundamental to a modern social democratic state – of the right to Māori and others to develop.[8]

In summary, the Treaty Principles do not seem to give individual Māori any particular rights that everyone in a social democracy does not have. However, the principles seem to give special rights to Māori organisations such as Iwi, but they are limited; that does not give those organisations a veto in the governance of New Zealand.

Co-Governance

It is useful to distinguish between self-government, partnership, co-management and co-governance.

The self-government of Iwi is mentioned explicitly or implicitly in a number of treaty principles (especially 7NZG) arising from the second article of Te Tiriti. It is argued that self-government may be weakened by co-governance, although that depends on what the latter means which, as we shall see, is uncertain. Many other voluntary organisations would claim the right to self-government.

Partnership is mentioned in the Treaty Principles (2CA, 5CA, 11WT, 13WT, 14WT, 17WT). However it is clear that the Court of Appeal’s was referring to an ongoing relationship between the Crown and Māori with obligations to act reasonably and in good faith, akin to a partnership, echoing an earlier phrase, ‘the honour of the crown’.

The Court’s judgement does not require the partners to be of equal status. It certainly did not have in mind the institutional arrangement which is the basis of legal partnerships. Indeed, it explicitly rules that out with its principles of the right of the Crown to govern and the right of Māori to continue to exercise self-determination.

Of course, the Crown may enter into a legal partnership on a particular project with an Iwi, as it can with any other entity, as a pragmatic solution to a practical problem. But this does not involve any treaty principle.

Co-management arises out of the second article of Te Tiriti and is implicit in some Treaty Principles (2CA, 5CA, 9NZG, 13WT, 14WT, 16WT). It is a pragmatic solution where the status of taonga/treasures is unresolved.

For instance, the ownership of the Waikato River is complicated by Māori and English law having quite different conceptual frameworks of river ownership. Rather than litigating it was agreed that the management of the Waikato River would be assigned to a Waikato River Authority. Half the ten-member management board is appointed by the Crown and half by local Iwi in a co-management of the resource. The funding is from the Crown; the accountability of each board member is not to the institution which appointed them, but to the trust as set out in the legislation.

The essence of co-management involves management of resources in the public domain where management is shared within a trustee framework set out by legislation.

Co-governance

There is no definition of co-governance. As Prime Minister Chris Hipkins said, ‘no one understands what

[co-governance]

means because we’re talking about quite different things’. A March 2023 survey found that only 17 percent of respondents said that they had ‘a good grasp of the concept’; they are likely to have offered many different grasps

The notion of co-governance seems to have arisen out of an attempt to implement the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. However, the declaration does not use the word. It refers to ‘government’ on only three occasions: ‘self-government’ (Article 4); ‘intergovernmental’ (Article 41); ‘good governance’ (Article 46).

The He Puapua report, commissioned to respond to the declaration, did not define ‘co-governance’, but it recommended ‘the establishment of a high-level co-governance body comprised of equal numbers of government ministers and Māori representatives’, including that consideration should be given to the creation of an ‘upper house in Parliament that could scrutinise legislation for compliance with Te Tiriti and/or the Declaration [of Independence]. Various models for the composition of such a body could include a partnership model (with 50/50 rangatiratanga and kāwanatanga representation).’

The most prominent example of co-governance is the first ‘Three Waters’ proposal, to manage fresh-, storm- and waste-water by four entities whose boards would consist of half appointees of the Crown or district councils and half from Iwi, similar to the co-management of natural resources. This sharing of seats on the board seemed to be at the heart of the notion of co-governance.

But Three Waters is not co-management. It is not about water but the infrastructure to manage the water – up to – $200b worth of it. Water is a Second Article matter, better dealt with by Māori having a share of the water consents in an approach similar to fishing quotas. The initial Three Waters proposal would have been like requiring all holders of fishing quotas to have half their boards consisting of Māori.

Each water infrastructure entity would have been a monopoly, with an element of taxation from its powers to raise revenue by water charges and by area-based rates. Additionally, borrowing requires an underwriting of the loans in case an entity fails financially. In principle, if the governance is shared between local authority and Iwi appointees then the risk should be shared too, although it seems unlikely that Iwi could guarantee their share of the $200b. The financial accountability of the proposed co-governance entities was very unclear.

There has been no attempt to relate co-governance to the Treaty Principles nor to any reasonable historical or contemporary interpretation of Te Tiriti o Waitangi. With less caution it can be said that unlike partnership, self-government and co-management, co-governance has not been derived from treaty principles.

Conclusion

The majority of the treaty principles are hardly controversial. They are articulated in terms of how the government should treat those of Māori descent restraining its majoritarian powers. We would expect the government to treat non-Māori in a similar way. One could envisage a statute binding the Crown to these principles which applied to all New Zealanders.

The one group of principles excluded from the sentiments in the previous paragraph are those which give Iwi a special status. Such preferences occur in other liberal democracies as when there is an established church or for some families (e.g. the Windsor monarchy). It is, however, a restricted special status.

What seems to be happening is that the expression ‘treaty principles’ is about a larger debate on the direction(s) a ‘modern’ New Zealand should/might take. Focusing on the principles fails to frame this debate in helpful or creative ways.

One concern is that those of Māori descent have some constitutional rights that non-Māori do not. (I assume that membership of an Iwi is treated as a question of family.) It is a belief of some Māori – I recall one who insisted he had rights under Te Tiriti to a medical treatment which would not be provided to a non-Māori. It is also the belief of some non-Māori, often with resentment.

While it is a larger task than I can do here, one could go through all New Zealand statutes (and policies) and identify those where Māori are differentiated. One example will illustrate the issue. The Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 establishes a tribunal which can only hear grievances against the Crown initiated by a person of Māori descent. Initially the focus was on property rights unfairly taken by the Crown from Iwi despite Article Two of Te Tiriti, but the scope of the Tribunal’s enquiries has since widened to other perceived grievances. A fair-minded non-Māori might be envious.

I shall go no further because we need the full list of the examples to have a civilised discussion. Yes, there will be instances when treating Māori differently makes sense. My favourite example is that one of the first actions of the publicly funded Māori anti-smoking agency was to recommend smoking be banned on marae. (Māori smoking rates are well above average.) No non-Māori agency nor the Government would have dared publicly advocate such a course. It makes sense to provide public services differently to meet the cultural differences of various groups – but not only Māori.

Whatever the outcome of such a review of the statutes, it probably would not address all the public concerns. At their heart is social change, which is happening perhaps faster than in any other prolonged period of human endeavour.

Much is generated offshore and from new technologies. However, there is a domestic driver: the development of an Aotearoa New Zealand distinctive from the offshore heritage and relevant to the locality – call it ‘decolonisation’. It has been going on since day one of the arrival of the proto-Māori, and is very evident in the record of the first European settlers.

An obvious part of decolonialisation is ‘indigenisation’ – drawing on the culture of the tangata whenua – something which would happen even were there no Māori genes left in the world. (A simple example. A mountain was named after the 1769 First Lord of the Admiralty who may have been a precursor of Gilbert and Sullivan’s First Lord –in HMS Pinafore – who ‘never went to sea’. The name has been changed to ‘Taranaki’.)

There is considerable resistance to such changes, even if with eventual hindsight they seem logical – understandably so, for individuals get their intellectual foundations from their early years. (Keynes famously said ‘there are not many who are influenced by new theories after they are twenty-five or thirty years of age’.) I am often struck by popular views not unlike those I learned in my childhood in the 1950s: most Māori are almost only of Māori ancestry; a treaty in in English was signed on 6 February 1840 which was unique rather that one of many Britain signed with natives; ‘we’ fought against ‘them’ in the Māori Wars of the 1860s. The nostalgia may even extend to a wish that ‘they’ would go back to the pa, despite today the majority of Māori being in urban centres. (They are good for New Zealand sport though.)

Managing social change is not easy. The temptation is inertia; sometimes it happens faster than even the majority of those with goodwill can cope with. Resistance often ends up with not very relevant symbols. Thus it seems to be with the objection to the principles of the treaty.

Endnotes

[1] The paper avoids using the term ‘racist’. It is one of those dialogue stopping terms which appear too frequently in New Zealand’s popular discourse, and which has so many meanings that is meaningless.

[2] Based upon https://teara.govt.nz/en/principles-of-the-treaty-of-waitangi-nga-matapono-o-te-tiriti-o-waitangi

[3] https://teara.govt.nz/en/principles-of-the-treaty-of-waitangi-nga-matapono-o-te-tiriti-o-waitangi.

[4] https://www.waitangitribunal.govt.nz/assets/Documents/Publications/WT-Principles-of-the-Treaty-of-Waitangi-as-expressed-by-the-Courts-and-the-Waitangi-Tribunal.pdf (2001)

[5] https://www.tpk.govt.nz/en/o-matou-mohiotanga/crownmaori-relations/he-tirohanga-o-kawa-ki-te-tiriti-o-waitangi (2001)

[6] E.g. D. Baragwanath (2024) ‘The Treaty and Essential Freshwater.’ NZ Law Journal, February, p.8.

[7] This interprets 11WT – the principle of partnership – as the Court of Appeal set out: to act reasonably and in good faith akin to a partnership.

[8] Waitangi Tribunal (1988) Report of the Waitangi Tribunal on the Muriwhenua Fishing Claim (Wai22)

LOOKING FORWARD TO 2050: The Future Shape of the Aotearoa New Zealand Economy

We need to think about the pattern of the economy in 2050 (or whenever), not just its level of production. Focusing on productivity (and population) growth is a trap. Long-term strategic analysis requires attention to the composition of those aggregates.

Nor should we over-focus on GDP as the ultimate outcome of the economy or the principle target of economic policy. We need to consider the (admittedly vaguer) notion of wellbeing. My most recent thinking is encapsulated in Chapter 2 of my just published In Open Seas.

Productivity

Productivity is an arithmetical ratio between two aggregates (output and input) and profoundly uninteresting. The factors which determine the arithmetic ratio are not, but they are not well established or even researched (which allows the commentariat to promote its ideological policy preferences even though there is no empirical backing for them).

Productivity growth is usually attributed to ‘technology’ which is best thought of as blueprints – of how to do things. (See Chapter 4 of In Open Seas which also elaborates the earlier point that economic development is a much more complex phenomenon than growth in aggregate output.)

The ownership of the blueprints raises many difficult economic issues. However, more relevant to this paper’s focus is that around 99.7 percent of blueprints are created offshore. (Every country tends to claim its R&D sector punches above its weight; even were that true here, New Zealand’s contribution would still be tiny.)

Not every blueprint is relevant to New Zealand but there are also areas where local activity, such as geology, where it makes a significant contribution. Generally, the New Zealand challenge is to import and adapt blueprints created elsewhere. In many areas this would hardly modify the local research effort. The effective introduction of new medical treatments requires a vibrant local medical research program – if it sometimes makes world-innovative breakthroughs New Zealand is twice blessed. (On the other hand, failure to adapt the internationally generated can be catastrophic; economic policy’s willingness to import economic models from overseas without adapting them for differences in size, structure and other circumstances has contributed to poor economic performance.)

But economic growth also comes from the shift from non-market which is not included in the measures to market activity which is. One such shift involves the depletion of natural resources. (Chapter 5 of In Open Seas.) A second major one has been the shift from production within the household to commercial activity as when food preparation in the kitchen is replace by purchases outside the home. (Chapter 4 of In Open Seas but also Chapters 29 and 38 of Not In Narrow Seas.) These are long-term shifts, which is why a perspective from economic history is so valuable.

There is a substantial literature on necessary conditions for sustainable economic growth. The Ministry of Economic Development used to publish an annual list which evaluated New Zealand’s attainment against them. Generally, it scored high grades. The exception was the performance of local managers. The empirical evidence is sparse although it is consistent with anecdote. It suggests that New Zealand management is not of high quality. In my view this reflects culture. New Zealand’s management for small enterprises and agencies – which historically dominated – is probably good, but as the agency size increases the small-business style of management proves increasingly ineffective.

A caveat to all this is that it is clear that historically New Zealand’s economic performance has been intimately involved with the external sector. There is a tendency to analyse with the ‘Econ101′ closed economy and neglect the significant difference in the way that the small open multi-sectoral economy works. (In Stormy Seas)

The Evolution of Aggregate Output (GDP)

I have done considerable work measuring long-term productivity going back to the 1860s. It has not been easy because of data measurement difficulties.

I gave a paper on my findings to the Ministry of Economic Development in 2004. [1] It does not contain the presentation graphs which are attached here as a power point.

I do not propose to summarise the paper but the discussion around Chart 6 is pertinent here. I’ve underlined the key notion:

I have cobbled together the various GDP series, to give a 142 year run from March year 1861 to 2003, always using the better quality data. Chart 6 … In summary the last hundred years have seen an average growth of per capita GDP of about 1.6 percent p.a., a doubling of output per person every 44 years.                      

Chart 6 also shows a trend line based upon a fourth order polynomial. It recognises the nineteenth century stagnation, but sees a strong upward trend in the twentieth. However notice that the trend bends down late in the twentieth century. (For the record, the point of inflexion is 1938.) It may reflect the stagnation of the following years, an interpretation supported by the fact that GDP levels have been above trend in the past few years. Alternately, it may indicate a slowing of the long-run growth rate for New Zealand.

I have not updated the paper (yet – it is somewhere in the work program). But the observation that the growth rate of GDP seemed to be slowing down remains pertinent today. (Note that the variable discussed here is total output, not productivity.)

While I had forgotten I had made the observation, I have been continuing to ponder on the general issue of secular stagnation. The problem does not seem confined to New Zealand. I need to check that New Zealand per capita GDP still seems to have been growing at similar rate to other affluent economies (see Chart 7 of the 2004 paper) once one allows for shocks like the wool price crash and Rogernomics. Of course, there are short term differences related to different cycles and minor secular differences which may be attributed to measurement differences.

Internationally there is an argument that the affluent economies have entered a long-term phase of secular stagnation. I discuss this in Chapter 7 of In Open Seas, which sets out seven possibilities why this may be happening. They are:

1. The shift from the non-market economy to the market economy may be nearly exhausted.

2. If economic growth has been dependent on consuming natural resources we may be reaching the point where the exploitation is ending.

3. It is possible that there is a slowdown of new growth-promoting technologies compared to the last two centuries.

4. It is possible that the new technologies do not give a commercial return.

5. There may be increasingly severe difficulties measuring conventional economic growth as we shift from the product economy to the service economy.

6. The rising degree of monopolisation which inhibits innovation. [2]

7. I wrote in Globalisation and the Wealth of Nations about the possibility that stagnation is a rich economy phenomenon because the rich countries offshore production to poorer economies.

The World Economy

I have also given considerable thought to the future shape of the world economy, which will reflect both the changes in relative economic growth and population. Briefly, there is a long-term transition going on from an international order dominated by a hegemon – which characterises the last two and more centuries – to a multipolar world. The argument is set out in Chapter 8 of In Open Seas. More recently I have begun thinking more about the challenges the transition poses for New Zealand. See ‘The Meaning of MAGA’.

It is not just that China and India are going to play a more prominent role in the world economy and international order, and that there is likely to be change in the second rank – especially pertinent to New Zealand is likely to be the growing influence of Indonesia. How the world economy – indeed international relations – functions when there is no hegemon is far from obvious.

How a small country – especially one as geographically isolated as New Zealand – functions in such a multipolar world is not obvious either. There is a danger of policy inertia – of thinking in terms of the past world order. Certainly, that is the way that public international-relations discussions seem to be grounded. [3]

This concern, of course, applies to wider issues than just economic relations. A particular immediate one is the degree to which the open international economy is being replaced by economic isolationism and what can be called ‘trade wars’. I have yet to work through the ultimate outcome in a multipolar world. The wider issue is the degree to which the international order – including its economic dimension – will be based on a rule of law.

The Structure of the Economy

The narrative in Not in Narrow Seas demonstrates the crucial role of the changing economic structure in the history of New Zealand. My research in the area of the structure of the economy has focussed on sector shares. It is no accident that the first quantitative item in my 2004 paper tabulated the change in sector contributions to nominal GDP as far back as I can trust the data. (Again, I have not got round to updating the table.) I have since looked at labour force shares by sector and can get back a reasonable series to the middle of the nineteenth century.

We haven’t thought much about trends in the future structure of the economy. But there is a hint in a projection to 2050 commissioned by the Climate Change Commission, although it reports only the export structure. This is not as limiting as it might appear, since New Zealand’s domestic economic structure will largely mirror those of other affluent countries, reflecting common patterns of consumption.

The details of the CCC’s CGE model have not been published, but in Chapter 29 of In Open Seas I explored what is available. In summary, the export composition is going to shift markedly away from natural-resource-based exports (unless we classify tourism as resource-based) to service-based ones. (Perhaps not in passing, the service sector has markedly increased its share in the domestic economy – I am not sure we have thought enough about this either.)

The primary reason for this shift is that the resource-based industries are physically constrained (and may be more so by environmental factors including climate change policies and consequences).

The slack is not going to be taken up by manufacturing because New Zealand is too small to reap the economies of agglomeration on which an advanced manufacturing sector depends, compounded by its location which adds the handicap of the costs of distance. (There will be occasional exceptions but Fisher and Paykel – which used to be the exemplar of New Zealand’s manufacturing success – moving offshore indicates the general problems facing New Zealand manufacturing.)

New Zealand manufacturing could compete with that in the new industrialising nations, which would mean paying their wages either directly or by shifting the wage reductions across the entire economy using border protection and the like. I shant pursue this possibility further, except to say lower incomes mean more out-migration, which is discussed more generally below.

The export gap in the model projection is filled by the service sector. Unfortunately, CCC’s CGE model treats the service sector as a single activity so there is no indication what, among the diversity of services, the model has in mind when it projects a trebling-plus of service exports over the third of the century.

Today’s single biggest component of export services is the tourist sector, which vied with dairy products to be our single largest export sector before the covid pandemic. The model seems to project tourist receipts to about treble. Is such a growth feasible? In which case can we envisage a New Zealand with three times as many tourists as our last good year of 2019; thrice as many hotels, thrice their contribution to congestion?

Tourists to New Zealand come here for the natural resources. It is less obvious that New Zealand has any comparative advantage in rest of the service sector, where economies of agglomeration may be powerful (although the costs of distance may be not the same handicap where cable is involved). There are some outstanding service businesses based in New Zealand, but perhaps they face the prospect of Fisher and Paykel.

The Terms of Trade

The CGE model implicitly poses the gloomy prospect of New Zealand not having the industries to generate the foreign exchange it needs. There may be one upside.

Forty years ago, there was the expectation that New Zealand would face falling commodity terms of trade for its primary exports (perhaps offset by faster than average rises in farming productivity). Since then, those terms of trade have begun to rise. The reason is rising incomes from industrialisation and prosperity in a group of (particularly East Asian) countries which has increased their demand for food faster than their local supply. New Zealand farming, which tends to supply higher quality foods attractive to a rising middle class, has benefited and may benefit further as other heavily populated countries with limited food supply sectors join them. The FAO, in particular, is gloomy about the prospect of the world being able to supply sufficient food in 2050.

I had hoped to explore this issue when I asked for an extension of my three-year Marsden Fund grant. Despite the project having already written Globalisation and the Wealth of Nations. it was declined. (Apparently future of the economy was not a high research priority.) [4]

(The book uses an interesting but complicated model which explains the economic rise of Japan and, later, China and East Asia, and the change in the trend direction of the food terms of trade based on the costs of distance and the economies of agglomeration. The model underpins this meditation. See here for more details of the analysis.)

My impression is that the CCC’s CGE model assumes a constant terms of trade account. (Its full documentation has not been made available.) [5] If they rise, the export economy will not have to rely so heavily on service exports. However, it seems unlikely that any terms of trade gain will be sufficient to cover the likely under performance of service sector exports. Which leads to the question of whether the New Zealand economy – New Zealand – is viable in the long term.

The Future Scale of New Zealand

This brief section explaining that the population size of New Zealand cannot be taken as given is an alert rather than a detailed discussion.

Usually, long-term economic projections involve separate projections of population and productivity. However, the population is not independent of the level of affluence, since income relativities between New Zealand and elsewhere (particularly Australia) affect the level of (net) migration. There have been periods of poor economic performance which led to net out-migration – the Long Depression of the 1880s is an example.

Out-migration generates economic difficulties, since it usually involves the best and brightest. They who leave behind the debt servicing and welfare serving obligations of the economy.

To illustrate the issue starkly, a number of the more ‘peripheral’ regions have already suffered out-migration to the urban centres of New Zealand. Typically, the loss is of the most able of working age. They leave behind the less able and those not in employment (especially the old), who must carry the region from their more limited resources – those regions are struggling. There is an offset became the leavers still pay taxes to the central government which passes some of that revenue to those left in the regions. That tax circuit does not apply when the leavers go offshore.

Conclusion

The purpose of this note is to demonstrate that the economic issues confronting New Zealand are much wider than its productivity growth. The ‘pattern’ of the economy matters – we can, to some extent, shape it; it shapes us.

There is a second lesson here. Focusing on productivity treats the local economy as isolated from the international economy. The world outside New Zealand has had an important role in shaping the economy – its has been so ever since the isolation of the Māori economy ended with the arrival of the first Europeans, now a quarter of a millennia ago. That impact will continue. How we respond to those external changes and pressures is critical to Aotearoa New Zealand’s future.

Endnotes

[1] Here is the short version (which directs to the long version).

[2] It may not be relevant to this paper, but competitions policy is finding challenges from service markets in contrast to the product markets about which it was originally developed.

[3] On the other hand, New Zealand has made some brilliant diplomatic redirections on occasions in the past.

[4] Without funding I could not pursue the topic, mores the pity. The offset was that I wrote my economic history of New Zealand.

[5] Another issue I do not know is the ‘closure’ of the model. This may seem a technical issue, but it critically determines a CGE model’s outcome. For example, offshore borrowing is critical.

Experiences on the Treasury Forecasting Panel

A note written for some younger economics colleagues.

I was lucky when I was on the Treasury Forecasting Panel (from about 1998 to 2008) that Jas McKenzie was on it too and we could discuss our experiences. Generally, our approach was that they were the Treasury forecasts and that our task was to help them understand their implications, something which sometimes gets lost in the sheer pressure of getting the forecast together. Neither Jas nor I tried to impose a different forecast on Treasury. Our role was much more Socratic.

The benefit to Treasury was that they could draw upon our analytic and technical skills honed by experiences going back over six decades, while our memories of past difficulties could help them see their way through the current ones. We both enjoyed the comradeship of working with professional, competent economists including with the newer members of the Treasury forecasting team as they learned a new trade.

We were valued. After my first panel session – Jas had yet to join – two senior Treasury economists came up to me – independently – and said it was good to have someone there who knew something about macro-forecasting. The other independent panel members were academics who had little experience of the exercise – some could be astonishingly ignorant.

There were many memorable episodes. They included sorting out what was happening to the terms of trade, the bloody inventory cycle (which may not be as serious as it was when we first began forecasting, because of better inventory management – offset by a heightened unemployment cycle which is better monitored today by the data), struggling with noise in the data or where the data definition did not correspond to the economic notion, dealing with new statistics, and making suggestions which improved the forecasting process.

The most difficult issue was that practically a macro-forecast is cycles and noise around a trend. Sometimes the pressures of dealing with the first two means insufficient attention is given to the underlying trend.

I continue to worry over this. Has the long-term trend flattened out? I have put a lot of effort into exploring NZ’s trend (back to the 1860s). The long-term productivity growth rate has been surprisingly constant. (Of course there has been deviations which are mainly explainable.) However, there seems to have been a puzzling slowdown since 2008. (It may be a phenomenon for most affluent economies.)

Alas, Jas and I did not stay long enough on the panel to help them with this. We were laid-off in late 2008 just before the GFC. This was not the Treasury choice. They told us they were most disappointed. At that time, the panel was run from VUW by a person who was bereft of macroeconomic forecasting (or any economic) knowledge and skill. He seems to have wanted to downsize and naively sacked the two most experienced members of the panel, probably because they were not attached to the university and because he knew so little about what he was doing. Treasury was unable to do anything because they gave the university independence in the composition of the panel.

The sackings had an interesting consequence. The next forecasting round occurred after the initial impact of the GFC. The Treasury forecast, in line with other NZ forecasts, badly missed the size of the downturn. When that became clear, a Treasury economist told me that with hindsight the Treasury advice on the fiscal stance to the new minister (Bill English) was of poorer quality than they expected of themselves.

We can but speculate on the counterfactual of what would have happened had Jas and I still been on the panel. But we discussed what our advice would have been at the time, so what I am about to write is not based on the hindsight of many years later.

The widespread comment at the time compared the likely outcome of the GFC shock with the Asian crisis just a decade earlier. That was obviously nonsensical, but it was all that most younger economists could remember. Jas had been on a key Treasury desk during the 1966 wool-price shock and had been pulled back into Treasury to build a forecasting unit after the 1975 forecast debacle. (Shortly after he had to deal with the data ballsup of the time.) I was not here in 1966-67 but my forecasting experience started earlier than his and I have studied the wool-price shock. We were both there in the 1985-1995 period, and so on.

Perhaps the first rule of forecasting is that the initial forecasts underestimate the size of the impact of an external shock, as exactly happened in regard to the GFC one. Had Jas and I been on the panel we would have drawn attention to the rule/past experience and asked the Treasury forecasting team whether they were confident of their relatively modest downturn. I cannot say whether the team would have lowered their track, but I am sure they would written up the EFU with greater attention to the downside risk and that would have strengthened the pessimists in the Treasury during the fiscal policy discussions.

The Wing Parties’ Economic Policies.

It is difficult to make sense of the Luxon Coalition Government’s economic management.

This end-of-year review about the state of economic management – the state of the economy was last week – is not going to cover the National Party contribution. Frankly, like every other careful observer, I cannot make up my mind.

Certainly Christopher Luxon and Nicola Willis are doing things, but there appears little coherence in what they are doing (after implementing the expenditure and tax cuts promised during their election campaign). The Post senior editors ranked the two’s performance in the bottom half of the cabinet. (The top rankers were Chris Bishop, Simeon Brown, Todd McLay, Mark Mitchell, Winston Peters and Erica Stanford; the Lambton Quay rule is that it is rare for more than five cabinet ministers to be outstanding performers.)

Instead, this column focuses on ACT and NZF, the two wing parties in the Coalition Government who have quite different economic visions.

ACT was founded by neoliberals and on the whole has followed their approach. For instance, its election manifesto tried to slip into its Treaty Principles Bill a neoliberal reinterpretation of the second article of Te Tiriti based on its account of property rights. Their approach was so anachronistic that the bill before Parliament has replaced it with something which is closer to what was the thinking at the signing.

However sometimes ACT policies can be puzzling. David Seymour is minister for Pharmac and announces major public funding initiatives. No doubt that goes down well with the public but it is unclear how greater public funding fits in with a neoliberal vision of a health system. A conspiracy theorist might argue that the cunning plan is that while the additional spending is not very effective, it chews up public healthcare spending which could be used more effectively (such as reducing waiting times and earlier prevention) and so drives people into the private healthcare sector and private insurance.

ACT’s Ministry of Regulation is even odder. It was to be funded by closing down the Productivity Commission, which was established as an ACT initiative during the Key-English Government. Presumably ACT’s thinking has shifted from the need for an independent assessment of the impact of government interventions to one which was more ministerially driven.

The Ministry is going to be about twice as expensive as the Commission. One reason is that it will be paying the highest remuneration in the public service. Seymour’s group working on charter school is also more generously remunerated than average. So much for the neoliberal vision of small government.

Even more strangely, Minister Seymour has chosen agricultural and horticultural products, Early Childhood Education (ECE) and hairdressing for the first regulatory reviews. One doubts that improvements there are going to make a lot of difference to economic performance. (The review of building regulations by National’s Minister for Building and Construction, Chris Penk, will have a far great impact, although it is to be hoped they will not repeat its mistakes which led to the leaky building saga.)

An even stranger story is that neoliberals in general and Seymour in particular have a passion for a Regulatory Standards statute. In Opposition they twice introduced a bill into Parliament – both times it failed – and plan to again. However, in an interim regulatory impact statement the Ministry of Regulation said that while it supports the overall objectives, the legislation isn’t needed. Its preferred option is to build on, and strengthen, an existing regime based on Labour’s legislation passed in 2019.

One is left with the uneasy feeling that, as with the Treaty Principles Bill, ACT is not showing any of the political skills that were so admired in the delivery of the End of Life Choice Act.

If ACT is the successor of Rogernomics, NZF is the successor of the economic management paradigm that it replaced. Yes, Winston Peters is Robert Muldoon’s successor. The media does not like Peters. Nor did they like Muldoon, both of whom treated them with belligerence. (In any case the Establishment is always uneasy with populists.)

While it is easy to criticise Muldoon’s second period as Minister of Finance (1975-1981), his first period (1967-1972) was widely admired. In the later period Muldoon was beset with economic problems which, he could not solve because of the politics. But the interventionist economic paradigm developed in the 1930s and 1940s had proved successful for four decades. (Not in Narrow Seas explains why it became obsolete, although it probably can be adapted.)

Peters made no great mark as Minister of Finance (1996-1998) but he adamantly rejected ‘neoliberalism’: ‘[t]he truth is that after 32 years of the neoliberal experiment the character and the quality of our country has changed dramatically, and much of it for the worse’. His occasional mention of economic issues – like at this year’s party conference – would be supported more by Muldoon than by Seymour.

This stance is reinforced by NZF’s number two, Shane Jones, who is the Minister of Resources (and Minister for Oceans and Fisheries and for Regional Development). Like Peters, he is a populist and belligerent towards the media. Jones may be overqualified for a politician, with enormous Māori mana and a Harvard degree, and having worked as a university teacher, a public servant, in commerce (including chairing the Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission) and in diplomacy.

Jones left the Labour Party, where he had been a minister, in 2014 because it was not sufficiently committed to the private sector, but his promotion of the Fast Track legislation and other development initiatives shows that he is also highly interventionist. It is a mix which politicians from the pre-Rogernomics era would recognise. Fast Track is an example of the ‘think big’ approach which goes back to Julius Vogel over 150 years ago. (Muldoon gave the approach a bad name but previous programs had often been successful.) Think Big is anathema to the neoliberals.

Jones is an Associate Minister of Finance, as is Seymour (and National’s Chris Bishop), Willis being the minister. Economic policy discussions within the Luxon Coalition Government must be rather tense because while with Luxon, National has a majority, the politics of coalition enables both Jones and Seymour to wield a veto. Perhaps that it is why it is so hard to fathom what Luxon and Willis actually stand for.

Foreshadowing HYEFU 2024

By way of prologue, the closest parallel to the current economic situation may be when Ruth Richardson became Minister of Finance in late 1990. The economy had been contracting, although there were signs of a fragile recovery. She was an Austerian and cut public spending savagely.

The economy plunged a further 5% in GDP per capita terms. Unemployment rose to above 10% of the labour force. Richardson could claim she achieved her Austerian goal of lowering relative government spending.

But National only narrowly won the 1993 election (because the left was severely divided – this was before MMP). Richardson was sacked. While she could point out that the rate of inflation came down under her watch, it was not really her win. World inflation was falling and in any case, as the legislation she supported clearly states, inflation was the responsibility of the Governor of the Reserve Bank (then Don Brash) not the Minister of Finance. (Perhaps one should add that the National Government also suffered electorally from its attempt to commercialise the health sector.)

This is not to say that this will be the political fate of Nicola Willis, nor of the Luxon Coalition Government. But the memory of the effect of heavy cuts to government spending on a weak economy hangs heavily over today’s policy stance.

Treasury’s 2024 Half Yearly Economic and Fiscal Update (HYEFU) is due for release on Tuesday 17 December – an awkward time of the year, which precludes serious analysis published before Christmas. Helpfully on 21 November, Treasury’s Chief Economic Advisor, Dominic Stephens, gave an indication of what is likely to be in the macroeconomic forecasts – not the numbers, but the way they are shaping up.

He observed that the economy has been doing worse than the central forecast of May’s Budget Economic and Fiscal Update (BEFU), pointing out that since the September quarter of 2022, per capita GDP has fallen by 4.6%, making this already a larger per-capita recession than the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-10. Recent economic data suggests the downturn has been deeper, and the recovery will begin later, than the May BEFU forecast (which was already pessimistic compared to the December 2023 HYEFU):

– in the June quarter GDP fell 0.2%, compared to the Budget forecast of a 0.2% increase.

 – as of October, spending on electronic cards at retail stores remained 1% lower than a year ago.

– indicators of manufacturing and service activity remain at contractionary levels, suggesting little or no growth in the economy over recent months.

– Despite improvements in firms’ expectations of future trading activity, the Quarterly Survey of Business Opinion reported that firms are more pessimistic about their current trading conditions than they have been since 2009 (apart from the pandemic).

In fact the economy seems to have been tracking nearer the downside economic forecast which was also set out in BEFU2024. I look at two aspects of what this may mean: unemployment and the fiscal position.

Unemployment tells us something about the shape of the output (GDP) track although it tends to be a lag indicator. BEFU2024 had its rate at 4.0% of the labour force in December 2023, rising a third to 5.3% at the end of 2024 (about now). Then it was to fall sluggishly so that in December 2026 it would still be at 4.6%. There is no downside forecast for unemployment, but a reasonable guess is that it would have peaked near 7% sometime in second half 2025 and would be correspondingly higher about the time of the next election (even 6% in December 2026). Recall that after the GFC it took the economy almost five years to return to its previous GDP peak.

The fiscal forecasts are gloomy too. Treasury’s Chief Economist reported that ‘Treasury has been revising its revenue forecasts lower. Tax revenue has proven lower than expected given the state of the economy in recent economic and fiscal updates. … If this trend continues, there could be further downside risks to the Treasury’s revenue forecasts.’ One of his Associate Ministers, Chris Bishop, was less discreet, announcing that it is unlikely that the fiscal position will return to surplus by 2027/8 as forecast in BEFU2024.

The Treasury did not foreshadow anything about the public spending track. That is a ministerial prerogative; ministers are indicating they expect more public spending cuts. A group of 16 economists led by Ganesh Nana have argued there should be no more spending cuts or delays to infrastructural spending because they will ‘needlessly exacerbat[e] the current recession’. In effect the economists are arguing for a bigger government deficit – that it is not necessary to pursue as rigorously the debt-to-GDP target. Bishop may agree; he said the government was ‘not going to be a slave to a surplus’ (not mentioning one can get enslaved by debt). Prime Minister Christopher Luxon said ‘I’m not going to chase a surplus at all costs.’ We await HEFU2024 to learn the new date.

One should not quibble with public spending cuts whose purpose is to reduce over-staffing, while arguments about cuts of programs which the government does not like are political, although there will be technical consequences. The offset to this position is that the government should increase expenditure where there is under-staffing or on programs which it favours. The technical issue is whether the government should be cutting overall expenditure (or restraining it below population and related demands) to return to surplus. (There is a parallel discussion around raising taxes.)

What Nana et al. are arguing is that not only are such cuts unnecessarily harsh but they are compromising long-term economic growth. On the other hand, there are Austerians who think that the state sector is still too big and are using the crisis to cut it back. (The exception is that they prove to be big spenders in their own portfolios.)

This is likely to be a major debate from now to the next election. In the interim the economy is contracting and is likely to stagnate a bit before it recovers. I withhold an explanation until we have the detailed Treasury HYEFU2024.