Valuing Immigrants: Ans Westra’s Photographs Raise Many Challenges

Listener: 31 December, 2005.

Keywords: Literature and Culture;

In the 1950s, Maori, then mainly a rural people, began their great migration into the Pakeha cities. Ans Westra, 21 years old when she arrived from Holland in 1957, photographed it.

Perhaps we all saw the Maori in the 1950s, but Westra “saw” them in a sensitive and perceptive way. Like all new immigrants, she was struck by the practices and customs of her new country. She commented, “Everything I saw on the Maori at that point was superficial, and mostly just for the tourism market – there seemed to be a whole culture out there that people were quite unaware of.” Even when later her attention turned to other moments of the day – street scenes, crowd scenes, workers, public protests – as like as not there is a mix of Maori and Pakeha in the picture. She has deposited over 100,000 of her images in the Alexander Turnbull Library,

Because of unfamiliarity, immigrants sometimes unintentionally transgress social conventions. However, these often change. Westra did that in 1964 when her school bulletin photo-essay Washday at the Pa was withdrawn from classrooms by the Minister of Education. (They were guillotined – the censors had the grace not to burn them.)

The primary complaint came from the Maori Women’s Welfare League, who thought the images of a poor Maori family in a dilapidated house were not “typical” of contemporary Maori and would have a detrimental effect on race relations. (Of course, they didn’t when the book was republished by Caxton Press.) One could accuse the league of political correctness, but it was like your mum tidying the house before the arrival of richer visitors. What was overlooked was the aroha shining, something that snobby visitors also miss.

I recently revisited the touring exhibition Handboek: Ans Westra, Photographs. Many of the pictures in the exhibition are iconic, and the rest seem familiar. But they were not when she took them. Her images made the unfamiliar commonplace. (The exhibition’s book won a 2005 Montana Book Award.)

The exhibition got me thinking about migration. The evidence about its economic benefits and costs is equivocal. Any proponent, or opponent, can present a convincing case based on anecdote, casual statistics and bad economics as to why we should, or should not, increase the numbers coming into the country. But is that the point? Should we judge everything in narrow economic terms?

Westra’s lifetime income has been substantially below the national average – we have not been generous to our artists. Suppose the immigration official who let her in those 50 years ago had told her to go back because she would lower GDP per capita. What a terrible mistake. Income does not measure a person’s value to society.

Adding to our life experiences is surely the real value of immigrants. They change the way we see the world, the way we engage with the world and the way we cele-brate our world. It is a particular issue for a small country like ours, where it is so easy to become insular and complacent, as we were about the Maori in the 1950s; it is so easy to stagnate while the world moves on. That stagnation misses exciting opportunities, as we had when the Maori came to town. Fortunately, guides like Westra alerted us to the possibilities.

How many of your friends are migrants or children of migrants? Almost a fifth of us were born overseas. What have they brought to New Zealand, and to you? Think of the difference of the life you lead from the pudding culture of the 50s when Westra (and the exhibition curator and book’s editor, Luit Bieringa) arrived. How much of it has been imported from overseas and blended into our distinct way of life? Don’t think about the economic riches – that is not a Christmas thing. Think about the richness of the life we lead.

Handboek: Ans Westra, Photographs will visit Dunedin (February 18-May 15, 2006), Leiden, Netherlands (August-September 2006) and Christchurch (March 3-June 17, 2007). Or you can read the book. A documentary of her work will be shown on TV1 in 2006, too.

The High Exchange Rate: What Is the Government Doing? What Can It Do Further?

This note was prepared for a client in mid December 2005

Keywords: Macroeconomics & Money;

Background
1. The over valued exchange rate reflects imbalances in the New Zealand economy, particularly the savings deficit.
2. It is also partly the consequences in the world economy, particularly the US government deficit.
3. New Zealand needs to end its imbalances in order to be ready when the world goes through what may be a chaotic time as it ends its imbalances.
4. There are no quick fixes The forward exchange market will dampen the effect of any policy measures.
5. There is a need to avoid rapid and drastic adjustment in order to avoid a hard landing.

What is the Government Doing?
1. The Reserve Bank is unable to carry the burden of adjustment. It is coordinating with Fiscal Policy.
2. The Governor and the Government are trying to talk down unrealistic expectations of house prices.
3. The Governor and the Government are trying to talk down unrealistic expectations of a sustainable exchange rate.
4. Higher interest rates will help slow down housing spending, and may encourage more consumer saving (although they impact unfavourably on the exchange rate in the short run).
5. Fiscal policy remains tight. The New Zealand government has one of the strongest public balance sheets in the world, and it aims to keep it that way.
6. A government expenditure review aims to reduce wasteful spending.
7. The government has various policies to increase household savings. (It should speed up their implementation.)
8. It is reviewing business taxation with an intention of encouraging business investment.

What Can the Government Do Further?
1. It is reviewing the monetary system to ensure that the international money flowing into housing and consumer debt is adequately regulated.
2. It could review the taxation system to reduce distortions in the housing investment market (with a minimum of impact on home ownership).
3. It could offer more investment opportunities in New Zealand by opening up opportunities for long term investors in SOEs.

What Else Needs to be Done?
1. There needs to be a public enquiry into the best way to measure the impact on the economy of the government’s fiscal activities. A good venue would be the Select Committee on Finance.

Dateline Hong Kong: What Will Happen to the Doha Round?

Listener: 17 December, 2005.

Keywords: Globalisation & Trade;

The World Trade Organisation Ministerial Conference, to be held in Hong Kong December 13-18, will be a desperate attempt to get the Doha Round’s trade liberalisation back on track.

The plan was that the conference would settle the framework of the proposed settlement. The details were to be filled in over 2006, for signing in 2007 before President Bush’s congressional authority ran out. But so little progress has been made that the best we can expect is another ministerial conference early next year.

The EU and the US have made offers for eliminating their export subsidies, increasing access to their domestic markets and reducing their domestic subsidies. Each says it has gone as far as it can, but the other side has not conceded enough. Japan remains as recalcitrant.

Meanwhile, the developing economies are expected to open their borders in exchange for market access. They say they are being bullied. There is much inconsistency between the rhetoric of trade liberalisation and its reality. Advocates talk about its benefits and ignore its costs: equally vociferous critics talk of its costs and don’t mention any benefits. The brutal reality is that any trade liberalisation will make some people worse off, as well as making some better off.

The offers of the EU and the US are as daring as they are allowed by their protected domestic interests. The French, following the rejection of the proposed EU constitution, are saying no to further EU concessions, and particular farm interests in the US – beef, cotton, dairy, sugar – are as adamant. The developing world’s concerns are exacerbated by potential EU concessions to the Latin Americans that could damage Caribbean and Pacific islanders.

No article can do justification to the intricate complexities that arise from the subsidies and restrictions, even one that just focuses on agriculture, and neglects timber, fish, manufacturing, services … The Doha Round is about rationalising and reducing them. But some interests will be consequently worse off. Behind this is a disturbing story involving the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

A 20-year trade dispute should have come to an end in August when Canada won a supposedly definitive ruling under NAFTA, which ordered the US to drop its punitive duties on Canadian softwood and refund the $US4 billion- odd already collected. But the US has refused to comply. Canada’s Industry Minister calls the US “hypocritical” and “a bully”. If the US treats its long-time best friend and neighbour so cavalierly, abrogating disputes procedures when it suits it, what is the value of any free-trade agreement with the US?

Yet, a world without progress on the Doha Round could be as frightening. Perhaps the main players would, after reflection, recommit themselves to improving international trading arrangements. More likely, a breakdown could lead to brutal trade wars reminiscent of the 1930s, which helped precipitate World War II. New Zealand has much to lose in such a scenario, which is why it is to be welcomed that our negotiating team in Hong Kong is bipartisan, with Tim Groser, new National MP and ex-WTO ambassador, teaming up with ministers Jim Sutton and Phil Goff and the officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

World trading arrangements are rigged against our efficient producers, depressing their prices, costing them and the New Zealand economy dearly.

Much of our growth in the past few years has been the result of the partial liberalisation from the Uruguay Round, which raised our export prices nearer to those of our heavily subsidised domestic competitors. One unpleasant (for us) outcome of the Doha Round may be the rich countries giving generous concessions to the developing ones and minimal offerings – sufficient to save face – to each other, but nothing of value to us, and their continuing to protect our competitors in order to conserve their domestic support.

But as gloomy as that prognosis is, a world without a successful round could be much worse. We have – correctly – emphasised multilateral over bilateral international relations. A world in which trading blocks and bilateral agreements predominate, with trade wars rather than the rule of law, would be treacherous for small countries. As Lee Kuan Yew, from just as small Singapore, pointed out, whether elephants make love or war, the grass still gets trampled on.

A related speech written about the same time.

Tackling the Exchange Rate

This Note was written in early December 2005, to clarify some issues in my mind about exchange rate policy

Keywords: Macroeconomics & Money;

Why is the exchange rate high. The short answer is that the New Zealand economy is badly imbalanced, and the imbalance vents through the foreign exchange market into a higher exchange rate.

There are two sorts of responses. We could try to vent it another way (inflation might be an option), or we could try to reduce the imbalances.

In my view the priority has to be reducing the endemic imbalances. The world economy is also badly imbalanced, the most obvious cause being the US fiscal deficit. Whatever the state of the New Zealand economy, it will be affected when the world economy adjusts, but the damage will be very much greater if the New Zealand economy is also imbalanced. So we need to address our imbalances before the world economy does (although I dont know how it will happen, nor when).

At the heart of the domestic imbalance is that we are spending too much and saving too little. We are forced to finance the deficit by borrowing offshore. That drives up interest rates to attract foreign capital, and the exchange rate. the focus has to be on the savings deficit.

The implication here is that what the Reserve Bank does, is not nearly as important as in the public rhetoric which is about quick fixes, rather than addressing the savings deficit. As it happens, I think that the Reserve Bank policy framework is flawed, and said so when it was introduced in the 1980s, persistently criticising it through the 1990s. One day we will get a better framework, but that will take time.

(My concerns are that monetary policy cannot regulate the economy by itself, and in any case given the limited range of policy instruments it has – one, the OCR, plus rhetoric – it has only a limited capacity to attack complicated macroeconomic issues.)

I do favour the operational transparency provisions in the Reserve Bank Act, and would not want to see them revoked. Rather, when they were introduced in the late 1980s a number of monetarist assumptions were slipped in, which need to be reviewed. There is some good news here. One assumption was that monetary policy could operate independently of fiscal policy, overriding its failures. It cant. Today, there is much greater cooperation between the Reserve Bank and the Treasury. The Labour government deserves credit for this.

What about fiscal policy? A coherent macroeconomic policy requires that if private savings are insufficient, the government’s income and spending plans have to offset them by extra public saving. (There is also a strategic reason. When the economy fractures because of the imbalances – international or local – the public will demand that the government steps in and helps it get over its earlier foolish decisions, a demand which will be partly politically irresistible. So the sensible thing is for the public sector to have an especially strong balance sheet in preparedness.)

The New Zealand public balance sheet is one of the strongest in the world: long may it remain so. However, it took on water during the election, as irresponsible National tax and spending proposals were countered by Labour, while the coalition agreements seem to have added a little more to the water logging.

What the government has to do now is to restrain its spending (even if it had no plans for future income tax cuts). This is going to be harder than it might seem because not only are there political pressures, but also because there has to be major outlays on public infrastructure over the next few years. The public expenditure review is a part of this strategy (although it wont cut that much), certainly not as much as was promised by the National Party during the election campaign.

So the short answer on fiscal policy is to restrain everyone’s natural desire to spend more and tax less. We are lucky that we have a Prime Minister and a Minister of Finance who are fiscal conservatives. They need all the support they can get.

What else can be done? The household sector needs to be encouraged to increase its savings. So any incentive measures the government has in train might be accelerated.

There appears to be two specific, but connected, problem areas. The first is housing, where outlays seem excessive, driving a housing construction boom and driving up housing prices. The Reserve Bank and the government are trying to reduce expectations of house price increases. My impression is that housing prices are peaking, so their cautions may have some effect.

Additionally, I’d be looking at taxation on housing. I was surprised last week to hear a couple of respected business leaders privately regretting the way household savings are going into houses rather than businesses: both advocated capital gains taxes on second homes. They are not advocating publicly (yet) and (yet) it is easier for them to say so than the politicians. Even so it would be sensible to check tax law on housing, to see if any tightening, including removal of those which encourage commercial exploitation of loopholes. even if only on the margin. Small changes may contribute out of proportion to restraining the boom.

The other problem area is the consumer spending funded by debt, sometimes secured on housing. The debt finance (for mortgages and general consumer spending) is generally funded from overseas, through a conduit provided by banks and other financial institutions.

The banks are not behaving irresponsibly, for they make money from this conduit. However, the outcome of increasing consumer debt is irresponsible household balance sheets. Hence, the arm wrestling between the trading banks and the Reserve Bank. There may be some financial measures which would restrain this consumer lending, although I doubt we would (or could) go back to hire purchase.

Meanwhile, the cost of consumer finance is rising, not only as the Reserve Bank pushes up short term interest rates, but also as foreign investors allow for the downside risk of a fall in the exchange rate. I must say I am pessimistic about finance costs restraining consumer debt although it will restrain the housing market.

The other potential domestic saver is the business sector. The government is reviewing business taxation. I would place a priority in a regime which encourages business to retain profits.

Second, some local investors are portfolio investing overseas because of the limited opportunities in New Zealand. Such investments add to the amount of cash which flows through the foreign exchange market, which has to be offset by borrowing from overseas sources, increasing gross foreign borrowing, and pushing up the exchange rate. (Note I am discussing here portfolio investment, not foreign direct investment.) Can we increase portfolio investment opportunities in New Zealand, thereby encouraging New Zealand savings to stay home and reducing gross overseas borrowing?

Why not let private investors in state owned enterprises. This is how to do it.
1. The government makes a clear statement why public ownership of SOEs is appropriate.
2. It identifies those SOEs where cornerstone ownership is appropriate – that is where it is the largest, usually majority owner – but where total ownership is not necessary.
3. It offers to sell down its shares to the cornerstone level, to long term investors – such as pension funds, the Cullen Fund, GSF, ACC – who thereby switch some of their investments from offshore to onshore, reducing the need for gross foreign borrowing.
4. It will have to make some other concessions such as minority representation on the board, registration of shares on the share market, and some access to CCMAU.

The sort of SOEs I have in mind are like Air New Zealand, Railtrack, Transpower. I would not included those SOEs which have social objectives (or a primarily funded by the government) but are held in a corporate form for convenience (including TVNZ, RNZ, DHBs CRIs, …). I would not include the electricity generation companies, until the sector is sorted out. (My definition of SOEs is wider here than the legal one. A longer paper would have to be more precise, but for political purposes it has to be clear there are no go areas.)

The advantage to the investors, are they are substantial companies, with a solid effective owner, likely to make good returns over the years.

In summary there are no quick fixes,. Addressing the imbalances requires a spectrum of measures, some of which are being implemented and others which could be introduced without too great difficulty.

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A Small New Zealand in a Big World

Presentation to the Browning Institute, of Public Affairs forum “The WTO in Hong Kong: Make or break time for neo-liberalism?”, 14th of December, McKenzie Room, St John’s in the City, Wellington.

Keywords: Globalisation & Trade;

If New Zealanders are to do what they say they want to do, the New Zealand economy is going to have to specialise in what it is good at, to obtain the dynamic economies of scale which give the high productivity which can underpin New Zealanders’ desire for a rich, sustainable and varied material and non-material life. The New Zealand economy will then have to trade much of what it specialises in, for that which it cannot produce so well. That rules out autarchy and puts us squarely into a world of international economic engagement.

Because New Zealand is small, its best trading strategy is multilateralist, that is as a part of a interconnected world where trading relations are regulated by the rule of law, based on mutual agreement. We are not big enough to be able to go unilateralist, and a bilateral arrangement would be akin to that between a colony and an imperial power, as occurred when we were a member of the British Empire. Multilateralism in international economic affairs parallels our multilateralism in political and security affairs.

The existing multilateralist economic regime is under the World Trade Organisation. The WTO is not perfect, but it is the best we have, and it has, I believe, the opportunity of improving. It is a bit like the nascent democracies of the past. They were dominated by bullies (unilateralists and imperialists); they were often unjust, and imposed unfair practices on the weak. But over the centuries the bullies got reigned in, there were some reductions in injustices, and the lot of the weak improved relative to the bullies. The same applies for the WTO regime. It is far from perfect – there is still too much room for bullies – but it can get better if we work at it. A better alternative to the WTO is not obvious.

The Doha Round is a part of the way of improving it. But much of the rhetoric about it and international trade is nonsensical – from all sides.

First, trade liberalisation does not give a big boost to economic activity in the short run. That means it wont reduce poverty much in the short run either.

Second, the short run impact of trade liberalisation is to give large benefits to some groups at the expense of large costs to others, especially those who have to be redeployed as their work closes down after losing protection.

Third, much of the posturing going on is how to ensure each country can maximise its benefits from a partial trade liberalisation. One substantial beneficiary from the round could be New Zealand. One estimate is the ending of export subsidies will raise the return on our beef by 8.4 percent, sheepmeats by 18.0 percent, and raw milk by 17.1 percent.* This is because the bullies have rigged the world trading system against New Zealand farmers. They have also rigged the system against developing world cotton producers and sugar producers.

Fourth, the big gains from the Doha Round are in the medium run, when the dynamic effects of specialisation become effective. Trade from that source has been a major promoter of growth and development of medium and small size economies, and of regions in large economies. Not all countries will benefit (in proportion). China is likely to be the biggest beneficiary. Some may suffer, especially if they cock up their responses to the opportunities a more liberal trade regime offers. The bullies may help them to do so.

We need to be clear about the consequences of a failed Doha Round. It could be business as usual. It could be a renewed effort to progress the rule of law. However the most likely outcome would be a breakdown in the world trading system. There are still unilateralist imperialist bullies, and countries like New Zealand could be forced into bilateral colonialist deals. The spectre which haunts economists is the breakdown which occurred in the 1930s, contributing to the slide to the Second World War.

The issue is how to progress the world trading regime. It is easy to say the WTO is terrible and the Doha Round is worse – that may be even partially true. But what is the progressive alternative?

A related column written about the same time.

* An analysis of agricultural trade policy reforms and their impact on the EU, China and New Zealand by Caroline Saunders, Anita Wreford and Shanika Rasin

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Reason for Treason to Be Forgot

A response to a comment by Rosalie Sugrue in Broadsheet: The Newsletter of the Churches’ Agency on Social Issues, December 2005 (Issue 105).

Keywords: Literature and Culture;

In my youth, Guy Fawkes was more explicit on the Fifth of November than today, often with a dummy of the guy being pushed round in a wheelbarrow. We sung jingles like “Please remember/The Fifth of November/With gunpowder treason and plot/I see no reason/Why gunpowder treason/Should ever be forgot’.

Our neighbours did not celebrate Guy Fawkes Day. I vaguely knew it was something about them being Roman Catholics, but the issue became clear during my first November the Fifth in England with an article by a Jesuit in the Sunday paper, arguing the conventional history of the event was wrong. I dont recall the details, but Guy Fawkes Day celebrates the thwarting of an alleged Roman Catholic Plot against a Protestant Parliament.

This was reinforced by the celebration in Lewes, where I lived. During the regime of Mary I, six Protestants had been martyred there, and there is a memorial to them on the hill above the small Sussex town. The town makes a thing of Guy Fawkes night. Bonfire Societies spend the year organising for the big event , which includes rolling burning barrels, representing bishops, into the River Ouse below. It is essentially an anti-Papist demonstration, although four centuries after the event only one of the bonfire societies was explicitly so.

Later I realised the event is a continuation of a pagan celebration, for it ends with great bonfires around the hills of Lewes, to strengthen the sun as the gloom of winter covers the land. The ritual continued for hundreds of years after the local people had officially become Christians. Presumably it was transmuted into the Protestant celebration which we now recognise. I have no problem with such continuities, but I am certain we should not tolerate any religious intolerance.

Arguably the anti-Papist dimension of the celebration has all but disappeared. The grandchildren of the neighbours probably join in the fireworks display like the rest of us. But what is the point of it all? I have no problem with a public party, but why on November the Fifth, apparently celebrating an even that occurred four hundred years ago, on the other side of the world, in a manner most of us today would find distasteful if we thought much about it.

If we want to have a public display of fireworks about that time of the year, it is surely should be the evening before the second Sunday in October when Daylight Saving is introduced. Anyone with little children knows that keeping them up that extra hour on November the Fifth to see the fire works after dark is a trial. Doing it three weeks earlier is not so much about the sun going down a little earlier, but that whole hour before daylight saving is introduced. So why not the fireworks on the Second Saturday of October, telling the little ones that this will mean the sun will go to bed an hour later from tomorrow? (They’ll believe that like they believe in Father Christmas.)

Rosalie Sugrue suggests we shift the display to Matariki, the Maori New Year, in late May or early June. But the shift is too big to work. (Not to mention the weather, although the fire risk will be lower then than November: it will be a bit lower in October too.)

But we also need to be careful not to appropriate a Maori concept because we cant do think of anything by ourselves. That is just as subservient colonialism as adopting a ritual from the other side of the world and millennium. If the Maori would like to celebrate Matariki then super, especially as in their generosity they’ll invite us to join in. But it is for they to give the lead.

So here’s to a fireworks display the night before daylight saving begins. And if the Maori want to recall the day that the demigod Maui and his whanau slowed the sun, then that is a story we can all tell to all our mokopuna too.

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The Rise and Fall Of Department Stores:why Did They Come Unstuck?

Listener: 3 December, 2005.

Keywords: Business & Finance;

Once in the heart of our cities were department stores. Many readers will have visited them as children, accompanied by mother, aunt or grandmother. Perhaps you played in the children’s area while they were shopping. There was the excitement of the lift with its own operator, and one even had an escalator that was so grand to ride. And sometimes – not always, and you had to be especially good – you were taken to the graciously tableclothed tearoom for orange cordial and a generous slice of that very special cake.

Until adults point it out, children live in a gender-free world. I did not realise that department stores were women’s zones. In a world where men went to work and women stayed at home, shops were for women. Department stores were so segregated, according to Helen Laurenson’s Going Up, Going Down: The rise and fall of the department store, that the men had discreet separate entrances to their clothing departments. One of the few stores left, Kirks on Lambton Quay, still has its men’s clothing entrance tucked away on a sidestreet.

Many will read the book for its delightful evocation of a past era. But, as its subtitle reminds us, there has been a rise, followed by a fall of department stores. An economist has to ask why.

Such questions are often answered with the implicit assumption that department stores were the norm, destroyed by some evil spirit. It may be more helpful to ask why the various departments – manchester, mercery, hosiery, haberdashery, mantles, millinery, napery, lingerie … – lived under the same roof. What was the glue that stuck them together?

Some of the glue was credit. Remember how Mum had an account there? Today you use a credit card. The building was another costly capital item. Nowadays, it is owned by some property development company or pension fund, rather than the shop. Import licences were important between 1938 and the 1980s, privileging those who had them, and discouraging new entrants.

Laurenson draws attention to another glue. Before television and all that, how did one know what was the fashion? Your department store followed overseas trends carefully, set them here, and told you. That was why they were competing in the bigger cities, for each serviced a different social group. That’s why your mum went to one or two but not others. (I thought it was the playroof.)

Some argue that department stores failed when shopping moved to the suburbs. But they survive there transformed. The shopping mall is the modern department store, with the children’s area in the arcade, and the separate departments and tearooms as independent shops. Each depends on the judgment of individual entrepreneurs rather than the departmental store management – and come and go depending on the quality of that judgment. The malls meet the needs of many more social groups. I recently walked through one, with my daughter identifying the customers of each clothing shop – by age, by occupation, by taste, by purpose (work, informal, sport, evening …). There is a whole range of knowledge that we men have little access to: Laurenson’s book helps.

The decentralisation of department store management to individual shops reminds us that management was, and probably remains, key. Perhaps that is why a few stores left survive, often targeting the premium market.

Department stores are not the only example of businesses that came unglued. Stock and station agents depended on credit to keep a wide diversity of activities together. As farmers obtained alternative sources of finance with the monetary liberalisation of the 1980s, the agents lost activities to independent providers because the farmers were no longer tied into buying from their credit supplier. Now there is only one left.

So, although we might be nostalgic about department stores (and in the case of a few farm families, their stock and station agent who helped them through the Depression), changes in capital markets, in international communications and management practices, together with increasing social heterogeneity, have led to new ways to meet our needs. But one retains a soft spot for the tablecloth, the cordial and that cake.

On the Future Of the Sociology Profession in New Zealand

Response to Paul Spoonley’s Paper, SAANZ conference, 27 November 2005

Keywords: History of Ideas, Methodology & Philosophy;

Let me begin by saying that while I welcome Paul’s paper, it suffers from a major deficiency when it claims that sociology should be a core social science discipline, but does not define the subject. When I was at the University of Sussex, the social sciences scrapped vigorously between themselves as to their importance and their relationships. Sociology was one, but even a subject led by Tom Bottomore had difficulties defining what was its core. My observation of New Zealand sociology – say characterised by the subject of papers at this conference – is that it would have considerable difficulties defining a core here too: defining the minimum that a graduate sociologist should know. I may be wrong, but to the outsider sociology often seems social studies, which is a subject, not a discipline.

Let me put the issue this way. Does sociology teaching think of itself like classics which prepares a mind to tackle a wide range of problems? Or does it think of itself like economics which is organized around the concern of how to deal with scarce resources, the response to which is useful for tackling a wide range of problems? If so what are those organising principles? Paul leaves the issue open, but unless it is addressed, the future of sociology cannot be.

Suppose it is. At this point some of the parallel experience of economics in New Zealand seem relevant. For academic economics, like sociology, has been shrinking, despite the expansion of business courses. As for sociology some of this shrinkage is misleading, for there are graduate economists teaching in other university departments – health, natural resources, business studies and so on – although much of that teaching is embarrassingly bad, by those who could not get a job in an economics department because they are not good enough, and go where standards are more easily compromised. There are exceptions: I first knew Peter Davis when he was in a sociology department, have watched with pleasure his progress through the sociology of health, and am delighted to see him back as a professor of sociology.

Economics has already penetrated into a number of occupations and institutions. It is – with accounting – at the core of Treasury, and central to other government departments in a way in which sociology is not, but Paul wants it to be. So desperate are the departments for economists they will hire mediocre ones.

Outside the public service there are opportunities for economists in consultancy, local government, in secondary school teaching, in so-called think tanks, and some industries such as banking. And, of course, some economics graduates leave the profession.

Is economics is more successful than sociology? One measure estimated only 167 economists in tertiary institutions while there were 248 sociologists together with those in social policy, social work and gender studies – not all of whom may be trained sociologists though.

Moreover, much of the work New Zealand economists do is of poor quality. We suffer from pop economics, just as we suffer from pop sociology. I am not willing to speculate on sociology, but the roots of poor quality economics start in the academy – in the university teaching.

Another area of poor quality work, endemic in the academy, is public policy. Having written four books on the topic, numerous reports, and having earned my much of my living in the area, I can say this with some confidence. Public policy is a separate discipline, although it makes use of other social sciences. It is not a matter of attaching the term ‘social policy’ or ‘public policy’ to your department, and getting a few hacks without practical experience to teach from the rather bad US and British textbooks. If sociology wants to move into social policy, it is going to have to think very carefully about what the discipline of sociology is, what the discipline of public policy is, and how they relate. Academics, in particular, are going to have to stop being dismissive about public policy and work hard to understand it.

The same is true for economics.

The Social Critic in New Zealand

Keynote address to the 2005 Conference of the Sociology Association of Aotearoa New Zealand, 25 November, The Eastern Institute of Technology, Napier. [1]

Keywords: History of Ideas, Methodology & Philosophy; Political Economy & History;

In Samuel Beckett’s Waiting for Godot, the tramps abuse one another: ‘Moron!’, ‘Vermin!’, ‘Abortion!’, “Louse!’, ‘Sewer-rat!’, ‘Curate!’. Then Estragon says with finality ‘Critic!’. All Vladimir can reply is ‘Oh!’. The text says ‘He wilts, vanquished and turns away’.

Yet, Karl Popper argues that the critic is the key to progress, because it is only by ruthlessly criticising existing knowledge can we move onto new and better understandings. His exposition is usually thought to apply to scientific knowledge, but his Open Society and Its Enemies makes clear he thinks this is also true for social knowledge.

However, any Popperian critique of society typically subverts the existing social knowledge – the ‘conventional wisdom’. This knowledge is not merely some abstract theory. It is also integral to the social group’s existence, to its cohesiveness and understanding of itself. Under threat from a critic, the group will be as abusive as Estragon.

This is certainly true in New Zealand. Today I want to explain why the social critic is so important, and yet why we are so dismissive of her or him. Even so, I want to encourage those who have the inclination to participate in the thankless task of social criticism, and for the rest I implore they are more supportive of it, than we have been in the past.

The Popperian critic is a public intellectual whose function, according to Edward Said “is to represent a message or view not only to, but for, a public and to do so as an outsider, someone who cannot be co-opted by a government or corporation.” (Representations of the Intellectual) Not all ‘brain-workers’ are intellectuals. Indeed most occupational-intellectuals are not, because they are insiders typically loyally working for the government or corporations.

There is less difference between Beckett and Popper than at first appears. Beckett’s play was challenging the conventional wisdom – of the conventions of the theatre and, even more pointedly, of our very understandings of the meaning of our existence. He is actually one of the critics who Popper and Said acclaim. So Beckett is not implicitly abusing such ‘critics’, but those who are defending the conventional wisdom – who found Waiting for Godot outrageous because it challenged the verities upon which their lives were comfortingly and confidently based.

The Conventional Wisdom

The term ‘conventional wisdom’ was coined in John Kenneth Galbraith’s Affluent Society. He begins by arguing that economic and social phenomena do “not conform to a simple and coherent patterns” and “often seem incoherent, inchoate and intellectually frustrating”. He goes on

“Because economic and social phenomena are so forbidding, or at least seem so, and because they yield few hard tests of what exists and what does not, they afford to the individual a luxury not given to physical phenomena. Within a considerable range he [or she] is permitted to believe what he [or she] pleases …
As a consequence, in the interpretation of all social life there is a persistent and never-ending competition between what is relevant and what is merely acceptable. In this competition while strategic advantage lies with what exists, all tactical advantage is with the acceptable. Audiences of all kinds most applaud what they like best. And in social comment the test of audience approval, far more than the test of truth, comes to influence comment. …

Just as truth ultimately serves to create a consensus, so in the short run does acceptability. Ideas come to be organised around what the community as a whole or particular audiences find acceptable. …

Numerous factors contribute to the acceptability of ideas. To a very large extent, of course, we associate truth with convenience – with what most closely accords with self interest and individual well being or promises best to avoid awkward effort or unwelcome dislocation of life. We also find highly acceptable what contributes to self esteem. … Economic and social behaviour are complex and mentally tiring. Therefore we adhere, as though to a raft, to those ideas which represent our understanding. This is the prime manifestation of vested interest. For a vested interest in understanding is more preciously guarded than any other treasure. … Familiarity may breed contempt in some areas of human behaviour, but in the field of social ideas it is the touchstone of acceptability.

Because familiarity is such an important test of acceptability, the acceptable ideas have great stability. They are highly predictable. … “ (p.17-18, Penguin 1962)

And, I would add, that predictability is also comforting.

As much as there is to admire in Galbraith’s insight, he underplays two major features of the conventional wisdom. First, he suggests that there is a consensus, whereas society is fragmented and each fragment or social group has its own conventional wisdom. Second, the stability that Galbraith observes is temporary. Conventional wisdoms change over time, not rapidly and certainly behind the changing facts they purport to explain. But change they do.

Many Conventional Wisdoms

Why did Galbraith think the conventional wisdom was an ‘exceedingly broad’ consensus? The Harvard professor was focusing on the understandings of the elite. Despite the pretence of conflict over principle, the elite has a lot of commonalities.

However in society as a whole there are many social groups, each of which has its own understandings. The groups overlap, so the understandings overlap, but nevertheless they can be distinct.

One such group, with a distinctive conventional wisdom, which has recently been raised to prominence is the ‘mainstream’. A curiosity is that its main spokesmen – and I am conscious of the gender of the noun – belong more to the elite than to the group for whom they purport to speak. This is possible because while the concerns of the elite are not the same as those of the other group, the elite needs the support of what it calls ‘the mainstream’.

This becomes more insidious, if one recalls that the term ‘mainstream’ was used a couple of decades ago by the rogernomes – the advocates of neoliberal policies – to claim that their account of economic theory was the internationally dominant one. That was demonstrably untrue, but the effect of the claim was to mislead those unfamiliar with modern economics.

There is no simple economic mainstream. It was, and is, more like a braided river, with a left bank and a right bank and many channels down which economics flows. To say otherwise is to misrepresent how economics developed. This is as true for claims there is a social mainstream. Of course there are some commonalities across all the streams. Commonalities are important and what make us a nation or a part of humankind. But the differences are also important.

The claims of a ‘mainstream’ perspective have been promoted most recently in relation to the issue of political correctness. That is a topic in itself, but I would be failing here were I not to say something about the issue from the point of view of a Popperian critic.

As Galbraith set out, within every social group there is a tendency not to challenge – not to criticise – some of its beliefs. Of course we dont have the time and expertise to evaluate all of them, but in some instances we dont try because it is – well – not politically correct. Too often they are lazily and uncritically repeated without any evaluation, on the basis that if the group says they are true, they must be.

We often do so out of a solidarity with the group, perhaps because we hope we are supporting it, perhaps because it seems oppressed. But even though it may deserve empathy, it does not need uncritical support. To give that is to do the group a disservice. It deserves the best analysis each of us can give it. To do otherwise is to condemn the group to an intellectual wasteland and the likelihood of severe disruption when it is confronted with reality.

I cannot justify much of the tenor of Don Brash’s 2004 Orewa speech, but it did confront the Maori community and its friends with a lot of their sloppy thinking, which had been tolerated, because it was considered politically incorrect to challenge it. I only wish that the quality of the Brash critique had been higher, for it was just as sloppy as that which it was criticising.

Political correctness – the unwillingness to criticise certain understandings for political reasons – is an anathema to the Popperian critic. But it is a general anathema. There is no group which is privileged by not being subject to such criticism. However, the public intellectual is likely to concentrate upon the conventional wisdom of the elite – I shall call it the ‘establishment wisdom’ – and any designated mainstream consort, because that dominates the public discussion.

The Conventional Wisdom Through Time

Not only do different social groups have different social understandings, but those understandings change through time. This raises a severe difficulty for the conventional wisdom, since its central notion is that its truth is incontestable. This is quite different from science, whose position is that ‘this is our best understanding but we shall progress’.

In the case of the conventional social wisdom, any challenge is not simply about the relative merits of two ideas. Those ideas are central to the existence of the group, and to the authority of the group’s leadership. Challenging them is challenging the leadership, which is so afraid of the consequence of challenges that it tends to prohibit all of them. So the conventional wisdom ends up, as Galbraith reminds us, with an inconsistency between reality and its social understanding.

I illustrate my proposition with a couple of examples from my own research. The first involves asking the simple question: Which New Zealand port is the second to biggest joint exporter and importer of goods by value? For the record, the biggest export port for the last four years has been the port of Tauranga. But it is not a big importer. Ports of Auckland is now the second to biggest export port, and remains the biggest import port. The number two external port is our second largest import port and third largest export port. It’s about half the size of the Ports of Auckland. It is the Auckland International Airport.

You may think this a trivial pursuits question. I got interested in it because of the importance of air cargo in a globalising world with diminishing costs of distance. I raise it here because the airport has been our second most important external port – even ignoring tourism – for the fifteen years back to 1990 for which data is available. I doubt that this fact threatens the integrity of the establishment wisdom, but it illustrates how a gap between reality and perception can persist for long periods.

So let’s try a more substantial question. What proportion of exports by value today are from the pastoral sector? For the record, forty years ago, over 90 percent of exports were the products from sheep and cows. The proportion today is about a quarter.

The frequently quoted figure, of 55 percent or so, is constructed the following way. First it covers all farm exports including horticulture, and not just those from the pastoral sector. Second it includes forestry and, sometimes, fishing. Third, it ignores service exports, including our single biggest export sector, tourism. In fact farm-based exports – not just farm exports because over half of the value is added after the farm gate – are around 40 percent of export receipts. That they are vitally important to New Zealand is no reason to exaggerate their statistics.

I dont need to explain today, why the establishment wisdom is reluctant to acknowledge the reduced significance of the farm sector which dominated New Zealand from the late nineteenth century to past the middle of the twentieth. I was confronted by this fact because any serious account of the events of the late twentieth century has to recognise the enormous structural change in the New Zealand political economy.

The change in the economic mechanisms, the way in which the economy is regulated, which occurred in the 1980s was not because of the wickedness of Rob Muldoon, nor because the previous mode of economic regulation had been fundamentally wrong. Rather, the economic structure changed, and the economic mechanism had to change with it. Many of the critics of those changes have been just as blind as the proponents. Both ignore the changing structure.

Ignoring structural change has limited our understanding of economic development. Treasury’s work today focuses on a single-sector/single commodity economy. Of course such a simple model is simpler to analyse. But it misses the fundamental feature that an economy does not grow evenly, but different components grow at different rates. The lesson is that if one does not think ruthlessly and rigorously about an issue, one may overlook its most salient feature.

An Experiment

Bear with me by sharing in an experiment, although announcing it may ruin the test. I begin by asking what proportion of the New Zealand population is ethnically Maori? The usual answer is around 15 percent, a figure derived from the 2001 Population Census when 14.7 percent responded by ticking the Maori category.

Responses to questions about one’s ethnicity are self-ascribed and subjective. The census allows more than one response to ethnicity. Some 11.4 per cent of New Zealanders give more than one ethnic affiliation. Of those in the Census who said they were Maori, 44.0 percent, or 6.5 percent of the total population, said they had another ethnicity, a far higher proportion than any other major ethnic group. Only 8.2 percent of the population described themselves as of solely Maori ethnicity.

Why do we use the 14.7 percent figure rather than the 8.2 one? The technical reason is that until recently Statistics New Zealand used a ‘prioritisation’ criteria for allocating each New Zealander to an ethnic category. Those who classified themselves as Maori were put in the Maori category, even if they said they belonged to other ethnicities too. Those who classified themselves as Pasifika, were so classified, providing they had not also classified themselves as Maori. Those who classified themselves as Asian were so classified, unless they classified themselves as Maori or Pasifika. The same principle applied to the small ‘Other’ category. Finally there is the European category – Statistics New Zealand does not use ‘Pakeha’ in its Census returns – which is the residual of those who only classified themselves as European with no other joint ethnicity..

So the frequently quoted 72.8 percent of New Zealanders of European ethnicity ignores those who say they are of European ethnicity and something else. The totality – the figure comparable to the 14.7 of Maori – is actually 80.1 percent. But if we use this convention of double counting of people with two or more ethnicities there is an over-count of 14 percent of the population.

While trying to sort out this statistical problem, I discovered that the data became tractable if I created an ethnic category of Maori-Pakeha, that is the 5.9 percent who claimed to be both Maori and European. That reduces the over-count to 2.7 percent of the population, and that can be easily absorbed by mild averaging.

It turns out that my new scoring solution also affects how we might think about ethnicity. Basically I am proposing a new ethnic category, Maori-Pakeha, a name chosen rather than Pakeha-Maori which was used in the nineteenth century for Europeans who lived as Maori. I am not inventing a new ethnicity, merely making such people visible in our statistics. It has been there all the time, a group who think of themselves as neither Maori nor Pakeha but both. Like a Möbius band they see the two as an integrated whole. For while we may see the terms as two sides of the paper, the twist is such that the ethnicities belong to the same side. To label Maori-Pakeha in the data as Maori, is insulting to them, because they do not think of them as just ‘Maori’. It would be equally insulting to label them as just ‘Pakeha’.

We have had this statistical problem for about twenty years – basically how to get a column to sum to 100 percent. It is a nice illustration of Gilling’s Law ‘how you score the game, shapes the way it is played’. The way we have measured ethnicity has affected the way we think about ethnic relations, encouraging a crude and divisive biculturalism, ignoring the more subtle, more nuanced account like the one being expressed by the Maori-Pakeha themselves.

This change will not be welcomed by the conventional wisdom of the establishment, nor by their mainstream, nor by the dominant rhetoric in the Maori world. The existence of a Maori-Pakeha group has the potential to explain various phenomena in the politics of ethnicity which today we gloss over because they contradict our conventional wisdom. I would further argue that it provides a way forward to resolve some of the difficulties we are having with ethnic relations, which have to be openly confronted since Brash’s 2004 Orewa speech..

So what is the experiment? I have proposed a redefinition of ethnicity which resolves a technical problem, but also changes our perception of ethnicity. I may be wrong, but suppose this is progress. Just how long will it be before the notion of a Maori-Pakeha ethnic group is adopted by the conventional wisdom? And to what extent will the adoption of such a group into the national rhetoric be the result of the latest fashion, and to whar extent it will arise from careful research and analysis.

The Role of the Critic

I have given three examples of disjunction between reality and the establishment wisdom’s portrayal of a reality which, at best, is out of date, and at worse is damaging economic and social thinking. Such disjunctions provide a justification for the Popperian critic, whose task is to reconcile the perception and reality.

Since the conventional wisdom does not want to be out of touch, it will encourage criticism providing it is not too threatening. As Shakespeare’s Caesar said of Cassius: ‘He thinks too much: such men are dangerous.’

Instead there is a court following of pseudo-intellectuals, who are expert at mouthing platitudes, sounding wise to the unwary. One, also a bank director, once said to me ‘Interest rates look interesting. They will go up or down, dont you think?’

The court followers include gatekeepers whose function is to prevent serious discussion. Typically, early in their adult life they wrote a paper on some topic, which the establishment wisdom favoured. Rapid promotion followed. Nowadays they do no original thinking at all. But when the establishment wisdom wants to discuss something they go to the gatekeeper for comforting advice, albeit hopelessly out of date. This blocks any serious discussion on the topic, especially as the gatekeeper has a personal and positional interest in discouraging criticism.

The rule is never to quote the work of serious New Zealand critics, and frequently not even to read it. There are establishment research papers which make obvious – even laughable – errors that were resolved decades earlier, but alas by those outside the charmed circle.

Insofar as it practises peer review, the establishment carefully choses friends, or overseas commentators, who are rarely as good as claimed. As Bruce Jesson said, ‘New Zealand’s lack of intellectual vitality has always been related to its background of colonialism: lacking ideas of their own, New Zealanders have imported them wholesale and uncritically from overseas.’ (Fragments of Labour, p.12). One might add that citing overseas sources is a part of the tall poppy syndrome of not celebrating local intellectual success. As an earlier intellectual said “A prophet is not without honour except in his own country”.

The consequence is the endemically low quality of intellectual work for the establishment. They dont even know how low its quality is. A number of university departments were surprised how badly they performed in the recent PBRF exercise. You cant be more mediocre than not to know you are third rate. The ignorance is compounded, by the pseudo-intellectuals telling the non-expert how good they are, and so the poor quality becomes the standard conventional wisdom. One is constantly reminded of M. K. Joseph’s “That we may avoid distinction and exception/ Worship the mean, cultivate the mediocre.” (Secular Litany)

And, as Galbraith points out, the establishment wisdom is self-serving. Unlike a scientific paradigm, it is not simply an account of the world. It has the purpose of justifying the authority of those who promote it. Any rigorous criticism threatens that authority.

The Critic and New Zealand

One hundred years ago André Siegfried wrote that New Zealanders’

“… outlook, not too carefully reasoned, and no doubt scornful of scientific thought, makes them incapable of self distrust. Like almost all men of action they have a contempt for theories: yet they are often captured by the first theory that turns up, if it is demonstrated to them with an appearance of logic sufficient to impose upon them. In most cases they do not seem to see difficulties, and they propose simple solutions for the most complex problems with astonishing audacity.” (Democracy in New Zealand)

Siegfried’s observation was not the first time this frailty of New Zealanders was observed. Samuel Butler’s observed that Erewhonians

“are a meek and long-suffering people, easily led by the nose, and quick to offer up common sense … when a philosopher arises among them.” (Erewhon)

Nor was Siegfried’s observation the last time. The most famous has been the extremist seizure of economic policy in the 1980s. As I have already argued, there was a need to change the economic mechanism, following the structural changes which began in the late 1960s. However New Zealanders with their contempt for theories were captured by the first theory that turned up.

It proved to be a bad one, as the subsequent economic performance shows. In every one of the six years from 1987 to 1993 there was falling output per person, the longest period of economic stagnation in our recorded history (although not as deep as the shorter Great Depression of the 1930s). In those years, New Zealand fell from being slightly above the OECD average in the GDP per capita stakes to near 20 percent below.

Instructively, the establishment wisdom does not address this fall. Ignoring it has led to the absurd demands that with the aim of returning to the top half of the OECD, we should introduce policies which look remarkably like those that dropped us out of the top half when applied in the 1980s. The conventional wisdom is not renowned for learning from experience.

Less obvious was the suppression of the critics of these ill-thought-through policies. Lenin said the first thing after the revolution was to shoot the intellectuals. New Zealand is more civilised. Jesson reports ‘techniques ranged from the withdrawal of research funds, the use of patronage, to crossing people off Christmas party lists.’ (Fragments of Labour, p.55) Few protested.

The politics of the 1980s involved a revolution – really a coup in which one elite was replaced by another. The introduced policies were not only a part of the coup, shifting power from the old to the new, but they also shifted income and wealth from the population at large to the new elite.

In contrast to the sharp changes in political governance by parliament or council following an election, there is considerable continuity in the elite. A recent Christchurch Press series on the powerful in Canterbury contained family names which would have been in earlier lists, although in different industries indicative of the structural change. Those familiar with their local communities could tell the same story,

Thus there was considerable continuity between the elite before 1984 and after 1993. But as one of their spokespersons, Roger Kerr, said not without pride, “The average age of chief executives of major companies has dropped ten years.” (Spicer et al 1992:74) The inter-generational coup required a change of rhetoric, of the establishment wisdom. Today’s elite is trapped by it, while events have moved on. It needs a new rhetoric but it has not the firepower to create one. Nor will it allow others the means to do so.

It is not merely a matter of the failure of past economics, nor of the economic and social changes that have happened since. A public appalled by the coup seized the initiative and imposed MMP.

New Zealand has been what Bruce Jesson called a ‘hollow’ society, where, with few exceptions, the institutions for wielding power arose out of the state rather the people, who put their faith in the government to protect and promote their interests. For most of New Zealand’s history that trust was returned. However the structure of governance was like a fort with a wall and guns aimed outside to protect those inside. Once the enemies of the people captured the guns, they turned them inward, and – well – we got the massacres we call Rogernomics and Ruthanasia.

MMP is essentially a procedure to control those who man the guns, but it does not fill the hollowness in New Zealand society. It is beginning to be filled by institutions which have some independence of the government. The most obvious is the business sector, which was liberated by Rogernomics. But it hardly comes out of the people. More promising are the iwi, and the unions which survived the ECA onslaught.

I am not sure about the universities. They claim to be institutions independent of the state, and are not as dependent upon public funding as they were. But are they sufficiently independent to be able to pursue their traditional liberal objectives in the face of external pressures?

For the universities have failed to support public intellectuals, ironically so for the intellectuals’ raison d’être is to be the critics and consciences of society, the task with which the universities are statutorily charged. Their academic economists no longer contribute much to public life, as is evident in the decreased role they play in public discussion, for the media today depends almost exclusively on bank economists for commentary on the economy, even though as employees of large financial institutions they must frame their remarks in that context.

The failure to support the critics of the Rogernomic reforms cost the universities dearly. It was obvious from the 1987 Hawke Report on Post-Compulsory Education and Training that the universities would be subject to reforms inimical to their interests too. Their reluctance to encourage critiques of the general reforms left them with no means of analysing and preparing themselves when it was their turn. They end up like chattering opossums in the headlights.

The media has yet to prove itself. In the early 1990s, two of the establishment sent their acolytes around to persuade editors to cease giving space to the critics. The media largely succumbed. Today it is characterised by shallowness, laziness, the pursuit of sensation and gossip, and poor research, unable to distinguish between the significant and the trivial, the profound and the fatuous.

The arts are helping to fill the hollow. Not only are there many more awards for artists today, some are far more generous, but there is less dependence upon state support, with corporate funding and a variety of sometimes idiosyncratic patrons to top up the market. Even so, there were few from the arts sector who engaged directly with the changes of the 1980s.

So we have a less hollow society than a couple of decades ago, but there are still serious gaps, especially as far as intellectual activity is concerned.

The established wisdom was bitterly antagonistic to MMP, intuiting that it was a vote of no confidence. Even today it has a palpable dislike for MMP. The events after the 2005 election were interpreted in terms of the Winner-Takes-All alternative – a more accurate term than FPP – nostalgically assuming there were no problems under WTA. There is a yearning in the establishment to return to a time when a small group could capture the state, and impose its policies. The policies are certainly in the best interests of such bolsheviks, but they apparently still do not understand the difference between their interests and those of the community at large..

The meek and long-suffering have a grievance against Rogernomics. Better, less greedy, economic management would have had them today a quarter and more better off in material terms. Even so, the failed policies were possible because New Zealanders are a practical people scornful of scientific thought, incapable of self distrust, with a contempt for theories, who nevertheless seize upon the latest fashion: an illustration of Keynes’s dictum about practical men and women being but the slaves of defunct intellectuals.

Being a Critic

Even so, there may be those convinced that being a public intellectual is so worthwhile they are tempted to pursue the profession of social critic.

To what extent should a critic directly confront the establishment? As Edmund Burke remarked “It would be well if gentlemen, before they joined in a cry against any establishment, had well considered for what purpose that cry is raised,” and on an earlier occasion he said, “It is a general popular error to suppose the loudest complainers for the public to be the most anxious for its welfare,” (which might be a good motif for an election campaign).

Each critic will solve the challenge in her or his own way. Often the conventional wisdom’s no-go areas are where the most interesting insights are. If entering into one results in a challenge, then so be it. Some will avoid direct confrontation perhaps in jargon ridden diatribes which the public do not understand. Others will relish the challenge of confronting the conventional wisdom in a way which is accessible to the general public.

But while in every culture the critic’s role is problematic, in New Zealand it is more difficult because of our size and our distrust of the intellectual. There are so few niches here in which the public intellectual can function. The universities have not been very supportive, while none of our so-called think tanks has genuine independence or funding to offer much hospitality to genuine critics.

Sometimes academics grumble about their conditions, saying they are thinking about retiring from the university and taking up the life of an independent scholar. I tell them about its loneliness, limited collegial networks, professional jealousies from those within the academy, lack of status, difficulties of obtaining grant funding, poor financial rewards including difficulties of long term provision for retirement, the lack of technical support which academics takes for granted, the risks if anything goes wrong – say with your health, and so on and so on. At which point the academic decides their current job does not look so bad.

The public intellectual’s income prospects are certainly not great. The New Zealand Herald pays its columnists between 30 and 40 cents a word. At the top rate, and allowing for overheads, (at less than the current university markup), a public intellectual would have to write 1000 words – clean – every working day to earn the average wage, and also find sufficient commercial outlets to publish them. as Herbert Guthrie-Smith wrote about his great insight into New Zealabnd ecology and development ‘I don’t want to boast, but I believe the revenues from Tutira, capitalised and carefully invested, should easily keep me in toothpaste.’

It is the lack of public understanding which the intellectual finds hardest to bear, with the resulting lack of support, and precariousness of position. We are a long way from Voltaire’s ‘I may not agree with what you say, but I will defend your right to say it’. Rather, any new idea is jumped upon as stupid or politically incorrect, rather than asking what is the problem the intellectual is troubled about? Ad hominem abuse is frequent. Addressing the issue is much rarer – better to ignore it.

We may despise public intellectuals and social critics, and yet still try to be one, captured by the first theory that turns up and proposing simple solutions for the most complex problems with astonishing audacity. There is no commitment there to do the hard grind of reading original texts, nor thinking carefully and systematically. We find it so easy to be seduced by court followers, giving pseudo-intellectuals a prominence and significance out of line with their competence, if in line with their status. As Keynes said ‘worldly wisdom teaches that it is better for the reputation to fail conventionally than to succeed unconventionally.’ Our inability to judge intellectual quality damages the quality of our intellectual life..

No, dont chose to be an intellectual. The life is too uncomfortable, too precarious, too dangerous, and the immediate rewards are not great.

For some though, there is no choice. Driven by a curiosity, by a passion to serve the people by helping to understand better where they came from, where they are, and where they are going, such people will be public intellectuals and social critics anyway, whatever the costs. As Bruce Jesson reflected towards the end of a far too short life

“If you had said to me, when I was 17 or 18, ‘you’ll spend your life writing, you won’t make any money, you’ll publish magazines, you’ll publish books,’ I’d have thought: ‘Wonderful. What better a way to spend your life?’” (The Nationbuilders)

The immediate reward is to have got something right, or at least better that what had gone before. To have written a good sentence – or equation – which encapsulates some truth gives a satisfaction which is hard to describe to the non-intellectual.

If there is a longer-term reward, it is in the secular heaven of being remembered. Recall the richness of the contribution of those this lecture has honoured by quoting them: Jesus, Shakespeare. Voltaire, Burke, Butler, Siegfried, Guthrie-Smith, Keynes, Beckett, Popper, Joseph, Said, Galbraith, Jesson, …

For the rest of us, we need to accept the passion of the critic, appreciating its application is vital to the success of our society in a troubled and troubling world. When we go out of our way to support a public intellectual, especially in those trying times when they are being shot at, or when the bank balance is redder than the ideas being promulgated, we earn points in our heaven too, contributing to our society’s development.

Ultimately even the conventional wisdom will acknowledge the value of critics, turning up at their funeral, to say how their insights are valued, how important their contribution to social understanding has been, and how they overcame so many challenges and hardships to do so. But the establishment is also there to make sure the coffin lid is well screwed down.

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Notes
[1] I am grateful to Elizabeth Caffin, Don Gilling, and Alan Gray for vigorous criticism of earlier drafts.
[2] Some 16.2 percent told the Census they were of Maori descent. The question is there for electoral purposes. We do not usually use racial notions in public discussion, but law requires an objective measure, whereas ethnicity is subjective. Not all those of Maori descent describe their ethnicity as Maori and not all who describe themselves of Maori ethnicity are of Maori descent. The Census does not ask descent for any other race: probably over 90 percent of New Zealanders are of European descent.

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Business Vision: How to Get Government and Business to Work Together?

Listener: 19 November, 2005.

Keywords: Business & Finance; Political Economy & History;

One might think there is a standoff between government and business. A fortnight before the election, a Business Herald “Mood of the Boardroom” feature showed that many chief executives were antipathetic towards the Labour-led government and willing to say so in public. The impression was reinforced by leaks showing that business and a business lobby group had been involved in the making of Don Brash, leader of the National Party.

It’s more complex than that. Business is not a unity and neither is its attitude to the government. Even so, in 2005, the public again chose a party that some businesses seem to dislike. For there is considerable public unease with the business sector. Ironically, for each day we purchase and consume the products of myriad businesses, while most workers like their jobs and the bosses. So most of our trans-actions with businesses are benign to beneficial. But we ignore that when we think of “business”.

The public anxiety towards business seems to have intensified since the 1980s, when policy was based on “what was good for business was good for the country”, a view which assumes that the country’s interests are exactly the same as those of businesses. Its logic is that Gross Domestic Product is the nation’s objective, since business is best at adding to GDP.

However, surveys show New Zealanders have little enthusiasm for GDP as the ultimate goal of their society. Sure, they like more material things and more spending power to attain them. But they also want community, independence, quality of life, security and sustainability, none of which business is particularly good at delivering. The 90s obsession with GDP contradicted New Zealanders’ aspirations.

In 1999, the voters elected a Labour-led government whose “New Zealand Vision” begins with wanting:
– a land where diversity is valued and reflected in our national identity;
– a great place to live, learn, work and do business;
– a birthplace of world-changing people and ideas;
– a place where people invest in the future.

These do not directly contradict business’s requirements, but they are broader, and so demote business from the dominant role it had in the previous 15 years. But you can’t blame this on the government. We chose it. Moreover, the government seems acutely aware of the tension. A secondary element of the Vision Statement involves a country “rich in well-founded and well-run companies and enterprises characterised by a common sense of purpose and achievement. They are global in outlook, competitive and growing in value.”

Business generally does not seem to have come to terms with this apparent demotion. The ideology of the Business Roundtable focuses on business knows best. Much of the rhetoric in the business pages seems to belong to another country. (There are, of course, those such as the NZ Business Council for Sustainable Development, which promote business interests in a broader context. To repeat, business – like the rest of us – is not a unity.)

It is not helpful to argue that “what is good for New Zealand is good for business”. The statement is either meaninglessly platitudinous or wrong. Sometimes national decisions are not entirely in all businesses’ best interests. But that is generally true – policy cannot please everyone. On occasions, each of us loses out on some matter of public policy. Ironically, because the government has to resolve the tension between business and the community, it often, illogically, gets blamed for it.

We need business to acknowledge that although it is a critical part of the nation’s success, that success is not to be solely measured in terms of the GDP it is so good at generating, but in terms of wider objectives to which GDP often, but not always, contributes. Sometimes business interests will not predominate.

But the rest of us need to remember that although we may have broader objectives, those hundreds of commercial transactions we do every day indicate that we depend on a significant contribution from business to our welfare. Even though business requirements may not be paramount, their concerns – particularly when they are put in the context of our wider objectives – should be carefully listened to, respected, and overruled only with reluctance.

The previous sentence applies, of course, to every sector of society.

Goals & Values:bruce Jesson Was Not Just a Journalist, but a Political Economist

Listener: 5 November, 2005.

Keywords: Political Economy & History;

Once upon a time, economics was “political economy”. It was not only interested in the technical issues of how the economy worked but also its impact on politics and society (assuming they can be distinguished). David Ricardo (1772-1823), for instance, developed a theory about rents on lands, wages and profits, because they were the foundations of the power of landlords, capitalists and workers.

Perhaps the greatest political economist was Karl Marx (1818-83), although he is frequently misunderstood, and some of his followers have given him a dreadful reputation. (The same happened to Jesus.) Marx’s critics add to the confusion by misrepresenting him with banal slogans. (Ditto.) Marx was a 19th-century economist, and of course he did not get everything right – he was notably weak on technological change. But he offered a framework to view the world, which remains useful despite subsequent economic and social (and technological) change. (Christians would say the same about Jesus.)

Sadly, the economics profession has largely abandoned this 19th-century approach to political economy, without offering a serious replacement. New Zealand history is similarly bereft of an economic dimension.

So one of the joys of talking to Bruce Jesson (1944-99) was his thorough knowledge of political economy, including familiarity with those who had intelligently updated it, like Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937). Jesson was not strong on the technical economics, which evolved after Marx’s death. Even so, his creative intelligence applied old-style political economy to provide shrewd insights into current issues, a humbling reminder to modern economists of what we have lost.

Although Jesson wrote mainly as a journalist, his was not a superficial commentary to wrap fish and chips a day later. The just-published selection of his writings, To Build a Nation, is a timely reminder of the perceptive framework shining through his writings.

Of course he misjudged some contemporary events, just like you and me. Unlike us, though, he frankly admitted his errors, for he was not an ideologue, impervious to the evidence. He subjected everything he wrote to rigorous scrutiny. His Marxian framework was an engagement with reality, not an imposition over it.

Sometimes he got events more right than his readers deserved. The opening article’s assessment of Robert Muldoon has a truth that the shallow ideological commentary since 1975 has distorted. Its authority comes from Jesson having read widely – including all Muldoon’s parliamentary speeches. This was for an unpaid article in the Republican, the monthly he edited, produced and posted for over 20 years.

The selection, chosen by Andrew Sharp, professor of political studies at Auckland University, relates the history of the last quarter of the 20th century. Despite its incompleteness, it is so insightful, because Jesson was. All the usual suspects appear, including three fascinating columns on Donna Awatere’s Maori Sovereignty. His penetrating commentary on her drafts made it a significant book.

But the collection is not just history. Jesson’s underlying concerns continue to challenge us. He is scathing about the failure of the political left to have an account of the period, almost contemptuous of their issues-based politics, and derisive of their failure to deal with the New Right. (Is “derisive” the right word? It would be, were he not so modest.)

Jesson’s alternative was based on republicanism. This was not the replacement of a governor-general with a president, but a way about thinking about New Zealand’s history and political economy. He apologises that he did not offer more of an alternative, but, like many original thinkers, he was unable to progress until others caught up and challenged him. We failed him, and so we failed ourselves.

Jesson was proudly a New Zealander, committed to us despite our faults. “To Build a Nation” was his last essay both in the book and ever. It was to be the beginning of his next book, a manifesto for his republican political economy. It still speaks to us, six years on. “Most people flinch from economics because it tends to be presented as a series of technical problems, to do with matters such as savings and investment. There is beneath this, however, the more fundamental level of goals and values.”

To Build a Nation: Collected Writings 1975-1999, by Bruce Jesson, edited by Andrew Sharp (Penguin $35).

New Zealand’s Pharmaceutical Policies: a Fresh Look

This report, commissioned by Pharmac, reviews the report by Castalia Strategic Advisers New Zealand Pharmaceutical Policies: Time to Take a Fresh Look.
 

Keywords: Health;
 

INTRODUCTION
 

In August 2005, Castalia Strategic Advisers, published a report New Zealand Pharmaceutical Policies: Time to Take a Fresh Look. The report was commissioned by Pfizer New Zealand Ltd and was prepared by Alex Sundakov and Dr Viktoria Sundakov.
 

The report claims that the public pharmaceutical procurement policy is inefficient and could be improved. If the allegation were true, it would be serious, for it implies that there is severe fiscal waste.
 

But, as we shall see, the claim is largely tendentious, and often based on factual errors or misunderstandings. There is little rigorous analysis and certainly no discussion of an alternative procurement policy.
 

Pharmac (Pharmaceutical Management Agency Limited), the New Zealand public agency responsible for the procurement of pharmaceuticals, has commissioned this report to independently review the allegations of the Castalia report, and also to carry out an assessment of Pharmac’s current evaluation assessment procedures.
 

This report is in three parts. Chapter 1 reviews the Castalia report. Chapter 2 describes the current procedures for deciding whether a pharmaceutical will be publicly funded. Chapter 3 assesses the extent to which the current procedures are economically efficient.
 

The conclusion of this report is that while there may always be opportunities for improving the administration of the existing procedures, their underlying principles are robust. However these were not issues to which the Castalia report contributes much.
 

This report reflects the analysis and views of its writer. It does not necessarily reflect Pharmac’s views.
 

(or background see P. Davis (2004) ‘”Tough but fair”? The active management of the New Zealand drug benefits scheme by an independent Crown agency’, Aust Health Rev 2004: 28(2): 171–181)
 

CHAPTER 1: THE CASTALIA REPORT
 

Here follows a slightly edited version of the Executive Summary of the Castalia Report, plus a commentary upon the summary and the main argument.
 

Some of the report is concerned with the central issue of the efficiency of the pharmaceutical procurement policy. That is mentioned, but largely left out, as it is not central to the issues being explored. In particular little attention is paid to the means by which Pharmac and the pharmaceutical industry negotiate the prices of the pharmaceutical (which sometimes involves restricting purchase of a particular medicine to a single supplier), once the treatment has been decided upon.
 

The Castalia report’s Executive Summary is in two parts, a main text, and a summary commentary in the margin. The main text in italics and the summary commentary is set here in bold italics after the relevant section.
 

********************
 

Two elements make New Zealand’s policy for funding pharmaceuticals prescribed to patients not in hospitals fundamentally different from policies adopted in other countries:
 

* First, where possible, New Zealand uses sole source tenders to bid down the price of prescription medicines. Under this policy, only one or a limited number of products are procured for each indication. The expectation is that the winning bidder would agree to a lower price in return for the opportunity to supply the entire New Zealand market demand for that medicine. In some cases, this is widened to preferential or sole supply access for a therapeutic group/sub-group. And the danger here is that patients react differently (benefits as well as side effects) to different medicines, hence the need to have multiple medicines in each therapeutic category.
Pharmac recognises the danger. Where there are proven differences it will make the different pharmaceuticals available on the schedule. However, while it is said that there are such differences, in many instances there is little compelling scientific evidence.
 

Second, the budget for the funding of pharmaceuticals (in other words, Pharmac’s budget) is strictly capped.
It is indicatively, not strictly, capped. See Chapter 2.
 

 … In New Zealand, it is the entitlement that gets adjusted through the year in order to remain within the set budget. New drugs tend to be approved only if savings are made on older drugs. Further, there is strict control over the discretionary approvals for drugs that are made available under “special authority criteria”. The ability to grant “special authority” is limited by the budget cap, rather than by clinical considerations.
What happens is somewhat more complicated than what is characterised here. (Chapter 2)
 

In addition to these explicit restrictions on customer access, there are concerns about the transparency of the process for getting new medicines listed. In particular, we have encountered growing concern that the Pharmacology and Therapeutics Advisory Committee (PTAC), whose job it is to review the effectiveness of new medicines, is being influenced in their judgements by fiscal imperatives rather than by the relevant clinical considerations. While fiscal issues must be taken into account, there are risks to the integrity of the system and the quality of decisions if fiscal restraint is exercised implicitly under the guise of concerns about effectiveness or safety. The Castalia report does not indicate the sources of these concerns. It seems unlikely they were expressed by health professionals. While there may be concerns, they seem to be based on a misunderstanding of the issues. These are elaborated in Chapter 2.
            The crucial misunderstanding is that a treatment (pharmaceutical or other) is clinically effective, does not mean it is economically justified, or fiscally prudent. A quick illustration is that were a clinically effective treatment to cost a very large sum (say $100m a dose) it could not be economically justified.
 

Finally, New Zealand, like a number of other countries, also uses reference pricing to beat down prices of patented pharmaceuticals. … We do not address the general effects of reference pricing in this report because it is not unique to New Zealand.
This report does not address reference pricing either, except to note the fact that it is used by a number of countries, gives some weight to the probability the method is effective.
 

New Zealand’s funding of pharmaceuticals is unusual: we subsidise only one drug for a relatively wide range of conditions, and access to drugs is varied during the year to keep to a budget.
All national systems of funding pharmaceuticals are ‘unusual’ in that there are very great differences between them. The Castalia report does not make the case that New Zealand’s is more ‘unusual’ than any other one.
 

This policy has been consistently implemented since 1997. As a result, in the last eight years, New Zealand’s pattern of expenditure on pharmaceuticals has diverged dramatically from other OECD countries. New Zealand’s pharmaceutical expenditure – both as a proportion of total health expenditure and of GDP – fell sharply during a period when, elsewhere in the OECD, these proportions have grown in response to innovative treatments and increased reliance on pharmaceutical rather than surgical interventions. In essence, New Zealand set out to achieve the lowest possible prices for pharmaceutical products but in the process, has restricted the range and quantity of medicines available to prescribing medical professionals and their patients.
There are a number of non-sequiturs here.
            That pharmaceutical expenditure fell as a proportion of total health expenditure and GDP does not necessarily mean that pharmaceutical use has declined. First, expenditure has increased. Second, the analysis focuses on only a part of pharmaceutical use – publically funded primary care use, and private secondary care. It does not cover public secondary care use, nor private purchase. Third, the analysis makes no allowance for different costs of medicines over time and by country (where the different institutional arrangements need close attention when comparisons are being made).
            In any case, it is possible that a reduction in drug use (or at least the elimination of some drugs) may be beneficial.[1]
            The expression ‘choice’ and ‘customer’ is misleading. The choice is usually made by the prescribing agent (typically the general practitioner) for the patient typically follows the agents advice. He or she is not really a ‘customer’, nor is the prescriber.
            Indeed the claim of reductions of ‘access’ and ‘choice’ are misleading reflecting a faulty framework of analysis. Once Medsafe, an agency totally independent of Pharmac, has approved a pharmaceutical, access is unrestricted, and the patient’s prescriber may choose the pharmaceutical if that is desired. However, the patient or some private source, would have to pay for it unless it is provider in some way through the public system.
            What the public health system, with Pharmac as one of its agents, does is enable patients to have access to some pharmaceuticals without private payment (or sometimes with a public subsidy to the private payment). Thus the public health system increases access and choice which the private payment system restricts.
            The Castalia report sets out the issue out as if all pharmaceuticals are in principle available (presumably without charge irrespective of their cost or effectiveness) and the Pharmac procedures restrict access and choice. In practice it is the other way around.
 

As a result, our drug use has declined relative to other OECD countries but at a cost of reduced access and choice.
Both the fact is unproven, because not all medicines were considered, and the conclusion is unproven, not only because it is based on an unproven fact, but because it misrepresents the situation.
 

This restraint can be considered good policy if and only if:
            * the restrictions on the availability of medicines do not result in adverse health and social outcomes and do not impose additional costs by leading to more costly surgical and other interventions, and
            * the restrictions are the only way to achieve reasonable prices for pharmaceuticals.
Despite the ‘if and only if’ the apparent theorem is not proven, but stated. As stated it cannot be true as the following examples illustrate.
            The first condition is not necessary. Suppose that the restrictions led to minor adverse health events for a few people and major gains for others, then the first condition is not fulfilled, but the restrictions might still be beneficial. Similarly the restrictions may lead to costly other interventions for some people but still save funds. (This is explained in Chapter 3.)
            The second condition is not necessary either. There may be other means of achieving reasonable prices – such as the local production of medications without the payment of royalties – which would be considered inferior to the method used in New Zealand today.
            Even were the two propositions necessary, they would not be sufficient.
            The thinness of the argument becomes evident from the arguments which follows.
 

Our analysis suggests that there are good reasons to believe the above conditions do not hold:
            * First, there is indicative evidence to suggest that restrictions on pharmaceuticals have had a negative impact on New Zealand’s disability burden and health outcomes. Our high level of welfare dependency, at a time of nearly full employment, has recently become a focus of political attention and has been attributed, in part, to a culture of dependency. However, our analysis suggests that New Zealanders may indeed be more disabled than comparable populations, in part due to poor management of conditions arising out of restrictions on pharmaceuticals.
The use of the expression ‘indicative’ means that the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis, but that there are alternative hypotheses which are just as explanatory, or more so. The Castalia report does not rule out these alternatives, and so the indicative evidence is weak.
 

            * Second, there also appears to be evidence that restrictions on pharmaceuticals are shifting costs to other more invasive, costlier treatments.
That there ‘appears to be evidence’ rather that ‘there is evidence’ demonstrates the evidence is weak. No specific instances are sited.
 

* Finally, while the Pharmaceutical Management Agency (Pharmac) was successful in reducing New Zealand pharmaceutical prices at a more rapid rate than other OECD countries during the early years of the policy, New Zealand prices now appear to have settled at a constant ratio to the level in Australia, with the gap between the two countries likely to narrow.
It is unclear how this relates to the argument. (Even if it did, the Castalia reports asserts the ‘facts’, rather than demonstrates them.)
 

Both countries are enjoying on-going reductions in the prices of medicines due to a mix of purchasing techniques (such as reference pricing) and the on-going substitution of brand products by generics as patents come off. While New Zealand prices are, on average, somewhat lower than those in Australia, our analysis suggests that these differences can not be attributed to the severe restrictions on access imposed on New Zealand consumers.
There is no clear logic between the concluding statement, and the initial sentence, nor the first clause of the final sentence and its conclusion.
            The use of the term ‘consumer’ rather than ‘patient’ is indicative of the confusion the report has between a private market and a public one.
 

These possibilities are serious enough to warrant a thorough review of pharmaceutical funding. Since so many factors affect health outcomes, heroic assumptions would be required to isolate the impact of restrictions on pharmaceuticals from everything else that is going on to a standard of scientific proof. We do not pretend to be able to do that. However, we believe there is sufficient information to suggest that very serious questions should be asked about the effects of the current pharmaceutical benefits scheme on the well-being of New Zealanders.
The Castalia Report’s argument is so thin – the possibilities so tenuous – that it has not made a case for a thorough review of pharmaceutical, and certainly it has made no contribution to any such review. The issues discussed in Chapter III reflect an ongoing discussion within the New Zealand health analysts community, which it is opportune to give a more public profile.
 

This does not appear to be minimising total costs: restrictions may be worsening disability rates and increasing the need for more costly and intrusive treatment while achieving prices not much better than in Australia.
The conditional ‘may’ is indicative that such analysis that is being provided is conjectural rather than based on sound investigation and analysis. This becomes even more evident in the detailed argument below.
 

Strong suspicions of pharmaceutical companies’ motives and business tactics, combined with the successes achieved in the late 1990s in shifting New Zealand from a high pharmaceuticals price country to a low price one, have cemented in many peoples’ minds the idea that the policy works, and that complaints about the system are no more than self-interested lobbying.
The ‘strong suspicions are not attributed to any particular party. It may be that there are sections of the community who are ‘suspicious’ of the pharmaceutical communities’ motives and certainly there is a vigorous international debate about whether current arrangements for the pharmaceutical industry lead to best outcomes.
            However in the Pharmac documents I have read, and in discussions with Pharmac staff over a number of years – informally and more formally when discussing their practices – there has never been any hint of the suspicions alleged in the Castalia reports.
            It is true there are tensions, as inevitably there must be where two economic actors are negotiating over deals involving very large sums of money. But the impression I have is that Pharmac respects the Big Pharma, and understands the contribution they and their products make to the public’s health.
 

However, in our view, it is risky to allow prejudices against the “big pharma” to obscure the costs that restrictions on access to pharmaceuticals are imposing on the New Zealand society. Even in the narrow fiscal sense, it is likely that the spectacular “achievement” of keeping spending on the funding of outpatient pharmaceuticals virtually unchanged for many years, simply masks higher costs and inefficiencies in other parts of the health and welfare budgets.
It is agreed that such prejudices would be inimical to the public health. It is good that Pharmac does not have them.
 

A common mantra in defence of the current pharmaceutical funding policy is that New Zealand is a poor country, and while we would like to spend more, we can not afford it. However, this begs the question, confusing restraint on expenditure on pharmaceuticals with the overall fiscal constraint on health and welfare spending.
The mantra is unsourced so it is difficult to comment upon it. In practice New Zealand experiences fiscal restrictions which limits it from providing all the health care that would be considered ideal. This is the situation faced by every public health system (including Medicare and Medicaid in the United States) whether they are in richer or poorer countries. It is true that because New Zealand is poorer than some countries its fiscal restriction on health spending is tighter. However the tightness applies equally to all sub-components of spending and not just to some components more than others.
            The report provides no evidence of the fiscal restrictions applying more onerously to pharmaceuticals, and provides no evidence that is the intention of current funding arrangements.
 

Suspicion of Pharmaceutical companies should not be allowed to prevent a careful check of whether drug cost containment is increasing costs elsewhere that is, whether we have the right cost mix.
Agreed. It is fortunate those suspicions do not exist in the current processes.
 

The real question going forward is whether it is possible to achieve better health and social outcomes by re-allocating resources from other areas of health expenditure to pharmaceuticals while remaining within the overall budget envelope.
This is a good question, although not well formulated. Nor does the Castalia Report contribute to answering it.
 

Our analysis suggests that the answer to this question is “yes”. It is certainly timely to examine alternatives. In preparing this report, we have not sought to design a detailed proposal for an alternative model. However, our analysis suggests there are strong indications that the costs of the current funding model are likely to exceed its benefits. The available evidence certainly raises sufficient concerns to recommend a wide-ranging inquiry into the policy.
            In our view, the key challenge will be to design a funding regime which improves access to a broad range of pharmaceuticals and provides sufficient incentive to the pharmaceutical companies to market and trial their products in New Zealand, without undermining sound fiscal management and without creating conditions for unjustified price increases in New Zealand.
The analysis in the report is so inadequate that it provides no guidance as to how one might go about answering it, which would normally be the outcome of a rigorous thorough approach. Which is the focus of the remainder of the report.
 

It should be possible to do better by rebalancing overall spending between drugs and other treatments consistent with sound fiscal management and increasing patient choice.
It would have been helpful had the Castalia Report made some suggestions as to how such a rebalancing might occur.
            Under ‘sound fiscal management’ increasing patient access to publically subsidised pharmaceuticals will reduce their access to other treatment options. This is a key balance the public sector health system faces.
 

CHAPTER 2: HOW THE SYSTEM OF PUBLIC PHARMACEUTICAL PROVISION CURRENTLY WORKS
 

Background
 

Behind the current system are four key questions:
(1) Is the medicine safe (have greater benefits than risks if appropriately used’)?
(2) Is the medicine clinically effective?
(3) Is the medicine cost effective (give a return to justify its expenditure)?
(4) Who pays for the medicine?
 

1. Is The Medicine Safe?
 

Once a pharmaceutical becomes internationally available, usually following approval by the United States Food and Drug Administration, the provider typically approaches Medsafe a business unit agency within the Department of Health.
 

Medsafe is responsible for ensuring that, as far as possible, the medicines available in New Zealand can be expected to have greater benefits than risks if used appropriately. This is achieved through:
            * assessing the safety, quality and efficacy of medicines before they are marketed;
            * auditing manufacturers, packers and wholesalers of medicines to ensure their premises and practices meet an acceptable standard
* monitoring the safety of medicines on the market.
 

In the case of new medicines a company wishing to market a medicine that has not previously been available in New Zealand must obtain the consent of the Minister of Health (or her or his delegate) to distribute a “new medicine”. Typically, in order to obtain consent, the company has to submit an application dossier containing detailed information about the safety, quality and efficacy of the medicine.[2] The application is considered by the Medicines Assessment Advisory Committee, which is a committee of experts set up to advise the Minister of Health. If the application is acceptable, the Minister of Health approves the medicine, and it can then be marketed.
 

At this point the medicine is available on prescription by any designated medical professional (typically a doctor, but for some medicines dentists, nurses and so on). However some medicines are classified as ‘over-the-counter’ (OTC) and supplied by a pharmacist or, in some cases, by an unqualified agent such as a supermarket.
 

Medsafe decisions pay only a limited attention for the question of clinical effectiveness (see section 2) and no attention to the other two questions, particularly who should fund the purchase (except for OTC medication, where implicitly they are allowing the user to pay).
 

2. Is The Medicine Clinically Effective?
 

The British National Health service defines clinical effectiveness as ‘the extent to which specific clinical interventions, when deployed in the field for a particular patient or population, do what they are intended to do – i.e. maintain and improve health and secure the greatest possible health gain from the available resources’.[3]
 

A shorter definition is that clinical effectiveness is ‘the extent to which a treatment achieves its intended purpose for the range of patients who will receive it in practice’[4]

There is no New Zealand government agency whose primary responsibility is to determines the extent to which a medicine is clinically effective. However, Medsafe has to pay attention to the question when it trades off the potential harm a medicine can do (say from side effects) against the potential benefits, while clinical effectiveness is the foundation of cost-effectiveness, and therefore of considerable concern to Pharmac.
 

In practice the prescriber makes the decision as the effectiveness of the treatment. Typically the decision is made on the basis of the prescriber’s expertise and experience, augmented by such evidence there is from clinical and other trials.[5] The research evidence is usually filtered through such channels as the pharmaceutical company’s marketing, professional colleagues, and standard practice.
 

Many ‘complementary medicines’ have had no rigorous analysis of their medical effectiveness at all. (They are not covered by Pharmac and do not receive a public subsidy.)
 

3. Is the Medicine Cost Effective?
 

The definition used here is that a ‘cost effective treatment gives treatment outcome using least resources, where the treatment outcome is measured in terms of uniform units of health such as quality adjusted life years’ (QALYs).[6]
 

Any purchaser of a pharmaceutical with a budget constraint explicitly or implicitly makes a cost effectiveness decision when they ask whether they are getting value for money. This applies just as much to the OTC purchaser as it does to the District Health Board.
 

However those who do not pay for the medicine need only be concerned about its clinical effectiveness. This applies to patients when the treatment is funded by the public sector or by private insurance, and it can apply to prescribers (although many are increasingly aware of the issue of value for money through public and professional education).
 

The government agency responsible for the evaluation of cost effectiveness of publicly provided medicines prescribed by the private sector is Pharmac. (Public secondary care involves a different method of evaluation.)
                                   
Pharmac cost-effective evaluations uses orthodox economic principles, adapted for the particularities of the circumstances they face. While sometimes the detailed analysis is unnecessary – as when a more expensive medicine is replaced by a cheaper one with the same clinical effectiveness – the broad pattern of their approach when a full decision has to be made is as follows. (A schematic diagram has not been included in this version of the report.)
Pharmac is usually alerted to the potentiality of a new medication by the supplying pharma (which may involve more than one company). Often there will be supporting submissions from a voluntary group concerned with the health problem the medicine is intended to address.
 

Pharmac appoints a ‘Therapeutic Group Manager’ who seeks, reviews, and collates additional literature and information. This is submitted to the Pharmacology and Therapeutics Advisory Committee (PTAC) which assesses the evidence. (Not detailed here but shown in the accompanying diagram, the process has referral back where further clarification is required.)
 

The PTAC deliberations are based on criteria listed below. After sector consultation the recommendations (including prioritisation) goes the Pharmac Board for consideration. After sector consultation (and further Pharmac analysis), recommendations go to the Board which decides whether the new drug meets its criteria, and if there is the funding is available. If the Board’s decision is favourable to the medicine’s availability, the Therapeutic Group Manager notifies the sector and arranges for the medicine to be added to the Pharmaceutical Schedule of medicines available for use by approved prescribers. This means that the patient being treated with the drug does not have to pay its full price (and may not have to pay anything).
 

There is also a process of settling the price which the pharma will be paid for supplying the medicine. Although important in its own right, this negotiation is not central to the approval process, except insofar as it the cost of the medicine is important in the evaluation process.
 

Note that a favourable cost effectiveness finding may be set aside if there is insufficient funding in the ‘indicative budget’. This is an amount agreed between the government and Pharmac as to what the total government outlays for drugs for primary care purposes should be. (Section 4 elaborates this.) Each year there may be some room within the indicative budget from reducing the price of medicine (by, for instance, negotiations with pharma suppliers or lapsing of patents) or better management of their use. The released funds can be used for new medicines.
 

Pharmac also has the opportunity to bid for more funding for its indicative budget in the course of the government’s budgetary cycle. This is most likely to happen when the new medication is expected to be costly in terns of the total funds.
 

The effect of the indicative budget is to set the maximum cost of treatment for a given health outcome. The primary measure of health outcome used by Pharmac is ‘quality adjusted life years’, (QALYs) an internationally accepted measure. This measures any years of life gained from a treatment adjusted of life as the result of an improvement in the enjoyment of years from reduced pain, increased mobility and so forth.[7]
 

Essentially the criterion is the number of Quality Adjusted Life Years gained from the treatment in terms of a net outlay (say QALYs per million dollars spent – Q/$m). Net outlay refers to all expenditures of the public health system, allowing that a pharmaceutical treatment may reduce other treatment costs, (This is one reason why the indicative budget may be increased, in effect shifting health funds from non-pharmaceutical treatments to pharmaceutical treatments.)
 

The effect of this procedure is to set a minimum level for Q/$m. If the minimum, in future here called the ‘threshold’, is exceeded then the medicine is placed on the schedule (subject to funding availability). The threshold is, in effect, set by the indicative budget. An increase in the indicative budget reduces the minimum (there being more funds available, less cost effective treatments can be funded), an increase in the threshold increases the minimum (and less medicine is funded).
 

Calculation of the ratio is not easy. Often there is not the detailed clinical effectiveness information available to make an exact judgement.[8] Very often, the best available assessment procedure is to take overseas cost effectiveness studies and adjust them for New Zealand conditions (especially the costs). There may be a number of such international assessments with inconsistent findings. Thus there is a need for careful judgements in nay cost-effectiveness assessment, the reviewing of which ifs the one of the tasks of the PTAC.
 

The PTAC is directed to take into consideration the following matters:
            • the health needs of all eligible people[9] within New Zealand;
            • the particular health needs of Maori and Pacific peoples;
            • the availability and suitability of existing medicines, therapeutic medical devices and related products and related things;
            • the clinical benefits and risks of pharmaceuticals;
            • the cost-effectiveness of meeting health needs by funding pharmaceuticals rather than using other publicly funded health and disability support services;
            • the budgetary impact (in terms of the pharmaceutical budget and the Government’s overall health budget) of any changes to the Pharmaceutical Schedule;
            • the direct cost to health service users;
            • the Government’s priorities for health funding, as set out in any objectives notified by the Crown to Pharmac, or in Pharmac’s Funding Agreement, or elsewhere; and
            • such other criteria as Pharmac thinks fit. Pharmac will carry out appropriate consultation when it intends to take any such “other criteria” into account.
 

As explained in chapter 3, many of the criteria are directly covered by the cost effectiveness evaluation.
 

Completeness requires a brief account of the practice of public secondary care, which may provided medicines without charge which are not on the Pharmac schedule. They are also under a budget constraint. A not uncommon practice is for a hospital to have a ‘preferred medicine lists’ which is a list of medicines which doctors may use without restriction, and a procedure of referral to senior colleagues for approval to use a medicines not on either list. Neither the preferred medicines list nor the referral process usually use as rigorous a cost-effectiveness evaluation as does Pharmac, but costs are taken into account in the decisions.[10]
 

Cost effectiveness determines the degree of public funding available for a treatment. The New Zealand application involves a political decision at the highest level – the amount of funds voted by parliament – but it designed that once the overall funds are set, the decisions are made by experts (at the Pharmac level including the medical experts involved in the decision), while the the medical professional (usually) focusses only on clinical effectiveness at the patient level. This separation of powers is characteristic of all decisions in the public health system.
 

4. Who Pays for the Medicine?
 

Once the medicine has been approved by Medsafe as effective, any approved prescriber may obtain it on behalf of a patient.[11] Patients may pay for the medication themselves or have it paid for some other private agent such as a private insurer or a friendly society. In such cases there is no charge to the public purse.
 

If the patient is in a public hospital, there is no charge to the patient. The cost of the medication used is charged to the hospital, which receives its funding from the District Health Board.
 

The public funding provisions for Pharmac scheduled medicines in primary care has recently changed. Today the District Health Board in the region where the medicines are prescribed pays the subsidy on the medication. Pharmac collects the information on actual DHB outlays and compares that total with the indicative budget for pharmaceuticals. While the amounts need not be the same (and are never exactly the same), too large a divergence could require a major review.
 

The advantage of having pharmaceutical funding within DHB budgets is that it gives them an incentive to better manage primary care in order to reduce their overall costs, thus reinforcing the cost effectiveness valuation by complementary management.
 

Coda
 

This chapter and the next have concentrated upon only one aspects of Pharmac’s activities. Other activities include the purchase of the pharmaceuticals on behalf of the DHBs, and thereby the price setting for them (it also does this for some hospital pharmaceuticals), and the influencing of prescriber behaviour.
 

CHAPTER 3: CAN THE CRITERIA BE IMPROVED?[12]
 

Systematic decision-making requires a rational criteria. Quality Adjusted Life Years per million dollars spent (Q/$m) is such a criteria, developed out of the microeconomic framework of Cost Benefit Analysis. Use of it for decision making, leads to efficient outcomes, in the sense of the maximum QALYs for the outlays.
 

However, application of the principles always involves some practical compromises, so it is worth reviewing the criteria in detail. In particular it sometimes occurs that the compromises sometimes lead to unintended anomalies, although none were found in the Pharmac procedures.
 

This chapter is in five sections. The first section reviews the notion of health outcome which is the numerator of the criteria ratio, the second reviews the notion of cost which is denominator of the criteria ratio, the third reviews other factors, the fourth the discount rate and the fifth reviews the procedure to select the new pharmaceuticals.
 

1. Health Outcome
 

The circumstances in which Pharmac makes decisions involves the use of medication for the treatment of different disease. The health outcome has therefore to be measured in a way in which the effects of different diseases and their alleviation or cure can be compared.
 

The health outcome used by Pharmac is QALYs or Quality Adjusted Life Years lost or gained. This is a more general measure than morbidity, because increasingly the effect of various treatments is to give patients a higher quality life as well as to postpone death.
 

One year of ordinary healthy life is measured as one QALY. If the individual suffers discomfort or restrictions on their life during the year, then its QALY value is discounted. A dead individual’s QALY is valued at zero. Surveys of opinion are used to interpolate the intervening steps. The surveys have found that some life states are judged worse than death, and are so are measured as negative.[13]
 

Some examples of standard QALY measures are
1.000 No problems;
0.760 No problems walking about; no problems with self-care; some problems with performing usual activities; some pain or discomfort; not anxious or depressed;
 0.516 Some problems walking about; some problems washing or dressing self; some problems with performing usual activities; moderate pain or discomfort; moderately anxious or depressed;
0.329 No problems walking about; some problems washing or dressing self; unable to perform usual activities; some pain or discomfort; not anxious or depressed;
0.222 Some problems walking about; no problems with self-care; no problems with performing usual activities; moderate pain or discomfort; extremely anxious or depressed;
 0.079Some problems walking about, unable to wash or dress self, unable to perform usual activities, moderate pain or discomfort, moderately anxious or depressed;
0.000Death;
-0.429 Confined to bed; unable to wash or dress self; unable to perform usual activities; extreme pain or discomfort; moderately anxious or depressed.[14]
 

A rating has to be assigned to each disease, which involves judgement because different patients may have different condition states, and because their conditions change over time.
 

QALYs are used extensively in cost effectiveness and related studies .While they are by no means perfect (and are being continually improved) there is probably no better across-disease measure, for the comparison of outcomes.
 

For a while, QALYs were challenged by DALYs (Disability Adjusted Life Years) which were proposed by WHO. A fundamental weakness is they use a 5% p.a. discount rate which limits the use of alternative rates. (See Section 4.) They also seem to become less popular for various reasons. It is not recommended that the Pharmac analysis switch to DALYs.
 

Very often, the QALY is applied only to the patient. But in some cases the patient’s health state can place a considerable burden on the patient’s close associates – family and friends. The counsel of perfection is that such a burden should be incorporated into the measure of QALYs gained or lost from a treatment or fail to treat. In practice it may be quite difficult to do this, especially as the external burden varies from patient to patient. There are also raises ethical issues. The current practise is to alert the TPAG when the disease commonly involves a lot of external burden (say on the parents and siblings of a sick child) , and for them to take it into consideration where it is particularly important. Until progress is made with this issue at the international level, this would seem to be the recommended practice.
 

For some purposes, such as the cost burden of disease and cost-benefit analysis it is necessary to put a dollar value on a QALY, This valuation is problematic and controversial. However, it is unnecessary to do this for Pharmac’s purposes. since the Q/$m ratio gives a satisfactory ranking of comparable health outcomes for its decision-making purposes.
 

Recommendations
1.1. ALYs (Quality of Life Years) are the best available measure for comparing the effects of disease and the impact on health outcomes where different diseases are involved.
1.2. It is not recommended to change to DALYs (Disability Adjusted Life Years).
1.3. Although the lost of QALYs by associates of the patient is relevant, and should be taken into consideration where the impact is large, it should not be included in the calculation of the criteria ratio.
1.4. It is not necessary to put a dollar valuation on QALYs for Pharmac’s purposes.
 

2. Costs
The denominator of the criteria ratio is expenditure by the health system. This includes outlays on the medicine, which may offset to some degree by outlays on other treatments which are avoided as a consequence of the use of the pharmaceutical.
 

Since the other health expenditures are taken into account, it is hard to understand the source of the claim of the Castalia report that ‘there also appears to be evidence that restrictions on pharmaceuticals are shifting costs to other more invasive, costlier treatments’, except as an inappropriate application of the criteria. (Some possibilities are discussed later.) A deceptive case would be where a particular medicine is not included because of cost effectiveness but where a small proportion (allowed for in the cost effectiveness evaluation) led to expensive treatment, it being cheaper to do them than outlay on all the potential suffers only a few of who require the expensive treatment.[15]
 

A more serious concern is the exclusion from the denominator of other costs involved in the cost effective comparison.
 

Some of these are public sector costs, including costs incurred by Work and Income (say payments of sickness benefit) and any loss of tax revenue due to the failure of the patient to work because of the disease. A whole-of-government approach should require the inclusion of these costs in the denominator of the criteria ratio. It should be noted that overseas cost-effectiveness studies often do not include such phenomenon, and local protocols would need to be developed.
 

The extension of the denominator to cover net private costs is more problematic. The most important (other than the time and other costs to family and friends) may be the gains to the individual from an early return to employment.[16] The effect of including such gains for employment would be to prioritise treatment which enabled patients to return to the workforce.[17] Given the expectation that unemployment will remain low, and the need to maintain high labour force participation rates for high GDP per capita, such an outcome would seem consistent with the government’s wider objectives (as well as reducing fiscal pressures).[18] This issue needs to be explored further, especially as it has an ethical dimension.
 

By adding further savings from the treatment recommended changes here would tend to increase the Q/$m ratio. This need not impact on the total pharmaceutical spending, but rather would raise the threshold by which new medicines were introduced were the indicative cap be kept at its current level. However it could change the prioritisation of medication (particularly in terms of these recommendations towards the treating of diseases which reduce labour force participation.) As is explained in section 5 the suggested changes may also lead to a redeployment of government funding to the pharmaceutical budget from other public sector budgets, with a net gain to the effectiveness of government spending and improvements in economic performance.
 

Recommendations
2.1 The notion of cost in the expenditure should, as it does now, include all treatment costs, including the savings from treatment forgone as a result of the medication.
2.2 There is a strong case for extending costs to a whole-of-government basis, by including net savings to the entire government budget from the medication.
2.3 The case for extending costs to include employment and other private costs needs to be explored. This is likely to become more important in the future with the need to make better employment utilisation of the population.
2.4  The recommended whole-of-government approach could lead to a redeployment of public funds to the indicative pharmaceutical budget with improvements in the effectiveness of government spending (as could the inclusion of private cost savings, were they also to be included).
 

3. Other Factors to Be Taken Into Consideration
 

The following matters are taken into consideration by the Pharmacology and Therapeutics Advisory Committee (PTAC) when making its recommendations. (The ordering differs to from the Pharmac list):
 

General Matters
• the budgetary impact (in terms of the pharmaceutical budget and the Government’s overall health budget) of any changes to the Pharmaceutical Schedule;
• the Government’s priorities for health funding, as set out in any objectives notified by the Crown to Pharmac, or in Pharmac’s Funding Agreement, or elsewhere;
• such other criteria as Pharmac thinks fit. Pharmac will carry out appropriate consultation when it intends to take any such “other criteria” into account.
Matters included in a Cost Effective Analysis:
• the health needs of all eligible people[19] within New Zealand;
• the availability and suitability of existing medicines, therapeutic medical devices and related products and related things;
• the clinical benefits and risks of pharmaceuticals;
• the cost-effectiveness of meeting health needs by funding pharmaceuticals rather than using other publicly funded health and disability support services;
• the direct cost to health service users.
Other Matters Not included Above
• the particular health needs of Maori and Pacific peoples.
 

Except that the direct costs to health service users may not cover net costs such as loss of employment (as discussed in section 2), the current practices are well covered by the current procedures.
 

The last listed here (the second in the Pharmac list) reflects a weakness in cost-effective and related analyses (including cost benefit analysis). They do not allow for fairness and other distributional matters. For instance suppose the ranking set only drugs for the elderly above the threshold determined by the indicative budget, and the next – immediately below the threshold – was for children (at roughly the same pharmaceutical cost). It would be quite understandable for the children’s medication to be prioritised a little higher. It would mean slightly lower QALYs. but equity considerations are important in a modern society. Currently the equity point only directly refers to a couple of ethnic minorities. It would conform more closely to the notions underpinning Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, if it were to be extended to ‘the particular health needs of minority groups including Maori and Pacific peoples’.
 

The list above applies to Pharmac’s concerns. Elsewhere in the health system, the principles of when to treat are taken on other criteria. Are they consistent, particularly where the pharmaceutical and other treatment regimes interact? If they are not, there could be inconsistency of optimal treatment and a loss of efficiency.[20] There would seem to be a case for a overall set of principles for the health system, similar but more general to the Pharmac ones, to ensure consistency.
 

It might be asked that given there is an apparently objective ranking from the Q/$m ratio, is there any need for a PTAC and its sub-committees. It would be unwise to use an entirely mechanical mechanism, for the following reasons:
• The PTAC system acts as a quality review of the assessment;
• The Q/$m ratio can be very sensitive to assumptions, many of which those who do the analysis (e.g economists) are not competent to judge. The PTAC brings a competence outside that of narrow disciplines involved in the ratio’s calculation.
• The Q/$m ratio is subject to a margin of error which needs to be taken into consideration when ultimate decisions are made.
• The PTAC is able to make assessments of matters which the cost-effectiveness analysis cannot or has not taken into consideration. (There are examples of such matters in other sections .)
• The PTAC gives confidence to the professionals who prescribe the pharmaceuticals. This is particularly important where it is necessary, for whatever reason, to restrict the availability of the medicine.
 

Having accepted the need for a PTAC, it may be that its members should receive a briefing on the cost-effective analyses which they backgrounds their decisions.[21]
 

Recommendations
3.1 hat the current set of matters to be taken into consideration be retained with the second matter be extended to ‘the particular health needs of minority groups including Maori and Pacific peoples’.
3.2 That the PTAC procedure is appropriate, particularly to deal with deficiencies in the cost-effective ratio and to give confidence to prescribers. There may be a case for giving members of the PTAC and its subcommittees an annual briefing on cost-effective analysis, and recent developments in its application.
 

4. The Discount Rate
 

Discounting is the means with which cost-effectiveness (and related procedures) deals with outcomes and costs over time. It is a routine procedure, well justified and accepted by economists. At issue is the appropriate discount rate, the parameter which controls the discounting.
 

The higher the discount rate, the greater the weight given to events in the immediate future compared to events in the distance future.[22] For instance a 10% p.a. discount rate reduces the return on an event 10 years into the future by over 60 percent, whereas a 2% p.a. discount rate reduces it by 18 percent. The effect of lowering the discount rate might be said to increase the ‘preventative’ element in the health system relative to the ‘urgent’ element.
 

There is no agreement as to what is the correct discount rate. Currently the discount rate used in evaluations is 8% p.a..
 

It is good practice to test the sensitivity of the Q/$m ratio to the choice of discount rate. A good set for tests would be 8% p.a. (the current rate); 5% p.a. (a moderate rate used by WHO for its DALYs), and 2% p.a. (which corresponds more closely to the sustainability rate). PTAC would want to be sure that its recommended prioritisation was as robust as possible to the choice of discount rate. (Note the use of different discount rates in different parts of the health system could lead to inefficient use of resources).
 

Part of the dispute over the appropriate discount rate involved the premium for risk. The further out the projection, the wider the margin for forecasting error.[23] There is not a robust theory of such risk which can be practically applied. Commonsense suggests that where there are these margins of error, that a sensitivity analysis should be applied to indicate the likely Q/$m range.
 

Recommendations
4.1 Where discounting is necessary, the Q/$m ratio should be calculated with different discount factors. (Suggested were 10% p.a., 5% p.a. and 2 % p.a.)
4.2 Where assumptions are subject to error, the Q/$m should be presented in a likely range.
 

Selecting the New Pharmaceuticals
 

The Q/$m ratio is used to prioritise the proposed pharmaceuticals. The priorities are then adjusted for the other factors that the ratio cannot encompass. The cost of introducing each pharmaceutical is then calculated.
 

There are also projections for the outlays on existing pharmaceuticals. The difference between this current aggregate and the indicative budget is then available for the prioritised pharmaceuticals, and the top pharmaceuticals on the list is approved until the difference is exhausted.[24] This has the effect of creating a threshold Q/$m ratio (although the other factors taken into consideration may make the precise threshold fuzzier than implied here). Medicines which exceed the threshold are added to the schedule, those that do not are not.
 

The threshold is a useful policy indicator. It helps assess the adequacy of the indicative budget. It would expected to be relatively stable from year to year, but to fall in the long run with growing affluence (indicating the community is willing to spend more to improve quality of life)..
 

However, as described here, the procedure may not give an efficient use of the available funds on a whole of government basis. That is because the decision procedure (i.e the fiscal cap) uses the cost of the pharmaceutical in the denominator but the prioritisation ratio uses the net expenditure of health spending (the cost of the pharmaceutical less savings of other treatment costs) in the denominator (which we have argued is the correct concept although it could be extended to a whole of budget basis). In particular while the procedure maximises QALYs for a given outlay on pharmaceuticals, it does not guarantee a maximum of QALYs for a given outlay by the health system as a whole, if that be the goal.
 

Whether this is important and leads to significant distortions from the most efficient choice of medication is an empirical matter. If it were, it could be resolved in one of the following ways:
 

1. To redefine the indicative pharmaceutical budget as outlays on pharmaceuticals less other treatment savings. This is a counsel of perfection, but would be a very complicated operation. (I emphasises the point that the cost of the pharmaceuticals to the health system is considerably less than the amounts outlaid, because they save other treatment costs.)
 

2. Allow ‘side-payments’ from other agencies. For instance Work and Income might finance medications which would improve their ability to get their clients back to the workforce, DHBs would charge to themselves (rather than to their pharmaceutical budget) primary care outlays (or the part costs) which reduced their treatment costs. While such side-payments should never be ruled out, widespread use of them is likely to be unduly complicated.
3. Allow Pharmac to bid for more funds, increasing the indicative budget, in the annual Budget Round, making the case on the basis of savings by other government agencies in a whole-of-government context. This, in effect, centralises the side-payments and/or moves closer the counsel of perfection of a redefined indicative budget.
 

Recommendations
5.1 Observing that the current indicative budget is confined to pharmaceutical spending only, and the prioritisation procedure uses net spending of the health sector, it is recommended that consideration be given to varying current procedures to ensure that decisions are not distorted by this inconsistency.
 

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Endnotes
[1] Some examples, such as reductions in Hormone Replacement Therapy and antibiotics, are given in the Pharmac Annual Review, 2004. In neither case does there seem to have been an alternative treatment replacing them.
[2] It is unnecessary for these purposes to record the differing consent paths for innovator medicines, multi-source or generic medicines, and over-the-counter medicines.
[3] Promoting Clinical Effectiveness -A Framework for Action in and through the NHS. NHS Executive (1996)
[4] Efficacy is defined by the same source as ‘the extent to which a treatment achieves its intended purposes under the strict conditions of randomised, controlled trials, in patients typically recruited to such trials.’
 (http://www.nsfpathways.co.uk/glossary.html#anchor45412351)
[5] Pharmaceuticals generally experience extensive testing in order to obtain FDA approval. However the testing cannot be comprehensive, and often continues after the approval, including by independent researchers.. There is much less testing of comparable clinical effectiveness where the performance of different drugs is compared.
[6] International Guidelines for Estimating the Costs of Substance Abuse (2ed), E. Single, D. Collins, B. Easton, H. Harwood, H. Lapsley, P. Kopp & E. Wilson (WHO 2003). The expression ‘cost effectiveness’ has different definitions on either side of the Atlantic. Some might call this definition ‘cost utility effectiveness’.
[7] Single et al (2002) op cit. An alternative measure, not used in New Zealand, is ‘disability adjusted life years’ (DALYs) . Chapter 4 considers the relevance of each measure.
[8] Sometimes this is impossible. For instant assessing beta-interferon on multiple sclerosis involves making judgements about the impact on the drug on patients many decades in the future, for which there is no evidence, and cannot be available given the recent use of the drug for this purpose.
[9] As defined by the Government’s current rules of eligibility
[10]  Pharmac provides advice to hospitals on request.
[11] The requirement of an approved prescriber is because there may be potential side effects from treatment or misuse. However in the case of OTCs, these risks are considered sufficiently small to allow the ‘patient’ to make the decision, although the pharmacist and information included with the medication way add to the patient’s knowledge.
[12] Pharmac is currently reviewing its criteria.
[13] http://www.evidence-based-medicine.co.uk/ebmfiles/WhatisaQALY.pdf
[14] Based on EQ-5D health state valuations.
[15] Suppose a medicine was applicable to 1000 patients, costing $1000, and that one of those patients would subsequently require treatment costing $10,000. There would be a net cost to the health system of $90,000 to prescribe the medication. In one case (out of 1000) the failure to include the medicine on the schedule could have resulted in a more invasive, costlier treatments.
[16] The resource gains to the economy as a whole from a return to employment are usually measured as the gains to the individual worker, and the taxes paid from the worker’s employment. There is a further adjustment in a cost-benefit or a cost-effectiveness study where there are transfers, such as social security payments.
[17] Attention would have to be given to returning to the informal workforce, as when medication enables a parent to better look after the children.
[18] This will be particularly important with the growing proportion of sickness and invalids beneficiaries, many of whom are highly skilled, as the result of psychiatric disability and drug addiction. (The appropriate treatment may not always be pharmaceuticals.) The recently announced pilot work-focussed service program is a recognition of its increasing significance.
[19] As defined by the Government’s rules of eligibility.
[20] For instance, one group of treatments (say pharmaceuticals) may assess QALYs gained by children and elderly the same, and another (say surgery)give greater weight to children’s QALYs. This could result in the first group under-providing to children, resulting in the second group to use more expensive (less cost-effective) treatments. The example is chosen because there is a literature on QALY weightings by age, especially in the ‘fair innings hypothesis’, the noun indicating an awareness that there are ethical issues involved.
[21] The Castalia report suggests that briefings for health professionals may also be useful.
[22] When the evaluation of beta-interferon treatment to Multiple Sclerosis was undertaken, high discount rates emphasised the returns from reducing episodes in the year of prescription, but gave virtually no weight that it seems likely that the fewer episodes would mean that the patient would experience delays in the deterioration of the quality of life some decades later.
[23] For instance in the beta-interferon for MS evaluation, it was assumed that it slowed down the later stages of multiple sclerosis some decades on. This a plausible conjecture, but based on thin scientific evidence. Such are the time horizons involved beta-interferon will be out of patent well before the scientific evidence is available to evaluate the conjecture.
[24] A complication, which need not detain us, is that if a new medicine involves great use, the total outlays may breach the expenditure cap. If some means cannot be found to reduce the outlay, then small outlay lower priority medicines may be substituted. The omitted medicine may then be reviewed, held over, or a special case made in the health budget round.
 

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The Rough Drafts Of History

‘Writing the Recent Past’: A New Zealand Book Council Seminar, 1 November, 2005.

Keywords: History of Ideas, Methodology & Philosophy; Political Economy & History;

Let me begin by saying that although I am not a trained historian – two courses in economic history being my total at university – I read history for pleasure, I use history in my research and writing, and I recommend students do history to broaden their perspectives. However, today we are talking about contemporary history, which comes out from another profession.

Above my office desk there is a Doonesbury cartoon showing the front of the White House. Inside Clinton, coming to the end of his term, has called in some historians to tell them how he ‘truly made history’. He says to his audience.
‘Wait a minute, you are not historians, you’re just journalists. What are you doing here?’
They reply,
‘We write the rough drafts of history’.
Contemporary history is the rough drafts of history.

One definition of contemporary history is it where you could be subject to defamation proceedings. Its first lesson is to respect those one is writing about. This is not to mean to say I strive for blandness. I believe my readers want sound thought-provoking judgements

The first defence of defamation is truth, certainly a key goal for any historian. (A post-modernist would not last long in a court of law.) The law on defamation is such that journalists fear they will make an unintentional – but litigiously costly – mistake, especially as the law is so erratic. One of the last things I do before sending a manuscript off is to go through it checking whether any sentence could be defamatory were it wrong. Where that is possible, I double check its accuracy, perhaps also preparing a defence just in case. My publishers routinely check for libel too. On one occasion our lawyer thought what I had written was fine but, since the politician was particularly litigious, it would be wise to modify the presentation. Which I did without, I think, losing any force of the judgement.

That I have, on occasions, to deal with the possibility of defamation indicates that I am working on the frontiers. Contemporary history is not always so ambitious. Much is inoffensive, hiding behind the safe and trite. But I want to engage with the conventional wisdom, challenging my readers, suggesting where it may be in the future – albeit by that time I will have moved on too.

It will be historians who will judge how well I do this. I was touched that when he was writing the history of the contemporary Treasury, Malcolm McKinnon asked to read my Listener columns to get one perspective of the times. There are about 700 of them starting in 1977: half are either on my website or in a book. I dont generally amend or update them. They are a part of the historical record, and that includes my mistakes and misjudgements.

Of course, Malcolm did not rely on such writings, Primary sources were much more important to him. I am surprised how often contemporary accounts fail to use documentary evidence, despite ready access via the Official Information Act. Too often the rhetoric that pretends to be informed debate relies on popular accounts, ungrounded in evidence or analysis, rather than the hard slog of going through the primary sources. I can think of one book on contemporary events, which seems based upon clippings from the local newspaper, the author apparently unaware that journalist’s rough histories are not always correct.

Malcolm also interviewed ex-Treasury officials. I dont do a lot of such interviewing because I am not trained in oral history. When I do, I usually write a letter, setting out my understandings, and inviting the interviewee to respond. I have valued others’ interviews. I particularly recall one of Henry Lang by Ann Beaglehole where, as useful as the transcript was, it could not capture Henry’s meaningful pauses.

There is a sort of contemporary history based on the principle that everyone has a right to have their account of the events, even when the documentary record contradicts their memories. TV1’s Revolution is an example. So are some commissioned biographies or ghosted autobiography. Just because they were there, does not mean they knew what was going on, nicely illustrated by Shaun Goldfinch’s Remaking New Zealand and Australian Economic Policy, where some respondents make claims about influences on the 1980s economic policy, which are verifiably wrong.

In practice, not all those involved have the same right to have their views on contemporary events recorded and reported. Typically those that do, belong to the strata of society could be called the ‘high and mighty’ – the insiders, the powerful. The outcome is a bias to the conventional wisdom.

Interviewees have agendas. I recall an ex-Treasury official saying he was pleased to get down some material in his interview with Malcolm. He was not alone – Malcolm’s final text is properly circumspect. Knowing what has been put on record, a future historian has a really interesting story – but only when defamation proceedings are not possible.

The contemporary historian has an agenda too. The implications are quite different from traditional historians. I enjoy reading Christopher Hill on seventeenth century England. While his particular agenda may influence my understanding of what happened 350 years ago, he has no influence on the actual events he writes about. Those involved in contemporary history do.

We may be involved.. One of my contemporary histories of social policy is carefully written to suppress the fact that I was there. The story I was telling was far too important to be obscured by my ego. No doubt when the history is rewritten, I could appear, but it wont change the story much.

Even if the contemporary historian is only involved as a story teller, the perspective that is related may change individual’s understandings and hence ongoing events. There is no neutral position. The historian who chooses to tell the story in terms of the conventional wisdom, does just that: tell the story from the perspective of the powerful. It will give comfort to the insiders, and the storyteller may be well rewarded. However the story will be bland and boring, and later it will appear quaint and out of touch.

Choosing another perspective runs that risk too. I can think of a number of Marxist studies which were quaint and disconnected when they were published. They remain so decades later. Bruce Jesson is an exception. As his just published collected writings To Build a Nation shows, here was a lively and engaged mind. Bruce did not always get it right, as he says so himself, but he is so intelligent and informed, that the reader is challenged to think about how he got it wrong.

My situation has been more complex. New Zealand is so small, it is not hard to be a Forest Gump at important events, sometimes even carrying the towel. And it is not impossible that on occasions I have influenced perceptions. Whether future historians will bother to provide some evaluation need not detain us. The point is that it would be naive for me to ignore these effects. To a greater or lesser extent that applies to every other contemporary historian.

The events of the last thirty years have been some of the most controversial in the history of our nation – the equivalent, I suppose, of a civil war. It is still too soon to tell how the authoritative version will finally turn out.

Part of the problem is many commentators are not economic historians, and do not have the technical expertise to understand the issues. It is a bit like writing a history of warfare without knowing the difference between armaments and ammunition. The result is often a superficial conventional wisdom, in which key issues are ignored because the powerful do not want to think about them.

For instance, 1987 to 1993 were six consecutive years of falling output per person, the longest period of economic stagnation in our recorded history (although not as deep as the shorter Great Depression of the 1930s). In those years New Zealand fell from being slightly above the OECD average in the GDP per capita stakes to near twenty percent below. Future historians will not be able to ignore such a dramatic stagnation, especially as it contributes to an explanation of some of the important political and social events of the period and after. Today’s conventional wisdom choses to overlook this salient fat. Those who uncritically relate the conventional wisdom fail their readers, and will look shallow to future ones and to real historians.

I would expect the alternative account of what happened, to which I have contributed, will fare a little better. But even so, over 350 odd years it will be modified. In the interim, we contemporary historians do the rough drafts which future historians will use. One does not ask they find we got it right. One hopes they will find that we tried to tell the truth.

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Avoiding Global Meltdown: How the IMF Lost Battles but Won the War

Listener: 22 October, 2005.

Keywords: Macroeconomics & Money;

Monetary activity is dominated by capital flows. Its interaction with the trade of goods and services may seem marginal, but a financial crisis in the monetary system threatens the payments system, and could lead to a depression. This is especially true internationally because of the foreign exchange requirements of trade.

A worldwide crash may have been just avoided in the past decade when a series of financial disasters could have collapsed the world payments system. The threats were possible major financial defaults by Mexico (in 1994-5), Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea (1997), Russia and Long Term Capital Management – LTCM (1998), Brazil (1999), Turkey (2000) and Argentina (2000-1).

The Chastening provides a thrilling and chilling account, in the words of the subtitle, “Inside the Crisis That Rocked the Global Financial System and Humbled the IMF”. Its author, Paul Blustein, an economics journalist for the Washington Post, has written an exceptionally revealing work, based on careful interviews with the main players and the documents.

At the heart of each bailout, LTCM excepted, was the International Monetary Fund. Although the world’s lender of last resort may be the bête noir of many people, Blustein’s sober account is more complex, more nuanced, and all the more revealing. When a country’s financial system was in difficulties (running out of foreign exchange), representatives of the IMF would turn up, do their best, act professionally, and generally behave honourably.

However, often they got it wrong – sometimes badly – especially from requiring too tight a fiscal stance. So the rescue package often had unintended outcomes. (The IMF thinks so, too. It has the commendable practice of reviewing its performance after each package. Would that our government agencies were as brave.)

It was not always the officials’ fault. Sometimes the troubled country would hide crucial information. Sometimes the IMF’s reserves were overwhelmed by the quantities of foreign exchange required for the bailout, and it had to go to other holders of foreign exchange with their own agendas – the US Treasury in particular. (Even New Zealand was asked to contribute, an indication that our dollar has some international standing.)

More important, the IMF staff were not always expert on the countries involved. Often they seemed to demand economic reforms so that the country conformed to the models that the officials understood. The packages then failed because the economies did not conform.

Although generally the IMF was more honourable than their critics allow, the Indonesia intervention is somewhat murkier. Blustein tells the story of Paul Volcker, the chairman of the American Federal Reserve Bank prior to Alan Greenspan, flying to Indonesia at the government’s invitation. It was a long flight. “I’m half asleep and I get to page 46 or something [of the IMF proposals] and there I see [the provision for dismantling the monopoly on cloves].” You may ask, as did Volcker, “What on earth has a spice monopoly to do with restoring financial stability?” It was not just that the IMF was trying to make the economy conform to their competitive models. The monopolist was a son of Indonesian President Suharto.

Blustein reports that there was even consideration given to using IMF et al leverage to topple Suharto. I have no truck with this unpleasant kleptocratic dictator who promoted graft, corruption and cronyism. But it is not the function of supranational authorities to decide who should be running a country. Fortunately, wiser heads within the IMF prevailed. The Indonesian crisis was the only case of such a contemplation of regime change that Blustein found.

Even though the IMF made numerous mistakes, marvellously their actions prevented the collapse of the global financial system. They may have lost battles, but they won the war, preventing a global monetary crisis. But it was damned close.

Why the war? Blustein largely takes it as the result of wrong policies in the crisis countries. However, the Reagan years, with their substantial US fiscal deficit, flooded the world with American dollars, facilitating poor quality financial practices in some countries. When the elder George Bush and Bill Clinton turned off the flood, the inept practices became exposed.

Blustein says that the IMF is humbler. Let’s hope it has learnt from its past mistakes. There will be more bailouts.

It’s the Economy, Stupid: the Election Was Not About the Economy. Why?

Listener: 8 October, 2005.

Keywords: Macroeconomics & Money;

In a few months, the 2005 election debate may be forgotten, as we focus on the real economic issues that were hardly addressed during it. The most salient include:

1. The Current Account Deficit: we are working (and holidaying) for 11 months and spending for 12. Private foreign debt is high and growing. If there are ructions in the world financial system, New Zealand will suffer because of the private debt and deficit overload. (The good news is the low government debt may help us to manage the crisis.)

2. The oil price spike, mainly arising from the shortage of refining capacity: we don’t know how long or how damaging it is to the world economy, but it is impacting on ours.

3. Inflation: low unemployment, cost pressures and the oil price spike add to the problem.

4. The growth path: we have to move from a low productivity growth/labour-extensive growth strategy to a high productivity one because the sources of additional labour are running out. (One of the sillier episodes was a group of politicians saying on TV that we needed more economic growth, as if the aspiration would magically produce the desired outcome. I did not hear a single practical policy discussion, although there was the usual cant of ideology unsupported by facts.)

I have summarised each briefly because, I promise you, commentators and this column will be repeatedly coming back to them once the election partying is over.

Regrettably, as a result of the election we have to add a fifth concern, exacerbating the others.

5. Fiscal stability: election promises of tax cuts and spending will be hard to meet.

One estimate had National promising a net increase of $4.5 billion a year in spending, three years out. That is a big fiscal injection of about three percent of GDP.

Labour retaliated, according to this estimate, with $1.2 billion pa extra cuts and spending. Both estimates could be contested – they seem a bit low to me – but even Labour will have difficulty keeping to its promises without knocking the economy off course into more inflation, a bigger current account deficit and lower sustainable growth. Expect a vigorous version of the usual post-election government expenditure review.

National went into the election with the most impressive finance team of politicians ever: Reserve Banker Don Brash,merchant banker John Key and ex-Treasury official and previous Minister of Finance Bill English. And yet they ended up with an excessively expansionary – many would say irresponsible – fiscal package (unless they had some secret plan to cut spending, which they hotly denied).

Had you doubts of this assessment, consider their last announced policy, the temporary tax reduction on petrol. It was an attempt to curry public favour, without addressing the real problem of the oil price spike, by shifting it onto the fiscal deficit. Who does such brazen cynicism remind you of? Rob Muldoon of course. And yet the three are not economic Muldoonists.

Perhaps the New Right believed its own propaganda, that its measures of the 80s and 90s had put the economy onto a golden path (albeit one that was some 20 percent lower than when they started). So instead of arguing that we had serious economic challenges and National had the men to address them, they assumed everything was satisfactory and the issue was about spending any future gains.

My doubts about such gains were confirmed by one statistic. In the six Labour years, real income rose about 21.5 percent and real private consumption by 25.7 percent. (Real government spending rose about 22.2 percent.) The figures mean that private consumption is already outstripping what we were earning. That’s the reason that the current account looks so shaky. And yet – and yet – National was offering a further three percent boost.

It was, of course, not in Labour’s interests to tell you that despite the excellent economic performance, we still face challenges. It went into the election on “you’ve never had it so good” slogan, and came out with “and it’s going to be even better”. Well, yes, we have never had it so good. But to get better is going to require some hard work, beginning with more fiscal discipline.

The Opinion Polls and the 2005 Election.

Some material I prepared just before the election, which my son put on his Vorb website, where there are the graphs and some subsequent comments.

Keywords: Political Economy & History; Statistics;

I thought you might be interested in the following two charts. They combine four polls (NZH, Fairfax, TV1, TV3), interpolate between polls and project after them (out to election day – a very foolish thing I add).

Some material I prepared just before the election, which my son put on his Vorb website, where there is also commentary and the graphs

Keywords: Political Economy & History; Statistics;

I thought you might be interested in the following two charts. They combine four polls (NZH, Fairfax, TV1, TV3), interpolate between polls and project after them (out to election day – a very foolish thing I add).

Briefly they suggest
1. Labour hit its nadir on the 6th Sept and has been slowly recovering.
2. National peaked on 30th August, and has been falling steadily since.

3. Little gains or losses to NZF or Greens but, if you trust the polls, both are above 5 percent (but given what has been going on in Tauranga, who knows).

4. Not much movement in ACT or Maori Party.

5. Some growth in Progressive but this may be the effect of sampling error.

6. UF seems to be a gainer from the falling off from National (as I expected).

7. LPG has always been the dominant party, but was struggling at the end of August.

BUT it does not have enough votes to govern without support from UF, or NZF, or MP.

Couple of other things.
A. Take the last 5 observations with a grain of salt.
B. I don’t trust the polls to give good levels. It is still a close run thing.

As Jim Bolger famously said ‘Bugger the Polls’.

But as Nobel prize winning economist Bob Solow famously said of the addicted gambler’s response to the pokie machines in a far from salubrious joint, ‘I know they are crooked but they are the only game in town.’

Comment: with hindsight

As a statistician I have long had an interest is surveys and opinion polls, and did a lot of work on them in the early 1980s. For most of the time the outcome cannot be verified. Hence the interest in analysing them statistically just before the election.

Public opinion pollsters do not randomly survey (which is what they theory of sampling requires) but they ‘quota’ sample, that is they divided the population into groups, calculate the share in the overall sample that each group should have (the ‘quota’), and telephone around until they fill the quota. We have to take it on trust that the procedure gives an unbiased outcome. (‘Bias’ here is used in the statistical sense, not the political one. I am not saying particular pollsters favour particular political groups.)

The public polls were all over the place. Two taken at about the same time could be statistically inconsistent. They are great for commentators and as talking points. But did they contain anyinformation?

My assumption was that their levels were statistically biassed but the trends were not. (The trends could be biassed, if different quota groups were behaving differently.) So I pooled them. (Others pool them too, but they dont usually allow for timing differences.)

It’s all a bit rough, if less rough taking the polls on faith. You can see the graphs of the trends at Vorb. Note I projected the trends out to election day.

For the record, the election day projections and actual outcomes were as follows:

Party Share (%): Pre-election and Prediction and Post-Election Actuals

PARTY Prediction Outcome
Labour 40.6 41.1
National 38.8 39.1
NZF 7.0 5.7
Greens 5.3 5.3
Maori P 1.5 2.1
United F 3.9 2.7
Act 0.6 1.5
Progressive 1.5 1.2
Other 0.9 1.2

On the whole the fit is not bad, although not perfect. (I could make it look even more impressive by rounding to the percent.) It is certainly within the ‘margin of error’ (whatever that means, as any statistician must dryly add.

I found this fascinating. It suggests what while the levels in each poll are unreliable parties, the trends may not be, and the average (poll of poll) levels may have been about right. Apparently all the idiosyncratic quota cancel one another out.

A cheer for Gauss and his Central Limit Theorem?

What Happens After Oil Production Peaks

“Peak Oil: Economic, Political & Environmental Impacts” Monday 26th September, organised by the VUW chaplaincy.

Keywords: Environment & Resources;

When we were young we assumed that our parents will live for ever. As adolescents, we realise they will die one day, but at a time so far in the future it hardly seems relevant. As mature adults we realise that day is closing in, and we wonder what it will be like when they go. And so they pass on, but you survive in the world without them – perhaps, like me, missing them.

It’s the same with oil. In our ecological childhood we thought the supplies were eternal. Later we worked out they were finite, but we thought it was a long way off before they ran out. Nowadays we know that one year the world’s total oil production will peak, and decline thereafter. My co-presenter Bob Lloyd has gone through the evidence. It is clear there is considerable room for disagreement. Some experts think it will be this year or next, others think the peak is decades off. In 1979, British Petroleum experts predicted it would happen in 1985.

Our understanding is not helped by those who cry wolf, promising that the peak would be soon, and the world will end shortly after. Any market it subject to ups and downs, but that does not prove that there will be a fundamental change in the near future. Its like the busy bodies who remind you of your parents’ impending demise every time they get the flu. I still await the doomsayers, who predicted in 1981 that oil prices would soon double, to come back to me.

In fact the oil price today is about back where it was in 1981 relative to other prices. That is a problem just as a parent in bed with the flu is a problem. But your doctor does not announce the parent is mortal and doomed. He, or she, examines the patient and diagnoses what is going on.

The diagnosis is that the world economy is in an upswing, particularly as a result of the US and Chinese economic booms and so it is using more oil. However, we seem to have the production capacity to produce enough oil, although there is not much of a margin. Where there is no margin is in refining capacity. During the last decade, it has been growing more slowly than demand and we seem to be in a situation where world demand for oil products exceeds what can be supplied, even when the Gulf of Mexico refineries return to full production after their hurricanes. More refineries can be built, but that takes time, so prices may be high for a while. But price spikes from such short term phenomenon do not presage the end of oil.

There are other events which could cause such oil price spikes. Terrorism taking out a major installation; a shipping accident blocking the Straits of Hormuz at the entrance of the Persian (or Arabian) Gulf.

Even so, Bob’s paper indicates, one day – probably in our lifetime – the world’s total oil production is going to peak.

The world as we know it will not end the following day. (In any case, the peak will involve a higher level of production than today, with probably some time before it is back at current levels or lower.)

The production peak will have been signalled by rising oil prices, which will encourage further production from old fields. As the price of transport fuels continue to rise tar-sands become commercially exploitable. Substitutes – bio-fuels, coal, electricity and gas, possibly hydrogen – also become commercial, while some static fuel sources – solar energy and wind – will enable other energy forms to be switched to fuel.

When I last looked at the likely economic cost of the supply of suitable substitutes for oil, I got an estimate near $US70, around about what it is now, when they would be commerically viable. That does not mean they will cut in tomorrow. First, the figure was a projection of what the likely cost of supply would be five or so years out. It is a bit higher at the moment. Second, this is a long run figure, which is not comparable with short term peaks. Third, it takes time to build the production capacity of the alternatives.

However, the best I could judge, around $US70 a barrel was the long run level for liquid fuels, even after oil production peaks. That does not mean we wont get price spikes above that on occasions. But the likelihood is that as the new alternate fuels cut in the cost of transport energy as oil phases out will be substantially higher than it has been over the last few years, and comparable to what it is currently is.

The higher prices means users will be more fuel efficient. As a result our ways will steadily – but probably slowly – change. We will use smaller more fuel efficient cars, and drive less while walking, biking and using public transport more. Houses on the outskirts of town away from public transport will become less attractive, and their relative price would fall. Inner city accommodation may boom.

Because some of the alternative fuels have non-transport uses (and elsewhere in the world fuel oil is used for home heating and industrial production) the price of other energy forms would also rise. Heating your home would be more expensive so people would dress warmer. Air conditioning would be reduced – people may stop living as much in subtropical climes (and also the colder ones). Temperate zones would become fashionable again.

Industry would look for more energy efficient production methods; we would cut back our consumption of energy intensive products like aluminium. Some products currently made offshore would be made locally to conserve costs of transport, although information industries would remain footloose.

After oil production peaks the world as we know it would not end. It would change steadily – as it usually does.

My intuition – I have never seen any projections – is that there will be a period of slower economic growth associated with the shift to less energy intensive technologies and changes in the expression of demand. Essentially there would be a slowing down or even a reduction of productivity during the transition. I dont know how long it would be – at least a decade I would guess. The world economy would be more difficult to manage, but there need not depression. Recall the late 1970s, when there was a world productivity slowdown.

A more serious term threat is that some country – or some interests in some country – will think it can secure its energy supplies by invading a net energy producer. In principle this involves only a change in ownership of the resource, not its long term usage. In practice war can be very disruptive, the costs far outweighing the returns.

That is what we learned from the Second World War, which in part was a struggle for control of resources. Fortunately Germany now knows that lebensraum can be better pursued by commercial market transactions: Japan learned the same about its Co-prosperity Sphere. Some of the American Right, with ‘might equals right’ just under its rhetoric, have yet to learn that markets are more efficient than war. But many Americans have. Let’s hope their good sense prevails.

So what to do? That is where the timing of the peak is important. Just how close does it have to be before one starts planning for the higher fuel prices that go with it. The problem is some of the adjustment will involve capital goods that will exist for a very long time. This is especially true for housing – both in terms of location and insulation. It may be for some transport. And business plant and equipment may also require forward planning.

The public sector has an important role. It seems likely that our transport infrastructure has got so far behind, much of what we are putting in today will still be viable in a decade, even if fuel prices are much higher. But we would need more public transport, and that may mean putting in the infrastructure now. On the other hand we need to be careful that we dont spend a fortune on infrastructure that is underutilised as people instead turn to fuel efficient cars, bike, walk, and inner city accommodation.

And we need to be realistic. Many will not give up their cars, although they will use them less. Perhaps we should focus on better commuting, so there is more fuel available for leisure.

The oil price spike may be a blessing, because it stimulates people to think about the longer term. Some have transferred to public transport – will they stay their when the spike settles back? Others will be reconsidering their location. Hopefully the public sector too will be stimulated to think more ahead.

But as the Hitchiker’s Guide said in large friendly letters ‘Dont Panic’. The depletion of our oil reserves is a problem, but it is not an unresolvable one, although we will resolve it better as we plan ahead.

To illustrate the orders of magnitude, let me talk a little about what may be a real panic. While global warming has been a concern to some for some time, my impression is that the evidence is accumulating that serious warming is occurring, and insofar as this has been precipitated by human actions, those actions are unlikely to be reversed in the near future.

(Oh yes, I am aware that there is an interdependence between global warming and oil consumption. But I skip that intricacy for a larger issue.)

The global warming problem is more serious because, unlike the oil peak which can be largely dealt with by the market mechanism, there is no natural homoeostatic mechanism to move the world back into medium term equilibrium. The necessary measures involve a political will which thus far the world has not shown, with at least two major blocs with different policies – perhaps neither able to slow down the warming. In contrast with peak oil there is a market mechanism which will cope without a lot of government intervention, although some intervention will ease the transition and help us cope better.

In the case of global warming, it is the other way around. It requires government intervention which may be facilitated by the use of market mechanisms. Thus global warming is potentially a far greater threat than the oil production peaking. Moreover unlike the peak, the warming process is not in the future but already underway.

That is not to say that we should ignore the oil production peaking. It is inevitable and the world will have to adjust to it. So while we need to ignore those who misleadingly cry wolf, we should and respond to a real threat. But it is not the greatest threat that the world economy or ecology faces.

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Heart Gains: David Hay, Pioneer Cardiac Physician

Listener: 24 September, 2005.

Keywords: Health;

Although we think of lung cancer as the disease of tobacco, the weed is associated with other cancers, with respiratory disease (such as emphysema), and with heart and circulation conditions (cardiovascular disease). Not only do the chemicals in tobacco smoke trigger mutations within cells that lead to cancer, and damage the lungs, but they also stiffen the walls of the blood vessels. That requires the heart to work harder, so smokers are more prone to coronary heart disease (CHD) and stroke. Stopping smoking is the best way of preventing heart disease.

So it is not so surprising that New Zealand’s anti-tobacco campaign was led by cardiologist Sir David Hay, of Christ-church, who has just published his memoirs, Heart Sounds. Hay became a cardiac physician in the 1950s, when the eminent British epidemiologist Sir Richard Doll, who died a few months ago, began reporting his ground-breaking work, which showed that smoking causes early mortality. Hay returned from his British training in 1955 convinced that New Zealanders had to quit smoking. As the first medical director of the New Zealand Heart Foundation, he had a leading role in the campaign.

It makes good sense for a heart doctor to recommend smoking cessation. Cancer physicians welcome quitting, too, but the mutation that triggers the cancer or the undermining of the lung may be not reversible, although cessation stops further mutations and damage. The news from cardiologists is even more heartening.

Within a year of quitting, the excess risk of CHD caused by smoking is reduced to about half. It continues to decline gradually. After 15 years of abstinence, the risk of CHD is similar to that of persons who have never smoked. The risk of stroke for ex-smokers takes five to 15 years to return to that of never-smokers. (The current state of knowledge is summarised in a recent National Heart Foundation technical paper authored by Dr Hay, although he is officially long-retired.)

It is a standard joke that your GP will advise you to stop smoking, even if a cigarette has never passed your lips. Breathing in other people’s cigarette smoke also raises disease risks. One study found that nurses regularly exposed to second-hand smoke at work were almost twice as likely as the unexposed to suffer heart disease.

The shift in attitudes to smoking has been brought about by the efforts of many people. GPs discouraged their patients from smoking. Public health physician Murray Laugesen at the Ministry of Health, oncologist Alan Gray first medical director of the Cancer Society, and university epidemiologist Robert Beaglehole played vital roles. So have numerous lay-people, particularly Deirdre Kent, first director of ASH (Action on Smoking and Health), which Hay helped found. Their concern and passion enabled politicians to institute measures to reduce smoking (including raising excise duties on tobacco). The anti-smoking campaign is probably the single most important health measure taken in the past 30 years.

Hay’s genial book throws light on medicine over the past 50 years, with frequent apologies for past practices that would be unacceptable today; there have been improvements in how we treat patients.

The reflection is more strident in the penultimate chapter’s “personal prescriptions”, when the autobiographer becomes the passionate physician giving firm advice on how to look after one’s heart. The gentle humour remains, as Hay starts by confessing that he, too, has trouble with his weight. (He experimentally smoked as a teenager, but never as an adult.) For the chapter is about changing diet, increasing exercise, and that damned controlling of weight, as well as not smoking. Hay was also a pioneer in the promotion of behaviour change. Much of what he suggested is today’s conventional wisdom – his advocacy helped make it so.

This leads to the economic problem of the ageing population, as greater longevity imposes a heavier burden on the economy. However, we all benefit if loved ones survive longer because of taking David Hay’s advice, so that is a challenge economists can live with.

Building Coalitions: the Banzhaf Index

On Friday 23 September, 2005, this was put on the No Right Turn website . It used the election night seat outruns. I have updated it to the final election seat outturns, and added a subsequent comment.

Keywords: Political Economy & History; Statistics;

One of the advantages of MMP is it enables us to think more systematically about the political process (although given much of the nonsense that is being written at the moment, it does not appear to force us to). What this note sets out is a a mathematical procedure which enables us to think systematically about coalitions (although, and as I shall explain, like most mathematical models it has imitations) .

However, first a word about its progenitor, John F. Banshaf III, a remarkable professor of law at George Washington University who is known as the ‘Ralph Nader of the Tobacco Industry,’ “the Ralph Nader of Junk Food,’ ‘The Man Who Is Taking Fat to Court’ and ‘Mr. Anti-Smoking’. (He is also Faculty Advisor for the GWU Volleyball Team.) Earlier he had been an electrical engineer and obtained the first copyright ever registered on a computer program. He also developed a method for measuring the power of parties negotiating coalitions – the Banzhaf Index.

The Banzhaf Index

I use the Banzhaf Index in the current New Zealand political situation. I take the current allocation of seats. The specials may change the numbers but not the principles illustrated here.

There are eight parties vying for power, with a total of 121 seats. Each may be in or out of a coalition, so in total there is the possibility of 28 or 256 coalitions (including the zero when nobody joins). There are 128 of these in which the coalition has the required 61 votes or more to govern.

Of course not all parties belong to all the possible successful coalitions. Labour with 50 votes is in 72 (or 78%) of the coalitions. The figures for all the parties are shown in column 4 (and column 5) of Table I.

However, this does not discriminate between the importance of a party in a coalition. For instance in the coalition of all parties with 121 seats, if Progressives with their one seat walk out the coalition still has 120 seats, more than enough to govern.

So the Banzhaf index involves counting the number of times of a party to walk out of a coalition with the result that it loses its majority. In the current situation, any party can walk out of the ‘All’ coalition and it would still have a majority. (Were Labour to walk out, there would still have 71 (121-50) votes).

As it happens Labour is required in 72 of the 128 coalitions, while the Progressives are required in only 5 of them. (Column 6). The Banzhaf index adds the number of times this happens for all parties (237) calculates each party’s total as a proportion of the grand total, and calls the level of power of each party relative to the rest. (So Labour’s relative power is 72/237 = 30.4%).

TABLE I: Illustrating the Banzhaf Index

Party Seats % Coalitions % Vetos %
Labour 50 41.3 100 78.1 72 30.4
National 48 39.7 92 71.9 56 23.6
NZ First 7 5.8 82 64.1 36 15.2
Greens 6 5.0 78 60.9 28 11.8
Maori P 4 3.3 74 57.8 20 8,4
U Future 3 2.5 70 54.7 12 5.1
ACT 2 1.7 68 53.1 8 3.4
Progressive 1 .8 66 51.6 5 2.1
TOTAL 121 100.0 124 100.0 236 100.0

The final column in bold shows the Banzhaf index of the power of each party in coalition forming.

We have the well known phenomenon that smaller parties seem to have power out of proportion to their votes.

Incompatibles

The previous section was highly idealised, assuming that the parties are only interested in power and have no principles (or backers, which is often the same thing). Sometimes parties are incompatible and wont go into coalition together.

So lets add some of those principles as follows:
1. Progressives always go with Labour
2. ACT and the Greens never go with each other
3. The Maori Party wont go with National because it wont entrench the Maori Seat provision.
(I can easily add some more, but this illustration suffices.).

Now there are only 26 viable coalitions, and as Table II shows Labour is in 90.6% of them.

TABLE II: Banzhaf Index with Some Political Restrictions

Party Seats % Coalitions % Vetos %
Labour +
Progressive
51 42.1 24 90.6 22 41.5
National 48 39.7 14 52.8 10 18.9
NZ First 7 5.8 18 67.9 10 18.9
Greens 6 5.0 12 45.3 5 9.4
Maori P 4 3.3 8 30.2 4 7.5
U Future 3 2.5 14 52.8 2 3.8
ACT 2 1.7 7 1.7 0 0.0
TOTAL 121 100.0 26 100.0 53 100.0

The final column in bold shows the Banzhaf index of the power of each party in coalition forming.

Not surprisingly, those parties which do not rule out partners as a matter of principle generally have a higher proportion of vetos and more power relative to the unrestricted case. Conversely those that rule out some options have a lower proportion of the vetos and less power. Sometimes the bigger party has which has restrictions has less power than the smaller pragmatic party.

The exception is ACT. Through a quirk of the numbers, a party with 2 seats is unable to veto any coalition.

Minority Government

Banzhaf designed his index for one-off situations. It is usually illustrated in the American literature, by the Electoral College for the US President, which comes together, votes on the sole matter of who is to be the next president, and then dissolves.

The New Zealand situation is different because the parties meet again after every election and, as we shall see, the prospect of that affects how they behave now. Moreover, the coalition process is an ongoing one in the intervening three years, particularly when there is a minority government, as there has been in eight of the last ten years and there is likely to be over the next three (and probably after).

We can adapt the index as follows. Let’s assume that Labour remains a minority government with the Progressives. It has to seek coalitions of the remaining six parties in parliament (that is the government has to raise at least another 11 votes).. There are coalitions available to it for this purpose Table III shows the calculations for the minority parties.

The Labour and Progressive row is deleted. The theory is not robust enough to measure the power of an incumbent minority government, which has a whole range of institutional instruments which enhance the power from their seats. However the Banzhaf Index can be used to measure the relative power of those outside government, as Table III shows.

TABLE III: Banzhaf Index for Relative Strengths of Outside Parties (assuming Labour and Progressives form a minority government)

Party Seats % Coalitions % Vetos %
National 48 68.6 32 62.7 13 34.2
NZ First 7 10.0 30 58.8 9 23.7
Greens 6 8.6 29 56.9 5 13.2
Maori P 4 5.7 28 54.9 5 13.2
U Future 3 4.3 27 52.9 3 7.9
ACT 2 2.9 52 21.0 1 2.6
TOTAL 70 100.0 52 100.0 38 100.0

The final column in bold shows the Banzhaf index of the power of each party to influence the minority government.

Table III suggests that while National has more than two thirds of the seats outside the minority government, it has only just over one third of the power to form a coalition to influence the minority government. All the other parties have correspondingly more power.

National Remains Outside

However, this requires cooperating with the government which, for reasons good or bad, National has not done so in the past. Suppose they refuse to join in. Table IV shows the relative power of the remaining parties outside parliament (assuming that ACT is willing to cooperate).

TABLE IV : Banzhaf Index for Relative Strengths of Outside Parties (assuming Labour and Progressives form a minority government and National is not willing to cooperate).

Party Seats % Coalitions % Vetos %
NZ First 7 31.8 28 73.7 18 36.0
Greens 6 28.0 26 68.4 14 28
Maori P 4 18.2 24 63.2 10 20.0
U Future 3 13.6 22 57.9 6 12.0
ACT 2 9.1 20 52.6 2 4.0
TOTAL 121 100.0 38 100.0 50 100.0

The final column in bold shows the Banzhaf index of the power of each party to influence the minority government.

The outcome is that the power of the remaining parties is close to their proportion of seats. Moreover, their power is higher than if National was a player. In effect National not joining in gives the others more power, for three or so years anyway.

Conclusion

The above has tried to clarify the current state of the coalition discussions using the Banzhaf index of power. It shows that if there is a minority Labour led government, and National does not join in the coalition making on a one policy basis, the role of the minor parties is strengthened.

There are at least two further caveats in this assessment. The theory is really about a series of one night stands. Coalitions, even those between those inside and outside government, often have more of a marriage element, insofar as one party may compromise against its immediate interests in order to get overall gains in the long run.

Second, while National will not join in the public glare of the House, as is well known that Select Committees are considerably more cooperative. No doubt the coalition principles explored here are relevant, although the caution about the ‘one night stand’ assumption applies here too.

Notes

The theory of the Banzhaf index .

A computational algorithm is available. This makes some assumptions which results in estimates not quite as precise as those given here, which are derived from a spreadsheet. This more tedious procedure gives the user a better feel of the underlying theory, and also allows the introduction of the incompatibility restrictions.

Read more about John F. Banzhaf III. Its enough to make someone need a hamburger. ☺

Added later
As I tread to explain the Banzhaf Index is a bit stiff and clunky. It does not quite match reality. But it does enable one to think systematically about coalition, which is more than many commentators have been doing. Indeed it is more than many politicians may have been.
As I tread to explain the Banzhaf Index is a bit stiff and clunky. It does not quite match reality. But it does enable one to think systematically about coalition, which is more than many commentators have been doing. Indeed it is more than many politicians may have been. While revising for the final counts, I came up with the following simplification:

Given a Labour+Progressive Government, the following partners would give it a majority in the house:

National;
New Zealand First + Greens;
New Zealand First + Maori Party;
New Zealand First + United Future;
Greens + Maori Party;
Greens + United Future + ACT.

All are not equally likely.

I also looked at abstentions. (The Banzhaf index in its current form does not alolow for this).

If New Zealand Future or the Maori Party abstain, there are no new combinations;
If the Greens abstain, New Zealand First by itself of Maori Party + United Future + Act would also give the government a majority;
If United Future abstains, then New Zealand First + ACT give a majority;
If ACT abstains, then Greens + United future give a majority.
If New Zealand Future and the Maori Party abstain, then the Greens by themselves give the government a majority.

And so on. If it is a minority government these combinations can go on for ages ☺.

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The Economics and Politics Of Globalisation

Revised version of Paper for NZIIA Seminar “The Economic and Social Impacts of Globalisation” 21 September, 2005.

Keywords: Globalisation & Trade;

 

The Economics of Globalisation: An Introduction is a version of this paper with a more detailed economic analysis

Introduction

The Royal Society of New Zealand awarded me a Marsden Fund grant to study globalisation. The study is a continuation of my earlier research program, especially that which is summarised in my book In Stormy Seas with its central message that the fate of New Zealand will be largely a consequence of what happens overseas, together with our ability to seize the opportunities and manage the problems those events create.

The study is founded on five themes.

1. Globalisation is the economic integration of economies – regional and national economies.

2. Globalisation began in the early nineteenth century, so the phenomenon is almost two centuries old. Since globalisation is an historical phenomenon, focusing on the last few decades throws away a rich source of insights.

3. Globalisation is caused by the falling cost of distance: transport costs, plus the costs of storage, security, timeliness, information, and intimacy. This gives a driver for the globalisation process.

4. Globalisation is not solely an economic phenomenon. It has political, social and cultural consequences.

5. The policy issue is not being for or against globalisation, but how to harness it to give desirable outcomes.

The structure of the program is it first develops the economic analytics, and then explores political and social consequences such as nationalism, sovereignty, policy convergence, cultural convergence, and diasporas.

The Underlying Economics

Much of New Zealand economic thinking is trapped in economic models which have been superceded in the last thirty on years. This does not mean the old theories are wrong, so much as that they can be advanced. Many of the policy stances that are derived from the superceded theories are still valid, but the current understandings are richer and more nuanced. In particular, I know of no reason to abandon the strategy of global connectedness, which is one of the principles of the government’s growth and innovation framework.

The new analysis focuses on economies of scale and the costs of distance, phenomenon which are largely ignored by the superceded theory. Their interaction generates outcomes which can be quite different from the standard theory without costs of distance and only diminishing returns. Sometimes the outcomes are not obviously intuitive to the well trained economist.

The Costs of Distance

The costs of distance are more than transport costs. They include storage, security, timeliness, information, and the loss of intimacy that separation causes. A paper ‘Trade Costs’ by James Anderson and Eric von Wincoop, calculates that the average American manufacture has a mark-up of 55% from the factory door to the final domestic retail price. The price of an export involves a 170% markup, or 74% more than the domestic sale.

Analytically the costs mayf distance (or trade costs) may be treated as a tariff. (Recall that costs of difference are sometimes called ‘natural protection’). Total costs of distance far exceed tariffs.

Moreover, they are coming down. While we can not measure the fall in the costs of distance precisely we can observe it schematically. In 1855 it took around three months to get from New Zealand to Britain, whether it was sending a package, a person or a message. Let’s represent the time by a line across the page:

************************************************

Today it takes only a month to get to Britain by ship. That’s because ships are faster, and they can go through the Panama Canal. That line now looks like:

**************

But that is misleading in regard to people and light valuable goods. Once they went by ship to London too. Today they can fly to London in less than two days. Compared to the 1855 their world looks like:

*

Yet information can be sent in vast quantities almost instantaneously via the world wide web. On the same scale that time is represented by something smaller than the full stop which ends this sentence.

A practical illustration of the implications of the falling costs of distance is that New Zealand’s second largest import port by value and our third largest export port by value is Auckland International Airport. Even that underestimates its importance, because it does not include the value of the tourism that passes through it. Perhaps one day Auckland International Airport will be our largest export and import port. It may not hold that position for long, when the broadband connection with the rest of the world generates an even greater flow of business.

Some Economic Analysis

I now skip through the economic analytics by referring to some, but not all, of it.

One describes how falling costs of distance changed an entire political economy, using the impact of refrigeration on New Zealand, which changed the effective cost of distance for meat and dairy products from prohibitive to negligible. That shifted the New Zealand political economy from the quarry to the sustainable settlement based on processed grass which dominated 80 years of our history.

The New Zealand experience can be explained by the traditional comparative advantage model. It does not explain urbanisation which depends on industry economies of scale (agglomeration), where as an industry increases in size in a location it experiences falling costs. Agglomeration is a super-multiplier, which enhances any initial superiority of location, although it can be offset by congestion costs. The cost and quality of future governance is also important. The book’s illustration is New York, but recently I have been applying the analysis to Auckland.

A later chapter describes how many services have become internationally tradeable. In recent years, as telecommunications costs have collapsed, so parts of the service industry need no longer be located near the customer. Such offshoring is not a new phenomenon, but an extension of the relocation of manufacturing which has been going on for a couple of centuries. Thus the offshoring of ICT services to Bangalore parallels the offshoring of manufacturing to China.

One of the peculiarities of the new theory is the location of some industries are not determinant but accidental. Why should Nokia, the world’s largest mobile phone company, be located in Finland? The answer may be that economies of scale and low distance costs creates the possibility that some industries simply occur in particular locations as the result of accidents of history and path dependence. (Fisher and Paykel is a New Zealand parallel. Why should we be good at whiteware?)

This explains the role of competitive advantage. In contrast, comparative advantage generates deterministic locations. But suppose accidence results in industry starting up in a particular place. How does it maintain its predominance, when other businesses and locations can replicate its production processes? Dominance can be maintained by the first mover if it continues to innovate ahead of its rivals. That is the core of competitive advantage.

Another peculiarity of this theory, and the modern world, is intra-industry trade (IIT), which traditional theory based on comparative advantage does not predict. IIT occurs when two economies export and import the same product. Whereas it hardly existed internationally in 1950, it is now thought that about a quarter of the international trade in goods is IIT. (The other quarters are oil, primary commodities, and other manufactures). We need to be aware that New Zealand has one of the lowest levels of IIT among rich economies.

In preparation for my final discussion in this paper, I need to mention the chapters on technology transfer and the related Convergence Club where countries which are high income at one point in time, tend to remain high income thereafter. In contrast, very few companies which were top a century ago, or even a quarter of a century ago, even exist today. Economists are comfortable with this high business turnover. Why dont countries experience a similar turbulence in their ranking? Again this is not predicted by comparative advantage.

Prospects and Strategy for the New Zealand Economy

Before concluding this part I want to say something about its implications of the theory for the New Zealand’s economy’s prospects and strategy.

In their The Size of Nations, Alberto Alesina and Enrico Spoloare argue that middle sized countries (New Zealand would be on the lower end of the group) tend to have a better economic performance than larger economies, because they are simpler to govern. Much of the research on economic growth focuses on the market sector ignoring the public sector, or seeing it as a handicap. Instead, they argue the public sector is important, and that the less heterogeneous the population the more efficient the sector is. In simple terms New Zealand has a comparative advantage in its public sector.

Middle sized countries face a tradeoff of a more efficient public sector with less economies of scale in market production. The resolution is specialisation in production, with international trade converting the production into a more general mix of consumption. The paradox, lurking throughout the book, is that smaller nation-states may be able to survive, but only by abandoning some sovereignty by participating in international trade. Global connectedness is critical.

The Consequences

The second part looks at the consequences of the economic processes I have just described.

It begins with nationalism. The nation-state is a relatively recent phenomenon, no more than a couple of centuries old. Germany did not exist as a state in 1805. Two hundred years later it has many of the state’s ‘traditional’ functions subordinated to the European Union. Nation-states are a response to the falling costs of distance, which made smaller communities part of larger communities. I discriminate between ethnic nationalism and civic nationalism. The former defines national identity by membership of a racial, ethnic, or religious type. The latter defines itself by membership of the community, and is far more tolerant of diversity. Although the nation-state is changing, thus far the research suggests it will continue to play an important part in people’s lives. Hopefully, it will be increasingly based on civic nationalism.

So I have to explore the meaning of sovereignty, making the distinction between de facto and de jure sovereignty, which often gets lost in popular discussions. The example is the measurement of time. New Zealand has the de jure power to opt out of the international calendar and time system. In practice it would be so unwise that it lacks the de facto power to do so. The same applies to international economic agreements, such as the aborted Multilateral Agreement on Investment, once they are implemented.

This leads to two questions, whose answers to seem to be intimately tied up with the future of the nation-state.

The first is whether cultural convergence is inevitable? Will eventually the entire world – or perhaps initially just the rich world – have a common culture? That Canada has a long and large trading history with the US, and yet remains culturally independent suggests ‘not necessarily’.

The second question is whether there is policy convergence under globalisation. Does everywhere end up with essentially the same policy? It appears that policy convergence in some areas seems all but inevitable, although it can be very slow, as in the case of international trade in agricultural products. However there are some areas where policy convergence appears to be unnecessary, as in much of the health system. And there are policy areas where the outcome is not obvious. Is the social market economy a phase which globalisation will drive out of existence as countries compete to the bottom of raw market solutions? I have yet to answer that question.

The final chapter in this sequence reflects on the role of borders. While jurisdictional authority seems important, I am increasingly thinking that labour mobility is key to many of the politico-economic policy issues which globalisation raises.

That leads to a discussion on kinds of nations. Should New Zealand join Australia, the United States or the European Union or stay outside? What are the viable options for nations in a globalised world? My preliminary thinking is, that in economic terms anyway, it is not necessarily in New Zealand’s interests to abandon its de jure sovereignty, nor is it necessarily inevitable.

Patterns of World Development

I have yet to disentangle the story of gainers and losers from globalisation. So here I onlly look at patterns of world development.

To begin with two long term well-established trends. The first arises from the sharp divergences in income and productivity in the world today. We might expect their distribution to be clumped in the middle with a few extremes at the top and bottom. Instead it is U shaped: a lot of people and countries are at the bottom, more – albeit fewer – at the top, but very few in the middle.

As the convergence club recalls, the reality is that those countries which were poor a hundred years ago, are typically still poor, unlike the era before globalisation, when the relative differences between the top and bottom income countries were tiny in comparison to what they are today. We might have expected economics forces – international trade, international migration, international investment and technology transfer – to have diminished the differences. That is what the advocates for tree trade say. But the convergence club persists. Why?

The second long term trend is that the shifts in the geographical distribution of manufacturing. As the following table shows before globalisation began two countries, India and China produced more than half of the world’s manufactures. Two hundred years later the contribution of the two countries was insignificant. This contrasts starkly with the far greater stability of world population shares.

Manufacturing Output (By World Share: Percent) 1750-1938

Year India China Rest of
Periphery
Developed
Core
1750 24.2 32.8 15.7 27.0
1800 19.7 33.3 14.7 32.3
1830 17.6 29.8 13.3 39.5
1880 2.8 12.5 5.6 79.1
1913 1.4 3.6 2.5 92.5
1938 2.4 3.1 1.7 92.8

Source: Simmons (1985), p.600.

It would be easy to dismiss the change as a consequence of the transformation from handcrafts industry to factory production. But the location of manufacturing type activities may be driven by accident and time dependence.

We can, albeit clumsily, provide a simple model which describes what happens as the costs of distance falls to the manufacturing (relocatable industry with economies of scale) in two identical countries. Initially, the two economies have the same level of manufacturing, but as trade costs decrease, the share of manufacturing goes through a critical point and suddenly one country (arbitrarily) ends up with all the manufacturing, and the other with none.

The manufacturing country is better off. In the formal model the labour force qualities are identical but after the bifurcation workers in one gets paid more than the other, because of the higher productivity of manufacturing and the restriction on labour migration between the countries. In effect, the costs of distance enable the prosperous workers to capture some of the rents from the economies of scale. There are bells and whistles – physical capital, technology, human capital, governance – that can enrich the story. One might speculate that it is not impossible that incomes in the loser economy may stagnate or even decline. Paul Samuelson’s recent paper on offshoring shows that this can happen in the standard model, via terms of trade shifts.

A fuller more complex model might have many bifurcations. The accelerated growth we see among some East Asian economies in the last two decades may be an example of this shifting from one branch of the overall bifurcation to another. Perhaps the economic dominance of the developed core is but a transition in the history of the world economy.

One is reluctant to push the model too far, and the practical world is smoother than its sharp changes. But it might explain the transition from the beginning to end of the nineteenth century as reflecting two sides of the bifurcation.

Models with bifurcation are not common in economics, and their properties are not well understood. In this case as the costs of distance falling, suddenly the model’s bifurcation snaps back, to equal shares of manufacturing for the two idealised countries. The intuition is that when costs of distance are near zero, manufacturing settles to where the population is, and where there are lower wages.

Assuming this is the underlying process, we cannot be sure how long it will take to return to the end outcome of manufacturing shares more closely reflecting population shares. Given that it took over one hundred years to create the developed core, it seems likely that it will take at least a hundred years to end it if that be the destiny. The latter transition may take even longer for today’s core economies have accumulated advantages in physical, social and human capital. But that need not persist forever.

And some other factors may slow down or reverse the process. There may be an minimum to how low distance costs can go. Perhaps costs will rise with higher fuel costs or the needs for security against terrorism. Path dependent theories of growth precipitated by exogenous events leave open many possibilities. It will be our descendants, four and more generations on, who may be able to be more definitive.

China and India

Certainly this chapter will be speculative, but it is a speculation constrained by the discipline of modelling. It reinforces the suspicion that China and India are going to play a more prominent role in New Zealand’s and the world’s future.

So let me a couple of caveats. If China and India are going to become relatively more important in New Zealand’s economic future, which countries are going to become relatively less important? The obvious candidate is Australia.

That is likely to happen with current developments in trading arrangements: China joining the WTO, the Doha round, and free trade agreements with China. If we stop thinking in terms of a two country world, but a three country one – a shift from bilateralism to multilateralism in our modelling and thinking – we see that New Zealand is likely to lose market share for Australian manufactures to China as well as some manufacturing activities in New Zealand.

To go a step further, suppose China and India become major suppliers of general manufactures (including relocatable services) to the world. General manufacturing will almost cease in New Zealand, the exceptions being products that have to be manufactured close to consumers, and the early processing of natural resources to reduce the costs of transport (like stripping water out of milk). Is there room for any other manufacturing? Or will New Zealand revert to being a natural resource exporter (including tourism) with domestic production dominated by services that cannot be relocated.

The analysis is complicated by that the individual phases in manufacturing processes may no longer be under one roof, with components, sourced from different businesses and even different countries given the falling costs of distance, assembled elsewhere. New Zealand may get into some parts of the action, but not others. The offshoring of the manufacturing of swandri clothing to China, while the design and royalties are retained in New Zealand may be a precursor of the future economy.

This challenge is not peculiar to New Zealand. It seems possible that at least in the medium run technologically advanced, highly skilled, innovative manufacture will remain in rich countries. What are we going to do about ensuring New Zealand has such a sector? That, in my opinion, is one of the key objectives of the government’s Growth and Innovation Framework.

Conclusion

Globalisation is going to change dramatically the New Zealand economy. We can resist it temporarily with protection, but that is not a long run solution. Better to engage. To do so requires a more sophisticated understanding than we currently have. Certainly scholars are struggling with the underlying issues, but my impression that policy makers are hardly addressing them, trapped in economic theories which are as Maynard Keynes famously described as ‘defunct’.

I am not yet sure of the study’s policy implications. Anyone with a policy agenda can use the currently available analysis on globalisation to support theirs.As always, my approach, is to push the analysis as far as I can, before coming to policy conclusions, if any.

Ultimately, the cheerful conclusion may be that size need not be a handicap to New Zealand (and any distance handicap is diminishing). However to seize the opportunities, we need to understand better the processes causing them and try to avoid being entrapped by old theories which poorly describe the rich complexity of the world in which we live.