Will The 2021 Budget Be Focused on Wellbeing?

Now is about the time that the Government is getting its Budget Strategy together

In the week before the budget – the 2021 one is to be delivered on Thursday 20 May – there is a strange ritual in which all the commentariat and lobbyists (who are not necessarily distinct from one another) tell us what should be in it. This is long after the budget decisions are made by cabinet, and even after the date when it is printed, so the ostensible purpose for what is being said is irrelevant. But it entertains us and fills gaps in the media.

It is about now – mid April – that the strategic budget decisions are being made. Were the lobbyists serious, were the commentariat trying to keep the public informed, it would be about now they would be discussing the budget strategy.

The difficulty is that those making the strategic decisions – the Minister of Finance and the Prime Minister, the inner Cabinet and eventually the entire Cabinet – decide in great secrecy, because the making up of their minds takes time and involves reconciling conflicting demands. Complicating the decisions is that each minister has different priorities. So what they will decide no one knows. At this stage even insiders, including the ministers themselves, have only vague ideas. I certainly don’t know.

However, we might ponder what could be in the budget were the government to pursue its claim that the budget was framed by wellbeing.

 First, we know that, as a general rule, raising incomes does not by itself increase wellbeing much. Admittedly, if you raise my income relative to everyone else’s I will feel better off (a point much advocated in Budget Ritual Week).  However, there is one major exception to this finding. Those at the bottom of the income distribution are struggling, and will get a lift in wellbeing if their incomes are increased. So a wellbeing budget would be focused on raising the incomes at the bottom. This would also reduce child poverty and reduce income inequality, which are also government objectives. (Actually, these are related ways of measuring income wellbeing.)

Another gain would be that the income lift of the poorest would improve the health and education (which are dimensions of wellbeing) of children, which would in the long term make the education system more effective, reduce spending on health and justice, increase labour productivity and add to the prosperity of the economy.

Investing in children is kind of investing in social infrastructure but we do not give it the same priority as physical infrastructure, perhaps because there are no commercial lobbies which directly benefit, perhaps because children do not have a vote. In any case, our public or private strategies are not noticeably forward looking as distinct from addressing current urgent pressures.

Another aspect of wellbeing is quality jobs but I do not expect the budget to do much for them – smoke and mirrors aside. Strategic development there takes much longer. My understanding is that there are various working groups looking at these issues.

We are not going to make much  progress as long as we have the centre of the government’s labour market policy lost in the byzantine structure of the Ministry of Business, Industry and Employment (MoBIE), which necessarily treats workers as a commodity much the same as icecream.  One was not, perhaps, surprised at that attitude by the Key Government which merged the Department of Labour into MoBIE, but it is surprising that after four years a Labour Government has acquiesced to National’s approach. Labour supporters would be delighted by a budget announcement of the establishment of a Ministry of Labour and Employment (and immigration). They cannot even petition the minister for one; there isn’t a minister.

The government separated out housing from  MoBIE into a Ministry of Housing.  Rightly in my judgement,  for the neoliberal view that housing is like anything else and administration and policy can be scattered around government agencies reflects a misunderstanding of how difficult the economics of housing is and how central it is to wellbeing.

Were I a government adviser, I would be counselling that given the big housing package a month ago, we should be waiting to see how it works out, so housing should not be a focus of the May budget; we may expect another package  towards the end of the year. In the interim any further measures to increase the supply of housing would be welcome. No doubt there will be some in the budget. Every minister is entitled to a budget press release.

Health is another wellbeing area which the budget can progress. Every year there is an increase in public spending on healthcare although new demands keep appearing. I am not always impressed by the effectiveness of these claims. Frequently I am reminded of H. L. Mencken’s ‘every complex problem has a solution which is simple, direct, plausible — and wrong.’ What is needed is setting a standard for making these claims and a funding program for advocates to bring together the evidence that their proposals meet that standard. (But keep away from the Key Government’s social investment ‘experts’ who seemed to be totally unaware of the  detailed, sophisticated and rigorous evaluation procedures developed in the health sector.)

Health policy is going to be dominated by the government’s decision to  redisorganise the health sector. I doubt that it will make any contribution to improving wellbeing. They will claim it will – they always do. It seems to be more about centralisation and financial control than delivering better health outcomes. Why do it now when the Ministry is at war against Covid? Can you imagine the First Labour Government redisorganising the armed services in the middle of the Second World War?

Mind you, the war against Covid has demonstrated how misguided the Key Government was to run down the population-based services within the Ministry of Health. (It is a miracle that the fragmentary system has functioned so well in such difficult circumstances – the key players deserve sainthoods.)

That is a quick run though about what may be some of the key strategic issues the government might thinking through in a run up to a wellbeing budget. In addition it will be fighting a whole lot of fires – the largest is the Covid crisis. There are also opportunities in other portfolios  to improve wellbeing at the margin, including some I really care about. That I haven’t listed them shows why I am not a proper member of the commentariat or a lobbyist. I cannot even participate in the budget rituals properly.

A Proposal for an Earnings-Related Redundancy Insurance Protection.

1          Summary

1.1       This short paper sets out a scheme for reducing the shock of lost income from redundancy.

2          Preliminaries: Dealing with a Private Market Failure

2.1       This proposal arises because the private market has not been able to provide adequate income protection for those who become unemployed from redundancy. In particular there is a need for short term coverage to reduce the shock of the loss of income following termination of employment.

2.2       I have no problems about proposing public solutions where the market fails to deliver, or its delivery is very expensive. Moreover, I would support such interventions in areas even if they resulted in increased inequality. (An example is the government subsidising the NZSO which most benefits an elite). There are other policy instruments to compensate for the change where it was desirable to deal with such equity effects. (E.g higher income taxes at the top which enables the funding of the NZSO.)

2.3       The view that the state should never operate in the interests of the ‘middle class’ is a favoured neoliberal position (much honoured in the breach). It comes from a belief that there are no significant ‘market failures’ – except where the minimalist state is (grudgingly) involved. My view is that the market often does not provide adequate outcomes and that sometimes well-designed public interventions may add to wellbeing – including for the middle class.

2.4       To be clear, if the scheme is to remedy an inability of the private market, progressing with it requires that workers desire such a remedy. If they did not, I would not progress it.

3          Tiers and Piers

3.1       I have long pondered over how to integrate the flat-rate social security system which began, say, with Seddon’s Old Aged Pension in 1898 with Bismarck’s earnings-related social security system which was introduced into New Zealand with the 1903 Workers Compensation Act (Seddon again).More recently it is the contrast between Social Security (as codified by Thaddeus McCarthy) and Accident Compensation (as proposed by Owen Woodhouse).

3.2       The solution to which I am attracted, was the ‘Henry Lang’ one of a flat-rate first tier, plus an earnings-related second tier (and a third tier of private provision). This is discussed more fully in Chapter 5 of The Whimpering of the State: Politics After MMP.

3.3       The advent of Kiwisaver introduced the three-tier principle into the provision of retirement incomes. (There is a sense that there may be another tier of home ownership.)

3.4       If a worker is to be provided with earnings-related support, then the scheme has to be contributory, not only for equity reasons, but because the contributions define the level of protection. (A person with a record of part-time, short week, or intermittent employment is going to get less coverage. But the shock from her or his income loss is smaller too).

4          Design Parameters

4.1       Having established the framework of the proposed scheme, it is necessary to put the cladding on the structure. Here I set out some possibilities, although were different parameters chosen I would not be fussed. (Where they are comparable I have tried to use the ACC parameters.)

4.2       First, to set the proposed rate of compensation. Median weekly earnings from wages and salaries was $1,060 in the June 2020 quarter. A target of 80 percent (before-tax) compensation means the level of short-term compensation for the median worker following a redundancy would have been $850 a week. (The benchmark income for the redundant would be earnings over the last year, or whichever the ACC uses.)

4.3       At that time the unemployment benefit (job-seekers) for a single adult was $281 per week. (See para 5.2) That leads to the calculation that were the redundant to receive 54% of their previous wage topped up by the unemployment benefit they would reach about 80 percent of their pre-redundancy earnings. (I would happily settle for 50% with the proviso that the benefit be set at 30% of the median wage.)

4.4       The effect of this measure would be that those on below median wages would receive more than 80 percent compensation (if they were over 25) and those above less. As for ACC, the level of compensation would be capped.

4.5       The compensation would be paid for up to six months (although this could be changed). The evidence is that most workers find a job within that period. What happens if they do? This involves a long and complicated argument about the interface with an active labour market program (see para 6.2). We can wrestle over the exact arrangement.

4.4       The scheme would be funded by a levy on employers and employees. The balance is a political decision I leave to others.

4.5       The levy would be calculated to cover a couple of business cycles. – say ten years. In prosperous times the scheme would build up a reserve to run down during downturns. (There would be a proviso that in particularly severe times when the reserves run out, funding would be supplemented by the government – a sort of overdraft facility – to be recovered when the economy returns to prosperity.) The reserves should probably be held in government bonds (anything to keep the madness of the ACC and the actuaries out).

4.6       A difficult issue is how much of the burden should go onto employers (including what happens to current redundancy arrangements). There is a temptation to try to load as much as possible. Whatever the political wisdom of this, the ultimate impact is that it will affect worker take-home pay either from levies or from employers setting lower pretax wages to maintain overall employment costs or a one off price rise.

4.7       There is a lot of fine tuning to be done. For instance, what constitutes redundancy? (Consider employers requiring layoffs and asking for volunteers.)

5          Interfaces

5.1       I have not thought a lot about how the scheme interfaces with Accident Compensation (the complication is that this scheme provides for permanent income loss). However, wherever possible the assumptions and parameters of the two schemes should be consistent with the possibility that one day there could be some merging.

5.2       It is probably necessary that in order for the scheme to work it will be necessary to convert entitlement in the flat-rate social security system from a household basis to an individual basis. (The current system, based on a distant past, assumes that there is only one earner in a household and that the household can be easily identified.)

5.3       The impact of the scheme on child poverty would be small because the causes of child poverty are different (as my work from the 1970s explored). That requires a very different approach.

5.4       Note that the scheme contributes to an automatic fiscal stabiliser, especially in a major downturn, since spending goes up (and reserves run down) as the economy slows down.

6          Extensions

6.1       I have been mindful of devising a scheme which could be extended to short-term sickness coverage. It might be best to introduce the sickness scheme at the same time.

6.2       This scheme is designed to deal with the shock of an income loss from an unexpected event (redundancy or sickness). It is separate from an active labour market program which, among other purposes, aims to facilitate the redundant’s return to quality employment. If we ever get around to introducing such a program, interfacing will be necessary but it would be fine tuning.

7.         Conclusion

7.1       Were this scheme for redundancy coverage to be extended to short-term sickness it would represent the greatest extension of the welfare state since 1938, especially by integrating the two modes which is operate – say Woodhouse and McCarthy.

Trading Red Tape

Whatever the damage, especially to the British economy, Brexit has done us a service by illustrating the complexity of trade.

Brexit is the only example we have of two closely integrated sophisticated economies severing trading ties. The European Union and Britain still do not have tariffs or import quotas between them – the stuff of standard trade theory – while the problem of regulatory alignment has been temporarily shelved. (Without the latter, one country could introduce policies which amount to de facto protection. The Norwegian and Swiss experiences signalled the issue. They are outside the EU but frequently have to adopt regulations introduced by Brussels – to protect consumers, workers or the environment – which affect what the outsiders want to export to the EU.)

Even so, the break has illustrated the complexities of managing the economic border. We knew about them, but we did not know how complicated they were.

For instance, in December 2013 members of the World Trade Organisation agreed to the Bali Package including the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA), which aimed to reduce red tape at borders, increasing transparency and taking advantage of new technologies, especially to reduce border inefficiencies and complex customs rules. It was not news headline material but it was thought that implementation of the TFA would have a greater impact on international trade than the elimination of all the world’s remaining tariffs, reducing average trade costs by up to 15%. (That does not include the impact of quotas of course.)

Earlier, the 1986 Single European Act (SEA) had created a single market within the European Union – it took till 1992 to get there – by removing non-tariff barriers to cross-border trade and investment. From 1985 the Schengen Agreement (largely) removed barriers to people moving between most European countries. ‘Europe Without Walls’ they called it. Brexit makes the English Channel (La Manche) a wall.

However, Brexit has illustrated a whole range of problems at the border which were hardly envisaged when the British people voted by a slim majority for Brexit.

Most of us will be aware of the queues of lorries near Dover and Calais because documentation takes longer. (Lorry drivers into France had their ham sandwiches confiscated because of phytosanitary rules. Cough: a source of road accidents is drivers not having eaten.) Even where the lorries can move, red tape documentation can result in them having to return home unladen.

Delays can be disastrous where fresh foods are involved. The British fishing industry suffers. Less smelly are the disruptions to supply chains especially if the delivery is to a factory which has been minimising storage costs by practising just-in-time management of its supplies. (An indication of the significance of smooth supply chains is that the blockage by the Ever Given of the Suez Canal had consequences as far away as China, half a world away.)

Then there was the English garden which found its Northern Ireland market cut off because there could be soil on the plants it was providing. (Northern Ireland is a part of Britain but its regulatory regime is behind the EU – the wall is at the Irish Sea.)

Such muddles are being sorted out. Michael Gove, who was the British Minister in Charge of the Brexit negotiations, said that in ten years all the difficulties will be overcome. In the interim, British businesses are relocating their production and storage to the Continent. Jobs will move with them, and so will some workers – perhaps those who came from the continent during the boom years. (There is also relocation of jobs in London’s finance industry to Amsterdam, Frankfurt and Paris, but that belongs to another column when the total impact is clearer.)

Because the products which cross New Zealand borders tend to be at the beginning or end of supply chain, we are not as sensitive to many of these chain issues, although our fish exporters need minimal barriers for their fresh products. However, I have been struck when talking to diplomats how often ‘border problems’ crop up. (For instance, a trade commissioner explained that he was trying to get some New Zealand fish species treated as belonging to EU categories with lower tariffs.) Even if we gave up negotiating trade deals – not government policy, but opportunities are few or sluggish – we still require a massive diplomatic effort to keep our export effort running. In recent year the government has had to put increasing effort to deal with non-tariff barriers.

My Globalisation and the Wealth of Nations explained how the costs of distance have been central to New Zealand and international economic development. Falling costs of transport, of storage and of communications drove international economic growth; reductions in tariffs and import quotas were another factor. I knew that other border costs mattered, welcomed the Trade Facilitation Agreement and was not surprised by the estimates of the promised gains.

But Brexit has opened whole new insights. With sadness I am grateful for the experiment, but my book and a host of other studies predict that the British people will be worse off in material terms as a result, as will the rest of the world on average, but not by nearly as much.

Notes on ‘Rentier Capitalism’

I have been dipping into Brett Christophers’ Rentier Capitalism: Who Owns the Economy and Who Pays for It? Economists should be warned that his use of the term ‘rentier’ is ‘heterodox’ (his term). I have no difficulty with Humpty-Dumpty’s ‘When I use a word, it means just what I choose it to mean – neither more nor less.’ but the book is a challenge to a trained economist, because one keeps having to remind oneself that Christophers’ meanings are different.

A consequence of his casualness with orthodox economics is that Christophers misrepresents Keynes; this is what this note is about. In The General Theory Keynes refers to ‘entrepreneurs and rentiers’, distinguishing between the returns to ‘risk’ and the returns to ‘waiting’ which traditionally are described as ‘profit’ and ‘interest’. Interest, then, is a payment to those who defer consumption. (Historically ‘waiting’ was called ‘abstinence’ but the term went out of fashion because it seemed odd to say that a rich bloated capitalist was ‘abstaining’.)

Christophers gets it quite wrong when he writes ‘Keynes … famously called for the euthanasia of the “functionless investor” that was the financial rentier.’ Keynes was more subtle. He did not ‘call’ for the euthanasia of the rentier but predicted it:

[when] capital has become sufficiently abundant. … I see, therefore, the rentier aspect of capitalism as a transitional phase which will disappear when it has done its work. And with the disappearance of its rentier aspect much else in it besides will suffer a sea-change. It will be, moreover, a great advantage of the order of events which I am advocating, that the euthanasia of the rentier, of the functionless investor, will be nothing sudden, merely a gradual but prolonged continuance of what we have seen recently in Great Britain, and will need no revolution.

His mechanism for the euthanasia is that capital would become so ‘abundant’ that opportunities for investment would become so limited that the rate of interest would fall to zero and the rentier class would disappear.

It is a matter of record that Keynes’ 1936 prediction was been wrong. (He joins a vast range of the profession, from Malthus and Ricardo to Schumpeter, who made similar stagnationist predictions.) The reason he was wrong is that new technological innovations created additional requirements for capital investment so that capital has not become relatively abundant. This shortage of savings meant that there was a premium for waiting.

(Part of my interest in this question is that if we enter a period of secular stagnation as a consequence of markedly reduced tchnological innovation then the stagnationist theory becomes relevant because interest rates will fall to zero. But let’s keep to Christophers’ concerns.)

Does this mean that Christophers’ book is irrelevant? The real focus for me was its drawing attention to monopoly capitalism. Keynes pays little attention to monopolies – mainly mentioning them in the context of price stickiness – in part because the work of Edward Chamberlain and Joan Robinson was just underway when he was writing. Christophers is not the first to focus on monopoly capitalism – strangely he does not mention Paul Sweezy and Paul Baran’s 1966 book Monopoly Capital: An Essay on the American Economic and Social Order.

Here is my rough take on the Christophers’ story of monopoly capitalism if we ignore some of his casual economics.

While technological innovation and creativity are (often) rewarded by the market (there may be public intervention such as intellectual property rights in order to stimulate them), those who command monopolistic power are also rewarded by ‘super-normal profits’. The sources of this power include innovation and creativity but it may also arise temporarily from being first mover in a competitive market. But another major source is genuine (permanent) monopolies arising from public licensing (the East India Company), barriers to entry and natural monopolies (common carriers). There also seems to be a phenomenon where oligopolies generate supernormal profits. (Any others?)

What happens to these supernormal profits? Initially, they go to the monopoly owners, but eventually the owners sell the profit flow to what Christophers calls ‘rentiers’ (most notably by IPOs). While these rentiers, in his definition, contribute to the economy by ‘waiting’, some take on some risk to obtain a higher return. (Another group of rentiers who don’t quite fit into the model are superannuitants whose pensions come from the government coffers.)

So Christophers is challenging the standard economics model which explains factor prices in a competitive economy. Chapter after chapter reminds us that often the reality is of monopolistic markets and the like which are far from temporary. From this perspective the book provides orthodoxly trained economists with a valuable and sobering service.

Taxing Questions About Taxing Housing

The government’s recent housing package may work; will it do enough?

Trick Question: Does New Zealand have a capital gains tax on housing?

If you ask the Prime Minister she will say not. It is true that her government is increasing the scope of the ‘bright-line test’ on non-family homes to ten years. That means that any financial gain made on the sale of the property within the specified period is treated as income and can be taxed.  The Prime Minister promised her Labour government would not introduce a capital gains tax so this change cannot be one, can it?

The Leader of the Opposition would have to agree. A bright-line test was first introduced by a National Government of which she was a member. National would never introduce a capital gains tax would it?

Harder Question: Should the Government subsidise investing in capital gains when there is not a capital gains tax?

You may not see the logic of such a subsidy, but there was. Purchase a house for capital gains, borrow to maximise the leverage, let it out to cover the cost of holding it, and you were allowed to deduct the costs of interest against your net income. The government is changing that (although the legislation is yet to be passed).

Seems reasonable, but is that not going to put up rents to tenants? Does that mean the deduction is really a subsidy to those leasing? If so, it is a funny subsidy because it only applies where the landlord has borrowed. Someone in a house whose landlord has not borrowed gets no such ‘subsidy’ from the government.

There are a group of landlords who say this argument does not apply to them. They are not there for the capital gain – that will be reaped after they die. They have invested in housing to get a better return than putting money in the bank and the new tax regime will cut back their return. True, if they have supplemented their purchase with borrowing, which would happen if they do not have enough to buy the dwelling they are going to rent without borrowing. Is that fair? Perhaps if they agreed to pay a capital gains tax out of their estate, that would be even fairer. Ooops.

In effect, the new tax range is a hike in borrower’s interest rates on second houses. The difference is the additional costs go to the government (which may or may not use the funds to build more houses or subsidise renters and first home purchasers). If the hike came from higher market interest rates, then investors would get more from their bank. Hmmm.

Will the withdrawal of the subsidy result in higher rents and by how much? Who knows? But better to deal with this by increasing the rental subsidy for housing rather than the erratic impact of allowing interest to be taxed as a cost against income. (The government is threatening rent controls; at best they work temporarily.)

Actually, it looks as though it would be more rational to have a capital gains tax on non-family housing. Wash your mouth out, Easton! There are lots of accountants and lawyers beaming at their fees for advice under this new regime.

The background is that there are two processes driving rising housing prices. One is the shortage of housing; the other is a speculative (Minsky) boom. The government package included measures to increase the supply of housing, but that will take time.

However, the main thrust of the package is to make the speculation less attractive, which will dampen the house prices for a while. We don’t know for how long; they may stagnate or fall briefly. But under current circumstances, assuming there are not massive increases in the stock of housing, the boom is likely to return some time in the future.

That is because householders have funds to invest. New Zealanders have a penchant for investing in housing. Where else are they going to invest?

No doubt many will get into collectables and cryptocurrencies. You do not make a capital gain out of bitcoin and the like until you sell – in effect your capital gain is the purchaser’s capital loss. Collectables are similar but if they are tangible you may enjoy the pleasure of possessing them. (There will also be some very risky schemes and even scams.)

The other big opportunity might be in shares. At least the company being invested in makes a profit (one hopes) higher than the return on bonds or bank deposits. Most New Zealanders do not have much experience investing in shares. Recall how quickly they gave up their shares during the Rogernomic privatisations; the intention was to get people into the habit of share market investment. Perhaps this time more will learn.

There is an interesting possibility here. Allow me to speculate (with ideas rather than money). The Reserve Bank is requiring the trading banks to increase their capital in order to make them more robust to financial shocks. (Some argue that is not necessary, but the decision has been made and relitigation is unlikely to change the decision markedly.)

Where are the additional capital reserves to come from? Ultimately it is the public. For example, suppose the (usually) Australian owner was to set up a separate New Zealand bank which it listed on the sharemarket while holding the majority of the shares. The minority would be sold to the public and, presumably, (most of) the funds would be used to add to the bank’s capital – thereby meeting the RBNZ requirement. (There have been suggestions that Westpac – our third biggest trading bank – may do something like this.) 

Would enough New Zealanders stump up the cash? Again one says ‘who knows?’, but investing in a bank is likely to be more profitable than a fixed interest deposit in it, although the shares will be riskier. It is probably not as profitable as investing in a housing bubble before it pops. Mind you, given the recent changes to the bright-line tax and income tax rules, investing in housing will not be as attractive as it has been recently. The advantage of the share investment is that management is not nearly as troublesome as being a landlord.

In summary then, the recent package will increase the stock of housing, but probably not by as much as needed – in the short term anyway. It will reduce the return of investing in housing, but we cannot be sure by how much, nor of all the consequences. However the overinvestment in speculative housing is unlikely to go away in the long-run until new investment opportunities are taken up.  One possibility would be investing in trading bank shares where they use the cash to increase their capital reserves,

If you are more certain about the future course of the investment market, you have not been following closely enough, Yet, if you have funds to invest, or already have them invested in the housing market, you are going to have to make decisions. Best of luck.

Open Modelling Climate Change Policies

The Climate Change Commission should immediately publish the details of its economic models and enable the public to access them.

There is something strange going on with the Climate Change Commission. In its draft report the CCC said

                ‘We have looked at the impacts which our budgets could have on the economy and society over the next 15 years. The overall costs of meeting the country’s targets and our proposed emissions budgets are likely to be less than 1% of projected GDP. This is significantly lower than what was estimated when the 2050 targets were set.’

My intuitive response is that I am surprised that the ‘overall  costs’ are estimated to be only 1 percent lower in projected output in 2050.* The policies almost seem to be offering a free lunch; that ultimately the cost of reducing our carbon emissions to reasonable levels is minimal.

To make it clear, I personally support New Zealand cutting our carbon emissions, but I have always assumed that we will have to make some sacrifices to do so. Apparently the CCC thinks not.

The immediate response is to look at how the CCC calculated the number – which for an economist is the most crucial number in the report (not that there are a lot of economic numbers).

The report mentions some economic models but their details are not published. Even more strangely, they are not going to be published until after the CCC gives the Government its final version in May in June or July 2021.

The story gets even more bizarre. The CCC reports that they consulted a number of experts who supported the model. All but one was overseas. I do not want to seem parochial but overseas experts often do not have a good grasp of the New Zealand economy. I recall having to explain to one that the reason he could not get the grain price to explain New Zealand agricultural output was that our livestock was grass-fed not grain-fed; I do not think he ever really grasped the distinction. Or recall the two who calculated that the tax structure introduced in the 1980s was detrimental to the economy. Their modelling assumed that the rise in unemployment was due to the tax changes and ignored the macroeconomic mismanagement and the structural changes. ‘Fifos’, as we call the fly in, fly outs (after grabbing their fees), often make fools of themselves. Whatever the grasp of a theory, it takes skill and local knowledge to apply it.

The one New Zealander who was consulted was Dr Adolf Stroombergen of Infometrics. Now I have the highest respect for Adolf in this modelling area. (I have to, I suppose. I was one of his doctoral examiners and he has done nothing since to persuade me that we made a bad recommendation.)

As you would expect, his review is professional but troubling in various ways which a couple of economists would probably sort out over a vigorous cup of coffee.

Before reporting the crunch statement, allow me to note that Infometrics are not the only New Zealanders with modelling capacity. Admittedly it is top shelf, but there are others also up there. Why were they not approached as well, instead of going to the uninformed offshore?

The crunch statement is that on 20 December, 2020 – three months ago – Adolf wrote, ‘I haven’t seen anything so seriously suspect about the modelling that it would prevent the Commission from publishing the work done to date.’ Yet, the CCC has ignored this recommendation,

The CCC says it needs to refine the data inputs – Stroombergen mentions the problem – but if it really believes that, it should never have published the claim of a minimal reduction.

Even under the urgency of the covid pandemic, scientists have not been so casual about publishing their findings. One hopes that the rest of the Commission’s scientific work is not so sloppy.

So lots of people are making (often heartfelt) submissions on the draft report in a cloud of economic ignorance. It is not just that the figures may be wrong, but close analysis might provide insights. For instance, it may be that some proposed policy changes are particularly painful and others are relatively painless. Would that not be helpful to know?

Another issue is that effective income seems to be reduced more than output, although no estimate is given. (Who would have guessed that the greenies on the CCC were more concerned with output than wellbeing?)

Ideally, the public should be given access to the model the CCC is using – after all we paid for it – and run their own simulations.

Note too, there is a strange inconsistency in what the CCC is saying. On one hand, they are suggesting that the costs of their recommended policies are negligible while Rod Carr, the chair of the Climate Change Commission, has stated that the shifts required to run our economy without fossil fuels will make the economic changes of the late 1980s ‘look like a trial period’. Both those statements cannot be right; perhaps neither is.

The danger is that the CCC will make its final recommendations following a consultation, the economic contributions of which will largely be irrelevant because, without access to the model, nobody will be sufficiently informed.

The government will then be stuck with the proposals even if further analysis shows they will generate serious economic problems. There would be an outcry which would undermine the integrity of the report and the overall strategy. The government would be stuck with  either going against widespread public opposition, which would probably compromise its political support, or it would abandon the CCC and have to start afresh. Those of us who think some action should be taken would find that eminently sensible policy changes are delayed. 

These are not scenarios that I would look forward to, were I the Minister of Finance. Yet he is trapped because the Climate Change Commission is independent, even when it does stupid things.

* The handout says the one percent reduction refers to 2035, but Stroombergen refers to 2050. I’ll go for the economist. It is probably another example of a journalist/public relations writer not understanding what they were writing about. (I found the report very clunky to read.)

Why Don’t We All Live in Australia?

Migration patterns provide further evidence that wellbeing is not simply measured by income.

New Zealand’s GDP per person is about 20 percent lower than Australia’s. Some think that the difference arises because our economic policies have been inferior. They then leaps to arguing for new policies based on ideology rather than evidence. Frequently those policies are neoliberal. Their advocates ignore that during the Rogernomics era our extremist policies, compared to the more centrist Hawke-Keating ones, cost us about 15 percent of GDP. Yes, the ideologues are ignorant of history; but Rogernomic failures aside, the historical record offers quite a different explanation of the difference.

The levels were much the same in 1966 when two major differences arose and the Australian economy powered ahead of New Zealand’s. First, there was the wool price shock, which set back New Zealand but not Australia because they produced fine wools for fashionwear rather than crossbred wools for carpets. But second, 1966 was also when the Australian minerals boom, which has been at the heart of Australian economic success, took off.

Why do we not have the same mineral resources? I explored the answer in the opening chapter of Not In Narrow Seas which concludes that it is because Zealandia is a young continent, whereas Australia is an old craton so its minerals have risen to the surface from the extra 450 million years of evolution. (However, there may be substantial minerals in Zealandia under the sea yet to be found; New Caledonia, at its northern end, has nickel.)

So countries have different resource bases and that greatly impacts on their economic prosperity. You would hardly have heard of Saudi Arabia had it not been sitting on the world’s biggest oil reservoir, while Russia would not be nearly so bolshie had it been bereft of its hydrocarbon reserves.

However, it is not just resources. There are also economies of agglomeration. Intense industrial centres produce high productivity, so Europe started off with a lead partly based on their coal resources but created an industrial base that reaped agglomeration and its productivity gains. New Zealand is too small to succeed on that path. Australia tries but may be too small too. The big centres of industrial agglomeration involve hundreds of millions of people and often cross national boundaries.

If Australia is doing so much better than New Zealand GDP-wise, why don’t we all go and live there? Before we consider the particularities, observe that Tasmanian Gross State Product is more than 20 percent below that of New South Wales. Why do not Tasmanians move to Sydney? Despite the relatively open labour markets between the two countries, trans-Tasman migration has additional complications, but that interstate migration is sluggish within Australia means we need to look for a more general explanation than just income.

For that is the hidden assumption in the above discussion; that GDP per capita, or a variation of it, reflects wellbeing. As an earlier column pointed out, this assumption is inconsistent with the evidence on subjective happiness. Supportive of this conclusion is that happiness is lower in countries with incomes well below the level of rich countries. We are not surprised that people from such countries take great risks to sneak past the border restrictions of the affluent – especially Africans to Europe and Latin Americans to the United States. (Another source of migration flows is refugees, reminding us that political instability is ruinous to wellbeing.)

I looked at the migration issue at the beginning of the twentieth century in Chapter 19 of Not In Narrow Seas. The evidence from the economic indicators of the potential source and destination countries of migrants to New Zealand is mixed. Sufficiently chauvinistic, you could argue New Zealand was a smidgeon ahead. But the migrants did not have the data base and there would be numerous personal caveats. So why did they come here?

I concluded that a key element was they saw opportunities that were not there in Europe. The economic ones ranged from the possibility of owning one’s farm to the perception that in the early 1900s New Zealand was a workingman’s paradise (hence Michael Joseph Savage and Peter Fraser coming here). Julius Vogel argued that women came for better marriage prospects – they were probably more adventurous than the sisters they left behind.

Opportunity still drives permanent migration between affluent countries. (Temporary migration may be the adventure of OE; for some it becomes permanent.) Ernest Rutherford and Kiri Te Kanawa could not have made it in New Zealand. Ed Hillary would never have reached the heights he did had he stayed at home. Contrast Katherine Mansfield with Ronald Hugh Morrieson buried in the country churchyard of Hawera. (The Bloomsbury set were a kind of centre of cultural agglomeration; Morrieson worked almost alone.) As a rule, those that leave forever are going to do better than our permanent inflow – although there are many exceptions to that generalisation.

There is no simple policy conclusion to this reality, unlike the prescriptions offered by neoliberals and many at the other end of the spectrum. But clearly, we have to be cautious about the rhetoric which depends upon GDP and its associates. For instance, it is laziness or stupidity to justify many activities in terms of their alleged financial benefits, when there is a more fundamental wellbeing justification (but, of course, we need to be aware of the resource cost).

We need to think through the whole issue of migration; both the outflows and the inflows, instead of leaving it in that muddle called MoBIE with its focus on the economy. Can we improve how we bind our expatriates to New Zealand? (KEAS – the Kiwi Expat Association – is an example of doing this.) Have we been too casual on who we let in? The gift of a passport to a billionaire who has hardly ever lived here was a disgrace.

As my writing shows, I am not xenophobic. (For instance, Chapter 37 and 49 of Not in Narrow Seas.) But I do not think that cultural policy should be driven by the market, just as we should not judge our wellbeing by per capita GDP.

Do We Really Care about the Marginalised?

Social philosophy in New Zealand is muddled and incomplete.

This year, 2021, is the fiftieth anniversary of John Rawls’ The Theory of Justice, described as the most important book on political philosophy written in the twentieth century. As you might expect it is a big book (587 pages with a follow-up one of 464 pages) and its arguments are complex. This column focuses on just one insight.

It raises the ‘minimax’ principle which says that policy should focus on maximising the situation of those at the bottom, that a society should be judged by how well it treats the most marginalised. (There are many dimensions of marginalisation; for instance how easy is access for the disabled.)

Rawls belongs to a long line of thinkers including Immanuel Kant with his prescription ‘to behave as if what you do would apply to everyone’. Kant himself goes back to Jesus with the injunction to ‘do unto others what you would have them do to you’.

Rawls has had surprisingly little impact on New Zealand. He nearly did. Almost simultaneously, the Royal Commission on Social Security (the McCarthy Commission) published in early 1972. It could not have had access to Rawls’ book, but its principle that the aim of social security was, as far as possible, to enable everybody to participate in and belong to their community comes from the same ideological stable. After all,. Michael Joseph Savage described his social security legislation as ‘applied Christianity’.

The minimax idea was once deeply imbedded in the New Zealand psyche as a part of the social contract. A way of characterising it is that the role of the state is to provide a reasonable minimal living for all and enable everyone to achieve above this if they wished. (This hardly applies to today’s poor children, who with inadequate nutrition, health care and schooling are not going to be able to achieve their full potential in adulthood.)

You might have expected the 1988 Royal Commission on Social Policy (the Richardson Commission) to have picked up the Rawlsian ball and explicitly integrate it into its account of the social security system. No such luck. Insofar as it had any conclusions, they were an intellectual shambles. The purpose of the RCSP was to provide an alternative to Rogernomics, but it demonstrated that the opponents could not get their act together and gave a carte blanche to the neoliberals to ‘redesign the welfare state’, as Richardson (a different one) and Shipley put it.

‘Redesigning’ was a slogan rather than a coherent policy. Much of it seems to have been about privatising and commercialising social security towards an idealised version of the American system – as idealised by the American right. It does not work there either, which is one of the sources of our clumsy shambolic system. Very typically, when we make a policy mess we try to solve it by adding more to the mess, rather than going back to the beginning and analysing why it happened. The result is a Heath Robinson system.

One thing was clear. The ‘redesign’ dramatically cut social security benefits (by over 20 percent in some cases) to pay for tax cuts for the rich. In effect they switched the 1972 RCSS’s approach of minimax to maximax – the aim was to maximise the incomes of those at the top. Not only were the benefits cut but since then they have been usually increased in line with inflation, not with overall prosperity. A way of thinking about this is that the redesign of the welfare state replaced the 1972 RCSS’s approach of a relative poverty with an absolute poverty one.

The 1999-2008 Clark-Cullen Labour Government did little to redirect or recover the social security system. It seems to have been dominated by the same muddled thinking of the 1988 RCSP. A nice illustration is that one of its leading thinkers described Working for Families as the best thing that the government did. Critics who want a more extended and coherent welfare state think it is a muddle which put back the development of welfare. Perhaps they are both right.

The 2008-2017 Key-English Government, under fiscal pressure after giving generous income tax cuts to the rich, continued National’s earlier approach and pressed down on beneficiaries. Maximax rules, OK.

Perhaps it is too early to judge the Ardern-Robertson Government’s approach. But it seems to remain in thrall to the muddle of the 1988 RCSP. There is little evidence of the influence of Rawls or the 1972 RCSS in its policy making.

Rawls’ thinking is surprisingly absent from New Zealand’s. For example, Jonathon Boston’s Transforming the Welfare State: Towards a New Social Contract has no reference to The Theory of Justice. He is not alone.

Why do we not include Rawls is our public discussion? It is not as if he gets mentioned and the writer then explains why they reject Rawls’ approach. Perhaps they object to its Christian foundations, perhaps they are maximax neoliberals, or something in between. I dont know.

It is almost as if all 1051 pages of Rawls is too much to get one’s head around. Have you noticed that in New Zealand we tend to ignore anything we disagree with, rather than address why there is a disagreement? The standard way to deal with quality intellectuals is to dismiss them as unsound and misrepresent their arguments. The consequence is that so much of our thinking is mechanical, shallow, unoriginal and colonial.

Perhaps a speech could be written for the current Prime Minister, Minister of Finance or Minister of Social Development pointing their government’s shift towards a minimax approach. But it would be delivered without conviction and received without comprehension by the commentariat sated with maximax, while the minister’s officials and advisers would be confused and puzzled.

So we are stuck between the muddle of the 1988 RCSP and the 1990 redesign of the welfare state. It might be worthwhile reading the 1972 McCarthy Commission (or the 1966 Woodhouse Commission on Accident Compensation) to see how one can think (and write) clearly. On the evidence, suggesting that our policymakers and commentariat read The Theory of Justice may be too big an ask.

Are We Really Budgeting for Wellbeing?

How Can We Make Wellbeing at the Centre of Public Policy If We Dont Measure It?

When the Minister of Finance announced in the 2018 budget that in the future economic policy would focus more on wellbeing, many saw a glimmer of hope that we were moving away from the mechanical thinking which underpinned Rogernomics/neoliberalism. Thus far, the promise has been aspirational with little sign of a significant change to the policy framework.

Ironically, though, the government was confronted with the issue with arrival of the covid virus. Unlike many countries, it chose to emphasise wellbeing over the economy and with good management, attention to the science and a bit of luck, did much better than many others did, both in terms of dealing with the virus and, to the surprise of many, in terms of narrow economic performance.

You may recall that there were naysayers critical of the lockdown, which they evaluated by its impact on GDP. Many made assumptions which proved to be wildly wrong, but even had they been right, the naysayers were judging the policy by a quite different criterion from wellbeing or, as they might put it, they equated wellbeing with economic output.

The equation does not make sense. To clear away some debris, GDP measures output not income (which differs if there are changes in the terms of trade and border transaction costs). GDP measures gross output including capital depreciation. It measures output in a country, not the income of those in the country. (One ambiguity is to what extent temporary visitors and recent arrivals should be included. It is possible that all the output gains in the Key-English decade accrued to the recent arrivals.)

Adjust for these, and the relevant national accounting concept is National Income (NI). The naysayers are likely to say that GDP and NI follow the same track (but beware of the issues mentioned in the last sentence of the previous paragraph). What they really mean, but forgot to tell us, is that they think income equated to wellbeing.

Income is no longer a good measure of wellbeing. This is a recent research finding which has surprised the economics profession. Historically, economists assumed that higher income resulted in greater wellbeing. That no longer seems as true in affluent economies. Age, employment status, gender, health, marital status and (even) ethnicity are all more important.

Economic policy has little impact on most of these variables; perhaps that tells the profession it should be humble. However, the evidence is that employment status (such as being stressfully unemployed) is more important than income.

It is true that people with higher incomes than others report higher wellbeing (measured, say, by happiness) but not by much. However (and surprisingly), raising across-the-board incomes in an affluent economy does not raise across-the-board wellbeing.

What seems to have happened is that when the paradigm was being fashioned in the early nineteenth century with its were much lower levels of affluence, a rise in income did improve wellbeing; that remains true in poorer countries – much poorer than New Zealand.  Which means that anyone who thinks GDP is an overall measure of wellbeing is stuck back in the nineteenth century.

It also seems from the research that there are significant immediate wellbeing gains from income increases for those on the lowest incomes in New Zealand. (There are likely to be other longer-term gains in health and education for children.)

Even if we stick to income, aggregates measured by GDP or NI are not equity-neutral but favour the rich. When economics tried to avoid interpersonal comparisons, it shifted to a ‘Pareto’ criterion that an increase in output was a good thing because the output could be allocated as the distribution authority saw fit. However, practically, we operate on the principle that any redistribution will reduce output because of the deadweight loss from taxation. Practically, redistribution is discouraged.

Amartya Sen pointed out that this approach assumes that a dollar to a rich person has the same social value as a dollar to a poor person. (That is an assumption which has been sneaked in, despite the alleged avoidance of interpersonal comparisons.) He suggests that a better assumption would be to treat a one percent increase in income to a rich person the same as a one percent increase in income to a poor person, and he proposed a measure which he called ‘real national income’.

I made an imperfect attempt to calculate changes in RNI. It suggests that real private incomes based on the dollar-is-a-dollar measure rose 1.2 percent p.a.  between 1982 and 2018. But because of the rise in inequality (which means incomes rose faster for the rich than the poor), on a percent-is-a-percent basis the annual increase was 1.0 percent, a sixth lower. We should not be surprised that a pro-rich distributional policy shows a lower increase in wellbeing than GDP according to the Sen measure.

There are other weaknesses from focusing upon GDP and its allies when we are assessing the economy. For instance, since wellbeing is substantially reduced by stressful unemployment (which is a different notion from the conventional unemployment measure and probably includes dire underemployment) the amount of stressful unemployment should be included in any aggregate measure of wellbeing.

Does it matter? We could construct a better measure of wellbeing but – well – doing that has not been a priority. The consequences is that public discussion inevitably defaults to another measure – GDP, which is a very poor measure of wellbeing. Most users will forget – if they ever knew – its limitations.

This is not really a prediction. It already happens. And whatever the aspirations of this government – which need not be followed by a successor government – that is how it will happen until we introduce a superior measure of aggregate wellbeing and place it firmly in the centre of macroeconomic policy and discussion.

Addendum: Any measure of the current state of wellbeing for macroeconomic policy purposes applies at a point in time. Trying to include sustainability in it will destroy any meaning. Instead, two supplementary indicators are needed.

First, there is a need for a measure of financial sustainability, more robust than the government-debt-to-GDP ratio. (You dont really think that the credit rating agencies arrive here, check the ratio has been calculate correctly and go home. They do a thorough review of the entire financial situation.)

Second, there is a need for an indicator of environmental sustainability, especially as reducing carbon emissions impacts on macroeconomic policy. This is quite different from the (usually uninformed) attempts to extend GDP to cover the environment. (The trick which determines the measure’s outcome is how the environment is valued. If the value is high, then the indicator goes down, if it is low the indicator rises – funny that.)

Designing a The Primary Macropolicy Wellbeing Indicator

Introduction:

The focus of this paper is on macroeconomic management and not on the entirety of economic policy. There are many issues which macroeconomic interventions cannot address. To use macroeconomic instruments, rather than the relevant targeted instrument, will blunt the effectiveness of macropolicy interventions.

Reflecting, this paper is really a critique of the current primary macropolicy indicator – GDP. Economists are too much creatures of habit for one to expect it to be replaced. At least we need to remember its limitations. While it dominates, macropolicy will have little to do with wellbeing.

Evaluating Wellbeing

There are two major problems concerning wellbeing that this paper is dealing with. The first is what determines an individual’s wellbeing.

Once upon a time economists equated wellbeing with ‘utility’, but the discipline has moved past that. (One methodological problem was that utility could not be defined independently of the theory which it is being used to justify.)

Instead, thinking has moved towards focusing on answers to subjective questions such as ‘are you happy?’ or ‘rate yourself on life satisfaction’. There is evidence that an individual’s objective physiology tends to be consistent with subjective responses, although it is not conclusive (and probably cant ever be).

Numerous studies have found consistent patterns with the subjective responses, most notably that age, employment status, gender, health, marital status and (even) ethnicity all seem more important.

(Note that it has been difficult to test/measure some obvious potential influences on wellbeing. For instance one’s wellbeing is likely to be higher if the wellbeing of close associates (such as immediate family) is also. It also seems likely that one’s wellbeing may be influenced by that of the society as a whole – an implicit idea behind the ‘team of five million’.)

People with higher incomes than others report higher wellbeing (measured, say, by happiness) but not by much. (Even here, it is possible that the effect is from being higher in the rankings of a society which measures status by income, which has quite different policy implications from if the wellbeing lift comes from the actual goods that the income can purchase.)

However (and surprisingly) raising across-the-board incomes in an affluent economy does not raise across-the-board wellbeing. (In contrast, in traditional analysis .economic growth was expected to raise wellbeing. It does, however, raise choice, especially in respects to Sen’s notion of ‘capabilities’, which also undermines traditional economic analysis.)

Historically economists assumed that higher income resulted in greater wellbeing. However, that no longer seems as true in affluent economies.

Economic policy has little impact on age, employment status, gender, health, marital status or ethnicity, which all seem more important for determining wellbeing. However, the evidence is that employment status (such as being stressfully unemployed) is more important than income.

The research does hint that there are significant gains from income increases for those on the lowest incomes, but the effect is not well measured. (There are likely to be other longer-term gains in health and for children’s prospects.)

In summary then, income is only marginally relevant in an affluent economy, yet the main paradigms have hardly been modified by it. This is as true as aggregate wellbeing, which might be the objective of macroeconomic policy interventions.

That raises the second issue. How to aggregate individual wellbeing for aggregate policy, such as macropolicy.

With the above background we consider how wellbeing might be incorporated into macropolicy, knowing the exercise is difficult, but is not as treacherous as relying solely on GDP.

(It could be added that economics is in even greater flux. The subject is older than psychology as a science and had to adopt simplistic assumptions about behaviour. However psychology has been testing those assumptions and found many are inconsistent with actual behaviour. Again, the findings have not been really incorporated into the standard paradigm, although at least six Nobel laureates in economics have contributed to the revolution. As far as I can judge, the findings do not generally impact on macroeconomics although their impact on microeconomics is likely to be great.

Below I add Maslow’s hierarchy of needs to the analysis.)

Summary: The Key Propositions

1. The way the game is scored shapes the way the game is played. (Gilling’s Law)

2. This paper is about macroeconomic policy – fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate interventions (alternatively it may be defined as aggregate demand management).

3. The easy way to lose a game is having multiple scoring systems.

4. Menus and pantries are checklists not ultimate indexes of performance.

5. GDP per capita is not a very good measure of wellbeing.

6. Income is no longer a good measure of wellbeing for most people.

7. GDP and related aggregates are not equity-neutral but favour the rich. A better measure is Real National Income (RNI).

8. Government spending needs to be included at a proper value to the recipients rather than cost.

9. The calculation of the RNI should include government services provided to the individual

10. Employment Status is a part of Wellbeing.

11. There is no evidence that price stability or inflation impacts directly on wellbeing.

12. The Primary Macropolicy Wellbeing Indicator will not contain much about sustainability.

Proposition 1: This paper is framed by Gilling’s Law: The way the game is scored shapes the way the game is played.

Proposition 2: Different games have different scoring rules. This paper is about macroeconomic policy – fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate interventions. (An older view, or perhaps a newer view, is that it is about aggregate demand management.) It is not, for instance, about the concerns of a productivity and wellbeing commission.

Proposition 3: The easy way to lose a game is having multiple scoring systems. Faced with them, there will be a default to a particular dimension. In the case of macropolicy this is likely to be GDP which, as we shall see, is not a very good measure of wellbeing. (Proposition 5). Thus the objective here is to identify one scoring regime (a single objective), although supplementary assessments are briefly explored. (Proposition 12)

It is argued that perhaps there should be a number of indicators with policy aiming to locate the economy within set bounds for each one. (E.g. consumer inflation between 1 and 3 percent p.a.) I am not uncomfortable with that approach (assuming the bounds are sensibly wide enough, and consistently obtainable). However the reality is that while the macroeconomic managers may have little difficulty with that approach, the public discussion will fixate on one particular indicator (GDP?). That will influence the politicians and in turn compromise the macroeconomic management. (An example of this sort of fixation is the net-public-debt-to-GDP ratio – more at Proposition 12.)

Proposition 4: There may be a role for menus (or pantries) but as checklists not as objectives. For instance, the Treasury has a wellbeing framework of five dimensions, useful for a Treasury official who, when finishing a paper, checks whether Treasury’s main concerns have been covered.

(My objection to the five dimensions is that there should be a sixth one of ‘quality’. It is an extraordinary omission given that many economic interventions are about quality. I assume that the oversight occurred because the Treasury adopted a limited neoclassical paradigm which says quality is not a problem in a market economy.)

Proposition 5: GDP per capita is not a very good measure of wellbeing.

It measures output not income (which differs if there are changes in the terms of trade and border transaction costs).

It measures gross output gross including capital depreciation.

It measures output in a jurisdiction, not the income of those in a jurisdiction. (Another ambiguity is to what extent temporary visitors and recent arrivals should be included. It is possible that all the output gains in the Key-English decade accrued to them.)

Because of these considerations, a better national accounting measure would be the SNA measure of National Income.

(Some of the other weaknesses of GDP, such as its treatment of externalities, non-market activity and resource depletion, are not so relevant for macropolicy. See however, Proposition 12 in regard to the last.)

Proposition 6: Income is no longer a good measure of wellbeing.

This is a recent research finding which has surprised the profession. Historically economists assumed that higher income resulted in greater wellbeing. However, as discussed in the introduction, that seems no longer as true as it once was.

What is happening may best be explained in terms of the Maslow hierarchy of needs (from bottom to top: physiological needs => safety needs => love and belonging needs => esteem needs => self-actualisation needs.) The economy’s primary contribution is to the bottom one (physiological needs). It is not quite true that the economy does nothing towards the higher one (for instance economic stabilisation may contribute to safety and security needs; possessions to status-esteem needs, but generally the role of conventional economics measures such as income become very less relevant in the way the research reports.

(Some economic measures may impact badly on the higher needs. For instance, pursuing greater economic output may decrease employment stability and reduce the ability to obtain safety needs.)

Proposition 7: GDP and related aggregates are not equity neutral but favour the rich.

When economics tried to avoid interpersonal comparisons it shifted to a Pareto criterion that an increase in output was good, because the output could be allocated as a distribution authority saw fit. However practically, we operate on the principle that any redistribution will reduce output (See Proposition 8). Therefore redistribution is discouraged.

Amartya Sen asked why we assume that a dollar to a rich person has the same social value as a dollar to a poor person. (That is an assumption which has been sneaked in, despite the alleged avoidance of interpersonal comparisons.) He suggested that a better assumption would be to treat a one percent increase in income to a rich person the same as a one percent increase in income to a poor person and proposed a measure which he called ‘real national income’ (RNI).

RNI is difficult to calculate given the current data base but one can use the standard household equivalent income calculations from the HYES data (i.e. not the national accounts). Between 1982 and 2018, real private incomes based on the GDP/Pareto measure rose 1.2 percent p.a. but because of the rise in inequality (incomes rose faster for the rich than the poor) the annual rise on a RNI/Sen basis was 1.0 percent. The cumulative difference was 6.0 percent. In effect, the RNI level was in 2018 where the GDP level was the same in 2013/5; growth had been retard by a month a year as a result of distributional policy.

While I have taken a Sennian approach here, at the distributional policy level the Atkinson approach (the Atkinson index, also known as the Atkinson measure or Atkinson inequality measure). Proposition 8 is relevant to it. (For an extension, see Proposition 9)

Proposition 8: Government spending needs to be included at full value rather than cost.

Government services are measured in the SNA framework at cost, whereas private production is measured in terms of the value to the consumer. We know something about the value of government services – or at least the Treasury thinks it does.

It takes that $100 of government spending (as measured conventionally) displaces $112 of private production. The logic which follows is that the government commits itself to spending only what it values the service at 112 percent of the nominal cost.

It is not hard to see why this might happen. For instance, the provision of public healthcare is considerably cheaper than private provision via, say, insurance. The additional cost of private insurance is thought to be more expensive than (12/112 =) 11 percent of total costs (which is a reason why US health care is so expensive but relatively ineffective).

Moreover, when some New Zealander receives $100 of public healthcare the other five million are likely to be pleased that the expenditure has happened because it gives them some comfort that if we need the service they will get it too. (Were they each to pay .01 cent for that comfort, the value of the $100 of care would be $150 to the nation.)

To add a premium of 12 percent to government services to convert from production costs to value would not necessarily change our international GDP ranking, since the same adjustment would be made for other countries’ GDP (although their premium might be different and the proportion of aggregate production devoted to government services also varies).

However, it would change the the growth of GDP when there was a change in the private to public expenditure balance. For instance, the share of public consumption (excluding public investment) was 19.7 percent in the 2009 year but only 18.0 percent in the 2017 year. Allowing for value rather than cost, the effect of the Key-English Government squeeze was to reduce effective GDP by 0.2 percent.

(One may be doubtful about the 12 percent premium, but it is the Treasury estimate. In the context of the above analysis, those on the left may think the premium was too low and those on the right think it too high.)

(As an aside – or is it? – the Atkinson approach has been around for about 50 years, but I have never seen it applied in New Zealand. (I have never had the resources to do this; others have.) Given its relationship to Rawls’s Theory of Justice which has also been around for fifty years and also has had little impact on New Zealand social policy, perhaps one is not surprised.)

Proposition 9: The calculation of the RNI should include government services provided to individuals (e.g. health and education – social transfers are already including in the RNI calculation).

They contribute to a person’s wellbeing Any increase or reduction of such services should be monitored.

I am not sure we currently have a database to do this on an annual basis.

(This adjustment is likely to reduce RNI growth relative to GDP growth even further, especially when big public spending cuts were made in the early 1990s.)

Proposition 10: Employment Status is a part of Wellbeing

A standard research finding is that wellbeing is reduced by stressful unemployment (which is a different notion from the conventional unemployment measure and probably includes dire underemployment).

There is a linkage here to Maslow’s hierarchy together with Jahoda’s latent functions of work. (Not in Narrow Seas: 410-1) The central insight is that work does not just provide income but has other personal and social benefits.

The logic of the research is that there is a tradeoff between higher output and higher unemployment. For instance, before 1984 there was a conscious policy of job creation to reduce unemployment even if it reduced productivity. After 1984 that policy tradeoff was abandoned, with the prioritisation of high output/productivity (the goal may not have been achieved) even though that raised the level of (stressful) unemployment. Wellbeing was diminished.

The tradeoff needs to be incorporated in the PMWI. Left among subsidiary indicators, as the unemployment rate is today, relegates its significance and means the primary indicator is not a comprehensive measure of economic wellbeing.(Note the stress from lower income is covered by a RNI measure; the concern here is the loss of the Jahoda/Maslow benefits.)

Proposition 11: There is no evidence that price stability or inflation impacts directly on wellbeing. While the inflation rate is a relevant concern for macroeconomic policy as a part of ensuring the market economy works properly it is not a part of a PMWI.

(In passing, the ‘Misery Index’ of adding together the unemployment rate with the annual inflation rate is an obvious mathematical nonsense – since the components are measured in different units – it also lacks conceptual foundations.)

Proposition 12: The Primary Macropolicy Wellbeing Indicator will not contain much about sustainability.

The PMWI is a measure at a point in time, the current state of wellbeing. Trying to incorporate sustainability over time will destroy any meaning. Instead, two supplementary indicators are recommended.

There is a need for a measure of financial sustainability. Currently the government debt to GDP ratio is used. Its defects are obvious. (Credit rating agencies look at much wider sets of indicators.) Financial sustainability also needs to include the overseas financial position and private balance sheets. To progress this to something meaningful requires a national balance sheet.

There is also a need for an indicator of environmental sustainability, especially as reducing carbon emissions impacts on macroeconomic policy. This is quite different from the (usually uninformed) attempts to extend GDP to cover the environment. (The trick, by the way, which determines their outcome is how the environment is valued. If the value is high relative to output, then the indicator goes down, if it is low the indicator rises – funny that. A related trick is to fiddle with the time-discount rate.)

Conclusion

The paper points out the humbling (for an economist) proposition that many of the greatest influences on wellbeing may no longer be particularly influenced by economic management.

Instead it explores the development of a Primary Macropolicy Wellbeing Indicator. The focus has been on the construction of a single indicator because multiple indicators will be misused – typically by defaulting to an inappropriate one. But because a macropolicy indicator is at a point in time there is also a need for two supplementary indicators to assess sustainability to add a time dimension.

In particular the paper explores the replacement of the current primary indicator – GDP – by something which takes better into account key elements in our understanding of wellbeing. Thus the paper reviews standard economic criticisms of GDP/output as a measure of social wellbeing.

Any alternative has to be able to be measured and able to be forecast to be useful. The paper does not propose a detailed PMWI but suggests how one might be constructed.

Among the issues the analysis has raised are

            – net income rather than gross output (Proposition 5)

            – what is the relevant population? (Proposition 5)

            – distributional considerations (Proposition 7)

            – how to value wellbeing enhancing government services  (Proposition 8 )

            – unemployment (Proposition 10)

            – sustainability (Proposition 12)

By playing down each of these and giving primacy to the GDP as the macropolicy indicator results in a bias against wellbeing in outcome. Arguably that has been a feature since GDP became the dominant indicator, say, four decades ago and as a result wellbeing has suffered.

In particular, there are many instances of when ignoring these wellbeing effects in favour of GDP has damaged wellbeing. There are may instances during the period of Rogernomics/Neoliberal dominance but there are also examples from the receny Key-English period.

The rough estimates in the paper suggest that moving towards a PMWI makes significant but not great differences to the current measure. What is important it changes the way we think about the impact of macroeconomic policy on wellbeing.

I do not expect New Zealand policy to replace GDP with something more suitable in the near future. Our policy framework is conservative, both in the sense of intellectual inertia and in favouring a pro-rich status quo. In any case the current framework is colonially subservient to overseas fashion. However, we might make a little progress – pay a little more attention to wellbeing – if we keep the critique made here of GDP more in the forefront of our thinking.

We Must Avoid Treating Māori As Living Fossils.

There are times when tikanga needs to be broken for tikanga to survive.

I recently gave a presentation on Māori economic history based on my Not in Narrow Seas. Its most important message was that Māori proved to be a very adaptable people continually evolving as new opportunities arose. The European tradition recalls the Duke in the novel The Leopard, telling his nephew ‘If we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change.’ Māori have a parallel whakatauki ‘Me whati te tikanga, kia ora ai te tikanga’; there are times when tikanga needs to be broken for tikanga to survive.

The presentation discusses the great Māori postwar urbanisation (also covered in my Heke Tangata). In the earlier part of the twentieth century, many Māori were living in rural subsistence conditions. As Apirana Ngata described them in 1940:

‘There are Māori communities which are satisfied to live on minimal reserves, where they grow the vegetables they require, from which they make seasonal excursions into the labour field to obtain the minimum resource for the purchase of clothes and food, and where they rusticate [live a country life] between periods of employment.’

The urban transformation has been dramatic. Māori were 71 percent rural in 1951; by 2013 only 15 percent of Māori lived in the countryside. Around 10 percent of Māori lived in the main cities in 1926; by 2013 this proportion had grown to 66 percent, not too different from the non-Māori figure of 75 percent, which had crossed the 50 percent threshold before 1926.

Māori were ill-prepared for the urbanisation They had little wealth to bring with them and they lacked education. Rural education tends to be inferior to urban education, but Māori rural education was even worse. The required skills for countryside farming, fishing, hunting and labouring are not those which schools teach easily. Modern education arose because industrialisation and urbanisation required literacy and numeracy. (Interestingly, Māori women seem to have adjusted to the urban economy better than men – presumably reflecting different skill sets and demands for female labour.)

Because a critical element in educational attainment and employment prospects is the transmission between generations, underqualified and underemployed parents means underqualified children who as adults have lower incomes and poorer employment prospects. Society needs to make an enormous effort to break the vicious cycle. New Zealand did not.

I could go through, as my books do, the sad indicators of the resulting outcome – for instance the higher unemployment rate. The evidence is that there has been a very slow socioeconomic convergence between Māori and Pakeha. (If the trend continues it will be decades before they will be close to equality.) But in the course of the presentation I was struck by another phenomenon which is discussed in the book and also my Heke Tangata.

What do we mean by Māori, for it no longer has the meaning that it had when they were primarily a rural people?

We have even changed the statistical definition of Māori. Up to the early 1980s, Statistics NZ had used what was jokingly called a ‘hydraulic’ definition: the proportion of Māori ‘blood’ (or descent) compared to proportion of non-Māori ‘blood’. This objective descent measure has been replaced with a subjective ethnicity measure of how an individual wishes to describe themselves. People often mix the two notions but formally, data is usually collected on an ethnicity basis. (The Population Census asks a question about people’s ethnicities, although there is also a question about Māori descent – but for no other descent group. This is necessary for calculating the number of Māori electorates; subjective ethnicity would be impracticable for legal purposes.)

Presumably someone with one of their thirty-two great-great-great-grandparents Māori ticks the ‘Māori descent’ box in the census, but what might they do to the ethnicity question: ‘Māori’? ‘Pakeha’? or both? About half of those who give a Māori ethnicity also give a second one. Let us call those who tick both boxes ‘Māori-Pakeha’ to distinguish them from sole Māori who tick only one. (A few tick other ethnicities such as Māori-Pasifika.) In which case those of Māori-Pakeha ethnicity would be our third largest ethnic group; they may be second largest in 2023.

A person of Māori descent may choose to register on the Māori electoral roll or he or she may not. Only about a half do.

Once we move outside the statistical data base, our knowledge is even murkier about what – and how – people classify themselves. Some may do so differently in different circumstances and their classification may change over time. For instance, the Health Inequalities Research Programme at the University of Otago’s Wellington School of Medicine found that the ethnicity on a death certificate did not always correspond to the census-reported ethnicity. The discrepancy was sufficiently large to modify some of their findings.

One further research finding (from the HLFS) which adds to the puzzle is that comparing socioeconomic status between those who report ‘sole Māori’ and those who report ‘Māori-Pakeha’ shows major differences. Here is an example using employment participation rates by ethnicity and gender. (The female participation rates are just over 10 percentage points below the male ones for all ethnicities.)

Employment Participation Rates by Ethnicity and Gender (Percentage), 2007/17

                                    Female             Male

Pakeha                         64.0                 75.1

Māori-Pakeha             65.7                 75.8

Sole-Māori                  57.9                 69.7

Strikingly, those who classify themselves as ‘Māori–Pakeha’ have employment responses similar to Pakeha. (They may be slightly higher because of different age profiles.) One is left with the uneasy feeling that subjective ethnicity may be influenced by objective socioeconomic characteristics.

What we cannot be sure of is how these definitional issues play out. But evidently there is a disconnect between the public perception, which is still too dependent upon the rural Māori of a century ago, and the reality of a socially and economic diverse urban population, as survey responses show.

The full paper and the books relate a story of Māori economic development evolving; of tikanga being broken in order for tikanga to survive. Māori have adapted to new opportunities in difficult circumstances,. But the urbanisation of the last half century has proved a challenge which has not been fully met, in part because it has happened so rapidly but also because the nation was so unprepared for it.

The message of this column, and the books and presentation, is that too often we impose our uninformed prejudices on Māori; prejudices which are based on historical misunderstandings and do not allow for Māori adaptation. Māori are not living fossils but, like Pakeha, evolving and adapting. We need to keep our thinking evolving and adapting too.

Excess Deaths in the Covid Era: A Note

I have been gripped by the World Oddometer’s daily reports tracking the covid statistics. In a way it was a rejection of Stalin’s ‘one death is a tragedy; a million is a statistic’; I have watched with agony the paths of various countries.

But this statistician knew that the data reflected reported deaths from covid, and that there is considerable variation among countries’ diligence at collecting their statistics and definitions vary too..

A way around these problems is to use ‘excess death rates’ which is to look at the deaths above past trends. Until recently nobody did the exercise systematically and comprehensively enough to give a reasonable overview.

However, last week The Economist published figures for about sixty countries. There are some disappointing omissions – particularly China and India*.

It turns out that many countries are woefully under-reporting their covid deaths. But surprisingly, the excess deaths in some countries are substantially below the reported covid deaths and in some case (including New Zealand) they are negative. I shall not comment on the latter because it is outside my statistical skills; it is easy enough to think of reasons but one has no idea about each effect’s magnitude. My focus here is on the statistics..

Here is a tabulation of the top 25 countries ranked by their excess death rates but also showing their reported covid death rates and the ranking. (Note that the method/tabulation assumes that counties accurately count their dead; alas not always true. I have vague memories of grumpings about Brasil.)

One conclusion is that countries we tend to track – the UK and the US – report more rigorously than others. So they report 4th and 7th on the covid death measure, but on the excess death measure they are 17th and 23rd, a salutary reminder that for all the pain we have shared with them, there are countries who are suffering even more.

Excess and Reported Covid Death Rates to 18 February 18 (rates per 100,000)

Country* / Excess Death Rate/ Ranking/ Reported Death Rate/ Ranking
Bosnia & Ha 5100 1 1518 8
Bulgaria 2720 2 1415 13
Peru 2610 3 1338 15
Lithuania 2580 4 1166 19
Russia 2520 5 564 41
Serbia 2330 6 492 44
Mexico 2270 7 1372 14
Romania 2060 8 1026 26
Bolivia 2030 9 964 28
Ecuador 1990 10 867 32
South Africa 1890 11 815 33
Poland 1840 12 1099 24
Slovenia 1820 13 1806 2
Montenegro 1800 49 1474 9
Belgium 1770 14 1878 1
Portugal 1700 15 1548 6
Czechia 1670 16 1764 3
UK 1600 17 1753 4
Spain 1600 18 1426 12
Italy 1570 19 1571 5
N Macedonia1460 20 1449 11
Croatia 1460 21 1320 16
Hungary 1410 22 1455 10
USA 1380 23 1521 7
Moldova 1340 24 923 29
Kyrgyzstan 1270 25 220 48

If there is a conclusion it might be that there are ‘lies, damned lies and statistics’. More constructively, a statistician always needs to be cautious  with sources – particularly cross-country comparisons.

Footnote. New Zealand. The Economist estimates New Zealand’s excess deaths at minus 200 in the covid era (in contrast to plus 26 reported covid deaths). The conclusion was earlier found by a team led by Nick Wilson of the Wellington Medical School. As I recall they conjectured that the greater flu vaccination roll out, greater personal hygiene and fewer car deaths because of less motoring during the lockdown may have had a role, but as far as I know detailed evaluation is not yet published 

* The other countries/regions reported in the study were as follows. (The order reported here is the rankings by excess death rate from highest to lowest. The break between South Korea and Norway is to show those countries which have negative excess death rates.)

Switzerland; Kosova; Netherlands; Sweden; Austria; Brazil;  France; Latvia; Slovakia; Chile; Ukraine; Germany; Egypt; Colombia; Belarus; Luxembourg; Uzbekistan; Istanbul; Estonia; Albania; Jakarta; Israel; Malta; Greece; Canada; Oman; Montenegro; Denmark; Finland; Qatar; South Korea;

            Negative Excess Deaths

Norway; Singapore; Japan; Thailand; Iceland; Costa Rica; Cyprus; Philippines; Australia; Taiwan; Mongolia; New Zealand

A Brief History of the Māori Economy: How Things Change

Presentation to a Statistics New Zealand Seminar, 23 February, 2021.

Māori involvement in the economy has been an integral part of New Zealand’s story, even if we ignore the first 500 years when there was only a Māori economy. Unlike many of our histories, Not in Narrow Seas does not. There are about 40,000 words on the topic – a book in its own right – beginning with the societies that our first Polynesians came from. My book does the same for the British and Pasifika immigrants, because each migrant wave brought its cultural baggage; for instance, the first proto-Māori shelters were modelled on their island equivalents.

The book calls them ‘proto-Māori’ because the first arrivals were not Māori but evolved into what today we call ‘Māori’. The answer to where Māori came from is ‘Aotearoa-New Zealand’. Their ancestors came from East-central Polynesia – say near Tahiti – and can be traced back to near Xi’an in inland China. No, they were not Chinese, but a different people who worked their way to the coast about 5000 years ago, learned how to sail and eventually explored most of the Pacific.

There is a lesson here central to the book. Māori proved to be a very adaptable people continually evolving as new opportunities and challenges arose. The European tradition recalls the Duke in the novel The Leopard, telling his nephew ‘If we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change.’ Māori have a parallel whakatauki ‘Me whati te tikanga, kia ora ai te tikanga’; there are times when tikanga (practices) needs to be broken for tikanga to survive.

Adapting means the present and future will be different from the past. We should not impose our current preoccupations onto the Māori past, a particularly tempting exercise where there is no written record.

The Origins of Māori

For instance, we do not know how the first arrivals 700 years ago, reacted for they came to a land mass far in excess of anything they were familiar with elsewhere in Polynesia. Yes, they ate moa but the evidence from the middens is they depended on fish, as had their Pacific Island ancestors, and continued to do so for the next 500 years.

In their sort of economy, about 80 percent of economic effort was devoted to feeding themselves – compared to, say, 10 percent today. Then the seas and shores were rich in fishes. The nutritional challenge was adequate energy – not protein. In the north it came from kumara, in the far south it came from seal blubber. That is why there were fewer Māori in the middle of the country.

There are many intricacies in their story – climate change has a role in at least two ways – but the basic economy was affluent; there was probably a lot of leisure time except in the peak season. Hapu were largely self-sufficient. There was trade among them but generally it was for what amounted to luxuries. Their life expectancy was lower than today, but similar to the most robust European societies,

The rules for this exchange were rather different from today’s commercial format which focuses on the value of the product being exchanged, not those involved in the exchange. In traditional gift exchange economies the focus was on those involved in the exchange rather than the product.

The First European Impacts

Yet when outsiders turned up, Māori proved adept at bartering. The very first exchange – between Cook’s Endeavour off the Hawkes Bay shore and the waka that came up to investigate them – is instructive. Māori at the time were neolithic – that is, they used stone tools and gardened – although, as I have indicated, they were a sophisticated society. They proved much less interested in the iron nails Cook’s officers offered for fish, and more in the tapa cloth that the seamen did. However, by the time Cook got ashore, Māori had got the hang of metals and the spikes had become very attractive. We’ve just seen two adaptations. First, from gift exchange to barter and second, the introduction of new technologies.

Exchange involves two sides – two perceptions. In the early exchanges between Māori and visitors, the differences were large, quite unlike the equilibrium market transactions of economic theory. For instance, ‘the natives [were] eager to exchange a 10lb fish for a ten penny nail’ in 1815. The report has a European perspective that Māori were exchanging something valuable for something cheap. But they would have seen the value imbalance the other way around: as a part of a normal day’s catching, the fish probably cost them minutes rather than hours of labour. A metal implement was far more efficient – labour saving – than a stone one.

One of the complications of trying to understand the Māori economy is the very rapid change following the European impact. For instance, the missionaries brought literacy for Bible reading; by the middle of the nineteenth century Māori were probably more literate than the Europeans. Europeans also bought diseases – dysentery, influenza, measles, STDs, whooping cough – to an immunologically virgin population. The resulting mortality and infertility seems to have resulted in a greater reduction of the Māori population than the fighting of the nineteenth century; certainly it had a greater impact than the 1918 influenza or today’s covid pandemics.

The impact of new technologies was also mixed. To focus on just one – the musket – to illustrate how we can misleadingly impose a contemporary frame on a historical event. The Musket Wars – from 1820 to 1835 – were devastating and caused considerable death and turbulence to Māori society. It is from them that the latter-day perception of Māori as warriors arises. But it is not obvious that, before the musket, the inter-hapu fighting was particularly vicious. The fighting would have been hand to hand and the weapons not too destructive; perhaps they were a bit like rugby matches, with similar injury rates and exaggerated memories of conflict.

The musket transformed the affray; it was a bit like arming one team in a rugby match with flick knives, although hand-to-hand fighting became less important. Eventually, both sides became armed and by the mid-1830s Māori were looking for ways to reduce the tensions – that was a role of James Busby, the first British resident.

So were Māori a warrior culture? Possibly not, unless you think rugby is about war. While I do not want to minimise their warrior contributions in the twentieth century, recall that it is said of all New Zealanders – brown and white – that they were slow to wrath but stern in battle. Does that make us a warrior nation?

For another example of how easy it is to impose the wrong framework, consider how early relations between wahine and European males have been described as ‘prostitution’. However, the contemporary reports – and indeed most subsequent comment – evaluate the exchange from a (typically judgmental) European perspective. Almost certainly, Māori had a different account. We have very few indications of what the women’s attitudes were but one wahine had tattooed on her arm the name of each seaman she stayed with, which is hardly what a conventional prostitute would do. Perhaps the notion of ‘seasonal wives’ may be a better place to begin.

So the two peoples struggled to come together often with misunderstandings. Perhaps the greatest one was over land. It is a long story and takes up some space in the book. To summarise, after a generation of Māori bartering food and other resources for their commodities, it might have seemed obvious to Europeans, coming from their commercial backgrounds, that Māori would treat the exchange of land rights in the same way. But for Māori, land was very different from fish or nails; it was a taonga. Cook regretted that he was unable to acquire other taonga, a greenstone mere. In return, Cook refused to give Māori guns.

Land belonged to this latter non-tradeable category. This may seem antiquated today; or does it? If someone wants to export – that is, exchange with a foreigner – food or manufactures, we applaud their enterprise. But if someone wants to exchange (sell) land to a foreigner, as likely as not they will require permission from the Overseas Investment Commission.

To summarise thus far the two salient lessons. First, Māori proved remarkably adaptable to the new circumstances although they did not always get it right at first. Second, we must be careful not to impose our understandings – and misunderstandings.

The Arrival of the Commercial Economy

Māori proved adept at getting involved in the commercial economy, supplying settlers and provedoring visiting ships. Initially they kept some Māori ways of doing so, working in community groups and distributing the proceeds according to customary practices, say the way they allocated fish from an expedition.

However, there were various economic problems in the early exchanges. One was that the new technologies could require management outside their experience. For instance, they were horticulturists and not agriculturists. So they failed to introduce new seeds each season and so over the years the grains they harvested became infested with weeds. A second was that they built up stocks to supply ships, but when the ships did not come because of a commercial downturn in Europe, they found themselves overstocked with no buyers.

More subtly, they became major suppliers of European settlements. But the Europeans were borrowing offshore to establish their settlements and fund purchases from the Māori. This was unsustainable and the settlements had to turn to supplying themselves, thus reducing the demand from Māori.

At a very early stage then, the New Zealand economy faced today’s problems – the vagaries of the global economy and the risks of depending on overseas borrowing. Welcome to the globalised world.

I skip through the New Zealand Wars, except to mention a major misunderstanding. I was taught that they, then called the ‘Māori Wars’, were a conflict between ‘them’ and ‘us’. In fact Māori fought on both sides. It is not helpful to describe those on the Crown side as ‘loyalists’. There were deep political divisions in Māoridom and sometimes that led to warfare in which the Crown was involved almost as an adjunct.

Even so, the wars are an uncomfortable period in New Zealand’s history. They are associated with the confiscation of land but the whole story is more complicated.

The settlers were hungry for land; recall Edward Gibbon Wakefield’s advice: ‘Possess yourself of the Soil and you are Secure.’ Before European arrival, Māori had possessed all the land but eventually most of that land came into European hands by fair means and by foul. Forgive me for skipping the details – the book does not – but as important as the change of ownership was, the mode of land tenure also changed; Māori and English land tenure regimes were quite different.

English common law on ownership of land is based on William the Conqueror’s feudal doctrine that the sovereign was the absolute owner of all land and all others held interests directly or indirectly from her or him. The Saxon regime before him had been allodial (absolute) ownership; those who owned the soil had no obligations to any higher authority. Māori ownership was closer to the Saxon doctrine. The British settlers, not understanding this, insisted on imposing the feudal regime which applies in today’s New Zealand.

Because land is integral to a society, the transfer of regimes – usually involving the individualisation of title – disrupted Māori society, changing it from a communal one to one which was more individualistic. Such a change may have happened anyway. The market economy is a ruthless individualiser, an issue with which Not in Narrow Seas is preoccupied.

The End of the Nineteenth Century

By the end of the nineteenth century, then, the typical Māori was on their own bit of land although they would have continued a rich social life based on whanau and marae. Little of their land was of high quality but, even more important, it was poorly connected to the market economy, since roading development was skewed towards linking up Pakeha farmers with ports.

Even more disastrously, the land was in the wrong places. We have to go into Pakeha economic development to explain this. Increasingly, from the middle of the nineteenth century the economy was founded on sheep – first wool and then, from 1882, frozen meat. (Dairy became important at the beginning of the twentieth century.)

The indications are that Māori could have become successful sheep farmers. However, the majority of them did not live on land where sheep prospered. In about 232CE – before there were any humans here – the Taupo super-volcano erupted. It was a huge one, the most violent known in the world in the last 5000 years. The caldera is Lake Taupo. Its ash, which fell mainly to the east and the north, lacked key trace elements needed for livestock to thrive, while the new course of the resulting Waikato River left swamps through the Waikato basin.

Because of bush sickness and footrot, sheep farming was not practical north of Taupo. It was incredibly bad luck that the majority of Māori lived in this area and so they were cut off from the sheep boom to the south. Thus they did not go though the economic transformation that Pakeha did.

For the early parts of the nineteenth century European small farms – excluding the great sheep stations which were almost feudal estates – were largely in a subsistence mode of production and consumption. They sold a little produce from the farm but largely consumed what they produced; often their cash flow came from the men labouring off the farm so it was the women who ran the farm assisted by their men doing the heavy lifting.

Refrigeration changed this. You can track it in farm diaries. As the opportunity of farming crossbred sheep arose, the men moved back to the farms, which became more productive and more commercial, fully joining the cash economy. Thus evolved the family farm which was at the core of New Zealand’s political economy for a century.

Where they were on land where sheep could not thrive, Māori farms did not have that transformational opportunity. Six decades after the advent of refrigeration, Apirana Ngata observed that

‘There are Māori communities which are satisfied to live on minimal reserves, where they grow the vegetables they require, from which they make seasonal excursions into the labour field to obtain the minimum resource for the purchase of clothes and food, and where they rusticate [live a country life] between periods of employment.’

That was in a book, The Māori People Today, which is both an invaluable description of the state of Māori in 1940, and yet fails to forecast their future. For while its contributors were some of the most informed people of the times, they included no demographer and so did not see that while Māori were then mainly a rural people, the land they were on could not sustain their burgeoning population, especially if Māori farm productivity rose to Pakeha levels. After the war, there would be the great Māori migration into the cities, which is described in Not in Narrow Seas, and also in my Heke Tangata.

Heke Tangata: Māori Urbanisation

There had been some movement of Māori to the cities in the interwar period but it was a trickle compared with the flood of urbanisation after the war. Māori were 71 percent rural in 1951.By 2013 only 15 percent of Māori lived in the countryside. Around 10 percent of Māori lived in the main cities in 1926; by 2013 this proportion had grown to 66 percent, not too different from the non-Māori figure of 75 percent, which had crossed the 50 percent threshold before 1926.

There was both a push and pull to the great migration. Māori were pushed by the lack of opportunities in the countryside and pulled by the opportunities in the cities. Typically, those urban opportunities involved low and general skills but as the economy evolved towards high and specific ones – a trend which seems to have accelerated from the mid 1960s – opportunities for Māori became less available.

Māori were ill-prepared for urban living. They had little wealth to bring with them and they lacked education. Rural education tends to be inferior to urban education, but The Māori People Today was adamant that Māori rural education was even worse. The required skills for countryside farming, fishing, hunting and labouring are not those which schools teach easily. Modern education arose because industrialisation and urbanisation required literacy and numeracy. (Interestingly, Māori women seem to have adjusted to the urban economy better than men – presumably reflecting different skill sets and demands for female labour.)

It was a vicious cycle. Because a critical element in educational attainment and employment prospects is the transmission between generations, underqualified and underemployed parents means underqualified children who as adults have lower incomes and poorer employment prospects. Society needs to make an enormous effort to break the economic cycle. New Zealand did not.

You see this in the unemployment statistics where, even today, Māori do worse. I report the inferior employment a little differently from the conventional approach which looks at the unemployment rate; an unemployed person is without a job but actively seeking one. That excludes the discouraged who are jobless but do not seek work because hard experience has shown that they are never successful. One of the ways of avoiding the psychological trauma is to give up looking.

To allow for such discouragements, my Heke Tangata looked at the employment participation rate: the proportion of those in a group who are in employment. Its complement provides a measure of all those who are not employed but might be, whether they are actively seeking work or not. (Various caveats and complications are reported in the book.)

Because of the different age structures of the various ethnic groups, it is better to compare the employment rates by cohort. Here is a tabulation: (Unfortunately there is no data by gender and age together.)

Employment Participation Rates by Age and Ethnicity (Percentage), 2013

Age Group                        All                   Māori

15–19 years                               33.7                 29.7

20–24 years                               65.0                 55.8

25–29 years                              73.6                 59.1

30–34 years                              75.2                 63.6

35–39 years                              77.3                 67.8

40–44 years                              80.2                 70.0

45–49 years                              81.7                 70.7

50–54 years                              81.1                 70.7

55–59 years                              77.4                 67.5

60–64 years                              67.8                 61.2

65 years and over                   22.1                 26.2

TOTAL                                      62.3                 56.5

(Source: 2013 Population Census)

The table shows that the employment rate for Māori is almost always lower than for everybody. In total it is about 10 percent lower – allow for age composition and it would be higher. This is a better indicator of the difference in relative unemployment rates between Māori and the population as a whole. The census reported rates were 10.4% for Māori and 4.8% for all, a difference of only 5.6 percentage points. However, if we allow for lower employment participation of Māori the difference is not quite double that. (The higher participation rate for Māori over 65 years old probably arises because they have lower levels of occupational superannuation and retirement savings, and Māori elderly are younger.)

The evidence is that there has been a very slow socioeconomic convergence between Māori and Pakeha. If the trend continues it will be decades before they will be close to equality.

The Meaning of Māori and Pakeha

However the meaning of Māori and Pakeha will be very different by then. Indeed, as a consequence of urbanisation, that is already happening. ‘Māori’ no longer has the meaning that it had when they were primarily a rural people.

This is nicely captured by a decision that Statistics New Zealand made in the early 1980s. Up to then, it had used what was jokingly called a ‘hydraulic’ definition: the proportion of Māori ‘blood’ (or descent) compared to proportion of non-Māori ‘blood’. This objective descent measure has been replaced with a subjective ethnicity measure of how an individual wishes to describe themselves. People often mix the two notions up but formally, data is usually collected on an ethnicity basis. (The Population Census asks a question about people’s ethnicities, although there is also a question about Māori descent – but for no other descent group. This is necessary for calculating the number of Māori electorates; subjective ethnicity would be impracticable for legal purposes.)

New Zealand artist, Peter Robinson, confronts us with the problem when his works displays ‘3.125%’ That is one thirty-second and referred to the fact that one of Peter’s thirty-two great-great-great-grandparents was Māori. At the time – he was in his late twenties – Peter was being provocative about racial issues, ethnicity and identity. Not wanting to be pigeon-holed as an identity artist he has moved on, but the figure leads one to muse about how he, or someone like him, might classify themselves.

Presumably Robinson ticks the ‘Māori descent’ box in the census, but what might he do to the ethnicity question: ‘Māori’? ‘Pakeha’? or both? About half of those who give a Māori ethnicity also give a second one. Let us call those who tick both boxes ‘Māori-Pakeha’ to distinguish them from sole Māori who tick only one. (A few tick other ethnicities such as Māori-Pasifika.) In which case those of Māori-Pakeha ethnicity would be our third largest ethnic group; they may be second largest in 2023.

A person of one thirty-second Māori descent may choose to register on the Māori electoral roll or he or she may not. Only about a half do.

Once we move outside the statistical data base, our knowledge is even murkier about what – and how – people classify themselves. Some may do so differently in different circumstances and their classification may change over time. For instance, the Health Inequalities Research Programme at the University of Otago’s Wellington School of Medicine found that the ethnicity on a death certificate did not always correspond to the census-reported ethnicity. The discrepancy was sufficiently large to modify some of their findings.

One further research finding which adds to the puzzle is from comparing socioeconomic status between those who report ‘sole Māori’ and those who report ‘Māori-Pakeha’. Here is an example using employment participation rates by ethnicity and gender. The female participation rates are just over 10 percentage points below the male ones for all ethnicities. The ethnic differences are much the same as in the earlier table although the data comes from a different source.

Employment Participation Rates by Ethnicity and Gender (Percentage), 2007/17

                                    Female             Male

Pakeha                            64.0                 75.1

Māori-Pakeha                65.7                 75.8

Sole-Māori                     57.9                 69.7

(Source: Household Labour Force Survey, average 2007Q4–2016Q2)

Strikingly, those who classify themselves as ‘Māori–Pakeha’ have employment responses similar to Pakeha. They may be slightly higher because of different age profiles. (The database does not allow us to explore this.) One is left with the uneasy feeling that subjective ethnicity may be influenced by objective socioeconomic characteristics.

What we cannot be sure of is how these definitional issues play out. But evidently there is a disconnect between the public perception, which is still too dependent upon the rural Māori of a century ago, and the reality of a socially and economic diverse urban population, as survey responses show.

Conclusion

This paper has travelled over some 700 years. It is a story of Māori economic development evolving; of tikanga being broken in order for tikanga to survive. Māori have adapted to new opportunities in difficult circumstances extremely well. But the urbanisation of the last half century has proved a challenge which has not been fully met, in part because it has happened so rapidly but also because the nation was so unprepared for it.

Too often we impose our uninformed prejudices on Māori; prejudices which are often based on historical misunderstandings and do not allow for Māori adaptation. Māori are not living fossils but, like Pakeha, evolving and adapting. We need to keep our thinking evolving and adapting too.

‘Me whati te tikanga, kia ora ai te tikanga’.

Barbarians At The Library Gates

The burning of books has a long history. That it no reason why we should add to it.

If you want to get Burning of the Books: A History of Knowledge Under Attack from the National Library you may have to hurry. It is in the overseas nonfiction section; many books of which are being thrown out. One hopes that at least some of the librarians intelligently read this book before they dispose of it. Written by Richard Ovenden, director of Oxford’s Bodleian Library, it tells of numerous disgraceful episodes in human history when libraries were wholly or partially destroyed.

Some instances involved accidents or collateral damage from war. Sometimes there were barbarians who did not know what they were doing. Sometimes the barbarians knowingly destroyed a library, In 1812 the British deliberately burned the US Library of Congress because they thought that would reduce the effectiveness of the American government. Sometimes the destruction was for ideological reasons as when the Nazis destroyed Jewish libraries or when Christians in Sarajevo purged Moslem texts.

The exact reason that our National Library is disposing of its overseas collection may be one of the above – like ideological reasons purifying New Zealand culture from overseas contamination or perhaps trying to limit the effectiveness of a thinking government. The NL spent $20,000 on a publicity campaign which, it says, did not get its message across. Sometimes the message is so unconvincing that dollars cant get rid of the smell.

Ovenden’s book may give one reasonable parallel. The Great Library of Alexandria declined gradually over the course of several centuries. Part of its collection had been accidentally burned by Julius Caesar in 48BCE, but it is unclear how much was actually destroyed. The Library survived for another three centuries. Its demise involved both the purging of intellectuals and underfunding. Sound familiar?

Many public agencies have suffered from underfunding, but the National Library’s (and Archives New Zealand’s) difficulties have been compounded by its odd place in the government system. It operates as a division of the Department of Internal Affairs, which is a collection of miscellaneous activities. The DIA seems to think that centres of knowledge are a bit like a registries for birth, deaths and marriages or the passport office.

(There is a claim that the National Library lacks storage space or that it is very expensive. That cannot be entirely true because parts of its building have been used by the DIA for other purposes. One was a passport office which many people thought was an insult to the integrity of the National Library and to knowledge.)

One hesitates to mention, because a mad generic manager is likely to seize on the idea, but suppose Te Papa, the national museum and art gallery, was under the DIA. Presumably the department would have insisted on purging all of Te Papa’s overseas-sourced artefacts and works – they are very costly to store, you know.

Instead, Te Papa is a separate crown entity under the Ministry of Culture and Heritage, which values books in a way that the DIA does not, as an integral part of knowledge, culture and heritage – as an integral part of a civilised society.

A curious feature of the story is that our librarians seem to have shown little resistance to the purges; the main resistance having come from the literate, appalled at the cavalier approach to the storage of knowledge. Ovenden gives no example of librarians ‘burning books’. When the Nazis were destroying the Jewish collections in Vilna (Latvia) they had to rely on Jewish librarians who did their best to subvert the exercise. Perhaps one day some of our librarians will tell similar stories.

The consequence of it all is that it sets an uncomfortable precedent. I am not suggesting that schools and public libraries will start burning books, but they may be tempted to disconnect their users from overseas publications and thinking. The National Library claims to want to promote literacy but it is not setting a good example. My Mum was a librarian – Hillmorton High School named its library after her – who took the view that it did not matter what her students read; the task was getting them reading and they will move on to more substantial works.

It is not an accident that the National Library started in the Department of Education as the Country Library Service in 1937. (It became the National Library Service in 1945.) Nor is it an accident that the last effective minister of libraries, Marian Hobbs, had previously been a headmistress. (She was very effectively supported by Helen Clark, who was Minister of Culture and Heritage, and Michael Cullen, Minister of Finance.) She strengthened the independence of the NL but the following National Government compromised that independence by putting it into the department of registries and miscellaneous affairs (not, you notice, the Ministry of Education or Minister of Culture and Heritage).

Since then, ministers have been cyphers following the DIA advice. The last, Tracey Martin, an NZF minister in the Ardern-Peters Government, more concerned to kowtow to the DIA than to lead it – a common feature of the rump of ministers – authorised the disposal of the overseas collection, despite infringing the spirit of the Hobbs National Library Act. (The new minister, Jan Tinetti, was also a headmistress.)

Still, there has been some progress. The disposed books are not going to be burned but pulped. Those concerned with climate change will be so pleased – except that books of interest to them are to be pulped too.

The Sources Of House Price Inflation.

Building more houses is not going to reduce house prices much (although it will help more people to be decently housed). The inflation driver is financial speculation based on leveraged borrowing. Until that is addressed, house prices will continue to boom.

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Policies based on theories which do not fit the facts are not going to work. Thus it is with most of the suggestions to control houses prices. The most salient fact about house price inflation is illustrated in the shown graph. (It comes from Duncan Grant published in Spinoff.) Since 2002, house prices have been rising substantially faster than rents and wages and consumer prices. There have been two bouts of very rapid house price inflation but there was stagnation from 2008 to 2012. (For a longer but not as up-to-date series.)

It is difficult to explain this graph by claiming we have not been building enough houses. We did not suddenly slow down house building in 2002, speed it up during the GFC and slow it down once the economy recovered from the global shock. (In fact construction fell after the GFC.) Certainly there is a housing shortage and we should be building more houses. But that will not have much effect on overall housing prices.

The faulty policy conclusion arises from a reliance on supply-side economics (which is part of the neoliberal framework). Of course one should pay attention to the supply-side of an economy (as we did in the previous paragraph) but we should not ignore the demand-side. Sometimes it dominates behaviour and has to be managed. Indeed, given that the disjunction between housing price trends and general price trends was evident by at least 2007 and attention solely to the supply-side has proved ineffective in repressing the prices for over a decade since, we might think to have learned.

Why have those prices been rising faster since 2002 compared to their past pattern? What changed then? There was an enormous injection of international liquidity following the Bush II tax cuts. That enabled New Zealanders to borrow more offshore, via their trading banks, greatly leveraging their housing equity. So the high house-price inflation is the result of a speculative spree financed by offshore borrowing. (It may not be coincidental that the housing price inflation seems to have accelerated following the Trump tax cuts.) Cheap interest rates have not helped.

When world liquidity closed down during the GFC, it became harder to borrow offshore, people became risk adverse and, not surprisingly, the speculative spree was retarded until the liquidity recovered in the mid-2010s.

Speculative booms are difficult to manage. They are not helped by tying one’s hands behind one’s back by ruling out a capital gains tax. That would both make the speculation less profitable and suck extra cash out of the speculative market, in effect reducing the amount of oil being poured on the flames.

Another approach is to reduce financial leveraging. That is what a loan-to-value ratio regime does. The difficulty is that borrowing is necessary for those purchasing a home for a first time. One way around this would be to have higher LVRs for such purchasing compared to the ratio for second home purchasers and those increasing their leveraging by upgrading their housing. While this might be difficult to administer nationally, the RBNZ is reintroducing a more tiered scheme and trading banks are tightening up their criteria for lending.

The neoliberal hands-off framework tends to argue that dealing with speculative booms is not a concern of a minimal government. While the social costs from speculating on a lottery, bitcom or a game may be negligible, once there is borrowing lenders will be exposed too. It is not so much the speculative boom that is the problem but the speculative bust which follows, especially the pressure from those collaterally hurt for taxpayer bailouts. Government stabilising the boom before the bust is prudential.

The neoliberal pays little attention to the distributional consequences of a speculative boom. Leveraged speculation is only possible for those who have some wealth (or can convince the financial markets they have it – Trump?). So during the boom there is an increase in wealth inequality. Practically that means that those low in financial wealth – as most of the young are – are excluded and cannot buy their own homes.

In the bust, the increased inequality may not simply reverse. Certainly some high flyers do badly but often it is those with a modicum of wealth who suffer, while those who were arranging the lending go scot-free.

For example, a lot of people invested their surplus savings in finance companies before the 2008 GFC and lost their shirts when it turned out that the companies were into high-risk investments. But most of those who managed the poor quality investment continue to wear collars and ties.

In summary, the government which ignores a speculative boom does so at cost to it, or perhaps its successors, and certainly to the economy as a whole.

I’ve not written a lot about the policies to quell the speculative boom; the above are chiefly to illustrate the underlying mechanisms. For all the public hysteria, the government may not have many policies available to it either.

If a speculative boom has been under way for almost two decades it is not going to be easily suppressed (except by a disruptive bust). Have you noticed that some of the loudest critics (including the National Opposition) did little when they were in office? (Which is not to ignore lamentable performances by some Labour Ministers of Housing; that excludes Megan Wood.) You only have to look at the way that the housing portfolios have been mucked around with – National split the supply and demand parts of the housing sectors – to see a shambles.

If this is a pessimistic prospect for housing – and, because of the sector’s size and importance, for the whole economy – at least this column has tried to provide an analysis consistent with the historical facts. However, policy proposals for this complex problem will be dominated by answers that are clear, simple, and wrong.

Is The King Above The Law?

While many readers will say ‘the king is certainly not above the law’, not everyone believes that, especially if they are in power.

The term ‘democracy’ is complicated and often used misleadingly. For instance, the ‘German Democratic Republic’ (a.k.a. East Germany), which was a part of the Soviet Empire, had one male in four reporting to the Stasi (secret police).

Allow me to cut through the complexities by suggesting that it is helpful to identify two sorts of democracies: ‘popular democracies’ stress the rule of the majority, while ‘liberal democracies’ give high priorities to human and civil rights – in effect, they stress the rights of minorities, including the individual. A generous interpretation of the GDR is that it was a popular democracy.

A government has to make coherent and consistent decisions. In effect, that requires a king – someone (or cabal) who is given enormous power. Liberal democracies restrain those powers by submitting the king to lawful constraints.

An example is in US constitution. By way of background, James Stuart (I or VI, depending on where you come from) argued for the divine right of kings, a political doctrine of monarchical absolutism, which asserted that kings derived their authority from God and could not therefore be held accountable for their actions by any earthly authority such as a parliament. They were above the law. In 1649 the English Parliament overruled the claim by executing his son, Charles I. (The English tradition of lawful dissent and rebellion goes back at least to the 1215 Magna Carta whose Article 61 provided for the barons to lawfully challenge the king.)

Such issues troubled the Founding Fathers of the American Constitution ratified 139 years later (so the regicide was closer to them than the signing of Te Tiriti o Waitangi is to us). In between there had been a long debate. Key was John Locke’s Two Treatises of Government, published in 1688/9, which argued that there was a ‘social contract’ between the populace and the person they designated as king. If the king did not act in their interests, Parliament had the right to replace him. (This was written at the time of the ‘Glorious’ Revolution, when Parliament dumped James II and called upon Mary and her husband William of Orange to govern them.)

Faced with providing for a powerful king (the President) and yet restraining his (or one day her) powers in the public interest, the US constitution contained a set of intricate checks and balances, including the impeachment process. Certainly the President was to be selected by a majority (as it happens, of a mix of voters and their states) but the minority interests had to be taken into account.

Not all monarchs/presidents accept this compromise. Instead they take it that they, like kings in fairy tales, had unlimited power barely constrained by law. Perhaps Donald Trump had but a superficial understanding of these issues, but Dick Cheney, vice-president to George Bush II, argued the case with coherence and vehemence.

It is instructive that when Al Gore lost to George Bush II and Hillary Clinton lost to Trump (both by smaller margins than the 2020 outcome) they did not throw Trumpian tantrums but accepted that is where due process had taken the outcome. Barack Obama must have had the gravest doubts about Trump – ultimately justified – but he smoothly handed over power to him. (Instructively, he made Airforce One available to the incoming president; Trump did not.)

In the long run, Trump’s reign may be remembered for the degree that the US constitution was robust enough to restrain a king who thought he was above the law. It did hold, but clumsily and sluggishly. The ultimate defence was that more people (and states) voted Trump out but what happened was a close enough to raise whether there needs to be some attention to the improving its robustness.

One step might be to get a wider understanding that a liberal democracy is not about rule by the majority. Rather the majority chooses the ruler who may reflect its values but is is constrained by liberal principles. That is why we do not just need functional literacy – the ability to read advertisements and orders – but an education which includes an understanding of civic rights and responsibilities.

It is not simply about being above the law of the land. Both Putin of Russia and Xi of China were elected for limited terms but changed their laws to eliminate that restraint. Recourse to using a majority in ‘parliament’ to change the law to increase the king’s power is a familiar ploy in popular democracies. As well as China and Russia, the list of popular democracies includes Brazil (Bolsonaro), Hungary (Orban), India (Modi) and Poland (Morawiecki). The signal is when the rights of minorities are compromised or dissent suppressed. Tot these examples up and there are an awful lot of people who live in democracies of the popular rather than liberal kind.

It is easy for those in New Zealand to hunker down in a liberal democracy, although the Trump episode reminds us we cannot isolate ourselves (as, indeed, does our economic dependence upon China).

However, we also need to be careful not to get trapped in a populist framework. It has become more prominent since the October election with a common theme among some commentariat: that since the government has a majority of seats in parliament it is not constrained and may do what it likes. The side-deals Labour did in the previous three years were not necessarily failures of the democratic process but integral to it. (I did not agree with many of the compromises but I am so often in a minority I have learned to live with them.)

It being this time of the year, it is worth pointing out the Article Three of Te Tiriti o Waitangi is a statement that New Zealand was to be a liberal democracy (albeit they had in mind a nineteenth century notion – we progress). Earlier drafts of the treaty actually had the provisions of Article Three in the prologue preceding Articles One and Two as in a social contract.

Because all this is so familiar we can forget the principles of liberal democracy, especially when we are (always temporarily) in the majority. Each of us is in a minority of one, protected by the principles of liberal democracy with the danger – as Trumpian America illustrated – of backsliding. I am grateful that one out of four friends does not have to report me to the Stasi.

How Is The Economy Doing?

The Treasury forecasts suggest the economy is doing better than expected after the Covid Shock.

John Kenneth Galbraith was wont to say that economic forecasting was designed to make astrology look good. Unfair, but it raises the question of the purpose of economic forecasts. Certainly the public may treat them as horoscopes which is usually the way they are reported. For a professional the forecasting exercise is an opportunity to think systematically about the state of the economy.

In normal times a forecasting exercise is a bit routine because nothing really important changes much, When I headed a forecasting unit, we added the challenge each time of tackling a new issue. However, the last year has hardly been routine and the challenges have been there without having to think up new ones.

I am going to review the year of Covid by tracing through the Treasury forecasts. Treasury has one of the larger forecasting teams and tends, in any case to be in the middle. Moreover they, and the RBNZ, need to get their forecasts as well as they can because they have operational consequences for fiscal and monetary policy. (Also Treasury forecasts are publicly available in some detail.)

Compare the forecasts in the budget forecasts known as BEFU20 – Budget Economic and Fiscal Update – made in April 2020,a month before the budget, and HYEFU20 – Half Year EFU – made in November 2020 and published in December. A more detailed – and much longer – report would show a steady evolution after the Covid Shock as new evidence came in (and would include the Pre-election EFUs).

The big surprise is that the EFUs show that the economy has done much better than expected.

Of course, the Covid Shock was a surprise and caused a scramble among forecasters. You can get a sense by comparing BEFU20 with HYEFU19 – done in November 2019 when there was nary a virus on the horizon. The Treasury was then forecasting a volume GDP growth in the year to June 2020 of 2.2 percent. In the middle of the April lockdown, Treasury lowered their forecast to a decline of (i.e. minus) 4.6 percent, so they were thinking the economy was taking a hit of 6.8 percent across the year, most of which would have been in the single quarter of the lockdown. (So they were thinking of a collapse of production of roughly 25 percent in the lockdown quarter.)

As the data has come in, performance proved better than expected and the economy contracted by only 2.1 percent in the 2019/20 year; still a big hit. Recall the headless chooks running around saying that the lockdown was too expensive so we should take the covid deaths and keep the economy open. Those who kept their heads are allowed to puzzle why we did better than expected.

My view is that we underestimated the resilience of the domestic economy. (No, not the success of the government policies – they were already factored into the Treasury forecast.) The sort of things I have in mind range from the lady whose rural restaurant lost custom so she designed mail-ordered fashion masks. Or the travel reporters, who having their tripping to Shangri-la, stopped found all sorts of interesting places in our backyard.

It is one of the benefits of the market liberalisation of the 1980s. I noticed it in the early ’90s when unemployment rose to postwar record highs yet those who became unemployed found jobs after looking for only a few months. (We are not nearly as good at showing the same flexibility when it comes to exporting.)

Post-covid unemployment is expected to track higher than if there had been no virus, rising from about 4-and-a-bit percent in the earlier scenario to 6-and-a-bit on current forecasts – say an extra 70,000 souls. We would expect a short-term bump in unemployment from the shock, but the Treasury seems to think it will be more persistent. During the April lockdown they assumed that the world economy would recover soon enough; today they expect it to grow more slowly and that affects the prospects for our exports which are a major driver of the economy.

Treasury is currently expecting the economy to do better than they did in April, with some expansion in the current year (to June 2021), despite the unexpected (partial) Auckland lockdown last August. The economy then grows reasonably well. (Even astrological forecasts get fuzzier as they look further forward.)

It is a big picture forecast being presented here. There is a lot more detail in the Treasury figures which keep the nerd-forecaster busy. Mention has to be made of the net Core Crown Debt. In the pre-covid forecast in the 2019 HYEFU the Treasury expected it to total $76b in June 2024. Following government’s massive fiscal injection to cushion the Covid Shock the 2020 BEFU thought the figure would be $201b in 2024. That has been pulled back to $194b in the 2020 HYEFU. So the fiscal package is slightly cheaper than was initially projected.

People go on about government debt as if is wicked. That, given low interest rates, the cost of the debt is near zero does not mean that is necessarily so. The real issue here is who is, or will be, holding the government debt as an asset in their balance sheet AND what they will do with it. It seems unreasonable to expect them (whoever they are) to hold the asset at a near-zero rate of return. They are likely to want to convert it to what seems to give higher rates of return – speculative housing, collectibles, shares and status goods, such as expensive cars (the standard use of overseas travel being largely ruled out for a while).

I am going to have to come back to this conundrum in later columns. It is an example of how short-term success can have long-term awkward consequences (one of the hardest lessons to get across to teenagers).

In the interim, we may take some relief that the economy has dealt with the Covid Shock better that was expected – even after allowing for a sensible government response – probably because we are a more resilient people than we normally assume of ourselves

Opening Pandora’s American Box

All nations have shadows; some acknowledge them. For others they shape their image in uncomfortable ways.

The staunch Labour supporter was in despair at what her Rogernomics Government was doing. But she finished ‘at least, we got rid of Muldoon’, a response which tells us that then, and today, one’s views of Robert Muldoon, prime minister 1975-1984, are shaped by one’s political position. Even so, his memory looms large in New Zealand politics.

Trump will leave a longer memory. (I am not equating Trump and Muldoon, and I insist that despite each nation’s shadows, most Americans I have met are, like most New Zealanders, decent ordinary people.)

One of the curiosities of Muldoon is the frequency he, or someone like him, appears in New Zealand literature. I once listed 15 novels and plays which might be said to contain Muldoon-like characters; he appears in poems as well.

Karl Stead tells a story which casts light on what was happening. His 1971 novel Smith’s Dream, a kind of political version of Man Alone, had prime minister Volkner portrayed as an ugly dictator. Stead probably had in mind Sid Holland, prime minister during the 1951 waterfront dispute, although there are hints of Hitler and Mussolini. When the novel was made into the 1977 film Sleeping Dogs, Ian Mune played Volkner as a thinly disguised Muldoon. This led to an exchange between Stead and Muldoon:

‘The only time I met Muldoon he told me he’d arranged for a private showing of the movie made from the novel … “because people were saying it was about me”. He was on an official visit to the university when he told me and, trying to be a good host, I said “You were only a cabinet minister, fairly junior, I think, when I was writing that book.” (One imagines that Muldoon grimaced. Stead goes on…) My wife said “Yes, you’ve just grown into the role.” Muldoon hoisted his cheek and laughed his ‘we are not very amused’ laugh.’

The role? There is a shadow in New Zealand’s history of the tyrannical dictator which Muldoon took over. In Jungian psychology, a shadow is that hidden, repressed, for the most part inferior and guilt-laden, personality whose ultimate ramifications reach back into the realm of our ancestors. Nations have them too.

Probably MMP has meant that the prime minister can no longer be a thug (hopefully, I will never regret writing that) but most New Zealanders have met male and female bosses who can easily be so characterised. Are they more common today, perhaps as result of the new managerialism, or just more evident?

This is not the only shadow which stalks our land; the treatment of Maori is another but it requires a separate column. Shadows stalk all nations. The events of last week confronted America with a deep one.

The American shadow is darker and goes back long before New Zealand’s first European settlers, even before the 1789 US Constitution. The founding fathers, who drafted it, were moved by inspirational sentiments such as the Declaration of Independence’s ‘We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.’ The constitution itself begins ‘We the People’ affirming that the government of the United States exists to serve all of them.

Yet the founders had blind spots. It was just 100 years ago that American women were given the right to vote. The US has largely worked that one through politically, although there is still much gender inequality. One cannot say that they have worked though the 1865 amendment which abolished slavery – following a brutal civil war. Even today many Americans operate as if the Declaration of Independence does not apply to men and women of colour.

Whatever racism there may be in New Zealand, it is slight compared to that which exists in many (but not all) parts of the US. Over the last four years one has been continually confronted by the shadow, especially as the US President has done little to guide his supporters towards a more decent view of those who are not white. (Tut, tut, Brian. Euphemisms. Trump bloody well stoked the fires of racial resentment. Ed)

Recall that Trump’s predecessor, the admirable Barack Obama, was half black and treated with contempt by a large section of America. Faced with a terrorist attack on a black church, Obama went to the pastor’s funeral and sang ‘Amazing Grace’. Yes, they are right. He is very different from Trump.

Sure, Trump lost the election, but 70 million Americans voted for him. Some would have voted agains the Democrat ticket because the new vice-president Kamala Harris is a woman who is half Indian and half Afro-Jamaican. (On that measure they would not have voted for any of the five main New Zealand parties.)

But it is not only many Americans who are racist. So are many of their institutions. Compare the riot on 6 January 2021 with the huge Black Lives Matter protest in Washington on 1 June 2020. The authorities were then prepared, with a force made up of Washington police, US Park police, more than 5,000 national guard troops (many in full body armour) and federal agencies like the Bureau of Prisons plus an army helicopter. It is not sufficient to observe that in both instances the response was under the command of the, oh so culpable, Trump. Those directly in charge in January were not properly prepared either, treating black demonstrations differently from white ones.

The American shadow is so dark and deep that it will not be easily lightened or lifted. Even if Trump’s political life ends, the shadow will still be there to be taken over by others. They are likely to be smarter and more sophisticated than Trump, although they may lack the charisma which attracts Trump’s most devoted supporters.

Whatever happens, Trump is likely to symbolise that shadow for a long time – a Muldoon writ much larger; evil to some, hero to others. A political ‘crucifixion’ will only make the hero a martyr. Those who think he is a rogue must await the judgment of the courts or the financial markets, not a partisan political deliberation (no matter how attractive its contribution to splitting the Republicans may be).

Pandora’s box has been opened. The demons are out; they cannot be pushed back in. They must be faced; that will take a long and painful time and much effort.

A New World Order?

Does the US need to strike a grand bargain with like-minded countries to pool their efforts? What does this tell us about today’s global politics?

Perhaps the most remarkable editorial of last year was the cover leader of the London Economist on 19 November 2020. Shortly after Joe Biden was elected president, that stalwart of sensible liberal business wrote that in order to deal with China’s increasing influence ‘America needs to strike a grand bargain with like-minded countries to pool their efforts.’

It was an open admission that the US was no longer powerful enough to take on any other country by itself. The Economist was not arguing that the US was no longer the most powerful country in the world, Rather, that the gap between it and the others was shrinking.

Of course the hegemon always wears the crown uneasily, and there has been a constant flow of claims that the US dominance was economically or militarily challenged by another – the EU, Japan, Russia, as well as China. But in the past the solution was that the US should sort out the threat by itself. The Economist has concluded that it may be no longer powerful enough to do that.

For while the US has been the frontier economy leading the world, it is increasingly easy for other economies to catch up. There is an economic theory, for which I see both merit and evidence, that eventually the world will return to the situation before 1750 when economic power was distributed in proportion to the population of each country. That day, when per capita incomes are approximately equal across all countries, is a long way off, but you already can see the movement towards it. The EU and Japan have already caught up.

China is still a long way behind the richest countries in per capita terms but it is now, on some measures, the largest economy in the world as a consequence of its huge population. That gives it enough economic surplus to exercise an awful lot of muscle – arguably too its centralised government makes it easier for it to use its power.

But even if the US has a huge economy, it is finding its reach limited. It is still the biggest military power in the world but its generals warn they are not able to fight major conflicts on two fronts. (Who else might even try?)

The diminished power of the US is acknowledged by even Donald Trump and his followers. His slogan ‘MAGA’ – Make America Great Again – implies that America is no longer great. The diagnosis, though, is hopelessly wrong. America’s diminishing authority is not because its leadership lacks the will and that a strong leader would restore US leadership (shades of Nietzsche), nor that the ‘deep state’ in Washington has been betraying the country (shades of McCarthyism).

So the relative power of the US is diminishing. Serious American thinkers acknowledge this but perhaps are not as willing to say too publically, given that the MAGA crowd are likely to accuse them of treachery. Barack Obama and his advisers were well aware of this situation and were trying to maximise their leadership leverage. However, many members of Congress – even senators – were (and are) more MAGA inclined.

Trump had the US running the fight single-handed. Old allies – ‘weaklings’ – were henchmen, not partners. The outcome of Trump’s policies was to leave a huge space in the international political order for China to fill.

Instead, the Economist is arguing that the strategy should be closer co-operation with like-minded countries. Its cover image has Australia, Britain, Canada, the EU, Japan, South Korea and the US holding hands in a linked circle.

New Zealand is too small to feature in such grand strategies. In any case we have problems which highlight its difficulties. It is certainly true that we are more comfortable with the seven in terms of their (mostly) liberal democratic institutions and practices, while our strongest military and intelligence relationships are, broadly, with them. But China is our largest trading partner (although we export more to the seven collectively); it is also the largest trading partner of Australia, Japan and South Korea, three of the Economist’s seven.

How to tread the path between the two sides? The uneasy example is China’s recent treatment of Australia which has been bully rampant, signalling a threat to the US. That is the danger of being a small ally of a large power: the other side may pick on you to make an example.

MAGA America appears to have given little support to Australia in its conflict with China. I imagine that Biden’s America will offer more. But MAGA reminds us that the US may not always be reliable. Trump’s legacy has been to weaken America’s ability to provide leadership, because no one can trust it in the long run.

Biden’s more sophisticated understanding of the international order can only provide some remediation, especially as Congress is unreliable. Recall that Obama’s new engagement with the Pacific included joining the TPP. Neither Trump not Hillary Clinton was committed to the deal. Whatever their personal views, they knew they could not have got it through a Congress where MAGA had sufficient support to block it. The MAGA crew are still there.

Uncomfortably then, the rest of the world are in the hands of a couple of big bullies. China’s direction may be clear but we are very uncomfortable with it, especially the internal repression which is especially acute in Hong Kong, Xinjiang and Tibet while there is increasing repression of freedom of expression throughout China.

We ought to be more comfortable with the US, but it is a far greater paradox – recall Churchill’s description of Russia as a ‘riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma’. (He said that the key was national interest.) Much the same applies to the US.

How can a country with the finest cadre of scientists in the world be so scientifically illiterate – only a third of Americans believe in evolution? Its medical fraternity is equally world class so how has the US been able to make such an enormous cock-up over its response to a pandemic? I admire so much the American thinking on liberty, yet I look at their treatment of blacks. The country which dominates the world is populated by those who have little knowledge of global geography. It has been a leader in promoting the rule of law but finds its parliament building invaded by a mob supporting a president whose understanding of the law is, at best, tenuous.

Hopefully we will experience a saner US than we have seen over the last four years but that will not resolve the challenges the world faces.

After Brexit?

The deed is done, the doers undone

Had I been a Brit, I would have voted ‘Remain’ rather than Brexit (or ‘Leave’). Instead, I have been bemused by the comic theatre of British politics, fascinated by what the Brits actual think and professionally interested by the revelations of the complexity of the interactions between Britain and the (rest of the) European Union.

The complexity is summarised in the 2000-plus page agreement (and many loose ends which, when settled by negotiation, will add even more pages). It comes to three times the length of my Not in Narrow Seas and that is covering only 650m years of New Zealand’s history.

I never imagined how complicated was the totality of UK/EU relations. I began wondering what would have to be negotiated supposing there was a standoff between us and the Australians – something I hope never happens. It would not just be repealing the CER agreement but would involve a wide variety of other dimensions, which are beyond my competence to list, together with numerous informal arrangements – for instance, our attorney-general attends meetings of the Australian state attorney-generals.

I doubt the majority British voters in 2016 expected a 2000 page agreement signed at the last minute. They had been told that the deal was easy. What do they think now? Actually, it is not clear what the majority ever thought. The 2016 referendum gave 52 percent for Brexit but there was so much disinformation that it was unclear what was happening. More voted in the 2019 British election for parties which supported Remain than for those parties which supported Leave (say 55% to 45%). However the eccentricities of the British Front Runner electoral system gave the pro-Leave Conservatives a comfortable majority in parliament.

At the heart of the Brexit rhetoric was the demand that Britain exercise its sovereignty and ‘take back control’. ‘Sovereignty’ is a complicated term. On many matters – sometimes described as ‘cultural’ – Britain already had it. A country can decide on such matters as the choices at the end of life or how to regulate cannabis. That is true for member states in the EU which has a governing principle of ‘subsidiarity’ – that decisions should be made at the lowest level possible.

However subsidiarity does not work once exchange between economies is involved, as is well illustrated by the 2000 pages. Suppose one country has some regulatory standards. It will be reluctant to allow imports from another country which does not have these standards. It would be a fat lot of good, for instance, taking domestic measures to restrain carbon emissions and then consuming imports from a country that did not care. Similarly, as a general rule, one country will not allow another to subsidise exports to it if it compromises its local industries.

As a consequence, the EU requires Britain to maintain similar standards for its exports if they are to be tariff-free. So rather than take back control, the British freedom to regulate on such standards is limited. Norway and Switzerland, countries outside the EU but with earlier trade deals with it, complain they are bound by EU regulations despite having no say in their formulation. Britain might have a fraction more wiggle room, but it has hardly taken back control.

One stream in the Leave thinking was neoliberals who objected to the EU standards and thought that if Britain was in control it could set lower levels of consumer, environmental and worker protection in a no-deal option in which trade would be simply regulated by WTO rules.

It is unlikely that the vast numbers of those who voted Leave would favour the elimination of these standards – they were not neoliberals. Their concerns were about sovereignty in a wider, almost cultural, sense. One irritation was from the free flow of people between EU countries. Brexit restricts EU citizens’ right to live in the UK but the offset is that Brits lose rights of free movement throughout the EU.

In my judgement, the case for unlimited people mobility across borders is not as clear-cut as some economists argue. (I am less laissez faire in this regard than was the Key-English Government.) I can see that unlimited mobility is necessary in continental Europe with its permeable borders. Once the principle was there it was harder to justify restricting flows across The Channel/La Manche. There may be some gains here for some Brits if there be losses for others. The measures will impact unevenly. Now those on short-term holidays on the continent will have the ignominy of having to queue with us at points of entry.

Behind this is a British view that their country is more important than it is. Almost all countries claim to punch above their weight – we do too but we are still flyweight. Perhaps because of its imperial history British claims are excessive. The promise to out-negotiate the EU was absurd. Some 45 percent of British exports went to the EU but only 15 percent of the EU’s went to Britain (the latter proportion excludes member states’ exports to one another). This is not surprising given that the EU after Brexit produces more than five times as much as Britain. On the other hand, the EU’s structure of a confederation means it is not as politically cohesive as Britain, although sometimes that can be an advantage.

In contrast to its ambitions, Britain may find itself quite lonely in the world. Even New Zealand with its sentimental ties to Britain will prioritise the EU. Can Britain gather the equivalent of the 27 votes in the UN and the economic power that the EU has? It will be prone to be bullied by even a Biden-led US. That the EU rolled Britain makes it very vulnerable to the next bully who comes along to negotiate an FTA. We are offering one, of course, but this flyweight will insist on concessions for agricultural access.

Nor is there much expectation that the British economy will boom, although PM Johnson has claimed that. (That he has claimed to have done the EU deal better than promised does not give one confidence for this claim either.) The key factors may be the structural change which will become necessary and the rise in transaction costs across borders. Brexit has not simply been a neoliberal ambition, but I am reminded of the claims of the Rogernomes who confidently promised huge economic gains while knocking off 15 percent from our GDP.

Behind the comedy of British politics and the tragedy of the outcome, we can treat Brexit as an experiment – the first trade pact to reduce the flow of trade. Outsiders watch it to learn but, sadly, if one is fond of the best of Britain.