Freeze and Thaw

Listener: 21 July, 1984.

Keywords: Macroeconomics & Money;

The publication of the June 1984 quarter Consumer Price Index increase will revive the issue of whether the freeze was successful. While the issue will not be settled in any scientific manner for several years, the research economist needs to provide some framework for the present public debate.

The first point to emphasise is that the freeze was not just the price controls which were imposed on June 22, 1982, and (partially) lifted on March 1, 1984. There were a number of other measures. The most important were:

(1) An exceptionally tough wage freeze (by previous standards) which is still in operation except that an $8 a week adjustment was implemented on April 1, 1984.

(2) The Government limited increases in its indirect taxation and public sector corporation charges, particularly after the July 1982 budget when they were all but frozen.

(3) The government also reduced some of the restrictions on competition (most notably CER and for transport), which resulted in lower costs.

(4) Controls on rents (relaxed in March 1984 ).

(5) On June 23. 1982, the fixed real exchange rate was replaced by a fixed nominal exchange rate, which meant that import prices rose more slowly. Note, however. that on March 3, 1983, the exchange rate was devalued by six per cent because of the Australian devaluation.

In addition, world inflation was falling in 1982 and 1983. The net effect of all these changes was that producers experienced lower costs, which made it a lot easier for them to hold their prices whereas previously wages. import these tax cuts it is almost certain that the freeze would have boiled up, because workers would not have tolerated the substantial cuts in their rea! incomes.

The difficulty with the strategy of substituting income tax cuts for wage increases is that the Government’s budget deficit was dramatically increased. This deficit has been at a rate of about nine per cent of GDP (around , $3000 million a year) for a record seven quarters, with the likelihood that it will continue for at least a further four quarters.

An example of how this turns into higher prices is in late 1983 when monetary control went a bit soft, and there was a surge in house prices, because of the easy money. The higher house prices appear in this June quarter consumer price index.

To fund the deficit properly the Government has had to borrow from the public, rather than have the Reserve Bank create money. Borrowing from the public is the same thing as selling Government debt. Successful selling requires an attractive price, and since the price of debt is the interest rate, real interest rates have to be high. Consequently interest rates, and hence interest costs, have not fallen as much as inflation. A lot of the Government’s interventions in finance markets have been a desperate attempt to get around this.

There was one further crucial factor which kept inflation down. The New Zealand economy was extremely depressed from mid-1982 to late 1983. Producers hold down their prices in such circumstances, preferring to take a smaller margin on sales than not to sell at all. (At the same time the depressed economy made it easier to fund the large Government deficit.)

By giving income tax reductions in lieu of wage increases and by restraining indirect tax and Government charges, the Government reduced production costs and consumer prices directly and indirectly. In doing so, it switched pressure from inflation to the deficit and thence to financial markets.

There are some economists who argue that inflation is merely suppressed and that it will break out again either from the monetary creation from the deficit or as a consequence of the measures that will have to be taken to reduce the deficit to a tolerable level. I would not rule out the possibility that the economic growth will be severely limited by the measures taken to resist either of these outcomes, with an explosion into inflation as competing groups dispute over the limited economic cake.

Controlling the Market

Listener: 18 February, 1984

Keywords: Regulation & Taxation;

The current debate about controls and the market is not merely a question of ideology. Underlying it are analytic propositions about how markets work. Consider an uncontrolled market which settles on a price of $1 a unit at which suppliers sell 1000 units weekly and buyers purchase 1000 units. Now consider the Government imposing a price ceiling of, say, 90 cents. The effectiveness of the controls will in part be a result of how the suppliers and buyers react.

For instance, suppliers might be willing to sell 999 units for 90 cents, or they might be willing to sell only 500 units, Similarly, at the lower price, buyers might want 1001 units or 2000 units. Thus the amount that buyers want in comparison to the amount suppliers offer – economists call it excess demand – may be very small or very large (compared to total market transactions).

Clearly, the controls are more likely to work if the excess demand is small rather than large, which will depend on suppliers’ and buyers’ responses to prices. Economists measure these prices by ‘elasticities’. My impression is that those who advocate and apply controls and regulations to markets believe that the elasticities favour small excess demands. There may be some justification for this belief in a number of important markets. Anyway, let us concede this, and explore whether it follows that controls will work.

The first thing to note is that a small weekly excess demand may accumulate over a year into a sizeable gap. Secondly, while buyers and sellers may not respond much in the short run, their response may be much greater in the long run. A small weekly excess demand when controls are first imposed may be substantial some time later when everyone learns to adapt. So the first lesson I conclude is that controls will be most effective if they are not applied for too long.

The second problem is that market controls require adherence to laws and regulations. In a law-abiding country such as New Zealand, this may not seem serious. Nevertheless, every time laws are imposed which are considered ‘unfair’ there is a tendency for us to become less law-abiding. I conclude that for economic control to be effective it needs to be widely accepted.

Of course, while the letter of the law may he adhered to, the spirit may not. My impression is that 40 years ago there was not a lot of activity designed to get around controls. The managers of today appear to be more vigorous and ingenious. I suspect one cause is the greater challenge of international markets. Selling in the Middle East, Japan, or wherever, requires a high degree of initiative and innovation. Internal competition and technological change also encourage these skills. Note that a major cost of regulation and control may be skills required for international marketing, technological innovation, and growth being diverted to regulation avoidance.

As the November interest rate measures show, it is not easy to enact in legal form comprehensive and consistent regulations. Many of the most powerful concepts of economics are abstractions from a reality. For instance, so apparently simple a concept as income has some ambiguities. Typically, economic analysis avoids such ambiguities, but lawyers need an additional degree of precision. Regulations, often imposed in a hurry, do not always attain such precision. Nor would I expect them to. But the consequence is that the regulations have to he amended over and over again, as loopholes are identified and the regulations are avoided.

One solution is the dictator’s ‘Thou shall not transact in this market without express (and perhaps arbitrary) approval from the authorities’. Outside the dictatorship, regulations tend to be ad hoc, lack comprehensiveness, and be unfair. Moreover, the continuing amendments and further interventions to correct these deficiencies mean that economic management can drift in the direction of dictatorship. Considerations such as these are the political and ideological objections to regulation.

Nevertheless, some regulations have been successful, and it would only be an ideological extremist who would argue that they should never be used. But when should they be used? Some time ago Norm Thomson, of the University of Adelaide, and I tried to answer the question in our textbook An Introduction to the New Zealand Economy:

‘Instruments which divert the economy from the free market economy are likely to be effective without great loss of efficiency if:

1. the diversion is not great,

2. a maximum use of the market mechanism is associated with them (eg [near] market interest rates for securities in captive reserves, the auctioning of import licences and so on),

3. the costs of enforcement are not high and the means of avoidance are not easy,

4. their application is even-handed and comprehensive (which limits opportunities for avoidance),

5. there is public acceptance of their need, and

6. they are not expected to be effective for too long a period.’

I am not sure that our law-makers have read the book.

Sequences

Listener: 3 December, 1983.

Keywords: Globalisation & Trade; Macroeconomics & Money;

The view that there is excessive intervention in the New Zealand economy is widely accepted. Even the 1983 Budget expresses sentiments along these lines in a number of places when it reports changing the form and level of protection, the review of export assistance, decision “to move toward less disparate rates of assistance” within the agriculture and fishing sector, the decision to free up internal transport, the extension of foreign exchange licences, and the tendering of government stock, for instance.

Nevertheless, withdrawal of intervention has been a slow process, and sometimes there have been major reversals of policy – of which the interest rate controls since late 1981 are a good example. I used to think that the slowness to reduce intervention reflected the fact that any reduction is likely to affect the income of some group. However, the issue is somewhat more complicated than this.

Intervention is extraordinarily widespread in New Zealand. One piece of intervention may be the consequence of other interventions, to balance them, or correct an anomaly. For instance, one particular product may have price controls on it. These may be there, in part, because the producer ‘is a monopoly. The monopoly may, in part, be because the producer receives protection from import licensing. The producer may require that protection, in part, because the costs of some of the domestically supplied inputs are high. The costs of the inputs may be high, in part, because they are taxed by government, or receive protection from import or some domestic licensing, or because the other products of the input supplying firm have their prices depressed by price controls, and the firm recovers the Loss on the input.

This means that ir one form of intervention ‘is removed, an affected party can justly claim that they are disadvantaged by the interventions that remain, and demand a reinstatement of the removed intervention to retain balance, Because intervention is so comprehensively tangled into the New Zealand economy, there is no obvious sequence to untangle it. While it is not always so labelled, the “sequencing problem” is one of the major puzzles which beset the policymaker. Not surprisingly, there are a number of strategies to untie this knot.

One is to do nothing and hope it goes away. It hasn’t. An only slightly more resolute approach is to wait and abolish an intervention when the opportunity arises.

At the other extreme is the strategy of those who want to cut the Gordian knot. Its main proponents are those, typically in an article or speech, who say protection is a bad thing, and it should be abolished overnight. There are two difficulties here. First there is no list of all the protection in the economy. It is easy to give examples, but that is quite different from a comprehensive list, without which sweeping away all interventions is impractical. It is important not to become obsessed with one form of protection – import controls and tariffs, for example – to the neglect of all others. Second, a comprehensive overnight deletion of interventions would cause a major economic and social upheaval. Perhaps a quarter or more of the population would become unemployed, at best temporarily, a similar proportion of firms become bankrupt.

Among the realistic strategies have been attempts to measure the most inefficient interventions, or their resulting activities, ana act against those. This has been the approach of the Industries Development Commission, which has argued that where an industry has a high “effective rate of protection” (ERP) the protection should be withdrawn or scaled down. ERPs measure only external protection and more recently a new measure “the effective rate of assistance” (ERA), which includes internal protection, subsidisation and the like, has been developed. Whether ERAs measure what their advocates claim is another matter. The ones I have seen are not comprehensive enough, because they tend to measure the government’s assistance to industry, but neglect all the costs of government intervention.

Another strategy is to reform intervention in the internal economy first. Advocates claim this only involves changes in the distribution of income between New Zealanders, without a I net loss of national welfare. As persuasive as this argument is, it is unlikely that the big issues such as the ratio of wages to foreign prices and the budget deficit will be readily solved by tackling internal issues only. Internal intervention and external intervention are too entwined to settle one without the other.

The final popular sequence strategy, and the one to which I subscribe, involves a major change in ~he nominal exchange rate, a wide-ranging reduction of protection and subsidies and a reform of the internal tax system. If we get the package right, it would maintain or improve our external competitiveness, and substantially improve government spending and taxation at the same time. Some options suggest that the package could be phased in. The difficulty is that no one is sure what are the “right” levels; there is a real possibility of the package initiating inflation; and there will be some upheavals in jobs and businesses which might be wasted if there is iflnation or the figuring is wrong.

Which is why the do-nothing option is such an attractive sequence except the tangle remains and with it our poor economic performance.

Introduction :Unemployment and Its Consequences

This is an introduction to a symposium on Unemployment in New Zealand.  “New Zealand Journal of Industrial relations”, Vol 7, No @, August 1982, p.101-106.*
 

Keywords: Labour Studies;
 

Research on unemployment in New Zealand is not as widespread as in most affluent economies, no doubt partly reflecting that for the post-war period up to the late 1960s unemployment, however measured, and the social problems arising from it were small. In the 1970s, unemployment began to increase sharply, reflecting difficulties in economic performance, and its social consequences became a matter of public concern.
 

It would be fair to say that this change left social scientists a little stranded. There were two strategies open for overcoming this lack of research. One was to adopt overseas research, preferably in a critical way. The other was to bring together whatever New Zealand material was available. Both strategies are evident in the papers of this symposium; together with the evidence of the beginnings of a systematic research programme on unemployment. Obviously this symposium has not provided a comprehensive account of all research on unemployment available in New Zealand but, with one exception, the collection reflects the contemporary state of the research.
 

That exception is the debate, of sorts, about the determinants of unemployment. The caveat, “of sorts”, is necessary because while economists are taking distinct positions on the issue, there is not yet a dialogue between the various positions. There are two particularly influential views. One argues that the price of labour (i.e. wage cost to the employer) relative to domestic costs is too high. (Reserve Bank, 1982) At the other “extreme” it is argued that there is a structural imbalance between the external sector and the internal sector, which results In unemployment arising as a means of conserving foreign exchange (Phillpot and Stroombergen, 1980). Perhaps the two positions could be reconciled if each were to pay more attention to the price of labour relative to external costs with the implication that producers are substituting imports for domestic labour (Easton, 1982).
 

Part of the stand-off in the dialogue arises because of the data problems. In the late I 970s, difficulties in measuring employment meant that for almost four years there were no up-to-date, authoritative employment statistics, and the problems of agreeing on, and measuring unemployment, have been even more acute.
 

Defining Unemployment
 

The international definition of (involuntary) unemployment can be summarised as a person is unemployed if they are actively seeking work and unable to find it (Easton, 1980, pp4446). Except for the quinquennial census we do not have measures corresponding to such a definition.
Even so, the census definition has its difficulties. Its expression “unemployed and actively seeking work” is not further defined; there is an ambiguity in response since it would be perfectly reasonable for many women to respond to either “household duties unpaid” or “unemployed”, for many over-sixties to respond to either “retired” or “unemployed”, and for many beneficiaries to respond to “other” or “unemployed” since in each case the categories are not mutually exclusive.
 

Alternately we use as a measure “registered unemployed”, which are those who are unemployed using the international definition and who also register with the Department of Labour as unemployed.
 

For reasons which have nothing to do with statistics or economics, but appear to be political, it has been common practice to classify workers on government sponsored temporary employment and special work schemes as unemployed. Using the international definition such workers are employed, and certainly there is no evidence that those on the schemes work less hard than, say, economists, journalists, or politicians — although they may have less job security. Combining the unemployed with those on work schemes lowers the status of these work schemes. Given that there is no legitimate reason for doing so, this practice should be discontinued.
 

Discussion on employment and unemployment is complicated by two further factors. First, members of the peripheral labour force may appear as employed, unemployed and actively seeking work or not in employment and not seeking work. (Easton, 1980; Bowie, 1982) The peripheral labour force is the group who do not work full time for a full year. Typically, they may work seasonally, part-time, or for part of the year. In total they appear to make up roughly 400,000 New Zealanders, around only half of whom are in the labour force at any one time. In social terms the peripheral labour force includes house wives, the retired, beneficiaries, and students. Within each of these social groups, there typically exists an element of “discouraged unemployment” — those who are not actively seeking work but would if labour market conditions were closer to full employment
 

An economist may best treat the peripheral labour force as one of the buffers which adapt the supply of labour to the demand for labour without necessarily causing unemployment. Clearly, it would be wrong, and confusing to an understanding of the underlying processes, to classify all of the non employed members of the peripheral labour force as unemployed although there is inevitably a fuzzy line between the members of the peripheral labour force who may not be actively seeking work and the unemployed who are. However, in social terms the social needs of the not-seeking-work subgroup are similar to those who are employed or unemployed (and seeking work).
 

The problem of international definitions of unemployment have been neatly avoided in Hicks and Brosnan’s paper by choosing comparisons with countries which also have data based on a registration procedure comparable to New Zealand’s. The greatest care has to be taken in interpreting their data because institutional factors may still be important. Nevertheless, their paper extends our knowledge past identifying the main groups of unemployed as being the young, the unskilled, the handicapped, racial minorities, and women, plus, possibly, members of the peripheral work force such as the retired, housewives, beneficiaries, and students, depending on one’s conceptual framework. (Easton, 1980) They conclude that, while the global measures of unemployment for New Zealand suggest that this country has suffered less than most, the disaggregated unemployment data. – (suggests that) . . the distribution of unemployment is more inequitable than in other countries used for comparison.
 

Thus, while this confirms that unemployment remains low by international standards (for census measures see Easton, 1981), the groups that suffer the most in New Zealand are relatively worse off than many of their foreign counterparts. Why this should be so is a puzzle which, as a result of the Hicks-Brosnan contribution, has no doubt joined the research programme.
 

The Psychological Effects of Unemployment
 

While economists focus upon the economic functions of work — pay and conditions — there are wider implications. Social psychologist Marie Jahoda (1979) has suggested there exist latent social functions of work.
 

First among them is the fact that employment imposes a time structure on the working day. Secondly, employment implies regularly shared experiences and contacts with people outside the nuclear family. Thirdly, employment links an individual to goals and purposes which transcend his or her own. Finally, employment enforces activity. (p.313)
 

In the light of these functions, it is not surprising when asked “do you enjoy the work you do a lot, a little, or not at all?” one British survey found 75 per cent of employed persons said “a lot”. (Barker, 1978)
 

Two papers examine psychological impacts. Macky and Haines present a survey of the literature, particularly placing the New Zealand research in the international context, and commenting on research directions. They conclude that the studies “provide evidence that unemployment has serious consequences for mental and physical health, but many are characterized by methodological deficiencies”. Nevertheless the connection is dramatic with unemployment being associated with higher suicide rates, psychiatric distress, a higher rate of delinquency, depression, decay of self esteem and morale, decreased attendance of clubs and voluntary organisations, reduction in use of free libraries and reading habits, a disintegration in their senses of term, and (particularly surprising in terms of the narrowly focussed, rational economic man) personal budgeting being progressively abandoned.
 

Jahoda (1979) argues that the notion of workshyness is not particularly relevant to the unemployed. Undoubtedly there are those who suffer from a degree of workshyness, but for the vast majority the phenomenon is more correctly identified as depression and the decay of self esteem and morale.
 

New research, based on a sample of the unemployed by Hesketh and Shouksmith, suggests a mechanism by which this apathy occurs. Success by the unemployed in finding jobs is partly dependent upon active job search strategy. But failure produces feelings of low well-being. The apathy which avoids the threat of exposing oneself to failure becomes a rational psychological (and economic) strategy in the short run. Nevertheless, in the longer run, the sense of failure cannot be denied.
 

The Social Implications of Unemployment
 

On the social implications of unemployment, tentative suggestions for a research programme might involve the following four areas:
            (a) Self esteem: The latent social functions of employment, and the consequences of not working on the individual’s self esteem and ability to function as social being, were mentioned in the introduction.
            (b) Social status: Of course not only does work status affect self esteem it also affects others’ perception of the individual and hence the individual’s social status. In the situation where a social group has a perceived high rate of unemployment their social status is correspondingly lowered.
            (c) Transition: A number of the groups are in transition from one life-state to another: the adolescent approaching adulthood, the housewife whose children are growing up, the disabled being rehabilitated. In each case, employment has a major role assisting the transition. Conversely, unemployment will add to the social difficulties involved in the life transition.
            (d) Income consequences: While we tend to see income as an economic phenomenon, it also has social consequences. In particular, a depressed labour market will tend to reduce the opportunities for a family to earn extra income to sustain itself through difficult financial periods. This may be through the wife being unable to take a part- time job, or the husband being unable to obtain overtime or a second job.
Mary Hancock’s case studies of workers made redundant provide the raw material for such a programme.
 

The Industrial Implications of Unemployment
 

The existence of unemployment must affect those who are employed and their employers. Roberta Hill’s study applies the model of the “reserve army of labour” to a group of employed women who are particularly vulnerable to unemployment. Their firms were experiencing declining profitability due to overall economic stagnation and for reasons special to the clothing industry. Her study shows, how managers, using the threat of unemployment from this stagnation, were able to manipulate their female work force to counter the industry’s specific pressures.
Unfortunately, we have insufficient research in order to thaw wide conclusions. It is to be hoped that we shall see further studies on workers who are in the core rather than the peripheral labour force, and studies of firms which are expanding despite overall stagnation. It is to be regretted that we do not have similar studies made when unemployment levels were lower.
 

The Political Consequences of Unemployment
 

Given all the above implications of unemployment it is evidence that unemployment is also a political phenomenon. Murray Pereira’s paper relates one strange political outburst over the National Research Advisory Council’s Committee’s report on youth unemployment. Undoubtedly, a legitimate criticism of the report was its inadequate economic analysis of unemployment, but as pointed out earlier, such analysis is not readily available, so the criticism reflects more upon the economics profession than the committee whose brief was to report on the state of research. A second problem was the diversity of disciplinary backgrounds within the committee which resulted in a report which was difficult for a critic from a narrowly based discipline to respond to. (One of the functions of symposiums such as this is to widen the experiences of narrowly based disciplines.) Despite these caveats, the wider political response to the report was remarkable, which Pereira records without drawing wider conclusions.
 

That ringing eleventh thesis from Feuerbach, “the philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is, to change it”. Rob Campbell presents a vigorous account of the trade union view on unemployment and redundancy. If we may offer a couple of cautions to the account. First, it is vital that “unemployment” be distinguished from “redeployment”. Policies to prevent or make costly redundancy of individual workers may cause the industrial stagnation which will generate widespread unemployment. Second, to repeat an earlier theme, the trade union perspective of the causes of unemployment presented here is far from sophisticated. Once more the lack of an adequate account by economists is inhibiting the effectiveness of others.
 

Conclusion
 

Drawing general conclusions from the above is not easy, except to say that a research effort on unemployment must be a high priority. To this plea we might add the following three points:
 

First, increases in unemployment generally increase the demand for government services. While the direct expenditure on unemployment benefits and employment creation is fairly obvious, there are pressures for additional expenditure in the Education, Health and Justice votes as well as other areas of the Labour and Social Welfare votes. Ironically, this is occurring while the tax base is contracting. If the government deficit before borrowing is constrained by the balance of payments and/or for inflation reasons, the government may be wanting to cut expenditure in unemployment related areas just as demands are rising.
 

Second, the social consequences of unemployment are such that unemployment could well be explicitly incorporated in any social objective function. What is the appropriate measure for the unemployment variable is less obvious. An aggregate level of unemployment such as registered unemployment as a percentage of the work force may be readily available but does not closely correspond to a variable which indicates social implications. Two additional but not so readily available measures might be:
            (a) the average period of unemployment, recognizing that a dynamic economy may experience involuntary unemployment through redundancy and restructuring but whose unemployed are typically only in that state for short periods.
            (b) the concentration of unemployment in various social groups recognizing that un employment may be less serious if it is shared throughout the community rather than in particular social groups, identified by age, location, sex, race or class.
 

These lead to the third conclusion that current measures of unemployment may be poor proxies for the concepts they are being used for. Undoubtedly unemployment is related to the under-utilization of industrial capacity and to excess supply in the labour market. That the latter are distinct concepts indicates the problems of using unemployment to proxy for both. Similarly, unemployment is related to social distress and social tensions but again the correlation is far from perfect.
 

This is not to rule out (as absolutely irrelevant) the present unemployment measures that are available. In particular, for international comparisons we should use international definitions. Neither is it to suggest that the measures have not indicated the general direction of movement. Under-utilization of industrial capacity, excess supply of labour, and social distress have all increased markedly in the last decade. Rather it is to argue that the peripheral labour force, the employment buffers, the disguised and discouraged unemployed, and similar phenomena, point to a much more complex labour market than is implied by the traditional categorization of employment, unemployment, and not in the labour force.
 

* The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Robert Bowie (NZIER) and of a research grant from the Social Science Research Fund.
 

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References
Barker, J. (1978) Computers and employment London, National Opinion Polls.
Bowie, R. (1922) The peripheral labour force , NZIER, Wellington (Working Paper 82.06).
Easton, B. (1980) Social policy and the Welfare State in New Zealand Sydney, Allen and Unwin.
Easton, B. (1981) Unemployment 1976-1981: A note. Quarterly predictions Dec. 1981.
Easton, B. (1982) The causes of unemployment NZIER, Wellington. (Working Paper 82.03).
Gallacher, J. (1974) Quarterly potential employment series for New Zealand. In M.A. Lumsden, (Ed.) Further data for economic research some methods and results for New Zealand Wellington .(RBNZ Research Paper).
Jahoda, M. (1979) The impact of unemployment in the l930s and the 1970s. Bulletin of the British Psychological Society 32 : 309-314.
Philpott, B. and A. Stroombergen (1980) Unemployment and structural change Wellington, Victoria University of Wellington. (PEP Occasional Paper No. 41).
Reserve Bank of New Zealand (1982) Unemployment : causes and policy options Reserve Bank bulletin June.
 

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Advise and Dissent

Listener: 23 January, 1982

Keywords: Political Economy & History;

In his valedictory speech, the outgoing director of the New Zealand Institute of Economic Research, Kerry McDonald, argued that our economists should be more mvolved in the public debate on economic policy. While such sentiments are eminently appropriate in a democracy there are practical problems.

For instance, half of the New Zealand economics profession is employed by the government, in the Treasury, other departments of state and the Reserve Bank, and that includes some of our most capable economists. Inevitably there must be limitations on what public servants can say in public, since their main function is to advise government.

Nonetheless, I agree with McDonald that government economists could make a greater contribution to the public debate. First in their work government economists produce a vast quantity of research material which could easily be prepared for public release.

Second, government economists could give more ‘think piece’ papers in public. Some readers will recall a lecture given by a young Treasury official at the ANZAAS Conference in January 1979. Its topic was the protection of industry, and it provided a public indication of what some Treasury economists were thinking. In the event, it prepared us for the 1979 budget changes to our border protection.

Nonetheless, the paper illustrates a limitation of officials’ participation in public debate, because it omitted exchange rate policy. Almost certainly the original version of the paper discussed the possibility that devaluation would be necessary if the level of protection was reduced. But devaluation is a sensitive area. A Treasury official mentioning it might suggest to some that the Government was thinking about devaluing. This must be the reason why the section was chopped out, though it left a serious omission in the paper’s argument. (It will be recalled that the Government devalued by 5 percent when it introduced the protection package in the 1979 budget.)

The omission of government economists from the public debate leaves a curious imbalance. We get a lot of the criticism about government policy but little of the advice that the Government receives and on which it bases its policy. The balance is further distorted by the tendency to ignore agreement with the Government, Would you read a headline ‘Economist agrees with Government’? Our shoot-from-the-hip politics and journalism does not always lead to a well informed public debate.

There are problems for the other half of the economics profession participating in the public debate. The difficulties that Len Bayliss has faced illustrate the private sector’s problems. Bayliss’s employers have given him a considerable degree of independence to comment publicly, and the community has benefited. However, the bank must be embarrassed on occasions when Bayliss expresses very different views from their own – as must occur if he is independent – and perhaps even more so when his views are markedly different from those of the Minister of Finance, since the government owns the bank.

A number of private sector advocacy groups, representing special interests such as employees, unions, manufacturers, and farmers, employ very competent economists. Inevitably these economists are limited by their job requirements. For instance, recently a broadcasting journalist was unable to get an independent assessment of the car assembly industry because all the experts were hired by various advocacy groups.

The limitations on government and private sector economists places a great responsibility on those in universities. With Kerry McDonald, I think academics could do more but having recently left academia I am not unaware of the problems. At the university I was at, economists and other social scientists had a much greater teaching load than, say, the natural scientists, and teaching crowds out research and keeping up with all the economic issues. In addition, stepping outside one’s expertise can be dangerous. The most notorious case is of the academic who published a long newspaper article against export incentives. Unfortunately the incentives he was denouncing had been abandoned a few years earlier.

Faced with such problems, compounded in this case by the lack of Treasury papers on the topic, most academics wisely remain silent. However, they might note the strategy of a professor in a highly theoretical field of psychological measurement who used his scientific skills to become an expert on a topic of public interest (abortion), because he thought he had a responsibility to make a contribution in the public arena

Another professional source or public economIc discussion is the New Zealand Institute of Economic Research. As the incoming director. It would be inappropriate for me to comment on its role here. But McDonald argued vigorously for more economic research, in the institute and outside, suggesting that one of the ways the Government may deliberately censor unfavourable economic comment is by refusing to fund research. It will be interesting to see how the Government responds.

A Degree Of Choice

Listener 7 November, 1981.
 

Keywords: History of Ideas, Methodology & Philosophy;
 

With the examination season in full swing, there must be a few younger readers – plus their concerned parents and other relatives – who are contemplating a career in economics. No certification is needed to become a professional economist, but most economists have been through a programme of education and training, which can begin at secondary school.
 

Any general secondary school programme is a sound foundation for a career in economics, particularly if it includes history and mathematics. History faces the student with a set of “facts” and interpretations and, if it is taught well, with the problem of reconciling these into a coherent but by no means unique overview –  not uncommon task of the economist. It will also improve one’s writing skills.
 

The role of mathematics in economics is more problematic. Some academic economists require high mathematical attainment by their students, sometimes higher than they have attained themselves. I consider such an attitude misguided. Certainly mathematics can be a great help but it can also be a hindrance; the symbolism can obscure the social realities of economic processes.
 

It is not uncommon for the careless mathematical economist to make ludicrous mistakes when applying his studies to the real world, because the mathematics he is using has simplified the problem past the point of relevance. It is because mathematics is not an empirical science that an economist needs history.
 

Nonetheless, mathematics is an extraordinarily powerful tool. My advice to the aspiring economist is to do as much as he or she can” and to make sure it is understood- even at the price of going back and repeating the year. But when the mathematics gets to the point of pain, give it up, and’ if your economics tutor requires more mathematics than you have, then change your tutor.
 

I have not recommended doing economics at secondary school. If you want. to, and have the space within your programme, then of course take it. But all first-year university courses assume that the student starts fresh, and in the long run a language, a physical science, biology, geography, literature, music or whatever, may be more valuable.
 

There is no “best” university in New Zealand for economics. Each has its own distinctive style and areas of concern, which will suit some students and not others. If one university’s style does not suit you, then vote with your feet.
 

(For such vociferous proponents of freedom of choice and the market, our university economists have not been very active in offering distinctive course options to their students. However, at least one university is an exception, and I expect that over the next few years other local monopolies will disappear.)
 

There is no need to confine the university major course to economics. Some of our best economists majored in agricultural economics, while economic history and social statistics have also produced very good professional economists. Or you could graduate in some other subject and then transfer to special programmes in economics. Graduates from backgrounds as diverse as chemical engineering and history have taken these “knight’s move” courses, called after the
knight’s move of the chessboard up (to an honours degree) and across (to an economics  major).
 

As well as a major, most university programmes include minors, or courses in related subjects. Again, there is no best minor. Indeed, the profession needs a diversity of programme, so that it can contribute to areas like ecosystems, family life, the energy crisis, company profitability, health expenditure, forestry etc. Almost certainly the student’s course will include some statistics, though usually as an integral part of the economics programme.
 

After graduation it is vital to leave the university world for a couple of years for business or government. Without such practical experience, the economist is akin to the medic who has investigated only live rats and dead people. After that, you could go back to university or overseas to do a doctorate. Overseas experience of one sort or another is vital for a mature economist, so that he or she can escape the narrow view that whatever happens in the New Zealand economy or in the textbooks is the only possibility.
 

Opportunities for well qualified economists are likely to remain good, even if every adolescent reader of this column is persuaded to become one. Today the biggest employers Treasury, the Reserve Bank, research institutes and teaching institutions cannot get enough graduate entrants. Even if they could, any surplus would be rapidly absorbed by other government departments and by business.
 

And since a good economics education is also a good general education, at the very worst. the graduate economist would be no worse off than the student who took a general university degree with no vocational content.

Economy … or the Lack of It

Listener 10 October, 1981, republished in Listener Bedside Book, (1997) p.313-314.

Keywords: Growth & Innovation;

“People should be made to see this,” the passenger exclaimed. He and a group of Europeans and Australasians had been stranded half way between West Germany and Australia, when an engine of our 747 ingested a vulture in Bombay. Now we were travelling by bus from the Bombay airfield to the hotel where we were to be put up while the engine was repaired.

The exclamation arose from the shanties we could see from the bus. Sometimes there were 100 metres of hovels, constructed from rubbish dwellings of a standard inferior to many New Zealand children’s play huts. And the passenger reflected the mood of the bus. “How could people be expected to live decently in these shacks? H{»J.’ could we ignore their plight?”

I was more interested in the bus passengers. Here were a group of people who by the standards of their nations were worldly wise -for most this was not their first trip. Moreover, for two decades they have been deluged with images of some of the world’s poorest conditions. Few of us have not seen pictures of such shanty towns and television has provided more spectacular examples.

Individually we respond to appeals for aid. Even the average 10-yearold would respond correctly to a true or false question on the statement “There are many people in the world whose housing is very, very poor.”

Yet it was not until that group saw the shacks that the real significance of such images. and statements, dawned on them. For the record it should it be noted that this occurred before they had reached the sumptuous hotel which made the contrast even starker, and before they were besieged by the mutilated and children begging for money

This problem of limited perception is not peculiar to observers of India or the world’s poor. There is sufficient material in New Zealand for each of us to gain an adequate assessment of South Africa’s apartheid. But race relations conciliator Hiwi Tauroa belongs to a notable group of New Zealanders who had to go to South Africa and see it before they could believe.

It seems to me that we have an internal mechanism to protect us from unnecessary anguish, which enables us to be confronted with adequate documentation and yet not believe. We need the immediacy of reality.

Of course it’s hard to come to terms with the six million living in Bombay, one of the poorest cities in the world. It’s much easier to respond to refugee camps in Kampuchea, drought in East Africa, and floods in Bangladesh, while neglecting the fact that, compared with us, the people were poor before the war, drought or flood. It is too easy to run a fire brigade operation, putting out the fires but never asking whether we should do something in the area of fire prevention –or even let the whole lot bum down.

That evening over dinner a West German businessman talked to me. Despite operating in Egypt he had been dismayed by what he had seen. In his opinion it was only their religion which was stopping the Indians turning communist. It is probably more complex than that. Despite the crowds and the squalor, the people appeared to be happy. Some of the occupants of the shanties wore attractive saris – indicating to this economist that part of the problem was that the shack erectors did not have the legal right to occupy the land and so it was not in their interests to put up permanent buildings.

Nevertheless, simple or complex, the issue remains. In our intellects we know that these conditions exist, but we ignore them in our hearts. I felt obliged to write this column because, although I saw nothing that surprised me, I was made acutely aware that my technical skills as economist were shielding me from the reality that these people were poor. Similarly, politicians year after year have spoken platitudes about the needs of the world’s poor. But their record, reflecting ours, is to have done little about it.

A day later, the bus drove back to the airfield in a way which made a three-engine 747 appear the epitome of safety. The passenger whose quotation began this column remarked, “Thank God we are leaving Bombay.” But we left six million behind us.

Island Industry

Listener: 18 July, 1981.

Keywords: Globalisation & Trade;

The islands to our north present New Zealand with a number of economic social and political problems – the problems of how to treat neighbours who are small in numbers and materially poor, but significant to us in human terms (and perhaps of strategic importance). It would be so easy to neglect them or to use them for our convenience. However, in 1976 we took a more positive Islands Industrial Development Scheme (PIIDS).

The idea of PIIDS is simple. Appropriately directed subsidies enable New Zealand firms to establish factories In the Islands, thereby employing the native people. The subsidies include grants towards the costs of new or additional factory plant and equipment, staff training, transfer of staff and plant, and feasibility studies.

Countries eligible for this assistance are the Island members of the South Pacific Forum: The Cook Islands. Fiji, Kiribati. Nauru, Niue, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Western Samoa and Vanuatu. So far there have been 37 PIIDS ventures, creating 545 jobs at a cost of around $2000 a job. Some of these ventures have been criticised. The most controversial. becaus: of th: health implications, was a cigarette-manufacturing operation in Western Samoa. But like all the others, the project was approved by the local government. Is it appropriate for the donor government to overrule the recipient government?

A more general issue is whether the scheme results in the wrong sort of industries. A number of projects are rather similar to the import substituting industries we established in New Zealand in the 1960s. Instead of importing final products, components are imported and local labour used to assemble them. The catch, as we know to our cost, is that when there is a shortage of foreign exchange such semi-processing industries do not have the imports to sustain them. and there is resulting unemployment.

A better strategy is to use some natural product of the Islands as the basis for manufacturing. In 1977 the scheme was extended to cover ventures which processed agricultural products. Successful ventures include banana drying, jam manufacture using indigenous fruits, ginger, orange juice. tropical plant propagation, coconut cream, honey, and annato seeds for dye. An exciting recent development is the processing of timber from senile coconut trees.

Some islands are so short of natural products that they are using labour-intensive processing of imported raw materials to produce export goods. Both Niue and Tonga are making hand-stitched soccer balls for export. Apparently the traditional manual dexterity of the local people give high productivity.

But in order to export, be it soccer balls or processed local materials, there has to be access to markets. In the case of the Island economies their major markets will be Australia and New Zealand. Recognising this, these two countries have drawn up the South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Co-operation Agreement. which from the beginning of this year enables the South Pacific Forum countries to have duty-free and unrestricted access to our markets, subject to a few restrictions where great hardship would be caused to our own industries.

One of the most interesting criticisms is that industrial development based on private investment will Inhibit the grass-roots rural development and self-reliance. The wrong sort of industrialisation could destroy the social fabric of the islands which we are trying to support. New Zealanders will recognise that our equivalent debate is whether an over emphasis on think-big projects will distort our social and economic development.

Island leaders appear to have warmly supported PIIDS. The United Nations Industrial Development Organisation has been sufficiently impressed to commission a report on the scheme by Wellington economist Dennis Rose. Yet it would be wrong to leave the reader with an uncritical picture of glowing optimism.

It may well be that there is no economic structure for many Pacific Islands which will maintain the present and future population levels at an adequate standard of living. Even moderate levels may involve major social change. destroying much of what is most precious to the Islands. If so, we can expect that many Pacific Islanders will continue to migrate to New Zealand. Personally, I welcome them. Already they have added a variety and richness to our community and – providing the migration is steady rather than accelerated – our economy can. cope with and benefit from more Pacific Islanders. However, I am uneasy about the effects on the Island communities of a too rapid depletion of the young and the capable: Perhaps the role of our aid programme is to slow down the depletion and ease the transition rather than to try to provide the long term viable economies that some of the islands cannot hope to attain.

It is not easy for New Zealand to be concerned and supportive to our Pacific neighbours without being directive and interfering. It is not easy for us to protect our economic and strategic interests without being domineering. In the past we have too easily wavered between neglect and paternalistic imperialism. We must try to do better in the future.

All the Keynes Men

Listener: 23 May, 1981.

Keywords: History of Ideas, Methodology & Philosophy;Macroeconomics & Money;

I once asked Dr W.B. Sutch how much Keynes had influenced the thinking of the first Labour Government. John Maynard Keynes’s book The General Theory of Employment and Money has been the most influential piece or economics writing this century in terms or its impact on both economic theory and economic policy. It explained how a government could practice deficit financing to increase employment.

Sutch, who was a government adviser in the 1930s, replied that Keynes had little influence. Rather, the government observed that housing materials were not being used, house builders were unemployed, and families desired houses, so that the Government ensured there was the finance to bring the builders and materials together to construct the houses that were needed.

This is undoubtedly an over simplification – Sutch had studied Keynes’s work in his doctoral programme* – but it is appropriate to emphasise the pragmatic response or the Government in the years immediately after 1936. Later economists used Keynes’s General Theory to justify and improve the management of the economy adopted at the time.

As a result, an entire school or Keynesian economists arose, and also politicians, businesswomen and others adopted the Keynesian framework of the time. For many of the practical men this adoption was uncritical without an awareness of some of the limitations or the framework, limitations that were known to Keynes.

For instance in a Keynesian-managed economy with powerful firms and powerful unions it is very difficult to prevent inflation, except by direct controls of wages arid prices.

A second obvious weakness is that the simple Keynesian models have no exports and imports. Keynes was aware or this and in the early 1930s had advocated the use of import controls as a means or limiting the impact of foreign trade on the domestic economy. In 1938, racing a shortage of foreign exchange the Labour Government introduced import controls, again as a pragmatic response rather than with a knowledge of Keynes’s position.

A third major limitation was that in order to simplify his theory Keynes assumed that the prices for goods and services in the economy were fixed relative to one another. This assumption was unnecessary, except for simplification. Unfortunately it was picked up and misinterpreted by the practical.

For them what the theory seemed to be saying was that prices may be ignored when we are concerned about the overall behaviour of the economy, in terms of its output, employment and balance of payments. Such a view was reinforced by a couple of antipathies from the 1930s.

First there was an antipathy against the market as an economic mechanism. Markets were seen to be a cause or the Depression or the 1930s and also an integral facet or capitalism.

It seemed to these people it was better to regulate the economy by direct government controls super-imposing over the market where necessary.

Second. changes in prices modify income distribution, sometimes against the interests of a particular social group such as businessmen, farmers or workers. If it is thought that these price changes have no effect on output, employment or the balance or payments, it followed that prices could be set for any desired distributional or political purpose.

The result was a plethora or arbitrary subsidies and indirect taxes, curious government price arrangements and the establishment of high cost industries.

It was these. sorts or considerations which gave rise to the simple Keynesian approach which was popular a quarter or century ago. Briefly it may be summarised as. that ‘it is right for a government to use its taxation. spending and monetary powers to pursue objectives or output, employment, the balance of payments and price stability’. However, the price structure has little influence on these objectives and so may be manipulated for other purposes. Today there is a significant and influential group or practical people who still hold this view; a group to be found in most pressure groups and all political parties.

Over the period there has grown up a succeeding group or Keynesians who, while agreeing with the first half or the proposition, disagree that the price system is irrelevant. To the contrary they would argue that our ignoring the price mechanism has been a major factor in a poor growth performance, unemployment, and our slowness of adjusting to new world economic circumstances.

Some of the personality disputes which erupted in our political parties last year were also disputes over economic policy. It is a pity that coverage tends to be about personalities with so little attention to the policy issues.

Concluding his General Theory Keynes remarked: ‘The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else. Practical men. who believe themselves to be quite exempt from intellectual influences. are usually the slave of some defunct economist.’ Forty-five years later that defunct economist is often a simple minded version of Keynes.

* Sutch probably studied, or would certainly been aware of, Keynes’ Treatise on Money. He reviewed The General Theory in Tomorrow in early 1936, only months after it had been published. (Added in 2003)

Free to Choose by Milton and Rose Friedman (review)

Listener 23 May 1981.

Keywords: History of Ideas, Methodology & Philosophy;

This book may well become a bible for advocates or the political right in New Zealand. Expressions from it (or from the television series on which it is based) are already gaining currency here. Yet such a fate would. be unfair to the Friedmans, and to New Zealand.

For Milton Friedman, professor of economics at Chicago University and , 1976 Nobel prize-winner, and Rose, his wife (the only information the book accords her), are “little Americans” – that is, their book is about America and is intended primarily for Americans, and it does not relate easily to New Zealand conditions:

Chapter three, for instance, plays a central role in the book. The Friedmans argue that there has been growing government involvement in the United States economy, which they attribute in part to the response by Americans to the Great Depression of the 1930s. They argue that Americans have misinterpreted the cause of the Depression, seeing it as a failure of the private economic system which was rescued by the Government, whereas the Friedmans consider that government measures in fact precipitate the Depression. If private enterprise had been left to itself, they say, the economic hardship would have been less and shorter-lived. Scholars may argue about this interpretation, but whatever conclusions are reached they are irrelevant to New Zealand. Whether the international slump was precipitated by America private enterprise or by the American Government is academic in this context since the result to us was the same.

Another instance is that, while the account of the inefficiencies of the American social security bureaucracy is fascinating, it would be ignorant to attribute similar deficiencies to the New Zealand social security system. Indeed, despite our deficiencies here, this country may well offer numerous examples to counter the book’s claim that responsible government cannot improve community welfare.

As befits little Americans, the authors are selective about the evidence they present from other countries; for instance, many New Zealand viewers of the television series, were .puzzled by Friedman’s advocacy of Hong Kong as an example of how to run an economy, for they had seen Corso’s A Fair Deal,’which used Hong Kong to illustrate how people were suffering under private enterprise. There is no inconsistency between these two views – each simply neglects to mention what the other promotes, and whether you see greater virtue in happy businessmen or in prosperous workers is, of course, a value judgment.

Similarly, the Friedmans state: “A society that puts freedom first will, as a happy by-product, end up with both ‘greater freedom and greater equality.” Are we entitled to assume from such an unqualilfied judgment that countries which give highest priority to freedom have the greatest equality (the expression should, of course, be the “least inequality”)’? If so, we can report that Northern Europe and Australasia have less unequal income distributions than the US; from which one concludes that New Zealand, among others, gives a higher priority to freedom than does the US – which I think even the Friedmans would find surprising.

Nonetheless. despite the little Americans and the frequent cavalier misuse of facts, there is a theme in this book that all New Zealanders need to consider. Over the last 100 years social development has created vast bureaucracies in government {and, I would add, private enterprise) which are becoming increasingly unresponsive to social control, and which pursue policies in their own interest, even though they claim to be acting in the public interest. There frequently develops a collaboration between the bureaucracy and part of private enterprise in which the government supports private enterprise, allegedly in the interests of the public, and for which in return the private sector maintains the bureaucracy.

In the past we have tended to be less than critical of such symbiosis. The Friedmans’ criticism of this development is important and deserves consideration, but the solution they offer – a return to the economic mechanism of the 19th century, with its rampant uncontrolled corporate enterprise – falls somewhere between the nostalgic and the foolish. That mechanism was abandoned for good reasons and, while its successor in the form of a high degree of government intervention may have its limitations, the history of social development is one of inevitable progression.*

For all this, the book makes a worthwhile contribution. It is a pleasure to read economists who make no pretence of disguising their values and who argue vigorously, if, alas, without wit. The danger lies not in the book itself but in the uncritical acceptance of it as having direct relevance for New Zealand. The challenge for the political right in this country is to present us with their own well-argued case, so that we have the freedom to choose or reject it.

* Added in 2003: I am not as sure about the ‘inevitability’ today as I was in 1981 – certainly in the short to medium term. BE.

Compensating Factors

Listener: 25 April, 1981.

Keywords: Social Policy;

One of the curiosities of the 1970s is that although it was a period of economic stagnation, a number of important innovations were made in the income maintenance area.

The most radical was the introduction of the Accident Compensation Scheme. but others were National Superannuation, the Statutory Domestic Purposes Benefit, income tax rebates for families, and changes removing some of the discrimination against women, Even curiouser, most of these changes occurred under a National Government, which is not normally thought to be especially concerned with social security.

I tried to explain this in a book Pragmatism and Progress: Social Security in the Seventies to be published soon by the University or Canterbury. As the title suggests, I concluded that the developments were primarily a pragmatic response to social stress in the stagnant ‘70s, but it also reflects a change in the late 1960s by the National Party to a more sympathetic approach to social security.

While preparing the book for publication I was confronted by the 1979 budget changes which cut the level of National Superannuation across the board, reduced the level of the unemployment benefit for those without children, and eliminated .the Additional Benefit as instituted in 1975.

However, at the same time the family benefit was doubled, the child allowances for social security beneficiaries was increased, and the Additional Benefit reconstituted as a supplement for beneficiaries with high housing costs. Thus the 1979 Budget changes are better treated as a redeployment (restructuring) of the limited funds for income maintenance in a stagnant economy – in the budget after the excesses of election year.

The conclusion of my book was that at the end of the 1970s the National Party was faced with a choice between returning to its traditional antagonism towards social security or continuing a sympathetic development limited by the overall economic stagnation. I did not hazard which path it would choose.

Perhaps the Accident Compensation Amendment Bill currently before Parliament gives some indication It is widely accepted that reform of the scheme is needed. The reforms the Bill encompasses include a worthwhile improvement to the situation of the self-employed.

However, most of the proposals have the effect of cutting back the level of compensation available. This includes reducing the lump-sum compensation cutting out some of the compensation for non-pecuniary loss, in some cases making the accident victim pay for the first two visits to the doctor, eliminating compensation for non-work injuries for the first two weeks (instead of one week) and reducing the compensating improvements in the first week for work accidents from 100 percent to 80 percent of earnings.

What I want to draw attention to that white the overall effect of the changes is to contract the scope of the Accident Compensation Scheme. unlike the 1979 budget changes there are no compensating improvements. Thus the Bill as it now stands represents a break from the pattern the National Government set itself in the 1970s.

For instance I am inclined to the I view that it makes sense to reduce the compensation in the first week from 100 per cent to 80 per cent of earnings. However. instead of reducing the costs of the scheme to the firm, who pay first week compensation, the funds could have been used to extend, say, cover for workers who suffer long-term sickness.

If it makes sense to charge the accident victim for the first two visits to the doctor. and I am far from persuaded that it does, then it makes sense to charge the sickness victim for I only his or her first two visits to the doctor and then for the state to pay for subsequent visits.

Not only does the Bill fail to offer any compensations for the reductions, but it fails to tackle the generally acknowledged major deficiencies in the present legislation. Those deficiencies are:

1) Legislation which is overly complex, and the drift to legal adversary procedures in administration.

2) The inadequate’ treatment of non-earners, particularly women and students.

3) The gross inequity between the victims of accidents who get earnings-related benefits and the victims. of sickness who get nat rate benefits. {Given a social goal of ‘equality of opportunity’. the prospects of the children of family men on a long-term sickness benefit are particularly unfair.)

4) Inappropriate financing. We could make greater use of the user group pays principle by, for instance, levying alcohol to cover the costs or alcohol-induced accidents, foreign visitors could pay a levy on arrival to cover their entitlements under the scheme. (I support the government’s proposal to switch over to a pay-as-you-go basis instead of the present funded approach, which adds unnecessary complexity.)

Whether the Accident Compensation Amendment Bill proceeds depends upon the parliamentary and political processes. It seems to me that it would be most unfortunate that it I should, particularly in this International Year for the Disabled, unless the proposed reductions were paralleled by major improvements for those who suffer misfortune.

Highly Concentrated

Listener: 28 February, 1981.

Keywords: Business & Finance;

With today’s fashion for advocating ‘more market”. it may be useful to consider the structure of New Zealand markets. A market may have one of many structures, and government intervention in each ought to reflect that.

If the market is highly competitive. with a large number of buyers and sellers, then much of the economic regulation may be left to it. With a single seller and many buyers, the government may have to limit the monopoly’s ability to abuse its own power There are many other market structures, including few sellers, many buyers and sole seller sole buyer.

The study of market structures is not a well-developed part of a New Zealand economics, but a few studies offer some guidance.

Economist John Whitehead examined consumer spending according to the level of competition among sellers He round that only 24 percent of consumer spending was on commodities subject to a high degree of competition. Another 42 percent was subject partial competition and the remaining 34 percent experienced little or no competition.

These figures are unlikely to be exactly correct but they strongly suggest that competition does not dominate the consumer in the New Zealand marketplace.

But this does not tell us why. In many areas of spending the government is the monopolist (e.g. electricity) or has given a monopoly to a quasi-government agency (e.g. fruit and some dairy products) In other products however, there may be only one or a few firms in the industry.

Some idea of the problem is gained from John Ellis’s study Industrial Concentration for the 1970-71 year and from Department of Statistics data 1976-77. Each examines only manufacturing industries, where there little government ownership.

The degree of “monopoly” or industrial concentration, can be measured by the employment figures of each the industry’s three largest business units . For instance, in 1976-77 there were 44 meat export works owned by 20 business units. Of the 33,056 workers employed in the industry, 15,338 (46.4 per cent) were employed by the three largest units.

In the 144 industries studied, the measure of industrial concentration in the three largest units varies from 100 percent in 18 industries to 10.7 percent in the case of builders, carpenters and joiners.

Ellis suggest those industries whose ratios exceed 66 per cent should be identified as high-concentration industries, and those whose ratio is below 34 percent. Thus 42 percent of manufacturing industries are in the highly concentrated range, 37 per cent in the medium range. and 21 percent in the low range. Compared with Britain or the United States, our manufacturing, industries are apparently much more concentrated. or as a layperson might say, monopolistic.

Perhaps this is not surprising: ours is a much smaller economy, But this obvious conclusion proves that we would be foolish to administer our economy as if it were a larger one a view frequently advocated by those in favour of ‘more market’.

Curiously enough, in some areas we seem to be much less interventionist. Some of the mergers of the past few years have been subject to much less rigorous scrutiny than they would have had in Britain or the US.

What we do know is that concentration has been rising. For the 49 industries available for comparison between 1971-72. and 1976-77, some 35 (71 per cent) show a rise in concentration in the five-year period. It seems likely that this concentration has continued to increase over the past four years of economic stagnation and restructuring. There has also been a growth of conglomerates. like Fletcher Challenge, with holdings in several industries.

Monopolies are not necessarily bad thing. Because they are technologically innovative and reap the benefits of long production runs, they can make major contributions to economic growth. A conglomerate may be the best way to restructure if the government is unwilling to implement effective economic and social planning. We may need export monopolies in order to meet the challenges in our overseas markets. These can be real benefits to balance against their excessive economic power.

There is no unique formula for striking the right balance between the benefits and disadvantage of concentrated industries. One’s choice will also depend on political taste. A social democrat might argue for the following changes in New Zealand.

(i) Legislation to enable the identification, investigation and, if necessarily, prohibition of restrictive practices, The investigation needs to be public.

(ii) Similar legislation dealing with mergers.

(iii) More information published by firms, particularly when they are monopolistic, The information would include data on production, markets and plans. In addition, I find it astonishing that not even shareholders know who firms make political donations to.

(iv) A review or government regulation, legislation and practice that restricts competition or prevents new competitors from entering the market,

This is not a plea ‘for unlimited competition. But workable competition can be an effective way or ensuring social control over monopolistic economic power. In New Zealand we are a long way from the ideal.

Some Hope

Listener: 13 January, 1981.

Keywords: Growth & Innovation;

Many economists are developing a cautious optimism about the New Zealand economy. It is it view which has only the most tenuous links with the strident claims of faith in our future which we shall be hearing from the politicians this year, and the economist’s optimism may well survive the election.

The view is based on the assessment that after more than a decade of stagnation the processes, particularly in the farm sector, which drove the New Zealand economy on a growth path for d hundred years up to 1967 are beginning to reassert themselves.

Indeed, with hindsight, the stagnation in the farm sector now has the appearance of a restructuring. If so. it is a fascinating case of how restructurll1g can take place. On the one , hand we have had farmers responding to the market-price signals, changing the mix of what they produce and how they produce it. On the other hand the New Zealand taxpayer has been pouring in subsidies into the farm sector in order to sustain it in the face or harsh prices, and to ease the structuring adjustment.

Meanwhile new policies have been put into effect. Perhaps the most important was the package in the 1979 Budget which. with the crawling peg exchange rate and the supplementary minimum prices, has given farmers the confidence that they will get a reasonable return for their effort.

The spectre or the EEC still looms over our ability to export, but part or the restructuring effort has been the selling of new products to new markets. We are no longer so dependent upon Britain to take our food exports. Whereas in 1966 67 percent of all exports went to Britain, in 1979 the figure was down to 28 percent, there with another percent going to the United States, 1 percent going to Japan, and nine percent going to the industrializing nations of East Asia which with the Middle East, Latin America and Eastern Europe, promise to be our growth markets for the 1980s.

Moreover, forecasts for world food demand are particularly favourable for our products. It appears that a number of countries are going to move into the income range which has a demand for sheepmeats and dairy products. T. Barna of the the Sussex European Research Centre has produced a study (for which I provided the New Zealand input) on Agrilculture Towards the Year 2000. He predicted Third World deficits in the year 2000 of 1.3 million tonnes of sheepmeats and 35 million tones of milk with a maximum supply from the high-Income countries of 7 million and 10 million tonnes respectively, In both cases the gap between what the rich can supply and what the poor will want to buy is greater than what New Zealand will export, We must be cautious about such projections, especially, as they are dependent upon successful Third World development, But our caution need not be pessimistic.

Factors such as these have led to a set of projections for farm output over the next decade of an increase in farm export volume of up to a half, In today’s prices that could be an extra $1.5 billion of exports a year, by the end of the decade.

In other areas we are also cautiously optimistic, We are creating more opportunities for further processing of farm production, Managed properly. fishing and tourism will make significant contributions to export revenues, So will forestry, but more in the 19905 than the 1980s, Developments in the energy sector will reduce our need for imports and contribute to exports from the mid-1980s. It looks as though we are going to have a few more years of difficulties, but with luck the main difliculty will be getting the growth mechanism to work rather than fighting off stagnation, There are good reasons to be cautious, for the economists’ optimism is dependent upon a number of crucial assumptions. They are assuming that the world economy will not stagnate and that the rich in the world will foster rather than inhibit the development of the Third World.

They are assuming that the Government will not neglect the primary sectors in favour of the energy sector, and that the resources required for energy development wilt not be drawn from farming. Economists remain nervous about our high rate of inflation , either unsure how to reduce it or concerned that anti-inflationary policies may damage the mechanism of investment and growth: A particular worry to farmers is that domestic inflation could put them in a cost.squeeze with insufficient income to generate the production thrust.

Most of all there is concern that the Government” will muck things up, either by an overstimulus of the economy in the short term or by expensive election bribes – the spectre of national superannuation looms large here.

Let us not deny that we have been through a rough’ period. The evidence is that we are moving out of it, To do so wilt require good luck and good management, Let us, with caution, hope for both.

Development Strategies for the Eighties

Address to the Electrical Supply Authorities Association conference in Christchurch on 22 September; published in the ‘New Zealand Monthly Review, November 1980. It was also published in “Straight Furrow”.

While there can be little dispute that the structure of the New Zealand economy will be very different in 1990 from what it is today, there is considerable room for debate on what that structure will be. For today we face real choices about the future structure of our economy, and the strategies we might pursue.

I want to simplify this range of choices by examining two basic development strategies. We might summarize one strategy as the “Small is Beautiful” strategy, using the phrase of E. F. Schumaker. The alternative strategy might be called “Think Big”. Here I shamelessly use the slogan of Mr George Chapman, President of the National Party.

Before I describe the two strategies to you, let me point out that they have some areas of common agreement. Both see our future in an economic structure very different from the past. Undoubtedly traditional sheep and dairy farming will continue to be of great importance in our economy, but they will not have the role of the leading sector in development as they had in the past.

The second point of agreement is that New Zealand must, in some sense, specialize. We cannot imitate the industrial nations of the world in Japan, Europe, North America, or even Australia. Our economy is too small. We cannot reap the economies of scale which are so crucial for their development. If we try to imitate such economies we will have a lower standard of living, and lose our highly skilled labour force to those countries which through economies of scale have higher productivity and pay higher wages than we can. Just as we did in the past as a specialist supplier of high quality animal food and fibres to the rest of the world, in the future we will also have to find a specialist role, although possibly a different one.

So much for the agreements. The disagreements are more substantial, so let’s look at each strategy in turn.

The “Think Big” strategy

As publicly presented the “Think Big” strategy centres on a few crucial industrial sectors. The most typical and vaunted are energy and chemical projects based upon the Maui gas field. These include electricity, ammonia-urea, methanol, synthetic petrol and petro-chemicals. Another big sector is metal smelters supplied from electricity produced from hydro stations in the Upper Clutha Valley and coal from the Waikato. In addition, there are similar “Think Big” proposals in forestry (although the main thrust here will be after 1990), in some mineral mining, and to a lesser degree in fishing and tourism.

The “Think Big” strategy is characterized by taking some of our raw materials, such as Maui gas, coal, hydro electricity, and forests, and processing them for export. The processing plants are large, and capita- intensive, so they employ little labour compared to the value of output. Characteristically the plants are owned by multinational firms, or consortiums of a large New Zealand enterprise and a multinational.

Few employment opportunities created

It has been correctly pointed out that the “Think Big” projects will not directly generate enough employment opportunities. Let us recall the magnitude of our employment problem. Today we are around 100,000 jobs short; by that I mean that the actual level of unemployment is 100,000 New Zealanders. In addition we have to find an extra 20,000 jobs a year to deal with the labour force increase, in addition to those jobs that will be destroyed by technological and economic change. At the very least we are concerned about creating an extra 300,000 jobs over the next ten years, and the true figure may be closer to 500,000 if we allow for job destruction. Some of these jobs will develop naturally in the government and service sectors, but perhaps a half will have to be created in the primary and secondary sectors, including transport and construction. Thus we have a formidable job creation task before us.

Compared to these figures the big projects create very few jobs. For instance, the most ambitious use of Maui gas giving us 80 per cent self-sufficiency in liquid fuels creates 3,000 permanent jobs, with a construction force rising to a mere 7,050 at its peak.

However, these employment figures are for direct employment only. What is crucial about many of these “Think Big” projects is that net export earnings per worker are intended to be high. Of course they may not be, if for instance we oversubsidize the firms, or most of the surplus accrues to the overseas investors. But if things go well, we could make substantial gains in foreign earnings. For instance, with regard to that use of Maui gas, the expected estimated net annual foreign earnings is $880m or around $290,000 per permanent worker.

Such very substantial gains would enable us to expand the economy and this would create jobs and employment. Thus the employment generation mechanism of the “Think Big” strategy is more aimed at improving our balance of payments and thereby creating the jobs we require.

Problems with “Thinking Big”

There are a number of major problems with the “Think Big” strategy. First there is the question of whether the projects will be as socially profitable as the advocates claim. Quite frankly, I am somewhat sceptical about the social profitability of many of the projects. A number of them seem to require government subsidies, rather than standing on their own two feet.

The second difficulty is that no one has calculated whether these big projects will create enough jobs directly and indirectly. We could find ourselves in the mid-1980s with only enough projects to earn, say, foreign exchange for half the jobs we require.

Third, even if we have enough foreign exchange, there is no mechanism to ensure that the rest of the economy creates the right jobs. It is quite easy to envisage the development of a low-productivity manufacturing sector which sops up unemployment but does not really contribute to national production.

You will also notice that the strategy does not say much about what happens before the projects start earning the foreign exchange in the mid 1980s. Part of the answer is that there will be interim employment opportunities in the construction of the plant, financed by overseas borrowing, but, alas, unemployment will remain. Moreover, the overseas borrowing will, of course, reduce the social profitability of the projects.

A fifth point is the regional impact. There is little in these projects for the north of the South Island, and most of the North Island. Characteristically the expenditures and employment will be intense in localities but there will not be widespread benefits.

A sixth point is the question of ownership and social control. It is not merely that most of this development is based on large corporations. The plants they run are ideal for very militant unions. You need only to look at Kinleith and Kawerau for evidence of the consequences of labour relations in capital intensive industries. Historically our labour relations have been best in small businesses and farms. Our national aspirations are that we want to be self-employed rather than corporate managers. If we go for these big plants we are going to have to pay a lot of attention to the issues of social control of the large corporation and the powerful union.

Faced with these problems the Big Thinker would argue that they are not insurmountable, and in any case you can’t make an omelette without breaking eggs. If there was no alternative development strategy, the case for thinking big rather than doing nothing would be unbeatable.

The “Small is Beautiful” strategy

Thus, at the very least, the “Small is Beautiful” strategy provides a test of the viability of “Think Big”. However, it is more difficult to describe. Its essence is to see our farms and, to a lesser extent, forests, fisheries, mines and hydro stations, producing a wide variety of raw materials which we process with a highly skilled labour force into a wide variety of products for export or substitutes for imports. Typically these processing firms will be small scale and in international terms of output of a particular product may be small. But collectively they would add up to a substantial foreign exchange earner.

Let me give you some examples. The food industry has evolved this way for a number of years now. Instead of carcases and a few bulk dairy products we are diversifying into food preparations; honey, horticultural products, wine, feed stuffs, and deer and goat products. Today we scour about half of our wool, and we aim to increase that proportion and to process the grease which the scouring extracts. Moreover, we fully process only 8 per cent of our wool. We can build up exports of woollen yarns, carpets, and fashion wear. Instead of exporting pulp and paper from capital intensive plant, our comparative advantage is to export the more labour-intensive solid wood products, including furniture. Wood chips can be used in small stills throughout the country to produce ethanol as a substitute for petrol. We can export skills, in terms of international contracting and consulting. This is just the beginning of a list of a myriad possibilities which the “Small is Beautiful” advocates see.

You will notice that the products I have mentioned usually require a highly skilled work force. There is no future in our attempting to compete with the lower skilled work forces, say, of South East Asia. That would mean we would have to pay low wage rates, which would result in outmigration to high wage countries.

The “Small is Beautiful” strategy meets some of the problems of the “Think Big” strategy. Since the strategy is land-based, there is a natural regional balance. The typical firms will be New Zealand-owned and managed, with a size that gives a chance for good labour relations. The strategy directly creates jobs, but as the new firms will also create and conserve foreign exchange there will also be indirect creation of jobs. And the jobs will be created throughout the 1980s including the first half when the big projects are yet to come on stream.

Problems with “Small is Beautiful”

Nonetheless there are some difficulties with the “Small is Beautiful” strategy. Where is the investment capital for the developments to come from, although the requirement is not as acute as in the case of “Think Big” since the strategy is less capital intensive? Again we cannot be sure that the strategy will create enough jobs, although we might surmise there are enough potential opportunities. But can we convert these potentialities into actualities?

Therein lies the central problem of the “Small is Beautiful” strategy. It is easy enough to think big, and to initiate big projects. You advertise you have so much electricity, gas, or whatever, and invite proposals from corporations. Then it becomes simply a matter of pitching the government terms, prices, and subsidies at a level which will make it worthwhile for the corporation to initiate the project. Thereafter the corporation takes over.

In contrast, the initiation of “Small is Beautiful” projects is less direct. For instance, we might observe that there are opportunities for the export of a wide range of pharmaceuticals and cosmetics based on natural products that our farmers can grow. How does the government go about converting these opportunities into real live exports?

The answer is a lame one. The role of the government is to create an economic environment where private initiatives can do the conversion for us. Such an environment includes a good infrastructure, a well trained labour force, a vigorous research programme_ and sufficient business services. In addition the price and taxation structure has to be favourable. For instance, the current practice of capital subsidies encourages the capital-intensive technologies, which “Think Big” supports, while penalising the more labour intensive industries which the “Small is Beautiful” strategy supports and generates unemployment.

Indeed the curious paradox is that so-called private enterprise supporters advocate a form of development which is deeply dependent upon state involvement. The big projects invariably involve a very direct partnership between the corporations and the state. We must distiguish between corporate enterprise, including state corporate enterprise, and private enterprise. In contrast the “Small is Beautiful” camp has an almost naive faith that, given the right economic environment, private enterprise in the form of small and medium businesses, the self-employed, will grasp the initiative  and flourish. The big thinkers have far less confidence in the efficacy of multinational private enterprise. Ironically the so-called private enterprise lobby has the lesser faith in private enterprise.

The “crowd out” effect

The natural question the onlooker to the debate will raise is whether we can have both strategies. Indeed the proponents of each strategy will claim that there is room in their strategy for the best elements of the opposition strategy. Undoubtedly we are going to have a bit of both, but in reaching this conclusion we must not ignore what economists call the “crowd out” effect. Its essence is that the initiation of one project can prevent the initiation of a second; that is, it can crowd it out.

To illustrate this phenomenon let me take the recently published 1980 Energy Plan and the contentious issue of metal smelters base on electricity. Unfortunely the plan is a bit cryptic, but if I read the relevant part correctly it goes like this.

The government has contracted to supply to a number of metal smelters, of which the aluminium potlines are the most notorious, a total of up to 5,000 gigawatt hours a year. This requires construction of a number of power generation plants over the next fifteen years. The energy plan mentions stations on the Upper Clutha at Clyde, Lugate, Queensberry, and Gibbston, geothermal stations at Ohaki and an unspecified site, a new coal-fired station in the Waikato plus the conversion of part of the Marsden B oilfired power station near Whangarei into coal-firing. It would appear that only part of the installations at Clyde are for domestic power; other domestic increases over the fifteen-year span can be met from the completion of the Upper Waitaki system and the station at Huntly. Thus all the other new stations I have mentioned are necessary to supply power to the metal smelters. In addition the plan says we will have to burn fuel oil and distillate in the late 1980s to meet the smelters’ requirements.

The plan itself expresses doubts as to its feasibility. The exact words are “the plan contains measures which have yet to be confirmed as feasible”. The planning schedule appears tight, even if it is feasible. If one new power station’s commissioning is delayed we would be faced with a power shortage leading to the burning of even more of the expensive fuel oil, or to power cuts. One cannot help but look to the current industrial dispute at Huntly, and wonder what would be happening if we needed the Huntly station urgently.

Leaving aside the questions of engineering feasibility and scheduling, we have to ask whether the schedule is economically viable. You will already be aware of the public debate over the social profitability of the aluminium smelters. To make a trivial but fundamental point, much debate arises out of a lack of agreement as to the rules of the game. For instance, some evaluations are based on the national interest irrespective of which part of the nation benefits. If the investing corporation may make a large profit and the rest of the country make a smaller loss, some assessments conclude the project is viable since the total benefit to the country is positive. Other assessments concentrate only on the benefit to the non-corporate part of the economy and, faced with the same facts, argue that the project is not viable. Their conclusion is that the government subsidies to the corporations are too high.

Another disagreement arises in terms of the alternatives. If we compare aluminium smelting to doing nothing, then the project may well be viable. If we compare it to a number of other projects which cannot go ahead if the smelter and electricity power stations are built, we may well get a different conclusion. Clearly this second approach is the essence of the “crowd out” argument.

Will the smelters prevent other projects? Let me instance three ways in which they can crowd out.

Higher electricity prices

The first is that associated with the smelters is the vast power station construction programme I mentioned. It looks as though the construction programme will cost $1,200 million (in today’s prices), or an extra $80 million a year. All this finance will not come from revenue for electricity sales to the smelters. It is clear from the announced selling prices that the electricity account will be in deficit throughout the 1980s because the outgoings in investment and fuel costs will exceed the revenue. It is not until the 1990s, at the earliest, that the smelters will start paying their way.

There is nothing wrong with this in principle; it is a standard development strategy to invest now to get a return in the future. However, we need to ask who is going to provide the extra savings in the 1980s for the investment. Given that we are referring to the government’s power-station construction programme we can predict, I think with confidence, that the extra construction cost to provide for the metal smelters will have to be financed from higher domestic electricity prices than would otherwise be necessary.

Some will escape these higher prices by switching to cheaper gas, which will put up the price of electricity to the rest of us, particularly those in the South Island, East Cape, and Northland who are not on the natural gas pipelines. The higher electricity prices will push up firms’ energy costs and, in that they feed into labour costs through higher consumer prices, the firms’ overall costs. Some firms which will have been viable under a low electricity cost regime will not be viable under the higher price due to the smelter regime. This “crowd out” effect may be marginal for a particular firm, perhaps preventing an extension into exporting or import substitution. Aggregated across all firms the “crowd out” effect may be more substantial.

Crowding out irrigation schemes

There is a second “crowd out” effect from the alternative deployment of the resources we use for the construction works. In the case of hydroelectric power stations the alternative civil works are improving the transport network, land development, and irrigation schemes. The bulldozer driver on the Clyde dam cannot be building irrigation works.

There is an interesting story attached to irrigation. The government tells us in its Growth Opportunities catalogue that there is the potential for another 200,000 hectares of large scale border dyke irrigation schemes in Canterbury alone. Commissioned, they would generate an extra $100 million of export earnings, and the internal rate of return is at least 12 per cent. But total works expenditure on irrigation this year is a miserable $6.3 million in the whole of the South Island (compared to $68 million on South Island hydro power works), and there are no irrigation projects going on at all in the Waitaki area where the main hydro power works are under way.

If this is not sufficient evidence that the electricity power station construction programme is not crowding out irrigation schemes, let me go a step further. The government uses a standard discount rate for evaluating projects of 10 per cent p.a. That means roughly that government requires a 10 per cent social profit on capital investment. There are two exceptions. On irrigation projects the required return is 15 per cent p.a.; that means they have to be one and a half times as socially productive as the standard government project. Thus irrigation projects with a return in the 10 to 15 per cent range are being held back. The other exception is on energy projects, where the discount rate appears to be only 6 per cent p.a. or two-fifths below the standard rate, and less than half the return required from irrigation works.

So one cost of the smelters is delaying the irrigation works programme, and that means less farm production for processing and export.

Nuclear power stations?

There is a third “crowd out” effect by the smelters of a longer term nature. As is clear from the energy plan, we are going to have to use most of the Upper Clutha, our best geothermal sites, and much of a coalfield to supply the smelters. For domestic needs in the 1990s we are going to be left with the lower Waitaki, the lower Clutha, and perhaps very little else. Long-term power supplies for the South Island look reasonably secure until after the turn of the century, but what about the North Island? The concern is compounded by the rising energy demands of the forestry programme after the 1990s. How are these going to be supplied?

One response might be to commission a second platform at Maui, although this would have the effect of halving the life of the Maui gas field. It will be expensive and I shall not be surprised if such a commission is added to the power plan in 1981 in order to avoid the feasibility and scheduling problems.

Even so, it is difficult not to interpret the energy plan to imply that by the end of this decade we will be seriously discussing whether to build a nuclear power station in the North Island, probably close to Auckland. Like you, I had thought the issue of nuclear power in my lifetime had been settled by the Royal Commission. If we go ahead with the smelters the issue must once again be raised.

A policy of moderation

While the smelters and associated power stations may be profitable, particularly to the corporations rather than the rest of the country, if there is nothing else to do, the evidence is that they will crowd out a number of viable projects which will create jobs and improve our balance of payments. Nobody has demonstrated that the smelter projects are better than these alternatives. All the available evidence points to the contrary, that in economic terms we will make large economic losses by not proceeding with the alternatives that the smelters will crowd out.

That is the trouble with the Big Thinkers. Because some of the big projects they propose are economical1y viable, it does not follow that all the projects are viable. On the contrary. some are clearly not, but we have committed ourselves to them through an attack of megalomania. The costs of these ill-conceived projects could be high — literally hundreds of millions of dollars.

Such a view does not automatically conclude that the “Small is Beautiful” strategy is 100 per cent correct. Undoubtedly it has its defects, undoubtedly  some of the big projects should go ahead —it would be crazy to leave the Maui gas in the ground. However, it seems me that the Big Thinkers are too dominant in terms of our current economic strategy.

What we need is moderation, and greater faith in the ability of New Zealanders to seize initiatives if the economic environment is right. If we had that faith, I believe New Zealand will finish the 1980s as a prosperous and varied social democracy. If we do not pursue a policy of moderation the best we may expect is in 1990 the economic and social problems that will confront us—those of us who are left—will be worse than they are today.

Blood Brotherhood

Listener 8 March, 1980.

Keywords: Health; Social Policy;

Legislation passed in 1979 made it illegal to buy or sell human blood, except with the consent of the Minister of Health. Is this not another example of the government over-regulating life? Did not Gerald Ford, ex-president of the United States, part-pay his way through university by selling his blood? Given the miserable level of student bursaries, is the prohibition on selling human blood yet a further attempt to ensure that future New Zealand prime ministers will not have a university education?

After all is not blood like any other commodity, demanded by some who are willing to pay for their requirements? And if they are willing to pay enough, will there not be others who are willing to supply the blood? Payment for supplying blood is the main method in the United States and the Soviet Union– why is it not appropriate here? In the US blood is also supplied by expatients replacing what they had earlier used and by relatives of patients in return for lower hospital fees. But the principle of human blood as a marketable commodity remains. Why then should we get out of line with the super powers ?

If the last two paragraphs have left you a little uneasy, you will find thoughtful support in Richa!d Titmus’s The Gift Relationship (Allen & Unwin). Titmus who was Professor of Social Administration at the London School of Economics died in 1973, alas, but he left us some of the most thought-provoking ideas of the 1970s on social policy.

The book begins with a comparison of the supply of human blood in the US and Britain where, like New Zealand, blood is supplied by voluntary donors through a state-dominated service. He concluded that the resource cost of providing blood in the United States was about five to 15 times the cost in Britain. There were a number of reasons for this. Donors in the US are more likely to have hepatitis there the selling of their blood is a major source of income for alcoholics and other drug addicts. The British voluntary donor is more likely to be accurate about his health status than the paid American. Blood is perisHable and the American system of firms in competition is more wasteful than the British monolith.

Thus we might justify the legislation because it is cheaper for our health service to be supplied from voluntary rather than paid donations. However, it is dangerous to conclude that an action is good because it is cheaper to the government. On more than one occasion this column has drawn attention to the inefficiencies and inequities which have occurred from this practice.

Consider what would happen if, for instance, commercial firms were to come to New Zealand to purchase blood for export. (This may sound a bit macabre, but already it is happening in a number of third-world countries. ) Even if the agencies confined themselves to skid row (and university students) their activities would affect voluntary supply.. Titmus shows how the introduction of a commercial market reduces people’s willingness to donate blood since the action has been tarnished by commercialism.

Why do people donate blood without direct reward, at a cost of their own time and effort, to another with whom they have no direct contact? It is surely easier to be a Good Samaritan if you meet the needy on the road, or see him on the television screen-as in the case of Abbotsford to give but one recent example. Titmus surveyed a group of British blood donors and found them a relatively representative cross-section of the community as measured by socioeconomic class, age, or sex. (A recent New Zealand survey showed cigarette smokers were under-represented among donors. I leave you to speculate why. )

Donors gave a wide variety of answers as to why they gave blood, including the odd humorous response: ‘I get a good cup of tea’; ‘I go along to hold my husband’s hand’. However, the most important reason was altruism, the regard for the needs of others as a principle of action. Donors showed a high sense of awareness of belonging to a community and of social responsibility.

Thus the consequence of the legislation preventing the commercialisation of supplying blood is to maintain a means for us to express our commitment to the community we live in – Titmus’s final chapter is entitled ‘The Right to Give’.

It is useful to reflect on what other areas of human activity commerialisation could or has driven out other social values: voluntary help, sex and parenthood are some possibilities. In my view one of the problems of our welfare state is that, while it is firmly based upon the principles of altruism and community, it emphasises the collective giving and so tends to ignore the individual gift, the contribution we may make as a person to the needs of others, be they old, sick, struggling parents and so on.

This, of course, is not yet another demand to shrink our welfare state for good commercial reasons. Those who join that cacophony need to be reminded that the commercial market-place can be destructive to social behaviour , that people do things for reasons other than greed and self-advancement.

By making it illegal to buy and sell blood (without the Minister’s consent) the government is acknowledging that we are a community. By you giving your blood, you do the same.

Families Need Fathers

Listener: 26 January 1980

Keywords: Social Policy;

What is your reaction when you see a truck with a couple of children in the cab next to the driver? Concern for their safety? Anger at their mother for working? Or does it please you that here are a couple of kids with the good fortune to spend a day with their dad at work?

A couple of centuries ago it was normal for children to be with both their working parents, There are some residual areas, such as on the farm, where this still happens But for the majority of children their father’s (and mother’s) work is out of their range of experience, an effect compounded where the job has little to show physically for itself (it is easier to grasp what your Dad is doing on an assembly line, than if he works in an office),

Fragmentation of our lifestyles and social groups seems to be an inevitable consequence of modern technologies. For some fathers all that is left is the fertilisation and financing roles. They remain the child’s biological father, they provide economic support for the family, but the activities of supervising, playing with and talking to their children are negligible.

There are some fathers who are fighting to maintain their proper role-perhaps at the cost of income and career But for too many families the minimal fathering role is apparent.

Can we get away with such a minimal role? Urie Bronfenbrenner, professor of child development and family studies at Cornell University, while visiting us reported research which compared a group of children from two-parent families with a group of children from one-parent families who were similar on various biological, psychological and socio-economic variables The research showed that they performed worse on a number of psychological and emotional tests.

This need not surprise us. Because of the lack of social support for one parent families, including financial support in America, such families are in an inferior environment, and the children are bound to do worse

The serendipitous research finding was that one group of children from solo parent homes did as well as the matched children from two-parent homes What distinguished them from the others was that although the fathers did not live with them, they continued to take an active role in the family. As well as looking after the children, the fathers ran errands and babysat for the mother, supported her with discipline, and advised her. They may not have slept in the house but they continued much of their role as father and (even) as husband.

The implications of this research affect many aspects of social policy. For instance, it suggests that when a marriage breaks up, the more that the parents can continue to work together the better for the children. For the marriage partnership, the implication of the research is that fathers have a vital role in the development of the children. If we are concerned about child development and the quality of our future, we must pursue a social policy of promoting good fathering.

Policies such as parental education and social attitudes lie outside the ambit of economics But there are economic changes which could improve fathering For instance, at the job level firms could make it easier, even encourage, children to visit their fathers so they know what he is doing.

At the economy level, we need to take pressures off the family so that the economic comfort of a family is not at the cost of the father’s absence.

Professor Bronfenbrenner goes a step further and argues for a shorter working day for fathers so they have more time with their children. This would involve some economic loss to the country, from reduced worker output. On the other hand, Bronfenbrenner also sees the increasing numbers of mothers in the workforce as a positive benefit, to the woman herself and in terms of extra output. The result could be two parents each working a six-hour day producing more output and giving more quality parenting than the father working a 10-hour day.

Such a strategy involves a different approach to working patterns from what we have today; more flexibility in working hours, a greater variety of patterns, more (quality) childcare. The present levels of unemployment, plus the impending problems arising out of rapid technological change, provide us with the opportunity to improve fathering in New Zealand, once we are willing to accept that fathering is more than just semen and cents.

Three New Zealand Depressions

New Zealand and the World: Essays in Honour of Wolf Rosenberg ed W.E. Wilmott, (1980) p.72-87.

Keywords: Macroeconomics & Money; Political Economy & History;

The graphs which illustrated the tables are not included

By 1979 it was evident to even the conventional wisdom that New Zealand was in its greatest economic crisis since the 1930s. It is natural to ask whether there are similarities between this crisis and the earlier ones in the 1880s and the 19305, and if so, whether we can learn from our history.

In fact, the late 1960s and the 1970s are more comparable to the late 1860s and the 1870s, and to the 1920s. The previous two Great Depressions were each marked by two phases, a. recession phase and a depression phase, separated by an external event that tipped New Zealand from the milder but nonetheless economically difficult recession phase into the deep depression phase with severe social and economic hardship. In that recession phases are associated with the ability to borrow overseas, New Zealand could be said to be in the recession phase of its Third Great Depression, at least to 1979.

There is some controversy over what constitutes a depression in terms of events and what were the appropriate periods for the New Zealand depressions (Hawke 1974, 1975). While these issues are not insubstantial, we propose to avoid them by concentrating on a specific depression process in which land prices, the profitability of farming, and the state of overseas’ borrowing act together to create a pattern of first false prosperity and subsequently economic dislocation. While the recession phase could be treated as distinct from the recession phase (Hawke 1975), in terms of the economic processes that are being analysed here the two phases are integrally associated

Perhaps the. most important conclusion of this study is that the previous two Great Depressions have not been an external world depression imposing itself on New Zealand. The evidence of the recession phase preceding the world depression suggests that part of the depression phase is of our own making. Whether we can unmake the depression phase of the Third Great Depression remains to be seen.

The Long Depression

The broad outlines of the long Depression are reasonably well recorded (Sutch, 1966 p.3-37; Simkin, 1951; Ch. X, Sinclair and Mandel 1961 IV, V, VI; Hawke.1975). Following the peaking of the gold production in 1866, and the proclamation of peace ending the Anglo-Native land Wars in 1865, the New Zealand economy slumped into a long period of depressed conditions, which ended in the mid-1890s with world Inflation and the growing significance of the exports of refrigerated meat and dairy products.

In the thirty-year depressed period there were minor fluctuations (Simkin, 1951) .and occasional short bouts of prosperity, the most noteworthy being associated .with Vogel’s public-works programme financed from public foreign borrowing in the 1870s.

As a result, the Long Depression appears as two distinct phases of about equal length, of which the second phase was more severe. The break between the phases occurs around 1880 and was Initiated by the City of Glasgow Bank Crash in October 1878, in Britain, which caused the withdrawal of bank credit from New Zealand in the following years.

There are little comprehensive data for the period, which limits the possibility of detailed economic analysis. Fortunately, we do have a set of price indexes constructed by J. McIlraith ( 1911) for the period from 1860 to 1911, and these, supplemented by less complete data series and historical records, enable us to provide some account of the economic mechanisms.

McIlraith’s price series for farm products and non-farm products are shown in Table I. The second half of the 19th century..was a period of falling world prices, so we have also shown the ratio of farm-product prices to non-farm-product prices, which might be treated as a measure of the farm terms of trade. Simkin’s terms of trade includes gold as an export commodity (1951, p.35). This is relevant for his purposes, but not when we are primarily concerned with behaviour in the farm sector. We shall be using a similar concept in the next two sections

Table 1: Prices Indexes for the Long Depression

(1890-99)

Year Farm
Products
Non-farm
Products
Ratio
(TOT)
1861 194 181 107
1862 186 186 100
1863 220 183 120
1864 217 188 115
1865 202 185 109
1866 224 191 117
1867 186 187 100
1868 193 181 107
1869 149 169 88
1870 131 163 80
1871 122 160 76
1872 126 164 77
1873 156 167 93
1874 164 160 103
1875 148 148 100
1876 140 140 100
1877 152 142 107
1878 145 131 111
1879 141 121 117
1880 126 131 96
1881 122 127 96
1882 129 120 108
1883 121 117 103
1884 112 116 97
1885 107 112 96
1886 108 108 100
1887 100 104 96
1888 96 106 91
1889 118 109 108
1890 100 110 91
1891 101 111 91
1892 103 104 99
1893 100 100 100
1894 98 98 100
1895 91 94 97
1896 98 95 103
1897 100 96 104
1898 103 95 108
1899 102 96 106
1900 102 100 102

Source: McIlraith (1911) Table 4A, pg 68.

In nominal terms, both farm-product and domestic prices were high in the first half of the 1860s, and indeed relatively higher than British levels compared to a few decades later, perhaps reflecting short-term scarcities caused by gold rush and war, and high transport costs.

From the mid-1860s farm-product prices fell sharply. In 1871 they were 60 percent of the 1861 average level. Non-farm-product prices fell more slowly, so that the farm terms of trade suffered a sharp deterioration. However, in the early 1870s farm products prices recovered while non-farm-product prices continued to fall, so that from 1873 to 1901 the farm terms of trade remained in a relatively narrow band rarely deviating more than 10 percent from the average in any one year.

Both price patterns are similar to that of the English Price Index (McIlraith, Graph 1), except that a slightly sharper fall may reflect the falling costs of ocean transport. Evidently prices were flexible downwards in late nineteenth-century New Zealand, and a there is no statistical series, we may assume that wages were also flexible downwards, or lower-paid women and children were substituted for men.

However one price, crucial in a capitalist economy, was not flexible downwards – the price of debt. The contractual relationships we call credit and debt are written in nominal terms, so that if prices fall, the real value of. debt rises. Or, as the farmer with a mortgage would see it, farm mortgage outgoings would rise relative to farm-income and other costs. We do not have the data for farming for the period before 1922. Nevertheless we can make some assessment of what happened.

In the 1870s land prices seem to have rise dramatically. H. Rodwell calculated Canterbury land prices rose fivefold between 1870 and 1880 (Condliffe, 1959 p.297-8), and the price for sold Crown land rose by 60 percent between 1870 and 1870 (Sutch, 1966, p.16). The discrepancy between these two figures is disappointing but in either case they show a substantial rise in land-prices while farm product prices fell four percent.

Land-price increases such as these could be economically justified by a compensating increase in output or expected output, but the value of total exports of wool and grain rose by 123 percent in the decade to 1890 (Condliffe, 1915, p. 901), but much of this increase came from increases in land use. Prices and productivity in the subsequent decade did not justify the increase either .

Justified asset prices in a market economy means that in the long run the income accruing from the asset will reflect the going rate of return. If it does not, then at some point the value of the asset will have to be scaled down. In the interim, a speculative boom can, and in the case of New Zealand land in the 1870s .did, occur.

In this speculative phase, individuals are making capital gains by selling the land at a higher price than it was purchased. This means that there must be money flowing into the boom, to compensate for the money the speculators were taking out. Characteristically, much of this money came from fixed-interest loans.

The introduction of this mortgage-debt into the economy means that no longer can land prices be simply flexible downwards. Certainly, the owner can write down the value of his land to the extent of his equity. Any further writing down involves reneging on his debt. Where a land company is involved, whose legal owners of the equity are the shareholders, the initial writing down is even more disruptive. H. J. Hanham (1963) and R. J. C. Stone (1973) describe a number of instances.

We can see now why, despite a reasonable balance in the price-structure of products throughout most of the long Depression, there were nonetheless two distinct phases. The first was when British credit flowing through the financial institutions created or supported a land-boom, When the credit ceased from 1879, the process did not simply reverse itself, but instead created bankruptcies and near bankruptcies, and the social hardships we associate with the 1880s.

By concentrating on this economic mechanism, we have neglected many other of its economic and social features. Perhaps two further points which have later parallels should be mentioned.

First, towards the depression’s end in 1891 there was elected a mildly radical (or liberal-progressive) government under Ballance and later Seddon. The economy was now swinging out of the deep depression phase, and it was not particularly the actions of the new government which created the subsequent economic prosperity .Perhaps this is part of the explanation of why the government lost its radicalism so quickly.

Second, between 1865 and 1895 the New Zealand economy went through a major structural change. In 1865 New Zealand exported quarry products such as gold, timber, and kauri gum, plus wool and tallow from land-extensive sheep. By 1895 the depletables were becoming exhausted, making up only 20 percent of exports, while wool and tallow added 46 percent. The growth industries were the export of refrigerated meat and dairy produce, by now contributing 19 percent and growing rapidly. It seems doubtful that the population envisaged by Vogel could have been sustained by a wool and tallow economy. Refrigeration, which he could not have foreseen, and the basis for twenty-five years of prosperity from the end of the Long Depression in 1895 to the beginning of the Interwar Depression in 1920.

The Interwar Depression 1920-1940

The National Myth is that New Zealand experienced a great depression in the 1930s. However, New Zealand was basically depressed throughout the entire period between the First and Second World Wars (Sutch 1966, p. 37-46).

After the First World War, there was a sharp slump in export prices, 25 percent down between 1920 and 1922; bankruptcies rose and remained high throughout the 19205, and farmers, particularly servicemen, were walking off farms, (Burdon, 1965, Ch. 1-4). Overall, the volume of production in most industries seems to have grown during the 1920s (NZOYB, 1930, p. 927) but there were falls in 1919-20, 1921-22, 1923-24 and 1925-26. We shall show evidence that farming was not basically profitable. Overseas borrowing was continued. (The Vogel-like borrowing programme initiated by Ward in 1928 is the most renowned instance, but borrowing of almost comparable magnitude had occurred in 1925-26 and 1927-28).

However, as in the case of the Long Depression, the first phase collapsed into a second phase. The 1929 Wall Street crash rippled round the world, New Zealand borrowing became limited, and bank credit was withdrawn. Meanwhile, export prices fell, and the period from 1931 to 1933 was one of the most acute periods of depression that New Zealand has ever experienced. Export prices began to increase from 1934, and the New Zealand economy began to expand again, although there were still 32,000 males unemployed or in receipt of relief from the Employment Promotion Fund in March 1939 (compared to the peak of almost 80,000 in 1933). (All data can be found in various New Zealand Official Year Books).

While there are much more data on the interwar period, it is often very fragmentary and incomplete. A useful set for analytic purposes is the Farm Income and Productivity data from 1921-2. (Philpott et. al, 1967) which we have summarized in Table 2. While it omits the early few years of the period, it gives a good coverage across the break point of 1929-30. Unfortunately, there is not a Farm Land Value series, so a guestimate was made (Appendix).

The Farm Terms of Trade Series, that is the ratio of farm-output prices to farm-input prices, suggests a relatively high level in the 1920s followed by a sharp drop in the early 1930s, and from 1935 returning to a level about 20 percent below the 1920s average. The series follows quite closely the external terms of trade, the ratio of export prices to import prices. Because New Zealand is small, we may take the external terms of trade as exogenously determined in the world (or British) markets. In that the farm terms of trade appear to follow the external terms, this suggests that on the whole internal prices were ex post flexible downwards. In fact, a number of measures were taken to scale down prices, including cutting civil-service salaries in 1931 and 1932, the Arbitration Court taking similar action in the private sector in 1931; in 1933 mortgage rates were cut by a fifth by the National expenditure Adjustment Act, and from 1933 the Mortgagors and Tenants Relief Act, and successor legislation, scaled down mortgage-debt. Moreover, the price of sterling (and hence farm-export prices in New Zealand currency) was raised in January 1933.

Table 2: Data for the Interwar Depression

Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1922 51.9 67.3 77.1 4.4 196 2.2
1923 54.8 59.3 91.9 8.8 205 4.3
1924 53.5 55.8 95.7 7.3 212 3.6
1925 62.8 56.5 111.2 17.0 229 7.4
1926 54.9 56.0 98.0 7.2 220 3.3
1927 51.7 54.7 94.5 80.3 6.3 220 2.9
1928 53.7 55.2 97.2 88.9 11.9 229 5.2
1929 56.9 55.6 105.9 94.9 17.2 243 7.1
1930 49.9 55.6 89.7 84.0 8.1 237 3.4
1931 35.2 55.2 63.8 67.9 -8.5
1932 30.6 52.4 58.3 60.0 -9.1
1933 26.9 48.4 55.6 58.1 -3.1
1934 34.0 47.7 71.2 64.9 11.4
1935 32.9 47.8 68.8 71.6 8.0
1936 39.5 48.4 81.6 76.5 18.1
1937 48.5 53.1 91.3 85.9 24.9
1938 46.2 59.1 78.1 86.6 13.2
1939 47.5 60.9 77.9 82.5 10.3
1940 48.9 62.0 78.8 81.4 10.8

Sources
Year (March year ended)
(1) Farm Output Prices : Philpott et al (1967) p.27 (1949/50 = 100)
(2) Farm Input Prices : Philpott et al (1967) p.27 (1949/50 = 100)
(3) Farm Terms of Trade: (1)/(2)
(4) External Terms of Trade: NZOYB 1976; (Average 1927-1940 same as (3))
(5) £m : Philpott et al (1967) Table 1 – adjusted, see appendix.
(6) £m : Appendix
(7) % p.a.: (5)/(6)

Nonetheless, the farm terms of trade fell in line with the external terms, an effect visible in the income by Farmer Equity series, where Philpott’s Net Farm Income Series has an allowance deducted for the farmer’s labour earnings. (Appendix) Throughout the 1920s the profits ran between £6.3m and £17.0m. (We shall see how high this return was shortly). However, in the three years 1930-1, 1931-2, and 1932-3, profits were actually negative. Indeed, Net Farm Incomes including farmer’s imputed earnings were negative in 1931-3. After 1932-3 profits returned to levels similar to the 1920s.

In order to calculate profit rates, we need a series of the capital values of farms. Unfortunately, there is no series for unimproved land values, but we have been able to construct something like one up to 1930. This suggests that a rate of return ignoring the capital gain on the farmers’ wealth averaged 4.4 percent p.a. over the nine years to 1929-30. The return must be compared with the 6.5 percent p.a. that he was paying on his mortgage (Philpott et al 1967, p.42).

The question arises why the farmer would accept a lower return on his farm wealth than that he could get by investing in someone else’s farm. The gap between the two rates is too large explain by data quality, or by farmers’ willingness to pay a premium in order to farm. In balance we would expect farmers to require a premium above the mortgage interest rate interest rate because of the greater risks they face.

There are two related possibilities. Firstly, the farmers may have been over-optimistic, expecting the future to give them higher returns to compensate for the current poor returns. Secondly, the farmer may have been receiving an additional capital gain from the land.

The lack of land-value series restricts us from pursuing this last possibility .The one available series suggests that land-prices rose rapidly in the 1916 to 1925 period, but it ends in 1925 (Condliffe and Rodwell, 1927). It does not seem likely that land prices continued to rise substantially in the latter half of the decade if only from the mortgage evidence (Appendix).

Whatever the reason for the low return, arithmetically it is attributable to overvaluation of land. It seems likely that this over-valuation occurred in the 1910-20 period, reflecting rises in export prices during the First World War. Some indication of the level of over-valuation can be gained from noting that unimproved land values and debt would have to be scaled down 30 percent in order for farmers to have averaged 7 percent p.a. on their wealth.

We are now in a position to examine two effects to explain the low farm income in the three years from 1930-31, 1931-32. 1932-33: the farm terms of trade, and the over-valuation of land.

Farm Terms of Trade In the five years from 1925-26 to 1929-30, the farm terms of trade averaged 97.1 (1949/501= 100), while In the five years from 1933-34 to 1937-38 it averaged 78.2. Between these periods they averaged 59.2 or a third below the 87 .7 average of the preceding and succeeding periods. If we assume that prices had been more flexible downward, so that the 87 .7 figure was attained, we can calculate that net farm Incomes would have been £24m higher over the three years. We have had to make all sorts of implicit assumptions in order to get this figure, including a partial equilibrium frame and that falls in farm costs were not reflected in consumer and other prices. But the result is an order of magnitude, which suggests the loss due to the unusual fall in the farm terms of trade was about a year and a half’s income.

Land Over-valuation. If we assume that farm land was over-valued by 30 percent in the 19205, that correspondingly it was carrying 30 percent too much debt, and that the savings in interest payments were used to reduce farm-debt further , farmers would have begun 1930-31 with only half the debt they did. In addition, rental payments would also have been down by a similar proportion. This reduction in costs of interest and rent would have equalled £18m over the next three years. Again, this is an order of magnitude, but it is over a year’s usual farm net income, and only a bit below the farm terms of trade effect.

The sum of the two explains £42m over three years. Such an additional amount, would have brought farm incomes up to the levels of the poor years 1922-23, 1923-24, 1925-6, 1926-7, 1933-4 and 1934-5. Thus, the industry could have coped. Indeed, the industry may have coped if it had only to face the terms of trade or over-valuation effect by itself.

It is tempting to attribute 24/42nds of the industry’s problems on the terms of trade effect and 18/42nds on the over-valuation. This would be misleading, since the two are closely connected. Our over-valuation calculation assumed the farm terms of trade of the 19205. Given that the terms of trade deteriorated in the 1930s, we have underestimated the over-valuation of the land, and hence its effect.

On the other hand, it was the fall in the terms of trade which precipitated the realization that the land was over-valued. This was reinforced by a withdrawal of credit, which made it more difficult to tide the industry over in the expectation of better future times.

New Zealand came out of the Interwar Depression as the world inflated through an arms race and towards the Second World War. The new terms of trade were lower than the 1920s, which had the important consequence that either farming would have to improve its productivity relative to domestic industry by roughly twenty percent, or there would be a shift in industrial structure in favour of domestic production and import substitution. The end of the 1930s saw the development of new manufacturing industries, the first major shift since the 1880s.

Another form of structural change was the introduction of new forms of economic and social management and related institutions such as Marketing Authorities, the Reserve Bank, Social Security, the State Advances Corporation, and Keynesian economic management. Some of these introductions are associated in the national mythology with the first labour Government elected in 1935, yet precursors can be observed before 1935.

Like its Liberal predecessor, Labour had been elected on the end of the depression upswing. Much of the economic prosperity associated with the period was thus not of Labour’s making. And like its predecessor, the first Labour was unable to sustain its radical thrust.

The Third Great Depression

At the time of writing, the conventional wisdom points to the dramatic fall in New Zealand’s external terms of trade (i.e., export prices relative to import prices) after the October 1973 Oil Crisis as the commencement of the current economic crisis.

However, an examination of a variety of economic indicators suggests that a significant break in New Zealand’s economic performance took place in the mid.1960s. (Easton 1979, 1980).

The external terms of trade were 12 percent lower after 1967 .Increasing around 2.8 percent p.a. until 1967 , consumer prices start increasing more rapidly after that time. Farm profitability (excluding the capital gain) drops from 6.3 percent p.a. before 1967 to 4.4 percent p.a. after, or by 30 percent . The return on personal wealth (again excluding capital gains) falls from 4.5 percent p.a. to 3.5 percent, or by 23 percent. Instead of growing at 3.5 percent p.a., as it did to 1968, farm output stops growing after this date. The growth of real GNP falls from 4.3 percent to 2.5 percent p.a., or over 40 percent, after 1966. Net immigration is halved after 1966, while registered unemployment leaps from virtually nothing to an average of 4000 from the same date. One series which does not show the break in the mid-1960s is that for the balance of payments. We shall return to this. (Easton, 1979)

We have interpreted the post-1966 change as a step downward. It is not difficult to see in many of the series a declining trend, particularly if 1972/73 with its very favourable terms of trade (or in some cases 1973/74) is neglected. It is also noteworthy that the post-1966 period is much more erratic.

What is clear from the above is the foolishness of seeing New Zealand’s economic problems in 1979 as originating in 1972/73. The year 1966/67 looks a much better candidate for the crucial year. Moreover, on the basis of the previous two Great Depressions, it would appear that this post-1966 period has been that first recession phase of the Third Great Depression. We can see this further by once more examining farm performance.

Before doing this, we might mention why New Zealand farming did not enter a recession phase in the early 1950s. Farm prices had risen sharply in the late 1940s, partly as a result of the removal of land-price controls. Fortunately, the farm terms of trade improved at the same time, justifying the higher land-prices. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s the price of farms relative to the consumer price index slowly decreased, by around a fifth, suggesting that farms may have been slightly overpriced in the early 1950s (Easton, 1978). Note how this over-valuation was removed by rising general prices rather than by falls in the nominal value of land.

Nonetheless, throughout the period, farmers were enjoying the real capital gains of the late 1940s and the subsequent nominal capital gains. The new purchasers, buying the capital gains, raised mortgages to do so, and the rates of farm-debt to equity rose from around a quarter in the early 19505 to over 60 percent in 1970.

The terms of trade which had risen to record heights in 1950 as a result of the Korean War boom remained prosperous but variable through to the mid-19008 and began to decline, except for the 1972/3 boom. The impact of this decline on the farm sector was manifold, first cutting into the underlying rate of return, and then as the investment programme slowed down through lack of re-investable income, farm output stopped increasing. Instead, investing in land to return untaxed capital gains became popular.

Table III: The Data for the Third Great Depression

0.37.9

Year (1) (2) (3) (4)
1955 118 112 5.8 3.7
1956 111 109 5.0 8.4
1957 120 105 6.3 1.2
1958 104 93 6.8 3.4
1959 94 88 5.7 2.6
1960 102 102 7.0 7.4
1961 93 94 7.0 5.8
1962 87 90 5.6 4.6
1963 90 96 6.1 7.3
1964 101 106 7.2 6.7
1965 101 109 6.6 7.7
1966 99 106 6.1 3.4
1967 90 103 4.9 2.4
1968 86 91 4.9 6.8
1969 87 87 4.8 2.2
1970 86 83 4.8 0.1
1971 84 83 3.9
1972 91 89 4.9
1973 119 105 7.6 15.7
1974 120 5.4 12.8/TD>
1975 83 0.6 7.8
1976 71 2.1
1977 76
1978 75

Sources

Year (March ended)

(1) Farm Terms of Trade: 1955-1967 Philpott et al (1967); 1968-1973 Johnson (1976); 1956-67 = 100 (June Year)

(2) External Terms of Trade: Official Series; 1956-67 = 100

(3) Return on Farm Equity without capital gains (% p.a.): Easton (1978)

(4) Return on Farm Equity with capital gains (% p.a.): Easton (1978)

Initially, real farm-land prices continued to fall after 1966, but from 1972 as a result of inflation, the prosperous 1972-73 period, and (probably) over-optimism, farm prices began increasing again to a level comparable to the early 1950s in real terms. There is no evidence that the new levels will be matched by future farm incomes, and a cautious estimate suggests that by 1975 farms were over-valued by around a quarter. Since this includes the value of stock, plant and improvement, land by itself would be over-valued even more.

The effect of this inflation in land-values, and of the general inflation, has been to decrease the rates of farm-debt to equity in 1975 to a level similar to the 19505. We see that one of the functions of inflation is to reduce the real value of debt, although we shall suggest that the debt-to-equity ratio may rise again in the next decade.

Up to 1966 the farm terms of trade was falling relative to the external terms of trade. The decline seems to be about 17 percent a decade, which could be explained either by the greater rise in productivity in farming or by farmers having their output prices set in more competitive markets than their input prices.

However, after 1967 the farm terms of trade fall a little less slowly than the external terms, and they rise more quickly in the 1972-73 upswing. It would appear that the stabilization measures developed in the post-war economy have some effect. The most likely factor for the period 1967 to 1970 was wool-purchase by the Wool Board. On the whole, then, it is difficult to argue that commodity-price flexibility has been a problem in New Zealand.

Nevertheless, this flexibility was gained not so much by a downward flexibility as by an inflationary process in which some prices inflated more slowly than others. Mortgages remained fixed in nominal terms, and for a variety of reasons, including government intervention, nominal interest rates responded sluggishly to the increasing inflation so that real rates went negative (which again encouraged land speculation for capital gain).

In post-war New Zealand, farming was still sufficiently important for its performance to have a major impact on the economy. The falling terms of trade led to low farm profitability and to the fall in the return on personal wealth. The lower farm profitability, perhaps coupled with lack of new technological innovations, resulted in poor output performance by the farming sector; and the resulting lack of imports weakened the growth of national output. Apparently, the necessary price flexibility was generated by inflation.

The balance of payments did not deteriorate promptly after 1966 because the Government found that by managing the economy with a lower usage of capacity , indicated by the slightly higher rate of unemployment, the external account could be balanced. There was also a temporary burst in exports from higher slaughter rates as farmers cut back on livestock accumulation (Buckle, 1970). However, the price for this was that the growth of output was cut back and no effective measures were taken to deal with the basic problem of the fall in terms of trade. New Zealand should have been industrializing, in part substituting, and reorienting its farm industries.

Because of the poor growth performance and the lack of effective remedies, the lower capacity strategy was a temporary expedient. By the mid-1970s sharp rises in unemployment (and falls in capacity) left New Zealand with an external deficit of around a billion dollars a year for six successive years.

Without a borrowing programme, New Zealand would have had either a major restructuring of its dependence upon imports or massive unemployment. Without it, the substantial government subsidies to production enterprises could not have been maintained, or the welfare system would have had to be reduced. In farming alone, estimates of these subsidies range from a conservative $300m (Maugham and Ward, 1978) to up to $500m (Easton, 1978) for the year 1978-9. Without the overseas borrowing, the substantial government lending to farming, mainly through the Rural Bank, could not be sustained. The 1978 budget voted $163m at low interest rates to farmers.

It is pertinent to note how, analogous to previous recession phases, the overseas borrowing programme is being used to support the over-valued farm land, this time by subsidies to production costs as well as direct lending. Even so, it seems likely that the effective debt-to-equity ratio will be increased. First, the high rates of inflation which have been devaluing the real level of debt have also pushed up nominal interest rates in compensation. Thus, debt’s share of the farmers’ income is larger than the debt-to-equity ratio alone suggests. Second, if farmers attempt to capitalize their capital gains by selling their farms, the new owners will have to borrow in order to purchase. Thus, while inflation as a means of attaining price flexibility may have short-term advantages, it poses long-term problems, particularly if land speculation is further encouraged as a means of avoiding income tax.

The last two paragraphs include the implicit assumption that the overseas borrowing programme will be maintained indefinitely. The experience of the previous two recession phases suggests that such an assumption cannot go unchallenged. Indeed, the issue may .not be “if” foreign borrowing becomes restricted so much as “when” foreign borrowing becomes restricted. It is because New Zealand has been able to borrow that we consider the post-oil-crisis period as a continuation of a recession phase, rather than arguing that New Zealand entered the deep-depression phase then.

In a sense, such a conclusion is optimistic, for if New Zealand restructured its economy to become less dependent upon the borrowing (including sensible asset prices and debt-to-equity ratios), then at the point in the future when international borrowing ceases, we may well be able to cope without a depression phase.

However, experience over the last decade suggests that political pressure may be too entrenched and political leadership too weak to take the decisive actions which are necessary. Moreover, given that such measures may involve significant modification to the private right to purchase or own land, and to take out mortgages on such land, New Zealand may well get into a Catch-22 situation, where the most viable strategy to reduce her long-run dependency on overseas borrowing could cause a loss of private foreign confidence in the economy and the short-term withdrawal of the overseas loans, which would precipitate the deep depression phase.

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Bibliography

Burdon, R. M. (1965) The New Dominion, Wellington: A. H. and A. W. Reed.

Condliffe, J. B., (1915) “The External Trade of New Zealand” New Zealand Official Yearbook , Wellington: Government Printer, 858-969.

Condliffe, J. B. (1959) New Zealand in the Making, London: Allen and Unwin.

Easton, B. H. (1983) The New Zealand Income Distribution, Wellington, NZIER.

Easton, B. H. ( 1978) “Profitability and Planning in the Post War Farm Industry”, Proceedings of the 1978 Conference of N.Z Agricultural Economists.

Easton, B. H. (1979) “1966 and All That”, The Listener, May 12, 1979, p.23.

Easton, B.H (1980) Profitability and Performance in Post-War New Zealand: The Impact of the Terms of Trade. Victoria University Department of Economics Working Paper, Discussion Paper No.3.

Hanham, H. J. (1963) “New Zealand Promoters and British Investors, 1800-1895” Studies of a Small Democracy: Essays in Honour of Willis Airey, ed. R. M. Chapman and K. Sinclair, Hamilton: Blackwood and Janet Paul for AUP .

Hawke, G. R. (1974) “Review of Makers of Fortune, by R. J. C. Stone” New Zealand Journal of History, April 1974, Vol. 8, No.1, p.83-85.

Hawke, G. R. (1975) Towards a Reappraisal of the ‘Long Depression’ in New Zealand 1879-1895, Victoria University of Wellington (mimeo).

Johnson, R. W. M. (1976) Sector Accounts for Agriculture 1960/1 to 1972/3, Wellington, Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries Research Paper 4.76.

New Zealand Official Year Book, (various years), Wellington: Government Printer.

McIlraith, J. W. (1911) The Courses of Prices in New Zealand, Wellington: Government Printing Office.

Maughan, C. W. & A. B. Ward (1978) Farm Production in New Zealand, An Analysis of Incentives and Disincentives, Palmerston North, Department of Agricultural Economics and Farm Management, Massey University, Paper No.2.

Philpott, B. P., B. J. Ross, C. J. McKenzie, C. A: Yandle, & D. D. Hussey (1967) Estimates of Farm Income and Productivity In New Zealand 1921-65, Lincoln: Agricultural Economics Research Unit Report No.30.

Simkin, C. G. F . (1951) The Instability of a Dependent Economy: Economic Fluctuation in New Zealand 1840-1914, London: OUP.

Sinclair, K. & W. F. Mandle (1961) Open Account, Wellington: Whitcombe and Tombs.

Stone, R. J. C. (1973) Makers of Fortune, Auckland: AUP/OUP.

Sutch, W. B. (1966) Colony or Nation? Sydney University Press.

Thankyou to Bob Buckle, Gary Hawke, Brent Layton, Wolf Rosenberg, Suzanne Snively and Bill Willmott who helped improve this paper.

Appendix I: The Interwar Depression Data

The basic data source is Philpott et al. (1967), but two developments were necessary. First, the published series combines in its net farm income series both the return to self-employed farmer and the return to the farm-equity. The earnings of self-employed farmers was calculated as 125 percent of the rate for paid , farm labour .

Second, there is no available series for the value of unimproved land. However, for the 1928-29 and 1920-30 years, the Government Statistician used the land-tax returns to calculate the unimproved value of country and farming lands; the figures were £164.5m and £166.9m (New Zealand Official Year Book, 1937, p.633). For the years before 1928-29 the figures were estimated by maintaining a constant debt-to-unimproved-land value. A sensitivity analysis suggested that other plausible assumptions would not materially affect the conclusion about the rate of return. Given the economic events after 1939, the constant proportion assumption would obviously not be valid then.

The rate of return figures are thus calculated from the following table.

Appendix Table: Farm Values in the 1920s (£m)

Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1922 56.7 6.1 114.8 130.7 229.4 4.4 2.2
1923 59.7 6.8 118.9 138.3 119.2 230.7 8.8 4.3
1924 60.1 7.2 124.4 143.7 123.9 323.3 7.7 3.6
1925 71.2 8.3 128.3 149.9 129.2 243.1 17.0 7.4
1926 62.9 8.7 126.7 155.2 133.8 229.0 7.2 3.3
1927 58.3 11.0 129.5 156.5 134.9 228.4 6.3 2.9
1928 61.7 12.0 133.6 156.6 135.0 232.8 11.9 5.2
1929 71.3 11.9 136.6 164.5 141.8 242.4 17.2 7.1
1930 65.2 11.9 139.4 166.9 147.7 235.7 8.1 3.4

Sources
This table has been corrected from the version in the original production
Year: June year ended.
(1) Livestock: Philpott et al (1967)
(2) Machinery: Philpott et al (1967)
(3) Improvements: Philpott et al (1967)
(4) Unimproved Land Value: See text
(5) Debt: Philpott et al (1967)
(6) Net Equity: (1)+(2)+(3)+(4)-(5
)
(7) Income: See text
(8) Return (% p.a.) (7)/(6)

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Riches Without Wealth

Listener 24 November, 1979, republished in The Listener Bedside Book, No 3 (1999) p.182-183.

Keywords: History of Ideas, Methodology & Philosophy; Maori;

Raymond Firth’s study of the pre-European Maori economy, The Economics of the New Zealand Maori, is half a century old. In 1929 Firth, a young New Zealand economics graduate, decided to pursue economic anthropology, and undertook a doctorate, supervised by Bronislaw Malinkowski, at the University of London. Today, at 80, Firth is one of the grand old men of anthropology , with honorary doctorates from seven prestigious universities.

The book still holds a fascination for today’s economist. How was it that traditional Maori society coped with work, production, possession and exchange without the economic institutions (wages, prices, money) that we assume as standard? Fifty years of further research may have modified, elaborated and even corrected Firth’s analysis, but his basic conclusions still stand.

Rather than the accumulation of wealth, traditional Maori society operated on the basis of the accumulation of mana (prestige and community respect). By working well the Maori added to his or her mana, and to the mana of his whanau (family group). Labour was regarded as an honourable activity-even a chief was expected to muck in. To this day, the ohu (work group) remains a powerful force in Maoridom.

In many ways, traditional Maori society was richer than our modern society. It did not have as many physical possessions as we do-but then, they were not in the same demand. Anyway, concepts of ownership were different from today.

The ownership of land was more complex, causing some of the saddest episodes in the history between the Maori and European races.. We should think of the Maori holding land in a community trust, which gave the individual the right to work it but not to dispose of it. But even this interpretation obscures the emotional significance of the land. A Maori’s land enhanced his mana and gave him his turangawaewae (a sense of self in community).

While the Maori was involved in exchange he did not actually barter, buy or sell. Instead, food, ornaments (and other exchangeables) were given by one group to another. Typically there would be no immediate payment for the gift. But a principle of reciprocation placed an obligation on the recipients to make utu at some later date. Such ‘repayment’ was expected to be of a higher value than the original gift.

Such exchanges were not enforced, but if the utu was not met then the recipient would lose mana. More practically, future opportunities for exchange would be lost.

Firth argues that ‘magical’ elements like tapu (sacredness) and rahui (prohibition) frequently had a common-sense economic foundation. They were used to protect the environment from undue economic exploitation, and to underline to the community the significance of production processes.

It is not difficult to recognise some of the economics of the pre-European Maori in our modern life. Our economic dealings within family, friendships, the community and the work group often involve concepts like mana, ohu, utu and even tapu and rahui. Perhaps we do not do it as well.

Only part of this is learnt from the Maori; some of these aspects are remnants of the pre-industrial, pre-commercial time in Western Europe.

I would not choose to live in those older societies. Modern life offers me too many things, unknown to my ancestors. Nor would I argue that the ancient Maori was inherently morally superior to us today. But as a New Zealander I count myself lucky to have within my community a reminder that it is possible to organise economic life on principles other than the greedy acquisition of wealth. I would be even luckier if we were to manage to develop a lifestyle where these alternative values playa more prominent part.

Using Official Statistics: A Research User’s View

Conference of Users of Official Statistics 11-12 November, Wellington, 1979?

 

Keywords: Statistics;

 

I suspect I was invited to give this paper as one of the research workers in New Zealand most dependent upon official statistics. From one point of view then, I am experienced over a very wide range of official statistics and the problems which confront research users. From another point I am unlikely to bite the hands that feed me. Indeed how can I be less than generous to the providers of official statistics who over the years have taken much time and trouble to assist me?

 

They will report that I lead a fairly chaotic research life, and I move from one research topic to the next disparate one, often in a matter of hours. But for today I shall try to provide some order to my experiences by examining the following topics; documentation, access, aggregation and confidentiality, consistency, timing and development.

 

Documentation

 

The choice of documentation as the first topic rests on the principle that effective use of statistics requires an understanding of their definition and construction.

 

For instance last week I came across the problem of what do we mean by “child”. There are two separate ideas in the concept – to quote the Pocket Oxford a “young human being” or “a son or daughter”. Thus in some circumstances the child may be an adult. The problem occurred in a measurement of solo parent families using the 1971 Census, which usually uses child to mean an (unmarried) son or daughter of any age. That has the unfortunate consequence that some of the solo family groups recorded in the Census are elderly widows and their adult unmarried children. I hardly need to remark that that is not the solo parent family concept that the user had in mind.

 

An experienced researcher soon learns to watch for these definitional traps, but most users are not so experienced and data documentation has to be presented with their needs in mind. The experienced researcher is more troubled where there is data construction.

 

For instance I have raised elsewhere the problem of how we measure the imputed rental on owner occupied dwellings. If our method is too conservative, we underestimate our Gross Domestic Product, our growth rate and the efficiency of our investment. I am not arguing that the official measurement procedure is wrong. Rather for other purposes we may wish to use a different method. In such circumstances a description of the official measurement method becomes crucial.

 

Such issues are current problems. They become more acute with time, and economic historian Brent Layton asked me to mention the importance of keeping good archives so that such issues can also be investigated in the future. I am a great believer in the importance of the historical perspective – if we had more we would be in less of a mess today. I understand that there is no official statistical archivist. May I suggest that despite the sinking lid on public service appointments, the time may be particularly propitious to establish such an archivist. After all it may be some time before once more the Minister of Statistics is also a history graduate.

 

Access

 

Traditionally the main access the research worker had to official statistics was through official publications. Perhaps the most important is the “New Zealand Official Year Book” even though its data may be up to eighteen months behind the latest figures available. I use the Year Book extensively, but despite its strengths it has a major deficiency for a statistician in that it gives little guidance where else to go. May I plead that all its tables should include the source from which they are derived and each chapter should conclude with a section referring the reader to more comprehensive data sources.

 

However, in the future we may expect greater use of direct access to the data files – a facility of particular value in terms of time, coverage, and ease of use when data from the main file can be read off into a working file of the user. I know of CISS, the Central Index of Statistical Series, and I understand that there are discussions on making the Index available to non-official users, perhaps through on-line access. I am sure all research workers will applaud such a development.

 

I am not familiar with the details of CISS to comment further. It now forms the basis of the “Monthly Abstract of Statistics” which, once sufficient on line terminals become available, may gain a new role since access to the latest monthly data will be quicker and more comprehensive through CISS. Many monthly tables will in future need publication only once a year. Perhaps the new role of the MAS will include publication of documentation and research developments and of the semi-official4 statistics I shall be referring to later.

 

CISS is a much bigger data bank than is available in current publications. Public access to it will make redundant my point that research workers often need more detailed data than is published. I have been fortunate to have had the co-operation of the Department of Statistics in providing me with their detailed figures for some purposes. I hope that this privilege can be extended to more researchers, with less hassles for the Department.

 

One area which I doubt that CISS will contribute to is access to cross tabulations, but I shall deal with that in the next section.

 

I complete this section by reference to the access problems of research workers outside Wellington. We are fortunate in Christchurch to have a large office of the Department of Statistics. Research workers in other centres who are not so fortunate (or in the case of the statistics collected by other agencies) can have major frustrations in trying to get appropriate data or explanations. Perhaps one should remind Wellingtonians that most research is done in other centres. The role of Wellington seems to be to generate the research problems.

 

Aggregation and Confidentiality

 

Every research worker requires his or her own level of aggregation. Ideally the data should be available at the most disaggregated level in a computer file, with the researcher carrying out the aggregation when calling up the data. Practically the effort of constructing such finely disaggregated data can be resource consuming and problematic. Moreover disaggregation.generates problems of confidentiality. Energy Engineer, John Peet, remarked to me recently that he had actually lost information in the process of disaggregation because so much of his crucial production data had those frustrating asterisks which footnote to “suppressed to avoid disclosure of confidential information”. The problem must become acute for regional scientists.

 

There cannot be any general approach to this problem. I must confess I favour much greater disclosure of information by companies, particularly monopolies, but that is a question of commercial policy.

 

In the mean time I wonder whether in some cases the Statistics Department might approach the monopoly and ask whether they would permit publication of the relevant data. Such an instance would be Petrocorp, sole supplier of Natural Gas.

 

Another approach is to construct semiofficial estimates of the obscured data. This is what researchers like John Peet do anyway, using published data to construct plausible estimates of the unknown statistics. Such semiofficial statistics could be calculated by the statisticians doing the official statistics, by an outside contractor (I will give almost an illustration of this later), or by some research worker in the course of his work. They would be published with the official data, but with an indication to show they were derived a different way and less reliable.

 

A third approach is to give research workers a sample of the data with individual identification removed and allow them to work on it. For this to be successful the population has to be large and the sampling proportion small. Perhaps it is only appropriate for the Population Census, and currently the Cents Aid facility makes it possible for the research worker to examine large numbers of house-holds without in anyway infringing the confidentiality of the Census Records. I hope we see Cents Aid as a start. It has only a limited number of inferential statistics options – I feel quite naked being unable to carry out multivariate analyses, such as regression. Another problem which I have hit is that the census household does not conform to the unit for taxation purposes, and it looks that I shall need a more direct access to the sample files than the programs currently permit. We have also had processing problems. The logistics for those of us out of Wellington make it a very slow procedure, while being charged commercial computer rates loses the University social scientists one of

 

the few financial advantages we have. I hope serious consideration will be given to making sample files of the Census records, suitably masked to protect confidentiality available to approved researchers.

 

But none of these approaches are going to solve a problem I met a fortnight or so ago, which involved a tabulation from the annual farm returns which is not published. I was in a hurry so I did a patch job from existing data, but if the demand had not been urge might I have been able to approach the Department of Statistics for the required tabulation? I suspect they would have been co-operative but let us go a step further. In those annual farm returns we have a marvelous data bank with which multivariate statistical techniques could no doubt produce some fascinating results. In this case a one percent or even ten percent sample of the 70,000 odd farms would not be particularly useful given till enormous variation within the population. We would have to use all the returns. Is there a way we can do this?

 

There is a continuing tension between confidentiality and aggregation. I respect the need for confidentiality, particularly where individuals are concerned. Moreover confidentiality is often a prerequisite for the co-operation required for providing the data. But we must also be careful that we do not waste all that co-operation by failing to use the data effectively.

 

I acknowledge that little in this section may be applicable to regional statistics.

 

Consistency

 

Economic and social change plus that phenomenon which scientists call progress means that over time data definitions have’ to be changed and old statistical series replaced by new ones. Sometimes the enthusiasm for innovation can destroy the usefulness of large quantities of data, as when the researcher cannot get a comparison between the new and old series. The most notorious example is surely the changes in occupational classification in the 1961 and the 1971 Censuses, which devalued the usefulness of past censuses and inhibited any investigation of the changing occupational structure in post war New Zealand.

 

Ideally research workers would like at least one year dat in the old and new format. A good example of this is new SNA national accounts commence from 1971/72 while those based on th old conventions finish in 1975/76 giving us five common years of the two accounts. (I understand that the Department of Statistics is also assisting the production of a semiofficial set of SNA national accounts back a further ten years, again an approach to be applauded).

 

More generally, might I suggest that before a change is may consideration be given to the consequences upon past data? If the change is really that valuable it will be worth our while ti put the extra effort into providing the means to lap the old any new data on an official or semi-official basis.

 

A related problem on the introduction of a new series is C it takes time to gain familiarity with it. Special papers, presentations at conferences, and seminars are all helpful in that respect.

 

But even so we may still get a problem, which I illustrate with a case I have not investigated to any detail. The general price index, that replacement to the wholesale price index, is a useful step forward in a number of ways. It was commenced in the December Quarter 1977 so we have less than three years o the series. That means, as so often happens with the introduction of new series, that the traditional techniques of multivariate regression for relating the series to, say, the consumer price index is not yet possible. What is that relationship? How long do we have to wait before we can use the GPI as a lead indication of the CPI? Am I right in my perception that the traditional relationship between the Wholesale Price Index and the CPI has changed? In the interim only those with direct access to the data base which created the indices – that is the officials in in the Department of Statistics – can offer any real indication to the answers of such questions.

 

As much as I favour innovation, experience with the problems of switching from old to new bases means I must advocate caution.

 

Timeliness

 

There is inevitably a delay between an event and the publication of its statistical record. However, sometimes the delay becomes excessive. Our last labour force figures are for 1977. We are told the estimates are being revised. That may well be so, but there is considerable concern about the state of the current labour market, and there can be little doubt that it has changed dramatically since the end of 1977.

 

It is possible to use existing data to construct a fair approximation to the true labour force figure. Here is a good place for the use of a semi-official statistic.

 

An illustration of this approach applies to the National Accounts which inevitably come out with a long delay. In the interim the New Zealand Institute of Economic Research provides estimates – in effect semi-official statistics.

 

I suspect that there is a need for a broad discussion about the timeliness of existing statistics, particularly among macro-economists. Sometimes we will be able to find adequate proxy statistics. Sometimes there will be administrative reforms perhaps in conjunction with sampling procedures and or extra resources. And sometimes we will have to rely upon semiofficial statistics.

 

In addition I suggest that in each of the current reviews of official statistics areas there be a specific section concerned with the timeliness of the publication of the data.

 

Development

 

One is tempted to list under the section head developments, a series of urgently required statistical series. But my list could claim no precedence ahead of many others, and instead I want to focus on the problems of identifying and developing new statistical needs.

 

One problem is undoubtedly the resource cost of development coupled with the statistical obt useness of politicians. It is easy for a politician to argue that we have functioned perfectly well for many years without a particular data base, and for him to ignore the difficulties, even blunders, that the lack of data has caused. Fifteen years ago statisticians were pleading for an annual household survey. But it was not until 1973/74 that the first survey was commissioned. Full development of the survey is not complete, but already it has had a major influence on the construction of the price index, income maintenance strategies and energy policy. Sometimes I think that when the politicians turn down a proposal we should say that they were making the same arguments against the household expenditure survey fifteen years ago, and if they insist that the arguments remain valid we will withdraw all access to the results based on the Household Expenditure Survey.

 

But there is a second problem tied up with the whole nature of research which compounds the logistics of the development of statistics. Significant research in any area involves a few pioneers on the frontier. By the time the conventional wisdom has recognized its significance, supported the development of the statistical basis, and that base is developed, many years will have passed.

 

If I may illustrate this with a small example of my own work. Whilst comparing the 1971 Census with the 1970/71 income tax returns I was struck by a large group of people who do not appear as working according to the Census, but worked according to the tax returns. The explanation is that they work during only part of the year but not in Census week. Overseas they are described as the “peripheral workforce” and they prove to be not only an important component of the adjustment mechanism for a labour market, but one of the interfaces between the economy and society. The conventional wisdom will be telling you this in a few years’ time. Our statistical knowledge of the peripheral workforce is rudimentary. It requires specific surveys of the sort done overseas. We are unlikely to have such a survey before the mid-1980s. Allowing for processing time and accumulation of a number of surveys it will be fifteen odd years between the data anomaly and its scientific resolution.

 

I am phlegmatic about such delays but they could be shortened by giving research workers a greater role in the data collection agencies. In advocating the appointing of more research workers in, say, the Department of Statistics and the extension of its activities into research, I do not want to undervalue the quality of the present staff nor their research work. I have had too many helpful discussions with departmental officers and attended too many memorable Departmental papers at economics, statistics, and demographic conferences ever to do that.

 

Rather I want to argue that an effective data collection agency needs also to have a strong involvement in the research uses of the data. There is often this involvement there, but it seems to me that it is undervalued, and should be promoted. As a University teacher I want my best graduates to be coming to me at the end of the year about careers advice and volunteering “What about the Statistics Department?” without my prompting. And I should like to be able to reply with more confidence about a career structure for social statisticians and quantitative social scientists. Some of the students’ textbooks and articles are written by employees of foreign government statistics departments. That is’ something we should aspire to here.

 

The advantage to research workers of such a development is two fold. It means we have kindred spirits more closely involved with data development and aware of our needs. The same people can also extend the informal consultancy services which the agencies provide.

 

Conclusion

 

In conclusion I must confess that the overall thrust of my remarks is that we should be spending more on the official data collection agencies. This comes from my belief that there is only one thing more expensive than research and that is no research, a point I would illustrate with some of the botch ups we have around us today.

 

Yet there is a sense in which my suggestions are cheaper than they may seem. Official statistics provide research workers with an enormous data bank which is being underutilized. That databank does not answer all our questions, but very often it will be more fruitful and less expensive to pursue the questions the data bank raises than to go to the trouble of creating new data sources. One-off small scale surveys are easy for research workers to do, but expensive, particularly when the results do not tie into the population in any meaningful way.

 

This country spends over $12m a year on its collection and preparation of official statistics. We should ensure the results are used as effectively as possible.

Population and the Economy

In Warwick Neville and James O’Neill (1979) <>The Population of New Zealand: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, pages 259-280.

 

Keywords: Environment & Resources;  Growth & Innovation;

 

Introduction

 

Population studies and economic studies are each vast subject areas, and there is not space to discuss all the issues. This chapter attempts to survey some of the more significant ones, and in particular focuses on the question: ‘What has been the impact of population growth on the postwar New Zealand economy, and what is likely to happen in the future?’ Many people will be quick to give a simple answer to such an apparently simple question. But a comprehensive answer is far from simple, and is dependent upon a host of value judgements. The aim will be to provide an appropriate framework for people to make their own conclusions, without attempting to suppress or disguise value judgements.

 

The appropriate population

 

Unfortunately most people discuss the population and economy questions using an analytical framework which assumes the population, or perhaps the population structure, is constant. There is no need to emphasize that over 39 per cent of New Zealanders in 1976 were not born in 1945, and perhaps another 7 per cent were not living in New Zealand in 1945 (Department of Statistics, 1976a, Tables 1. 6). But how exactly do you make judgements when a population is changing?

 

Consider a case where we are trying to assess the effect on the economy of an immigrant. What notice should we take of the benefit to the immigrant himself? For instance before the immigrant arrives we might conclude that his arrival would be a bad thing for New Zealand, but after he arrives we might conclude that it is a good thing, even though the facts have not changed at all. Now the immigrant is a New Zealander and we have to take into account that he benefited, even if on the whole the remaining New Zealanders did not. This explains the paradox of immigrants who advocate the ending of immigration. They may have benefited from it, but they are explicitly judging that those who were here before they arrived have not benefited from their presence, which is a harsh self-judgement in many cases. While we have illustrated the issue by immigration, the problem exists for emigration, birth, and death. There is no unique, acceptable population appropriate for every case.

 

In practice many policy decisions appear to be made with a notion of provisional membership of the population. Thus a conceived fetus is given provisional membership, subject to section 182 of the Crimes Act, which permits abortion under certain circumstances. An immigrant is given provisional membership in that not all his civil rights are immediately available (for instance, registration on the electoral roll and some social security benefits require a period of residence), and the non-naturalized can be deported. On the other hand New Zealand emigrants retain some of their legal entitlements suggesting they are only provisionally rejected from the population. Note that for some purposes such as bequests and inheritance the wishes of the dead are given almost equivalent status to those of the living.

 

A smaller problem, particular to migration issues, is the welfare of those outside New Zealand. That immigration was beneficial to the immigrant and to those in New Zealand would not automatically ensure it was beneficial to those in the immigrant’s homeland. It may be necessary to consider other country effects, particularly where the country is poorer than New Zealand and the immigrant has an expensively acquired skill (for example, doctors from South Asia) or comes from a small economy (for example, from the Pacific Islands).

 

The material standard of living

 

The conventional measure of the material standard of living is per capita consumption. Assuming we have decided on the appropriate population, there is still the problem of whether each member should be given the same weighting. The obvious and for our purposes significant issue is the treatment of children. It can be estimated that a household comprising two young children and a couple need to spend about 49 per cent more than the couple to attain the same standard of living. Hence a child’s consumption needs might be treated as 49 per cent of an adult’s (Easton, 1973). The figure is approximate, but it suggests it would be appropriate to treat in terms of per capita consumption levels two children equal to one adult.

 

The appropriate consumption measure is not immediately obvious.[1] Since investment does not directly contribute to the material standard of living, output can be firmly rejected.’ Obviously private consumption is a part of the material standard of living, but what about public consumption, that is the current expenditure of central and local Government? This is a vast issue which it is not easy to answer briefly. In my view the majority of public consumption is either subsidies to production and consumption enterprises, Government administration, or maintenance and investment in human capital (see below). Consequently, these need not be included in the individual’s material standard of living providing private consumption is measured at market prices and not factor costs (so our measure tells us little about the efficiency at which it is provided). Only a small amount of Government expenditure may be treated as directly supplementing private consumption (for instance, national parks, public libraries, etc.), and only this item should be added to private consumption to get a representative measure of the material standard of living. On the other hand we should subtract from private consumption items currently there which are employment costs or are for the maintenance and investment in human capital. Although private consumption is a rough measure of the appropriate variables, it is better than total output or public plus private consumption.

 

There are many inadequacies in the private consumption measure associated with the conceptual area known as ‘externalities’ (Mishan, 1967). Only those that are concerned with population need detain us here, except to forewarn that the whole area is fraught with difficulties.

 

Changes in the population can increase or decrease the effectiveness of an individual’s expenditure (that is, measured by private consumption) to maintain his standard of living. For instance, population increases may convert one’s pleasant isolated lagoon into a holiday camp, and since there are a limited number of lagoons, this can occur in a way in which everyone is worse off. Conversely an increase in population may make possible amenities that are not available to smaller communities. For instance, there may be insufficient interest in small towns in a musical group which specializes in Bartok. There is no unambiguous way of incorporating such changes in any measure of private consumption. We need to note the existence of the issue, and interpret any data with care.

 

Whatever conclusion may be drawn about these particular problems, it must be remembered that any measure of the material standard of living may be a poor indicator of the quality of life. Indeed it seems to me that we should pay more attention to increasing the quality of life than the quantity of output. That is, I believe it is possible to improve quality for a given quantity of material standard of living, by more intelligent concern about the output mix. Fortunately for the following discussion, quality improvement activities are similar to quantity increase activities in the broad, so that either or both are implied in subsequent analysis.

 

The determinants of output

 

Having decided upon an appropriate measure of performance, we now need some explanation of what determines the level of private consumption. It is simplest to treat long run consumption as the residual from total output after we have provided domestic investment and public consumption.

 

What then determines national output? The novice should be warned that there is considerable controversy at present over this issue, but we shall attempt to evade such issues by answering the question at a fairly general level. Even so the explanation may not always seem what it appears in terms of the conventional wisdom. [2]

 

The familiar components of the determinants of the national output are physical capital such as machines, buildings, and roads; natural resources such as land, hydroelectric power sites, and minerals; and technology which is the way in which we arrange the other components (and in which we shall include the economies-of-scale). However, instead of using the familiar labour input as a determinant of production, we shall use the less familiar notion of human capital. This is because we are particularly interested in the population issue, and need a concept more precise than that usually used.

 

Human capital

 

Human capital can best be explained by analogy with physical capital. The value of a physical asset is some sort of sum of the future income the asset can be expected to generate (Easton, 1980, Chapter 2). Obviously income which is far in the future is valued less than income more immediate, so we ‘discount’ it more.

 

Similarly we can think of a human being as an asset generating income in the future and calculate his value by discounting these future incomes in a similar way. You may think this is a cost accounting approach to people. But providing we remember that people are the ultimate consumers, then we can treat the human capital approach as one, but only one, facet of the whole person.

 

Table 1: Average human capital by age, 1971 [3]

Age Group Human Capital

Total

Per Person

as annuity

Net market

output

 

$

$ p.a.

$ p.a.

0-4

12,100

901

-1,030

5-9

22,100

1650

 -760

10-14

33,000

2470

 -470

15-19

47,000

3530

  720

20-24

55.300

4150

2650

25-29

51,800

3890

3130

30-34

46.200

3460

2940

35-39

40.000

3000

2820

40-44

33,200

2490

2630

45-49

26,300

1970

2310

50-54

19.400

1460

2060

55-59

12,600

  950

1760

60–64

  6,300

  480

1290

65-69

  1,700

  120

  660

70-74

   – 800

  -60

  120

75-79

 -1,300

-100

 -180

Discount rate of 7.5 per cent per annum.

 

Table 1 presents some estimates of the average value of the human capital of individuals at various ages. These figures are not particularly acct rate.[3] There are two important assumptions mentioned here briefly, but which are discussed in further detailed later. Firstly, we have made an imputation for childcare by parents because this is a very important activity in the creation of human capital, even if there is no market payment for it. Secondly, there is no deduction for the consumption of the individual. This is because we are treating such consumption as a benefit to the individual.

 

A third important assumption is that of the discount factor. Unfortunately the value of capital is very sensitive to the discount factor so sometimes it is more helpful to look at the annuity or stream of income the capital would generate. This is equal to the capital value times the discount rate. This is shown in column 2. The particular discount rate used is 7.5 per cent per annum. which seems to be roughly the after-tax corporation discount rate.

 

The first thing which may strike you is how valuable an average New Zealander may be. The 1971 peak average of an excess of $50 000 for a person in their early 20s may be compared with the average for the standard house at that time of $8 300. However, without slavery you cannot convert the human capital into a lump sum except in the goodness of time through working. Indeed, if you and your spouse march in on a banker stating your human capital value is $100 000 and you want to borrow a tenth of it for your house, even your cost accountant is likely to think you a little strange.

 

But for the community as a whole we can calculate the total value of the human capital in New Zealand. In 1971 this was $85,000 million which compares with a total personal wealth of $14,000 million and perhaps another $2500 million held by Government and foreigners. So our human capital exceeds our total physical capital (Easton, 1980, Chapter 7).[4] The importance of human capital as a contributor of total output is clear. The annuity from this wealth is $6 400 million, almost double the actual labour output of $3 287 million. The reason for this difference is that, as a result of a very rapid population growth that we have experienced in the postwar period, half of our human wealth is still in the gestation stage, like an unfinished power station or stored wine. We shall see this has important implications for long term prospects in New Zealand.

 

Note also that children who are absorbers of net output in terms of health care, education, and parent care have a positive net wealth and, as measured by their annuity, are directly contributing to society. However, the contribution is not appearing as extra output for consumption, but as appreciation of the human capital embodied in the child. This is such an economically and socially important phenomenon that it requires a section of its own. But before discussing this topic further it is useful to look at the converse: human capital depreciation.

 

The average individual’s human capital peaks in the 20s and thereafter decreases to less than zero in his early 70s. This reduction in the individual’s future stream of output is diminishing through age, retirement, and death. Such a process of capital appreciation followed by depreciation is inevitable if man is born with nothing and dies with nothing.

 

Before completing this section the reader is reminded that these figures are not very accurate, but they illustrate the point we need to make. Human capital is important. Such an exercise in cost accounting must be seen as a part of the total human picture.

 

Investing in human capital

 

Children, or more precisely expenditure on children, is an economic activity which generates a joint product. This piece of jargon is not a reference to the biological truism that it takes two to conceive, but that expenditure on children produces three separate types of outputs (or benefits) in roughly fixed proportions. You are warned that joint products are by no means easy for economics to handle.

 

Firstly, the child, who is a member of the community benefits from the expenditure. Secondly, the child’s parents benefit from the expenditure in that they derive pleasure from their children. They indicate their pleasure by sacrificing their own consumption in order that their children may consume. We shall see that these sacrifices are substantial. (Incidentally the widespread phenomenon of one person directly benefiting from another’s consumption complicates economics, to the point that it tends to be ignored. But in the case of parents and children we cannot ignore it.)

 

Thirdly, the expenditure is also an investment in the child, building up the human capital of the society which will later be realized when he produces as an adult. So three groups jointly and separately benefit from the expenditure on children in different ways; the child, its parents, and society.

 

Consideration of expenditure as investment in children does not automatically assume that the expenditure is necessarily productive. For instance wine maturing in a cellar may be annually blessed by the priest. In the light of present scientific knowledge it appears unlikely that the blessing has much effect upon the wine, but nonetheless the vintner will record that as an activity associated with its production. Our education system may have a similar effect upon our children, and I am not only referring to activities under the Nelsonscheme of religious instruction. But again we record this as an investment in our children.

 

There are major types of expenditure on children. Firstly, there is the private consumption expenditure on food, clothing, housing, and recreation. Using the `two children equals one adult’ ratio, and assuming expenditure is shared equally within the family, about 20 per cent of private consumption, or $670 million in 1970-71 was consumed by children. Secondly, there is public expenditure, mainly on health and education. In 1970-71 this came to about $300 million.

 

Thirdly, mothers (and to a lesser extent fathers) decide not to go out to work in order to stay at home and care for their children. This is particularly significant among parents with pre-school children (Easton, 1977). In that the parents’ production of other commodities is reduced, and they or other members of the community forgo the resulting consumption, the parents’ time can be treated as expenditure. In the previous calculations on human capital this came to $460 million in 1971. Thus total expenditure upon children came to $1 430 million, a sum similar in magnitude to gross domestic investment on physical assets in 1970-71 which was $1 522 million but included $193 million provided by overseas borrowing (Department of Statistics, 1976b).

 

It is clear that there is no simple way of allocating the total expenditure on children between the various outputs or benefits. For instance we might argue that education is primarily investment, but obviously children may enjoy the educational experience, and their parents may be pleased that the children are receiving the education. However, it is possible to calculate who provides the $1430 million. The parents provide the child’s consumption less family benefit and tax concessions plus the parents’ forgone earnings less taxation on the earnings. In 1971 this totalled about $860 million. The remaining $570 million was society’s share provided through the tax system. Probably about half of these taxes were paid by parents. Thus the direct parental contribution to investment in children was three fifths, and they contributed another fifth through the taxation system. Conversely non-parents contributed only one fifth of the total cost.

 

If we treat all of this expenditure as human capital investment, which is plausible providing we do not assume that all of it is equally productive (see below), we can say that four fifths of human capital formation is provided by parents. Remembering that parents are also likely to be purchasing their houses, at least partly because of their children, parenting is probably the biggest source of community savings for total human and physical capital formation. Clearly it is an activity that deserves much more investigation, and acknowledgement in its role in the economy.

 

We may ask whether it is fair that parents should carry such a large share of the burden of capital formation. This question becomes more pointed in a society with effective contraception, where couples can choose not to have children, others have small families, and at any point in time a significant proportion of households have no children.

 

One response is that parents now choose to have children. Presumably the choice implies that they think they will benefit from the children. There is no need to subsidize the parents’ benefits further. On the other hand parents might respond that they do not see why they should subsidize the childless who are benefitting from the human capital formation. Another response is that increased financial assistance to families would increase the birth rate (assuming for the moment this is considered a ‘bad thing’). There is not a great deal of evidence that family size is so sensitive to the level of family incomes although no doubt the timing and spacing of families could be affected.

 

On the other hand it might be argued that investment in children appears very profitable, so we should do more of it. Obviously we could well spend more upon the productive parts of the investment but, as we shall see, it is not clear what is the productive expenditure. As in so many of these issues, the pure demographic and economic analyses provide a framework in which decisions can be taken. But we need some ethical judgement in order to use the framework.

It seems to me that a judgement not unlike that of the Royal Commission on Social Security is more appropriate in New Zealand circumstances (Royal Commission of Inquiry, 1976, 65). The Commission took the view that an aim of New Zealand society is, ‘That everyone is able to enjoy a standard of living much like that of the rest of the community, and thus is able to feel a sense of participation and belonging to the community’.

 

There are a number of groups who may have a much lower standard of living but we may not think them entitled to public financial help. For instance ascetics who prefer a lower material life style, or persons capable of work, for whom there is work, and who choose not to take it. For this to occur requires full employment (Rosenberg, 1977). Families are another issue. They have a low standard of living because they are providing a high proportion of the savings of the community (Easton, 1977). Many feel they are not able to participate or belong to the community as a result; this is likely to occur particularly among mothers.

 

Research suggests that in 1974 about one quarter of our children and one fifth of their parents were below the material standard of living set by the Royal Commission as a minimum for pensioners (Easton, 1976a). That was 640 000 people, and the number since then has probably risen as a result of the downswing of the present economic depression. The National Superannuation Scheme has raised the standard of living of all pensioners markedly above the Royal Commission minimum level. The largest group of the poor in New Zealand today are families with growing children. The ethical judgement points towards the State contributing a higher proportion of the expenditure on children.

 

The productivity of the investment

 

There is not much evidence to indicate which types of expenditure upon children are the most productive investment. Obviously one can go on at length about good nutrition, house environment and similar needs, but it is preferable to be a little more precise. However, some forms of expenditure may be anti-productive investment. For instance it is thought that childhood obesity may increase adult health care costs, and reduce longevity.

 

Perhaps the only relevant systematic study involved the return on education. Ogilvy concluded an overall social return on secondary and tertiary education of 17 per cent per annum (Ogilvy, 1970). One might question his figures, but they suggest that, across the board, post-primary education investment is very productive. There do not appear to be any similar studies on primary and preprimary education, health, parent care, and consumption goods. Even more useful would be an indication of which parts of education are most productive. For instance I am inclined to the prejudice that good elementary mathematics teaching is very productive, as would be courses at secondary school and adult education which improve individuals’ ability to manage their own health, and their children’s. One can speculate on these issues at length. There can be little doubt that we could markedly improve the effectiveness of our investment in our children. The problem is how. All our evidence shows is that it is a question well worth pursuing. Having established the importance of human capital it is useful to examine some of the other output determinants with particular respect to the population issue.

 

Renewable natural resources

 

Any country has limited renewable natural resources such as land and hydroelectric power sites. An increase in population reduces the quantity of natural resources per head, and ceteris paribus should decrease the output potential of the country. However, it is not immediately obvious that natural resources are a major factor in output determination, and that physical capital substitutes do not exist. For instance farmland may appear limited, and urban growth reducing it. But there is farmland of past years which is now underutilized. It is possible that if we needed more farmland very little capital expenditure in access roading and the like could make this wasteland productive again. Obviously if the population were to increase tenfold, natural resources could be a major limitation on material output, but it seems unlikely that they will be a major limitation in New Zealand with the likely population ranges possible here.

 

Depletable natural resources

 

It is undeniable that the world has been drawing heavily upon its stock of depletable resources, the most important of which is minerals, particularly fossilized energy. At some point such resources will be exhausted, although there is some dispute as to how soon. Obviously a higher population, and all other things equal, will deplete the resources faster (Chapter 12).

 

However, there is a prior issue. Present measures of material output overestimate true income, because they are not reduced by the reduction of the wealth stored in depletable resource form. When this has been adjusted for it is not at all clear that the industrialized nations of the world have experienced much growth in the last few decades. Contrariwise we can treat the investment programmes and the introduction of new technologies as substitutes for resource depletion. It is obvious that the world cannot deplete its resources faster than the substitution of investment and technology without a long run decline in its material standard of living. Whether this has been occurring we do not know. In such circumstances it might be wise to limit the pressure on depletable resources until we are surer of the actual situation.

 

These are worldwide considerations. New Zealand appears to be a substantial importer of depletables, particularly oil which provides 62 per cent of our primary energy, and phosphate. On the other hand we export ironsand and processed energy and fertilizer materials. Perhaps it should be added that at least part of the current energy demand controversy centres around population assumptions. It looks as though nuclear energy and the utilization of prime environmental sites for power stations could be avoided if low birth rates continue.

 

Export market limitations

 

A variation on the natural resource limitation thesis is that the New Zealand export markets are limited, particularly for the traditional product of processed grass. Thus our ability to export is fixed, and consequently so is our ability to import; although the rate at which we have been borrowing since 1975 may appear to contradict this argument. If imports are fixed, a larger population means imports per head are smaller.

 

Thus far the argument is probably a plausible approximation of reality; the next step is more questionable. The argument goes on that there is a direct relationship between imports per head and output per head. Thus, a higher population means lower imports per head, and a lower material standard of living. The assumption of a simple relationship between imports and output is probably incorrect and, even worse, misleading. It is based upon some peculiar belief that import substitution is impossible or, at least, very expensive. Not far away is the belief that all our exporting is efficient which is patently untrue as indicated by the vast subsidies we have been pumping into export industries.

 

Physical capital

 

Under the ceteris paribus assumption, the less physical capital per head, the lower will be output. How much lower is not easy to measure, and we must also consider to what extent a higher population increases the supply of savings.

 

Economies of scale

 

A larger population is frequently advocated on the basis of ‘economies of scale’ which is the notion that costs of unit output reduce as total output increases. This argument tends to be overemphasized, is technically deficient, and ignores a counter argument.

 

The economies-of-scale argument is exaggerated because the likely range of possible populations in New Zealand is small. For instance the difference in population size between a zero and 15 000 per annum net immigration rate is about 11 per cent after 30 years which is hardly large enough to reap major economies of scale.

 

The argument is technically deficient because it does not distinguish between economies of scale for a given technology and economies of scale with a variety of technologies. Nobody denies that for a given technology to produce a product there is an optimum scale of production and that, for some of these technologies developed in much larger economies, the optimum scale is large compared with potential New Zealand production.

 

However, economic theory is more equivocal on whether economies of scale exist at all, when we have a variety of technologies. It is possible that there exists another technology, perhaps as yet unknown, which has a smaller optimum scale but is just as materially efficient as that of the technology of larger economies. Large scale technologies are used because of the market, rather than any inherent technical advantages of the scale itself.

 

This argument has a substantive policy implication. If New Zealand uncritically imports foreign technologies, it is likely to be faced with operating below the optimal scale. On the other hand if it searches for its own technologies it may be able to produce at much lower costs, and indeed export the technologies to similar small scale economies.

 

Finally, if there are economies of scale, there are diseconomies of scale. That is, the population may be too large and create congestion costs. This seems a plausible explanation of some of the problems which arise in large cities throughout the world.

 

If economies of scale are important they are likely to be found, not in manufacturing industry if we use the most appropriate technology, but in infrastructure such as regional transport (where better and cheaper services could be provided if the transport traffic volume warranted it), and housing (because family privacy requirements mean a small family uses more housing per head than a large family). The diseconomies similarly appear to be infrastructural and at their most significant in the provision of urban services such as private transport, communications and utilities, but not with respect to urban public transport and community facilities which may experience economies of scale.

 

The effects of rapid population increases

 

The preceding section shows there is no clear answer to the question as to the relationship between the level of population and output, in the sort of population range possible to New Zealand. However, it is important to distinguish between the level of population and the growth of population. While we cannot be sure of the long run effect of a population of 6 million instead of 3 million, whether the population doubles overnight or over a millenium will markedly affect the economic situation in the period between now and the long run.

 

Consider an economy which is experiencing a rapid population growth. Compare that with the same economy experiencing a negligible population growth. Assume that the cost of providing the extra population (by whatever means) is provided without significant cost to the community. This is plausible for population increases from birth, where most of the costs are willingly given by the parents and from immigration where the migration costs are small and in part provided by the immigrant or friends and other voluntary donors.

 

However, the provision of the extra physical capital remains a problem. In the long run the new addition to the population may, in effect, generate sufficient savings to provide the extra capital required to maintain the average material standard of living of the population. In the short run either the savings must be borrowed from foreign sources or the population must increase its own savings and lower its consumption.

 

The quantity and timing of the savings and investment required depends on the source of the population increase (see below). But there can be little doubt that under rapid population growth consumption must be depressed or foreign investment increased in the short run. Whether these changes are great is another matter.

 

The most severe problems occur where there is a change in the population growth rate. If it suddenly increases, the economy quickly has to find extra capital resources. Conversely, if it suddenly falls the economy can reduce its investment programme during the transition. These ‘accelerator’ effects appear to be quite substantial, and suggest that changes in population growth rates may be a major factor in economic performance. On the other hand, as we shall see, providing performance is properly measured there may be very little difference between this case and the performance of an economy experiencing a steadily increasing population growth.

 

Two other issues are relevant. Increased population in a tight labour market economy generates extra expenditure that is likely to be met by increased imports and borrowing, or inflation, or both (Monetary and Economic Council, 1966). That is why the Australian Government has increased its assisted immigration programmes when it is reflating.

 

Secondly, population lives in a society, and new population has to be absorbed in an existing social environment or, particularly when growth is rapid, create a new one. The record of suburban expansion in New Zealand suggests that however onerous has been the task of providing the physical infrastructure for suburbs, including roading, housing, and recreational facilities, we have been far less successful in providing the social infrastructure in which social relations take place. The phenomenon in newly established suburbs of severe social problems, such as delinquency, which fade away as the suburb matures, is an indication of the social problem generated by rapid population growth.

Some policy issues

 

A useful way of bringing together the analysis, in preparation for the final discussion on the postwar and future experience, is to consider some policy issues involving population, with particular emphasis on the economics of the issues. However, policy decisions must take place within the context of a community, only part of which is ‘economic’. We often find that fundamental social issues dominate the economics. In population issues these are frequently matters of civil liberties, but even these liberties reflect very fundamental social concerns such as the sanctity of life and individualism.

 

The birth rate

 

Some people propose that the community should consciously control its birth rate. Advocates may want a higher birth rate or, more frequently in recent years, a lower birth rate. It is important to appreciate that such social control of the birth rate in either direction is likely to be ineffective or involve major infringements of personal liberties as we currently envisage them. However, even if we could consciously modify our birth rate, would we want to?

 

It is clear from the preceding discussion that childbearing or rearing is, among other things, a productive activity, and that the supply of adequate human capital is vital for the continuing functioning of society. We can investigate the effects of birth rates on human capital by considering two population projections provided by the Government Statistician, one involving the ‘high’ fertility assumption and the other the ‘low’ fertility assumption, each with the zero net migration rate (Department of Statistics, 1973).[5] Table 2 shows the expected population under the two assumptions, and the average human capital for 1971, 1986, 2001, and 2031.

 

The construction of Table 2 necessitated several assumptions, but the results should be robust enough to make a number of points. Take the high fertility assumption projections first. These have a long run net reproduction rate of 1.54, or similar to the 1971 net reproduction rate (N.R.R.). The projections assume zero net migration, and no further human productivity increases.

 

Over the 60 year period these projections show a slight increase in human capital, and a 20 per cent increase in the conventional output per capita. These changes arise because the 1971 population is the result of a higher fertility rate than that projected, so that there is a stock of human capital stored in children in 1971 which gets released as they grow up, but not all of the stock is replaced, because of the lower birth rate. Two adjustments have been made to the conventional output per capita measure, although in the case of the high fertility  assumption they make only a slight change to the percentage increase. Adjusting the population, with children having only half the weighting of an adult, the increase is 19 per cent over the 60 year period. If we also impute the consumption of children and the loss of output due to parenting as a benefit to the parents, the increase in output over the period is 18 per cent. The small fall compared to the conventional measure is due to their being proportionally fewer children in 2031 than in 1971. The human capital measure and all three output measures show most of the increase in the first 15 years of the period, and after 30 years they are nearly stable, indicating that the economic effects of the slightly lower fertility would appear relatively quickly.

 

Table 2: Human capital projections, 1971 prices (a)

Factor  

1971

1986

2001

2031

Increase

1971-2031

 

Population

H

2.86m

3.63m

4.61m

7.65m

167%

L

3.39m

3.85m

4.47m

56%

Diff

7%

20%

71%

Average Human Capital H

$29,300

$29.800

30,300

30,100

3%

L

$30,600

30,300

27,600

-6%

Diff

-3%

0%

9%

 

Output per capita

H

$950

$1130

$1140

$1140

20%

L

$1270

$1380

$1340

41%

Diff

-11%

-18%

-15%

Output per adjusted capita (b) H

$1080

$1280

$1290

$1290

19

L

$1420

$1520

$1470

36

Diff

-10%

-15%

-12%

Adjusted output per adjusted capita (c) H

$1370

$1610

$1620

$1620

18%

L

$1710

$1800

$1700

26%

Diff

-6%

-10%

-6%

(a) High: High fertility assumption; Low: Low fertility assumption.

(b) Adjusted capita: children equal half of one person.

(c) Adjusted output: adjusted for non-monetary benefits of children.

 

However, the low fertility projection with a long run N.R.R. of 1.03 may conform somewhat more closely to realistic expectations, given present trends in fertility levels. As it involves a markedly different long run population structure  from 1971, that there are markedly different long run effects is not surprising. Over the 60 year period, by which time, without migration the population is approaching stability, there is a fall in average human capital of 6 per cent but a rise of conventional output per capita by 41 per cent. This population has proportionally fewer children and young adults which represents lower human capital, but larger proportions among working adults resulting in a higher market output. It is investing less in its children, and is able to produce more for consumption. The transition from the high pre-1971 fertility to the low long run fertility is all the more dramatic considering that the average human capital peaks in 1986 and falls thereafter, and the output variables peak in 2001 and fall thereafter (though by 2031 they are stable).

 

Since the high fertility gives a 20 per cent increase in average material output while the low fertility gives 41 per cent, or about an extra 0.3 per cent per annum over the period, a strong economics case for a low birth rate might appear to be made. But look at the other output measures. When adjustment is made for the consumption needs of children, the low fertility output is only 14 per cent higher. Wheri adjustment for the benefits of children to their parents is included, the low fertility output is only 6 per cent higher. This latter figure is so small and the calculations so approximate that it suggests the output in 2031 of the two fertility projections can be treated as roughly the same.

 

However, before an overall conclusion can be drawn it is necessary to consider whether there are any other relevant issues, particularly with regard to the non-human factors of production and the quality of life. These were surveyed earlier. The reader is invited to review them and consider whether they point overwhelmingly in one direction or another. It is perhaps relevant to remark

some of those arguments against larger populations are in fact arguments against higher total output. Thus it may be as economically realistic to advocate the prevention of production of motorcars as of children. Indeed as soon as my family has bought its second car, we will join the Z.M.G. lobby.

 

The physical capital issue requires a little more analysis since obviously the high fertility projection assumes a much greater requirement. But by how much? To answer this you have to make many more dubious assumptions, but if you accept these arguments you might conclude that the high fertility requires an extra savings per year of $66 per person (in 1971 prices), which is

not going to make a great difference given our accuracy, and the significance of the intangibles which the calculations exclude. Some of it will be saved willingly in order to provide for one’s children, some of it can be borrowed internationally, at no real cost if you believe the neoclassical economics from which the $66 figures was derived.

 

It is true that the extra capital requirements may be sharper in the early part of the 60 year period, or to put it another way, the low fertility projection involves the realizing of pre-1971 investment in the first half of the period. Obviously if you cannibalize your investment you will benefit. But the figures suggest that in the long run there is no significant real cost to the community, unless it wanted to increase its birth rate. Surprisingly there is no evidence in the low fertility assumption of serious problems arising from the aging population. This appears to be because the transition is relatively slow and stabilizes close to zero population growth (Z.P.G.). A rapid fertility fall going well below an N.R.R. of unit could involve complications.

 

It might appear from this discussion that the economic analysis is fairly agnostic to the fertility rate, and that other considerations are more important. The latter statement may be true, but the analysis is far from agnostic. The conclusion is, that if the population chooses an N.R.R. of 1.54 then economically it will be in much the same situation as if it chose an N.R.R. of 1.03, and vice versa. If, however, it chooses an N.R.R. of 1.03 and is forced to expand at an N.R.R. of 1.54, it will be much worse off because it will insufficiently value the sacrifices it makes for its children. The converse holds for the high fertility preference population restricted to low fertility. Their extra material output will not compensate them for the loss of benefit from not having children. Far from being agnostic, the economic analysis is strongly sympathetic towards individuals choosing their preferred reproduction rate. There is always the likelihood that some people in the population have a higher fertility preference and others a low one. That is the same problem as when some households want three cars, and some one car and a good public system. Clearly this is a more general issue which requires another treatise.

 

This conclusion differs from a crude economic assessment for two reasons. Firstly, it includes the critical role of human capital and human capital formation. Secondly, it recognizes that some investment in children also has consumption characteristics because individuals perceive themselves as benefiting from the investment in their own children.

 

Access to contraception

 

Once again this is an issue which involves civil liberties, and in which economics can provide only a frame. Economically attention must be drawn to the high costs of ‘unwanted’ children, perhaps in terms of their involving low human capital or investment in their having a low return on their investment. Even so, once they are members of the community such children are entitled to be treated as humanely and fairly as any others. Economic analysis draws attention to the need to prevent ‘unwanted’ children, but sidesteps the issue of how to identify them. However, while we might not be confident that potential parents would always make ‘right’ decisions it would seem that a policy, consistent with civil liberty objectives, of allowing the potential parents to make the decision as to whether or not the child would be wanted is not inappropriate and likely to be more effective than authoritarian directives. This would point to no abnormal restrictions being placed on contraception.

 

Should contraception be paid for by the couple using it? The price mechanism is a normal restriction, and exists for other consumption that we might deem ‘worthwhile’, such as food. It is argued that contraception is a medical expenditure, and medicine should be provided free. For my part I do not see any a priori reason that health services should be free. Rather that each service should be judged on the basis of separate criteria. In any case it is not obvious that contraception should be treated as medicine, any more than routine maternity involves a medical service (Easton, 1974).

 

I know of no plausible general reason for the provision of free contraception. However, there are a number of groups in the community who have specific reasons justifying free contraception; for example, because of medical circumstances, individuals with low incomes and low borrowing power who may desire expensive sterilization, and so on. It is unlikely that it would be possible to provide free contraception for all these groups without extreme administrative complexity or inequity. In these circumstances the simplest administrative procedure might be to provide free contraception. This is a particularly strong argument for contraception through abortion once medical and legal permission is given and, to a lesser extent, for sterilization.

 

Euthanasia

 

When the annuity value of an individual’s wealth falls below his consumption, it may appear that there is an economic case for euthanasia of that individual, since average incomes would increase as a result. However, this would be an invalid use of economic analysis. Critical to the issue is the appropriate population. It is certainly true that the economic welfare of the population increases after euthanasia, but the pre-euthanasia population is worse off, since one of it is dead. Of course the narrow economic judgement may not be the most important issue. As has happened with previous policy questions on civil liberty issues, so in this case, the sanctity of life would be considered more significant.

 

Where the economic calculus has some relevance is in making judgements about allocating life sustaining programmes when there are limited resources available. In particular, the peak human capital age group of 15-30 years has been experiencing rising mortality rates in some countries, mainly due to accidental death and suicide. The calculus suggests it could well be profitable to allocate more funds to minimize such mortality.

 

Economics, per se, says very little about two issues often confused with euthanasia. The appropriate legal (and social) definition of death, and the individual’s right to die in dignity. These are likely to be significant issues in the near future, but economists qua economists have only a marginal contribution to make to these debates.

 

Immigration

 

Few would dispute the right of the modern nation to regulate the entry of non-nationals. Consequently a policy on immigration is inevitable and, except for the special issues of refugees and family reunions, economic considerations are likely to play a major role in its formation.

 

A popular view in the 1960s, and still held by some groups, is to use immigration to solve labour shortages when the labour market is tight. This view arises from the fallacy of composition; the belief that what is true for the part is true for the whole. The immigration of carpenters might

solve the labour shortages in the building industry but the new carpenters’ expenditure would generate shortages elsewhere. It can be shown that the newly created shortage exceeds the solved shortage (or substantial imports are generated) so the general use of immigration to solve short run problems arising from a tight labour market is self-defeating (Monetary and Economic Council, 1966).

 

A variation of this argument, which was popular during the 1975 election campaign, was that the immigrants caused the housing shortages or high housing prices at the time. The actual reasons for the housing market situation were vastly more complex than the crude immigration argument suggests (Easton, 1976b) although there can be no doubt that immigration was a factor (Monetary and Economic Council, 1966). However, it needs to be remembered that, compared with the established New Zealander, the immigrant is likely to have an intense housing usage on arrival so that, for instance, an immigrant replacing an emigrant is likely to increase the amount of housing stock available to the remainder. Moreover, new arrivals tend to concentrate in particular housing areas, so that the element of truth in the analysis can easily be converted into a prejudice.

 

The compounding of this prejudice with racial prejudice, as appears to have happened with Pacific Islanders, is especially ironic for they are particularly likely to have a low housing usage. After Labour Weekend, 1976, the police reported eight Pacific Islanders sleeping in a garage. The motorcar population might be entitled to object to the effect of immigration on their housing, but clearly in this case the human population should be ashamed rather than prejudiced.

 

In fact the Pacific Islander on a temporary work permit may be the one exception to the conclusion of the uselessness of immigration for solving short term tight labour market problems. His aim is to save rather than spend, and he is likely to be a low utilizer of physical capital. His net effect may be to reduce the labour shortage. However, this analysis has the implication that when the labour market slackens the temporary migration is terminated. In effect we export our unemployment to the Pacific Islands, and the termination of the remittances from New Zealand can have a disastrous effect upon the Island economies. It is hypocritical to talk of the temporary immigration of Islanders as a form of foreign aid when we both promote it and terminate it for our own benefit.

 

If, with the possible exception of Pacific Islanders, immigration for short term reasons is rejected, is there a case for it as a part of long term strategy? For those who support a larger population the answer is clearly ‘yes’, and those who are against any population growth the answer is equally clearly ‘no’. But how should it be viewed by those who do not place the population level as the highest priority?

 

From the preceding discussion it is clear that immigration which involves the acquisition of a high quantity of human capital may well benefit New Zealand. Practically, this means the immigration of skilled or professional labour of which there is likely to be a long term deficit from New Zealand sources, usually because we cannot train such personnel ourselves.

 

Even so, the skill must be an appropriate one. For instance, imported engineers whose experiences are based upon production scales far in excess of anything realizable in New Zealand may insist upon entirely inappropriate technologies. Another instance is the foreign social scientist who believes hisown culture is universal and uncritically interprets New Zealand society in its light; an individual only too familiar, even in the 1970s.

It is also important that the migration policy does not inhibit the provision of the internal supply of the skill. Our technical education programmes have been set back at least a decade because we thought we could import suitable technical and skilled workers. Moreover, another problem was created since the imported worker has often been better qualified and hence entitled to higher status, pay, and more opportunity, than his equally able New Zealand coworker. This has been an understandable if unfortunate source of antagonism towards British immigrants.

 

We need also to note the adjustment problems of the new arrival, which may be unmeasurable but are all too obvious. They appear sufficiently large to make some apparently viable immigration proposals socially expensive. On the other hand, equally unmeasurable are the benefits, particularly for a small society, of the extra diversity of experience which the foreigner brings with him. Finally, we need to note that if New Zealand gets free human capital from the immigrant it has to supply the associated physical capital, a point well appreciated by Vogel in the 1870s whose schemes involved both immigration and overseas borrowing.

 

Overall, then, immigration as a long term supply of human capital is not as attractive as some of its advocates argue. Paradoxically though, since there may be more human capital in the immigrant’s wife and children than in the individual himself, the immigration of families is more attractive.

 

Emigration

 

Emigration is largely the converse of immigration. Typically it involves the loss to New Zealand of human capital, and the release of the associated physical capital to the rest of the community. Generally emigrants are high in human capital, and probably involve a net loss to the community. In many cases this loss will be more than recovered later if and when the New Zealander returns with the benefit of the alternative overseas experience.

 

However, the right to emigrate to a country which will accept him is considered one of the civil liberties of the New Zealander. Moreover, a small country must accept that it will be unable to cater for all the abilities of its population. We must be delighted that a Rutherford is able to pursue his studies overseas, even if we are sad to lose him.

 

There may be a case for some sort of discouragement on those whose human capital is partly the consequence of large social expenditures. An obvious example is that of medical graduates. A possible procedure might be to treat university costs as an interest free suspensory loan which need not be repaid if a doctor carried out 10 years service in New Zealand. There would need to be provision for postgraduate training overseas. Thus there would be no restriction upon the graduate leaving New Zealand but an economic charge if he did not repay the community contribution to his earning power. For reasons of equity the scheme would need to be applied to all university graduates, although for many the public costs of their tertiary education is quite low. Perhaps the first 3 years at university might be treated as a gift.

 

Although in the past, economists have concentrated upon the economics of immigration, the rising levels of emigration suggest that more attention will have to be paid to that aspect.

 

The regional balance

 

There is almost a national consensus that New Zealand is facing severe problems in the regional balance of its population, particularly with the drift to Auckland, and to a lesser extent with urbanization. The problem arises because internal migration is determined by private decisions, concerned only with private costs and benefits. The consequent social expenditure follows these private decisions. It appears that the social costs of population moving to Auckland have been outweighing the extra private benefits of the move, and similarly rural areas and the South Island have been suffering social costs of out-migration in excess of the private benefits. These extra social costs were mentioned in the discussions on the infrastructure and economies of scale, and the social problems of rapid population growth.

 

So far New Zealand has tried to meet the problem of regional unbalance by neglect (in the 1960s) and vague indicative planning with a few regional subsidies (in the 1970s). Neither policy has been particularly effective. The only policy likely to be effective is to curb directly the growth of Auckland by price or administrative means while building up alternative growth nodes. It appears that either Auckland industry should be charged for the extra social costs of growth in Auckland (which may partially occur through local authority rates if a policy of neglect is continued) or by restricting employment growth in the Auckland area by requiring approval for a firm to increase its size.

 

Unfortunately the degree of parochialism in New Zealand makes the choice of alternative growth nodes invidious. It seems likely that in the north there should be greater concentrations in Hamilton, Rotorua, and Tauranga as alternatives to Auckland. With the Kaimai tunnel now completed, Tauranga could well become much more important as a port. In the south, Christchurch will have to grow in order to generate opportunities in the remainder of the South Island, but this growth must not be at the expense of the remainder. At present Wellington would seem to be an inappropriate growth node, unless it divested itself of some of its governmental activities through a devolution of central Government powers to local decision makers.

 

Population and economic perfromance

 

The preceding discussion has indicated that there will be no simple, brief, comprehensive summary of the effect of population growth on economic performance; and the opposite issue is not even being touched upon. However, the following broad brush conclusion might be fair.

 

The postwar increase in the reproduction rate which led to a near doubling of the New Zealand population in the 30 years after the Second World War places a very great strain upon the economy, through its human capital and physical capital investment requirements, and on society through the pressure on urban social structures. On the other hand we might consider the period as one where although the material growth rate performance was not great, the country increased its investment in its human capital stock and this investment will be realized in the future in terms of greater material growth with the falling population growth rate of the future.

 

We might also conclude that at least part of the strain arose not so much from the growth itself, as from failure to face the issue. It is not difficult to write down a check list of viable policies which could have substantially improved the integration between the population growth and economic performance. That we permissively permitted the excessive growth of Auckland, ran an immigration programme based upon short term expedients, neglected the parental, pre-school, and health role in human capital formation, and ignored the problem of unwanted children is undeniable. Whether these failures were the result of a lack of knowledge, foresight, or political will must be debated elsewhere.

 

The next 30 years are likely to be very different. The birth rate is falling close to, and perhaps below, replacement levels. Economic conditions over the next decade are likely to result in a net immigration close to zero, or even negative. Investment in human capital and associated physical capital for the population increase is likely to be a lower proportion of economic activity.

 

The result could well be higher growth levels in our material standard of living, higher labour productivity, and higher female participation in the workforce. On the other hand if our balance of payments remain in the desperate situation of the 1973 to 1978 period, we may instead experience continuing unemployment and net emigration.

 

Future policy prospects

 

I cannot conceive of a future world which at some stage does not have a long run constant population. This being so, we might as well start thinking of zero population growth now, even if we are a few generations off stability. One hopes that we can reach that state without a desperate economic collapse. I must confess that recent population trends throughout the world make me more optimistic than I was a decade ago, but it still could be a near thing.

 

If the whole world is to have a net reproduction rate of unity, then New Zealand must have a similar one. We are already close to it, and the one area where I see a need for action is in the reduction of unwanted children. I should be sorry if we were to go markedly below unity because it would show a lack of faith in ourselves as a nation.

 

However, even if the world experiences zero population growth, there seems to me to be a strong case for some growth of the New Zealand population through net immigration, so that the population of the world is more evenly spread. Such migration should take place without excessive short term economic pressures upon New Zealand, and within a context of our growing cultural and social autonomy (which, I hasten to add, is certainly not the same thing as racial autonomy). Fortunately ours is a migrant’s culture, so it would be easier for us to respect the contribution of the immigrant than for some nations with a different history (Easton, 1976c). However, we shall have to think carefully about how we are to cope with the extra population although I do not think the problem is insurmountable.

 

I have suggested that while the economy is depressed there is likely to be zero or negative immigration. Nonetheless the substantial emigration, amounting to over 1.5 per cent of population each year will have to be replaced at least in part. Thus there is a need for a policy stance towards immigration, even if we decide that New Zealand already has its share of the world population.

 

Firstly we need to know more about the reasons for emigration and particularly whether there are New Zealanders overseas who would like to return, but cannot for reasons with which we can deal. Secondly, while the Pacific Islands’ intentions remain unclear, it is likely that we will have to take a larger share of the South Pacific Polynesian population in New Zealand. This could easily be improved the integration between the population growth and economic performance. That we permissively permitted the excessive growth of Auckland, ran an immigration programme based upon short term expedients, neglected the parental, pre-school, and health role in human capital formation, and ignored the problem of unwanted children is undeniable. Whether these failures were the result of a lack of knowledge, foresight, or political will must be debated elsewhere.

 

The next 30 years are likely to be very different. The birth rate is falling close to, and perhaps below, replacement levels. Economic conditions over the next decade are likely to result in a net immigration close to zero, or even negative. Investment in human capital and associated physical capital for the population increase is likely to be a lower proportion of economic activity.

 

The result could well be higher growth levels in our material standard of living, higher labour productivity, and higher female participation in the workforce. On the other hand if our balance of payments remain in the desperate situation of the 1973 to 1978 period, we may instead experience continuing unemployment and net emigration.

 

Future policy prospects

 

I cannot conceive of a future world which at some stage does not have a long run constant population. This being so, we might as well start thinking of zero population growth now, even if we are a few generations off stability. One hopes that we can reach that state without a desperate economic collapse. I must confess that recent population trends throughout the world make me more optimistic than I was a decade ago, but it still could be a near thing.

 

If the whole world is to have a net reproduction rate of unity, then New Zealand must have a similar one. We are already close to it, and the one area where I see a need for action is in the reduction of unwanted children. I should be sorry if we were to go markedly below unity because it would show a lack of faith in ourselves as a nation.

 

However, even if the world experiences zero population growth, there seems to me to be a strong case for some growth of the New Zealand population through net immigration, so that the population of the world is more evenly spread. Such migration should take place without excessive short term economic pressures upon New Zealand, and within a context of our growing cultural and social autonomy (which, I hasten to add, is certainly not the same thing as racial autonomy). Fortunately ours is a migrant’s culture, so it would be easier for us to respect the contribution of the immigrant than for some nations with a different history (Easton, 1976c). However, we shall have to think carefully about how we are to cope with the extra population although I do not think the problem is insurmountable.

 

I have suggested that while the economy is depressed there is likely to be zero or negative immigration. Nonetheless the substantial emigration, amounting to over 1.5 per cent of population each year will have to be replaced at least in part. Thus there is a need for a policy stance towards immigration, even if we decide that New Zealand already has its share of the world population.

 

Firstly we need to know more about the reasons for emigration and particularly whether there are New Zealanders overseas who would like to return, but cannot for reasons with which we can deal. Secondly, while the Pacific Islands’ intentions remain unclear, it is likely that we will have to take a larger share of the South Pacific Polynesian population in New Zealand. This could easily be seen as a great problem, but it is better regarded as a challenge which needs to be tackled positively in consultation and concern with the Pacific Island communities. Given that the proportion of their populations involved may be substantial, and their migrants may be low in human capital (but not in human worth) it is likely to be both in their interests and ours that the migration be orderly and slow. It may well be that temporary migration with the Islander returning to his community may be very important, and certainly if the Islands ask we should give them every reasonable assistance to maintain their population and cultural autonomy.

 

Migrants who do not originate in the South Pacific require a different approach. Undoubtedly we shall continue to select immigrants high in human capital. From earlier discussions it follows that we should not see this as a long term major supply of certain skills, but as supplements or initiating programmes to build up internal supply.

 

This is not the only change of approach to migration that is needed. The earlier recognition of the human capital in the remainder of the approved migrant’s family suggests that selection should consciously adopt a family capital point of view. A family with a skilled (though not necessarily working) mother, and adolescent children already demonstrating ability or with some occupational training, may be an attractive immigration proposition. Providing such immigration is a long term strategy there seems to be no reason why the number of immigrant children per family should be restricted.

 

As a long term immigration programme will involve further physical capital formation and this is the main reason migration programmes are likely to be restricted during the current economic depression, the extra savings need to be found either domestically or by borrowing. Immigrants’ own funds and gratis gifts from countries who support emigration of their nationals could also be helpful.

 

Given the expected emigration rate of New Zealanders, it is unlikely that the proportion of foreign born living in New Zealand will decrease much below the current 10 per cent (excluding those born in the Pacific Islands and Australia). Strategy towards the origin of these immigrants will need reviewing, particularly if one of the advantages of such immigration is the cultural diversity it makes possible. The preponderance of British foreigners is partly the result of lethargy arising from historical practice and partly the mistaken belief that culturally New Zealand is like Britain. The contribution of non-British minorities such as the Chinese, the nineteenth century Scandinavians, the middle European refugees from Nazism, and North Americans in the last decade or so has far exceeded their numerical size, and suggests that such a policy could remain productive. One step would be to encourage immigration of groups already well established and integrated in New Zealand such as the Chinese and Dutch. If the international regional balance is a major reason for any immigration programme migrants from South and South East Asia should also be considered. Providing it is controlled to prevent exploitation, the adoption of young Asian children into New Zealand families may be a viable policy.

 

Finally if overseas experience is seen as advantageous to New Zealanders, involving them in short term migration, returning after, say, 3 years perhaps a complementary programme should be considered for short term migrants here, with the understanding that if they like us enough we will consider allowing them to stay. We already practise the first part of such a programme for Asian students.

 

Conclusions

 

The relationship between the economy and the population is by no means a simple one. Yet there is no reason for neglect. The neglect in the past with regard to economic and social policy has been illustrated throughout this chapter. But there has also been an academic neglect. In the past, studies in New Zealand have been between the wishful and fragmentary, and for a variety of reasons conclusions from foreign studies are not particularly appropriate.

 

In advocating more attention to this study area, and the related one of manpower (or is it personpower?) planning, we are not yet advocating further official committees stacked with the benevolent, the inexpert, the part time, and the token representative.[6] Our real need is for systematic research; that is the payment of full time social scientists supported by adequate facilities to explore further the issues raised in this chapter.

 

Notes

1 For some peculiar reason the National Development Council used an output rather than a consumption measure of welfare (National Development Council, 1972, 1).

2 A good summary of the collapse of the conventional wisdom’s aggregate production function is to be found in Harcourt and Laing (1971).

3 Details of the calculation are available from the author. The human capital is the expected net market output, that is, factor income less health, education, and parent-care expenditure discounted at 7.5 per cent.

4 The discount rate for human capital is higher than the return on personal wealth, which has the effect of undervaluing human wealth. On the other hand the estimate for wealth held by government includes only items for which a return or imputation is made in the national accounts.

5 The post-2001 projections are the author’s.

6 Such as is proposed in Task Force on Economic and Social Planning (1976, 73).

 

References

Department of Statistics (1973) New Zealand Population Projections 1971-2001. Government Printer, Wellington.

(1976a) 1976 Census of Population and Dwellings: Provisional National Statistics, Bulletin 2, Wellington.

(1976b) National Income and Expenditure 1974-75, Government Printer, Wellington. Easton, B.H. (1973) A Needs Index, mimeographed.

(1974) ‘Financing of medicine,’ in D.W. Beaven and B.H. Easton (eds), The Future of New Zealand Medicine: A Progressive View, Peryer, Christchurch, 91 –97.

(1976a) ‘Poverty in New Zealand: estimates and reflections,’ Political Science, 28, 127-40.

(1976b) ‘The New Zealand housing market,’ New Zealand Economic Papers, 10, 1-29.

(1976c) ‘These islands now,’ New Zealand Monthly Review, 17, November, 1-2.     (1977) ‘The economic life cycle of the family,’ Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology, 13, 1, 85-89.

(1980) The New Zealand Income Distribution, New Zealand Institute of Economic Research, Wellington.

Harcourt, G.C. and Laing, N. (1971) Capital Growth, Penguin, London.

Hicks, J.R. (1948) The Trade Cycle, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Mishan, E. (1967) The Costs of Economic Growth, Staples Press, London.

Monetary and Economic Council (1966) Increased Immigration and the New Zealand Economy, Government Printer, Wellington.

National Development Council, Targets Advisory Group (1972) Growth for Better Living, Government Printer, Wellington.

Ogilvy, B.J. (1970) ‘A cost benefit study of education in New Zealand,’ New Zealand Journal of Educational Studies, 5, 1, 33-46.

Rosenberg, W. (1977) ‘Full employment: the fulcrum of social welfare,’ in A.D. Trlin (ed) Social Welfare and New Zealand Society, Methuen, Wellington, 45-60.

Royal Commission of Inquiry (1976) Social Security in New Zealand: Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry, Government Printer, Wellington.

Task Force on Economic and Social Planning (1976) New Zealand at the Turning Point, Wellington.