Big Bad World: Is There Any Future for an Independent New Zealand?

Listener October 4, 2003.

Keywords: Globalisation & Trade;

Our economic debate is bedevilled by defeatism, the belief that New Zealand cannot survive as an independent nation. Rogernomes seem to conclude that since their policies failed, there is no alternative but for us to become a colony. But even many post-Rogernomes, typically trained in the ideal of the US economy, think we are too small and too distant to survive.

Their usual solution is for New Zealand to merge with Australia, something the Australians would welcome because they know they are going to thrive and the added market (as well as from Pacific Islands) would further help. The current defeatist strategy is to tie New Zealand into the Australian economy by a myriad of institutional arrangements. Closer Economic Relations (CER) was a major strategy and their current push is for monetary union in which the New Zealand dollar would be replaced by the Australian one.

There was quite a different view when CER was negotiated. It reflected a confidence that New Zealand could survive, but in a radically changing world, it had to adapt. No longer relying on the British market absorbing our pastoral products, New Zealand would continue to be a specialist producer, but not just of meat, wool and dairy products. And it would export everywhere. CER was a part of that global opening, learning international engagement, but Australasia was never the end point. Every trans-tasman engagement was tested by whether it helped the economy relate with the rest of the world: eg, when the two countries adopt common standards, the test is whether they were consistent with those likely to be adopted by the Atlantic economies.

Thus, monetary union only makes sense in the most unlikely prospect that there would soon be a single international currency. In the long interim, we would find ourselves shackled to the Australian economy to which only a fifth of our exports go, and many of whose own exports, such as grains and minerals, have little to do with us. In any case, monetary union does not work very well without fiscal union. (Argentina locked its currency with the US. The unwinding of the disastrous consequences means incomes are now a fifth lower than they were.) Not that the defeatists eschew fiscal union, since that would merge us further with Canberra (though the Australians might be reluctant, since we would be a fiscal drag on them).

Defeatism is about swapping Mother England for Sister Australia, the fear that one cannot make it in the big bad world, so New Zealand needs someone else’s skirts to hide behind. It’s irritatingly bad economics, compounded by a lack of any historical sense. Defeatists like to point to a circular map of the world centred on a New Zealand surrounded by acres of water, with the rest of the world on the fringe. But it is relative. If that map applied to the 19th century, when it took months to sail to the other side and there was no network of cables, a map on the same effective scale of effective distance is a dot when shipping is now weeks, flying to England is a couple of days –– a microscopic dot in the case of telecommunicating information.

Ironically, the defeatist sees the closer world as frightening –– “where are those skirts to hide behind?” –– whereas the New Zealander sees it as an opportunity to exploit new markets for goods and services. Despite the image of New Zealanders as linguistically challenged, some of us supply overnight translation services for European businesses. They email the texts at the end of their day, New Zealanders translate them in their night and our day, ready for the next European business day. If distance is a problem, it is increasingly less so. The next step may be an airfreighting network, instead of relying on the cargoholds of planes carrying tourists to determine where our exports can go.

And sure, we are small. We always have been small and that did not hold us back in the past. That means we are still going to be a specialist economy. But smallness has its advantages both in governance and in adaptability. We should not try to ape big economies, and certainly avoid the theories that are based on being big.

Defeatism is closely related to isolationism, that the world is so frightening that we can’t succeed in it, and should hide in fortress New Zealand. The genuine internationalist knows the globalising world is a challenge, but New Zealanders have succeeded internationally, and will continue to succeed if we remain energetic about our opportunities and intelligent about our prospects. The biggest threat to New Zealand’s future is the defeatists and isolationists who influenced so much of our policy thinking over the past three decades.

New Zealand Centre for Globalisation Studies

Keywords: Globalisation & Trade; Growth & Innovation;

In September 2003, the Royal Society of New Zealand announced their ‘Marsden Fund’ support for some 105 new research projects costing a total of $43.8m over three years from 2004 to 2006. The Marsden Fund is a government scheme, administered by the Royal Society to ensure independence, which aimes to promote original scholarly focussed research with long term outcomes.

One of the awards went to Brian Easton for a research proposal on globalisation. A part of the research proposal is to establish a virtual New Zealand Centre for Globalisation Studies. Its purpose will be to bring together New Zealand scholars working on globalisation in all its various facets, to enable interested overseas scholars to connect with the New Zealand work, as well as to enable others to access the research.

The website will include
– a list of the scholars (with contacts);
– links to relevant sites (including the personal sites of the scholars);-
– research papers (Brian Easton’s index of papers on globalisation)>;
– announcements and events;
– forums.

While as the ‘director’ of the Centre, Brian has his own program, which may or may not influence other people’s work, the Centre has no specific ideology or approach, other than a focus on analysis rather than rhetoric. Scholars are likely to cover a wide range of disciplines including demography; economics; education; international relations; labour studies; political studies; public health; and sociology, and be based in universities and research institutes as well as including independent scholars.

The Centre will be set up in early 2004. Following discussion with, and the involvement of, other scholars The web address www.nzglobalisation.ac.nz has been reserved for the site.

Public Intellectuals (index)

Keywords: History of Ideas, Methodology, Philosophy;

The Legacy of A Poet: Milton! Thou Should Be Living in this Hour. (July 1984)

Money Speaks: the Information Battle is Now Fought in the Market Place. (June 1987)

Philosopher Kings and Public Intellectuals (August 1996)

Locked Out: Of Free Press and Free Economics (May 2001)

Public Policy and ThinkTanks (September 2003)

The New Public Intellectuals? (September 2003)

Individual Intellectuals (Index)

Student Loans and Student Fees

Presentation for Annual Conference of Federation of University Women, Christchurch, 27 September 2003.

Keywords: Education;

I do not actually object to student loans. It is perfectly sensible way for a student short of cash to borrow on the security of future earnings. I will have something, in the short time available to me, to say about the inefficiency of the current student loan system, but what I am really concerned about today is the way we force students into debt through our university fees and allowances system.

Let us begin, where most New Zealand education discussion should begin, with the Fraser-Beeby principles of student entitlement which (adjusted for gender) states:

The government's objective, broadly expressed, is that every person, whatever her or his level of academic ability, whether he or she be rich or poor, whether he or she live in country or town, has a right, as a citizen, to a free education of the kind for which he or she is best fitted and to the fullest extent of her or his power.

It is one of the most noble sentiments articulated by a New Zealand government, but we were some distance from that vision when the current tertiary regime was introduced in the early 1990s.

In fact the new regime seems to have had some benefits in raising the quality of our workforce, a major concern a decade ago. A recent international survey found that 36 percent of New Zealand’s 25 to 64 year olds had post-secondary qualifications. That is third equal in the OECD, where the average is 26 percent. One worry is whether the certificates and diplomas are of international standing. Our degrees still are, although there is a danger that inadequate funding of the degree providers will undermine our reputation. (It will not only be the new graduates who will suffer but all the past graduates who need international acceptance as well.)

However, the survey also suggests New Zealand’s achievement is much more middling if we look at the qualification mix. The strength is in certificates and diplomas. Only 14 percent of the age group has degrees or higher, a little below the OECD average of 15 percent. In effect, we have at least 20,000 New Zealanders who should have a degree, but do not.

The implication is that we are over-certified and under-degree-ed. On the supply side we have focussed the tertiary education expansion on low level qualifications, because it was cheaper. But the demand has been for low level qualifications. Why? It is not, presumably, that New Zealanders are less capable of education than the rest of the world. Rather we make it too expensive to get a degree, so New Zealanders choose to take cheap tertiary qualifications, such as diplomas and certificate. The high cost is not just the student fee levels, but the whole cost of spending but not earning during the course together with fees and learning expenses.

Now you might say they do not really matter, because the whole costs are covered by student loans. I’ll come back to the Fraser-Beeby principle shortly, but even were it irrelevant, the implication of our poor graduate performance is that the loans are not doing the job. They were imposed ideologically, without consideration of whether the return on private education is sufficient. They are very inefficient financial instruments, for they are not standard loans but ‘contingent ones’ – for the repayment is contingent on subsequent events. But borrowers dont understand this, treating them as conventional. The misunderstanding means poor quality decisions and not enough students going to university.

(Perhaps the fundamentally problem is their policy foundations theorise that people behaviour in particular ways, whereas in practice, as Chicago economist Richard Thaler shows, people behave quite differently.)

The loans are also misleadingly represented in the government accounts. I have only time here to sketch the point, but in essence the quantum in the accounts is the valuation of the future stream of revenue the government will receive from recent graduates as a part of the taxes they pay. So the loan scheme is really a tax on recent graduates.

It has the problem of all taxes, together with some peculiarities of its own. Among those are the misunderstandings, the contingency nature of they way they operate, and that they penalise the poor more than the rich since it is the poor who have to borrow. If putting them in the government accounts is a good idea, why dont we go the whole way and put in an item for the value of all the future taxes the government is going to receive?

For what the scheme was really about was my generation, who got broadly free tertiary education, lowering income taxes on ourselves but keeping them high on recent graduates. The inequity is patently obvious, so we have to disguise it in the mumbo-jumbo of accounting and finance.

After all my generation was a beneficiary of the Fraser-Beeby principle. Having benefited we pulled up the drawbridge so later generations do not get the same benefit. We said that in future the principle would only apply the primary and secondary education but not to tertiary education, a strange argument because it applied to tertiary education in the past when the only the elite received it, but not today when the masses go on after school. The argument seems to be based on New Zealand being a third world country too poor to afford its citizens a tertiary entitlement. Are we that poor?

Designing a new system based on the Fraser-Beeby principle applied to tertiary education is not simple. First we are going to have to find some more money, in effect spreading the fiscal burden across all graduates and not just to recent ones. Getting the right balance across lower fees, higher (presumably targeted) students allowances, and a student loan scheme is a complex task. There will still have to be a student loan scheme, although it would be a different one from the current one, including discounts for being in priority New Zealand occupations (including parenthood) and working in graduate scarce regions. Most of all it would be based on the premise that students should not be forced into debt in order to get a standard tertiary education.

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The New Intellectuals?

Panel Presentation for Public Intellectuals Seminar, Friday 26 September. An earlier panel was Public Policy and Thinktanks

To continue the approach of focussing on the public intellectual discourse, in which case the issue of the New Intellectuals is under what conditions might they occur. At issue, then, is whether those conditions have changed sufficiently to be able to say ‘new’. Here I look at, as befits my profession, resources and institutions.

The central change feature is the way that economic, political and social commentary has moved off campus (although in the creative areas – say of writing and performing arts – the shift has been in the opposite direction)..Yet the off-campus situation is far from satisfactory. Sometimes academics come to me as a scholar operating outside the academy. They usually start by grumbling about the conditions in their university, explain they are thinking about retiring from the institution, and ask about the life of an independent scholar.

I tell them about its loneliness, the limited collegial networks, the professional jealousies from those within the academy, the lack of status, the difficulties of obtaining grant funding, the lack of public understanding of the intellectual and the resulting lack of support, the precariousness of the position, the poor financial rewards including, the difficulties of long term provision for retirement, the lack of technical support which an academic takes for granted, the risk if anything goes wrong – say with your health, and so on and so on. At which point the academic decides the current job does not look so bad.

How then do public intellectuals survive in such appalling conditions?

In my case economic consultants are paid reasonably well compared to most other disciplines which might provide intellectuals, so one works one’s butt off on contractual work and hopes there is enough time and independence left to do the valuable unpaid public intellectual work. (An additional stress to to cover the outlays that public intellectual activity generate.)

Others survive equally tenuously:

Some have really supportive spouses – Bruce Jesson and the wonderful Joce.

Some have private income – Charles Brasch..

Some are active after retirement. An example is Alan Ward who died this week, whose post-retirement activities impacted on everyone at this conference, immediately by his defence of the Alexander Turnbull Library and National Archives, but more generally by the shift in the government mindset that resulted.

And there are those who live on the smell of an oily rag, or whose intellectual activities are a part-time activity while they support themselves in a job, often a precarious job.

It is a bit like the fate of a creative writer a couple of decades ago, when there were few prizes and fellowships, but the royalties are even worse.

What about supportive employers? Compared to a couple of decades ago few have the discretionary income to support intellectuals. That is part of the reason why the activity has moved off campus, despite the statutory requirement of universities to be critics and consciences of society. We may be grateful that there are a number of academics who have taken this responsibility seriously, but it is difficult to think of a case where one was appointed knowing they would act as a public intellectual. And they tell me they get almost as little support as those outside the academy. Traditionally some newspapers had a journalist – perhaps an editorial writer – who was a public intellectual but they seem to have bene squeezed out. The same squeeze applies to those who tried to make their way in the public service. As I said on an earlier panel, the same applies to public interest thinktanks,.

Even so I am not a Platonist, who sees only a past golden age. The public intellectuals of earlier eras had a pretty rough time too. And there may be some new niches.

Will Maori support their public intellectuals from the resources they are accumulating – although I imagine it may be a different sort of public intellectual. Feminists, sadly, dont seem to have the resources. It is good to see a new journal – Red and Green – although the loss of Broadsheet, The New Zealand Monthly Review, and The Republican, plus the withdrawing of Landfall from Brasch’s vision of a wide remit, have left major gaps.

They may be filled by the web, which is a cheap form of publication and communications with significant opportunities, not all of which have been exploited or even explored. For example, my Marsden Grant includes an element for establishing a virtual New Zealand Centre for Globalisation Studies which while it is a scholarly enterprise may suggests possibilities. The interface between the public intellectual on the web and the wider public via the media has yet to be realised.

But where are the financial resources to come from? As government money is reduced for genuinely independent thinking will the private sector cover the deficit, or will it do so only with conditions that undermine the independence?

Yet despite the reduction in traditional niches, public intellectual activity is still there. It is there because there those committed to participating in it, despite the personal cost. For that is what the academics who came to me with romantic ideas of being independent scholars did not understand. Being a public intellectual is not a job. It is a profession.

Public Policy and Thinktanks

Panel Presentation for Public Intellectuals Seminar, Friday 26 September. A later panel was The New Intellectuals?

To begin, as is appropriate, with a dissent from the conventional wisdom. The notion of ‘Public Intellectuals’ seems to me to be unhelpful, because it focusses on individuals, and is likely to generate jealous spats of just who is or who is not one. It is the public intellectual discourse which we should focus on, the process by which intellectual activity is applied to questions of public policy in its widest sense.

We have just had a panel on universities. In my areas of public policy – economics and public policy in the narrower sense – it is unquestionable that their role has substantially diminished over the last three decades. With a few exceptions, today the news media rarely consults university economists on public questions, instead going to financial market representatives. Few academic economists get involved in public debate on a sustained basis, a situation which cannot be explained only by the media’s actions in the early 1990s to cut out a number of dissenters. When there is a desperate need for a thoughtful contribution for an urgent public issue – the foreshore debate would be a current example – academics are silent, although that is partly because their rhythms are somewhat slower than the way these disputes move. There is considerable contempt among public sector economists over the contribution of their academic brethren, not least because some of the public interventions have been poor quality and uninformed but, more importantly, because the majority of the academics are not researching and teaching in areas relevant to the issues of the day – or of the future, as far can be judged.

Not that the off-campus public intellectual discourse can be that comfortable over its standards. It has always puzzled me why the academy has not demanded higher quality. It has either failed to comment, or joined in at a level which, sadly, has contributed to a further lowering of standards.

So compared to thirty years ago, public discourse has moved off-campus. But to where? There are very few ‘think tanks’ if we use the term properly. Treasury’s Economics II in the early 1980s was one, partly because the political process loss control of the public servants. A government unit generating ideas subversive to the political order is not likely to happen again. Today’s similar inside-government units cling to the conventional wisdom, often adopting as new what was on the frontier a decade and more earlier. For example in the early 1990s I first wrote about the divergence between Australia and New Zealand economic performance after 1985, an academic picked this up in 1998, the NZIER first mentioned it in 2000, and the Treasury in 2002. In each case the publisher of the rediscovery did not cite the predecessors. One of the most characteristic features of the public intellectual process in New Zealand is the elementary failure to cite – and probably to read – earlier contributions.

Outside government the most successful thinktank in the terms of promotion of ideas which turned into policy has been the Business Roundtable, although the quality of its publications has been disappointing. That it was so readily accepted is an indictment on the public sector: that it was rarely challenged is an indictment on the academy. The NZ Institute of Economic Research was an important thinktank, but its discretionary income was eliminated in the 1980s and today it is a consultancy. If you want to see interesting quality economic research, look to the Motu Research Group,, where a number of independent scholars are cleverly exploit public research funding. They offered a fifth of all the papers at the last conference of the New Zealand Economist’s Association. But their intellectual freedom is largely proscribed by the funding.

That illustrates why there has been a reduction in public intellectual activity in areas associated with public policy in the narrower sense. The reforms reduced the niches in which genuine public intellectual activity could occur. I have already mentioned the self-imposed media censorship. There are very few New Zealand fora when one can partake in rigorous and vigorous intellectual debate. Moreover, as government funding became tighter it also became more controlling. It was fascinating how the universities accepted reforms which provoked the duty of them being critics and conscience of society but, like the porter in Macbeth, took away the performance.

With one exception, private funding never filled the void. But the well funded Business Roundtable has little independence, for while it claimed to speak in the public interest it stuck ruthlessly to the interest of the businesses it represented, including not exploring issues – such as protection – where there were conflicting interests among its members, and attacking businesses who were not members.

One can not help contrasting the generosity of the private sector, including individuals, to supporting artists to pursue their vocation, with its miserliness towards public intellectuals. That reflects, I think, a lack of faith of the nation in intellectual activity. Ours is a world of practical men and women unaware of their dependence on intellectuals for so-called commonsense and fashionable ideas – albeit typically defunct intellectuals.

Does it matter? Twenty years ago New Zealand adopted a new course of economic policy, the critics of which were unsupported, marginalised, and repressed, while the advocates were rewarded, promoted and feted. The outcome of those reforms was stagnation. Had the New Zealand economy grown at the same rate as the Australian economy, its GDP would be between 10 and 15 percent higher. Had the critics been listened to, we could have adopted the sober Australian version of the reforms rather than the drunken Rogernomics Not only would our incomes be higher, but New Zealand would still be in the top half of the OECD on the GDP per cap measure, a conclusion all the more ironic for that target being promoted by those who largely supported the misconceived reforms of the 1980s and who want to repeat them.

In other words, the poor public intellectual discourse which bedevils New Zealand, has probably cost the country over $10 billion this year, and every year for almost two decades. And there are anti-intellectuals who want to repeat the failure. It makes you think.

Punishing Exports: How Our Monetary Policy Inhibits Growth.

Listener: 20 September, 2003.

Keywords: Growth & Innovation; Macroeconomics & Money;

Remember the teacher who put the whole class into detention because of the misbehaviour of some rowdies at the back? Exporters have a similarly bitter view of the Reserve Bank (RBNZ). It has maintained a high base interest rate (coming down slowly) because the domestic rowdies have been putting inflationary pressure on the economy. Relatively high interest rates affect the rowdy businesses, but also the rest of the economy, especially exporters, because high interest rates tend to push up the exchange rate and reduce the profitability of exporting.

Does it matter? After all, the inflationary pressures across the economy are being slowed down. If the only concern is the level of prices, it may not. But the export sector is central for economic growth. Putting it into detention compromises the long-run prosperity of the economy.

Export businesses are crucial because they can grow faster than the economy as a whole, by selling into rapidly increasing foreign markets, or increasing their market share. By doing so, they drag the domestic sectors along, accelerating their growth and the economy as a whole. In contrast, a domestic business can grow rapidly only at the expense of other domestic businesses. (The exception is import substitution where the growth is at the expense of foreign exporters. But their profitability is as influenced by the exchange rate as much as exporters’.) When the exchange rate rises, businesses find it harder to compete overseas and cover their domestic costs, their profits go down, so exporting and export investment slow down, undermining the long-run growth of exporters and their ability to drag the economy along a high growth path.

Why then does the RBNZ hold up interest rates at the expense of exporting and growth? One reason is that the Reserve Bank Act says the RBNZ’s sole concern is price stability. More fundamentally, it really has only one policy instrument –– setting the base interest rate. It is like the teacher whose only available punishment is detention of the whole class, and who has no way of punishing only the rowdies. Note how the best use of detention is dealing with uproar, rather than trying to improve academic performance. Similarly, monetary policy may be better directed towards price stability than economic growth, even though pursuing the former may damage the latter.

It is a mathematical truism that a single policy instrument can target only one policy objective. Yet it is unclear from the official papers that led up to the Reserve Bank Act what the advisers were thinking. My suspicion is they were relying on something like the “Mundell-Fleming” model that says only monetary policy works when the exchange rate is floating (as it is today) and that only fiscal policy works when the exchange rate is fixed (as it was before 1985).

Unfortunately, the model makes a whopping great assumption that is practically wrong when it postulates that the economy can be characterised by a single product. Some modelling simplifications are inevitable, but the central feature of any small open economy, such as New Zealand’s, is that there are at least two major sectors producing different products: tradeables (mainly exports) and non-tradeables (for domestic markets). Assuming only one sector is a bit like assuming your class was only rowdies or goodies, but not both. The outcome will be poor performance (educational or economic).

The implication is that if we are to avoid collateral damage in the external sector while suppressing inflation in the domestic sector, we need more policy instruments. James Meade, awarded an economics prize in honour of Alfred Nobel in 1977, suggested four such instruments, assigning money for regulating nominal demand, the wage path set by unions and employers to determining the price level, using interest rates to affect investment, and fiscal policy to influence the balance of payments.

Unfortunately, it has not proven possible to control the stock of money sufficiently for such policy target purposes, while our union structure is too weak for them to lead a wage path. But it makes sense for the fiscal stance (the government’s deficit or surplus) to contribute to controlling the macroeconomy. Like Meade, I see its role as especially important in influencing the balance of payments, which determines the size of the tradeable sector and long-run growth prospects.

Even though they may be unworkable, Meade’s proposals indicate that there are options outside of the current constrictive interpretations of the Reserve Bank and the Fiscal Responsibility Acts and first-year economic models. It requires just a bit of creative imagination and disciplined thought. Like the teacher who gave us detention in the library. The goodies got on with their study, while the rowdies suffered misery (except for the one who began reading some books and joined the goodies).

The Analysis Of Costs and Benefits Of Gambling

‘It is a capital mistake to theorise before one has data’ Sherlock Holmes.

Keywords: Health;

Introduction

There as been various calls for a ‘cost benefit analysis’ of gambling in New Zealand. The expression ‘cost-benefit analysis’ (CBA) has a rigorous meaning in economics, and while there is no need for economics to insist that their meaning of the terms should be universally applied, it is helpful to recognise that the phrase is being used as a short hand for ‘an analysis of the costs and benefits’. Thus the CBA ends up with a single number – a total quantum of which summarises all the costs and benefits in an economy. But even were that quantum zero – so the costs and benefits netted out – there would still be considerable interest in the individual costs and benefits and their incidence. So until there is a consensus to the contrary, I propose to interpret the expression ‘cost benefit analysis’ to be synonymous with ‘the analysis of costs and benefits’ rather than economist’s technical term which in this text I shall refer to as ‘CBA’. I use the expression ‘cost benefit analysis’ to denote both.

Analysing the Costs and Benefits of Gambling

Even so, the best way of analysis the costs and benefits of gambling, or anything else, is to use the analytical framework that underpins a CBA. Of course like Humpty-Dumpty, we can make words mean whatever we want. The fallacy with his approach is that words are used to communicate with others, and if the speaker is their master, those who hear the words may not understand what it is intended to be conveyed. The fact is that expressions such as ‘costs’ and ‘benefits’ are used frequently in public conversation as if they refer to the economists’ notions. To Humpty-Dumpty the words would create confusion.

The core of the economists’ notion of cost is ‘opportunity cost’, that is the cost of forgoing the next relevant opportunity, as explained below. Benefits are treated in a parallel way, so we dont need to develop the economists’ notion of benefit.

The best way to think of an opportunity cost (or benefit) is to consider two situations which for the purpose of gambling might be called the ‘factual’ and the ‘counterfactual’. The factual is usually the current situation, but the counterfactual depends upon a precise formulation of the issue. In the following I am going to assume that we are interested in the question of how much harm – if any – does current levels gambling cause and the extent to which it is offset by benefits. The counterfactual might be a world in which there was no harmful gambling or perhaps a world in which there was no gambling. The choice of the counterfactual requires some judgement, but it depends upon the precise issue of concern.

(Another issue might be a concern as to what will happen if opportunities for gambling in a region were extended. The factual is the current situation and the counterfactual is the situation where the additional outlets or whatever exist.)

Now, in principle, we can compare the various features with the factual situation with the counter-factual scenario. Some will be exactly the same – the sun will get up in the morning in each. Some will be different but not enough to worry about. And there may be some very substantial differences. In principle we make a list of all these differences.

Notice the construction of this list does not really involve economists, but a host of other social scientists (and epidemiologists and accountants). In my experience the economist’s work is very dependent upon the quality of this list, both in terms of the precision of the definition of items on the list and their quantification. Very often people ask whether X or Y or Z can be taken into account in a CBA. The most common response is that if the questioner can specify and quantify the phenomenon adequately on the list, then the economist can do something (economists’ caveats below).

The list is likely to be a very long one. In practice it is shortened by aggregation but even so the list will still remain long and heterogeneous. At this stage the economist applies a valuation to each item of the list. The valuation is done by a set of rules which are based on that the cost/price equals the social marginal cost which is (broadly) the amount of resources that society would exchange for having the opportunity to avoid or incur that particular item. The costing can be tricky and sometimes involves guessing because the data base does not exist.

(There are also some contentious issues of valuation – see the bibliography for papers which discuss some of the disputes. I do not want to minimise these contentions, but I would say that as important as they are, I have been more often let down by enormous gaps in the data which characterises the list.)

If all the items on the list are valued in the same monetary units, they may be added together and that gives (just about) the outcome of a CBA. Over the years I have become uneasy about this simple aggregation. One reason is that it is not always obvious that the aggregation is like with like. For instance, how does one add together goods and services with human mortality and morbidity. (I have argued why it has to be done elsewhere, and could do so again. My concern here is that the public does not always understand sufficiently what has been done, and misunderstanding a statistic undermines its usefulness.)

Perhaps for gambling a greater concern is that the aggregate may obscure the distribution differences between a factual and counterfactual. For instance (harmful) gambling might make children worse off (because the parents gamble away money that should be used for the children’s welfare) and casino shareholders (say) better off. That details of the redistribution may be far more important than the net impacts of the two. CBAs are underpinned by what is sometimes called ‘Hume’s Law’: ‘ a dollar is a dollar, is a dollar’ and it does not matter who gets the dollar, or who loses it. (There are some more sophisticated measures such as the Atkinson-Stiglitz index, but I have never seen them used in a CBA.)

If may not be a full aggregation. If instead of aggregating to a single monetary amount but finishing with a number of separate items, we have what might be called ‘an analysis of costs and benefits’. Note that the components need not be valued in the same units – a great relief to economists for we are often stretched by the valuation problems.

The Implication for Non-economist Researchers

While the above has not understated the difficulties of applying the economic analysis, it has also drawn attention to that the real need is for a careful, quantified differentiation between a properly specified counterfactual scenario and the factual one.

The ‘industry’ sector part of the difference can, usually, be dealt with relatively easily. Data bases are typically well placed to quantify the differentiation, and there are straight-forward well-attested rules for valuation. In some parts of the industry side there may be gaps, although overseas studies may be helpful. In my experience with health applications, the health sector data bases are more problematic, although sometimes epidemiologists have slaved away to provide credible data about hospital outlays. The same is almost certainly true for the criminal justice system.

The government sector part of the difference is usually straight-forward too (other than public sector industries – see above). It is a mainly matter of the application of known tax rates checked against their revenue in the government accounts.

It is the household sector is the complicated one, because the data is usually grossly inadequate. There are two broad issues.

1. At issue is not the proportion of the population which is subject to a particular phenomenon, but the difference between the proportions in the two scenarios. For instance, suppose the counterfactual differs from the factual by there being no tobacco consumption. What we are interested in then is, say, the proportion who have lung cancer under current circumstances (when there is smoking) to the proportion in the counterfactual (when there is not). Now there will still be some lung cancer even if there were no tobacco consumption, and epidemiologists put a lot of effort into estimating what they call the ‘attributable fraction’ which estimates the additional lung cancer cases as a result of tobacco consumption.

The prevalence and/or incidence data used to calculate the fractions (and also the community levels) is not always as detailed as even the collectors would wish, and often subject to high margins of error. My impression is that there is not sufficiently high quality data for New Zealand, in part because some of the most serious conditions (say criminal behaviour engender by gambling) is, fortunately, a relatively low occurrence and so difficult to quantify with precision. (There is a more on incidence and prevalence in an appendix. I have noticed that non-epidemiologists, myself included, get confused by the distinction unless we close our eyes and try very hard.)

2. Additional to these population figures we need how the phenomenon impacts on the person and those associated with her or him. It is not enough to say that a certain proportion of smokers die from lung cancer caused by tobacco consumption. They go through a harrowing time before that, and their families and friends suffer too, both emotionally and perhaps financially.

The gambling impact is probably more complicated. What we want to know is the various differences in material possessions, health and welfare and so on between family groups with some members involved in harmful gambling and those with none (supposing that is the counterfactual). The exercise of measuring the differences is challenging, but it may not be impossible. While any results will not be entirely satisfactory they should represent progress. (We need not be too despondent if the progress seems limited. Ten years ago I was at a seminar which thought doing the cost of crime attributable to alcohol and illegal drugs was hopeless. Today they are being included in estimates of the social costs of drugs.)

Note that while the data is needed for an analysis of cost and benefits, it is also extremely valuable for all sorts of policy purposes. Think of the implications if we knew something systematic about how harmful gambling by a parent impacted on the children’s education and health.

This leads to a conclusion, but before doing so a word about regional issues. Cost benefit analyses usually cover a national jurisdiction, not least because that is the way the data is usually collected. There is a small literature which looks at the economic and social impacts of gambling, say, on a region or sub-national area. (The procedure could be generalised to look at some other sub-national group such as an ethnic minority or age cohort.) In principle such cost benefit analyses do not involve any new principles compare to national ones. In practice the balance of applications, and therefore potentially the conclusions, is different. Even more practically, the data is even more inadequate. (The two scenarios may be different. For instance the factual may be the region without a casino, the counter-factual may be the region if the casino is introduced.)

Conclusion

Hardly any of this is about the technical side of doing a cost benefit analysis, issues which are covered in papers listed in the bibliography. Rather the paper has tried to provide for economists a robust account of what economists are trying to do, and how ultimately economists are dependent upon what others define and provide. In particular the definition of the factual and counterfactual needs to be given carefully thought out, and the differences of between them carefully measured.

The other point made is that a cost benefit analysis, be it a CBA or an analysis of costs and benefits, is a systematic way of thinking about the entirety of the issue. The value of building one up is more than the numbers that come out at the end. For it forces us to think about the factual and the counterfactual comprehensively, and so move towards an understanding and perhaps policy directions, from a holistic perspective. The economist needs always to keep this in mind too.

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Appendix Prevalence vs Incidence Based Approaches

The following is an excerpt from International Guidelines for Estimating the Costs of Substance Abuse: Second Edition, 2001.

Estimates of the economic costs of substance abuse may be either prevalence-based or incidence-based. Prevalence-based studies estimate the number of cases of death and hospitalisations attributable to substance abuse in a given year and then estimate the costs that flow from those deaths or hospitalisations (as well as other costs, such as prevention, research and law enforcement costs). Incidence-based studies estimate the number of new cases of death or hospitalisation in a given year and apply a lifetime cost estimate to these new cases. Thus, prevalence-based estimates generally measure the costs of substance abuse in the present and the past in a given year, while incidence-based studies generally estimate the present and future costs of substance abuse in a given year. For ongoing health and social problems such as illicit drug use, the results of prevalence-based and incidence-based estimates are often similar. For health problems that are declining in magnitude (such as smoking in some countries), prevalence-based estimates will generally be lower than incidence-based estimates. For emerging health issues such as epidemics of HIV or Hepatitis infection, incidence-based estimates generally provide higher estimates than prevalence-based estimates, because many infected persons may still be in the latency phase of the diseases.

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Bibliography: Some References on Social and Economic Impacts of Gambling
Australian Institute for Gambling Research, 2001 :Social and Economic Impacts of Gambling in New Zealand, Final Report.
Banks, G. (2002) The Productivity Commission’s Gambling Inquiry 3 years on.
Collins, D. & H. Lapsley (2003) ‘The Social Costs and Benefits of Gambling: an Introduction to the Economic Issues’ Journal of Gambling Studies, 19(2):123-147.
Rankine, J. & D. Haigh (2003)
Social Impacts of Gambling in Manukau City. A report for Manuaku City Council July 2003.
Single, E., D. Collins, B. Easton, H. Harward, & H. Lapsley International Guidelines for Estimating the Costs of Substance Abuse: Second Edition, 2001 (The report will shortly be published by World Health Organisation.)
Walker, D. M. (2003) ‘Methodological Issues in the Social Cost of Gambling Studies’, Journal of Gambling Studies, 19(2):149-183.
Wynne, H. J. & M. Anielski, (2000) The Whistler Symposium Report. The first international symposium on the economic and social impact of gambling..On this Website
Index of articles on evaluation in healthcare.
Gambling in New Zealand: And Economic Overview.

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Single-sex Vs Co-ed: Is One Better Than the Other?

Keywords: Education: Statistics;

Ruth Laugesen of the Sunday Star Times asked me to look at differences between academic performance between single-sex and co-ed schools. Her summary report is “Same-sex Schools’ Success” (September 14) is in an appendix below, the longer report is “In a Class of Their Own” This paper summarises my findings.

It is generally recognised that students at single-sex schools have a higher exam attainment than those at co-educational schools. Why this is so, is much disputed. Not surprisingly, the advocates of single-sex schools claim they are ‘better’ educationally while the co-eds are likely to argue that the students to the single-sex schools represent a more academic or socially advantaged group.

This report does not attempt to sort these arguments out. Rather, every statistician (indeed, every detective) knows that association does not prove causation. That two statistics correlate (or two events occurred close together) does not prove one effected the other. There are a number of other reasons why the association may be evident. A common one is that there is a third variable which is impact on the two simultaneously. If one ‘controls’ for this third variable the association disappears.

So I controlled for the socioeconomic status of the school populations. Almost every New Zealand secondary school is allocated to a decile related to the socioeconomic characteristics of its students, ranging from 1 at the bottom to 10 at the top. The deciles are used for funding, so that those private schools that are not in receipt of this funding do not need to have a decile ranking. Some do, and I was able to allocate most of the rest on the basis of reputation. (I add that omitting them would have hardly changed the conclusions.)

The performance achievement measure was the proportion of the fifth form students who got in 2002 a NCEA level 1 qualification, roughly equivalent to the old school certificate. It is not an ideal measure, but it is the best we have. Note that schools can manipulate their pass rate – they are more likely to expel or move on a student who wont pass. Hopefully these are not major effects, but Auckland Grammar posed a problem, because its top stream boys, over half of the year, do not sit NCEA but an international examination. So only their weakest students sit the NCEA and they have a lower pass rate than if the school was to have all its students sitting. In the calculations I assumed all their students who took on the tougher challenge, would have passed NCEA. A few failures would not affect the results much, nor would have dropping Auckland Grammar altogether. (Ruth, who did all the foot slogging that statisticians really appreciate, could not identify any other schools where this effect would be important. If any readers know of similar examples, please contact me and I will adjust for them too.)

The Table below summarises the published data:

NCEA Pass Rate for Fifth Form Students by School Decile

Decile Co-ed
Sex: Boys
Single
Sex: Boys
Co-ed
Sex: Girls
Single
Sex: Girls
1 21.4% 41.5% 25.5% 40.4%
2 27.9% 30.4% 34.9% 57.7%
3 35.6% 43.1% 41.4% 67.7%
4 39.7% 49.3% 52.9% 58.1%
5 46.0% 56.8% 58.6% 63.2%
6 50.3% 57.6% 60.6% 68.9%
7 54.7% 59.5% 64.9% 76.6%
8 59.6% 68.7% 70.8% 75.5%
9 64.4% 69.3% 75.8% 81.5%
10 68.8% 80.9% 77.0% 88.5%
Average 48.3% 65.6% 58.0% 76.0%

Before looking at the single-sex to co-ed comparison, there are three other points which the table demonstrate, and which, it seems to me are, more important.

Point 1: Irrespective of the type of school, there is a clear gradient in the pass rate from the lowest decile to the top one. Whatever the reason for the gradient it is surely a matter of considerable concern, which the higher funding of to low sociol-economic schools is only partially addressing.

Point 2: Irrespective of the type of school, girls do better than boys. Again this is a matter of social concern. (As I recall, this is originally what Ruth Laugesen was investigating. One of the responses, was the claim that boys did better in boys’ schools because they better addressed boy’s problems. That cant be really be right, because girls also do better in girl’s schools too, so one cannot say that co-eds are biased against boys.)

Point 3: There is considerable variability around this trend. I’ll come back to this after addressing the single-sex versus co-ed issue.

What the bottom line of the table shows is that boys do better in NCEA in boys schools than in co-eds. Whereas 65.8 percent of the boys in single-sex schools pass, only 48.3 percent of those in co-eds do. Similarly 76.0 percent of girls in girls schools pass NCEA, compared 58.0 percent in co-eds. The differences are 17.3 percentage points for boys and 18.0 percentage points for girls, much the same difference.

However the single-sex schools tend to have higher socioeconomic intakes, and we know from Point 1 that intake matters. So we would expect them to do better in total. But when we look at the table we find that in every school decile group the students from single-sex schools do better than same gender students at co-eds.

One could use a lot of complicated statistical techniques to separate out the effects of sociol-economic differences but I use a very simple one here. The average of the difference within each school decile is 8.8 percentage points for boys and 11.4 percentage points for girls. So we can say that 8.5 (i.e. 17.3-8.8) percentage points of the boys’ schools’ pass superiority is because they are in higher decile on average. The difference for girls’ schools is 6.6 (18.0-11.4) percentage points. Arithmetically 49 percent (8.5/17.3) of the boys’ school superior performance and 37 percent (6.6/18.0) of the girls’ schools superior performance is explained by sociol-economic intake.

Whoops. Girls’ schools add more to their students’ pass rate do better than boys’ school. Perhaps the two numbers are statistically the same (due to sampling error) but they certainly confound some of boys’ schools claims. But in any case

Point 4: Between a third and a half of the apparent pass superiority off single-sex schools is due to the higher socioeconomic intake of the schools.

What determines the rest? It is easy to claim a superior teaching environment, and perhaps the rhetoric is right. But there are possibilities. Earlier studies (this is a well canvassed area – the point of this little exercise is it is the first time it has applied to NCEA, which only began in 2002) investigated whether the students who went to single-sex schools were brighter on intake than those as co-ed, although they have come to no agreed conclusion. I think parental attitude is important. Perhaps parents who are very academically ambitious for their children observe the better results in single-sexes and send their children there, with the parental background in part driving the better results.

However, one thing did strike me about the results, which is not so evident in the table. There was considerable variation from the averages. One such anomaly, evident in the table is that the two decile 3 girl’s schools did better than decile 4 and 5 girl’s schools.

But I also observed the three large co-eds (one each in decile 7, 8, and 9) which had higher pass rates for their boys than the average of the boys’ decile 10 schools. How did that come about? (I report only ‘large’ with more than 40 male students, to reduce statistical variability.) And I found eleven more which did better than the lowest of the top decile boys’ schools, one of which was in decile 5. So single-sex is not everything, even if the only interest is passing exams.. Which is why Ruth’s feature finishes by quoting me:

Easton said his study results showed enough variation between the performance of individual schools, that parents should weigh up a variety of factors in making their choice. "While single-sex or co-ed may be a factor in making a choice, there are many other factors, which are relevant and still need to be investigated," said Easton.

There are statistical techniques such as ANOVA which might shed more light onto the issue, and would probably refine the precision of the conclusions. any one interested in applying them should get in contact with me for the data.

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APPENDIX from the Sunday-Star Times, Sunday , 14 September 2003

SAME-SEX SCHOOLS’ SUCCESS by RUTH LAUGESEN

Boys at single-sex schools enjoy more academic success than those in co-ed schools, according to new research commissioned by the Sunday Star-Times.
The research – the first indepth analysis of last year’s NCEA exams – is a big boost for boys-only schools.
For years the schools have fought criticism that they are lacklustre, too conservative, too exclusive and hotbeds of bullying.
There has also been a perception that boys perform better academically in mixed classes.
Most New Zealand students go to co-ed schools, which outnumber single-sex schools by about three to one.

Economist Brian Easton was commissioned by the Star-Times to analyse pass rates for the NCEA level 1 qualification, which replaced School Certificate last year.
Girls-only schools also came out well, with their students doing better on average than girls at co-eds.
Haylon Smith, a 17-year-old student at Westlake Boys’ High School, a public school on Auckland’s North Shore, was not surprised by the findings.
“At a boys school you can just get down and work. You can concentrate on your sport, on your schoolwork, and not have to worry about the other sex.

“We’re pushed to do the best in academic achievement and sports. Our headmaster expects the best from us and tell us that every day.”
The results compared schools within the same decile. Deciles measure the socio-economic status of the communities students are drawn from, with more well-off areas typically having better pass rates. At every decile level, students from single-sex schools did better than boys and girls at comparable co-ed schools.
The results have been welcomed by boys schools, but greeted with some scepticism by the president of the Secondary Principals Association, Paul Ferris.
He said such research would only “sow the seeds of doubt” in parents’ minds about co-educational schools.
Such results were only averages, and it was important for parents to look at the performance of individual schools, he said.

Westlake Boys’ High headmaster Jim Dale said he believed boys at co-ed schools were missing out on teacher attention these days, because girls were now performing so strongly.
Girls had a head start on boys because of their greater maturity at an earlier age, said the headmaster.

“When those girls start to excel, through not fault of their own, they probably take up a greater amount of teaching and learning time because the teacher in front of the class is very motivated to teach the ones who at that stage in their development are beginning to shine,” said Dale.
At boys schools, boys benefited from the fact their teachers had high expectations of them.
Boys schools were also able to tailor their teaching to boys’ preferred learning style, with a competitive, highly structured environment.
Sports were “absolutely critical”, allowing the confidence from achievement in the sporting arena to spin off into confidence in the academic area, said Dale.

The associated feature article is “In a Class of Their Own”

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The Impact Of International Price Discrepancies on Ppp-adjusted Gdp

This is the first of a series of papers concerned with PPP measures. The papers are in varying presentational styles and also reflects may growing understanding of the issues involved, and my improving presentation of them.See Measuring PPP-adjusted GDP Index for the other papers. This paper, written in September 2003, is a simple mathematical exposition.

Keywords: Statistics;

This paper is presents a simple proposition:

Where the international prices of exported goods are less than the purchasing power parity prices of the same consumption goods the purchasing power parity adjusted GDP measured on the production side will be less than the purchasing power parity adjusted GDP measured on the expenditure side for those countries which are net exporters of the good.

The theorem, and its converse which applies to net importers, is important where there is a high level of international dumping, as occurs in regard to agricultural products.

The theorem is proved in the case of a single export (which may be a composite commodity).

Some Definitions

We take
Y(i) = the market value of good i, as produced in a particular country.
X(i) = the market vale of good i, as expended (purchased) in a particular country,
N(I) = the net exports of god I = Y(i)- X(i)
p(i) = the local price of good I and
P(i) = the PPP price which is applied in purchasing power parity comparisons to put all countries on the same price level, and which is measured in some standard currency say $US.
e = the exchange rate between the domestic currency and the standard currency.

For the record, the domestic value of any good is converted to the PPP level by multiply it by P(i)/p(i), except that (and it is this where the anomaly which gives the theorem arises) in expenditure side comparisons exports and imports are adjusted by the direct conversion of the value into the standard currency (e.g. the US dollar) at the standard exchange rate. So the conversion is by multiplying by e.

Proof

GDP adjusted for purchasing power parity on the expenditure side (the usual way) is defined by
GDP(X) = ΣX*P/p + ΣN*e

GDP adjusted for purchasing power parity on the production side is defined by
GDP(Y) = ΣY*P/p
= Σ(X+N)*P/p
= ΣX*P/p + ΣN*P/p
= ΣX*P/p + ΣN*e + ΣN*(P/p-e)
= GDP(X) + ΣN*(P-p*e)/p

Thus if P(i) > p(i)*e where N > 0
Then
GDP(Y) > GDP(X)
QED.

This covers the case of a country which charges the same price for a good whether domestically purchased or exported. If the country itself dumps then the theorem involves treating the produced commodity as two separate items, in which case the ‘p’ in the proof equations refers to the price involved in exporting.

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Waccy Economics: Are There Clear Rules Governing Public Investment?

Listener: 6 September. 2003.

Keywords: Business & Finance;

Not learning from the past often results in repeating its mistakes. So a short history of “project evaluation” is called for. In the 1950s, overseas economists proposed Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) as a systematic way of appraising government investment. By the late 1960s, it was being applied in New Zealand, but various government departments applied it differently.

The most contentious parameter was the “discount rate”, a measure of the community choice between today and the future. If the discount rate was 10 percent a year (above the rate of inflation), the community would want a return of at least $200 in seven years’ time for an outlay of $100 today. Projects that only returned $150 from the $100 would be rejected. The discount rate reflects the trade-off between consuming today rather than investing for consuming tomorrow.

Suppose that one government department had a discount rate of 12 percent pa, while another had one of 6 percent pa (such disjunctions were not untypical in the 1960s). The first department would reject a project with a return of 10 percent (it being below its 12 percent pa requirement), while the second would proceed with one with an 8 percent return (since it was above its 6 percent pa threshold). The different thresholds meant that society was not always investing in the most socially profitable projects.

By the 1970s, it was agreed that the same CBA rules and parameters should apply everywhere. What was not agreed were the precise parameters, especially the correct social discount rate. The theoretical debate was heated. With hindsight, it can be seen to be a conflict between the Rogernomes and the pragmatists, with the Rogernomes playing their subsequent game of stating the solution without providing a theoretical underpinning and then using their authority in the Treasury to make everyone else follow them.

The practical debate erupted over “Think Big”: whether various major energy-based projects should go ahead. Did a particular project attain the discount rate? Was its social rate of return high enough? Afterwards, the real issue proved to be risk: what happened if some of the other assumptions – especially the world price of energy – were wrong. They were, and the downsides on the investments were carried by the government, so it was the taxpayer, not the investor, who bore the losses.

To avoid such outcomes, the strategy of the 1980s was to get an economic system where the government did not have to intervene. That “solved” the discount-rate dispute. Businesses made their own decisions about investment. If they got them wrong, their shareholders suffered. If they got them very wrong, so would their bankers, suppliers, workers and customers. In practice, business uses the “weighted average cost of capital” (WACC, pronounced “whack “) as their internal discount rate. Whether social and private discount rates are the same, an issue fought over two decades ago, is now ignored. That is where the debate settled in the 1990s, except CBA is still used in a few non-market sectors such as health and roading.

However, the Treasury had to set a WACC for the state-owned enterprises that the Crown still owns. Typically, it is about 12 percent pa. Meanwhile, the Commerce Commission has to set pricing rules for private monopolies. Their WACC is sometimes as low as 6 percent pa. WACCs vary with risk, so they are an improvement on the discount rate. But the enormous variation is unconvincing. Are we back to the 1960s with different government agencies using markedly different parameters for what appears to be essentially the same exercise?

The result of different WACCs may be that the market signals for pricing and investment are inconsistent. Consider a state-owned enterprise negotiating a joint venture with a private monopoly under Commerce Commission price controls. The former has to get 12 percent pa to please its Treasury masters, but the latter may be restricted to only 6 percent pa. Another paradox was that privatising a state-owned monopoly could reduce its prices, although in the long run it might perform poorly because its low profitability would mean there was insufficient investment.

So the same economic model called the Capital Asset Pricing model (CAPM pronounced “cap-em”) apparently gives different answers to different public agencies – even after using the same consultants. A common view is that CAPM is problematic – while it incorporates some risk, it is not sufficiently comprehensive. But there is no viable alternative. It remains the workhorse for business investment decisions, so everyone understands it – even if only vaguely.

The lesson here is not the circularity of history – although one rather hopes that this decade’s debate will be more pragmatic and theoretically founded than that of the 1970s. Rather, it is hard to have consistent rules when governments intervene, unless there is an overarching framework. I doubt we have one at the moment.

Well-health and the Future Of the Pharmacist

Paper to the Unichem-Life Pharmacy Conference, Rotorua, 31 August 2003.

Keywords: Health;

You might expect an economist to focus on the state of public spending on health. Certainly were I the minister of finance I would. Indeed in a recent speech Michael Cullen expressed some dismay because since 1996 we have been increasing health spending faster than GDP and yet the problem of inadequate health funding appears unresolved.

We can only speculate what might be the effects which are contributing to this apparent black hole, for there is sadly little systematic analysis. They include
– the demographic shift towards the elderly which Mansoor Khawaja has just been discussing;
– a catchup from the cut backs in public health funding in the early 1990s, probably being more expensive than if they had been done at the time because it is cheaper to treat early than late.
– a bigger share of the funding going into preventative health care, but the benefits not yet appearing;
– some switching out of private health care to public health care, indicated by the falling proportion of the population with private health insurance;
– some of the funding increases have gone into reducing the cost of health care to particular groups – especially children – so that we may be more financially equitable between the sick and the well, without necessarily having improved health status.
– probably there is still waste in excessive managerial overheads on one hand, and new primary care providers that have not yet settled in on the other;
– new (expensive) medical technologies.

Some of these effects are transitory, although they may take decades to work their way through, others reflect fundamental changes elsewhere in the economy. Today I want to focus on but one, related to technology, and reflect on how it might affect the pharmacy industry. Talking about new medical technologies is misleading for it is a consequence of a more fundamental, more obvious, and yet more overlooked change to health care, one which has many subtle implications with which we are struggling to deal. That change is that the health system is steadily moving away from saving lives to enhancing the quality of life. That does not mean that the significance of life saving and prolongation has diminished – it is still has the highest priority. The change is that an increasing proportion of activity is concerned with improving the quality of life.

The point is that these increasingly expensive new technologies are meeting new needs, not just meeting old needs better. I want to illustrate the principle with a problem I worked on a few years ago. I am not medically trained, so I may get the story a little wrong, hopefully at the edges. In any case medical knowledge has moved on. Even so the story I tell is indicative of a common problem which those involved financing health care take.

In 1999 the Multiple Sclerosis Society approached me in regard to a very expensive drug, beta-interferon or ‘betatron’, which moderated the impact of the disease but which, at the time, Pharmac did not provide free because of its great expense.

Multiple Sclerosis is a chronic neurological disease which affects the myelin in the brain, leading to progressive loss of control over some muscles. We are familiar with MS sufferers on crutches or in wheelchairs, but that is a late stage of the disease, often decades after it has struck. The early stages involves acute episodes of illness often leading to periods of hospitalisation. For some, but not all, patients a course of betatron reduces these episodes in frequency and severity, and the treatment can mean they can return to living a reasonably normal life during the early stages. It also seems likely that prevention of these early stage episodes will delay the onset of the later stages of MS when there is less control over limbs. For a number of good scientific reasons this is conjecture, but in my work I used the common assumption, that where betatron was effective, it could delay the onset of the wheelchair stage by at least ten years.

A course of betatron is expensive – around $20,000 a year, and all the more effectively expensive because it does not work on all patients. Moreover it is more expensive than the costs of hospitalisation and other treatments which it avoids in the early stages of the disease. A pertinent element of the evaluation is that it does not seem that MS shortens life, it reduces its quality – I avoid saying it ‘only’ reduces its quality, because MS sufferers say it can be a big reduction. So the significant gains from the use of the medication are the enhanced quality of life of patients, both in the short term and also from the future delays in the progression of the disease. The economic problem I faced was whether the quality of life gains justified the considerable additional outlays of the medication. For some people the gains are so great they were purchasing the drug privately – some were literally bankrupted themselves or the family to do so. But not everyone could afford that amount, which is more than the average income of a New Zealander.

For the record, Pharmac agreed to provide the drug on a limited basis, the aim being to ensure it only went to those MS patients who would benefit. However, my purpose of telling you this story is to illustrate that this new medical technology was about life enhancing rather than life saving, and how it is much harder to decide what to do in such circumstances: who if any should receive free a new medicine. Betatron does not cure multiple sclerosis, it may delay its rate of progression, it does not reduce health costs. Its significance is it raises the quality of life of those who respond to it.

It would be easy to say that we should give the same priority to life enhancement as we do to life saving, but in truth the notion is a very encompassing one. Look around your pharmacy. You would probably argue that most of what you sell enhances the life of your customers. For instance, there are women who say their life would be devastated had they not recourse to cosmetics. Why then if betatron now available free from Pharmac, cosmetics are not? To complicate the story further, there may be free cosmetic treatment for the port wine stain of a birthmark or the removal of a tattoo. Why not if a psychiatrist recommends to a patient to get a make-over is that not paid for the state? While these examples might be thought of as extremes, it is difficult for common sense to draw a line in the between them separating what should be government funded from what could be privately funded. Note that because of the financing implications that line may be a function of the cost of treatment.

And just in case you think the contents od a pharmacy is the problem, the supermarket next door can argue that it also supplies life enhancing products. Why should we charge for life enhancing food if we provide life enhancing medicines free? (Should pharmacies distribute red wine on prescription?) My answer today to the paid-free dichotomy is not one of deep philosophy but the sort of pragmatism that one might expect from Pharmac or the Minister of Finance. There is a tight fiscal constraint, which arises from the limits on the willingness of the public to pay tax, and so each funding or availability decision has to be made incrementally, with the hope that they will not be over-influenced by special interest groups but show some sort of retrospective coherence. One suspects that we are well inside the boundary of what commonsense says should be funded, but additionally there is the constant worry that a great many of the treatments – including drug therapies – are not as effective as is claimed. Indeed often there is not a great deal of compelling scientific evidence for their effectiveness. The temptation, were I minister of finance or health, would be to introduce a program of eliminating the subsidy on well-established but scientifically unproven therapies, although the resistance from both those who use them for treatment and those who being treated makes this a politically unattractive option, even if it is fiscally responsible.

This does not directly impact upon pharmacists, since the decision to dispense government subsidised medication is made by others. Your task it is to ensure the dispensing is done efficiently to the required quality standards, that there is a minimisation of waste, and that the recipient is as fully informed as what is reasonable in the circumstances.

However, I want to suggest that the fiscal pressures plus another important social change is leading to another prominent healthcare task for pharmacists. That change is the shift from the view that the medical profession is responsible for the nation’s health to that the individual has responsibility for management of their own health (and their children’s) , supported by the medical profession. This transformation reflects, I think, two crucial changes in the postwar era. The first is a general shift to the liberal values of self-responsibility and the retreat of the big-brother state. The second is the realisation that while particular acute incidents are health and life threatening – for instance an inflamed appendix – how one conducts one’s life affects one’s overall health, the frequency of those acute incidents, and even their outcome. So while the medical professions are no less committed to dealing with the acute incidents, they are likely to add that their contribution could be avoided or substantially reduced if patients ate and drunk sensibly, exercised regularly, did not smoke, and so on. This message is so strong today, that even smokers are likely to say they are less entitled to treatment because they smoke, despite their contributing generously to the cost of public health system via the excise duties on tobacco.

This self-management approach involves a different approach from the health system, treating the public and private parts of it as a coherent whole. In comparison to the regime of professional responsibility, it is less obvious that one’s doctor is the gateway into the system based on self-management. Certainly, and I am agreeing here with recent developments in primary care, it make sense to have a special relationship with a particular general practitioner or practitioner group. But what self-management does is to subtly shift the focus from illness to well-health. While general practitioners might try to relocate themselves in that direction, the fact is that the majority of their work is likely to be past the point when self-management is sufficient by itself and where some sort of professional sick-care seems necessary.

It does not necessarily follow that the self-managed individual usually needs the counsel of the medical professional, but insofar as he or she does, that professional may be a pharmacist, who is not only dispensing prescribed medication, but is also providing information, therapeutic products, and possibly some services. I am offering this as a tentative suggestion, for they may be no need for an advisor or perhaps some other health professional such as the district nurse may do the job.

But let me explore a little about what the well-health pharmacist might look like, noting that this downplays the traditional role of the pharmacist as back-end of the GP dispensing prescribed medicines, and emphasises the front-end as health professional before the doctor.

Perhaps I should say that it seems likely that there may be no single model for the dispensing pharmacist. One obvious option is what might be called the ‘main street chemist’ which locates in the CBD of a large city and is in competition with other nearby pharmacists, but also with the supermarket for dietary supplements and body care products, and with special stores for body care products and so on. My impression is that the majority of customers are not attached to any particular main street chemist, and insofar as they are self managing they consult a convenient pharmacist on a casual basis.

The contrasting model may be the community chemist, typically located in a neighbourhood shopping centre with not much local competition either from other pharmacists or alternative providers of non-dispensing services, except perhaps the local supermarket. The customer may be much more attached to the pharmacy, repeatedly coming back to it for a variety of products and services, and may be well known to its staff – even with a computerised record. A typical conversation with the staff during a purchase may often be wider than the immediate concern and include an exchange of the customer’s health status with the pharmacist offering advice or extending knowledge – as well as the weather. The best placed community chemists will be very close to the local general practitioners’ clinic so not only are they the front and back end of the GP, but an adjacent geographical one. Perhaps there may even be some exchange of records.

Now this scenario may not be very different from the current practical situation of many existing pharmacists. What I am concerned here with is the change in head-space which the self-management approach involves. A practical example is the existence of over-the-counter medicines, the range of which has been increased in recent years. From the perspective of the standard commercial model, the purchase is an interesting one, because unlike the purchase of most products there are contra-indications when it should not be consumed. OTC medicines are one of the ultimates in health self-management, and for good reasons pharmacists are given an exclusive responsibility for selling them. This exclusivity may give pharmacists the unique selling proposition which they hope will give them a viable commercial future to practice their profession.

While health self-management rests on a liberal philosophy of people being independent and self-responsible, and is to be pursued for that reason alone, it also both reduces and increases the pressure on public spending. The spending reductions occur because effective self-management involves better prevention and early identification, each of which put less pressure on the public health system. Similarly, self prescribing with the support of a pharmacist may be considerably cheaper in resources than going to a doctor on a routine matter, with the bigger private cost being offset by time savings.

On the other hand, better management of health care may prolong life, eventually leading to greater public costs for the longer living elderly. This is a common paradox in health policy. Abolition of smoking prolongs life and adds to medical costs. The fiscally ideal cigarette might be one that extinguishes each smoker on the day he or she becomes eligible for New Zealand Superannuation. The resolution to such paradoxes is the concern is no longer simply saving lives but of enhancing its quality. Well-health strategies tip the balance away from medical treatments for avoidable conditions towards necessary ones for unavoidable ones.

Now economists are not very good at predicting the future, and I would be even less so about chemists, for I have not done a close study of the pharmacists’ industry. So I cannot tell you whether the industry will go down the main street or community pathway or how much of each, or perhaps there is a third way I have not addressed. My professional interest – the focus of this talk – is the implications of well-health strategies, especially today as they apply to pharmacies. You could decide to describe pharmacies as ‘well-health’ centres as a marketing ploy. I leave you to decide how effective that would be, and the extent to which it would give you a competitive edge over those who are contesting some of your markets. My economist caution is that the community pharmacy strategy probably involves giving free or near free services, at the very minimum spending a little more time with each customer. Of course one might say that the resulting customer loyalty pays for itself, and while I do not want to discourage such a notion, I wonder as to just how profitable it might be.

So let me suggests two strategy issues you might ponder on. The first is whether there are well-health activities that the government might contract pharmacists to do. Recently, it has been putting considerable emphasis of primary health care, funding a wide range of organisations – not all of which, I am afraid, have proved effective. Should well-health pharmacies be seeking some of the action, and if so what contribution could they make? Should you tender from the local DHB to provide preventive and advice services? (As an aside, this is quite a different issue from a possible need to subsidise some pharmacies to ensure that some communities have one where otherwise it may not be commercially viable.)

The other issue is what role might a well-health pharmacy have in relation to other health providers. Should you more systematically allow other local providers – such as podiatrists – to advertise in your shop? (What guarantees of quality do you give? Do you only allow some sorts of providers to advertise excluding, say, some alternative medicine providers?)

The big one is, of course, your relationship with general practitioners. Recall how I suggested there was an element in well-health of your being the GP’s front door, and not the just the back door dispenser. I suspect that is an issue fraught with complexities, because many general practitioners see their medical centres as well-health in addition to being sick-care agents.

These are only suggestions, intended to provoke you. Perhaps you can identify other possibilities which arise from a well-health strategy. Perhaps you may conclude that pharmacies are not part of a national well-health strategy.

In summary then, my theme has been that here is an ongoing transformation of the health system from professional management of individual health to self-management where the professional supports the individual. We do not seem to be sufficiently exploring the implications of this transformation, so I have suggested that perhaps pharmacists have a significant role to play in getting the best for the nation out of the transformation.

Let me conclude then with Skol, Kia ora, Well-health.

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Rightful Owners

Extended families, who happen to have a common Maori ancestor, have as much right to their family inheritance as do Europeans.
Listener: 23 August, 2003.

A fundamental principle of the political right has been to support private-property rights as a bulwark against the power of the state. Economists have added that economies with well-protected private-property rights tend to have higher standards of living, because economic actors are able to plan with more security. The 1980s Labour government thought this so important that it strengthened private-property rights by such policies as privatisation, leading many to assume that it had shifted to the political right.

However, neither Labour nor National is committed to the supremacy of private property. Taxation is an interference, so much so that some have described it as “theft”, although some taxation revenue is necessary for promoting the public good (including defending property rights). Additionally, it may be necessary to transfer some private property to the public domain, but that is usually done by voluntary purchase at a fair market price or, if that is not practical, by nationalisation with fair compensation. Arbitrary seizure without compensation would be anathema to almost everyone, so entrenched is the notion of private property.

The ultimate origin of a property right is not easy to determine. One way or another the law recognises past title and subsequent legal transfers to identify the current owners of title. But how possible is it to determine that past title? There are three broad approaches. First, the government may establish the title by statute, including recognising past rights or giving the title to itself. Second, when in 1840 the Crown installed itself in New Zealand (from whence its power to pass laws), it agreed to the existing ownership of resources. This was not only title to land, but as the Treaty signed at Waitangi says “taonga katoa” –– all treasured things. Third, the common law that the Crown brought with it recognises the notion of native or customary title that derives from pre-European settlement times.

There remain conundrums. Who owned the commercial property rights in the radio waves? It is not sufficient for the Crown to pass a statute saying that it owned them, because that ignores the question of who previously did, with the possibility that the rights have been expropriated –– nationalised without compensation. Instead, there was a compromise in which the Maori, who could claim to own them from the beginning, agreed not to pursue their claim in exchange for the establishment of a Maori-based broadcasting system. (That they did not know of the radio-frequency spectrum in 1840 is irrelevant. The Crown did not, either. Who owns something that is just discovered? What if it was a forgotten Rembrandt in your attic?) Those who attack Maori broadcasting in principle (rather than asking whether the Maori are getting the best deal from the public outlays on their broadcasting) are in fact reneging on the implicit private-property rights recognised in the deal.

What then of the property rights on the coasts? Either under aboriginal title or the Treaty of Waitangi, any private rights must belong to the relevant Maori, although it may take a court to decide which Maori. What constitutes those rights is more problematic. Suppose the practice was that anyone could walk along a beach. The courts are then likely to rule that we all have a common law right to do so. But, following a different traditional practice, it might rule a single whanau once had the sole right to fish there (a right extinguished by the Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Settlement in exchange for compensation). Maori custom, similar to our current practices, was that there existed a host of separate rights over a particular resource, often held by quite different groups.

The coastal situation is so untidy that the government proposes to sort it out via a statute that, I take it, will give owners of any private-property rights either a statutory entitlement, or compensate them if nationalisation proves necessary.

What is so uncomfortable is that many critics of the government ignore the private-property-rights issue, inciting a public belief that there are none, without any explanation as to where any public-property rights came from, either. The issue is not racial. It is about the property rights of some extended families, who happen to have a common Maori ancestor, and who have as much right to their family inheritance as do Europeans (even those who find a Rembrandt in the attic).

When it proved that about a third of New Zealand’s foreshore is subject to private-property rights, politicians who had been deaf to the Maori family claims urged caution. Of course. Insofar as there is any material abridgement of those rights, there needs to be compensation. But to defend white but not brown rights would be racist. Hopefully, the political right will be sensitive to such outrages. They would not want those lefty Labourites to be alone under the mantle of principled defenders of private property.

Evaluating a Trans-tasman Agency to Regulate Therapeutic Products

This is a report was commissioned by The Select Committee on Health in August 2003. It’s report Inquiry into the Proposal to Establish a Trans-Tasman Agency to Regulate Therapeutic Products was released in December 2003, which means the accompanying papers are also now in the public domain. This is published in part because of its intrinsic interest, but also because it is a small contribution to the literature on New Zealand cost-benefit studies.

Keywords: Health;

Executive Summary

Using a Cost Benefit Analysis Framework, this report reviews the NZIER Assessment of Regulatory Options for Therapeutic Products to answer the following two questions.

Should there be an Extension to the Coverage of the Regulated Therapeutic Products?(Para 4.10)

The unsatisfactory situation in regard of the regulation of therapeutic products needs to be addressed. The simplest option would be an enhancement of the current regime. That would involve the industry in about another $32m to $48m p.a. compliance costs adding perhaps 2 to 3 percent to prices on average.
These additional costs would be offset by following unquantifiable benefits.
– benefits of reduced self-regulatory costs and of reduced disruptions when there is a failure of one (group of) product(s);
– improvements in information and confidence of consumers;
– possibly some quality improvements of products and some reductions in adverse medical events.
The unquantifiable benefits may exceed the identified costs. However the incidence of the costs (and benefits) will not be proportional and some products may be withdrawn from the market because of higher compliance costs.
The main risks are that the gains would be nonexistent or insubstantial.

Should there be a Trans-Tasman Regulatory Agency? (Para 5.13)

If New Zealand is to enhance its current regulatory regime for therapeutic products it seems likely that the compliance costs could be substantially reduced by some an international arrangement.
One such arrangement is the Trans-Tasman Agency (TTA). It is thought to reduce compliance costs on average by $26m-$39m p.a. (1.6-2.0 percent). This would reduce compliance costs of extending to a comprehensive scheme to about .5 percent of prices, on average.
The unquantified benefits of the scheme (additional to the comprehensive regulatory arrangement) would be additional exports. An unquantified cost may be the loss of jobs to Australia. An additional risk arises from the difficulties of renegotiating an international agreement if the new regime does not work properly.
Any international intercourse involves some loss of sovereignty. The TTA proposal is no exception. It is a political decision as to whether the trade-off of the sovereignty loss is compensated by the reductions in compliance costs, which in the case of the TTA seem substantial.
The Select Committee should also consider the possibility of Mutual Recognition Arrangements, insofar as the TTA is not the only means of implementing an international regulatory arrangement. If it is practical, it may be useful to have a separate economic evaluation done on it.

An appendix which brought together the three tables in the body of the text is omitted.

1. Introduction

1.1. The Select Committee on Health enquiring into a proposal for a trans-Tasman agency to regulate therapeutic products has commissioned this report to provide an independent assessment and summary of the economic evidence presented to it, especially of the cost-benefit assessment provided by the NZIER to Medsafe and published as Appendix 3 to their Submission to the Select Committee.

1.2 This report is based upon the NZIER assessment, supplemented where necessary, by information from other reports also submitted to the Select Committee.

1.3 A major aim of this report has been to summarise the assessment. Some of the fine detail in the NZIER’s assessment has been omitted. It is not thought that any of the omissions materially affect the conclusions.

2. Cost-Benefit Analyses

2.1 Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) is a standard economic method for evaluating the economics of some proposal. It is not controversial, Other common criticism of the method is that it pays insufficient attention to the distributional impact of a proposal or to risks (variations around the central forecasts). In practice they can be quantified to some degree, although often albeit it clumsily. The accompanying narrative should draw attention to these issues, insofar as they may seriously affect the outcome.

2.2 At the heart of a CBA is a list of all the effects of the proposal compared to some base case (often the ‘status quo’), the quantification and valuation of each effect, and the addition of the values into a net benefit (if beneficial effects exceed costs) or vice versa. Usually the proposal is sufficiently complicated that not able to all its effects can be quantified, either because some effects are unmeasurable or because suitable data is not available. Any significant omissions are mentioned in the narrative which accompanies the calculations.

2.3 In my opinion, the NZIER report, meets the standards of a professional Cost-Benefit Analysis.

3. The Issues

3.1 The issue is complicated by there being two separate proposals:
Issue 1. Should the current regulatory regime be extension to cover complementary healthcare products and medical devices? (Section 4)
Issue 2. Should the current regulatory agency (Medsafe) be replaced by an alternative arrangement, most notably but not only, by a proposed Trans-Tasman Agency. (Section 5)

3.2 For presentational purposes, it is proposed to treat the two issue independently, although there is some interdependence between them. In one direction, an element for any justification for the extension of coverage has to include the cost of doing so, which in part depends upon the regulatory agency. In the other, the feasibility of different agencies – especially cross-national ones – may depend upon a commonality of coverage.

3.3 While in principle the Select Committee’s concern is with the establishment of a Trans-Tasman agency to regulate therapeutic products, it is clear that many of the submissions are concerned with the question of the extension of the regulation, irrespective of the agency which does it.

4. Should there be an Extension to the Coverage of the Regulated Therapeutic Products?

4.1 The case for the extension of the coverage of regulated therapeutic products is set out in Medsafe’s Submission to the Health Committee. It reports a need for new legislation because the current legislation is ‘unworkable’ (p.17), and suggests that some of the therapeutic products are being distributed in contravention to the Medicines Act. (p.9) (An implication is that the situation – and therefore the status quo – would be very different, were the law enforced). It also identifies actual instances where there appears to have been a serious public health risk as a result of inadequate regulation. (p.22-62)

4.2 It would appear that new legislation is overdue. The NZIER report evaluates this option by comparing the additional costs and benefits of an enhanced regulatory regime. The status quo option is the current regime – that is with current levels of enforcement of the Medicine Acts. They report that the number of activities (applications, variations and annual renewals ) would increase from 8000 a year to 37,000 a year, and the total agency costs would rise from $8m to $43m a year, as staff numbers increased from 62 to 319. (Table 8) Additionally there is the direct cost to businesses of complying with the regulatory regime, which they estimate as a further $7.7m a year. (Table 9) (The data on which the assessment is based were provided by Medsafe to the NZIER or, in some cases , are the NZIER’s own assessments. They have not been independently verified.)

4.3 The NZIER estimates of the resulting increase in costs as a result of the enhanced regulatory framework are as follows. The first column is the type of therapy, the second is the total increase in costs, the third is the increase as a percentage of industry turnover, and the final column gives a range for the percentage increase based upon the NZIER assessment. (Table 10)

I: ADDITIONAL COMPLIANCE COSTS from the enhanced regulatory regime compared to the current one.

Industry Type Cost To
Turnover
Range
Pharmaceuticals $24.1m 2.7% 2.4-3.0%
Complementary
Health Care Products
$7.5m 7.5% 5.3-9.7%
Medical Devices $9.3m 1.4% 1.0-1.8%
All $40.9 2.5% 2.0-3.0%

4.4 In assessing this table it should be noted that
(i) It is assumed that Medsafe will fully cost charge. This adds an extra $3.6m p.a. to business costs. Strictly this is a separate policy issue, but it does not markedly affect any conclusions. These could be offset by a $3.5m p.a. reduction in trans-Tasman import duties.
(ii) The percentage of turnover figures are averages. In particular Medsafe says that as much as 95 percent of current complementary health care products will be subject to a regulation involving self-assessment. It seems likely that many products will hardly be affected by the new regime. On the other hand a few may have a sufficient increase in their compliance costs to be withdrawn from sale, following consumer resistance to the higher prices.

4.5 The figures reported in Paragraph 4.3 are true resource costs (after a minor adjustment mentioned in Paragraph 4.4 (i)). The NZIER was unable to quantify the following benefits from a comprehensive regulatory regime.
Those to the industry include that it would reduce the costs of industry-self regulation. Also, in the event of some disruption over one or a particular group of products (say of a class of complementary health care products), there would be less industry wide disruption from falling sales, because the public would have more confidence in the other products.
Consumers would have more information, and more confidence in the quality of the products they are purchasing. They would also benefit from any pressure the regulatory regime put on suppliers to improve the quality of their products. Perhaps most importantly, consumers would be less likely to suffer from adverse events.

4.6 The NZIER report mentions Transit New Zealand uses a statistical value of life (avoiding death) of $2.55m. (NZIER report page vi) It seems that it is unlikely that the enhanced regulatory regime will result in the avoidance of premature death and other severe adverse incidents to offset the additional itemised resource costs.

4.7 However it is arguable that the big aggregate gains would be from modest gains in quality life years from many individuals avoiding particular self-medication with unfortunate side effects, that is from sickness or poor health rather than from death. Suppose at any time 16,300 people are currently experiencing a reduction of their quality of life of 10 percent as the result of avoidable side effects, and that was valued at $2,500 a person.[Footnoted: $2,500 is about a tenth of the implicit value of a quality life year that Transit New Zealand uses] That would more than cover the extra compliance costs identified above even if there was no reduction in the self-regulation costs, costs from industry disruption and other consumer benefits identified in paragraph 4.5. I am unable to judge whether such a figure is realistic (Appendix 2 of the Medsafe submission gives some background material), but note that a figure of 16,300 would represent less than 1 percent of the half of the population thought to make some use of the complementry health therapies.

4.8 The main risks from enhancing the regulatory regime would be that the gains mentioned in paragraphs 4.5 and 4.6 would be nonexistent or insubstantial.

4.9 In some ways the exercise presented here is based on a misleading status quo. If the existing situation (which is taken as the status quo in the CBA) is unsatisfactory and unstable, the enhanced regulatory regime is the true status quo of a CBA. (Alternatives might be
– a sharply reduced scope for the Medicine Act – perhaps with consumers having stronger statutory remedies for failure, or
– a vigorous enforcement of the existing law.)

4.10 Conclusion to Should there be an Extension to the Coverage of the Regulated Therapeutic Products?
The unsatisfactory situation in regard of the regulation of therapeutic products needs to be addressed. The simplest option would be an enhancement of the current regime. That would involve the industry in about another $32m to $48m p.a. compliance costs adding perhaps 2 to 3 percent to prices on average.
These additional costs would be offset by following unquantifiable benefits.
– benefits of reduced self-regulatory costs and of reduced disruptions when there is a failure of one (group of) product(s);
– improvements in information and confidence of consumers;
– possibly some quality improvements of products and some reductions in adverse medical events.
The unquantifiable benefits may exceed the identified costs. However the incidence of the costs (and benefits) will not be proportional and some products may be withdrawn from the market because of higher compliance costs.
The main risks are that the gains would be nonexistent or insubstantial.

5. Should there be a Trans-Tasman Regulatory Agency?

5.1 The essence of the proposal that the Select Committee is examining, is that the costs of regulating therapeutic products can be reduced by an international regime in which the costs are shared with other national agencies, in particular Australia.

5.2 The NZIER CBA report looks at two options. One involves a Trans-Tasman Agency (TTA) as proposed in the discussion paper A Proposal for a Trans Tasman Agency to Regulate Therapeutic Products. In the other, New Zealand unilaterally recognizes the decisions from overseas regulators which imposed similar or higher standards than those of New Zealand. This report omits consideration of the unilateral option, as the NZIER finds it less attractive than the TTA option (although in some ways – including lower compliance costs – it is superior to the enhanced domestic regulatory option).

5.3 The TTA option evolved out of the provisions under CER for a Mutual Recognition Arrangement, (MRA) in which the regulatory decisions of one of the Tasman partners would be recognised by the other. Thus any supplier of a therapeutic product would only have to register in Australia or New Zealand and be automatically recognised in the other jurisdiction. That would mean suppliers in country would only have to register once, reducing compliance costs.
It is to be regretted that the submissions made available to me do not provide any detail as to why a MRA has not proceeded. (One factor has been the different regulatory regimes of the two countries, but that would be overcome by New Zealand updating and enhancing its regime.)
It is likely to involve less loss of national autonomy, and also leaves open the possibility of a similar mutual recognition arrangement with other countries (say Canada). (Another minor gain is there could be ‘competition’ from the two regulatory authorities would put downward pressure on compliance costs.) This would further reduce compliance costs, and in New Zealand’s case may encourage exporting to these other countries. This is an expository rather than advisory paper. Its one piece of advice would be
The Select Committee should also consider the possibility of Mutual Recognition Arrangements, insofar as the TTA is not the only means of implementing an international regulatory arrangement. If it is practical, it may be useful to have a separate economic evaluation done on it.

5.4 For expository purposes this report takes a slightly different approach from the NZIER assessment. As presaged, it uses a different status quo, assuming that parliament has decided there is a need for an enhanced regulatory regime because the current one is unsatisfactory and unstable. The choice is whether to impose the enhanced regulatory regime (the new status quo) or the TTA.

5.5 The NZIER estimates of the resulting reductions in costs as a result of the using TTA instead of the enhanced regulatory framework are as follows. The first column is the type of therapy, the second is the total increase in costs, the third is the increase as a percentage of industry turnover, and the final column gives a range for the percentage increase based upon the NZIER assessment. (Table 10)

II: REDUCTION IN COMPLIANCE COSTS for a Trans Tasman Agency Regime Instead of the Enhanced Domestic Regulatory Regime

Industry Type Cost To
Turnover
Range
Pharmaceuticals $25.5m 2.9% 2.6-3.2%
Complementary
Health Care Products
$4.9m 4.9% 3.4-6.4%
Medical Devices $2.3m 0.3% 0.2-0.4%
All $32.6m 2.0% 1.6-2.4%

5.6 Because costs between the two nations are shared, there is a substantial reduction in the compliance costs to the therapeutic drugs industry. Given that the unquantifiable benefits will remain largely the same those considered in paragraphs 4.5 and 4.6 , the TTA option appears advantageous over the enhanced domestic regulatory regime.

5.7 At this stage it useful to compare the increases in compliance costs from the TTA regime over the current regime in a table analogous to that of Paragraph 5.5.

III: INCREMENTAL COMPLIANCE COSTS for a Trans Tasman Agency Regime Instead of the Current Domestic Regulatory Regime (Negative indicates reduction in costs)

Industry Type Cost To
Turnover
Range
Pharmaceuticals -$1.4m -0.2% ~0.2%
Complementary
Health Care Products
$2.6m 2.6% 1.8-3.4%
Medical Devices $7.0m 1.1% 0.8-1.4%
All $8.3m 0.5% 0.4-0.6%

(The estimates in Table III is broadly equal to the estimates in Table I minus the estimates in Table II.)

5.8 In summary, the TTA regime would be cheaper to administer than the current regulatory regime in the case of pharmaceuticals, would reduce the compliance costs of imposing the enhanced regulator regime on complementary health care products by two-thirds, and on medical devices by one-third. As paragraph 5.6 noted, there is no obvious loss of economic benefits from the TTA regime relative to the enhanced regulatory regime. (The NZIER mentions that the possibility of additional exports as a result of the simplification of entry to Australia. It also notes there may be net job losses as firms relocate regulatory affairs to Australia. Both effects are likely to be minor.)

5.9 The risks for this option include those which apply for the enhanced regulatory option (paragraph 4.7 of this report) although the estimates are less reliable (because the proposal involves more unknown parameters and experiences). Additionally there is the risk that if the new regime proves not to work properly, it is likely to be harder to reform because it involves an international partner.

5.10 The economics does not address the issue of the impact of economic sovereignty – in this context the ability of a nation to use all the economic instruments available to it. Sovereignty losses are not fully quantifiable, yet there may be a tradeoff between the loss of sovereignty and the gains from either cheaper regulation (relative to the enhanced regulatory option) or better regulation (relative to current regulatory practices).

5.11 Any tradeoff to be assessed by parliament. At one level the issue is one of deep principle – as the paper by Professor Burrows draws attention to. Such issues are generally outside the economics profession’s competence, although they would observe that any international economic intercourse involves some loss of sovereignty. Usually the smaller partner in the transaction suffers the greater loss.
At a practical level, one might ask under what circumstances might New Zealand want to adopt a different approach or treatment of a class of therapeutic products from Australia? It may be in this case, such circumstances would occur so infrequently that the practical loss of sovereignty would be small.

5.12 It may be that a mutual recognition agreement may involve slightly less loss of sovereignty (albeit possibly offset by a slightly higher compliance costs). However its importance is more about national economic strategy. One view is that CER was about forming some sort of economic union with Australia to obtain gains particularly from a bigger market. This is the view implicit in the NZIER report. An alternative view is that CER is part of a strategy of opening up the New Zealand economy to the whole world. Thus any particular arrangement (such as the regulation of therapeutic policies) is always tested as to whether it enables New Zealand to engage with a wider international economy.

5.13 Conclusion to Should there be a Trans-Tasman Regulatory Agency? If New Zealand is to enhance its current regulatory regime for therapeutic products it seems likely that the compliance costs could be substantially reduced by some an international arrangement.
One such arrangement is the Trans-Tasman Agency (TTA). It is thought to reduce compliance costs on average by $26m-$39m p.a. (1.6-2.0 percent). This would reduce compliance costs of extending to a comprehensive scheme to about .5 percent of prices, on average.
The unquantified benefits of the scheme (additional to the comprehensive regulatory arrangement) would be additional exports. An unquantified cost may be the loss of jobs to Australia. An additional risk arises from the difficulties of renegotiating an international agreement if the new regime does not work properly.
Any international intercourse involves some loss of sovereignty. The TTA proposal is no exception. It is a political decision as to whether the trade-off of the sovereignty loss is compensated by the reductions in compliance costs, which in the case of the TTA seem substantial.
The Select Committee should also consider the possibility of Mutual Recognition Arrangements, insofar as the TTA is not the only means of implementing an international regulatory arrangement. If it is practical, it may be useful to have a separate economic evaluation done on it.Go to top

Globalization and Its Discontents, by Joseph Stiglitz (review)

Listener: 16 August, 2002

Keywords: Globalisation & Trade;

Joseph Stiglitz may be the most important economist outside government in today’s world. He first came to notice as the editor of the collected works of Paul Samuelson, the second most important economist of the 20th century. Stiglitz went on to innovate in economic theory (receiving a Nobel Prize in 2001 in the economics of information), write a number of major textbooks and hold positions in many major universities. From 1993 he served on Clinton’s Council of Economic Advisers, going on to work in the World Bank in 1997. In 2000 he was forced out by a US administration who found his criticisms of them and the International Monetary Fund uncomfortable.

Stiglitz is deeply committed to the objectives of the World Bank to relieve poverty, and believes that globalisation – which he defines as closer integration of national economies – “can be a force for good and has the potential to enrich everyone in the world”. But his time as a policy adviser taught him that often this process was not well managed.

Globalisation and Its Discontents is Stiglitz’s account of his experiences in the policy world, which provides an insight to what went wrong and why he did not last long there. It was a cause celebre especially when the IMF attacked it vigorously. Penguin has brought out a soft cover (and hence cheaper) edition of the book, which includes a seven-page afterword, describing some of the conflict, as well as summarising his argument. It expands on his concerns over the intimate relationship between the fund and private financiers, but now regrets naming a particular person to illustrate them.

The book tells of Stiglitz’s time at the World Bank, where he was constantly appalled with the decisions being taken by the IMF (with the US Treasury), and the way that they damaged the poor of those countries they were trying to help. The theories to which Stiglitz has devoted his professional life were being misused, in ways that almost always favoured the rich, big business and finance.

Although the World Bank is often popularly equated with the IMF, its focus has been more pragmatic and pro-poor in recent years, in part because of a redirection that took place during Stiglitz’s watch. Providing the reader is aware of this refocusing, this insider’s account –– with many country instances: Botswana, Brazil, China, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Poland, Russia, Thailand, Vietnam –– is as revealing as it is fascinating. The disclosures are not about sleaze and corruption, but about an institution that thinks it is acting for the best interests (of whom?), but may not be. Nor, despite being a public institution, is it publicly accountable.

Stiglitz is not alone with such concerns. (Among his colleagues is New Zealander Robert Wade, professor of development economics at the London School of Economics.) But he writes so clearly and yet with a marvellous grasp of economic theory and lots of practical experience that he is surely their leader. Now a professor at Columbia University, he writes occasional weighty critiques of the world economy. A selection of his speeches has recently been published as The Rebel Within: Joseph Stiglitz and the World Bank. His The Roaring Nineties: The Seeds of Disaster is to be published soon. Its attack on the “misplaced faith in free market ideology” and his setting out of “a blueprint for the future: for the role of the state and European Social Democrats” promise another cerebral bestseller.

Perhaps Globalisation and Its Discontents is an entrée before this main. But it is a satisfying meal in its own right.

Taxing Our Patience

How seriously should we take the argument that higher taxes equal lower growth?

Listener: 9 August, 2003

Keywords: Regulation & Taxation;

New Zealand economics is bedevilled by slavishly imitating inappropriate overseas analyses. A nice example of this colonial cringe is the Business Roundtable’s annual celebration of “Tax Freedom Day”, the day on which they deem that we have paid our taxes with all our subsequent income tax-free. This year it said that it was somewhere between April 23 and May 17. (It has difficulties deciding what are taxes.)

The notion does not make much sense because one pays taxes as a proportion of income throughout the year. New Zealanders will also be puzzled by the date. Their tax year starts on April 1. It seems surprising that even under this peculiar convention all the taxes are paid in the next 23 to 47 days. The oddity arises because the Business Roundtable lifted their argument from the Americans for Reform Tax Foundation, and did not notice that the US tax year commences on January 1.

As the Business Roundtable’s calculations indicate, it is difficult to gauge the burden of taxes. Some New Zealand tax payments are but internal transfers within the government. It charges itself GST on its spending. Most countries would not. Social security benefits and New Zealand Superannuation are taxed at source. Most countries do not. Nor did we, 20 years ago. The impression is that the tax burden has risen as a result of these changes. It has probably fallen, insofar as the changes simplified government administration.

In any case, the calculation ignores the benefits that taxes bring us. Tax-free Day is offset by a Health Care Paid-for Day, an Education Paid-for Day, a Pension Paid-for Day, an Environment Paid-for Day, etc. (And if you are grumbling that there are collateral private payments made by the recipients of these government services or there should be more public monies spent, you are asking that Tax-free Day be later in the year.)

Are the current levels of taxation a brake on the economy? Even if they were, we might still want the taxes, preferring the resulting better quality of output to more output of inferior quality. Without public spending, there is likely to be poorer health, a more ignorant population, greater crime, a nastier environment, lower quality broadcasting and so on. The quickest way to return to the top half of the OECD GDP per capita list would be to execute everyone over 65. Output would remain the same, but the population decrease would put New Zealand up there. More subtly, we could reduce health care to the elderly, while screwing down their pension so they die earlier from cold and hunger. Listener readers, not all of whom are over 65, will shout “bollocks” to such a strategy. Exactly, New Zealanders care about goals other than the crudities of economic output.

Last year the Business Roundtable released a report that claimed that high taxation inhibited economic growth. I expected the result, because the underlying economic theory seems plausible, although the magnitude of the effect may be small. (Conversely, it can be argued that some sorts of public spending may accelerate economic growth.)

To my astonishment, the report did not validly reach that conclusion. It cited various international studies, but left out any that contradicted its thesis, including impressive ones by some big research names. Its econometrics was thin and unconvincing. Any effect has to be so tiny that it is not observable. That is why the issue can be so hotly debated.

So the Business Roundtable has been reduced to arguing that no economy with high tax levels has had a high economic growth rate. But some economies with low tax levels have had low economic growth rates. The Business Roundtable conclusion is not very statistically robust, so the pattern could be an accident. Even were it robust, correlation does not demonstrate causation. There could be other mechanisms. High growth economies also have huge industrial assistance, so others could use the Business Roundtable’s exact logic to justify policies that are anathema to it. The evidence that buttresses its theory is for decoration rather than for bearing loads.

Poorly designed and high-level tax systems can be a burden to the economy. So we need to monitor and design the tax system carefully. New Zealand’s appears reasonably satisfactory.

Our public controversy is really about the balance between the public and private sectors and the consequential quality of output, together with who pays the taxes and who benefits. These are proper matters for political debate (and are difficult political decisions). But they should not be confused with the scientific one of the unproven claim that our level of taxes are too high for quality economic growth. The next time someone makes that assertion, be it without evidence or buttressed by anecdote and statistical ineptitude, you –– dear reader –– may shout “bollocks”.

The Best Democracy Money Can Buy, by Greg Palast (review)

Listener: 9 August, 2003.

Keywords: Political Economy & History;

With sex no longer secret, we move on to the mysteries of corporations and their couplings with governments. Investigative journalists, among whom American Greg Palast is exceptional, today lift the curtains from the corporate bedroom windows. This book describes his recent investigations.

Its first chapter shows how, at the behest of the state government, over 57,700 voters were wrongly deleted from the Florida electoral roll in 1999. Most were black and probably voted Democrat. George W Bush, the brother of Florida’s governor, won Florida –– and the presidency –– by a mere 537 votes. The Bush administration’s dealings with the rich follow in the chapter that gives the book its title.

Later chapters are on the Californian energy crisis, globalisation and business, Walmart, the Christian-evangelist-cum-businessman Pat Robertson, Chile, Alaska (the Exxon Valdez as well as the appalling treatment of the natives), Pepsi-cola, Tony Blair’s government’s connections with big business, and a whole lot more besides.

Despite the book’s 400 pages, not all are detailed. Readers will know the broad outlines of many of the “scandals” via international news reports, often triggered by Palast.

He writes vigorously, sometimes wittily (“Blake’s ‘Dark Satanic Mills’ have been replaced by ‘Bright Demonic Happy Meals’ at McDonald’s”), and often crudely. The introduction for British readers is titled “Who gives a shit?”, after an editor who canned a story because he thought no one would be interested. Palast is excoriating about the timidity of the media. Some of his best US stories had to be released in Britain (he has worked for the BBC, the Guardian and the Observer).

Despite the guarantee of freedom of speech, the American media were not interested. Yet the UK media is stifled by restrictive laws. Palast suggests that Brits “trade in your Queen for a written guarantee of freedom of the press. In fact, you can borrow America’s –– we aren’t using ours.”

That said, any editor who is offered a Palast story faces severe problems. Although the goings-on in corporate bedrooms are far more titillating than in royal bedrooms, getting the complex story right is not easy. Palast can be casual. He quotes Keynes as writing “the mad rantings of men in authority often have their origins in jottings of some professor of economics”, but that is not exactly what Keynes wrote. If Palast does not check simple quotations, can we be sure of his reports of complex facts? Unchecked ones can be misleading. Activities in bedrooms are open to misunderstandings by outsiders, particularly those, such as Palast, who have a highly committed perspective.

There is no doubt that sometimes corporations and governments get together at the expense of the public good: probably more so in the US than anywhere else in the West. But they also get together to do good things. It is not sufficient to say that “corporate capitalism” is corrupt. Palast identifies a number of outrageous cases, but others may be misinterpretations, drawing invalid conclusions based on incomplete evidence or tenuous connections. And, although his indignation may be justified in some instances, the book does not go beyond rage to add to our understanding of why such things happen. One finishes reading it, fearful for a world led by “the best democracy money can buy”, but with little indication of the alternatives.

Even so, when asked “What do you feel is the biggest threat to the world?”, Palast replied, “Cowardice.” But why give a shit? As Edmund Burke more elegantly said, “The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing.”

The Exchange Rate (index)

Keywords: Macroeconomics & Money;

A correspondent, R.B. Chrystal, to The Listener asked

Why do we have a floating currency and what advantage is it to the country in general? To me it seems that all it does is allow another tier of parasites, ie currency speculators, into the system as well as create more uncertainty for our exporters. The strength or weakness of our dollar seems to bear very little relationship to the strength or weakness of our economy, as was touted when it was floated.

My answer, published in The Listener of 1 August 2003 is given below. Go to Brian Easton’s response I asked another economist to look at my reply. He thought it fine but also offered his account, which does not address the respondent’s question directly, but gives greater insight into official thinking. Go to another economist’s response < Also published here is an extract from In Stormy Seas which offers a definition of the Exchange Rate. Go to Definition

Other website indexes concerned with elements of the exchange rate are:
Reserve Bank of New Zealand and related issues which contains articles in the section on Monetary Policy describing how monetary policy impacts on the exchange rate, and articles in the section on Monetary Union which explores what happens when there is a fixed exchange rate with another economy, and
New Zealand’s Economic Performance which contains articles describing how the exchange rate impacts on the economy.

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Defining the Exchange Rate
The following is adapted from In Stormy Seas pages 85-88.

The nominal exchange rate is defined as the number of units of currency that could be bought for one New Zealand dollar. For instance on the day I first wrote this the ruling US dollar exchange rates the previous day was .5477. That means that one New Zealand dollar was trading for 54.77 US cents. The convention means that in a devaluation or depreciation the nominal exchange rate goes down; in a revaluation or appreciation the nominal exchange rate goes up.

In order to define the real exchange rate it is necessary to look at a three sector economy of exportables and importables [which combine into the tradeable sector, and non-tradeables.

Consider a business in the tradeable sector. Its profitability will be dependent upon the price of tradeables, less the costs of its inputs which will be non-tradeables (if we net out tradeable costs from the output price). Thus its performance will depend on the relative price of non-tradeables to tradeables. This ratio is called the real exchange rate. Its index is defined as

The real exchange rate = (the price of non-tradeables)/ the price of tradeables

The definition has a number of implications. First the higher the real exchange rate index the less favourable it is for the tradeable sector, since it is paying higher costs for its inputs. Which is the ratio’s numerator and which is its denominator is a convention.

In this exchange rate convention higher means worse for a producer of tradeable products. A higher nominal exchange rate means fewer New Zealand dollars for each unit of overseas currency they earn. Alternatively a higher real exchange rate means worse for the tradeable sector since their inputs cost more in foreign currency terms.

Second we can change the price of non-tradeables, which are sold only in the domestic market, relative to the price of tradeables which is set in the foreign market, by changing the nominal exchange rate. Suppose the nominal exchange rate depreciates, then the price of tradeables (such as exports) go up (the foreign exchange they earn is more valuable) and the real exchange rate goes down. (So the nominal and real exchange rates tend to move together.) The nominal exchange rate is not the only determinant of the real exchange rate, but it is a very important one.

A small economy has no influence over the foreign currency price it pays for its imports or receives for its exports. Thus its ability to influence its real exchange rate depends on its ability to influence its local price of non-tradeables and its nominal exchange rate. Moreover a change in the nominal exchange rate affects the real exchange rate by the same proportion, if the other prices do not change. In effect the real exchange rate adjusts the nominal exchange rate for differences between local and foreign prices.

In the short run, when domestic prices are not changing much, the real and nominal exchange rates follow similar patterns. In the long run it is better to fouc on the real exchange rate. which is not obscured by domestic inflation.

Interestingly, but perhaps not surprisingly, the pattern of the real exchange rate (REX) roughly – but not perfectly – corresponds with our overall economic performance:
– In the late 1920s the REX rises as the economy plunges in to depression;
– From the mid 1930s through the 1940s the REX drops steeply as the economy expands rapidly;
– In the 1950s through to the early 1970s the REX climbs steadily while our economic performance is disappointing;
– In the second half of the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s the REX is roughly flat: the economy experiences its best post 1950 performance;
– After 1985 the REX climbs very steeply: the economic performance is disastrous.

Here we have then an explanation for the growth performance of the economy. As a rule a low and/or falling real exchange rate is beneficial to the economy, and a high and/or rising one is detrimental.

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Brian Easton’s Answer

Our economics columnist, Brian Easton began by citing Alfred Marshall’s ‘All short statements in economics are wrong, with the possible exception of this one’, and then answered (briefly):

The New Zealand dollar has to float because the other of the world’s currencies are floating. Even had it a fixed link with another currency (say the Australian dollar) that currency floats too, so exporters would still have to cope with currency fluctuations for (at least) 80 percent of other markets. It is unfortunate that business commentators focus on the New Zealand to US dollar exchange rate and tend to neglect other currencies such as the Australian dollar, Euro, Sterling, and Yen. Sometimes the New Zealand dollar goes up relative to the US dollar and down relative to them, to the extent that on average (measured by the ‘Trade Weighted Exchange Rate Index’ – TWI) it falls.

A fixed exchange rate does not avoid currency speculation. Readers will recall that some ‘speculators’ made a killing when the New Zealand dollar was devalued in July 1984. (The currency float was instigated in March 1985.) The difference is that under a fixed exchange rate it is the government which pays the speculators’ profits: Under a floating one their profits come from other private ‘speculators’ who bet the wrong way.

Mr Chrystal is correct that while the rhetoric connects a strong currency with a strong economy, that relationship need not be true. The foreign exchange rate is but a (relative) price, reconciling the demand and supply for New Zealand currency. It is interesting, isnt it, that we get upset if the price of consumer goods rises, but there is cheering by business commentators if foreign currency rate goes up? Those who dont cheer are the exporters, because a high New Zealand dollar means that they get less New Zealand currency for their exports.

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Alternative Response Suggested by Another Economist

The theory that lead us and many others into floating exchange rates said that we would absorb changes in trading conditions more easily. If people stop buying wool carpets in favour of synthetics, or if the UK drops us to fit in with EC policies, we have to change. Unfortunately, change hurts, particularly so for those directly affected. An exchange rate that falls when bad circumstances happen spreads that change through time and across people. A lower dollar would provide some compensation for lower wool and meat prices. A lower dollar would boost returns to other exporters, helping encourage a shift from farming to whatever is more profitable. And a lower dollar would raise prices of imported products to you and I, motivating us to buy more NZ product, and again helping people shift to new businesses.

That was the theory. It kind of works. But exchange rates bounce around a lot more than is needed to absorb changes in circumstances, and often for reasons completely divorced from changes in fundamental trading patterns and prices.

Should we go back and try to fix exchange rates, or is rough and ready still better?

Fixed exchange rates of the type we used to have are these days probably unattainable. We’ve seen countries all over the world forced to give up their fixed rates in crises, having spent billions of taxpayers’ money trying to hold the tide back. That’s not smart.

But completely fixed rates can be had by adopting someone else’s currency, as much of Europe has recently done. For NZ, that would only be partial, and possibly come at a cost. Partial because our biggest trade partner – Australia – only accounts for 20% of our trade. We would still float against 80%. Possibly at a cost, because the 80% still facing floating exchange rates would be facing the Australian dollar. That theory, which kind of works, says the currency should move to absorb shocks. Well, it would be moving to absorb Australian shocks, not New Zealand shocks, and there may be times when those are quite different!

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Performance Anxiety: Why Incentive Systems Often Fail

Listener 26 July, 2003.

Keywords: Education: Regulation & Taxation;

In one of his witty essays in The Intellectual in the Marketplace, George Stigler describes a fictional Latin American university whose vice-chancellor aimed to raise the quality of the academic staff by a system of competitive exams. In order to win, the academics gave up teaching, so the system was changed to provide incentives to teach well. A further change had to be made to incorporate research achievement. Each time the ‘contestants’ found ways around the rules, the system was distorted and goals not attained. Eventually the VC moved on, to a position where he is as conservative as his radical reputation allowed, and his old university lapsed back to its traditional ways.

Stigler won a Nobel Prize in economics in 1982 for his seminal studies of industrial structures, markets and public regulation. His point was that an incentive system which does not exactly align with its goals will generate unintended – even perverse – outcomes. Yet it is very difficult to create exact alignment.

To which thousands of academics will say ‘Amen’, as they struggle with ‘Performance Based Research Funding’ (PBRF). The intention is honourable enough. Government outlays a couple of a billion dollars each year on tertiary education. Does it get quality for its spending? Students only really judge teaching, not the research nor the faculty contribution to the community and the wider public service. So the fund aims to financially reward tertiary institutions with above average performance measured by the research outputs of their academic staff. However, filling in the required forms has proved tiresome and difficult, for incentive systems often have substantial compliance costs. Even those with goodwill wonder if the results will measure real research performance.

As Stigler indicates, this is not a new problem. A enterprising university chemistry department once decided to aim for a high research output by focussing on structural chemistry. Research and teaching of biochemistry, which has more relevance to New Zealand’s prospects, was downgraded. Is that what was really wanted by the funders of universities? Will the PBRF reward or punish this decision? Research is often valued by it being peer reviewed in learned journals. But as physicist Joao Magueijo remarks, the resulting learned articles are ‘often empty of scientific content and reflect the author’s social standing, or their good or bad relations with the referee.’ The issue of relevance hardly appears.

The same applies to economics. The standard model of the economy – the one which is easy to use and to write articles for publication overseas – is based on an idealised US economy. The New Zealand economy is fundamentally different. It is smaller, more open to trade, with a dissimilar resource base, and different social and political structures.

For instance, the 1980s’ reform of government administration was heavily influenced by ‘public choice theory’, pioneered by James Buchanan who received a Nobel prize in 1986. It purported to be a universal theory of government, but actually applies to an idealised US government system, in which politicians and public officials are driven by self-interest rather than the public good. The resulting incentive system, which assumes that officials cannot be trusted to act in any other way than selfishly, requires them being closely monitored with heavy compliance costs (like the PBRF). Our public sector is still trying to deal with the uncomfortable outcomes from the reforms based on such flawed assumptions.

So the PBRF could easily end up rewarding university economists which research and teach this idealised US economy, thereby poorly prepare their students to work as an economist in New Zealand. Many would say that some already do that.

Consider the theory of ‘endogenous technology’, which is only about twenty years old and is still to be awarded a Nobel Prize. (One will probably go to Paul Romer.) It was generated in the US which largely produces its own technology. One can apply it to New Zealand, pretending we are similar, and get publication in prestigious overseas journals, while students are released onto an unsuspecting New Zealand public with some understanding of the large US innovation system and none about New Zealand’s.

Inevitably, a small country is a major importer of technology. Technology transfer, where selection and adaption are as important as technology generation, is at the core of many of New Zealand sectors’ economic prospects. Yet technology transfer barely gets mentioned in our national technology policy. (Ironically, our worst case of inept technology transfer may be the uncritical importing of the US economic model as if it were universal.)

The guidelines for the PBRF in Business and Economics say that attention should be paid ‘to possible constraints imposed by research that is focussed on local situations or information, in limiting access to internationally focussed publication channels’. Let us hope, for New Zealand’s sake, that this part of the incentive system works.

University Financial Statements, Operating Surpluses, and Student Fees

Prepared for some members of the councils of Tertiary Educational Institutions. (The choice of the VUW accounts to illustrate the general issues is fortuitous, and is not intended to reflect in any way – positively or negatively – on the university.)

Keywords: Education: Governance;

Statement of Financial Performance

Debates about student fees usually focus on the ‘Statement of Financial Performance’ which describes the revenue and expenditure of the Tertiary Educational Institution (TEI). However we shall see that other accounts are also important in order to understand this one. Table 1 shows the 2002 Statement of Financial Performance for the Victoria University of Wellington (VUW).[1] Its website is where you can find the details. (Attached to most line items is a ‘note’ which it is always wise to check when if you are interested in that line.)

TABLE 1: STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL POSITION
(VUW: 2002)

$m %
<b.Revenue
Government Grants 76.0 49.2
Domestic Tution Fees 35.3 23.0
International Tution Fees 16.7 10.8
Research Support 3.7 2.4
Commercial 8.3 5.3
Student & Family 7.1 4.6
Other 7.2 4.6
Total Revenue 154.4 100.0
Expenditure
People 94.8 61.4
Occupancy 11.2 7.2
Equipment 1.2 .8
Information Technology 3.9 2.5
Operating 25.7 16.7
Depreciation 15.4 10.0
Total Expenditure 152.4 98.7
Surplus for the Year 8.8 1.3

These accounts tell very little about the management of the TEI. They dont tell how much is spent on teaching, how much on research or how much on teaching international students or how much on teaching domestic students; or how much on marketing; or the library and so on. None of the tables in the Annual Report tell much about such things.

But they tell some things about financial arrangements. Suppose that in 2002 VUW had raised its domestic student fees by 1 percent. Assuming no students were discouraged from attending (including going to cheaper TEIs), then the additional revenue would have been $355,000 representing a .23 percent increase in total revenue. The very small change reflects that domestic tuition fees are only 23 percent of total revenue. (In fact .23% = 23% x 1%).

Now what might the university have done with this extra revenue? It could have reduced other revenue (say cut the fees to international students) and it could have spent the money on other items (say staff salaries). However the most likely thing VUW would have done is increase its ‘surplus for the year’ from $8.8m to $9.1 or by 4 percent. (It is explained below why one might expect them to do this.)

Statement of Financial Position

Table 2, is a simplified version of the published ‘Statement of Financial Position’ (and again set out here is without the notes). It shows all the assets and liabilities of the university at the end of the 2002 and 2001 year. (Shortly we will explain how to get from Table 1 to Table 2 – via Table 3.)

TABLE 2: STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL POSITION

(VUW: 2002)

$m
2001
$m
2002
Current Assets 36.1 50.1
Property Plant & Equipment 290.4 315.1
Development Costs .1 .0
Construction in Progress 1.5 8.2
Shares & Advances .2 .4
Total Non-Current Assets 292.3 323.7
Current Liabilities 30.7 33.4
Non-Current Libailities 6.1 7.5
Total Liabilities 36.8 40.9
Total Net Assets 291.6 332.9
Represent by
Community Equity
291.6 332.9

The table shows that at the end of 2002 the University had $332.8m of assets, up from $291.6m at the beginning of the year, and increase of $41.3m. Most of those assets (over 95 percent) are in the capital items of Property, Plant and Equipment. The university had substantial Current Assets (such as Cash in the Bank and Short Term Investments)of $50.1m but these were almost offset by its Liabilities (such as accounts owed) of $40.9m.[2]

Statement of Movements in Equity

How did the Net Assets (Community Equity) of the University increase by $50.1m over the 2002 year? The broad changes are set out in our Table 3, Statement of Movements in Equity. It shows that the increase came from a one of capital grant from the government, of $6.6m, an increase in the Revaluation Reserve of $25.9m, and ‘Surplus for the Year’ of $8.8m, which is exactly the item which appears in the Statement of Financial Performance. The revaluation reserve is a means of dealing with the rising value of capital items due to inflation. It does not tell a lot about the ability of the TEI to function better. (That the land a lecture theatre is on has gone up 20 percent does not tell a lot about the effectiveness of the lectures. Incorporating that increase in the accounts ensures the asset valuations are meaningful. Sometimes the university will think about selling the land in order to use the funds it represents more efficiently.)

TABLE 3: STATEMENT OF MOVEMENTS IN EQUITY
(VUW: 2002)

$m
2002
Surplus for the Year 8.8
Increase in Revaluation Reserve +25.9
Capital Funds Received
from Government
+6.0
Total Change in Equity =41.3
Total Equity at the
Start of the Year
+291.6
Total Equity at the
End of the Year
=332.9

Leaving aside price changes and special capital grants, the main source of VUW’s Net Assets (Community Equity) is the surplus recorded in the Statement of Performance. Had Domestic Tuition Fees been raised by 1 percent, the extra $355,000 would have increased the Net Assets by that amount or .1 percent (assuming it was not used for current spending or to reduce revenue elsewhere.)

Evaluating the Accounts

Thus far the accounts of the university are a set of numbers determined by the application of various rules, linked arithmetically together. That does not tell whether the university is in a healthy financial state (and of course the accounts tell very little about whether the university is in a healthy scholarly, teaching, or research state or in what ways it is contributing to the community and the nation).

The Tertiary Monitoring Unit (TAMU) of the Ministry of Education has set four criteria – minimum target thresholds – which allow some assessment of the state of an TEI’s finances. These are set out in Table 4.

TABLE 4: STATEMENT OF MOVEMENTS IN EQUITY
(VUW 2002)

Numerator
Definition
Denominator
Definition
TAMU
Target
2002
Cash Cover Liquid Funds Annual Cash
Operating
Outgoings
8% 32.6%
Asset Productivity Revenue Net Assets 40% 48.4%
Return on Assets Operating
Surplus*
Assets 1% 1.7%
Operating Surplus Operating
Surplus
Total
Revenue
3% 3.9%

* Excludes the Trust Income adjustment

A simple interpretation is as follows.

Cash Cover (liquid funds as a percentage of annual cash operating outgoings). The incoming revenue and outgoing expenditure of an TEI never exactly match, so it needs a liquid reserve to cover a temporary gap between the two. (Suppose a government grant is a month late. The university can still pay its salaries on time by running down its liquid reserves.) TAMU recommends a Cash Cover ratio of at least 8 percent. The VUW ratio was 32.6 percent, more than four times the TAMU recommendation. We cannot tell from the accounts whether the excess is justified, but it suggests that the university may be holding too much of its assets in liquid funds and should be using some to fund buildings, and the like.

Asset Productivity (Revenue over Assets). Although described as a ‘productivity’ measure this also gives a sense of whether a university has enough assets relative to its size. TAMU recommends a minimum Asset Productivity Ratio of 40 percent. The VUW ratio was the higher 48.6 percent. Perhaps this is due to the University leasing some of its assets rather than owning them. It would also be useful to look at the ratios for other universities (after adjusting for leasing). The conclusion from this measure might be that VUW seems to have about enough assets relative to its revenue.

Return on Assets (Operating surplus as a percentage of assets – excludes the Trusts’ income adjustment). This is an important measure in a business whose purpose is to generate a return on its capital. It is less obvious that this applies for a TEI (unless one thinks it is a business) especially as a lot of the true capital of the TEI – in the staff and the students – does not appear in the financial accounts. (In any case the operating surplus is not the ultimate purpose of a tertiary TEI although, as the next criteria explains, it is a vital for the TEI’s sustainability.) TAMU set a minimum threshold of 1 percent and VUW exceeded this at 1.7 percent.

Thus far VUW has done well on all the TAMU indicators.[3] The biggie is

Operating Surplus (as a percentage of total revenue – excludes the Trusts’ income adjustment). While a TEI may not be a business it is a financial entity and it needs to run a financial surplus in most years, for at least two immediate reasons and a long run one. Some of the surplus will be used for further investment and it is also important because creditors see a surplus as ensuring that they will be paid. Without a surplus the capital will be run down, and businesses will refuse to advance goods and services except on strict cash payments terms. In the long run a TEI which failed to generate a financial surplus in most years would be have to run down its assets to fund its current activities, and would eventually have to give up – or be taken over by another TEI on humiliating terms. TAMU recommends a ratio of 3 percent, VUW attained 3.9 percent in 2002.

(While VUW comfortably exceed the target in 2002, it went though some really bad years in 1999 and 2000, when its operating surplus was negative. So much so, that its net assets at the end of 2002 were lower than they were at the end of 1998. Academics still tell of the terrible impact of the adjustment on the life of the university. They would not want to go through that again. Despite a recovery, the university spent less in 2002 than it did in 1999.)

The implication is that if TAMU sets a minium target of 3 percent, and that on occasions that will not be attained, in good years the target should be exceeded. But by how much? VUW has set its own target of Strategic Objective 16 (page 71 in the Annual Report), to

Ensure that the University generates by 2004 an annual operating surplus of at least 6 [sic] percent of revenue, in order to support enhanced capital developments and buffer against changes in the external investment.

That is double the TAMU target minimum, and is described elsewhere as a ‘medium-term strategic target’ (p.34) .Certainly any incoming Council Member, including student representatives, would want to be fully briefed and convinced that the doubling of the TAMU target minimum was a justified medium term goal.[4] It is significant for fee setting as the next few paragraphs explain.

Suppose that VUW had decided to attain its 6 percent target in 2002 and there had been no freeze on student fees. The additional revenue required is $3.6m.[5] Since all the other revenue sources were fixed, the only means of attaining the target would be to increase tuition fees. Let’s assume that the international tuition fees are already at the market maximum. (If not, why not?) Then the domestic tuition fees will have to be raised from $35.5m by $3.6m to a total of $39.1m, or by 10.1 percent.

The point of this calculation is to show that the student fees are important in determining the operating surplus for each TEI. In effect the fees are the part of revenue which covers the residual requirements of the TEI. The operating surplus target will be very influential on the level of fees.

Conclusion

The level of student fees affects the tertiary educational TEI’s revenue, operating surplus and, ultimately, financial viability and financial position. Council members need to understand the links.

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Notes
1. This is for the ‘consolidated account’, which includes Victoria Link Limited, a subsidiary of the University.
2. The $7.5m of non-current liabilities was ‘Provision for Retiring and Long Service Leave.’
3. Another useful ratio for some purposes is that of current assets to current liabilities. It was 150 percent in the 2002 accounts, which means that if all the university creditors insisted they were paid, the university had enough readily available funds to meet their requirements and would not, for instance have to raise a mortgage on a building.
4. There is a relationship between the growth of revenue, the operating surplus target, and the asset productivity. If VUW was to persist with the 6 percent target it is likely that its capital would grow faster than its revenue and asset productivity would fall.
5. The Operating Surplus excluding the Trust income adjustment amounts to $6.3m. The new Operating Surplus divided by the new Total Revenue equals (6.3 + 3.6)/(161.2 + 3.6) = 6.0 percent.

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