Data Doldrums: The State Of the Economy Won’t Do National Any Favours in The Poll

Listener: 23 October, 1999

Keywords: Macroeconomics & Money;

Two major economic indicators for the June quarter were released a couple of days before the Prime Minister announced the election date. Both were depressing: the current account deficit – how much New Zealand has to borrow overseas – was at near record levels; while GDP – how much New Zealand produces – declined. There will be no further major official statistics released before November 27th, although the importance of each minor one will be over-played. (Both the Treasury and the Reserve Bank macro-economic forecasts published during the election campaign are likely to be more subdued in comparison to their last ones.)

It is easy to dismiss the two official statistics as aberations. Some commentators did, while the financial markets panicked, driving down the exchange rate and share prices. There is measurement error and random events so we should treat each statistic with caution. Nevertheless the new ones belong to a coherent account of the economy.

The mid 1990s were dominated by one of our longest and strongest post-war economic booms, attributable to a recovery from the stagnation of the 1980s, a sharp rise in our terms of trade (although the relative prices of exports have since fallen back), and a strong world economy. The economy went into downswing in early 1997 (just after the election), but not for long, because of the coalition public spending in the second half of 1997, which lifted the economy into a mild cyclical upswing. It was quenched by the Asian Financial Crisis with its collapse of key export markets. The July 1998 income tax cuts expanded the economy again in late 1998. The most recent expansion seems to be weak (according to the recently published data), and it may even be over.

It is easy to explain the weakness on special factors: the drought did not help farm production, while the hike in world oil prices is raising the import bill and reducing consumers’ effective spending. But such explanations are reminiscent of children who explain all their successes in terms of their beauty, intelligence, grace and wisdom, and all their failures on events outside their control.

The fiscal packages of 1997 and 1998 prove that a government can internally reflate an economy, by increasing domestic spending. But that does not address the external sector, and much of the spending goes on imports. Thus the stimulus of the package is weak on the production side, so the domestic reinforcing (multiplier) effects are muted as imports rise, and the spending blows out through the current account. Unless external conditions are very favourable, we experience weak, fragile upswings easily knocked over by external shocks. There will be another recovery as exports expand again, but those based on domestic expansion (by reducing the fiscal surplus) cannot contribute to prosperity in the short term without compromising the balance of payments.

When will this end? The short answer – which makes we economic commentators appear ignorant (if honest) – is that no one knows. A slightly longer one is that the phase ends when the hooks holding up the US sharemarket fall out of the sky, and the slump in share prices reduces the world’s willingness to loan each New Zealanders the $US20 or so a week, we each need to pay for extra imports. (Another possibility is when the Chinese financial system falls over, with a similar effect. I am assured by experts that the worries of a few months ago no longer appertain. Be very afraid.)

A third possible ending is to change economic policy. I agree with the broad direction of the “Knowledge Economy” package which recognizes that the government can positively influence the production process. But there is also a need to address the tradeable sector. New Zealanders have a huge appetite for foreign exchange. If we cannot earn enough, while given that heavy borrowing is unsustainable and direct import restrictions are likely to be largely ineffective, a reduction in incomes seems inevitable. That means higher unemployment and a lower standard of living.

My forecast is that the economy will look less prosperous a month after the election, than it does a month before. That has happened for most past elections.

Pop Goes the Bubble? Think Of the Sharemarket As a High Chain Letter.

Listener 9 October, 1999.

Keywords: Business & Finance;

Every time a share is sold, someone else buys it. So the dollars that someone puts into the sharemarket to buy shares equals the amount the ex-shareholders takes out. Suppose there are more people who want to put dollars in than who want to take them out. The potential buyers will have to give an incentive to some shareholders to turn their shares into cash. That inducement is the price of the share going up. So if cash is trying to get into the sharemarket, the prices of shares rise: if cash is trying to get out, they fall. However, in the actual trading the amount of cash that gets in equals the amount that gets out.

Why is the cash trying to get into a share market? Usually it is because the potential buyers think they will get a better return on their money owning shares than in any other investment. Firms pay dividends to shareholders, so hanging onto shares means a flow of dividend receipts over time. Dividends are risky. The amount paid varies from year to year: sometimes it is nothing; sometimes the firm goes bankrupt and never pays another dividend or other cash payments to the shareholders. That is why shareholders expect a higher return than if they invest in fixed interest securities.

A measure of the return on shares is the “price to earnings ratio” – the share price divided by the profits per share (including dividends) of the firm. Currently the P/E (pronounced “P to E”) ratio in the New Zealand share market averages over 20. So the typical share price is twenty-plus times the maximum dividends it could prudently pay. That is an annual return of less than 5 percent. But one can get a safe uninspiring 6.8 percent p.a. or so, by investing in government stock. Why go into a risky investment for a lower return?

Perhaps the business is going to get better. Corporate earnings may not be attractive this year, but next year they might rise, and continue to rise thereafter. The return on government stock is the same each year. But there is a more exciting reason for investing in shares. Every time money pushes into the sharemarket, share prices go up, so shareholders see themselves better off. Those who sell the shares now have more cash. What to do with it? Reinvest it in the sharemarket. With luck share prices will rise again.

So each time a share is sold at a higher price, somebody is paying for it at the higher price. It is like a chain letter. You send $100 to the person at the top of the list of five, strike the name off, added yours to the bottom, and send it to five more people. If everyone kept to the chain, you would eventually get $2500 for the cost of five postage stamps. This cannot go on indefinitely: eventually the scheme will collapse. Some would have made money, but at the expense of those lower on the list. The sharemarket is a little different because of dividends, but the low returns implied by the high P/E ratios suggest people are not in for them.

The jargon for when share prices cannot be sustained by corporate earnings is called a “speculative bubble”. Almost everyone knows the overpricing from expecting further capital gains cannot go on indefinitely, but they are hoping they get to the “top of the chain” before the bubble pops.

Is the New Zealand sharemarket a bubble? The US sharemarket is, and some of its speculative money has flown into New Zealand driving up our share prices, fuelling local greed. When the international bubble bursts, as it surely will one day, New Zealand share prices will fall too – probably dramatically – as everyone tries to cash up, getting their money out of the sharemarket. What happens to the economy? That is another column, which I dont have to write yet. For clues, look at what happened after the 1929 and 1987 crashes.

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From Listener 28 August, 1999

Appreciating the Sharemarket

The regular grumblings in the financial pages about the poor performance of the New Zealand share prices in the last decade reflects a longer problem. In a 65 year period, New Zealand share prices rose 30 percent less than production prices: their real capital appreciation was negative. I could not believe it at first, but there it is in the graphs of my In Stormy Seas (Figures 6.6, 16.3) which Americans Phillippe Jordion and William Goetzmann spliced together (I did not). But their study of the world’s sharemarkets shows New Zealand’s share performance is not that different from the average. It the US which is unusual, with an average increase of 4.3 percent a year more than production prices. Once again we learn the danger of treating the US as “normal.”

The poor performance does not mean it is unwise to invest in shares. Tax effects are important, the data does not allow for dividend payments, and alternative investments may be worse. But be cautious. Those who expected to make a sharemarket killing in the low inflation last 1990s have been surprised. They should have looked at the data.

Trading Platitudes: Review Of Apec in Focus, by S. McMillan, B. Ramasamy,

New Zealand Books, October 1999, p.3-4.

Keywords: Globalisation & Trade;

Malcolm Templeton’s Human Rights and Sporting Contacts and Trevor Richards’ Dancing on our Bones are about the same issue although sometimes the reader might think they were in different countries, so different are their perspectives: Templeton provides a comprehensive account of New Zealand’s fraught relationship with apartheid South Africa in the context of New Zealand’s entire foreign diplomacy; Richards’ account is that of the much vilified, but eventually successful (nowadays even respected), protest movement which he led.

Living as I do, on the margins of Wellington Establishment and many protest movements, but closely observing both, I am struck by the enormous difference between their perspectives. Both writers are deeply oppose racism, so one might think they were on the same side (which often happened to be different from the politicians they respectfully served and harangued). Yet each occasionally frags the other. Neither quite comprehends the constraints the other faces: the officials attempting to provide coherence to a foreign policy of which this was but one aspect, the protesters committed to single objective, but riven by tactical and strategic divisions. To say that our diplomats often have a better grasp of other countries’ internal activities than they do of New Zealand’s is perhaps too glib. But I am continually struck by the lack of understanding of government officials from all sorts of departments about anything that is going on north of Tawa or south of The Strait. On the other hand the dissenters seem to have as little understanding of what goes on in between (which is one of the reasons that those in opposition often make ineffective contributions when they are in government).

In another context I would now explore the politicians, the so-called hams in the sandwich. But here my remarks are preliminary to a review of the APEC debate where again the officials and the public could be well in different countries. This time there appears to be no commonality of ultimate objective which is not platitudinous. Moreover economic issues seem to me to be more technical, so it is not merely a matter of the path to attain the end, were it able to be agreed upon.

While I have referred to the “APEC debate”, APEC is symbolic of the wider issue of New Zealand’s role in an increasingly globalized world. Were APEC to vanish, the debate would continue just as ferociously. APEC is especially prominent in 1999 because the annual conference of its members is here, and because the government has chosen to make that conference a key part of its re-election prospects. I doubt it will get as much purchase as the 1981 Tour did. But in a year in which everything else the National government has done seemed to turn sour (if it was even noticed), while things it did not do captured the headlines, APEC must seem a jewel in a battered tiara. (One must say that the professionalism of the foreign affairs ministry has shone through, compared to the disaster of the management of the millennium celebrations, giving a new significance to the expression of being unable to organize a piss-up in a brewery.)

APEC, formed in 1989 when the Australians, in particular, became nervous about weakening of international commitment to globalisation and the dangers of the consolidation of economic blocs, may be an appropriate symbol for globalization. (The EU bloc was the main concern, but the US was also showing signs of isolationism). Thus was promoted a regional grouping around the Pacific Basin. (The “Asia” of the title is anomalous for every member state has a Pacific coastline, while some major Asian economies – especially those of South Asia and the Middle East – are omitted.) It is a loose federation – membership is voluntary – platitudes are spoken, motions are passed, and promises are made. There is no enforcement mechanism.

It is true that the members have committed themselves to free trade and investment in the region by 2010 for developed countries and 2020 for the developing ones. I do not know of any thoughtful observer who expects these commitments to be met in total, although there should be some progress. One will not be surprised if they are hardly met at all. A decade and two is a long time in an economic policy regime. The Bogor meeting in 1994 did not envisage the Asian crisis of the late 1990s, which has led to some members expressing doubts they will not be able to meet the goal. There will be new political leaders in 2020, there may not even then be an APEC as we know, or can project, it today.

If the commitments are met, it will be more to do with each country deciding that the winding back of protection is in the economy’s internal interest. There is a standard economic argument for this. Tariffs, it is said, are penalties on the unprotected (typically export oriented) industries of an economy. Eliminating them benefits the growth-oriented sectors.

New Zealand has made a fetish of extending this approach to a ‘trading naked’ extremism, the term for the strategy of stripping away all interventions, derived from the image of someone at a picnic taking off all their clothes in the hope that others will follow. While we have claimed extraordinary benefits from the strategy, the objective evidence is an embarrassingly poor economic performance: rising unemployment, poor productivity increases, modest economic growth funded by rising overseas debt. The punchline is the rest of the picnic looks at the naked one, and puts on another jersey.

How New Zealand chose the trading naked strategy is a puzzle. I am not sure that the official papers, had we access to all of them, would throw much light. My impression is that its adoption has been ideological – a misinterpretation of what economic theory has to say. Certainly most first year economics courses demonstrate that under certain conditions free trade maximizes economic output. Understandably, those whose ‘peter level’ is Stage I economics are impressed by the elegant result, and do not notice the multitude of assumptions, or go on to look at a variety of conditions where free trade is not optimal. Economists tend to acknowledge them, and then debate whether the deviations from the assumptions are sufficiently large to justify an alternative strategy to free trade. I have no sense that such a debate went on within the New Zealand policy community, or that the complicated judgements that an extreme free trade stance involves were ever made. If there had been a more strategic approach to liberalisation would surely have taken place, rather than the tearing off all clothes.

One political factor is that while the extremism of New Zealand may have done little for the New Zealand economy, or even damaged it, some powerful groups benefited, or thought they did. Undoubtedly the last decade’s economic policy has been very comforting to the finance sector and they in turn have supported it in their self-interest under the misapprehension that what was good for them was good for the nation. The export-oriented resource sector, especially farmers, also thought the strategy would be beneficial, but their gains have been minimal – far less than the advocates promised. Not unsurprisingly the farmers have turned against the National government, although they are split between those who want to intensify the strategy, and those who have doubts.

The difficulty for the public debate is that if the extremist policies are unconvincing, unproven and failed, it does not prove that all strategies which embrace globalisation are as equally unsatisfactory. One has a sense that the (non-farmer) anti-APEC protesters believe both propositions, but their rhetoric is only about the extremist policy options. Many of the pro-APEC supporters appear to see the same limited two.

It is a fundamental requirement of democracy that good government requires an informed public. I have heard enough of both sides’ rhetoric on APEC and globalisation to be confident we have not got one. The danger arises if, as argued in my recently published The Whimpering of the State: Policy after MMP, policy outcomes under the new electoral regime are going to reflect more closely what the public think, rather than what they are told is good for them. If so, poor quality debate about – and poor understanding of – trade policy, will lead to poor quality policy. Conceivably, given a public which sees the choice between trading naked and high protectionism, we could get a government which pursues the latter, which is likely to lead to just as disappointing outcomes as the former has. Over-dressed at a picnic means at the very least going a short on vitamin D, and hardly being able to move means missing out on the fun.

How one raises public understanding is barely addressed, because each side is concerned with ideology rather than education, which requires putting both sides of the case, and encouraging the hearers to make their own evaluation. Government departments are poorly placed to carry out this task, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade especially so, given its outward looking direction, and its poor connection with the wider population. Admittedly the ministry supports the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, but that mainly provides a reasonably independent bridge between the diplomats and the Wellington (and wider) Establishment. In any case its interests tend to be in politics rather than economics. This NZIIA member cannot recall a single attempt to grapple with economic globalisation qua economics by a wide debate on the economic issues and options. On those occasions where there has been some nibbling at the topic, the range of expert views has been tightly circumscribed and the discussion has been confined to the platitudinous.

THE NZIIA’s situation is well captured in its publication APEC in Focus. This slim volume – no longer than a long academic paper – is in two parts. Two thirds is an essay jointly written by Stuart McMillan, ex-leader writer at the Christchurch Press and Bala Ramasamy, a senior lecturer in economics at Universiti Tenga Nasional, Malaysia. It compares and contrasts their respective countries’ official attitudes to APEC. It is a useful exercise for it clearly shows that different members can have quite different attitudes to the organization (and probably to globalisation).

But the key element is left out, because there is no mention of the actual trade (and related internal) policies of the two countries. One only need recall Robert Muldoon on sporting links to know that politicians can make all sorts of promises for international consumption, and practice quite different policies domestically. My impression is that New Zealand’s external presentation is not too different from its practices, but I am less sure of Malaysia. I refer not only to prime minister Mahathir Mohamad’s widely publicized statements following the onset of the Asian crisis. I have spent some time looking at motor vehicle manufacturing. Malaysia, like other East Asian producers, has a record of protection and assistance which would fuel every prejudice of an anti-APEC protestor. Perhaps the NZIIA is constrained from looking too closely at domestic policies, but an opportunity to inform has been missed. Of course there is useful information in the booklet. For instance it reports that our foreign ministry argues for APEC in terms of a platform which gives New Zealand more leverage in world affairs, an objective which need not be compromised by a more cautious approach to globalisation than trading naked. Readers of the Templeton book will appreciate the importance of international platforms, although the protesters may ignore the complexities of international diplomacy (until they want New Zealand to take action on some foreign human rights or environmental breach).

I take it that the New Zealand-Malaysian comparison was seen to be too thin by itself, and a paper on ‘The Asia Pacific Region: Competition and (sic) Co-operation or Confrontation?’ by NZIIA president Frank Holmes was bolted on to bulk the publication. This does Holmes no service, for it is a paper first presented in October 1998, with a backward look at the Asian crisis (already then over a year old), quoting a limited number of sources, and providing neither great insight nor a comprehensive overview. (As I write all informed eyes are on China, on which the essay provides no guidance.) There are important and uncomfortable things to be said about the Asian Crisis, the way it is leading to a re-evaluation of Asian growth and prospects, and how that will impact on APEC. (A detailed study of the motor vehicle industry would provide insights). Sadly the opportunity was missed.

Perhaps I am asking too much. This booklet may be for the foreign affairs corps, their local friends, and their overseas equivalents. It is not one to give the more thoughtful anti-APEC protestors (yes there are some, and some even for the turning) and expect them to become much better informed.

In many ways APEC is a distraction from the real issue of globalisation. If there is any international institution we should be focusing on, it is the World Trade Organization, with its power to make binding decisions on international trade malpractices. (One might regret that did not meet in New Zealand in 1999.) Most of all, we need to be thinking about globalisation far more rigorously than either the shouting match which has dominated the public debate on trade policy, or the tiptoeing around the crucial issues which seems to go on within the two camps. Until we do, we are likely to be left with an international trade and domestic industrial policy inimical to the interests of the New Zealand, either because it is extreme, or because a moderate one is crudely applied. It is far from clear how we move to a more sophisticated debate. If the result of the 1999 focus on APEC is a review which concludes “could do better,” we may be at last on that way.

Books referred to in this review.
B. Easton The Whimpering of the State: Policy after MMP (Auckland University Press)
S. McMillan, B. Ramasamy, & F. Holmes APEC in Focus (Lincoln University Press and Daphne Brasell Associates, in association with the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs)
T. Richard Dancing on our Bones (Bridget Williams Books)
M. Templeton Human Rights and Sporting Contacts (Auckland University Press)

Picking Winners:

To enhance economic growth the government needs to stimulate economic change.
Listener 25 September, 1999.

Keywords: Growth & Innovation;

Those who proposed the early 1990s science sector reforms knew little about scientific research or economics. Just as the innkeeper Procrustes required all guests to fit his beds exactly, commercialisation was imposed on all activities. So the DSIR was replaced with a Ministry for Research Science and Technology for policy advice, a Foundation for funding, and commercially oriented Crown Research Institutes as the state research providers. The ideologically driven reforms soon proved cumbersome and inefficient. They are now being reversed, towards where they it would have been, had pragmatism and commonsense been more prominent in the early 1990s.

Thus the mid-August “knowledge economy” package. It was criticized for being ineffectually small (calling it “bright future” was not a bright idea), but its real importance is a signal of the redirection of economic policy. As Science Minister Maurice Williamson admitted, market forces could not always be left to themselves. The package represents a shift from that theory of growth – that the forces would do it all by themselves – which has been so ineffective over the last 15 years. The government is now into “picking winners” – some sorts of economic activities are more growth enhancing than others, and it reinforces them. (Williamson said his admission might sound like swearing in church. Perhaps it was more like popping into the TAB with the collection.)

As I wrote in my column, View From Abroad: What Do We Know About Economic Growth? (May 22, 1999) economists know little about what drives economic growth. But the little we do know suggests that advances in knowledge are intimately involved. To enhance growth prospects the government needs to stimulate technological change. Much of what it does will be wasted. Every “winner” will not win. The aim is to win enough to pay all the bets. To do so pick fast horses – technology is one of the fastest. Even so, I have some doubts with the current strategy.

First the package is too small. A key component of the knowledge economy is our tertiary institutions. They are desperately underfunded. The University of Auckland has only 72 percent per student of what Sydney University has. Nor will the package do much to encourage firms to increase spending on research and development.

The second caveat is that package is too elitist. Notwithstanding my earlier remark that we should be spending more on tertiary education, we are also going to have to do more for ordinary workers, who are key in the application of new technology. The story is told of a firm complaining to its workers that a new piece of machinery was breaking down too often. Those manning the machine said they had never been trained to run it. That was a management failure, but the story shows how workers’ technological competence is critical. Our elite may be well prepared, but the average New Zealander is not. How else to explain the anti-scientific attitudes evident in the support for some alternative medicines? (How to explain a newspaper being gulled by a public relations campaign to give massive front page coverage to a so-called cancer cure which had not even been tested on humans?) The entire public’s scientific and technological understanding has to be raised.

Third, we know that growth in a small open economy is dependent upon the performance of the tradeable sector, which earns or saves foreign exchange by exporting and substituting for imports. The tradeable economy needs at least as much attention as the knowledge economy, although best to get the two horses in the same harness.

The August “knowledge economy” announcement is yet another backdown from the policies which have led to the past low economic performance. We are at last admitting that the government can enhance economic performance by disciplined interventions which apply across broad sectors (rather than the firm specific interventions of before 1984). But have the horse got enough oats, are the jockeys really committed to winning?

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Stable Environment?

Shortly after the knowledge economy package, its presiding minister, Max Bradford, opined that we should focus research in a few elite universities, and let the rest be confined to teaching. An obvious retort is that on current levels of funding there cannot be any internationally elite institution. More fundamentally, bet on horse not the stables they come from. Even internationally top rate universities – the Cambridges and MITs – have weak departments, while some of our polytechs run nationally (even internationally) significant programs. The commitment needs to be to the best, not to a handful of universities.

How might can this be done without heavy handed government intervention? When I was teaching at the University of Sussex in the 1960s, the British government made generous grants to top students to do graduate study in particular programs. The new university already had a world class Institute of Development Studies and Science Policy Research Unit. Our offerings to funded economics students were restricted to development economics and industrial economics. We still had to compete with other universities so the students judged our quality. This arrangement may not work for population-smaller New Zealand, but the principles of tertiary specialisation and graduate student judgement apply here too.

Global Warning: What Would Bruce Jesson Have Said About Apec?

Listener 11 September 1999

Keywords: Globalisation & Trade;

I wish Bruce Jesson were here, especially as I write this column about APEC. Bruce and I use to discuss our putative writings. Never directly of course, but after a mulling over, one of us would say “I’ve been thinking about writing a column on this issue, and …” Sadly, we dont know what Bruce would have written on the APEC conference, but there are hints in his last major article.

Following the publication of his Their Purpose is Mad Bruce wanted to write a successor book shifting from the analytic – what has happened – to the programmatic – what could happen. The strategy was to write a set of essays for the Political Review, and reconstruct them into the book if the cancer gave him time. Alas it did not, and the only part he wrote was “To Build A Nation”. (We often talked about nation building.) Now I am not going to summarise the essay (read it for yourself in the April 1999 edition). It is pregnant with ideas, in effect his final testament. In it there are clues to APEC.

Significantly, he shows an impatience with his past record: “Most of what I wrote in the 1970s was negative in tone. I attacked ….”. The new book was to have reversed that, to offer an alternative. He applied this criticism to others including, may I hazard, those who criticize APEC. It is one thing to say there is an alternative. The issue is what is it? Demonstrators tend not to have them. What is a coherent anti-APEC manifesto?

There is also a paragraph which Bruce often expressed more strongly to me. The critics do not actually tackle the economic issues. They know hardly any economics. Bruce was not, of course trained as an economist, but he was quick enough and interested enough to grasp the key issues. He placed narrow economics in the wider context of political economy, arising from his studying of Georg Hegel and Karl Marx and their successors. What I am now about to write is my best understanding of Bruce’s position, although we never discussed it in this way and I may have got him wrong.

By way of background, nineteenth century Europe was dominated by the painful transformation of industrialisation. Some socialists – Pierre-Joseph Proudhon in his Philosophy of Poverty is a prime example – argued the solution was to go back to the agrarian society which was being destroyed. Marx retorted with his Poverty of Philosophy. His thesis acknowledged the pain of industrialisation but saw it as a part of the sweep of history. The redemption was that eventually the new economy would lead to a classless society in which workers would be the beneficiaries.

Bruce almost certainly saw globalisation as parallel to, and as inescapable as, industrialisation, driven by similar material forces of history (although that may be cruder than he would have put it). His final essay is about that process. (As an aside it quotes Marx and Friedrich Engels to demonstrate globalisation was a nineteenth century phenomenon too.) Nations are integral to the global economy. It “requires national political structures, if only to provide a system of law and authority and basic economic and social infrastructures.” I have no sense that Bruce thought globalisation would necessarily lead to a better world. Rather the essay begins to explore how to build a New Zealand nation which could benefit from the opportunities globalisation creates, although it is adamant that New Zealand is currently suffering. Unfortunately we dont have the rest of the book. We’ll have to write it ourselves.

‘Well, Bruce, thanks for the ideas for the column. Are you going to demonstrate against APEC yourself?’

That engaging impish grin. ‘Think I’ll go to the demonstration against the US lamb tariffs.’ It would not just be the freezing-workers son’s solidarity with farmers. The world’s largest trading nation with its rhetoric of, and interest in, globalisation screws smaller nations when it suits its national interest.

With a Whimper: Put Public Service Back in the Public Service

Listener 28 August, 1999.

Keywords: Governance;

In the opening chapter of Das Kapital, Karl Marx wrote in 1864 how recent developments in economics had “discovered the content” of value theory. His excitement is palpable, for the labour theory of value seemed to underpin his concerns of human alienation in industrial society. Unfortunately the theory does not quite work. Marx struggled with the idea, never completing Volume 3 (the text being put together from Marx’s notes). We all have brilliant ideas, which seem to solve the problems of the universe yet, as time go by, we realise are flawed. Fortunately, like Marx, we are not usually in a position to implement our faulty theories. When we are, things can go desperately wrong.

That happened in the 1980s, when some officials thought that by running government agencies as businesses, problems with which the Treasury had been struggling would be resolved. There was no pretesting of their theory. It was directly implemented in the 1988 State Sector Act and the 1989 Public Finance Act. Unfortunately the brilliant insight has not worked. Today we see failure after failure – ranging from the fiasco over the previous auditor-general to the bizarre goings on in WINZ. The picture of the public service is of a ship of state which keeps springing leaks. Whenever the shipwrights repair one, another appears. The Prime Minister in the premier cabin, is complaining about Captain State Services Commissioner (but she chose the ship). Those manning the bilge pumps know that something is desperately wrong.

A fundamental idea behind the 1980s reforms is deeply flawed. You cannot run a public service as if it is a private business. Professor Allen Schick’s 1996 report, Spirit of Reform sets down why. The reforms were right to give public servants the freedom to manage. But they overreached themselves by trying to commercialise the public service. Imposing business practices is destructive to good public practice. The required reform is not a matter of repairs. It is a rebuilding the ship. We need to put public service back into the public service.

The most important cabinet appointment after the 1999 election will be the Minister for State Services. (The Treasurer is the key appointment, but we know whatever happens, we are going to get a good un.) In the past, the portfolio has been given to an overloaded minister, because the State Services Commission could be relied upon. But today it needs a fundamental rethink, which the Commission – busy with day-to-day management – is not going to do by itself. If the Prime Minister appoints another part-time Minister, she will find state sector problems crucifying the government, as is happening to this one. Much of the recent bad publicity is not its fault – other than it chose the vessel.

I will not preempt the likely changes. But Schick was anxious about the abandoning of input control, so we may see a return to greater SSC and parliamentary supervision of the production process (which is currently the statutory responsibility of each department’s chief executive). I shall not be surprised if the SSC gets more involved in the appointment of the second managerial tier (instead of leaving it to the CE). One important reform would be for parliament to set some rules about how MPs may criticize public servants. As ministers have avoided responsibility, the attacks on their officers have become too brutal. However, public servants cannot attack back. Parliament’s treatment of the Commissioner of Inland Revenue has not only been unacceptable, but it will inhibit any decent person taking up the job in the future. Yet the integrity of the tax system is fundamental to a civilised society (as recent sad experiences in Russia show).

The ship of the state sector is not going to sink over-night. Rather it is wallowing in the seas. Or to misquote T.S. Eliot: it goes down, not with a bang but a whimper.

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From Listener 17 July, 1999.

No 1 WINZ

Journalists joke “it fell off the back of a bus”. More often they make careful use of official resources. Recently, a senior Treasury official apologised they had nothing on a topic I asked about, but insisted sending the nearest paper. Meanwhile, a Reserve Bank official zipped back a request for some specialist data by email. All so typical it hardly bares mentioning.

Later that day I rang Work and Income New Zealand. The hostility of the officer and her supervisor was palpable. “What do you want the data for?” The Official Information Act gives the right to information without justification. (As it happens all three questions were about meticulous cross-checking of results which are unlikely to appear in public.) Eventually I was told I would get an answer in 21 (working) days. Apparently the new department has not got round to its public relations. One wonders how WINZ treats some poor sod who wants a benefit or a job.

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From Listener 9 October, 1999

Parliamentary Patronage

The revelation that all the appointed members on the Lotteries Board were National Party members does not tell us that National are the gambling experts. Rather it illustrates the practice of governments appointing their friends and relations to public office. Patronage is hardly ever studied by academics – maybe they are hopefully of being its beneficiary one day. Yet it is a fundamental lever of government, albeit one usually hidden from the public. Even if the government goes for competence, a large chunk of the able are excluded by not being politically acceptable. It is like never appointing a woman because of her gender.

MMP may break the stranglehold of the party in power over patronage appointments. There were explicit provisions in the Coalition Agreement, but that has lapsed. Better still, let’s go for a balance of appointees reflecting the balance in parliament, rather than just the politically correct. That should raise their average competence. Today it often appears that when the appointment was made, competence was judged a negative.

Income Distribution and Equity

D. Milne & J. Savage (ed) Reporting Economics: A NZ Guide to Covering the Economy, (JTO, 1999) p.103-110.

Keywords: Distributional Economics;

The morning this section was drafted, I listened to a lead story dealing with a statistical study which showed income inequality had been increasing over the last 15 years. The work was familiar because the results had been first reported three years earlier. The presentation made the New Zealand cricket team look world class. The journalists confused wealth and income, gross income and net income, income levels and income shares, and percent change and percentage point change. Deductions were drawn that simply are not in the data. Given it was one of our top news teams, the inference to any journalist faced with a story about the income distribution is “dont”.

Yet the material was newsworthy. The public cries out for this sort of information. “Is it fair” underpins many stories, in the economic, social, and criminal domains. Instructively, the interviewed spokesman for an Opposition party said the income distribution was as important as real income growth (and the government minister said it was not). How is a journalist to meet the strong public demand for discussion on equity issues, but avoid the minefield of the technical complexities? (How is this writer to pack into the space provided an adequate coverage, when writing for a technical audience is difficult enough?)

This section first explains the general issue of assessing equity, defines a few key notions in the following section, and finishes with some remarks on strategies of how one might handle economic equity stories.

Equity and Other Treacherous Concepts

As any philosopher will tell you, that most people are ready to talk about fairness, does not mean it is a rigorous concept. Economists appear to avoid the issue by referring to distributional “equity” (the noun also has sharemarket meanings). But of the nine economic dictionaries by my desk, five do not define the term, and the rest say it is “fairness”. In comparison many other well used notions – like GDP – are reasonably precisely defined.

Once economists thought they could avoid making judgments about equity, and still draw policy conclusions. To simplify, it seemed that “efficiency” could be increased without affecting economic equity. Unfortunately, as so often happens with technical jargon, the economist’s notion of efficiency is treacherous to the layperson. Economists sometimes talk about the “efficiency-equity tradeoff”, with the implication that in order to achieve greater efficiency there will has to be a loss of equity. That cannot be true, in the normal meaning of the words. Imagine a leftwing Treasurer announcing their government’s policy was “to pursue equity inefficiently”, which appears to be the commonsense meaning of the tradeoff.

Economists have some rigorous notions involving equity. Here are some common examples, although inevitably the simple exposition has suppressed caveats. Horizontal equity refers to two people in similar circumstances being treated exactly the same. Typically the similarity of circumstances includes the same income, and similar personal and family characteristics. For instance it would be equitable (i.e. fair) to give two people on the same income the same health or educational entitlements, even though one was, say, a beneficiary, the other a worker. Vertical equity is the principle that people in similar circumstances, except for different incomes, should be treated on the basis of ability to pay. This was a traditional justification for progressive income tax, but has not been a central policy principle in recent years. Intergenerational equity is a form of horizontal equity, in which the situation of different generations with similar circumstances are compared. It has been important in recent years in regard to government borrowing (which places a burden on future generations), and retirement policy. Very often we want to make comparisons involving those not “in similar circumstances”, but rigorous comparisons are not defined. It can be argued that two people are always in different circumstances.

In these various judgements income plays a major role. Economists can measure the income distribution, without necessarily making judgements about it. There are a myriads of ways of doing this, for there is no agreed universal measure. A little of the complexity is shown in the appendix table, where 17 estimates of “average” weekly income from 5 data bases – all quickly available from the 1998 New Zealand Official Year Book and the most recent (1996) census. In case the basic point be missed, another 17 could have been presented. It will be evident to the casual reader that here are treacherous waters, because anywhere between $883 a week and $244 a week can be shown to be as an average. There is not the room to go through all the lines, so a couple of examples will be sufficient.

First, I have seen enthusiastic journalists combining the average male wage and the average female wage (line 1) to get an “average” household weekly income of $1226, whereas even with benefits added in it is about $880 (lines 4,8).

Second, the ACT party proposed a private contributory superannuation scheme which appeared to be very favourable to most people compared to the state New Zealand Superannuation Scheme with the same contribution. But it was based upon the mean wage (line 1) being a fair representation of the average incomes. (Averages, means, and medians are explained in the next section.) Inspection of the table shows that it is not. Many households and adults are not in receipt of wages and salary (for a full year), and on average their income is less than average earnings. Moreover, because the distribution is skewed towards higher incomes, less than half of wage earners receive more than the mean wage. A better measure is the person in the middle of the distribution. Typically this median is 75 to 80 percent of the mean. Thus the ACT figures were favourable because they chose the wrong average, which meant a scheme which benefitted upper income people was presented as if it was of benefit to those on middle incomes.

This last point draws attention to the simple statistical point that an average says something about the middle of an income distribution, but little about the dispersion in the distribution. There are formal measures of these (including standard deviations, variances, coefficients of variation, gini coefficients) which one will find in standard statistical textbooks. That adds to the difficulties. Not only are there numerous relevant definitions of income, but there is no simple way of summarizing an income distribution to determine uncontroversially whether there is an increase or decrease in equality. Consider the following three cases of the income distribution shared between five people A, the poorest, to E, the richest, and in which the total income in each case is the same (150).

CASE 1 CASE 2 CASE 3
A 10 15 13
B 20 25 18
C 30 30 28
D 40 35 38
E 50 45 53

In Case 2, 5 units of income has been taken away from the two richest and given the two poorest. Undoubtedly Case 2 involves a more equal distribution than Case 1, on any common sense or rigorous definition. But in Case 3 in comparison to Case 1, 2 units have been taken away from the middle income people (B,C,D), and shared between the poorest and the richest. Is Case 3 more or less equal than Case 1? There is no rigorous value free way of answering this question. We can add our values, but a journalist’s story may not be nearly so interesting if the “objective” expert has to admit the values they are using. On the other hand the reader/viewer is surely entitled to know that what is being reported is not some objective statistical fact, but a lot of opinion.

Defining Some Concepts

The previous section has been largely about problems which are so fundamental they puzzle economists. There is an underlying conceptual structure, which if misused compounds the confusion. Here are some frequently muddled standard dichotomies. (To get the main ideas across, some simplifications have been made.)

Wealth is the stock of assets held by a person: income is the flow of (mainly) money revenue to an individual which can be spent and save (so it excludes wealth transfer, such as receipts form selling a house, and employment costs). Income may be earned from labour activities (including wages and salary and the labour earnings of the self employed), it may be market consisting of earned income and income from wealth (interest, dividends, profits of the self employed, (possibly capital gains), and so on). Typically, but not always, total income includes market income plus social security benefits.

Gross income, without any tax deductions: net income is after income taxes are deducted (and usually) social security benefits added. Sometimes the expressions before tax, and after tax are used. After tax (and benefit) income is called disposable income.

An income level is some many dollars per period: an income share refers to the share of a group (often a decile or ten percent of the total individuals/households involved). A fall in income share need not necessarily mean a fall in the income level, since the shares of other income levels may have risen even further.

A percent increase measures the relative increase in the variable: a percentage point increase measures the absolute increase in a percent. For instance if an income share rises from 6 percent to 9 percent, that is a 50 percent increase, and a 3 percentage point increase. (Incidentally, try not to use a percentage when it exceeds 100 percent. Even if the journalist does not get it wrong – about four out of five times they do – the public will. For instance a 200 percent increase, means the new level is 3 times the old one.

The mean income is the total income divided by the total number of units; it is the most common form of “average”: the median income is the income of the middle person ranked from top to bottom. both are measures of “central tendency” of a distribution (as is the mode, or most common income). As a general rule means have superior statistical properties, but the median, may be a better indicator if the concern is a typical person because it is not so influenced by the extreme top incomes. Because the public is uneasy about “median”, use “middle income” or “the income of the person in the middle of the distribution.” Note there are also measures of the dispersion, or the width, of a distribution, the most common being the standard deviation.

To do justice to poverty, a state of economic deprivation, would take as much space as this again. Absolute poverty is when the person (or household) has insufficient material goods and services to subsist on: relative poverty is when the individual has insufficient to be able to participate and belong to their community. There is no official poverty line, but the most commonly used one is that set by the 1972 Royal Commission on Social Security as the level for someone on a social security benefit. Subsequent research suggests this benefit datum level (BDL) remains a plausible estimate of a relative poverty line. In March year 1998 prices the BDL was about $300 per week for a married couple. In the March 1993 year about 16.3 percent of the population had incomes less than the BDL. There is a vigorous debate, some of the contributions to it are nutty, few are value free.

Dealing with the Income Distribution

The basic advice remains “dont.” If the chief reporter has asked you to do an income distribution story and the usual avoidance strategies have failed (refusal, handing to a subordinate, taking a sickie, asking for a pay rise, resignation) the following seem to be the main strategies to prevent yourself preforming like a New Zealand middle order batsman.

1. Be humble. You dont know much about it, so admit that when you are pressing the expert.

2. Watch for flannel from the expert. If they cant explain it to you, they probably dont understand it themselves.

3. Repeat what you have been told in your own words. Show the expert any text you have prepared.

(The problem here is how do you identify an expert. Some economists are so keen for media coverage they will claim expertise on anything, especially where they can expound their personal values in the guise of objectivity. Most of the top journalists I know build up a relationship with good economists, who tell them who is the experts in the field.)

4. Ask the expert, if he or she has not indicated already, where they are making personal value judgements (as well as technical judgements). Ask them who is likely to give an alternative account of the story.

5. Beware of your own values. Why have I never heard a journalist mention that a hike in interest rates means that those lending to financial institutions will receive a hike in their incomes? Why do they always emphasize mortgages (according to the 1996 census only in 37 percent of private dwellings do the usual residents make mortgage payments, 32 percent own their own home without mortgage, 27 percent make rent payments, and the rest dont pay anything)? OK. so this is a rhetorical question. I reckon the answer is that most journalists are so badly paid they still have mortgages. In other words, journalists have personal values, like economists, and you need to be aware of them too.

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Bibliography

Here are works that should be in your library. I have omitted a few poor quality references, like one which does not even source its data.

The official data is in sources like
Statistics New Zealand/Department of Statistics (various years) New Zealand Census of Population and Dwellings. (various publications)
Statistics New Zealand/Department of Statistics (various years) New Zealand Official Year Book.
Statistics New Zealand/Department of Statistics (various years) Incomes, Wellington.
Department of Statistics (1990) The Fiscal Impact on Income Distribution 1987/88.

Easton, B.H. (1983) Income Distribution in New Zealand, NZIER Research Paper No 28, Wellington. (This has a lot of useful definitions.)
Easton, B.H. (1996) “Income Distribution”, in B. Silverstone, A. Bollard, & R. Lattimore (eds) A Study of Economic Reform: The Case of New Zealand, North Holland. (Instead of saying this is the most authoritative study of the 1980s and early 1990s, let me state that this is probably why I was asked to write this section.)
Mowbray, M. (1993) Incomes Monitoring Report: 1981-1991, Social Policy Agency. (Hopefully there will be an update to this report.)
New Zealand Planning Council (1988) For Richer or Poorer: Income and Wealth in New Zealand, Wellington.
New Zealand Planning Council (1990) Who Gets What? The Distribution of Income and Wealth in New Zealand, Wellington.

Also the Social Policy Journal of New Zealand, which has most of the contemporary debate, and New Zealand Economic Papers. An important paper is B.H. Easton,“Poverty in New Zealand: 1981-1993”, New Zealand Sociology, Vol 10, No 2, November 1995, p.182-213.

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Definitions are in the text above except as follows this table. (Adult: over 15 years old.) The website has limitations relative to a page, which means the table here is less attractive.

ESTIMATES OF AVERAGE INCOME ($ p.w.)

Name Average House-
hold
All
Adults
Male
Adults
Female
Adults
All Notes
Below
1. Gross
Earnings
Mean 620 693 533 1
2. Gross
Income
Mean 409 506 326 2
3. Gross
Income
Median 300 430 239 3
4. Gross
Income
Mean 883 4
5. Gross
Income
Median 667 5
6. Gross
Income
Mean 323 6
7. Gross
Income
Median 244 244 7
8. Gross
Income
Mean 879 8
9. Gross
Income
Median 667 9
10. Gross
Income
Mean 318 10
11. Gross
Income
Median 242 11
12. Gross
Income
Mean 426 541 317 12
13. Gross
Income
Median 0 291 428 242 13
14. GDP Mean 491 14
15. GDP Mean 635 15
16. Net
Income
Mean 305 16
17. Net
Income
Mean 395 17

Notes

1. Gross Earnings: Total wage bill divided by Full time equivalent employees (i.e. part-time people treated as a fraction). (Feb, 1997) Source: Quarterly Employment Survey, Table 14.13 of NZOYB

2,3. Gross Income per adult. (June 1997) Source: New Zealand Income Survey, Table 14.14 of NZOYB

4,5. Gross Income per household. (1996-97) Source: Household Economic Survey, Table 6.13 of NZOYB

6,7. Gross Income per person. (1996-97) Source: Household Economic Survey, Table 6.13 of NZOYB

8.9: Gross Income per household. (1995-96) Source: 1996 Population Census, 1996 National Summary, Table 37.

10,11. Gross Income per adult. (1995-96) Source: 1996 Population Census, 1996 National Summary, Table 37.

12,13. Gross Income per person. (1995-96) Source: 1996 Population Census, 1996 National Summary, Table 37.

14. GDP per person. (1996-97) Source: SNA (System of National Accounts), Table 17.1 of NZOYB

15. GDP per adult. (1996-97) Source: SNA (System of National Accounts), Table 17.1 of NZOYB

16. Net Income per person. Source: SNA (System of National Accounts), Table 17.9 of NZOYB

15. Net Income per adult. (1996-97) Source: SNA (System of National Accounts), Table 17.9 of NZOYB

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Economic Globalization and National Sovereignty

In R. Miller (ed)New Zealand Government and Politics OUP (2001) p.14-24. Written in August 1999.

Keywords: Globalisation & Trade; Governance;

In recent years there has been increasing concern that a phenomenon of economic globalization, in which the economic processes of production, finance, and exchange in each country are becoming more interdependent between countries, is undermining the sovereignty of the state. In the New Zealand of 1999 this was symbolised by APEC, one of the agencies which promotes this globalisation, albeit a minor one compared to the IMF, World Bank, and WTO (World Trading Organisation), but the government’s focusing on it as a part of its (failed) reelection strategy, because it was hosting the annual APEC conference in September 1999 in Auckland (and numerous preparatory ones before then) gave the organization an undeserved prominence. In particular there was widespread public discussion, much of it reflecting a concern, and some of it generating unrest because APEC (and more fundamentally globalisation) was seen to be against New Zealand’s interests, in contradiction to the government’s expressed belief that it was beneficial. Much of the debate, if it may be called that, from both sides was simplistic and rhetorical, missing the complexities and subtleties of the issue. Rather than provide a yea or nay, this chapter tries to set down the context, first by wading through the narrow economics, but later by opening up the topic to place the economics in the wider context of political economy.

Economic globalization is not a new phenomenon. Arguably the world was more globalized in the nineteenth century when migration was much easier, and national governments’ ability to interfere in the flows of capital and goods very limited because they had less political power and fewer policy instruments. Even so, since in the last half of the twentieth century there appears to be an intensification of globalization, after a period of greater barriers to economic intercourse in the earlier half of the century. Moreover, over the last decade, the process seems to be accelerating. While the intensification of globalisation may not be how future generations will judge these times, apprehension about the consequences of globalization is a popular concern in many countries, including New Zealand.

It is perhaps characteristic of this concern that the notion of globalisation is not well defined. It can mean many things, but one of the central notions is that individual countries are losing their autonomy of economic management, and as a result the public is worse off. The first view is surely ahistorical. Colonial New Zealand, trading in the international economy from virtually day one of European settlement, never had much autonomy. It may be contested whether New Zealand has ever had much autonomy, because it has always been an international trader and always dependent upon foreign capital. At times in the past, some parts of the economy were isolated from the rest of the world, but arguably this had the effect of further exposing the remaining sectors to the world economy.

The Economic Theory (in Brief)

The question of the extent to which globalisation makes some economies worse off is even more complicated. There is a well established economic theory which argues that, subject to some minor caveats which need not detain us here, the economy as a whole will be better off under a free trade regime, in which there is no government imposed restrictions to trade. “Better off” here means that there will be more material goods and services to share among the people in the country. However, that sharing may not actually occur, so that within a country some people may be worse off following the removal of protection while others better off. Those that lose are among those who protest at the removal.

Moreover, there are is the major caveat that the released resources (such as the workers in the protected firms) will be redeployed into other activities (including those which will increase exports). If unemployment rises, the country may not be better off. Of course the higher unemployment which has often occurred after the removal of New Zealand industry protection in recent years, may not be due to the specific anti-protectionist policies. In any case realistically there will be a period of transition in which the released resources are unemployed before they are redeployed. Economic theory provides little account of how long this period may be.

Nor does economic theory provide an estimate of the magnitude of the gains from free trade. When the actual potential gains are estimated they prove surprisingly small. For instance, estimates for New Zealand in the 1970s (using models based on precisely the economic theory alluded to earlier), the gains for total free trade were less than 1 percent of GDP, although protection was considerably higher than in the 1990s.

In any case the formal models usually assume that labour and capital are fixed. But a reality of the new world economy is that international investment flows are substantial and significant, while international migration may be greater than it was – say – a quarter of a century ago.

The Political Economy of Globalisation

It is worthwhile going through – albeit briefly – the limited conclusions of economic theory not only because the rhetoric suggests the gains are far greater than the theory or the evidence, but also because it poses the question that if the gains from trade are so small, why are the pressures to internationalise the economy so great? One answer is that there is some international conspiracy, or that the power elite of each country pursues globalisation because it is in its interests, although not in the interests of the rest of the population. However there are more realistic, if complex, explanations which are worth exploring. In particular, the globalisation phenomenon that we see in recent years is largely driven by technological changes which have changed the geography of the world, together with, secondarily, a converging of humankind’s interests and values.

We can see in the remains of dairy factors scattered through the Taranaki how technology undermines the local economy by making it interdependent with the regional economy. Fifty years ago there were a hundred or so factories each within a few tens of miles of one another, today there is but two – one in Waitara and the other in Hawera. What drove these changes? The sealed road and the motorised truck (the milk tanker) made it easier for the dairy farmer to deliver the milk further afield. At the same times larger dairy factories reaped economies of scale which made it worth each’s while to recruit milk from further away. Now dairy farmers were better off (since the lower costs of processing increased their return), but was the whole of Taranaki better off? Some workers had to travel further, some villages slowly died. Generally the change was slow enough, the region small enough, and people mobile enough for the communities to adapt to this provincial globalisation. Note too, that the communities may have even directly benefited from the transport change, since a wife could get a job in a place different to her husband who may also work some distance away from the house, while they may spend their evenings or weekends in a fourth place.

A more severe example of this change can be seen in terms of breweries, which were once scattered throughout the cities of the land. Today’s big four are found in Dunedin, Christchurch, Hastings and Auckland, again primarily as a result of the transport revolution combined with economies of scale in the production process. This time the closures are potentially more socially disruptive. It was not possible for the Wellington brewery worker to live in the same house and travel daily to the Hastings brewery after the Wellington one closed down. The worker could move, but that is likely to involve a significant social upheaval for the family. The difference between the dairy and brewery factory closures is that the workers are much less mobile over long distances. They may value the sealed road and the transport equipment that makes a holiday in the Hawkes Bay attractive, but that is likely to be an annual trek. Note how this time the benefits of the rationalisation are likely to go to consumers, in cheaper prices and better choice, as well as to the producer in higher profits.

(Some commentators of globalisation draw attention to boutique breweries which fill in niches the big ones can not. They exist because there are technologies not so dependent upon economies of scale and because of the growing heterogeneity of consumer choice. Certainly they generate jobs in the locality but it is also noteworthy that the boutiques do not expand into national and international businesses, nor do boutique manufacturers make up a sizeable part of employment in an industry, with the exception of fashionware.)

Suppose a major brewery was to move to Australia using increasingly cheap transport to supply the New Zealand market. Is that worse for the community which experiences the factory closure than if the business had gone to a distant part of New Zealand? One sort of answer might be that adjustment is usually slower across international boundaries than within nations. But, unlike the intra-national shift, the international relocation reduces the tax base of New Zealand (and increases the Australian tax base). Arguably this effect will be eliminated over time, as governments reduce taxation on producers as a competitive measure. In the long run the issue may reduce to the balance of job creation between the two nations. The assumption of full employment remains critical. (In the long run, labour market adjustment (migration) may resolve an imbalance – but as Maynard Keynes remarked “we are all dead in the long run.”)

However, even if these economic issues can be resolved there remains questions of national identity. New Zealanders are likely to be offended because the business leaves the shores, although the extent to which they are sufficiently offended to turn to consuming a higher cost domestic substitute puts an economic perspective on their indignation. This nationalism seems to be at the heart of the concerns about globalisation – why the shifting of activity offshore is seen to be much more troubling in proportion to regional or national rationalisations.

Note that in this account the changes are seen as a consequence of economic responses to technological change. The responses are intermediated by the profit seekers in the market, but it is far from clear that were there another economic mechanism the same phenomenon would not happen. Or rather if it did not happen, the resulting poor performance of the economy would not lead to its breakdown, as occurred with the COMECON economies a decades ago. Thus the globalisation is a consequence of the taking advantage of the technological change.

While the above illustrations involved gains from manufacturing scale and improved transport, in the last decade or so there have also been substantial potential gains from improvements in communications. Again a community need not make use of those gains – it could prohibit the provision of satellite news on television – the evidence is that as a rule they are reluctant to do so. Two important features of the communication revolution is that globalisation can now be applied to many of the service industries – even to knowledge itself (e.g. via the internet), and that it is possible to globalize business control in a way which was not possible in earlier times. (It may be possible that globalisation of political control is also increasing, except the impact of TV on the Vietnam and subsequent wars reminds us that there may be forces in the opposite direction.)

Additional to the technological changes have been fragmentation of social preferences. Communities seem more heterogeneous (or perhaps the heterogeneity is better recognised, or more easily expressed with affluence). This heterogeneity is expressed (among other ways) in the desires for goods and services, which appear to becoming increasingly fragmented, and more difficult to be supplied from a single (and hence in a small economy, local) plant. (A long time illustration in New Zealand is the preferences for a variety of motor vehicle marques and models, so that no local car assembly line has ever been able to achieve economies of scale.) This provides another reason for sourcing products from overseas.

Of course the increasingly heterogeneous communities still have commonalities. (Indeed the greater commonalities which appeared in the past may be an illusion. Was rugby ever a more dominant sport in New Zealand, or was it just presented that way by the ignoring of those who were not passionate about it?) One of these commonalities is a national identity, and that expression of an identity via state and economy, including ownership of common property and images. Thus the pressures to reap the technological opportunities that generate globalisation clash with the demands for community and national expression. Very often it is a clash between the macro and the micro. Many of those who publicly object strongly to the consequences of globalisation at the same time avail themselves of its benefits in their personal life: overseas travel, information sourced from overseas, foreign produced food, clothes, and computers, domestic transport dependent upon overseas imports, and so on.

In summary, the political economy argument is that there are technological changes which are driving globalisation, some of which are beneficial some of which are destructive. It becomes easy to identify the damaging elements and ignore the beneficial ones, or vice versa. In addition it is arguable that globalisation benefits some people rather than others. But again we need to be careful. Perhaps it is really the technological change which undermines some (especially workers with now obsolete skills, locations with now obsolete attractions). But that is a problem which goes back before the luddite cotton weavers. What is new is that the beneficiaries appear to be more likely to be offshore.

The Economic State in a Globalizing World

Globalization thus challenges us with the question “what choice (or what control), if any, does a society open to the globalized world have over its social and cultural policy?” A common view is that it will that international competitive pressures are so strong that they will drive every country down to the lowest common denominate of a pure market economy, with a minimum of government intervention. A (small) community in a globalized world, so it is argued, has no ability to shape its long run destiny.

For instance, suppose a society wanted to have a welfare state, providing a degree of public social security. That would involve taxing the incomes of factors and individuals. This would either raise the costs of production, so industries would move offshore to countries where they were not taxed. Or it would depress the returns on factors of production such as capital and labour, which would migrate to countries where their return was not so depressed. The logic of this account is that all countries will be pressured towards minimizing taxation, forcing them to dismantle their welfare state and shift to the private provision.

This seems to me to be overly pessimistic. But what it does indicate is that changes to the balance of funding government services may be necessary, especially by putting greater emphasis on user pays, user group pays, entitlements based on past contributions, and consumption taxes (rather than on factor incomes). Such changes will be resisted by traditionalists. Moreover and inevitably, there will some people who will be worse off from any rebalancing who, with their advocates, will also strongly complain (while those who are made better off are not as likely to be as vocal). It is not inevitable that the worse off will be the poorest, although any public debate is likely to focus on those among the poor who are worse off.

Much of New Zealand’s difficulties in debating such issues arises from the public prominence of the traditionalists on one hand and the right wing ideological extremists on the other. There are options between doing nothing (other than closing up the economy) and the sort of “trading naked” strategy which the extremists have advocated. (New Zealand’s propensity to strip away all interventions has been likened to someone at an picnic taking off all their clothes in the hope that others will follow. The punchline is the rest of the picnic looks at the naked one, and puts on another jersey.)

Certainly some policy instruments – increasing quotas and tariffs for instance – are becoming prohibited for international trade reasons, at least for a small economy. (Even large countries imposing border barriers are likely to be hauled in front of the WTO.) A positive conclusion may be that the policy issue is identifying new (effective) forms of industrial intervention. That seems to be the conclusion that the National Government came to after the eight plus years of lacklustre economic performance while it was in office. The mid-August 1999 “knowledge economy” package was a shift in that direction justified by the pure market not functioning well in the areas of science and technology and of education and training. It almost certainly presages a more interventionist approach in post economic policy after the election, whoever is government, although it will be a more cautious and disciplined intervention than that of the pre-1984 era. One factor which will force this is that bad policy which raises business costs or taxation without a compensating benefit will be punished in a globalized era, by migration of factors and businesses to less costly regimes.

Even so we can expect greater harmonization. Again there is a long history of this. There was grumbling when New Zealand metrified for international trade reasons (as the official statements clearly emphasize) but this was not seen to be a case against the globalization it was enhancing. Nevertheless the scope of the legal harmonization is increasing. For instance, today there is active discussion on the degree in which New Zealand should align its competition legislation with Australia. Part of the debate is which regime is more appropriate, but there is also a theme that there are advantages in having a broadly common regime. There is no compulsion to align the legislation. The issue is that of the benefits and costs of doing so. Even were New Zealand to adopt the Australian legislation in total, that would be a sovereign act, and at a later date a New Zealand government might choose another competitions policy regime. This applies for most other harmonization, although it may be increasingly expensive to abandon it.

(Harmonization and international law are not confined to economic matters. There are parallel developments for human rights, peace, the environment, and so on. Indeed those who oppose economic globalization are often strong advocates of the extension of international law in other realms.)

Foreign Investment and Capital Flows

A strong theme in the agitation against globalization is the increasing ownership of New Zealand capital by foreign firms, and the rising New Zealand debt. Again this is not new. It would have been a parallel feature of much of the nineteenth century European economy.

It would be easy to argue that the issue is not of national ownership but of national control. Historically the foreign firm that built a factory in New Zealand to supply the local markets, was as dependent upon the New Zealand government as a native one. However it is widely believed that New Zealand has less economic control than it had in its recent past.

Partly it is a matter of magnitude. There is no comprehensive indicator of foreign ownership but as good as any is the income share of production classified as the property and entrepreneurial income to the rest of the world. In the early 1980s it amounted to (on a net basis after deducting the same income from the rest of the world to New Zealanders) between 3 and 4 percent of GDP (i.e. aggregate income). In the late 1990s the ratio was between 7 and 8 percent, or double that of fifteen years earlier. However the rise is largely a consequences of the savings and investment decisions of New Zealanders. Over the period domestic savings were insufficient to fund the capital investment the economy required, so businesses (and suppliers of domestic housing finance) went offshore to fill the increasing gap. It is a fundamental rule of finance that borrowers (individuals, businesses or states) lose their independence – their capacity to make independent decisions – to the extent they are in debt. If that extent rises, their capacity – their sovereignty – falls. Now it may be argued that New Zealand’s past borrowings were unwise – a view with which most future economic historians are likely to agree – but the problem is not of the foreign investment but of unwise domestic decisions.

Such considerations are unlikely to satisfy those who must suffer the downside of the past decisions, nor does it address the symbolic significance of ownership of an asset to the dispossessed (nicely illustrated by the priority iwi have given to regaining land from which they had been alienated). While acknowledging this symbolism however, an economist might ask whether the holders are willing to make the related material sacrifices (as iwi may be doing by taking lower returns in their holdings of land than they could obtained from other investments).

Conclusion

However global financial markets may be overly liquid, and hence excessively volatile. New Zealand, like most debtor countries, no longer depends only upon foreign direct investment (i.e. in equity in businesses) to cover its savings gap. Much of the stock of foreign liabilities is in financial instruments which may be withdrawn at short notice (albeit at some cost to the lender). Thus the New Zealand financial system, and the economy which depends upon it, can be subject to substantial financial shocks. Although it has been New Zealanders who have one way or the other may the borrowing decision, and who have one way or another benefited from the funds that have been borrowed, in my opinion global liquidity is excessive, and potential detrimental to the global economy.

That raises the central dilemma which each country faces. The global economy is far from ideal, yet not to engage in it also has downsides. The theme of this chapter is that technological changes are increasingly integrating the economies of the world to the general benefit to those involved (but not to everyone who is involved). However it may be mismanaged at the international level (as illustrated by the dangerously high level of liquidity) and by each country involved (a proposition which probably true for New Zealand). The difficulty which confronts each economy is the how to relate to this imperfect situation. The choice is not of autarchy or even maintaining the current status quo (were that possible). Nor is it the extremism practised in New Zealand in recent years – the “trading naked” strategy. Getting a balance in between is difficult, especially for a small country which has so little influence.

The New Zealand critics of globalization confuse a number of different issues:
– the actual global arrangements compared with alternative (and possibly better) ones;
– the actual policies of New Zealand towards globalization (and other economic issues) compared with alternative (and possibly better) ones;
– the current losers from globalization compared with the gainers (and the portrayal of the losers as exclusively the poor and the gainers exclusively the rich).

In this confusion it is difficult to identify an alternative, other than one which addresses particular issues (such as protection for a car assembly plant) without examining the general consequences. Neither the uncritical anti-globalizers nor the uncritical pro-globalizers help much towards identifying the options which exist between the extremes. The result has been that New Zealand’s policy decisions have been much less effective than those of other countries (as evidenced by our poorer international trading performances).

Either approach compromises New Zealand’s sovereignty, although to be realistic we have little idea of what the long run sovereignty of nations may look like. With a few exceptions (England is one, unfortunately for Clarity of thinking in New Zealand which is so dependent upon images derived from English history), the nation state is a relatively recent development – a couple of centuries old. It may not last another two centuries. However the cultures which have underpinned the nation state are far older, and are likely to survive them. The notion that the world will end up as a grey cultural soup (based on Hollywood) seems unlikely, although it is possible that cultures may become detached directly from location, given the way that recent technologies are modifying the significance of geography.

New Zealand (and other economies) have some choice over the degree of their engagement in the world economy, although because each option has costs as well as benefit. Insofar as New Zealand can exercise this choice it retains its economic sovereignty. Yet by going into trading and other economic relationships its choice is reduced. A useful parallel with international trade is marriage. To enter into one involves some loss – even a permanent loss – of sovereignty. Yet such are the perceived benefits relative to the costs, that individuals get married, and they remained married even when it is evident to others that there are severe downsides in the arrangements). Thus it is with international trading relationships. The general benefits are judged to exceed the general costs. Similarly, New Zealand and other countries engage in the international economy.

The State Steps In: Michael Bassett Makes a Case for Intervention.

Listener: 14 August, 1999.

Keywords: Governance; Growth & Innovation; Political Economy & History;

Michael Bassett’s book The State in New Zealand 1840-1984 is an assiduous, if somewhat erratic, compilation of state economic activity in New Zealand, the result of burrowing through masses of archives from government economic departments. The picture he presents, up to 1984 anyway, is that the government of New Zealand actively promoted industrial development. On more than one occasion private initiatives were failing, and the state stepped in to assist a now successful business.

Bassett says that the book was written to prepare his account of the time when he was a member of a the Labour Government which stopped assisting industry (with the exception of the financial sector, on whom it lavished support). Yet, the book makes exactly the opposite case to the one Bassett’s government pursued. The history of the New Zealand economy is that of an extraordinary success over most of its life. As the book shows, that growth was accompanied by government intervention. Bassett cannot cite a time when government gave up getting involved with industry and the economy flourished. In 1930s and 1940s the economy grew at a similar rates to the Asian economies of the 1970s and 1980s. That was a period when intervention sharply increased under the first Labour Government.

It is true that the growth rate slowed down in the late 1960s to the mid 1970s, especially if invalid statistics are used. (Actually Bassett does not use the available data much. One would have thought that he would have found such statistics meat and drink for his history.) That is easily explained by the collapse in the structural terms of trade which devastated the vanguard growth industry of pastoral farming and processing. Once the transition to a more diversified economy was largely completed, New Zealand began to grow again, slightly faster than the average of other rich countries. What happens when a New Zealand government gives up assisting productive activity belongs to Bassett’s future book on the Fourth Labour. It will be a wonderful demonstration of the thesis Bassett is trying to reject. Hardly any industry assistance since 1984, hardly any industry growth.

The practical issue of intervention policy is not whether there should be any, but what sort of assistance. Robert Muldoon’s mistake was that his government’s involvement was too detailed. Current thinking is to support sectors and cross-sector inputs rather than firms.

An example of a cross-sector support is Research and Development. Electronic commerce is another looming challenge. My instinct is the government should be encouraging every New Zealand business to get on the net. Distance has always been a handicap to our new exporters. Why not create a cyberspace showroom which would exhibit all the goods and services New Zealand produces, so that potential foreign purchasers can see what we have from the comfort of their home terminal? Some businesses are already doing this. Lets get them all involved.

One of the first things that needs to be done is a review of the state and prospects of each sector. The resulting “Doomsday Book of Industry,” is likely to show a good chunk of them may be doomed if we continue as we are doing. Forward looking reviews were common up to 1984. The last great effort was under (then unknighted) Bill Birch. When he was Minister of National Development the identification of growth opportunities had to be done. A (dour) doer, rather than having an economic philosophy, Birch did it.

Out of the review will come growth prospects. The Irish Industries Development Agency’s priority sectors are: electronics; engineering; healthcare products, such as pharmaceuticals and medical devices; consumer products including sport, leisure and fashionware; financial services; and international services, including tele-services and software. (Note the order.) Our list will be different, but no doubt be as equally internationally outward looking.

Bassett’s book is valuable because we can learn from the past. Roger Douglas wrote in 1980 that “putting Government money into Tasman Pulp and Paper Company and New Zealand Steel was right. New industries were started that might not have been, because the private sector would not, or could not, do it.”

The Economic Context Of the Ministry Of Consumer Affairs

Although this is an official paper of the Ministry of Consumer Affairs, I contributed to it. The full paper is on the Ministry of Consumer Affairs website. It is summarised as follows (August 1999)

Keywords Business & Finance

The microeconomic management of the New Zealand economy has changed markedly since 1984. Today there is much less direct intervention by government and a greater reliance on voluntary transactions in a market environment for which government actions provide a context. The Ministry of Consumer Affairs, established on 1 July 1986, is one of the agencies charged by government with administering this policy framework. This paper discusses the principles relevant to the discharge of the Ministry’’s economic responsibilities within the framework.

At the core of the economic changes in regulatory policy has been the political vision that voluntary transactions are preferable to transactions resulting from government directions. Economic theory provides guidance on how to ensure that the outcomes of voluntary transactions are efficient, in the sense of maximising aggregate material prosperity. (In economics, transactions encompass production activities.)

The underlying economic analysis that has influenced the changes in the regulatory environment over the last two decades derives from:
– the Marshallian partial equilibrium paradigm (named after British economist Alfred Marshall), which looks at transactions in a single market; and
– the Walrasian general equilibrium paradigm (named after French-Swiss economist Leon Walras), which looks at how markets interact.

From Marshall’s and Walras’s work are derived two key normative principles (known as the Marshallian-Walrasian normative principles):
– prices in an economy should include, whenever possible, the cost of all the resources involved in the transactions
– transactions should be left to private decisions, with a minimum of constraints on the participants.

There are a few exceptions, for defined social reasons, to the principle that transactions should be voluntary. However, the vast majority of transactions are left to individuals in a market context. Nonetheless, economists have long recognised that the Marshall-Walras account of economic transactions analysis is incomplete, insofar as it underplays the significance of transaction costs. In particular, different institutional arrangements lead to different transactions, different outcomes and different levels of overall economic efficiency.

Transaction costs include the costs of obtaining the information necessary for the transaction, the immediate costs involved in the transaction and the costs which arise as a consequence of the transaction, including monitoring, redress and enforcement (should the transaction subsequently ‘go wrong’). Transaction costs can be described as ‘the costs of running the economic system’ or ‘the friction in the economy’.

One approach to incorporating transaction costs into economic analysis derives from the pioneering work of British-American economist Ronald Coase. The normative principle associated with this work is called the ‘Coasian Normative Principle’ (CNP), which states that ‘interventions should be structured to remove impediments to voluntary transactions, especially by reducing transaction costs’
.
Insofar as the application of the Coasian Normative Principle is successful, market outcomes will conform more closely to those predicted by the Marshallian-Walrasian normative principles, with the beneficial consequences of efficient use of resources and higher material output.

An important means of implementing the Coasian Normative Principle is to provide a comprehensive legal framework, with well-defined property rights where those rights can be exercised at low cost. For example, one aim of consumer credit law is to reduce transaction costs, including information costs. This is to the ultimate benefit of all consumers and those who provide goods purchased on credit, as well as for reputable providers of credit.

Certain limited direct interventions may also have a role in reducing transaction costs. For instance, by having an authority ensure and enforce standards for weights and measures, consumers will be more confident about the terms of potential purchases and more willing to undertake the purchasing transaction.

Many of the economic activities of the Ministry of Consumer Affairs are concerned with the costs of transactions. Notably, different regulatory arrangements can have very different transaction costs. As a rule, the Ministry aims to minimise total transaction costs, to the benefit of both consumers and businesses. The Ministry might be said to be concerned with ‘providing oil’ to minimise the friction in the economic system.

A major objective of the Ministry of Consumer Affairs, in its policy advice and its operational activities, is to remove impediments to voluntary transactions and to minimise the costs of transactions between consumers and businesses.

For my own writings on the topic see
The Whimpering of the State, Chapter 20.

Kulturkampf: Commercialisation Wars Against Arts

Listener: 31 July, 1999.

Keywords: Governance; Literature and Culture;

What have the following in common?

* The disappearance of the National Art Gallery;
* National Archives sued by its stakeholders in the High Court;
* The public outcry over the National Library’s proposed reorganisation.
* The National Trust under severe financial pressure;
* Te Papa confused with an amusement arcade;
* Radio New Zealand’s considering privatising its news service;
* The lack of local content on television.
* User charge threats to your local library;
* Victoria University of Wellington selling off a McCahon painting?

The Beehive must privately bewail the public agitation, often from National’s friends. But from an economic perspective, they are the consequences of commercialisation policies spreading into the cultural sector.

Commercialisation is the theory that business practice is best, even for non-businesses. We have stacked the boards and the top executives of our cultural organizations with business men and women, and those tempted by the fashion. The general rule seems the appointees have to be ignorant of what they are in charge of (so as not to be captured by the special interest groups). Were there a Literary Fund (it got abolished), its chair would have to be illiterate.

Because the commercialisation policies failed in the core economy, there has been no marked increase in material output, and no additional revenue for cultural activities. But the commercialisation mythology says there would be efficiency gains from business management. Business performs best where it is selling things, and so the cultural organizations focused on selling – on user pays, on advertising, on sponsorship, on arcade games. This distorted their purpose, and yet failed to provide enough revenue. Internal reorganizations began.

The theory of the commercialisation has a crucial assumption that supply and demand are “separable”, so the production process independent of the demand for the good or service. That is a reasonable assumption for many – but not all – products. Organic food and free range eggs are exceptions. So is handcrafted pottery.

Much of what is produced within the public sector is not separable. Because the “output”, as the jargon goes, is not precisely defined, the only way of knowing the quality and suitability of its services involves an evaluation of the production process. You dont buy a car that way. You assess it by its final characteristics, knowing little about how it was produced. But the achievements of an archive, library, or museum are not like commercial products. We understand them largely by their supply process, even if the Public Finance Act requires portentous circumlocutory definitions. The business leadership takes the verbiage seriously, not understanding that mucking around with the production process affects what really matters. Before they are finished, the stakeholders are up in arms.

I was fascinated by Helen Clark saying that when she becomes prime minister, she will also take the cultural affairs and heritage portfolio. Perhaps she sees herself in the tradition of Peter Fraser and Norm Kirk who, while not formally holding the portfolio, were great ministers of cultural affairs. They knew it is not just about high culture. An extra 4 cents a New Zealander a day would give a useful $50m plus a year injection to the arts, reducing financial and commercialisation pressures on them. But I would give a third to the popular arts and a third to supporting the interests of the young.

National’s record has been spotty. Its ministers have generally treated the portfolio as unimportant, or have been, as in the case of current minister Marie Hasler, outside cabinet. The government’s Strategic Results Areas (now “Goals and Objectives”) have been dismissive of the arts – if they are even mentioned. Reflecting on his premiership, Jim Bolger regretted he did not do enough for the arts. There are National leaners who care as passionately about the arts as do those on the left.

What Has Happened in New Zealand to Income Distribution and Poverty Levels

Social Policy for the 21st Century: Justice and Responsibility Proceedings of the 1999 National Social Policy Conference, 21-23 July, 1999. Social Policy Research Centre Reports and Proceedings, 1999.

Keywords: Distributional Economics; Social Policy;

Introduction

In a recent article, the London Economist describes the “bad point” of New Zealand’s economic reforms which began in the mid 1980s as “a big increase in inequality.”1 In fact the New Zealand economy has generally had a poor growth performance, higher unemployment, and a worrying current account deficit ever since the reforms (although price levels have been more stable). Table 1 is a comparison between the overall economic performance of the Australian, New Zealand and OECD economies since 1985. There is no doubt the New Zealand economy has done worse. 2 Why this has happened, and why the New Zealand economic performance has been inferior to the Australian one, belongs elsewhere. For this paper, The Economist’s observation emphasizes just how widespread is the view that New Zealand has a more unequal income distribution, as a result of the policy changes of the last one and a half decades. But The Economist comment gives no sense of the magnitude of the increased inequality, nor its causes, which are the focus of this paper.

1.50.57.16.9

Table 1 – ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: 1985-1998
NEW ZEALAND AUSTRALIA OECD*
Inflation Private Consumption Deflator (% p.a.)
1985 17.3 6.7 6.9
1998 1.3 1.9 3.3
Average (1985-1998) 4.6 4.1 5.5
Inflation GDP Deflator (% p.a.)
Average (1985-1998) 4.5 3.9 5.4
Unemployment (% of Labour Force)
1986 4.0 8.1 7.1
1998 8.2 8.1 6.5
Average (1986-1998) 7.2 8.6 6.6
Employment Growth (% p.a.)
Average (1985-1998) 0.8 1.9 1.2
GDP Volume Growth (% p.a.)
Average (1985-1998) 1.7 3.1 2.7
Labour Productivity Growth (% p.a.)
Average (1985-1998) 0.9 1.2
Terms of Trade Change (% p.a.)
Average (1985-1998) 0.9 -2.1
Export Volume Growth (% p.a.)
Average (1985-1998) 3.9
Import Volume Growth (% p.a.)
Average (1985-1998) 5.3 6.6 7.2
Current Account Deficit (% GDP)
Average (1985-1998) 3.7 4.8 0.2

OECD Economic Outlook, December 1998. The New Zealand figures do not always correspond to the official figures, but are used here for consistency. The OECD consists of 28 economies.
The 1998 data is estimated.

* G7 for unemployment.

The standard way in New Zealand to trace household income changes is to use household income reported in the Household Economic Survey, adjusted first to a disposable (after tax and benefit) income basis, and then adjusted for household composition using a household equivalence scale. There are difficulties with the resulting measures, but as far as is known the problems are not sufficiently strong to invalidate the results to be presented here. 3

A number of research teams have used this approach over the years. 4 There are two key studies. First, Mary Mowbray has provided estimates for the 12 available years between 1981/2 and 1995/6. 5 Second, and more recently, Statistics New Zealand (SNZ) has provided estimates for the four years 1981/2, 1985/6, 1990/1, and 1995/6. For a number of reasons the SNZ data might be expected to be more authoritative than the Mowbray (and other) studies. However it is not as comprehensive, so both are used here. In any case, all the studies tell broadly the same story.

Average Incomes

The equivalent disposable income of a household might be thought of as a sophisticated per capita measure of the household spending power, in which household economies of scales and differences between adults and children are allowed for.6 The Mowbray data is summarised in Figure 1 and Table 2. They show the mean income falling from $29200 (for a household of two in 1991 dollars) in 1982 to $25710 in 1994, and then recovering slightly to $29420 following the upswing to 1996, a gain of .06 percent p.a. over the 14 years. This pathetic figure is further evidence of the poor performance of the New Zealand economy over the period. In summary, over a 14 year period of reforms, the spending power of households has been stagnant.

The median income falls from $22402 in 1982 to $19680 in 1996 (an average fall of .92 percent p.a. over the period). The divergence between the mean and the median is an example of the increasing inequality of incomes. It means that the increase in inequality has not been simply a share shift from the poor to the rich, but a shift from the middle incomes to high incomes also. As a result those in the bottom 80 percent of the income distribution have experienced a fall in their real incomes over the period.

The Distribution of Income

TABLE 2: HOUSEHOLD EQUIVALENT DISPOSABLE INCOME
INCOME SHARES (percent) MARCH SURVEY YEARS
DECILES 82 84 86 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96
Bottom 3.5 3.2 3.9 2.5 3.7 3.8 2.4 2.7 3.1 2.8 2.9 3.0
2 5.4 5.5 5.7 5.6 5.4 5.2 5.3 5.3 5.2 5.2 5.1 4.9
3 6.2 6.2 6.5 6.4 6.2 5.9 5.7 5.8 5.7 5.7 5.6 5.4
4 7.2 7.2 7.4 7.3 7.0 6.7 6.5 6.4 6.3 6.4 6.3 6.1
5 8.6 8.4 8.5 8.4 8.0 7.7 7.7 7.6 7.4 7.5 7.4 7.3
6 9.7 9.6 9.7 9.7 9.2 9.0 9.1 9.0 8.7 9.0 8.9 8.7
7 11.2 11.1 10.9 11.2 10.6 10.4 10.6 10.7 10.4 10.7 10.6 10.2
8 13.0 12.9 12.5 12.9 12.6 12.3 12.6 12.7 12.6 12.9 12.6 12.4
9 15.1 15.3 14.9 15.2 15.0 15.2 15.4 15.7 15.5 15.7 15.5 15.4
Top 20.1 20.5 20.1 20.8 22.3 23.9 24.8 24.1 25.1 24.2 25.2 26.8
DECILE AVERAGE ($1999 thousands) MARCH SURVEY YEARS
DECILES 82 84 86 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96
Bottom 10.3 9.3 10.4 6.9 10.5 11.1 6.7 7.0 8.2 7.1 8.2 8.7
2 15.9 15.7 15.2 15.4 15.3 15.0 14.4 13.7 13.8 13.4 14.1 14.3
3 18.2 17.9 17.4 17.6 17.4 17.0 15.6 15.0 15.0 14.9 15.5 15.9
4 21.1 20.7 19.8 20.0 19.8 19.3 17.9 16.4 16.7 16.5 17.6 18.0
5 25.1 24.1 22.8 23.0 22.6 22.1 21.1 19.5 19.6 19.3 20.5 21.4
6 28.2 27.6 25.8 26.6 25.8 25.8 24.8 23.2 23.1 23.2 24.7 25.4
7 32.5 31.9 29.2 30.7 29.7 30.1 28.9 27.6 27.6 27.7 29.4 30.0
8 37.8 37.2 33.5 35.4 35.4 35.5 34.3 32.7 33.3 33.4 35.0 36.4
9 44.1 43.9 39.9 41.8 42.3 43.9 42.1 40.4 41.1 40.6 43.1 45.2
Top 58.5 58.9 53.7 57.2 62.8 69.0 67.7 61.9 66.6 62.6 70.0 78.8
MEDIAN 23.1 22.4 21.3 21.5 21.2 20.7 19.5 17.9 18.1 17.9 19.0 19.7
MEAN 29.2 28.7 26.8 27.5 28.2 28.9 27.3 25.7 26.5 25.9 27.8 29.4
RATIO 0.79 0.78 0.80 0.78 0.75 0.72 0.71 0.70 0.69 0.69 0.68 0.67
BELOW RCSS POVERTY LINE
11.7% 12.4% 12.5% 13.4% 12.3% 12.6% 14.6% 18.0% 17.3% 19.6% 14.9% 14.5%
GINI COEFFICIENT
0.26 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.28 0.30 0.31 0.30 0.32 0.31 0.32 0.32*

SOURCES: Mowbray (1993) plus update, except gini coefficients are from SNZ (1999) .
* 1997 = .033.

A common means of comparing changes in incomes over a period is to use the gini coefficient. A rise in the coefficient usually means there has been an increase in inequality. 7 The SNZ gini coefficient estimates are shown in Figure 2 and Table 3. There appears to be three phases. Between 1981/2 and 1987/8 (or possibly 1986/7) the gini coefficients are broadly constant indicative that the degree of inequality remained broadly constant too. The coefficients then rise sharply to 1990/1, from about .28 to .31. SNZ notes the increase is statistically significant. Afterwards, the inequality seems to rise more slowly up to .33 in a six year period. The standard deviation of the household distribution might be thought of increasing by just over a fifth to 1991, and by a half to 1997, compared to the what it was in the mid 1980s. 8

The picture from the gini coefficients is reinforced by Table 3 and Figure 3, which shows the household deciles. The top decile of households increases its share from 20.1 percent of total income in 1982 to 26.8 percent p.a. in 1996. The second decile holds its share (15.1 to 15.4 percent) and the remainder experience a decreasing share. Given that the average real disposable (equivalent) income hardly changed, we find that those in the top decile experienced a 34.8 percent in their spending power between 1982 and 1996 (equivalent to a 2.2 percent p.a.), the second to top decile experienced a 2.5 percent rise, and the remaining 80 percent had a 10.1 percent fall over the 14 year period. The bottom thirty percent have experienced an average fall of 12.6 percent, for the proportional reductions tend to be largest as one moves down the income distribution.

TABLE 3: HOUSEHOLD EQUIVALENT DISPOSABLE INCOME
INCOME SHARES (%) MARCH SURVEY YEARS
DECILES 1982 1986 1991 1996
Bottom 3.9 4.1 3.7 3.6
2 5.4 5.5 5.1 5.0
3 6.2 6.5 5.6 5.5
4 7.2 7.4 6.4 6.3
5 8.4 8.5 7.7 7.4
6 9.7 9.6 9.0 8.7
7 11.1 10.8 10.5 10.3
8 12.9 12.4 12.4 12.3
9 15.0 14.9 15.1 15.0
Top 20.1 20.3 24.3 25.8
DECILE AVERAGE ($1996 thousands)
Bottom 11900 12200 11600 11400
2 16700 16500 15900 15900
3 19200 19300 17400 17600
4 22300 22000 20000 19900
5 25900 25300 23800 23500
6 30000 28500 28000 27800
7 34300 32200 32600 32600
8 39800 37100 38700 39200
9 46500 44300 47000 47700
Top 62100 60500 75600 82200
MEDIAN 27800 27000 26000 25600
MEAN 30900 29800 31100 31800
RATIO 0.90 0.91 0.84 0.81

SOURCE: SNZ (1999)

Why the rise in inequality? First, observe the most rapid increase occurs in the period when the government is cutting the top income tax rate – it was 66 percent in the year to March 1986 and was 33 percent by 1990. This lifted the relative income of those in the top decile, who were the main beneficiaries of the tax cuts. This is sufficient to explain most of their income increase. In order to fund the reduction in income taxation on those at the top, the government cut social security benefits and other government spending (sometimes by the imposition of user charges), withdraw tax concessions, and allow income tax rates to rise on lower incomes via fiscal creep. 9 Since there was little income growth, the net effect of the fiscal changes was to switch income from the poor and those on middle incomes to the rich. 10

Thus far we have explained the increasing inequality by the deliberate actions of government taxation and spending decisions. Did the market economy, especially market liberalisation, also add to inequality? When I last did a comprehensive review I had only data up to 1993. I concluded that there was no evidence of an impact of market liberalisation on overall income inequality. I argued that the measures were so widespread they impacted on everyone, and so no part of the market income distribution especially benefited or suffered. Instead there was considerable turbulence within the distribution. 11

The addition of more recent data allows some reassessment. Inequality appears to have continued to increase after 1991, despite there being no major changes in the fiscal stance. While income tax cuts tended to favour middle incomes and families and benefit eligibility continued to be tightened, the changes were minor in comparison to the earlier changes. Because there are only a few observations it may be that the increase in the observed inequality is explicable in terms of statistical noise or the business cyclical, and there is really stability of income inequality. On the other hand, the trend increase is sufficiently perceptible to raise the possibility that, in contrast to before 1988, there is a systematic market mechanism which is increasing inequality. If there is it can be traced in the ratio of the median to the mean. Up to 1988 the ratio hovered in the .78 to .80 range. As we would expect, following the pro-rich fiscal measures, it fell to about .7 in 1992. But it appears to be continuing to fall, and was at .67 in 1996. Those who believe that more liberalised markets generate inequality have the current evidence on their side.

A table provided in the recent SNZ Incomes supports this conclusion. 12 If households are ranked my market income, there has been an increase in the share of market income of the top two deciles, and a corresponding fall in the share of the bottom seven deciles. Market income deciles do not simply relate to equivalent household income deciles, and the relationship changes over time. Nevertheless, the data is suggestive that, at the very least, rising unemployment has undermined the income of those in the lowest deciles. Unemployment was markedly higher in the mid 1990s compared to the mid 1980s – probably more than double when labour force participation rate changes are allowed for. It is also possible that there has been a widening in the dispersion of pay rates (especially at the very top of the distribution), and that changes in rates of return on investments are impacting on the income distribution, but neither is yet evident in the available data.

What Has Happened to Poverty?

Given that the real disposable (equivalent) incomes of the bottom three deciles have been falling, it might be thought unquestioned that poverty has been rising in New Zealand.

However there are some who contest this common sense. The most notable recent contribution is from Roger Kerr, the executive director of the Business Roundtable, which consists of the chief executives of the large corporations which have been both major advocates of the reforms and their largest (relative) beneficiaries. 13 In a recent paper he argued:

What does the [SNZ] study tell us about poverty, as opposed to changes in the distribution of incomes? Between 1982 and 1996, according to Statistics New Zealand, there was no increase in the proportion of individuals or households with an income of less than 50 or 60 percent of median disposable income. On the basis of these poverty benchmarks, between 6 percent and 12 percent of households were in poverty over the period.

These measures of poverty are similar to measures used by Stephens, Waldegrave and Frater.14 Using a benchmark of 60 percent of median disposable income, the latter found that the percentage of households in poverty fell from 13.7 percent to 10.8 percent between 1983/84 and 1992/93. At a benchmark of 50 percent, poverty was stable at 4.3 percent of households. The period examined did not reflect fully the economic recovery that started during 1991. Nevertheless, the study suggests that fewer households were in poverty than reported by Statistics New Zealand. Neither study suggests a rise in reported poverty since the reforms began.

The Statistics New Zealand study contradicts three claims that have frequently been made. First, the claim that the rich are getting richer while the poor are getting poorer is simply not true. People on high incomes have increased their share of total disposable income while middle income earners suffered a significant loss of income share. However, there was no significant change in the share of income of low?income households. (original’s italics)

The point here is not that Kerr is seriously misrepresenting the statistics (especial Statistics New Zealand, who do not even imply that 50 percent of the median is a poverty line). Rather he is using a poverty line indexed to the median, which as we have seen, has been falling relative to the mean. Consider the situation where the government takes income from those in the middle of the income distribution and gives it to the rich, without affecting the total income. The effect will be to depress the median, and hence the poverty line. Thus the numbers in poverty will fall according to the Kerr poverty line, even though they have had no change to their incomes, and inequality has increased.
There is a case for indexing the poverty line for changes in mean incomes in the long run. 15 However since average incomes have hardly changed, in practice a constant price poverty line is satisfactory for New Zealand analysis over this period.

Figure 5 and Table 2, report poverty levels if the standard (constant price) poverty line is used, based on the assessment of the 1972 Royal Commission on Social Security. It shows poverty rising slightly up to 1990, and then increasing dramatically in the early 1990s following the benefit cuts and the severe economic downturn. As the economy went into a cyclical upswing, poverty levels fell (probably as a result of increased labour market engagement), but still remaining above the level of the 1980s. The level depends on the precise poverty line, but the pattern remains broadly the same. In summary using the RCSS poverty line, poverty numbers inched up from 11.8 percent to 12.6 percent in the 1980s, rose dramatically to 19.6 percent in 1993, and by 1996 were 14.5 percent. If a constant price poverty line is used, poverty has definitely increased (and that would be also true were it were indexed to mean real incomes).

Kerr contradicts himself a little later, writing:

Relative poverty can only be reduced by raising the income of those who are judged to be in poverty at a faster rate than that of other groups. A doubling in everyone’s income, for example, would have no effect on the reported level of poverty according to a relative poverty standard.

An absolute income or expenditure threshold, on the other hand, focuses debate on the explicitly identified commodities and expenditure patterns that are necessary to avoid hardship. It is likely to show substantially less poverty than that reported in the studies discussed earlier. An absolute standard recognises that an increase in real income reduces poverty. This is simply common sense.

So Kerr has now switched to favouring an absolute standard for a poverty line. I will not rehearse the case for and against this view, with which every social policy analyst is familiar. The point is on page 3 of his speech Kerr relies on an indexed relative poverty line (plus some misreading of the statistics) for his argument. By page 5, he is opposed to an indexed poverty line, favouring a constant price one.

So while there is considerable agreement that the income distribution has got more unequal, it would have been less than comprehensive to have implied that there is a unanimous view on the course of poverty. Nevertheless real incomes have fallen at the lower end of the income distribution. Poverty must have risen on any commonsensical definition.

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Endnotes
1. 10 April, 1999.
2. B.H. Easton, The Commercialisation of New Zealand (Auckland University Press, 1997), p.142-7; B.H. Easton, In Stormy Seas: The Post-War New Zealand Economy (Otago University Press, 1997), p.257-8.
3. S. Carson & B.H. Easton, The Economic Status and Health Status Project, Paper to the 1999 conference of the New Zealand Statistical Association, July 1999.
4. M. Mowbray, Incomes Monitoring Report: 1981-1991 (Social Policy Agency, Wellington, 1993); V. Krishna, “Modest but Adequate: An Appraisal of Changing Household Income Circumstances in New Zealand”, Journal of Social Policy of New Zealand, Issue 4, July 1995 p.76-97; B.H. Easton, “Poverty in New Zealand: 1981-1993”, New Zealand Sociology, Vol. 10, No 2, November 1995, p.182-213; R. Stephens, C. Waldegrave, & P. Frater, “Measuring Poverty in New Zealand,” Social Policy Journal of New Zealand, Issue 5, December 1995, p.88-112; N. Podder & S. Chatterjee, Sharing the National Cake in Post Reform New Zealand: Income Inequality in terms of Income Sources, Paper presented to the New Zealand Association of Economists, 1998; Statistics New Zealand, Incomes: New Zealand Now, Wellington, 1999.
5. The 1995/6 year is for households who reported their previous year’s income between April 1995 and March 1996. This gives an average of the incomes for the year ended September 1995.
6. Indeed dividing by numbers of household inhabitants to give per capita income is using a crude household equivalence scale.
7. For the conclusion to be unambiguous the lorenz curves must not cross.
8. To convert gini coefficients into coefficients of variation see B.H. Easton, Income Distribution in New Zealand (NZIER Research Paper No 28, Wellington, 1983) p.33.
9. i.e. the effect of raising real taxes by not changing tax brackets for inflation.
10. An Australian audience is likely to ask what was the effect of GST. The research evidence suggests that GST did not in itself increase inequality. However, the resulting income tax cuts were skewed towards the rich, so the total package of GST plus income tax cuts increased inequality.
11. B.H. Easton, “Distribution”, in B. Silverstone, A. Bollard, & R. Lattimore (eds) A Study of Economic Reform: The Case of New Zealand, (North Holland, 1996).
12. Figure 4.9; page 60.
13. R. Kerr, Equalising Incomes or Reducing Poverty: Which Basis for Welfare Policies? (New Zealand Business Roundtable, 1999).
14. R. Stephens et al op. cit. (1995). See B.H. Easton, “Measuring Poverty: Some Problems” Social Policy Journal of New Zealand, 9, Nov 1997, p.171-180, for a commentary, and R. Stephens, C. Waldegrave, & P. Frater “Measuring Poverty: Some Rebuttals of Easton” Social Policy Journal of New Zealand, Issue 9, November 1997, p.181-185, for a reply.
15. B.H. Easton, “Poverty in New Zealand“: Five Years After, Paper for the Conference N.Z. Sociological Association, 1980; Easton (1995) op cit.

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Measuring New Zealand’s Economic Activity

Report on Measuring New Zealand’s Productivity

Keywords: Growth & Innovation;

Executive Summary

The Department of Labour commissioned this study to give further consideration of the Diewart and Lawrence output series, reported in Measuring New Zealand’s Productivity (D&L (1999), called here D&L99. This exploration data base raises two issues.

Construction of the D&L Series

The first is that they have appeared to construct a data base parallel to official and semi-official ones. Initially they did this because in their tax investigations required them to use expenditure aggregates at factor prices. However there is not the same need to do so for investigating productivity changes. Typically New Zealand economists have built data bases complementary to (rather than parallel to) the official ones (although sometimes Statistics New Zealand (SNZ) develops the parallel series at a later date, so there can be an overlap). The big data bases, such as the RBNZ and the RPEP, have detailed documentation of their construction.

It is also worth noting that there is a constant process of quality assessment of SNZ series, not only within the department, but from the actions of those outside who have used the data (often for macroeconomic forecasting), and informally discussed the results with SNZ. It is these processes of quality assessment (and the professionalism of those involved) which gives some confidence in the SNZ series, although obviously there are problems, and all the series are subject to noise larger than their users would like.

With the exception of the private and public (market) consumption series, which were provided by SNZ, D&L constructed their own component series which parallel to official and semi-official data. They do not seem to have attempted any reconciliation between them, their documentation of the construction is poor, and while they are likely to have had their own internal quality checks, quality assessment has not, thus far, been nearly as comprehensive as the official series.

It should be added that D&L are to be applauded for having obtained the SNZ consumption series, which were not previously in the public domain. With hindsight it is disappointing that they did not do this for the other components of their output measure. One would urge SNZ to push back their volume expenditure series which starts in 1983/4 as far as possible, and at least to 1971/2 when the consumption series starts. However it seems likely that an authoritative volume stock series would not be available before 1977/8. In that year a new commerce inventory series was introduced, which appears to overlap badly with the previous one, making it difficult to construct a consistent series.

Reliability of the D&L Series

How reliable is the D&L series? We can compare it with the parallel SNZ series (and where they do not exist, with hybrid ones constructed using official and semi-official data). On the whole the D&L series are not too unsatisfactory, except in the following respects:
– they are much more volatile;
– the secular story they tell is of slower growth before 1982/3 and faster growth after.

These differences (defects?) arise mainly from the sheer difficulty of the construction of the stock change series (which seems to be involved in every one of the unorthodox swings in the D&L business cycle), and some problems in the GFCF deflator, especially in the early 1970s. There may be other problems but they are swamped by the two identified here.

In summary, there is no reason to assume that the D&L series are superior to the SNZ based ones, while it seems likely that it is possible to construct superior expenditure side series before 1982/3 (of which GDPM(X) is an example, although it can be improved).

The Usefulness of the D&L Series

I give no opinion about the usefulness of the D&L data base in regard to their tax work, having not assessed it for this purpose. In regard to productivity measurement, it seems to me that the D&L data base adds little to that which we already have. In particular the high volatility means it cannot be adjusted to a cyclically neutral basis. The method used on page 29 of D&L99 is embarrassingly crude. Yet, other than using a three (or longer) year moving average, there is probably no better way, given the noise in the data base.

Can its long term secular trends be trusted? They are not that different from the official trends. Insofar as they are, that appears to be a function of the oddities of the GFCF deflator and the artificial volatility of the series arising from its stock change component. In particular I would be reluctant to use this series to demonstrate there has been an acceleration in the growth of productivity. Its conclusion to this effect seems far to dependent upon the faulty GCFC deflator series. (In any case insofar as it provides evidence, any acceleration began in the early 1980s, rather than the mid 1980s or 1990s, following the reforms.)

As a final caution, the difficulties in the GFCF deflator probably also undermine the reliability of the capital input index, although I have not investigate this in any detail.

Summary Conclusion

The ultimate test is that having spent a number of weeks investigating the series, would I use the D&L series for any investigation of the long term behaviour of the New Zealand economy? My short answer is no. There are better series in existence or easily constructible. I would use the consumption components of the D&L series, since they are based on official data, and I perhaps would use the D&L series as a cross check on any preferred series I was constructing or using. With those exceptions I would be reluctant to place any great weight on the D&L series.

Summary of Individual Sections

1. The report begins by describing briefly the measurement framework that was used, and some of the key notions.

2. D&L99 compute an expenditure side estimate of GDP excluding non-market expenditures (public sector net output and the imputed rent on owner occupied housing) for the period 1971/2 to 1998/9 in value and volume terms.
The construction of the output data in the report is poorly documented.

3. A comparison between the D&L99 and the SNZ market GDP series (measured at factor cost), shows the D&L series averaging 6.3 percent lower than the SNZ series. The gap was reduced to 4.0 percent if stock changes were excluded from both series. The correlations between the series on a levels and year-by-year (percent increase) basis are highly significant for the measure without stock change, and between levels for the measures with stock change. (The year-by-year correlation is markedly lower, although still statistically significant.)
In summary the D&L nominal series corresponds broadly, but not exactly, to the official SNZ series. The most problematic match is between the stock change series.

4. D&L derive their consumption components directly from SNZ. These are not given further consideration in the study.
A comparison of the D&L price deflators for exports and imports of goods and services with the SNZ one from 1982/3 (it is not available before) and the RBNZ before that date suggests the match is satisfactory.
However a comparison of the D&L deflator for Gross Fixed Capital Formation suggests it correlates poorly with the SNZ series (available only after 1982/3), and also with the RPEP and RBNZ series which go back to an earlier date. The fit is poorest up to 1983/4, especially in the early 1970s, where the D&L deflators seem far too high, relative to their later levels. (This means the D&L deflators rise more slowly than the official ones, so their real investment expenditures rise more quickly. The effect is to give later GDP growth a boost.)
In summary, the D&L external deflators are satisfactory, but the investment deflators are not, especially in the earlier part of the period.

5. Stock change figures are problematic in New Zealand before 1977/8 (when SNZ does not even provide an inventory valuation adjustment in its nominal national accounts), while SNZ volume figures are not available before 1982/3. In any case the stock change figures are the most problematic component of any expenditure side estimate of net output.
Following a detailed analysis, the study concludes that it is not possible to have any confidence in the real stock change series reported in D&L (1999). It is not clear how it was constructed, it does not appear to be comprehensive, there is some problem with the deflators (or perhaps the fundamental construction), and the series does not correlate with any other plausible alternate series.

6. The report examines five measures of net output:
GDP(P) The SNZ volume estimate of GDP based on the production side.
GDPM(P) The net output of the market sectors of the economy (i.e. Market GDP) constructed from SNZ data.

GDPM(X) This hybrid series of net market output measured on the expenditure side consists of splicing the SNZ market output series from 1982/3 to a composition of volume expenditure components before then.
D&LC(onstructed) This series was constructed from the individual components reported in D&L(1999).
D&LR(eported) This is the output series reported and used in D&L (1999). It differs slightly from D&LC(onstructed).
The D&L series do not match well with the officially and semi officially derived series. The best match is after 1982/3. The D&L series are also more volatile (measured by the percentage deviation of the percent annual increase). The trend patterns are also different. D&L has lower trend growth rates in the 1970s and higher in the 1980s.

7. It was only possible to compare the components of the GDPM(X) with D&LC, and their consumption components are identical. Moreover, the stock change estimates were not comparable. The GFCF and external components comparisons proved reasonably satisfactory, although there were important differences in trends. A curiosity is that although the GFCF value and price series were poorly correlated, the volume series from the two sources showed a similar cyclical pattern (but a different secular one).

8. Following a consideration of years in which there are large swings suggests that the both D&L series is much more volatile than the market output GDP and the hybrid expenditure series: probably misleadingly so. The very early difficulties appear to reflect the problems D&L have with their GFCF deflator. Over the entire period the inventory cycle seems to be problematic. In no case of a business cycle does the D&L series appear to tell a better story of the period than the more officially based data.

TABLES

Table 1: Comparison of D&L and SNZ Market GDP (1984/5)

Table 2: Correlations between D&L and SNZ Nominal GDP Series

Table 3: Comparisons between D&L and SNZ External Price Series

Table 4: Correlation between D&L, SNZ, RPEP, and RBNZ GCFC Deflators

Table 5: Correlation Between D&L and RBNZ Stock Levels

Table 6: Comparisons between Various Real GDP Series
6a: 1971/2-1997/8
6b: 1982/3-1997/8
6c: 1971/2-1982/3

Table 7: Comparisons between D&LC and GDPM(X) for GFCF, Exports and Imports

Table 8: Correlation between GFCF Characteristics (1971/2-1983/4)

Table 9: Years of Major GDP Swings

GRAPHS

Graph 1: D&L and SNZ Nominal GDP Series
1a: With Stock Change
1b: Without Stock Change

Graph 2: D&L, SNZ, RBNZ, and RPEP GFCF Deflator Series

Graph 3: D&L, RBNZ, and SNA Stock Change Series.

Introduction

The Department of Labour commissioned this study to give further “consideration of the Diewart and Lawrence output series [reported in Measuring New Zealand’s Productivity (D&L (1999), called here D&L99 etc]. In particular … we were interested in the major fall in the output index between 1974 and 1975 (-12%) and the major rise between 1983 and 1984 (+14%).”1 I have interpreted the remit a little more widely, not only to evaluate the cycle and noise, but also to look at the secular usefulness of the data. 2

1. Measuring Output

By way of background, it is to be recalled that economists measure economic output by the total production of goods and services in the designated region (i.e. New Zealand) valued in transaction prices. The underlying framework is the national accounts.

The core notion is the aggregate of net output. In order to avoid double counting from the output of one firm going into the input of another, the value of the inputs are deducted from the value of gross output.

In principle there are three main ways of measuring this output:
– the expenditure method (“side”) measures what is finally purchased (or goes into inventories), deducting imports since they are inputs not produced locally;

– the production side measures the net output of firms aggregated into sectors;

– the income side measures the incomes which the production process generates, since the sum of the incomes has to equal net output.
In principle the three totals measure exactly the same thing, and should have the same quantity in each year. Practically there are measurement errors (the “statistical discrepancy”).

Historically, Statistics New Zealand (SNZ) relied upon an incomes side approach (this is called ONA – old national accounts), matching it to an incomplete expenditure side (private consumption was a residual). In the 1970s it switched over to the recently introduced UN System of National Accounts (SNA) with a focus of a production side estimate. There are “official” national accounts in SNA definitions on the income and expenditure sides going back to March year ending 1962 (the New Zealand convention is to call this the 1961/2 year). (SNZ 1997) However previous to 1971/2 these are less reliable, and less detailed. Further major improvements were introduced from the 1977/8 year, and the expenditure side becomes more elaborate from 1983/4.

A particular problem arises from changes in prices, especially given the marked inflation in the 1970s and 1980s. Typically, the components of the national accounts are estimated in value (i.e. current price) terms, and are then deflated (using a suitable price index) to volume or constant price terms. Another common terminology is the value series is called “nominal” and the volume series “real”.

The aggregates may be valued in market prices which incorporate indirect taxes and subsidies, or factor (or producer prices) which do not. The SNA data is usually in market prices, whereas D&L use factor prices (which complicate the comparison). The difference hardly matters for the real series, since the deflation adjusts for changes in indirect taxes and subsidies. 3

Official volume estimates in an SNA format go back to 1971/2 on the production side, but only 1983/4 on the expenditure side. The Research Project on Economic Planning provides volume production side estimate back to 1954/5, and there is an SNZ estimate of total volume GDP going back to that year too. Series of unofficial estimates of aggregate production (value and volume), of varying reliability, go back into the nineteenth century.

2. Constructing the Output Data Series

D&L99 do not provide an account of how its output data series were constructed but its writers say they have “updated, expanded and further improved the detailed data base first developed in Diewart and Lawrence (1994, 1998).” (p.13) These earlier studies were primarily concerned with the incidence of taxation and the resulting consequences, whereas D&L99 is concerned about the measurement of total factor productivity. It may also be that the improvements refer to the input series, a conclusion consistent with D&L99 making no further reference to changes in the output series. The output data in D&L99 appears to be the same as in D&L98, except for the addition of the 1995/6 to 1997/8 years.

Regrettably, the discussion on the data construction in D&L94 is superficial, and in D&L98 is not comprehensive. As best as I can interpret from the published sources:
– The output data covers only market production on a GDP basis. This is elaborated in a following section.
– The data is measured at producer prices, rather than the more common market prices. As already explained this distinction is not so important after deflation.
– The data refers to March year, not calendar year, even when there is no indication in the text or tabulation. 4
– The data is constructed on an expenditure side basis.
– Some data was provided by Statistics New Zealand (SNZ) (private and public consumption), the remainder seems to have been calculated by the consultants, usually from official or semi-official sources.
– There is little detail of how the less official data was calculated. For instance in D&L98 the section on exports and imports amounts to 8 lines, and there is no reference to services. Investment goods (i.e. gross capital formation) has 23 lines, but there is no reference to inventory changes. There is more discussion on the inventory in D&L94 but, as reported below, that proves problematic.
– There is no explanation of how the components of the expenditure data are aggregated to the total output index. As reported below, I have been unable to reconcile the sum of the reported component outputs with the total output index.

In summary, the construction of the output data in the report is poorly documented. Those wishing to use the data should be aware that they are very dependent upon the competence of the authors. Independent verification of the data, other than that which comes direct from SNZ sources, has not been possible.

3. The Nominal Market Output Series

Because D&L work with an output series which covers only market production and which is valued in producer prices, their series is different from the conventional GDP measure which includes some other economic activities, and taxes and subsidies. In principle the conventional nominal measure can be put on the same market basis as the D&L99 measure by deducting indirect taxes, adding subsidies, and deducting the sectoral activities they define as non-market. D&L provide no comprehensive account of the sectors they include, but their non-market sectors are probably the public sector and the imputed rent on owner occupied housing (which is a component of private consumption). On this basis the nominal D&L estimate can be compared with the nominal official estimate.

An example for the 1984/5 (mid year of the D&L series) follows:

Table 1: Comparison of D&L and SNZ Market GDP (1984/5)
$m
Official GDP (at market prices)5 39,170
less Indirect taxes -4,524
plus Subsidies 598
less Net output of public sector -3,817
less Gross Operating Surplus on Owner Occupied Dwellings -1,601
Official Market GDP (at factor prices) 30,367
Diewart and Lawrence Market GDP (at factor prices) 28,626

Thus there is a difference between the two estimates of $1,741m or 6.3 percent of the official estimate. 6 Part of the difference is explained by different estimates in changes of stocks, an issue which has its own section. If the stock change is deducted from each estimate, 7 the estimates become $29,256m and $28,552m reducing the discrepancy to $704m or 2.4 percent.

For the 27 years in total, the difference of the output with stock changes ranges from 0.0 percent to 16.0 percent, with an average of 6.3 percent. Without the stock change included, the range is 0.6 percent above to 7.4 percent below, averaging 4.0 percent. 8

I also calculated the correlation coefficients between the series. Their high levels may mislead, because there is a strong trend from inflation (and to a lesser extent volume growth), so a correlation between annual percentage changes is also shown. The lower correlations for nominal GDP including stock change indicates that inventory change is an important source of measurement volatility between the series. The high rates between the GDP excluding stock changes, especially for the increase, suggest they are basically the same series.

Table 2: Correlations between D&L and SNZ Nominal GDP Series
Correlation coefficients
Nominal GDP Levels Percentage Increase
inc Stock Change .9994 .6709
exc Stock Change .9997 .9725

In summary the D&L nominal series corresponds broadly, but not exactly, to the official SNZ series. The most problematic match in stock change.

4. Converting from Value to Volume: The Deflator Series

The standard way of converting the aggregate from a current price (value) to a constant price (volume) series is to deflate the value series by a suitable price index. 9 D&L99 report 48 components to their series:
– 18 components of private consumption on consumption;
– 1 government intermediate spending;
– 6 components of fixed investment (including government investment);
– 2 (an agricultural and nonagricultural) inventory series;
– 11 components of exports (one of which was service exports);
– 10 components of imports (one of which was service imports). 10

Data on the first 19 (consumption) series was provided by SNZ, and may be taken as consistent with the official data. The remaining series were collected largely from official sources, but were subsequently processed. This introduces a source of potential error.

Exports and Imports

The D&L external series were compared with the
i) the comparable SNA implicit deflator from 1982/3 (when it first becomes available) to 1997/8. 11
ii) the comparable RBNZ implicit deflator from 1971/2 to 1980/1. 12

I have used three simple measures to compare the series:
– the average increase over the period;
– the correlation between them, for levels and percentage increases.

Table 3: Comparisons between D&L and SNZ External Price Series
1971/2-1981/2 Export prices Import Prices
D&L annual increase 14.0% p.a. 15.4% p.a.
RBNZ annual increase 14.1% p.a. 16.2% p.a.
Correlation coefficient .9995 (levels) .9997 (levels)
.9745 (increases) .9946 (increases)
1982/3-1987/8 Export prices Import Prices
D&L annual increase 3.1% p.a. 1.5% p.a.
SNZ annual increase 2.7% p.a. 1.4% p.a.
Correlation coefficient .9976 (levels) .9880 (levels)
.9914 (increases) .9816 (increases)

A curiosity of the analysis is that strictly we are comparing official and semi-official price indexes which include indirect taxes (and subsidy), with D&L indexes which exclude indirect taxes. The good correlations suggests that there is not a substantial tax element in the values. 13 The match between the series for either period is broadly satisfactory.

Gross Fixed Capital Formation

The relative capital formation deflator proved more problematic. On the three compass principle, 14 it was necessary to look at two alternative series (in addition to the SNZ one). A complication is that they are over different periods. The series that were compared were:
i) the D&L (implicit) aggregate capital formation deflator available from 1971/2 to 1997/8.
ii) the comparable SNA implicit deflator available from 1982/3.
iii) the comparable RBNZ implicit deflator available from 1971/2 to 1993/4.
iv) the comparable RPEP implicit deflator available from 1971/2 to 1996/7.

In order to simplify the presentation, we report here summary statistics between each series for as long a period as possible. They are shown below (with the number of observations in brackets):

Table 4: Correlation between D&L, SNZ, RPEP, and RBNZ GCFC Deflators
SNZ RBNZ RPEP
Trend: percentage points difference between row series relative to column series
D&L -0.3(15) -0.6(23) -0.4(26)
RPEP 0.5(15) 0.0(23)
RBNZ 0.4(12)
Correlation coefficient (levels)
D&L .992 .997 .995
RPEP .935 .998
RBNZ .996
Correlation coefficient (percentage changes)
D&L .689 .622 .605
RPEP .942 .983
RBNZ .956

While the RBNZ and RPEP series are reasonably closely aligned even on a percentage change basis, and correlate well with the SNZ series, the D&L series appears to be the odd one out. (An eyeball comparison shows that the there is a particularly poor fit in the early 1970s, with the match remaining poor until 1983/4.) The poor correlation before the official series was constructed should come as no surprise to those who have worked in this area. The gross fixed capital formation deflators have always been among the most problematic to construct, and both the RBNZ and the RPEP research groups are among New Zealand economists who have put an enormous effort into providing quality indicators. 15 Of course the two series may be constructed on largely the same data and assumptions. But they were constructed independently in two research programs, by researchers experienced with the New Zealand data and the New Zealand economy, and at least intuitively will have checked their results against other indicators of the New Zealand economy of the time. Thus D&L deflator has to be considered less reliable than either of these two.

The issues raised early of the effect on the comparisons of indirect taxation on exports and imports also applies here. The implications of the differences in deflators on the output estimates appears later. However it should be noted that unsatisfactory gross fixed capital formation deflators will also impact upon the estimates of real capital stock. Given the deflators are high in the earlier period, the effect will be to raise TFP growth in the 1970s.

In summary, the D&L external deflators are satisfactory, but the D&L investment deflators are not, especially in the earlier part of the period.

5. Stock Change

It is clear that the D&L have difficulties in regard to their stock change data, although it should be added that these are always even more problematic than the GFCF data, as the subsequent discussion will show.

The first difficulty is that the D&L series is not comprehensive. By their account they cover only livestock, and stocks of materials and commercial stocks (finished goods in manufacturing, retail stocks and the narrow definition of wholesale stocks). (D&L94:101-2) A major exclusion is forestry stocks (which fortunately grow fairly steadily), but there are also some minor stocks omitted. In addition SNZ makes adjustments between its stocks and other expenditure, most notoriously in regard to exports, because goods which cross the wharves (and are measured at this point as doing so) are not deemed exported until they are sold. I the interim they are transferred from exports to stock changes. Thus a number of items in the SNA definition of inventories are omitted.

The price deflator reportedly used to deflate the commercial stocks was the price index for all New Zealand industry inputs (excluding labour), implying there was no disaggregation. In any case the price index does not match the actual content of the stocks well, increasing too quickly, and thereby depressing real stock levels at the end of the period, and stock growth through it. Indeed the D&L series shows a decrease in aggregate stock levels between 1971/2 and 1990/1, which seems most unlikely (and is not replicated in any other available series).

The second difficulty is that while the D&L nominal stock change in the 1971/2 year is reported as $95m for their agricultural (livestock?) stock change and -$57m for their nonagricultural stock change, the value in 1971/2 prices is reported as $79m and -$61m respectively. Although as explained below, price deflators for stock change are problematic, they should be at unity in the base year. Here they are not.

Third, the data reported in D&L99 does not appear to be consistent with that in D&L94, but there is no further comment on data construction thereafter, so further investigation is not possible.

To understand the difficulties with the stock change, consider a simple inventory with a well defined price. Suppose its value is St at the beginning of period t, when the price level is Pt. The apparent increase in the value of stocks in the period t is given by

St+1– St

.
However, for national accounts purposes, which focuses on the growth of production, the effect of inflation in the increase in the value of the stocks is not a part of production. Assuming that the stocks are valued in current prices, than the increase in stocks from additional production is

St+1/(Pt+1/Pt) – St

at the beginning of the period prices. The difference between the two,

St+1(1-Pt/Pt+1),

is called the “inventory valuation adjustment”.16 Until 1977/8, the SNZ national accounts did not have an IVA.

To calculate the real increase in stocks, we divide the nominal value of each stock level by the price level (assuming that the base price level is set at 1.0). 17 The difference between them is the real increase, or in period t

St+1/Pt+1 – St/Pt,
or
{St+1/(Pt+1/Pt) -St}/Pt.

Thus the real increase is the SNA nominal increase divided by the price index at the beginning of the period.

However, once aggregation occurs, with the procedure being applied to a number of types of stocks each with their own price index, the simplicity of these formula disappears following aggregation. In principle this also happens for any other aggregation, but providing the price changes are all the same sign, and their increases of similar magnitude, the situation does not usually cause problems. However, because typically the components of the aggregate stocks series are both rising and falling, the aggregate nominal and real series do not follow one another well. For instance the nominal increase may be positive but the real increase negative, so the apparent implicit price deflator is negative.18

This meaningless of the aggregate implicit price deflator, means that we cannot compare the price deflators for aggregate stock change. Instead I have made a direct comparison of four estimates of the real stock change:
– SNZ: the official SNA series. (1982/3-1997/8);
– RBNZ: the series from the RBNZ data base. (1971/2-1994/5);19
– D&L94: I constructed this series from the data reported in D&L94. (1972/3-1990/1);20
– D&L99: as reported in D&L99.

Because we cannot standardise them to the same price base (other than by disaggregating into components, which is not possible given the lack of data), the best way of comparing the series is by correlation. The results are tabulated below with the number of observations next to the correlation coefficient.

Table 5: Correlation Between D&L and RBNZ Stock Levels
RBNZ D&L94 D&L99
SNZ .088 (14) .320 (9) .079 (7)
RBNZ .735 (19) .143 (20)
D&L94 .213 (19).

The only statistically significant correlation is between RBNZ and D&L94, probably because they are both dominated by commerce stocks. None of the unofficial series correlate well with the official ones, and the two D&L series do not correlate significantly either.

A weakness of the correlation approach is that it does not assess secular trends. Thus the correlation between the RBNZ and the D&L94 series is partly misleading because they have quite different long run properties. In particular, the RBNZ inventory stock measured in 1971/2 prices rises 68.9 percent between end March 1972 and end March 1991, whereas D&L94 falls 5.6 percent over the same period. The latter pattern seems unlikely, and probably reflects a faulty deflator for the commerce stocks.

In conclusion, it is not possible to have any confidence in the real stock change series reported in D&L99. It is not clear how it was constructed, it does not appear to be comprehensive, there is some problem with the deflators (or perhaps the fundamental construction), and the series does not correlate with any other plausible alternate series. (We will see its weaknesses playing a key role in later problems with the aggregate D&L output series.)

6. Comparing and Constructing the D&L Output Series

This report compares five series:

1. GDP(P)
This is the SNZ volume estimate of GDP based on the production side. It is the most used measure of changes in economic activity. We would expect this to be less volatile/cyclical than the market concept that D&L use, because the non-market sector is less cyclical.

2. GDPM(P)
This consists of the net output of the market sectors of the economy (i.e. Market GDP). It was constructed by subtracting the net outputs of the general government and owner occupied housing sectors from GDP(P). This series is the production side estimate of the market output concept used by D&L.

3. GDPM(X) (a.k.a the “hybrid” series)
This series, which is an expenditure side estimate of market GDP based on New Zealand sourced data, consists of splicing two series together. The more recent series was the SNZ economy wide output series on the expenditure side less the expenditures on (which are also the outputs of) general government and owner occupier housing, again converting the aggregate into a measure of market output. However this series goes back only to 1982/3.

Before then, back to 1971/2, I constructed a market output series from the expenditure side as follows.
– private and public consumption: The SNZ data provided to D&L;
– gross fixed capital formation: SNZ nominal GFCF deflated by a geometric average of the RBNZ and RPEP GFCF deflators;
– stock change: annual changes in the volume RBNZ inventory stock series (scaled to the 1982/3 SNZ estimate).21
– exports: the SNZ series of the total export volume index the reported in SNZ(1986/7). However this only covers goods. A comparison of the volume exports goods and volume export services series for the 1982/3 to 1997/8 period suggests they remained in a relatively fixed proportion, and that was assumed before 1982/3.22
– imports: the SNZ series of the total import volume index the reported in SNZ(1986/7). However this only covers goods, so the trended ratio between goods and services was projected back before 1982/3.23

The resulting series is of a rather mixed ancestry.24 Note that it and the next two have considerable commonality in that the consumption data comes from the same SNZ source.

4. D&LC(onstructed)
This series was constructed by adding the volume expenditure components (subtracting of imports) from Table 38a of D&L99.

5. D&LR(eported)
D&L99 report a (market) output series in their Table 3.1. One might expect it to be exactly the same as the D&LC(onstructed) but it is not. No explanation is given why they are different (although they are obviously closely statistically related).

1971/2-1997/8

Measures for comparing the series over the 1971/72 to 1997/8 period are given in the following table. (The standard deviation of the percentage increase, essentially a measure of a variation about the series trend, will be used in a later section).

Table 6a: Comparisons between Various Real GDP Series (1971/2-1997/8)
GDP(P) GDPM(P) GDPM(X) D&LC D&LR
Trend: percent p.a. annual increase
2.1 2.3 2.4 2.1 2.3
Standard Deviation of Percent Annual Increase
2.4 2.8 3.5 5.9 6.0
Correlation coefficient (levels)
GDP(P) 1.000 0.998 0.980 0.963 0.967
GDPM(P) 0.998 1.000 0.988 0.972 0.975
GDPM(X) 0.980 0.988 1.000 0.985 0.991
D&LC 0.963 0.972 0.985 1.000 0.998
D&LR 0.967 0.975 0.991 0.998 1.000
Correlation coefficient (percentage changes)
GDP(P) 1.000 0.983 0.602 0.175 0.126
GDPM(P) 0.983 1.000 0.670 0.260 0.215
GDPM(X) 0.602 0.670 1.000 0.639 0.637
D&LC 0.175 0.260 0.639 1.000 0.989
D&LR 0.126 0.215 0.637 0.989 1.000

Focusing on the percentage change correlations, we can see that the two production side series (GDP(P), GDPM(P)) are closely related,25> as are the two D&L series (D&LC, D&LR). This is not surprising, given their construction. The hybrid expenditure side series, GDPM(X), appears to correlate reasonably well with both groupings.26

Recalling that the hybrid series was constructed quite differently before and after 1982/3, and that generally the quality of the data base is superior after that date, the two sub-periods were checked separately. First consider the later series (form 1982/3), with its better quality data.

1982/3-1997/8

The measures for comparing the series over the 1982/3 to 1997/8 period are given in the following table

Table 6b: Comparisons between Various Real GDP Series (1982/3-1997/8)
GDP(P) GDPM(P) GDPM(X) D&LC D&LR
Trend: percent p.a. annual increase
1.9 2.4 2.8 2.5 2.8
Standard Deviation of Percent Annual Increase
2.8 3.0 3.7 7.8 7.8
Correlation coefficient (levels)
GDP(P) 1.000 0.999 0.994 0.977 0.984
GDPM(P) 0.999 1.000 0.994 0.979 0.986
GDPM(X) 0.994 0.948 1.000 0.977 0.990
D&LC 0.977 0.979 0.977 1.000 0.994
D&LR 0.984 0.986 0.990 0.994 1.000
Correlation coefficient (percentage changes)
GDP(P) 1.000 0.984 0.920 0.566 0.510
GDPM(P) 0.984 1.000 0.936 0.631 0.577
GDPM(X) 0.920 0.936 1.000 0.690 0.675
D&LC 0.566 0.631 0.690 1.000 0.983
D&LR 0.510 0.577 0.675 0.983 1.000

The separate grouping of the two production side and the two D&L series remains, although now even their increases correlate significantly.27 The GDPM(X) series joins the production side group (satisfyingly because they are all, in effect, official SNZ series).

1971/2-1982/3

The measures for comparing the series over the 1971/72 to 1997/8 period are given in the following table.

Table 6c: Comparisons between Various Real GDP Series (1971/2-1982/3)
GDP(P) GDPM(P) GDPM(X) D&LC D&LR
Trend: percent p.a. annual increase
2.0 1.9 1.5 1.3 1.3
Standard Deviation of Percent Annual Increase
2.8 3.0 3.7 4.4 4.4
Correlation coefficient (levels)
GDP(P) 1.000 0.996 0.790 0.420 0.444
GDPM(P) 0.996 1.000 0.812 0.426 0.440
GDPM(X) 0.790 0.812 1.000 0.673 0.678
D&LC 0.420 0.426 0.673 1.000 0.985
D&LR 0.444 0.440 0.678 0.985 1.000
Correlation coefficient (percentage changes)
GDP(P) 1.000 0.994 0.302 -.067 -.109
GDPM(P) 0.994 1.000 0.365 0.003 -.039
GDPM(X) 0.302 0.365 1.000 0.631 0.633
D&LC -.067 0.003 0.631 1.000 0.989
D&LR -.109 -.039 0.633 0.989 1.000

The grouping of GDP(P) and GDPM(P) and of D&LC and D&LR are again maintained, but on the basis of the correlation between their increases they are different series measuring quite different phenomenon. This time GDPM(X) appears to have more in common with the D&L series and little with the production side estimates.28 This is not so surprising in that the D&L and GDPM(X) series have their consumption components in common. However it is disappointing that GDP(M) appears to have little short run relation to the production side estimates. One suspects that a better estimate may be possible.29

(Note the different stories the series are telling about the patterns of secular trends. The production side estimate of market GDP has it growing 1.9 percent p.a. in the earlier period, and 2.4 percent p.a. in the later period, a rise of .5 percentage points The expenditure side estimates have lower growth in the earlier period (1.3-1.5 percent p.a.), and a higher one in the later period (2.5-2.8 percent p.a.) giving an increase of 1.2 to 1.5 percentage points, or more than double the production side change. Thus the story one may tell can be varied by suitable choice of the data series.)

The D&L series do not match well with the officially and semi officially derived series. The best match is after 1982/3. The D&L series are also more volatile (measures by the percentage deviation of the percent annual increase). The trend patterns are also different. D&L has lower trend growth rates in the 1970s and higher in the 1980s.

7. Comparing the Year to Year Changes by Components

It is only possible to compare the components of GDPM(X) with D&LC, since there is no expenditure side aggregation available for any of the other series. Moreover, two of the components, private and public (market) consumption are identical, while it is simply not possible to compare the stock change series.30 Again I have used the mean changes and correlation of levels and percentage increase method.

Table 7: Comparisons between D&LC and GDPM(X) for GFCF, Exports and Imports
Gross Fixed Capital Formation Exports Imports
1971/2-1997/8
Average increases (percent p.a.)
GDPM(X) 2.3 4.0 3.7
D&LC 3.0 4.0 4.7
Correlation coefficient
Levels .902 .998 .985
% Increase .939 .919 .980
1971/2-1982/3
Average increases (percent p.a.)
GDPM(X) 1.6 3.2 1.7
D&LC 3.8 3.7 3.9
Correlation coefficient
Levels .401 .978 .808
% Increase .947 .951 .993
1982/3-1997/8
Average increases (percent p.a.)
GDPM(X) 2.7 4.4 4.9
D&LC 2.5 3.9 4.9
Correlation coefficient
Levels .995 .996 .998
% Increase .974 .932 .970

The two export series show a close similarity over the whole period (although there is a different pattern between the sub periods, which may be an endpoint problem). The two import series are very similar in the post 1982/3 period, but a substantial trend divergence before (which is also reflected in the correlation coefficients).

However the relationship between the Gross Fixed Capital Formation series is odd. Again the post 1982/3 fit is good, but in the earlier period shows a substantial divergence in trend, together with a statistically insignificant (at the 5 percent level) correlation between levels. However there is a strong correlation between the increases. An examination of the value and price data shows the following:

Table 8: Correlation between GFCF Characteristics (1971/2-1983/4)
Levels % Increases (Average Difference*)
Value .999 .867 1.4
Price Index .985 .255 -1.0
Volume .401 .947 2.2
* between % increase of D&LC vs GDPM(X)

It appears that the while the value and price indexes correlate well at the series levels, their ratio does not. However, while they correlate poorly as percentage increases, their ratio the series increases correlate exceptionally well. The D&L description of how they constructed their investment goods data is brief. But D&L98 mentions that much of the data came from The Treasury. It is possible that the Treasury data came from the sources we used to construct the GDP(M) (volume) series. However, without examining the D&L worksheets it is not possible to explain why the underlying series diverge so greatly, why there is substantial differences in the trends of the volumes series, and yet why their cyclical patterns are reasonably close.31

It was only possible to compare the components of the GDPM(X) with D&LC, and their consumption components are identical. Moreover, the stock change estimates were not comparable. The GFCF and external components comparisons proved reasonably satisfactory, although there were important differences in trends. A curiosity was that while the GFCF value and price series were poorly correlated, the volume series from the two sources showed a similar cyclical pattern (but a different secular one).

8. Cyclical Swings and Errors

The terms of reference specifically asked to look at some of the sharp annual swings that occurred in the D&L series. However the New Zealand economy is subject to actual cycles, which is one of the sources of GDP growth swings. In order to accommodate this we have examined only the extreme annual percentage changes which were identified as follows. The four series of section 6 (excluding GDP) was separated into the two sub periods, and detrended. The GDPM(P) series, probably the most accurate, experienced a standard deviation about its trend of 3.0 percentage in the pre 1982/3 period and 2.6 percentage points after 1982/3. Swings from the trend which were greater than 6.0 percent in the earlier period and 5.2 percent in the second are listed as follows (the percentage increase being shown – brackets indicates it was inside the range):

Table 9: Years of Major GDP Swings
Year GDPM(P) GDPM(X) D&LC D&LR
1971/2-1972/3 (4.1) 8.1 10.8 9.9
1972/3-1973/4 6.8 (1.0) (3.5) (1.6)
1973/4-1974/5 (2.9) (-1.2) -14.0 -12.8
1974/5-1975/6 (0.5) (0.6) 9.0 8.9
1978/9-1979/80 (1.0) (-4.6) -10.0 -11.1
1979/80-1980/1 (-1.0) (3.2) 7.9 9.6
1982/3-1983/4 (2.6) 5.7 11.5 13.2
1983/4-1984/5 (4.5) 6.1 (-0.3) (-0.7)
1988/9-1989/90 (-0.1) (-1.7) (-6.2) (-5.4)
1992/3-1993/4 5.7 7.1 6.9 6.4
1993/4-1994/5 (4.6) 5.5 (5.0) (4.7)

In total this identifies 11 of the 26 possible years.

However we may dismiss the 1993/4-1995/6 period as the series are telling the same story. It was an exceptional boom.

One might be inclined to dismiss the first four year period, 1971/2-1975/6 on a similar basis. It is certainly true that all series show a strong expansion in the first couple of years, although GDPM(P) locates the peak a little later than the expenditure side series. However in the second two years of the period the D&L series tell quite a different story, of a wild downswing in 1974/5 followed by an almost as spectacular recovery. This is not evident in the other two series, in other indicators, nor in contemporary commentary. This is not merely a matter of timing, because the D&L series appear to be growing faster over the period. Inspection suggests that the faulty GFCF price deflators is interacting badly with the also fluctuating level of investment. (There may also be inventory problems, a caveat always with the D&L series.) In summary, it seems unlikely that the D&L series are well representing either the cycle or the trend over this period.

The D&L series have a mini bust and boom in the 1978/9-1980/1, again not evident in the other series, in other indicators, or in contemporary comment. The difference appears to be in contrary stock cycles between GDPM(X) and D&LC. Given the difficulties with inventory measurement there is little more to be said.

The 1982/3-1984/5 period also has different profiles of a cyclical between the GDPM and D&L series. Again the latter do not seem to conform to other indicators or the conventional wisdom, and again the inventory cycles between GDPM(X) and D&LC are quite different. However this time the GDPM(X) stock change data is based on the official (and very detailed) estimates, and may be taken as more authoritative.

Undoubtedly there was some contraction in the 1988/90 year. However The D&L contraction seems far too strong, and again the profiles in the stock cycle are quite different.

In summary, the D&L series is much more volatile than the other two series – probably misleadingly so. The very early difficulties appear to reflect the problems D&L have with their GFCF deflator. Over the entire period the inventory cycle seems to be problematic. In no case does the D&L series appear to tell a better story of the period than the more officially based data. 32

Conclusion
The detailed conclusion is in the executive summary. In summary:

The ultimate test is that having spent a number of weeks investigating the series, would I use the D&L series for any investigation of the long term behaviour of the New Zealand economy? My short answer is no. There are better series in existence or easily constructible. I would use the consumption components of the D&L series, since they are based on official data, and I perhaps would use the D&L series as a cross check on any preferred series I was constructing or using, but with those exceptions I would be reluctant to place any great weight on the D&L series.

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Bibliography
Diewert, E. & D. Lawrence (1994) The Marginal Costs of Taxation in New Zealand, Swan Consultants, Canberra (prepared for the New Zealand Business Roundtable). a.k.a. D&L94.
Diewart, E. & D. Lawrence (1998) The Effects of Capital Taxation in New Zealand, Tasman Asia Pty Ltd, Canberra (prepared for the Institute of Policy Studies). a.k.a. D&L98.
Diewart, E. & D. Lawrence (1999) Measuring New Zealand’s Productivity, Diewart Enterprises Ltd (prepared for Department of Labour, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, and The Treasury). a.k.a. D&L99.
Easton, B.H. (1997) In Stormy Seas: The Post-War New Zealand Economy, Otago University Press, Dunedin.
Easton, B.H. (1999) Commentary on “Measuring New Zealand’s Productivity” paper for Seminar on New Zealand Productivity, March 25, 1999, Economic And Social Trust on New Zealand paper 99.9, Wellington.
Philpott, B.P. (1999) Deficiencies in Diewart-Lawrence Capital Stock Estimates, RPEP Paper 294.
Statistics New Zealand (1999) Chain Volume Measures in the New Zealand National Accounts, Wellington. (This is the latest relevant publication. Various other SNZ sources were used to supplement it.)

Endnotes
1. Letter from S. Chapple, 9 April 1999.
2. Philpott (1999) has evaluated some aspects of the D&L capital series.
3. There is a very small divergence arising from the base shares differing, insofar as the taxes and subsidies are in different proportions on different components. this rarely affects aggregate indexes calculated by the overall results by a significant amount.
4. See D&L98 which, however, includes the mysterious statement “[r]ecently there has been a move to present New Zealand data more consistently (sic) on a June year basis.” (p.71)
5. This is the expenditure side estimate.
6. D&L do not actually give their GDP figure. This is calculated by adding together their figures for the components of consumption (including intermediate government consumption), stock changes, investment goods, exports less imports.
7. There is a slight double counting since taxes and subsidies are attributed to stock change.
8. The SNZ series grow on average 9.8 and 10.0 percent p.a. respectively, while the D&L99 series grow 10.1 and 10.2 percent p.a. This small difference on a year to year basis amounts to up to 8.5 percentage points over the 27 years. Even such a small difference can matter on an annual basis when productivity comparisons are being made.
9. There are a number of detailed options in the application of this approach, which are unlikely to affect the outcomes markedly and are not pursued here.
10. There are three more than D&L98 because of government investment, and other exports and imports being split into services and other goods.
11. The source for this and other data is Statistics New Zealand (1998), which is a chain volume implicit price index.
12. I did not compare with the SNZ deflators for they are for goods only and do not include services.
13. An issue which needs to be worked through is the impact of GST which was imposed on GFCF and imports (which are usually measured at the border exclusive of the GST they incur). I propose to check how SNZ dealt with this when I next talk to them. D&L make no mention of the issue.Endnote 2 may be relevant here.
14. Planes carry three compasses, because when there are only two, one cannot tell which is wrong.
15. Des O’Dea is another who promptly comes to mind.
16. On the incomes side, the IVA is deducted from operating surplus.
17. If the base period is 1, the base price is not P1 in this definition, because that is the price at the end of (not during) the period. A better estimate is usually (P0 + P1)/2, the average of the prices at the beginning and the end of the period.
18. Suppose there were just two stocks, where the nominal increase in the first was $100m and the nominal decrease in the second was $99m, so that the net nominal increase was $1m. Suppose the relevant price deflator for the first stock was 1.02 and for the second was 1.00. In this case the real increase would be 100/1.02 -99/1.00, or -$1m. So the implicit price deflator would appear to be -1.00! This phenomenon occurs in practice, and is one of the reasons that SNZ does not publish an implicit stock change deflator.
19. In fact the data goes back to 1961/2. It is provided as real stock levels, the difference being the real stock change. Note the series, which is primarily used for modelling, does not pretend to be comprehensive.
20. The inventory stock series are described as “March Year”. I have assumed that they are March ended. (D&L94, Tables A.14-17).
21. Given the inherent problems in all stock change series, I may well have been adding noise to the data.
22. The export and import service volume series could be improved with further work. For instance were I constructing my best possible market GDP on the expenditure side I would consider using the D&L service volume series before 1982/3.
23. A comparison of the volume imports goods and volume import services series for the 1982/3 to 1997/8 period showed a reasonably consistent pattern of decline in the proportion (so import services appeared to be growing at .9 percentage points p.a. less than import goods).
24. Because they could be improved, I have not provided a table of the individual components. They are available from the author.
25. I express some satisfaction that the expenditure side series trend a little higher, say .2 percentage points p.a., than the production side series. I argued this was true in Easton (1997) because the expenditure side deflators are likely to better adjust for quality. The observed difference here is of a similar order of magnitude.
25. The critical value for a correlation coefficient at 25 degrees of freedom is .381 at a 5 percent level of significance, and .597 at a 0.1 percent level of significance.
26. The critical value for a correlation coefficient at 14 degrees of freedom is .497 at a 5 percent level of significance, and .623 at a 1 percent level of significance.
27. The critical value for a correlation coefficient at 10 degrees of freedom is .576 at a 5 percent level of significance, and .708 at a 1 percent level of significance.
28. For instance, improving the external services components, and it should be possible to get reasonable estimates of volume stock changes back to 1977/8.
29. I tried a number of ingenious ways, but the underlying problem of the lack of a sensible aggregate deflator series, plus the lack of detail in the data, defeated me.
30. See Section 4 for further discussion on the gross capital formation deflator.
31. One of the Department of Labour commentators provided a very detailed comparison with the QSBO data. It concludes that “examination of the QSBO data does not seem to shake the soundness of the conclusions” drawn here. A copy of this note is available from the author.

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Electric Rhetoric: Sneering Instead Of Thinking

Listener 17 July 1999

Keywords: Business & Finance; Regulation & Taxation;

Concerned with what he thought was the excessive influence of women in New Zealand poetry, Rex Fairburn, writing to Denis Glover in 1934, described them as the “menstrual school.” It was a silly gibe – an adolescent using words not then mentioned in polite company. The rhetoric was unforgivable, if far too typical of the New Zealand vice of pigeon-holing one’s opponents with a superficial personalised witticism, rather than cogently facing the issue being debated. That is exactly what a recent editorial of The Dominion did when it accused minister of energy, Max Bradford, of a “Return to Muldoonism”.

For those who came in late – most of us – the electricity distribution reforms began about a decade ago. First, the publicly owned local supply companies were corporatised, followed by mergers and widespread privatisation, often to foreign owners. The government reduced its involvement in the electricity supply by selling off some of its generating capacity and splitting Electricorp into two, saying it would not sell off the smaller Contact. Later it split the residual Electricorp into three, saying it has no plans to sell them, and privatised Contact instead.

Meanwhile, for the story is a messy one, the government at last noticed that owners of the lines to most homes and businesses had a natural monopoly which could be used to give a competitive advantage in the supply of energy. Legislation was passed which restricted the companies to either lines or energy. The line companies remained a monopoly, so Bradford has legislation before parliament which would give the Commerce Commission the ability to control the line companies’ prices. In particular the Commission is likely to impose a “CPI-X” regime, in which prices are permitted to increase in line with inflation less an amount of X, forcing the line companies to seek productivity improvements of at least that rate. It may be a form of price control, but it is not the old “cost-plus” formula.

I have left out complications out (such as an oversight in the treatment of home electricity meters), for there is a more salutary lesson. Suppose a decade ago, Bradford, knowing what he knows now, had embarked upon the reforms. He may well have chosen the same final destination, but he would certainly have taken a different path from his predecessors. Even at the time, the reforms seemed driven more by ideology than by an understanding of how markets really work. Ministers before Bradford, then a backbencher, blitzkrieged the changes through parliament and ended up with the shambles that Bradford has been trying to clear up. (The perpetrators of the faulty path were his own government, so Shipley’s new-look ministers cannot blame the old-look ones for their messes. No wonder any eight year old government looks exhausted.)

Into this complexity strode The Dominion, strong on the ideology which got the distribution industry into a mess, but weak on economics. (The editorial does not even mention “natural monopoly” or related concepts such as “common carrier”.) It thundered “Muldoonism”, its bombast missing the real issues.

Rhetoric such as Fairburn’s tore Robin Hyde between her solidarity with the other women poets, and the insistent demands of her muse. Perhaps a less divisive and more supportive environment might have prevented her untimely death by suicide (in 1939 when she was 33). Her just published long (and long lost) prose poem, The Book of Nadath, demonstrates what an extraordinarily innovative and (yes) great poet she was. Had she survived, she might have modified the course of New Zealand literature. But the New Zealand practice of adolescent abuse instead of analysis did not encourage her talent.

Max Bradford is not a Muldoonist. Anyone who has followed his career, and his generation, knows that is an inane claim. It is all the more mindless when it is realised that “CPI-X” regulation of natural monopolies is considered internationally the state of the art, used widely overseas, and was first used systematically in Britain in the 1980s. If The Dominion were consistent it would apply the term “Muldoonism” to Margaret Thatcher.

Note: The family of Rex Fairburn wrote in a letter in The Listener (14 August, 199) that they thought I had been unfair to the poet.

Rethinking Economic Policy: The Washington Consensus Turns to Custard

Listener 3 July, 1999.

Keywords: Growth & Innovation;

Half a decade ago, capitalism appeared to have triumphed over communism (if one is allowed the crudity of these descriptors). When the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, the Eastern European nations of the COMECON pact left the Soviet fold, looking to the West as they transformed their economies and ways of political life. The rest of the Russian Empire broke up in 1993, and they went west too. No longer is a “spectre … haunting Europe – the spectre of communism” (as Karl Marx wrote in 1848).

The path these transition economies took is popularly captured by what is known as the “Washington Consensus”, although some countries were less enthusiastic than others. The city of Washington is the home of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the US Treasury, although the articulation of the ten key notions occurred at a think-tank conference held in that city in 1990. They are summarised as
– fiscal discipline;
– public expenditure priorities in health and education;
– tax reforms;
– positive but moderate market determined interest rates;
– competitive exchange rate;
– liberal trade policies;
– openness to foreign direct investment;
– privatisation;
– deregulation;
– protection of private property right.

Broadly they represent the direction of New Zealand economic policy in the last 15 years (although we often took a more extreme stance). The policies were not only seized upon by the transition economies, but also by the Western and Asian capitalists, enthusiastically greedy for the profitable opportunities they offered.

The transitions were always going to be difficult, but there was an alternative to the Washington Consensus, which has led to a far more successful economic performance. If Marx’s spectre no longer haunts Europe, China has continued along its own distinctive cautious liberalisation towards a more market, more capitalist economy (with continued political control). While the Russian Gross Domestic Product has fallen by about half since 1989, the Chinese GDP has more than doubled. By being more selective in its response to liberalisation than the Russians, the Chinese economy seems to be succeeding.

So the Washington Consensus is crumbling, if not already turning to custard. Leading the charge has been the World Bank, with the Fund and the US Treasury more reluctantly following. The chief critic is Joe Stiglitz, senior vice-president and chief economist of the Bank, a fine economist whose theoretical contributions are likely to receive a “Nobel Prize” in economics (deservedly, unlike some others so awarded). His criticism is summarised by “the failures of the reforms … go far deeper – to a misunderstanding of the very foundations of a market economy, as well as a failure to grasp the fundamentals of the reform processes. … at least part of the problem was an excessive reliance on textbook models of economics.” Later he says “the Washington Consensus doctrines of transition failed in their understandings of the core elements of a market economy”. At the heart of Stiglitz’s critique is that there has been the neglect of the social institutions which underpin an economy. Of the ten key policies, only the one about property rights mentions them.

In his paper to the Bank’s annual conference on development economics in April, Stiglitz is scathing about the “shock therapy” approach (he also calls it “blitzkrieg”) to the reforms. He argues for “continuous change – trying to preserve social capital that cannot be easily reconstructed.” Attitudes towards the recent reforms, he says, were like those of the bolsheviks (yes, he acknowledges the irony) who were intent on destroying the social institutions of the Russia they took over in 1918. But the Chinese seem to have learned from the failures of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. “They chose the path of incrementalism (`crossing the river by groping for the stones at one at a time’) and non-ideological pragmatism (`the question is not whether the cat is black or white, but whether or not it catches the mice’). They had the wisdom to `know they didn’t know what they were doing’ so they didn’t jump of the cliff after being assured by experts that they would be jumping over the chasm in just one more great leap forward.”

While Stiglitz seems unaware of the New Zealand experience (he visited here in 1968), the relevance of his analysis to the New Zealand experience is extraordinary. My book, The Commercialisation of New Zealand, argues along very similar lines, and its successor, The Whimpering of the State: Policy after MMP, due out this month, provides much detail about the way that social institutions have been damaged by our reforms.

Stiglitz, and his associates, are not arguing for an anti-market stance. His theoretical works (and textbook) show a tremendous respect for (and insight to) the power of the market system, and he would certainly support an open economy based on private property. But his account also recognizes the importance of society, with the government playing a positive role. His paper ends with “The [transition] countries – and their advisors – will have learned from the many bitter and disappointing failures – and the few successes – of the past decade.” Thoughtful New Zealanders will say “Amen”.

Institutional Economics

Extract from The Whimpering of the State. p.123-124.

Keynotes: History of Ideas, Methodology & Philosophy;

In 1931, at the age of 24 [Sutch] went to the Department of Economics at Columbia, at the time the most important in the United States, where it taught the dominant economic paradigm of the times ‘institutionalism’.(1) The neoclassical synthesis (often abbreviated to ‘neoclassical’) a combination of the macroeconomics that Keynes pioneered and the modern theory of markets (including a welfare economics which emphasises their beneficial outcomes), strongly laced with mathematical techniques only becomes important after the Second World War. Institutionalists trace their origin to Thorstein Veblin. Among the best-known are Gunnar Myrdal and John Kenneth Galbraith and Maurice Clarke, who lead inter-war Columbian economics.

Yuval Yonay summarises ‘the trademarks of institutionalism [are] empirical research, suspicion towards deductive theory, emphasis on the changing nature of economic institutions, habits, and norms, special attention to the divergence of market values (prices) from social values, and the belief in the reality of informed concerted action to improve human welfare.’(2) The (largely valid) implication of this definition is that the neoclassical economics which followed it is less empirical and more deductive. It tends to assume that institutions, habits and norms are irrelevant (but often the implicit assumption is the norms of an idealised white middle class US males). It thinks market prices normally match social prices, and while collective actions rarely improve human welfare, but individual ones usually do.

Readers may be a little dismayed to see such disagreement between the two economic paradigms, and may not even be reassured by Paul Samuelson, the key neoclassical innovator and doyen of MIT economics which replaced Columbia’s supremacy after the war, who said in 1999 ‘I do not come today to bury institutionalism nor to dispraise it. I believe it lives on as a lively element inside today’s mainstream economics, … American institutional economics [is] a force that will endure and flower in the next century to come.’(3) The eclectic economist has a toolkit, in which both institutionalist and neoclassical paradigms (and others) reside. Faced with a particular problem, the economist uses the tool (or tools) which best tackles the job.

American institutionalism was greatly influenced by nineteenth century German philosophy, as was Marxism. Both thought planning was an important part of economic policy, but for different reasons.

Endnotes
1. The next few paragraphs are informed by Y.Younay, The Struggle over the Soul of Economics: Institutionalist and Neoclassical Economics Between the Wars, Princeton.
2. Op. cit., p.52.
3. P.A. Samueslon, ‘The Golden Virtue of Eclecticism Economics’, The American Economist, Vol.44, No. 1 (Spring 2000), p.4.

The Politics Of Retirement Incomes

Chapter 5 of The Whimpering of the State: Politics After MMP. Does not contain diagrams or endtnotes.

Keywords: Social Policy;

It was not macroeconomic policy that proved politically disastrous for Winston Peters. NZF’s economic policy unravelled over retirement policy.

Retirement provision is not actually about transferring resources (or income) through time – from when a person works to when a person is retired. It is about the allocation of production at a point in time. An economy has a certain amount of goods and services available for consumption. Some is consumed by its workers and their children, and some is consumed by the retired. The more the retired consume (be it by their having higher relative incomes or a bigger relative share of the population), the less for workers and their children. Whether the elderly obtain the means to finance their consumption by a public transfer funded by tax, or by a private transfer funded by the return on capital, the material standard of living of the younger generation still suffers. If all the elderly were to die one night, the remaining population would be materially – but not necessarily spiritually – better off. They would pay less tax since New Zealand Superannuation would not have to be funded, and they would inherit the private savings of the elderly, and receive the unearned income. On the other hand, were the labour force to disappear, the elderly would be worse off.

But while retirement provision is not about transferring real income through time, it is about transferring social obligations between generations, which makes it a very political issue.

Tiers and piers

New Zealand has generally had a tier approach to retirement provision, the expression arising because the components are layered as shown in Figure 5.1.

[Figure 5.1 omitted. Basically it shows three layers on top of one another – the three tiers below]

First tier (state) provision is a flat-rate payment by the state out of general taxation. Since 1993 this has been known as ‘New Zealand Superannuation’ (NZS). (Previously it was called ‘National Superannuation’. Before 1976 it was a combination of the Age Benefit, introduced as the Aged Pension in 1898, and Universal Superannuation, introduced in 1938.) [1] If the first tier is taxed, then everyone in the eligible age category will receive some additional income, with those on higher other incomes (and hence paying higher marginal income tax rates) receiving less than those on lower incomes. If the first tier is abated, then there will be some who will be eligible in principle, but will receive no additional income because their high other income will mean that the entirety of the tier is abated to zero. From 1984 to 1997 National Superannuation was abated by a politically contentious ‘superannuation surcharge’.

Second tier (occupational) provision involves workers making earnings-related payments (often deducted directly from their pay and often with an employer contribution), which are invested into a fund which pays an actuarially based annuity on retirement. (Typically any second-tier income is taxed as ordinary income, and so is never fully abated out.) The schemes may either be compulsory, as the result of state legislation, or voluntary by individual choice (or as a part of employment conditions). Because the contributions are earnings-related, the pension will also be earnings-related, and so the retirement benefits will be higher for well-paid contributors than for poorly paid ones or those without work.

Third tier (private) provision covers a miscellany of savings activities including house purchase, life assurance, and investment in financial instruments such as bonds and equities. There may be government support and subsidies for all or some of these activities.

Many retirees – typically most women and many low-paid men – do not have a substantial enough work and income record to have contributed to second and third tier schemes enough for an adequate retirement income. This means that any comprehensive system has to have some first-level provision, even though it may be a primitive one.

An alternative is a pier system (Figure 5.2).

[Figure 5.2 omitted. Basically it shows two legs (piers) holding up a the third layer,. Like a table.]

One pier is typically a state-provided one, not unlike the first tier of the New Zealand system, but of a minimalist nature. The second pier is a compulsory contributory occupational scheme (not unlike the second tier). In principle, a person is only eligible for one of the two piers, but since many workers end up with an inadequate second-pier provision, they usually get some state first-pier supplement (which typically involves very high abatement rates). One might think of such people as falling between the two piers. A third tier of private provision remains on top of the two piers.

A brief history of recent public policy on retirement provision[2]

Royal Commission on Social Security (RCSS)
* The 1972 Royal Commission on Social Security recommended a two-part first tier, similar to the existing arrangements, simplified to
Either: From age 60: An abated first tier (called the ‘Aged Benefit’), advantageous to those on low market incomes.
Or: From age 65: A taxed first tier (called ‘Universal Superannuation’) of benefit to the rest.

Individuals could make their own second-tier and third-tier provisions (house ownership being very important for the latter). There were some tax subsidies on savings. [3]

The Third Labour Government (New Zealand Superannuation 1974)
* From age 60 to 65: An abated first tier, for those on low market incomes.
From age 65: A first tier, and a compulsory second tier (both taxed).

When in opposition in the late 1960s, the Labour Party had looked at the European retirement provision schemes of the two-pier type. A major consideration was the substantial investment funds that would be invested in New Zealand. Once in office, the Third Labour Government initially wanted to abandon the existing first tier (of the RCSS scheme above), but following official advice its scheme was changed to a second compulsory tier called the ‘New Zealand Superannuation Scheme’, which was on top of the first-tier universal superannuation from age 65.[4] The officials had probably calculated that the required contributions for Labour’s original scheme would be too high, while the transition problems between the existing and proposed schemes would be complicated. They also probably recognised the likelihood that at some stage the government would find itself supplementing the private contributions when the return on the investment of the funds was lower than promised.

National Superannuation
* A taxed first tier (i.e. universal) from age 60.

In 1976 the Muldoon government replaced the Third Labour Government’s scheme with ‘National Superannuation’, which (ironically) had been the scheme promised by Labour in 1935, but found to be too expensive. Note that it is, in effect, the second part of the RCSS scheme except that it commenced at 60 rather than 65, and had to be at a higher level in order to be beneficial to those already receiving the abated first tier.[5] The assumption remained that individuals would voluntarily pursue second-tier and third-tier provision, with the tax exemptions on savings remaining but diminishing in real value because of inflation. (The exemptions were revoked in 1988.)

The Fourth Labour Government introduced an income-tax-based abatement, called the ‘superannuation surcharge’ in 1985. (National tightened it in 1992.) On each occasion, there was much genuine political outrage, for when in opposition each party had promised not to impose a surcharge. In government each broke their promise, claiming fiscal necessity.

The Accord: New Zealand Superannuation (1990s)
* A first-tier provision with age eligibility raised progressively to 65 by 2001, abated with a superannuation surcharge.[6] The married couple rate was set at between 65 and 72.5 percent of average wage (all measured net). Within this range, the rate would be increased by the consumer price index annually. Those below the age of eligibility were still entitled to an unemployment, sickness, or invalid benefit, and there was also transitional retirement benefit.

In 1993, all parliamentary parties except NZF agreed to the ‘Superannuation Accord’, renaming the state support NZS.[7] Again the arrangement had parallels with the RCSS proposal, but the over-65 arrangements were better integrated with lower effective tax rates, although the scheme was more costly.

The Accord did not endure past the 1996 election campaign, for Labour – but not National – announced they no longer supported the superannuation surcharge. It was abolished by the NZF/National government as a consequence of the coalition agreement. (NZF had never agreed to the surcharge, and had stayed outside the Accord.)

The Act Scheme: Commercialisation by Two Piers
* The proposal is for a compulsory occupational scheme, with an opt-out once an individual’s fund reached a level that would generate a particular annuity. There would be a minimalist abated first-tier scheme for those who did not generate sufficient contributions to reach the annuity.
The Act proposal came from the radically different two-pier tradition. In some ways it was a return to the pre-1973 Labour scheme, resurrected by Roger Douglas, who had been a major supporter of it. The proposal became the basis of Act policy. But Act found its compulsion unsatisfactory, and modified it so that an individual only had to contribute up to the point where the individual’s fund could pay an annuity equal to the current level of NZS, at which point the individual could opt out. Given that individuals would be closely involved in managing their own funds, and that the funds would have a private corporate management, the Act proposal amounted to a substantial government withdrawal from involvement in retirement provision, a commercialisation of state superannuation.

In order to make the Act scheme appear attractive, it was presented as a benefit-determined scheme (where the retirement income is set independently of the contribution – if any), even though it was designed as a contribution-determined scheme (that is, one where the retirement income is determined by the contribution plus returns on investments, annuitised over the expected life of the retiree). First-tier provision is necessarily benefit-determined, for there is no personal contribution, and the state promises a particular level of income. Third-tier provision is necessarily contribution-determined, since the contributions plus the return on investment determine the eventual income to the retiree. In principle, second-tier provision is contribution-determined, but it is often misleadingly presented as benefit-determined – that is, contributors are assured that if they join this scheme they will receive a particular income (benefit) level at retirement. It is possible to make a second-tier scheme benefit-determined, but that requires a guarantee from an external agency – typically, the government [8] – since no market investment can ensure the return to give the required benefit level. [9]

To make the scheme appear even more attractive, the advocates project exceptionally high returns on the funds (without mentioning that workers would have to pay higher interest on their house mortgages). They use the average adult wage as the benchmark, although almost three quarters of working-age adults have an income less than the average wage. [10] Thus many people would still need first-pier state support, so that it is a two-pier scheme. Fully implemented, the scheme would favour the rich (Act’s main constituency) by lowering their taxes (since the first pier would cost less than a first tier), while the poor and middle-income groups would be worse off.[11]

The New Zealand First schemes

NZF’s proposal for retirement came from two different sources. One was Winston Peters’ promise to repeal the superannuation surcharge, imposed in 1985 and increased in 1991. Second, NZF’s economic nationalism included concerns with the purchase and increasing ownership of New Zealand productive assets by foreigners. To restrain or reverse this, it was necessary to increase domestic savings.

Initially the party considered a compulsory contributory earnings-related provision not unlike the pre-1973 election Labour scheme. However the proposal proved unattractive, for the same reasons that the Labour scheme was abandoned: it required high rates of returns, did not give a guaranteed minimum, and the transition problems were horrendous. So while in opposition, NZF shifted support to a scheme similar to the 1974 Third Labour Government’s scheme, in which there would be a universal first-tier scheme on top of which there would a second tier of a compulsory contributory earnings-related scheme (both being taxed but not abated). Anybody familiar with this NZF two-tier scheme would be well aware that it was deliberately designed to be very different from the Act two-pier proposal.

Peters stated that he saw this scheme as a defining characteristic of the party. During coalition negotiations both National and Labour separately agreed that a contributory retirement scheme would be put to a referendum in 1997. However, the ‘Retirement Superannuation Scheme’ (RSS) announced for the referendum was not the NZF proposal but the Act one. Of course it had greater detail than Act had proposed, but basically it was a two-pier scheme in which individuals could opt out of the contributory scheme once their fund achieved the target annuity. How did this come about?

I have read the officials’ papers that went to the Treasurer. They do not distinguish the various alternatives – say, between piers and tiers – and the reader of the official papers could well have been confused by the presentation. One is left with the impression that the designers had their own vision for retirement provision. One might understand how the right wing in the National–NZF cabinet might have been attracted to the Act-type scheme, but it is a puzzle why Peters dumped the NZF scheme in favour of the Act one. Given a common policy framework of commercialisation, it is conceivable that the Treasury had a parallel proposal to the Act one at the time of the 1996 election. Moreover, the RSS scheme was consistent with the general Treasury approach to reduce taxation and reduce its (i.e. the government’s) exposure to future risk. The RSS scheme shifts responsibility for retirement provision from the state (via NZS) to individuals (via their compulsory contributions). Given that the transfers involved in NZS are large (about 8 percent of GDP), the Treasury might be expected to find attractive a proposal to shift to a scheme in which it had less involvement. However, I am informed that the Treasury preference was quite different. The origins of the RSS are a mystery.

The RSS referendum and its political consequences

Attractive though the scheme was to the commercialisers, it was unattractive to the public – exceptionally unattractive. In summary, the RSS scheme meant that over half of the population (including most women) would not be beneficiaries, since their second-pier lifetime contribution would be insufficient to provide the target annuity (equal to the current NZS level). They would get a top-up from the government to give them the target annuity, so that their lifetime contributions would be of no value whatsoever, because irrespective of how much they contributed they would get the same retirement income. Moreover, the paid superannuation was to increase with prices but not with wages. Historically wages have grown at about 1.5 percent p.a. faster than prices, and so as people aged their relative income would fall under the RSS. Only the very wealthy would benefit from the scheme, because of the lower taxes. On average individuals would pay higher taxes (including their contribution to the fund) up to the year 2030.[12]

After a lacklustre campaign, for the outcome was seen to be a foregone conclusion, the referendum was lost by 91.8 percent to 8.2 percent, on an 80.3 percent turnout. It was a devastating defeat of the Act scheme, although it was NZF, rather than Act, which suffered the ignominy. The distinct economic policy component that NZF appeared to offer had been decisively rejected. What positive and progressive policies did NZF now stand for? It was left as a party of grievances in opposition, which might – or might not – remedy them in government. Arguably the RSS referendum was the point where NZF lost any chance to offer a distinctive economic alternative to National. In the rest of its short future in government, it was consigned to representing the centre flank of the National-led coalition.

The referendum failure also led to the demise of NZF in government. Cabinet ministers were allowed to express personal views on the referendum. Jenny Shipley publicly rejected the proposal, giving herself a public launch pad for the strategy which eventually toppled prime minister Jim Bolger, who had supported the RSS. Shipley then used her premiership to out-manoeuvre Peters politically, leading to the end of the coalition government in July 1998.

And yet retirement provision was to damage Shipley politically. In October 1998 her government announced and legislated that the married couple rate would be allowed to go below the 65 percent of the net average wage – the agreed floor of the 1993 Accord. The new floor was to be 60 percent, and there were hints that it would eventually be lowered to 55 percent. The government argued that it was continuing to increase the benefit in line with inflation, as had been occurring since 1991, so NZS’s real value was not diminished (but its level relative to other incomes would be). It claimed that no one would be worse off, but that it would save $2.5 billion over ten years, an achievement greater than the miracle of the loaves and the fishes. The public saw this as a betrayal and, to compound the irony of ironies, the fortunes of NZF lifted.

The rejection of the Act scheme by referendum was evidence of the strength of MMP. Arguably, had National been returned with a majority WTA government, the RSS scheme would have been proposed, accepted, and blitzkrieged into implementation. The referendum process prevented any blitzkrieg. The referendum outcome was a triumph for MMP.

The future of retirement provision: an accord?

The commitment to a universal first-tier retirement provision appears to be a fundamental part of the culture of New Zealanders. First discussed in the nineteenth century, and implemented from 1938 by stages, it has become such an integral part of their vision of themselves and of their governance that it could not be abolished. Even tampering with it can be unpopular, as the Third Labour Government found in 1975.

The failure of the RSS referendum, plus the break-up of the 1993 Accord, put retirement policy into a limbo. The policy instability meant that there was an uncertainty as to whether the existing provisions would continue long enough to enable people to plan with any confidence. A popular demand – arising from that fundamental culture – is for a new accord, but an old-style accord probably cannot be reconstituted. It was created under an FR/WTA parliament, when only the two main parties mattered. Parties seeking votes are analogous to firms seeking market shares. Under FR/WTA, there are really only two firms in the market, since any other entrant is unlikely to win sufficient seats to be an effective part of government. It is in the interests of oligopolists to reach agreement on the conditions of sale of any particular product they are both providing (especially where the cost, as in the case of retirement provision, is very high, without a great return – vote winning is a zero sum game; for every vote or seat one party wins, another loses it). Thus the Accord was a means whereby Labour and National could limit fiscally expensive competition over retirement policy. Not surprisingly, the Accord broke up as soon as MMP loomed. Smaller parties had an opportunity of winning sufficient seats to have a chance of influencing government.

In principle, any party which creates a policy attractive to five percent of the population (to get across the party-list threshold) will have that chance. The elderly are a rising 12 percent of the voting population. However, while there is a tendency to treat the elderly as homogeneous, they have diverse interests, so that subgroups may be targeted. For instance, the removal of the surcharge was beneficial only to the top third of the elderly, at a fiscal cost of around $2.5 billion over ten years.[13] Shortly after having eliminated the surcharge, the government changed the rule for calculating the benefit level, with a net fiscal gain of around $2.5 billion over ten years. In effect, the income of the bottom two-thirds was being lowered, to increase the incomes of the top third.[14]

In the long run, political parties will cease seeking support from all the elderly, because it is too costly – in any case, no single party is going to win them all – and instead will target segments which are compatible with the overall party philosophy. Because of the competitive process, there cannot be an old-fashioned accord – that is, a comprehensive agreement on retirement policy agreed by all the significant parties – for it will always be in the interests of at least one party to break away and offer another deal to attract a greater share of elderly (or other) voters.

Instead, a more flexible version is likely to evolve. The signatory parties might agree as follows:
* there should be a first-tier government-provided universal retirement benefit called ‘New Zealand Superannuation’;
* there would be an age of eligibility;
* the benefit would be treated as taxable income;
* the rate of NZS would be set according to a formula based on price and wage indexation;[15]
* the rates for couples and singles would differ according to a fixed formula;
* those below the age of eligibility would be entitled to an abated benefit if their circumstances warranted it;
* second-tier provision would be either voluntary or compulsory;
* there would or would not be specific subsidies (or exemptions) for second-tier and third-tier provision.

Each signatory party would attach a schedule which would describe how it would meet the optional provisions. The advantage of such an accord would be that it provides a framework for agreement and disagreement. By setting down a set of key parameters, it makes clear and easily comparable what each signatory party stood for. It seems likely that at least one significant party would not be a signatory, since judging by the referendum result there appears to exist a group of between 5 and 10 percent of the population who do not favour tier provision, but prefer an RSS/Act pier-type scheme. Conversely, such an accord can exist because 90-odd percent of the population support its structure, even though they may not agree on the details.

But is such a scheme, or indeed any retirement scheme, sustainable, especially as the porportion of the elderly in the population increases? The crucial issue is the share of the available consumption which goes to the elderly. When there are proportionally more of them, their share goes up, unless their relative standard of living falls. There is a case for trimming the cost of NZS, which means – even if the politicians won’t say so – reducing the share of available consumption of some of the elderly. There are three broad options.

First, the level of benefit could be cut relative to other incomes (as occurred in the October 1998 change which reduced the floor of the benefit relative to the average wage).

Second, the age of eligibility could change. It is being phased up to 65. The long-term age could be raised further to, say, 67, on the basis that people in their sixties are fitter and have a longer life expectancy now than in the 1890s, when the age of 65 was first chosen. In effect, people would be expected to work longer into their sixties, and to provide some private retirement cover up to 67 if they choose to retire early. Any raising of the age of eligibility requires adequate warning, and there needs to be a scientific debate on the biological, social, and economic aspects of ageing in the 60–69 age group.

And third, some abatement (such as a superannuation surcharge) on the high-income elderly could be reintroduced. [16] This particular policy option will not go away, and it is sufficiently logical to lead to the question of how it may be imposed. To be sustainable, it has to be announced in an election before it is implemented (in contrast to the 1984 and 1991 impositions which were surprise reversals of election promises). The abatement on the rich elderly will probably be proposed by a party whose voters are at the lower end of the income spectrum, and who will offer some offset to the poor elderly. It cannot just be presented as a fiscal saving measure. One possibility would be to phase in the surcharge from 2001, the year after the age of eligibility reaches 65, but to impose it only for those in the age range of 65 to 74, so that a universal unabated benefit would be available for the oldest elderly.

Prospects for a compulsory second tier

The 1993 accord assumed that any second-tier provision would be voluntary. Is there a place for a compulsory second-tier scheme, on top of NZS (as proposed by the Third Labour Government and by NZF out of government)? Any early introduction seems unlikely given the rout of the – albeit radically different – RSS in the referendum. A possible path is through the incremental development of voluntary occupational schemes.

To make such schemes more attractive, there is a case for converting them to a type where contributions and fund earnings are tax-exempt, but annuities and other payments from the fund are taxed. This is known as EET, in contrast to the current TTE arrangement, where fund contributions and earnings are taxed and payments are exempt.[18] The current arrangement suits the Treasury, but the alternative is likely to be more acceptable to contributors since they do not trust the politicians not to change the rules and tax (or double-tax) their retirement incomes. The fiscal balance aspects could be largely covered by requiring these EET funds to hold 20 percent, say, of their assets in government securities (matching the contingent asset implicit in the EET system, and maintaining fiscal balance).

People do not behave with the rationalism of the economic theory on which commercialisation was based, especially over their savings. The standard economic theory of individual behaviour is contradicted by the evidence of irrationality (or ‘quasi-rationality’).[18] In practice, as has been attested by numerous studies, the major predictions of economic rationalism fail.[19]

Richard Thaler’s summary of observed human savings behaviour gives the following rules:
1 Live within your means. Do not borrow to increase consumption except during well-defined emergencies (such as unemployment).
2 During emergencies cut consumption as much as possible.
3 Keep a rainy day account equal to some fraction of income. Do not raid the account except in emergencies.
4 Save for retirement in ways that require little self-control.
5 Borrow only on the security of a real asset.

Each rule, widely practised and generally thought prudent, infringes the economic rationalists’ theory. The fourth point has significant implications for retirement policy. We are not very good at saving unless there is a contractual element. We save by paying off the house mortgage or contributing to an occupational pension or life-assurance scheme. Berating us, as economists and government officials are wont to do, will not markedly raise savings, unless it induces us to contract into a compulsory long-term savings scheme (even though the contracting may be voluntary). Despite our best intentions, putting a little something aside each week for our old age will not generally succeed in providing a decent retirement income, unless we are forced to do so. On current policies it would appear that many New Zealanders are going to have a miserable old age.

The behavioural logic suggests that there is some merit in a compulsory second-tier retirement provision. Such proposals outrage economic rationalists. They have imposed their ideology’s narrow conception of the human condition on the public. Those who do not share it should be punished with an impoverished old age. Despite their claims to be liberals, the economic rationalists are fascists about personal behaviour, demanding ‘behave according to our rules, or our policies will punish you.’

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The Whimpering Of the State: Policy After MMP


Auckland University Press, 1999. 269pp.

The policy process has changed dramatically following the introduction of MMP. Fascinated by the theatre of politics, we too easily ignore the major changes in policy approaches and outcomes. Today, without an assured parliamentary majority the government has to consult over its policies rather than impose them. Along with the increasing recognition that the policies of the past have failed, the policy blitzkrieg has almost ceased and commercialisation is being shelved.

The Whimpering of the State looks at the first three MMP years with the same lively, broad -ranging and informed approach as Easton’s successful The Commercialisation of New Zealand, which described the winner-takes-all regime before 1996. Again there are case studies: health, education, science, the arts, taxation. retirement policy, and infrastructure. Policy possibilities are explored. Yet, as the title of the book suggests, any releif from the ending of Rogernomics is offset be a realistic pessimism arising from a shrewd analysis of the continuing deficiencies in New Zealand’s political and social structure. Although written for the general public, this book will also be read by politicians, policy analysts and students, and will shape policy thinking in the MMP era. Publisher’s Blurb

CONTENTS

Introduction
Prologue

PART 1: THE POLITICS
1. Policy Under MMP
Cutting Off the King’s Head
2. Moving Towards MMP
3. The Loose Canon and the Tight Prior
4. The Economic Failure
In Stormy Seas
5. The Politics of Retirement Incomes
Different Strokes
Richard Thaler’s Savings Principles
Selfish Generations
6. Taxation (and Government Spending)
Government Spending and Growth Rates
7. The Public Service
Does Professionalism Matter? (NZIPA paper)
Does Professionalism Matter? (Listener Column)
Two Styles of Management
8. The Social Basis for an Economy
Nationbuilding and the Textured Society
9. The Commercialisation of Democracy
10. The Health Post-Election Briefings
The Hospital Balance Sheet Crisis

PART 2: CASE STUDIES
11. Health
The New Zealand Health Reforms in Context
The Seven Percent Solution

12. Core Education
Why Economists Dont Understand Education … but still try to run it
Education Factories
13. Tertiary Education
14. Science Policy
15. The Arts
16. The Ownership of Water
17. Roading
18. Telecommunications

PART 3: THE FUTURE
19. The Political Future
20. A New Microeconomic Paradigm
Metrology and the Economy
The Economic Context of the ministry of consumer affairs

Epilogue: Culture and Reform

Bibliography
Index

Two Styles Of Management

From The Whimpering of the State: Policy after MMP (Auckland University Press 1999) p.88-91.

Keywords: Governance; Health

Alan Schick argues that the central theme of the reforms was ‘influenced by two overlapping but distinctive sets of ideas, one derived from the vast literature on managerialism, the other from the frontiers of economics. Managerial reform is grounded on a simple principle: managers cannot be held responsible for results unless they have the freedom to act. The new institutional economics is grounded in a very old idea: people act in their own self-interest.’ In effect, Schick contrasted two approaches (or cultures) to public sector management. He only faintly praises accountability, but warmly describes responsibility as ‘a personal quality that comes from one’s professional ethic, a commitment to do one’s best, a sense of public service’.(1)

The diagram immediately below summarises Schick’s analysis into two columns. Unfortunately they wont fit in simply to the text format so I have put one above the other.

PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENT THEORY
vs NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS

MANAGERIALISM
vs CONTRACTUALISM

Managers cannot be held responsible for results unless they have the freedom to act.
vs People act in their own self-interest.

Personal responsibility
vz Accountability

A personal ethic, a commitment to do one’s best, a sense of public service.
vs An impersonal quality dependent on contractual duties and informational flows.
(↓)

Not-for-profit
vs For-profit

The left-hand column shows public sector management theory leading to managerialism, where managers are given the freedom to act and are held responsible for the results, and in which personal responsibility and a personal ethic are expected of them.

The right-hand column shows the new institutional economics leading to contractualism, where people act in their own self-interest and they are held accountable, an impersonal quality dependent on contractual duties and informational flows. It was the latter that was emphasised in the 1987 Treasury PEB, but ‘clearly different conclusions might be drawn if the brief argued on different premises’.

The 1987 Treasury Post -Election Briefing, Government Management, devoted a chapter to economic rationality, the foundation of the accountability approach.(2) It is not well explained. Over half way into the exposition we are told that full rationality meant that people ‘possessed perfect knowledge and always maximised their own interests’. The straw theory is dismissed with this:

More recent thinking has instead developed the concept of the ‘contractual person’ [who] . . . is said to have ‘bounded rationality’ and to be opportunistic. The concept of bounded rationality still implies that individuals make decisions which will promote their goals, but without perfect knowledge: rather it is assumed that knowledge will be possessed differently by different people and that we [sic] have limited capacity to absorb and analyse knowledge. The limitation on knowledge allows the possibility of opportunism which assumes individuals are ‘self-seeking, with guile’. Organisations therefore need to evolve which can as efficiently as possible provide incentives for self-seeking individuals so their efforts will coincide with the common good.(3)

The text goes on to discuss altruism, stating that ‘[i]n a world of saints there would be no need for social policy or governments’, which is nonsense, since there would still be the problem of social co-ordination. But even if this point were not silly, the issue is not a choice between perfect saints and unmitigated sinners. Everyone is a mixture of self-interest and altruistic behaviour. The task is to design social organisations which harness both.

Just as men create their gods in their own image, economists design organisations based on their theories. A focus on self-interest means that the emphasis is on the selfish side of the majority of humanity, and they design systems accordingly. But selfish behaviour may drive out altruistic behaviour. Richard Titmuss considered the best way of obtaining a good supply of quality blood for medical purposes at the least social cost. Economists might argue that commercial relations work best. However, Titmuss showed that voluntary donations of blood resulted in better quality and a cheaper supply. Moreover, if some blood supply becomes commercialised, with donors being paid, voluntary donors are discouraged, so that there is a deterioration in quality of supply and a rise in its cost.(4)

Similarly Schick was concerned with the tension between the two modes of public sector management, and the possibility that contractualism undermines public managerialism. It ‘may diminish public-regarding values and behaviour in government’, including values such as ‘the trust that comes from serving others, the sense of obligation that overrides personal interest, the professional commitment to do one’s best, the pride associated with working in an esteemed organisation, and the stake one acquires from making a career in the public service’. The accountability of contractualism sabotages the responsibility of managerialism.

Sadly, Schick’s fears seemed to have been confirmed at the Accident and Emergency Service at Christchurch Hospital in the mid 1990s, where inadequacies may have led to unnecessary deaths. There was conflict between the management style of the generic managers who ran the hospital and who were accountability (contractualist) orientated, and the values of the clinicians and nurses with their professional ethics based on personal responsibility. Indeed, it was the pride of the clinicians and nurses in their professional standards, which they felt were being compromised, which led them to raise issues in public. The subsequent Stent Report found their concerns largely justified.(5) This is not to argue that public servants are never self-interested or opportunistic. But their personal ethic is also an important component in their behaviour, as the hospital’s generic manager learned. Designing institutions in ways which ignore and undermine such behaviour leads to inferior organisation, poorer performance by those who work in them, and a reduction in the common good.

In truth, people do not behave in the rational way proposed by economic theory. This irrationality (or ‘quasi-rationality’) is nicely illustrated in Richard Thaler’s The Winner’s Curse, which describes thirteen general anomalies where the standard economic theory of individual behaviour is contradicted by the evidence. Together they present a serious challenge to the ‘economic rationalism’ which is used to justify so much of recent economic policy.(6) It is always possible to invent an ad hoc explanation for an anomaly: the economic rationalists do it all the time. Recall how a planet Vulcan was invented to explain why Mercury did not follow the orbit which Newton’s laws predicted. When nobody could find it, Vulcan was said to be hiding behind the sun. Anomalies kept appearing in pre-relativity physics. For each anomaly an ad hoc explanation was found, until Einstein explained how Newton’s theory could be improved. Of course it is always possible to reinterpret anybody’s behaviour as acting in their self-interest – even that of a Treasury saint. The theory would then have to argue that if people use heuristic rules to pursue their self-interest, their rules are not particularly optimal. Economists have put considerable effort into developing optimal strategies, but the rest of the human race may not have access to the intricacies of some of the mathematics and concepts. At the minimum, the evidence Thaler brings together shows that heuristic rules, even if driven entirely by self-interest, give very different behavioral outcomes from those used in the theories of economists, outcomes which are so different that the policies derived from the theories are sub-optimal.

Endnotes

1. A. Schick (1996) The Spirit of Reform: Managing the New Zealand State Sector in a Time of Change, State Services Commission, Wellington. I have tentatively added a bottom line which suggests that managerialism appears to have most relevance to not-for-profit institutions (such as the public service and voluntary agencies) while contractualism applies to for-profit ones. This implies the Treasury approach of emphasizing contractualism forced government agencies into an inappropriate commercial structures.

2. p.427-34.

3. op cit p. 431. It is unclear whether the last sentence means that organisations have a will of their own, or whether there is just another collapse in the grammar.

4. Titmus, R.M. (1970) The Gift Relationship; From Human Blood to Social Policy, Allen and Unwin, London.

5. Commissioner for Health and Disability (1998) Canterbury Health Ltd, Auckland.

6. Thaler, R.H. (1992) The Winner’s Curse: Paradoxes and Anomolies of Economic Life, Princeton University Press; Thaler, R.H. (1994) Quasi Rational Economics, Russell Sage Group, New York.

Subjects Health, Labour Studies; Public Administration

Taxation and Public Spending

Chapter 6 of The Whimpering of the State. This was published in 1999.

Keywords: Regulation & Taxation; Social Policy;

During the writing of the 1984 Post-Election Briefing, Economic Management, Treasury economists got into a fierce argument over the purpose of taxation. Eventually a senior official, well known for his native wit, stepped into the heated fray and imposed the following opening of the relevant section of the PEB.

“The purpose of any tax regime is to raise revenue. The level of revenue will itself be dictated by the level of government expenditure and the size of the budget deficit that the government is prepared to accept.”[1]

The briefing goes on to discuss how to design a tax regime, making the obvious point that not all taxes are equally effective. Alas, such common sense has not been so evident in the public debate on taxation in the 1990s. The focus has been on taxes, with nary a reference to the government spending it provides, even though – a theme of this book – New Zealanders have a high demand for public spending on retirement incomes, health, education, and a myriad of other activities. Perhaps because taxation is the downside of such spending, those with an agenda of reducing public spending want to emphasise only its disadvantages. This chapter cannot be so irresponsible.

The role of government spending

More than most modern societies, New Zealand society is the creation of the state, a perhaps inevitable consequence of its recent settlement. Public spending is one of the most powerful instruments which the state can use to create a civil society. Thus government spending has been an integral part of the New Zealand culture. Surveys show that New Zealanders support increased public spending, including that which does not directly benefit the respondents (as when the elderly urge more spending upon education), even if it means they pay higher taxation.[2] In doing so, they affirm an involvement in a community: they are not just self-interested (and self-centred) individuals.

Undoubtedly there are many instances of advocacy of government spending (or other interventions) that are self-interested but presented as in the public interest. Teachers promoting more public spending on education are likely to improve their working conditions and remuneration if their advocacy is successful. Even so, one reason the advocates may be teaching – and perhaps having to accept inferior working conditions to those they could expect elsewhere – is that they believe education is socially important, and they are willing to take a financial sacrifice to pursue wider community goals. A common deception used to protect the self-interest paradigm is to argue that all behaviour is necessarily self-interested. Thus it is said the Good Samaritan really acted in his own interests when he helped the assaulted Jewish traveller. This verbal sleight on the meaning of ‘self-interest’ obscures the central point of the parable, namely that the Samaritan did not know who he helped (indeed, he belonged to a different community). Clearly we want to distinguish such behaviour from other kinds of behaviour where one is concerned only with oneself. It may satisfy the selfish to argue that everyone else is as selfish as they claim to be themselves, but common sense tells us this is nonsense. Each of us is a mixture of the self-interested and the public-spirited. The commercialisers choose to recognise only the mean-spirited component – but to do so is to reject the relevance of community to the human condition.[3]

An additional complication is over-optimistic expectations. Advocates, committed to a policy for public-spirited or for self-interested reasons, will overestimate the benefits and underestimate the costs. Very often arguments will be seized upon to justify policies, even if they are wrong, irrelevant, or short-sighted. Thus the debate on government spending and taxation rarely has the cool rationality one might hope for.

A particular downside that is rarely mentioned by an advocate of public spending is that the additional taxation may result in costs on the economy. These are not just administrative costs, but include behavioural responses. Briefly, higher taxation may result in the taxed changing their behaviour in a way that is economically detrimental. Most commonly, they will reduce the activity which is taxed, to some degree. If that activity is labour, the economy may have less output; if it is consumption, total spending on the commodity may be below that which is valued by consumers.[4]

There is an understandable tendency to use a simplified tax-free economy as a reference point to examine the effects of taxation on spending. However, the reference point is but a benchmark, rather than an economy with ideal properties. Treating the tax-free economy as some paragon is about as sensible as treating a temperature of absolute zero as special. Indeed, the point of advocating government spending is that the output of a tax-free (and hence public-spending-free) economy is criticised as not the best available. Those who are pressing for (more) public spending on education, health, the arts, or whatever it may be, are arguing that the output of the tax-free economy is inferior to one in which this public spending occurs. If the public judges them correct, it is illogical to use the output of the tax-free economy as a measure to evaluate the effects of the taxation and public spending. GDP may not be the best measure of economic welfare. The public appears to value much government spending more than it is valued in GDP.

Unfortunately, this gives little guidance as to how much public spending there should be, or what it should be spent on. That, ultimately, is a political question: some politicians and parties may argue for reductions in spending, others may argue for more. In practice, there is a need to judge each spending proposal in terms of its social benefits (realistically, not optimistically) and any offsetting costs (including the behavioural impact of the additional taxation). Typically, the government’s chief economic adviser, the Treasury, faces enormous pressures for additional spending and for reducing taxation: among government advisers it faces such pressures alone.[5] A cabinet might be thought of as nineteen ministers (backed by their caucuses) who want to increase spending, and a lone Treasurer who is expected to fund the increases (usually without raising taxation). Hence the Treasury’s support for fiscal austerity, although it does not necessarily lead to the ideology of commercialisation adopted in the mid-1990s.[6]

From the introduction in 1988 of the Public Finance Act, and especially in the 1990s under the National Government, there has been a steady squeeze on public spending. Much of this book is about the consequences of that squeeze on the state and on society. However, in the mid 1990s the political-economic debate tended to focus on levels of taxation without reference to spending. The debate may well have happened anyway, but much was institutionalised via the Department of Inland Revenue (IRD). In order to restrain the rampant Treasury minister Ruth Richardson, the National Government attempted to build up the policy advice capacity of the IRD under its minister Wyatt Creech, who sometimes bitterly clashed with her.[7] However the IRD’s hurriedly created policy advice arm seems to have got out of control, in the sense that its resources far exceeded the quality of its work.

The taxation debate (Diewert & Lawrence)

But poor-quality research on the effects of taxation was not confined to the IRD. A Business-Roundtable commissioned report, if taken seriously, suggested that the taxation reforms of the 1980s had been disastrous. The study by two overseas consultants concluded that the last dollar (i.e. the marginal dollar) spent by government ‘means forgoing $1.18 of benefit that would otherwise accrue to taxpayers. If the dollar of government spending were worth a dollar to the taxpayer, the gain from reducing government spending would be 18 cents.’[8] While the report’s introduction described the loss as ‘high’, the 18 percent figure (if true) means that if government spending at the margin was valued by the public at about a fifth more than it was valued in GDP terms, the taxation was worthwhile. This interpretation was completely ignored, even though it may more accurately reflect New Zealanders’ desires than the views advanced by the Business Roundtable.

The tax regime mentioned above was that of 1990, but the consultants also calculated the figures for earlier years. Before the reforms of the 1980s, the deadweight loss was 5 to 7 percent. Thus it appears that the effect of the reforms was to more than double the costs to the economy of income tax. [9] Apparently the tax regime under Rob Muldoon was more than twice as efficient as that introduced by Roger Douglas, even though the regime in Muldoon’s time was widely criticised – even by the government-appointed 1982 McCaw Committee – for its arbitrary exemptions and its complexity. Most independent expert commentators commend the Douglas reforms for creating a simple broad-based income-tax regime which rationalised expenditure taxation. (Many criticise the Douglas reforms for favouring the rich against the poor. That is a different issue from the overall design of the tax system. Most of the features of the Douglas system could have been retained with a higher marginal tax rate on top incomes.)

But there is a gross flaw in the consultants’ report, invalidating these conclusions. To simplify a little, the deadweight losses from a tax on labour earnings arise from the behavioural response of choosing to work less because the after-tax return is lower than before-tax return. Workers stop working because the taxes on their extra earnings do not make it worthwhile to labour. Instead of earning, and adding to the production of the nation, they choose more leisure. To make their model work, the consultants had to decide how much additional leisure there was in the economy as a result of the tax changes. They seem to have attributed all the increase in unemployment in the 1980s to higher tax rates. The unemployment rate more than doubled between 1984, when Muldoon left office, and 1990. In effect, the consultants claimed that all the additional unemployment is voluntary. They assumed that if only taxes were lowered, the unemployed would stop their ‘leisure’ activities and take up work. However, most of New Zealand’s unemployed do not have that choice – they simply cannot find a job. Rather than being discouraged by high tax rates, they are involuntarily unemployed. Thus it is unlikely that the Douglas tax regime was twice as inefficient as Muldoon’s which preceded it. The later regime – distributional objectives aside – is almost certainly more efficient.

The taxation debate (Scully)[10]

The IRD-commissioned studies were even stranger.[11] It is said that the department spent over $2m on its various commissioned studies. There have not been the resources outside the IRD to evaluate all the studies. We look at only one (probably costing around $100,000), but if the most prominently quoted one is so flawed, despite the quality control the department claimed it had, we must have similar reservations about all the others – until they have been properly and independently evaluated.

US economist Gerald Scully estimated the (‘optimum’) level of taxation which would maximise the GDP growth rate. [12] It would be tedious to go through all the weaknesses of the study, although they alert the experienced econometrician that there is a problem. For the layperson, it is important to note that correlation does not prove causality (although a lack of correlation means there can be no causal relationship). Scully estimated that an ATR (average tax rate; the ratio of tax revenue to GDP) of about 20 percent would give a maximum growth of volume GDP. The figure has been seized upon by politicians of a right-wing political persuasion, especially those in Act. In 1999 the actual ATR was about 31 percent for central government taxation,[13] so the advocates are covertly arguing for a major cut in government spending.

Note, incidentally, that Scully’s work says absolutely nothing about government spending or the government deficit. It appears to say that a 20 percent ATR would maximise economic growth, whatever the level of spending or deficit. Taking the research at its face value, one could advocate an ATR of 20 percent of GDP and a government spending rate of 31 percent and apparently obtain the maximum long-run optimal growth rate of volume GDP, despite the size of the government deficit that would be involved. Note also that the measure takes no account of the design of the tax regime, treating the clumsy Muldoon one as equally effective as the elegant Douglas one. Indeed, one of the oddities of the IRD research programme is that it did not address the area where the department had the greatest expertise and interest: the design and administration of an effective tax system. Instead, it examined an issue outside its remit: the relationship between taxation and macroeconomic performance.

Because the main fallacy of the Scully work involves some mathematical and statistical understandings, I have relegated the exposition to an appendix (not included here but in the book). The non-mathematical/non-statistical reader can see the work is silly, because Scully’s method produces absurd results. If there is an ATR which maximises economic growth, we might ask what ATR maximises other social phenomena. So I replicated Scully’s work, but I also applied the method to the growth of deaths and of reported criminal offences.[14] The results are summarised in the following table. In both cases, the maximum growth rate is given by an ATR of about 20 percent of GDP. Apparently high economic growth is associated with high mortality and high criminality. A Hobbesian outcome!

Optimal tax rate for various variables using Scully’s econometric method

Variable to be
Maximised
ATR for maximum growth
(Proportion of GDP)
Volume GDP .205
deaths .200
reported offences .230
unity (1) .212

The book table also includes the 95 percent confidence interval for each estimate. All cover .2

As the appendix shows, the results are the consequences of ‘spurious correlation’, induced by the way the data has been managed. A heuristic explanation of the results is that the actual econometric equation involves a transformation which results in the ATR being correlated on a (curved) transformation of itself. Providing the other variable in the equation is not correlated with the ATR (and thus there is no causal relationship at all between the ATR and the variable which is being allegedly maximised), the econometric equation will give an apparent maximum related to the average ATR. The 20 percent ATR conclusion only applies when the hypothesis being assumed is not true. The absurdity is well illustrated by using as the independent variable the number one (i.e. 1 for every observation). As the last row in the table shows, the econometrics dutifully advises that an ATR of about 20 percent maximises the number 1. Which is nonsensical: a change in the tax rate does not change the value of a number.[15]

Economic research and ideological politics

Science proceeds by such mistakes, to be corrected by later scientists. Normally one would expect this to happen here (although taxpayers might be disgruntled over the amount they paid to fund it). However, social sciences often function differently, in that work will be seized upon for ideological purposes, even if it is not scientifically robust. It is therefore worth exploring the wider context in which the Scully work was done. When I published a simplified account of these findings,[16] numerous economists said they agreed with me, or had come to a similar conclusion that the result was based on spurious correlation. Although Scully and the IRD chief tax policy adviser at the time of the work, Patrick Caragata, denied the finding, they did not try to replicate my analysis, and continued to promote the Scully result.[17]

The inadequacy of much economics research derives from at least three features. First, many economists have a very shallow methodology, deriving from the tight prior approach which sees the task of empirical research as being to find support for the theories which are tightly held, rather than testing them to see whether they are consistent with the real world.[18]Thus Scully seems to have had a theory that tax rates in New Zealand were too high. Since his econometrics supported that theory, it was uncritically accepted. In contrast, a scientist considers whether there are alternate theories (such as spurious correlation) which fit the evidence better.

A second feature is the dependence on ‘fifos’, fly-in-fly-out overseas consultants who spend a short time in the country to carry out work for government agencies (or the Business Roundtable). Why are the agencies so dependent upon fifos, who are not very knowledgeable about the New Zealand context of the problem they are looking at, and often not very competent, as shown by the quality of their work?[19] Why not use competent New Zealand economists (as shown by their ability to provide penetrating critiques of the fifos’ work if the opportunity arises), especially as this would build up the general competence of the New Zealand economics profession? There are probably two reasons for the limited use of New Zealand economists. First, the fifo can be controlled by the agency. Fifos may be independent, but the one with the right ideological bias can always be selected, and the consultant’s ignorance of New Zealand can be relied on to ensure that the agency’s assumptions are not challenged. Some would argue a second reason is the need for ideological control by the agency, but the issue is probably more subtle than that. Many economists in government agencies seem unwilling to go to New Zealand economists more competent than they, in case their own ignorance might be exposed. Moreover, a consultancy can increase the competence of the New Zealand economist, which one day might be turned against the agency. Better to go to the fifo for a one-night stand.

The third feature is the low quality of the reviewing of the research work. It is a standing joke that not to be invited to some presentations of commissioned research is evidence of one’s competence, for if a skilled person was asked to review the work, both the consultant and the agency which commissioned it would be exposed. Since the study meets the ideological requirements, if not the scientific ones, the only outcome of a rigorous review would be to undermine the research and raise questions about the wasting of funds. In defence, Caragata says that the IRD work was refereed by some economists the IRD chose, and it was published in an overseas journal. Others will conclude either that such refereeing was superficial, or else that the referees were not very knowledgeable about the particular research topic.

In an ideal world, scientists would offset this ideological predominance. In the natural sciences and medicine, they continue to do a reasonable job in New Zealand. But the closer the science relates to core political issues, the harder the task. Given the undermining of the independent scientific process in New Zealand, it commonly happens that politicians will abuse research for ideological reasons.

The future of the taxation debate

There will always be advocates of lower taxes, and the 20 percent target (central government’s tax take as a proportion of GDP) may be locked into the New Zealand political debate for some time. One would like to say that the advocates will honestly and as frequently state that they are advocating equally substantial reductions in government spending, which in practice would involve major privatisation in health and education, and reductions in social security benefits, together with a substantial distributional shift in favour of the rich. One might even hope that the advocates will eschew poor-quality economic research which seems to support their political objectives. More likely, they will focus on lower taxes, ignoring any spending and distributional consequences, using inadequate research when it suits them.

The other side of the debate can be equally cavalier. Interest groups will advocate government spending increases which contribute to their causes, usually without mentioning the need for higher taxation, and will quote equally faulty research when it suits them. It is more difficult to predict whether there will be a strong lobby for more government spending across the board and for the consequent tax increases. Both Labour and the Alliance are tempted towards this approach (albeit typically without mentioning the tax consequences), and there are even signs of support on the left of the National Party (i.e. the centre right), thus reflecting the stance of the majority of the public.

Even so, political parties seem to be reluctant to advocate increased public spending very strongly, perhaps for two reasons. First, while those who want lower taxes may be in a minority, theirs is the more vigorous political rhetoric. Second, there is the problem of finding the tax revenues to complement the spending. There may be some political mileage in a higher top tax rate on personal incomes. As Chapter 4 reported, both the Irish and Australian economies, which have had a better economic performance than New Zealand, also have higher top tax rates.[20] However, raising the top tax rate generates only a little revenue in comparison to the spending demands. Among other extensions which might improve the effectiveness of the tax regime, and raise a little revenue, are (1) a real capital gains tax to prevent distortion of investment and savings decisions; (2) a GST on various currently uncovered foreign consumption transactions (including tourism and international electronic commerce); and (3) a financial transactions tax. However, the big gains for improving the tax regime were made in the 1980s under Labour.

Which leaves the advocates of public spending largely arguing that the spending should increase in line with increases in GDP.

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(The Appendix is Omitted)

Notes
1 The crucial notion here is `regime’. Individual taxes may have other purposes, such as to align private costs with social costs. (Hence the excise duties on licit drugs.) Treasury (1984:210)
2. Easton Listener 1 March 1996, p.630 May 1996, p.75; RCSP (1988); NBR, 26 Feb 1999.
3. Part of the problem is that the commercialisers, besotted with US economic theory, do not recognize that in a federation as large as the US, taxation is less likely to benefit the community of the taxpayer. (Hence the strong pork barrel politics in the US congress.) This is another example of the fallacy which persists in commercialist thinking – the US is a model economy and all others should be forced to conform to it.
4. If the commodity is an economic bad – such as pollution – the reduction in consumption would be a good thing. However, the totality of economic bads is insufficient for taxes on them to fund all the economic goods that is desired. In any case, given an objective of the complete elimination of most economic bads, the taxation revenue on the (almost) eliminated is going to be (almost) zero.
5. I do not deal in detail the issue of the size of the government deficit, which temporarily allows spending to be funded from non-revenue sources. Briefly, a deficit adds to public debt, which has to be serviced from future revenue, so that a deficit shifts forward the required taxation rather than permanently avoids it. To some extent a deficit may contribute to economic growth, and pay for itself from the higher government revenue, as many Keynesians would argue. But this occurs only to a limited extent. Once that limit is exceeded, the situation in the second sentence applies, either immediately or in the future.
6. CONZ (85-98)
7. Richardson (1995); Creech (1996)
8. Diewert & Lawrence (1994)
9. The consumption taxes show a similar difference.
10. Sieper (1997) makes some similar points.
11. The Treasury has distanced itself from this IRD research. (Sieper 1997) When it is not down its ideological path, Treasury remains the most competent of all government economic agencies. The IRD work was so flawed, and had such horrendous policy implications – such as the ignoring the government deficit and not designing an effective tax regime – that the Treasury needed to reject the IRD findings.
12. Scully (1996, 1997)
13. This includes the income taxes on benefits and GST on government spending, which increase the ratio in comparison to most other OECD economies.
14. My estimates differ from Scully’s at the third significant figure, presumably as a result of rounding errors. I have used the Scully ATR, even though it does not include all the taxation revenue received by the government. John Lepper has pointed out that unemployment levies in the 1930s did not go to the consolidated fund, and it seems likely that other such revenues were also overlooked.
15. Another demonstration of the inadequacy of the econometric equation, is that if it is used to predict the growth rate, the error of prediction is greater than if the average had been used.
16. Listener, 12 July 1997.
17. Caragata (1997, 1998) The IRD asked me to provide a report but were unwilling to pay a fee for it. They did not even discuss a contingent fee, that is I would only get paid if the work was of acceptable quality. A number of agencies seem to have a belief that if they pay good money for a low quality work, they should get high quality critiques of it for free. Caragata misrepresents this interchange in his 1997 report.
18. CONZ (91-94); Reder (1982)
19. In 1987 I attended a lecture in Australia, where an Australian economist who had worked for the New Zealand Treasury on labour relations (so he said) told the audience that it was impossible to get a newspaper in New Zealand before 10.00 in the morning because of union restrictions.
20. 45 percent and 47 percent respectively in contrast to New Zealand’s 33 percent (although Labour has promised to raise it to 39 percent for incomes above $60,000 p.a.).

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