Thinking Fast, Thinking Slow, Thinking Moral

<>Presentation to the Ephesus Group, Wellington; 19 May, 2013.

 

Keywords: History of Ideas, Methodology & Philosophy;

 

I want to start a conversation which I hope will not end tonight. Instead I hope that many of you will go home and read the books on which the conversation is founded and continue it from there.

 

I am not an expert on the subject of either book. Both, in psychology, are outside the disciplines over which I have some mastery, but both shed light on some issues with which my disciplines struggle. Indeed I shall deviate a little from the main conversation to tell you why the first book troubles economists. The troubling of the second book on the politics of social and economic development should be evident enough.

 

The first book is called Thinking Fast and Slow. It is by the experimental psychologist Daniel Kahneman who was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics for some of the work the book covers. The second book is by social psychologist Jonathan Haidt – The Righteous Mind: Why Good People are Divided by Politics and Religion.

 

Haidt acknowledges that his approach is related to Kahneman’s, so there I start. Its key notion – there in the title of the book – is that we think in two quite different ways. Kahneman calls them System 1 and System 2, but I shall call them Think-fast and Think-slow.

 

They are characterised as follows:

Think-fast (System 1) is fast, automatic, frequent, emotional, stereotypic, subconscious;

Think-slow (System 2) is slow, effortful, infrequent, logical, calculating, conscious.

 

You may see the how the two operate differently by considering simple addition. If I ask you what two plus two is, four immediately comes to mind; it’s from your Think-fast system. On the other hand, if I ask you what is 127 plus 494, there is no instant response. In my case I can feel myself pushing the question into another part of my brain and labouriously calculating the correct answer. You have used your Think-slow system.

 

Of course you may have miscalculated despite using Think-slow, but what can be shown is that Think-fast makes mistakes more frequently. You know the advice that ‘before speaking make sure your brain is in gear’? In Kahneman’s analysis this means that instead of relying on Think-fast when you speak, first consult Think-slow.

 

You may wonder why bother with Think-fast given so it is prone to error It has two advantages. First you may need to think quickly – if something is about to fall on you, a Think-slow calculated assessment is less useful than reacting by getting out of the way.

 

But second, Kahneman shows Think-slow uses more energy. You know how you can get terribly tired from thinking – that is Think-slow at work. Without Think-fast it would be much more tiring. Kahneman says we are essentially energy conserving – lazy – and prefer to use Think-fast.

 

Introspecting, I have found Kahneman’s theory helpful, but I am not a trained psychologist so pursuing this here would be of little value. I shall shortly explain how Haidt uses the theory to discuss moral behaviour. Before doing so, a short deviation to review a problem that economists have and show a little more of how the two systems work.

 

Over the years economics has become increasingly dependent upon the assumption of rationality – that is, the belief that people make optimal decisions in their own best interests. It is there in the economics as a science and it also exists in economics as guide to policy. What Kahneman and others – including economists – have shown is that the assumption of rationality is not fully justified. For scientific purposes, abandoning the assumption does not matter – economics limps along with much weaker assumptions based on behavioural regularities. However there is a more substantial challenge to policy economics.

 

People show ‘time inconsistency’. A practical example is you go into the bar for a couple of drinks. The following morning you cant remember how many you had, but your head wishes you had not. What intrigues an economist is that while with hindsight you regret the outcome, you appeared to have been making a rational decision at each stage: when you decided to go in, at each purchase and the following morning. Together however, the set of decisions is not rational; you regret what happened afterwards.

 

The inconsistency can be explained by assuming individuals operate with two rules when evaluating decisions through time. One involves giving greater weight to current events and ignoring the future; it is sometimes called ‘presentism’; the other takes future consequences into consideration. Both are ‘rational’ and time-consistent but together they are time-inconsistent.

 

I conjecture that the centre for instant gratification is ‘Think-fast’, while Think-slow gives greater weight to the future. We have all experienced blurting out something, and then immediately regretting it. That is Think-fast followed by Think-slow.

 

What if people are time inconsistent in ways which matter to economic policy? Suppose with hindsight they almost always wish they had joined a pension scheme years before. Big brother makes it compulsory, but the liberal society is reluctant to do this. Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness, a book by Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler observes that Think-fast tends to choose the default option for a choice (irrespective of what it is ). They suggest setting the default at the Think-slow choice. A practical example is that Kiwisaver’s default option is enrol, but you can choose to take the more circuitous opting out.

 

Haidt’s Moral Foundation Theory is not concerned about ethics – the philosophical foundations of morality. He is concerned about what individuals’ morality is, where it comes from and how they function with it.

 

Take a simple moral question. Should you steal? For most of us the answer comes back from Think-fast as quick as two plus two. Of course there may be situations in which you evaluate the question more carefully. The person is starving; the only way the hunger can be assuaged is through stealing some food. Should it be stolen? I can feel the question being pushed back into my Think-slow which, incidentally, says ‘I need more detail’. (You will recognise a situationalist ethical framework here.)

 

Haidt’s approach is social intuitionism, the theory that moral judgments are mostly the products of quick, intuitive evaluations of scenarios with certain content. He says that people are ‘intuitive lawyers’ whose reasoning usually seeks to vindicate the intuition rather than openly assess the case from an impartial point of view. Think-fast makes the decision; think-slow, if asked, finds a justification for it.

 

Of course reasoning can affect one’s moral intuitions, often stepwise and slowly. It is my Think-slow which is struggling with the issue of euthanasia. But, Haidt says that more often your Think-slow is used to provide a justification for the intuitive moral responses of Think-fast. Told that your Think-fast has led you into something stupid, you flip the reply to your Think-slow to justify the folly (although some use Think-fast to dig the hole deeper).

 

The imbalance between the two modes of thinking is so large that Haidt describes them as the elephant and the rider. Think-fast, the elephant, represents automatic intuitive responses. Think-slow, the rider, represents the conscious controlled processes. The rider has some control over the rampaging elephant, but not a lot.

 

Haidt goes on to argue there are six universal dimensions, or ‘foundations’, that underlie the moral judgements individuals make, although their balance may vary in different societies.

 

They are characterised by pairs of opposites as follows:

Care/harm for others, protecting them from harm.

Fairness/cheating, Justice, treating others in proportion to their actions, giving them ‘just deserts’. (He also refers to this dimension as Proportionality.)

Liberty/oppression, which characterizes judgments in terms of whether subjects are tyrannized.

Loyalty/betrayal to your group, family, nation. (He also refers to this as Ingroup.)

Authority/subversion for tradition and legitimate authority. (He connects this dimension to Respect.)

Sacred/profane (Haidt also refers to this dimension as Purity. I’ve changed his label from Sanctity/degradation .)

 

If Moral Foundations Theory is as universal as Haidt claims, there will be nobody in the room who does not recognise the dimensions, although they may argue over their precise meanings.

 

He next makes a thought-provoking generalisation based on surveys of people’s attitudes to the moral foundations. He says that people on the political right give a roughly equal weight to all six, but those on the left give a greater weight to caring, fairness and liberty. There is a sense, that conservatives are holistic while liberals (to use the American terms) are the extremists.

 

Liberals with religious concerns may not be aware they give a low priority to the sacred. One answer is perhaps they dont, but I suspect a more subtle explanation.

 

Haidt’s source for this generalisation is an on-line survey. I dont respond to them, because they are designed to engage only the Think-fast bit of a brain. Either the questions are trivial, relying on the instant opinionated response or, where they are badly designed, one keeps saying ‘wait a minute; it is more complicated than that.’ So Haidt’s generalisation is about the elephant of Think-fast; he is not assessing the rider of Think-slow.

 

What Haidt seems to have found is that liberals give priority in their Think-fast to a subset of the six dimensions; conservatives have the lot. I am not so surprised. Suppose my Think-slow has thought through a particular policy issue, after allowing for all the objectives and restraints. When I explain it to some liberals they instantly object on the basis of a particular issue – a single dimension – to which they obviously give priority. The speed of their response tells me their reaction is from Think-fast. (I say to myself ‘you have not thought about it at all’; I really mean ‘your Think-slow was never in gear’.) Of course such instant responses exist on the left and the right. But the expression ‘political correctness’ implies the left seems more prone to them.

 

So Haidt’s finding does not say that religious liberals necessarily give a lower priority to the sacred/profane dimension. It may be that they go back into Think-slow when they are required to evaluate a sacredness issue.

 

Although Haidt does not go into this he may be sympathetic to the interpretation. But as a moral intuitionist he gives less weight to the calculations of Think-slow. In any case his central point is that liberals are not seen to be as widely concerned with all the moral dimensions in as balanced way as conservatives. He argues that unless liberals can portray themselves as concerned on all dimensions, their ambitions will be eventually overwhelmed by the conservative one. Those who focus on a few dimensiosn – even more so those who are obsessive on only one narrow policy – undermine the grand liberal project.

 

At this stage, now it would be natural for me to follow Haidt and discuss the politics of all this. I leave that to another venue. Because Ephesus is a liberal religious group let me explore the issue in terms of the future of religion. Haidt’s analysis might suggest that liberal churches are likely to lose out to conservative ones because they do not pay sufficient attention to all the moral foundations. Sound familiar?

 

Religious liberals might respond that they are committed to all the moral foundations, but some are usually dealt with in Think-slow. According to Haidt’s moral intutionism that is not what the public want. They want certainty – comprehensive certainty – that Think-fast gives them.

 

One scene from Bertolt Brecht ‘s Life of Galileo has haunted me ever since I saw it at Downstage. It is between Galileo and a Little Monk who wants to become a physicist. The conversation is precipitated by Galileo’s astronomical discoveries which were subverting early seventeenth century scriptural understandings. Imagine the two in a garden; Galileo on a ladder picking fruit which he hands down to the monk talking up to him. The monk says:

 

THE LITTLE MONK: I grew up in the Campagna. My parents are peasants, simple folk. They know all about olive trees, but very little else. As I observe the phases of Venus, I can see my parents sitting by the stove with my sister, eating lasagna. I see the beams over their heads, blackened by the smoke of centuries, I see distinctly their work-worn old hands and the little spoons they hold in them. They’re very poor, but even in their misery there is a certain order. There are cyclic rhythms, scrubbing the floor, tending the olive trees in their seasons, paying taxes. There’s a regularity in the calamities that descend on them. My father’s back wasn’t bowed all at once, no, a little more with every spring in the olive grove, just as the child-bearing that has made my mother more and more sexless occurred at regular intervals. What gives them the strength to sweat their way up stony paths with heavy baskets, to bear children, even to eat, is the feeling of stability and necessity they get from the sight of the soil, of the trees turning green every year, of their little church standing there, and from hearing Bible verses read every Sunday. They have been assured that the eye of God is upon them, searching and almost anxious, that the whole world-wide stage is built around them in order that they, the players, may prove themselves in their great or small roles. What would my people say if I were to tell them they were living on a small chunk of stone that moves around another star, turning incessantly in empty space, one among many and more or less insignificant? What would be the good or necessity of their patience, of their acquiescence in their misery? What would be the good of the Holy Scripture which explains everything and demonstrates the necessity of all their sweat, patience, hunger and submission, if it turns out to be full of errors? No, I can see their eyes waver, I can see them rest their spoons on the table, I can see how cheated and betrayed they feel. In that case, they will say, no one is watching over us. Must we, untaught, old and exhausted as we are, look out for ourselves? No one has given us a part to play, only this wretched role on a tiny star which is wholly dependent, around which nothing turns? There is no sense in our misery, hunger means no more than going without food, it is no longer a test of strength; effort means no more than bending and carrying, there is no virtue in it. Can you understand now that in the decree of the Holy Congregation I discern a noble motherly compassion, a great goodness of soul?

GALILEO … You want me to lie to your people?

THE LITTLE MONK: (in great agitation) The very highest motives bid us keep silent: the peace of mind of the wretched and lowly!

 

Later their dialogue goes on:

THE LITTLE MONK: Don’t you think the truth will prevail, even without us, if it is the truth?

GALILEO: No, no, no. Truth prevails only when we make it prevail. The triumph of reason can only be the triumph of reasoning men. You describe your peasants in the Campagna as if they were moss on their huts. How can anyone imagine that the sum of the angles of a triangle runs counter to their needs! But if they don’t rouse themselves and learn how to think, the best irrigation systems in the world won’t do them any good. Damn it, I see the divine patience of your people, but where is their divine wrath?

THE LITTLE MONK: They’re tired. [1]

 

While Brecht is writing about events 400 years ago (and also writing about his times from the perspective of Marxist rulers) the underlying issues have a contemporary ring. People may no longer be as economically depressed as they were in the time of the Little Monk, and or even of Brecht, but the demand for the certainty of holy scriptures remains unabated.

 

In the economy, politics and society, that is the ‘modernisation’ problem. The world is continually changing. How to keep up? There are eternal verities but technological and external change and new understandings mean that we must keep updating their application, keep modernising (one of the themes of the history of New Zealand I am writing). We can only properly modernise our thinking in Think-slow; Think-fast is inherently conservative, because it is lazy. Yet the Think-slow rider on the elephant is not impotent for everyone. That is why we are not totally out of sync with the evolving reality.

 

Others avoid the challenge. Thus the presentism which bedevils today’s politics. People expect their politicians to address the hard, complex, long term issues – Think-slow ones – while they get on with Think-fast. However many politicians practice presentism themselves; perhaps we choose those who practice it although pretending to be addressing the real issues.

 

This belongs to another venue, but I suspect that the same challenge faces the Church, although because it is not unified – it is not the monopoly was in Galileo and Brecht’s days – the resolution is fragmentation, sects and schisms.

 

Is that the challenge of liberal Christianity? How to modernise while maintaining the flock’s need for certainties in its beliefs – even as they morph into other certainties – different ones?

 

Is Galileo’s view that they must learn to think – that is, make greater use of Think-slow – reasonable? What about the Little Monk’s response ‘They are tired’ or as we might say today ‘overwhelmed’? Think-fast, the low energy option, just wants certainty.

 

At the beginning of the seventeenth century new discoveries in the heavens were changing what could be said about us here on earth. And yet – and yet – the Little Monk asks whether we cannot just leave people with their beliefs. Eventually, the play says ‘he returns to the fold’. He probably did a more than adequate job of cosseting his flock. But it is Galileo, with his demand for truth in the light of knowledge, and his new heavens we remember.

 

Endnote

[1] Bertolt Brecht (1939, 1947, 2007) Life of Galileo, Translation by Wolfgang Sauerlander & Ralph Manheim.

Singapore Fling

Our national airline no longer stops over there but New Zealanders should.

 

Listener: 11 May, 2013

 

Keywords: Political Economy & History;

 

The fall of Singapore in February 1942 signalled the end of the British Empire. It was not just that an Asian power had conquered one of its key outposts. Japan’s success demonstrated that the UK did not have the resources to defend all its imperial interests – it was the economic might of the United States that settled World War II.

 

New Zealand was shocked, for Singapore had been seen as fundamental to its external defence. As the UK slowly withdrew from “east of Suez” in the 1950s and 1960s, New Zealand and Australia maintained a military role in the region; the New Zealand battalion did not withdraw from Singapore until 1989. The relationship changed. For many New Zealanders, Singapore became a stopover on the way to Britain.

 

Air New Zealand no longer flies to Singapore. Its Asian hub is Hong Kong, reflecting our increasing interest in China. But we cannot abandon Singapore at the centre of Southeast Asia. It hosts Apec, an influential grouping of 21 countries that seeks to promote free trade and economic co-operation throughout the Asia-Pacific region. Less than an hour by air to the north is Malaysia’s capital, Kuala Lumpur, which is becoming the international centre of Islamic

finance.

 

A little further to the southeast is Jakarta, the capital of Indonesia and home of Asean, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, which began as a forum to promote regional stability and is now also committed to economic integration. None of the 10 Asean capitals is further from Singapore than New Zealand is from Australia. Many are as close as or closer to Australia than we are.

 

About a seventh of our exports of goods, half of which are dairy products, go to Asean countries, mainly Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. A sixth of our imports come from them, almost half of which is oil, and we sell services to Asean members such as tourism and teaching of international students. Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Burma and Vietnam make up the remainder of Asean’s membership.

 

The island of Singapore is seen as an economic miracle. Its economy has been transformed since independence in 1965, when many citizens were still living in primitive housing. Today, Singapore’s five million people mostly live in apartments in an area the size of Great Barrier Island (population 850).

 

Although the pragmatism of Singapore’s Government should not be underrated, the three keys to its success have been location, location, location. It is the prime port on the Strait of Malacca, through which about a quarter of the world’s traded goods pass, providing a range of related services such as ship repairs, provisioning, oil refining and goods consolidation. An Indian businessman told me he sent his containers to Singapore for trans-shipment to East Asia, the Pacific and the western seaboards of the Americas.

 

International boundaries can mislead. An important part of Singapore’s economic activity is centred on Johor Bahru, Malaysia’s second city of two million people, which is across the causeway connecting the island to the mainland. In Indonesia, 45 minutes by boat across the strait, another million live in Batam, which has competitive (and complementary) port facilities. This illustrates the point that economic boundaries do not always conform to jurisdictional boundaries, one of the pressures for the abandonment of artificial barriers to trade.

 

Southeast Asia’s international boundaries are very recent. When the Portuguese arrived 500 years ago, there were no nation states. Today’s nations are largely postwar creations and many have had their boundaries contested since. In March, for instance, the Sultan of Sulu, from the southern Philippines, launched a military incursion in the Malaysian state of Sabah. It was to discourage such instability that Asean was established. Its increasing emphasis on economic relations is a reminder to members that trade is an alternative to war.

 

But we are not in Asean’s region just for the trade. Australia is virtually a Southeast Asian nation. Given its importance in our destiny, so almost are we.

 

This is the first of a series of columns on Southeast Asia made possible by a travel grant from the Asia New Zealand Foundation.

Reserve Judgment

In the unlikely event of a bank collapse, a proposed new measure would help safeguard our savings.

Listener: 27 April, 2013

Keywords: Macroeconomics & Money;

Banks can fail. That is not the same as a run on a bank, in which depositors withdraw funds faster than the bank can liquidate its investments, even though it has a sound balance sheet. The Reserve Bank routinely steps in as lender of last resort when banks can’t keep pace with withdrawals, a situation that went largely unremarked as bank liquidity tightened in September 2008 when the global financial crisis began.

A bank failure, however, is more permanent. Normally a bank will have more assets – loans, mortgages, trade advances, bonds and government stock – than deposits. The surplus is the equity owned by the shareholders. If the bank’s assets are worth less than the deposits, there is nothing for the shareholders and the bank cannot pay all its depositors.

The term “bank” in the last paragraph can be replaced by “finance company” (or credit union) and the analysis is exactly the same. When a finance company fails, its depositors lose the value of some or all of their investments. That is tough but they took a higher interest return in exchange for the risk of their investment failing.

Banks, though, are the foundation of our payments system. If they collapse, the economy could seize up because nobody could pay their bills or buy anything. Businesses without trade credit might have to lay off workers. Thus a trading bank cannot be left to collapse in the way a finance company or other business can.

There are a number of measures to protect the payments system, including the Reserve Bank’s role as lender of last resort to sound banks. Additionally, its six-monthly financial stability reports give investors information on which to base their decisions. The Basel-based Bank of International Settlements, meanwhile, has been setting higher standards for equity so there is greater protection for depositors if a bank’s investments go awry.

Last month, the Reserve Bank announced a proposed “open bank resolution” policy, or OBR, for when all else fails and a bank (or number of banks) collapses. Under our banking system, such a failure is unlikely: although other financial institutions have gone belly-up, there has been no severe trading bank problem in the past two decades.

Even so, the Reserve Bank considers it needs further protection. The OBR would work – roughly – like this. At present, if a bank gets into trouble, the ordinary liquidation processes for any troubled business will be triggered and the bank will close. However, the OBR would enable a troubled bank to open the following day, although depositors would be limited to accessing, say, 90% of their deposits, with a government guarantee so they do not have to rush to remove their funds.

The remaining deposits would, however, be frozen and used to cover losses on the bank’s assets if they exceeded shareholder funds. In that case, depositors wouldn’t get all the rest of their money back (although they would probably get some).

We should welcome the proposed OBR, for it clarifies what would happen in the unlikely event of a bank collapse. Admittedly, the Reserve Bank announcement has caused some shock because it explicitly draws the possibility of bank failure to our attention. And without an existing government deposit guarantee, a bank collapse would mean individuals could lose out.

The present Government has ruled out an insurance scheme that would guarantee depositors’ investments. Such insurance is not a substitute for the mechanism proposed by the OBR, in any case.

But maybe what many New Zealanders would like is both, accepting a high level of deposit security in exchange for a lower return on their deposits. The Reserve Bank’s OBR proposal does not exclude a future government introducing deposit insurance.

I wouldn’t be surprised if that happens one day, although taxpayer exposure is likely to be limited. Whether you put your money in a bank or under your mattress, there are no guarantees. Life is risky.

Partial Sale of the Century

Driving the state asset share floats is a government that is happy to subsidise business.

 

Listener: 13 April, 2013

 

Keywords: Business & Finance;

 

Why has the Government not made a case for its partial privatisation programme? The failure is a contrast to the privatisations of the late 1980s and early 1990s, although many of arguments advanced then were weak and, with hindsight, wrong.

 

Instead, the Government has just determinedly gone ahead with its programme, claiming it has an electoral mandate but not explaining why it sought one. Some people think this Government is just as neo-liberal as the Rogernomics and Ruthanasia ones but, limited by MMP, is implementing its policies more secretively. I think not. This is a business-government: one that is happy to support business with subsidies. Neo-liberals are opposed to even subsidising business.

 

Even so, the Rogernomics privatisation programme had elements of business subsidisation. The sharemarket crash of October 1987 devastated the financial sector and its ancillary businesses. Those who were not bankrupted found a dramatic fall-off in opportunities to earn profits from making deals. The Government’s privatisation programme created new opportunities, while injecting tax payers’ money into the business sector as a part of the sales programme.

 

Others may judge whether business was privileged by the privatisation programme. (Neo-liberals see privatisation as a necessary part of their aims; hardly anyone asked whether, given New Zealand share prices collapsed more than those anywhere else, there might have been something wrong with the policies that overstimulated them.)

 

It is easy to see the current bout of privatisation in a parallel light. The global financial crisis – this time not our fault – has severely limited dealing (although bankruptcy specialists are doing very well). Partial privatisation is a gift to dealers and the ancillary businesses that go with them, such as marketing.

 

The difficulty the Government has faced is that the public largely objects to the privatisation. Even a majority of its own voters may oppose the policy. That may be why it hasn’t gone for a full sale. Additionally, to make the bailout more palatable, it is offering special deals to small investors – in effect, forgoing revenue as a bribe for their support.

 

I wondered whether the Government might have had some objective similar to that in Margaret Thatcher’s privatisation programme. She disliked public enterprise, but also wanted to create a “share-owning democracy”, funding the subsidies on the cheap shares from the proceeds from the North Seas oil fields. We have no such bounty. No compelling evidence has been provided that the asset sales will make a marked difference to the Government’s cash flows in the long run. The subsidies might well mean it will have to squeeze government spending – less health care, fewer educational services, further benefit cutbacks, less for the arts and environment and so on.

 

In any case, the Thatcher privatisations failed to create a share-owning democracy. Most purchasers soon sold out (as you might expect if they got their shares cheap). The Government says it will offer incentives to purchasers who hang on to their shares – again at the cost of the taxpayer. If New Zealand becomes a genuine share-owning

democracy, it will be via

 

To add to the puzzle, the Government is in such a huge rush to sell off its businesses that, as I write, its promised subsidies are extremely vague – presumably this in the hope that everyone will have forgotten by election year.

 

One argument might be for “deepening the capital market” so the serious investor has more local options. Rather than subsidising small investors, the logical option would be to increase opportunities for KiwiSaver and government sovereign funds, such as ACC and the Government Superannuation Fund. Their options are limited here, so they have to invest offshore.

 

That objective might have been better attained by a scheme similar to that at Fonterra, where outside shareholders can invest in the company but have no involvement in its management, which remains in the hands of dairy farmers.

 

Perhaps ownership is far more democratic in the dairy industry than it is in the public sector.

Sky Lark

Managers don’t always do what their shareholders want, which may explain the SkyCity deal oddities.

 

Listener: 30 March , 2013.

 

Keywords: Business & Finance;  Governance;

 

Richina Pacific has hardly reported to its shareholders since 2008, according to NZ Herald business columnist Brian Gaynor. By ignoring them, Richina Pacific gave no information to stakeholders in Mainzeal, its wholly owned construction company, which has gone into receivership. Nor did it give any information to those whose buildings it was constructing or to its subcontractors, some of whom will lose money; all will suffer hardship.

 

There is an argument in economics that companies behave independently of shareholder interests, generously remunerating the board and senior executives while pursuing company objectives that do not enhance shareholder value. Instructively, former Mainzeal chairwoman Dame Jenny Shipley said, “In all my governance roles, I focus on the best interests of the company.” Not, you observe, the best interests of its shareholders.

 

Others reply that if a company neglects its shareholders, it will be bought out and its management replaced with those more shareholder-aligned. The threat keeps the existing management sensitive to shareholder concerns and the company economically efficient. They go on to argue that this justifies privatisation, since a government-owned company is not under the same shareholder pressure. You don’t hear this argued as strongly nowadays; the privatisations of the 1980s and 1990s failed to deliver the promised benefits.

 

Both sides agree that, given half a chance, the management will neglect its shareholders. The dispute is whether the sharemarket effectively monitors the management. In practice, there is both regulation by the stock exchange (although Richina Pacific is not listed) and law to improve the power of shareholders. But shareholders often have little power.

 

Perhaps indicative of the difficulties they face is that the Government has been unable to rein in state-owned Solid Energy, despite knowing for some time that troubles were brewing.

 

Given such freedom, managers will behave differently from when they are following the requirements of shareholders and other stakeholders. Even when they are not pursuing their own interests, they can make decisions based on intuition rather than some rational assessment.

 

This may explain various oddities about the Auckland convention-centre deal. Think of Prime Minister John Key as a business executive who judged that the SkyCity deal best fitted his firm’s objectives. As is common in business, he probably does not know exactly why; compatibility is often critical.

 

But he is not a business leader who can neglect his shareholders, even though New Zealand has a very thin formal constitution and it is relatively easy for a prime minister to ignore Parliament in the short run. Many readers’ memories will go back to the Muldoon era when that was too obvious. Muldoon was doing little more than previous prime ministers had done, but they were more covert and had a more compliant media.

 

Over the following 30 years, we have introduced a series of procedures that reduce the prime minister’s discretion; they amount to informal or semiformal constitutional restraints. There are more transparent public accounts and the Treasury regularly reports to Parliament. The Official Information Act was also introduced to restrain the executive.

 

Another dimension has been strengthening the roles of the parliamentary officers whose task is to act on behalf of an independent Parliament if it had the time and the expertise. Among those officers is the Auditor-General. In the case of the SkyCity deal, she concluded that the procedures we – our representatives in Parliament – usually require were not applied. She did not find evidence of the corruption of someone improperly benefitting from the deal; her concern was a corruption of the constitutional process.

 

Yet Key said he was “comfortable” with the report’s findings. Perhaps the Prime Minister was thinking of himself as a businessman doing a deal the way that business does. Those who have publicly defended him have been mainly from the business sector. They just want to get on with building the convention centre even though it involves fiscal subsidies and social costs. They do not really care about the niceties of the constitution. Alas, the Prime Minister seems to agree with them. Does Parliament?

Globalisation and the Future World Order

 

This paper was presented to the Curtin Sarawak Research Institute at Curtin University, Sarawak (Miri campus), 22 March, 2013. (And earlier version was presented to a politics class at Victoria University of Wellington). The Power Points are available on request.

Keywords: Globalisation & Trade

I am going to talk about globalisation. I am not using it as some vague abstract term nor as a term of abuse. I define economic globalisation as the process of closer economic integration of regional and national economies. I shall describe the processes which drive that integration. This research area is known as the economics of geography, and it adds a spatial dimension to economics which has – with a few exceptions – been largely lacking. That is why, for an economist, globalisation has both a regional dimension within a country, and a national dimension between countries.

 

Defined this way globalisation has a long history and is not a new phenomenon. It began centuries ago, but initially it was a very minor part in the history of the world. However, early in the nineteenth century the process began to accelerate and soon began to dominate the world economy.

 

So let’s go back before then. If you ask those of European descent what were the two largest manufacturers in 1750, they are likely to say Britain and one other country on the European continent. Both are wrong. A quarter of a millenium ago the biggest manufacturers were China and India. In those days manufacturing largely supplied the local population and the two largest populations in the world were in China and India.

 

Yet within a hundred years the world’s manufacturing was concentrated in North West Europe and, increasingly, the Atlantic seaboard of North America, and they were supplying the rest of the world. Now it is very easy to say it was a different sort of manufacturing – using industrial processes in increasingly large factories. But it evolved out of a manufacturing sector similar to that in Asia. And we know from today’s experience that Asians can be as good at modern manufacturing as Europeans. So why Europe rather than Asia?

 

In m view it was almost accidental that industrialisation began in a tiny, not very rich and tumultuous peninsula at the west end of the Asian continent – especially in the British Isles just off it. With hindsight one can draw attention to advantages which Europe had. A few hundred years earlier China had been politically more stable and technologically more advanced than Europe and it had a much larger market too.

 

If I had to draw attention to any single event that inhibited China it was Chinese Emperor, Xuan De, forbidding the building of ships longer than 30 metres in 1432. The ban’s permanence is probably explained by the priority of the defence of China’s land border but it turned the empire in on itself. Four hundred years later, quite unprepared for an invasion from the sea, Emperor Daoguang told the British envoy that Europeans had nothing of interest to China. He did not know about their guns.

 

The Europeans, on the other hand, had engaged with the world, in part to get resources they lacked – gold silver, spices – but also from curiosity and proselytising Christianity. Sailing required a constant improvement of technologies which fed back into science and domestic technologies. The flowering of Arab science occurred when they were solving the practical problem of the precise direction of Mecca for prayers. Additionally Europeans had to engage with alien cultures, which impacted on their view of the world and the nature of society. The lesson I derive from this is dont be too inward looking.

 

But whatever the reasons for the European leadership, what is important for our purposes is that at a certain stage in the development of the world, industry began concentrating in particular locations which were not particularly related to population. There were two drivers.

 

The first was a fall in the costs of distance. Not just transport costs; they include the costs of handling at each end and perhaps in the middle, the time it takes to ship – in commerce time is money, the ease of accessing information and administrative costs.

 

To illustrate the time dimension consider a picture of the world as seen from New Zealand. One hundred and fifty years ago the world seemed huge and everywhere seemed a long way away. But over time it shrank. Sailing to Europe once took six months, today it is less than four weeks. You can fly there in just over a day. Cables bring information even quicker. Your internet connection is almost instantaneous, affected more by time zones than by the physical distance.

 

There are many other cost cutting changes – telegraph and containers were important innovations in each century. A change which transformed New Zealand was refrigeration. Prior to 1882 it was nigh on impossible to ship quality meat and butter across the equator. Refrigerated shipping in that year converted an almost infinite cost to a near zero one, and led to the great pastoral boom based on exporting frozen meat and dairy products which shaped twentieth century New Zealand’s economy, politics and society.

 

Falling costs of distance meant manufacturing was no longer confined to small-scale supplying the locality. Now it could reap economies of scale, lowering costs and shipping to the rest of the world. The age of the large factories was underway; and it was no longer necessary for them to be near the large populations they were supplying.

 

You might have expected those large factories to have been scattered throughout the world, but a second distance effect called the economies of agglomeration clustered them in selected locations. When factories and their related servicing businesses huddle together, their overall costs fall. Economists list the reasons for these agglomeration effects as:

1. Mass production (the internal economies that are identical to scale economies at the firm’s level);

2. Availability of specialised input services;

3. Formation of highly specialised labour force and the production of new ideas, both based on the accumulation of human capital and face-to-face communications;

4. The existence of modern infrastructure.

 

So unless a factory is processing a heavy resource , it may be unwise to start up a green-field site away from other businesses because it misses out on these agglomeration advantages.

 

Of course urban centres also suffer from the diseconomies of congestion, which extends industrial heartland. Thus Europe’s industrialisation started in Britain and crept out to northern and western Europe, and also across the Atlantic (for the costs of water transport are much lower than land transport). In turn the North American heartland on the Atlantic coast crept out to the mid-west and then to the Southern and Pacific States. But basically by the end of the nineteenth century industry was clustered in the Atlantic economies.

 

It is sometimes it is argued – or implied – that only the North Atlantic economies benefited from this process. Not true. I have reservations about using market output as a measure of welfare but, for the record, output per head in Western Europe is about fifteen times higher than it was at the beginning of the nineteenth century, while Africa, the poorest of continents, has experienced a threefold increase. Not only are Africans better off on this measure, but today average African incomes are higher today than Western Europe’s were two hundred years ago.

 

Nevertheless there has been a a process of circular cumulative causation in which the rich have got richer faster than the poor. High income countries have generally grown faster, and those with lower incomes have grown much slower, although they have not – as a rule – stagnated.

 

So from the nineteenth century the world had a two-speed economy. The North Atlantic economies (plus a few of their Southern Hemisphere food supplies such as Australia and New Zealand) grew fast in material output terms; the rest grew much more slowly. So there was a fast pack and a slow pack, and not much in between.

 

Economists began to construct mathematical models which described this bifurcated economic growth. They are too complicated to explain in the time I have, but they made a couple of interesting predictions, both of which have proved broadly correct.

 

The first was that sometimes a country in the low growth pack would split off, grow very quickly and catch up to the fast pack. The creeping extension of the industrial heartland to avoid the diseconomies of congestion is an example, but far more spectacular has been Japan which was in the slow pack at the beginning of the twentieth century and had joined the fast pack by the 1980s.

Once it caught up with them Japan’s very rapid growth in the middle of the century slowed down to a rate not too dissimilar to that of the other rich countries. Moreover just as the North Atlantic heartlands spread out, so did Japans’, but to Korea, Taiwan and South East Asia. This is comparable to what happened in America, say, as the Mid-West deindustrialised and industry moved to the American south and California. But there it was seen as a national phenomenon; in Japan’s case it crossed international boundaries. Different political issues, but the underlying economics is much the same.

 

The economists’ model, comforted by the Japanese example showing that splitting off can happen, makes a second prediction. It suggests that as the costs of distance fall, some industry will relocate to where the world’s population is located. And since they are mainly in Asia, the model suggests that ultimately a much higher proportion of the world’s manufacturing will produced there. Which is what we have been seeing over the last quarter of a century.

 

To give an intuition of how the model works. The divergence in the growth paths means that those in the fast pack – the rich countries – can pay themselves higher wages, protected by the costs of distance. But as the cost falls, the poor country workers can undercut the rich country workers, and so some of the jobs and the manufacturing moves offshore – say from America to China. Once some businesses get to the new location agglomeration economies start cutting in, and so the poor countries gets into a positive cycle of cumulative causation and start paying higher wages. The wage gap between the rich and poor economies narrows, as it did for Japan.

 

Before discussing the future implications of this process, I need to add a few caveats.

 

The first is that while I have been talking about all manufacturing, not all of it is internationally relocatable. You need shoe and car repairers close to where you live. In the real world we need to be careful about the meaning of terms.

 

Traditionally economists divided the economy into three sectors. The primary sector were those activities which had to be located near the resources they were based upon – farming, forestry, fishing, mining. The tertiary sector were those activities which had to be located near consumers – services. The secondary sector (we tend to call it ‘manufacturing’) was more footloose, to be located somewhere between the extremes of where the resources were and where the consumers were, depending on transport and other distance costs. This meant governments could influence where manufacturing was located by policies, such as border protection, which is why politically the focus of development policy has tended to be on it.

 

Cheap telecommunications have untied a whole range of services from being close to the consumer. Who would have expected fifty years ago that call centres and business centres could be outsourced offshore? Who would have imagined an effective bookshop on the other side of the world – for that is what amazon.com is? While the internationally tradeable sector was once confined to manufacturing (and tourism), chunks of today’s service sector have joined it. Now there is a ‘tradeable service’ sector as well as a manufacturing one.

 

The second caveat is whether the costs of distance continue to fall, as I am about to assume. One cannot be sure of course, but I cant see why costs of electronic distance will rise. On the other hand, I expect transport energy costs – the price of oil – to rise faster than inflation. It is possible that, as in the past, the improvement in fuel efficiency will offset the rising costs, but probably means that the costs of distance for goods may not fall as dramaticly as they have in the past although it seems that the economies of agglomeration are intensifying.

 

Additionally there are some changes which seem to be altering the geography of nations. Global warming is opening up the northern routes via the Bering Strait to the east coast of North America and Europe. An indication of how revolutionary this could be is that Singapore has joined the nations cooperating in the Arctic Ocean. Historically the straits of Malacca have been one of the great choke points in global training routes. Apparently Singapore thinks that the opening of the Arctic routes may have some effect on that.

 

Another big geographical change may be enlarging the Panama Canal which means East Asia can send bigger shipments to the Atlantic all year. The canal is another choke point because there is a limit on the size of the ships which fit through it. Panamax ships will become obsolete in the second half of this decade. The New Panamaxs are two and a half time larger than the old ones.

 

On the whole I am inclined to assume that the forces of positive circular accumulation will continue to accelerate Asian growth for some time to come, although sometimes market processes can overreact. Hence the phenomenon in which some production is moving back from Asia to North America. I dont know how big it is. It may slow down the acceleration but I doubt it will reverse it. One thing which may accelerate Asian economic growth is that it is still largely externally driven. At some stage Asian domestic demand has to become a substantial driver of Asian production.

 

It is even possible that some manufacturing may become more localised from, say, three dimensional printing. There are already some commercial uses, but it is still very expensive, although costs are likely to come down over time. The potential use seems to be very widespread. It may be that ordinary products can be produced in the shop which sells it. You ask for it, the shop downloads the product specification from somewhere far away and the 3D printer makes it for you, possibly in front of your eyes, presumably while you sip a cup of coffee.

 

Will it happen in our lifetime? It is well to remember that technological forecasting is hazardous – and usually wrong. That applies for me too. About a decade ago I looked at on-site printing of books. Again the idea was simple. You went to the bookstore, told them what you wanted, and they pressed a button, downloaded the electronic template, and soon you had the book you required. Similar idea to 3D printing but it has not worked. I did not foresee e-books, so what seemed to be a perfectly plausible innovation has been jumped over by an even cheaper one.

 

So there are caveats to the details of the prediction I am going to make, but its central theme seems to be robust. Economic activity is going to move away from being concentrated in a few locations, to being more closely aligned to where the world’s population is. As the pattern of production in the world moves closer to the pattern of population, output per head is likely to converge.

 

That means there will be, as the model predicts, a convergence of North Atlantic and East and South Asian per capita output levels. It is even possible that the material standards of living of those living in the rich economies will stagnate (or fall). I am surer that they are unlikely to grow as fast as they have in the past. Thus their share of total world output will fall, as it has been falling in the last three decades.

 

This is likely to have dramatic implications for the work economy and the world as a whole. Let’s think about the medium term. I am going to do this by looking at the five largest economies in the world as measured by GDP (in the same standard prices). In order they are:

The European Union and the United States which are about the same size

China

India and Japan, which are about the same size.

 

Incidentally the next large economies – Brazil, Russia and South Africa – is each less than half the size of the smallest of the Big Five and is unlikely to catch up. ASEAN, especially were it to extend to encompass Australia and New Zealand, is potentially a large economy with 6 to 7 percent of world GDP. However its political arrangements will be looser than the even European Union’s so it may have a role in the economic leadership but not political leadership of the world.

Each of the Big Five has its own economic, political and social problems; had we time we could mull them over, and I shall allude to some as I go. However I am going to assume they resolve them, although it will take time. I am mindful of Winston Churchill’s ‘America will do the right thing; after it has tried everything else’. That is broadly true everywhere else too; sometimes getting there can be very damaging. I’ll describe a British example shortly.

 

In the first two hundred years of globalisation, the world was dominated by a single power – what we call a ‘hegemon’. In the nineteenth century the hegemon was Britain. By the middle of the twentieth century the hegemon was America – it still largely is. In principle the European Union could challenge it, but it is a relatively new state and it is still to sort out its political arrangements. (In the shorter term the Global Financial Crisis has added some difficulties.)

 

Shakespeare said ‘uneasy lies the head that wears the crown’. The American popular debate is obsessed with which country is challenging its hegemony. At various times the concern has been with the Soviet Union, the European Union and Japan. Currently it is China.

 

This is misleading, a thinking fixated on the past of a globalised world with a dominant economic power. That a globalised world has always had a hegemon does not mean that there will always be one. Instead, it is likely that we are going to have a multipolar world in which no country dominates. While the US may no longer be the hegemonic player in the world economy, it will not be replaced by another dominant power. No country will be big enough in a multipolar world to lead unilaterally; the others can gang up on it.

 

We can only dimly the multipolar world of the future. While economists know a lot about how to think systematically about a world in which there is one dominant player, and a bit about a world in which there are two major contestants – for that is what monopoly and oligopoly analysis of economics is about – once there are a number of large players, the analysis has no simple insights. Yet the regime the world is entering is one with a number of large contesting players.

 

Perhaps we are already there. As much as it tries America cannot impose a solution on the whole world as it could in the past. Hence the deadlock in the Doha trade negotiations; it is also happening over the world regime on carbon emissions; and it is likely to happen as they try to sort out the world financial regime. In each case America is powerful enough to be able to veto others’ wishes but not powerful enough to impose its own. That is increasingly true for the others of the Big Five.

 

A word about America. It is hard to be losing hegemonic power, especially when global hegemony is central to the national psyche. Adjustment will be difficult. Certainly there are American intellectuals who are aware of the changing role of the US, but they are not much listened to. Sometimes President Obama touches on this reality but the politics of the presidency has given him little room to move.

 

There is the gloomy possibility that America is becoming ungovernable; the congressional deadlock over the budget may be just the beginning. Perhaps it and the rise of the Tea Party reflect an unthinking, barely understood response to declining US hegemonic power, even though this negative response may accelerate the decline. What prospects are there for the world economy in which one of its largest economies and the issuer of the international currency cannot run a disciplined fiscal stance?

 

I am very mindful of what happened to Britain as hegemony transferred to America. It found it very hard to adjust to adjust to its diminished role. Long after it became a secondary power its national rhetoric continued to claim it was a leading world power. It maintained a military presence far in excess of what its economy could bear, with the consequence of further weakening its economic role. Eventually, and slowly, it had to withdraw from military activity ‘East of Suez’ as it found it could no longer afford to maintain an effective presence there. That led to political destabilisation in South East Asia, the Middle East and the South Atlantic.

 

Some argue that the US involvement in Iraq has been similarly ruinous. Yet, what happens when the US scales down its military aspirations to be more in line with its economic size? Who will fill the vacuum; how will it be filled? China cannot simply fill the whole vacuum. While its economic performance has been impressive over the last few decades it faces a number of difficulties. To list them briefly.

 

First, unique in the developing world, China has an aging population, with population dynamics even more problematic than most rich countries’ How quickly will its aging population become an uncomfortable burden?

 

China’s second problem is that it has serious environmental challenges (as has India) including water shortages, water pollution, dirty air and carbon emissions which may retard or divert its development path.

 

Third, China is not what we would normally call a democracy, but its development is creating a middle class which is likely to be increasingly uncomfortable with current political arrangements, even if their demands may not be exactly the same as those of Western middle classes. How with the Chinese politburo respond to them?

 

The fourth problem China faces is really the world’s. It is such a big economy that its growth is creating feedbacks which stifle it and disrupt the world’s economic arrangements. For instance its gargantuan appetite for oil and raw materials drives up everyone’s prices and makes China less internationally competitive since it is not a very efficient user.

 

Additionally, and fifthly, the Chinese economic miracle has been driven by an export strategy. Importing countries simply cannot absorb China’s exports if they continue to grow at their past rate. How can China switch to greater domestic consumption? And what happens internally when China gets to the point that Japan did in about 1990, and its growth rate slows down to the world average?

 

The sixth danger is that financial crashes are an integral part of the capitalist monetary systems; China is probably not immune. We dont know enough about the Chinese banking system to be able to assess just how robust it is, but the sniff test suggests that many of its banks have unsatisfactory balance sheets, that the system is fragile and could crash in the wrong shock.

 

The final, and seventh danger, to be mentioned here, is that China has a number of unresolved border disputes.

 

The point is that it is unwise to project the past linearly into the future. That there has long been a world hegemon does not always mean that the globalised world will always have one; that the Chinese economy has impressively expanded for some decades does not mean that the Chinese economy will continue to expand as rapidly as it has; it may even experience a period of financial or political turmoil, or both.

 

I am not saying that China will fail. In the fullness of time, given its population, it will become an increasingly large component of the world economy and a key contributor to world political stability, even if it is not the hegemon. But, because of the difficulties I have listed it will not get there in a linear fashion. Every one of the rest of the Big Five – Europe, America Japan and India – has its own difficulties. Do not expect a smooth transition to the new world order.

 

How does a small country fit into a multipolar world? Let me offer two pieces of folk wisdom from your region and mine.

 

First, many years ago New Zealanders learned from Lee Kuan Yew the saying that ‘when elephants fight, it’s the grass that gets trampled; but when elephants make love, the grass will suffer even more’. A multipolar world is going to be difficult enough for the large players; it will be even harder for the small ones.

 

Second, we New Zealanders like to quote our Nobel prize-winning Ernest Rutherford, perhaps the finest experimental physicist of the twentieth century,  who said that ‘we havnt much money so we have to think’.

 

That is exactly what the smaller economies have to do – think about their strategies for coping in a multipolar world. No one strategy fits every player. The solution for Malaysia is different from the solution for New Zealand.

 

But the underlying analytics is the same and it rests on the same factual foundation. Once economic activity occurred where the population was. About two hundred years ago it began concentrating in particular areas – initially the North Atlantic economies. The forces which drove this was the falling costs of distance and the economies of agglomeration moderated by the diseconomies of congestion. The logic is that as they become more powerful the activity expands into other regions – as it did for Japan and as it is doing in much of the rest of Asia.

 

But because population is dispersed throughout the world there will be no hegemon. Rather a handful of economies will vie for world leadership; none will be powerful enough to able to dominate the remainder nor to operate independently of them. The emergence of this multipolar world is already underway.

 

Its grass will have to think hard about how to respond.

Son of Think Big

New technologies and light-handed regulation are a recipe for disaster.

 

Listener: 16 March , 2013.

 

Keywords: Business & Finance; Regulation & Taxation;

 

The leaky-building debacle involved homes and commercial and public buildings being built with new technologies that the builders were not competent to use, coupled with weak supervision and regulation. The failures were not found out for many years, by which time a lot of the builders had retired and/or closed their companies.

 

Remediation has generally been clumsy and expensive. The substantial burden of the costs has often been carried by innocent parties.

 

Other new building technologies have met a similar fate. Evidence presented to the Canterbury Earthquakes Royal Commission suggests much the same happened when new buildings were being earthquake-proofed; people may have died as a result – buildings certainly did.

 

Such failures were not confined to Christchurch (elsewhere the buildings have yet to be tested by earthquakes). So  as well as the massive construction effort going on in Canterbury, many buildings around the country have to be earthquake-strengthened. This includes older buildings not built to today’s standards as well as those that were purported to have been but weren’t. (There may be faults in some recent buildings that even the owners are unaware of; this was the case in Christchurch a couple of years ago.)

 

Additionally, other owners of buildings built during the years of negligence are struggling with similar – albeit not always as onerous – difficulties arising from new technologies not being used properly; apparently, decks were often very poorly installed.

 

The backlog of remedial rebuilding does not stop there. Many publicly owned rental houses (and probably some private ones) were not adequately maintained, are near their end of their life and need to be rebuilt.

 

What such a backlog means in economic terms is that although we paid builders and others in good faith, their work must be replaced or redone. Much of what was paid has been wasted, with the spending having gone into consumption with little in return. Now we have to reduplicate their efforts. How is remedying the backlog being paid for?

 

We could cut back our consumption, in effect offsetting the past consumption funded by the outlays on poor-quality buildings. It’s more likely we will borrow offshore, which shifts the offsetting of lower consumption onto future generations. (In the interim, the borrowing will drive up the exchange rate, inhibiting economic growth, especially in the export sector.)

 

The terrible fact is that much of this past capital investment was not effective. Much of the investment over the next few years will be diverted to dealing with past failures, rather than adding to our productive capacity. The long global recession aside, we might well expect slower economic growth in the future as a consequence.

All reminiscent of Robert Muldoon’s “Think Big”. Then we invested enormous resources in (mainly) the energy sector, which gave little contribution to net output but came at a considerable cost to the taxpayer. The difference this time is that while taxpayers and ratepayers cough up for badly built schools, hospitals and other public buildings that are leaking or earthquake risks, much of the burden will be borne by the private sector.

 

We took action to avoid a repeat of Think Big, but there is less thought about this failure. “Light-handed regulation” still pervades public-policy thinking, with its confidence that the market will find a solution. Yeah, right. If we don’t have enough competent builders, the market will use incompetent builders. Construction prices are already rising, which is another market solution.

 

You will notice that this column is bereft of statistics. Few secure ones exist. Once upon a time, a public body would have calculated the size of the backlog, added in the construction needs of a growing population and any infrastructural backlog, and projected the future size of the construction industry. It was called “indicative planning” and would have provided a useful foundation for public discussion as well as sectoral guidance, such as to the numbers of builders our apprenticeship and polytechnic sector would have to provide. That approach of thinking about the nation’s problem in a systematic way has long gone – better leave it to a market that has already failed us.

Counting on your Co-operation

The confidential details you provide in next month’s census forms will prove valuable.

 

Listener: 2 March , 2013.

 

Keywords: Statistics;

 

On Tuesday, March 5, millions of New Zealanders will fill in census forms on behalf of themselves, their children and their dwellings. They will do so out of a civic duty, although given the importance of a comprehensive count of the state of the nation, they also have a statutory requirement to do so.

 

Later, Statistics New Zealand will release the number living in New Zealand and in each location on census night – especially important for drawing up the electorates that underpin our democracy. Then will follow a multitude of tabulations and cross-tabulations of our social characteristics and of the nation’s dwellings. The results will be anxiously scanned, because the delay from the Canterbury earthquakes means the errors of social projection after 2006 are greater than usual. I am regularly reminded what a nuisance the delay has been for my research work.

 

What happens to the data after that? The Public Records Act 2005 requires that the census forms be securely stored and retained for 100 years. Each is also converted into an electronic record that can be used only for statistical purposes – government agencies such as the police, immigration, Inland Revenue, Winz and the NZSIS may not access the individual records.

 

Their confidentiality is explicitly protected by the Statistics Act 1975 (as are all such unit records the department collects). Over the years, Government Statisticians (the chief executives of Statistics New Zealand) have said if the law were changed, they would resign rather than infringe the principle that in return for your civic co-operation, the information you provide is totally confidential. In many places in the world, the integrity of the official database is threatened by politicians. New Zealand’s is one of the safest.

 

Unit records can be released for legitimate statistical purposes. This is such a serious matter that the Government Statistician personally approves each release. (Researchers also sign an agreement that sets out the importance of confidentiality.)

 

Researchers are never interested in the individual record per se, but sometimes they may be trying to match one record with another. For example, the University of Otago Health Inequalities Research Programme (HIRP) at the Wellington School of Medicine matches census records against subsequent mortality records. The detail in the census unit record is invaluable in judging what may have influenced a death.

 

One issue is that people sometimes change their ethnic status when their circumstances alter. The ethnicity reported on their death certificate by the undertaker can be different from that ticked on census night. One cannot simply compare ethnicity at death with the national statistics of ethnicity.

 

Even so, people’s names and addresses are never disclosed. In any case, researchers do not have the time to look at individuals out of curiosity. Instead, they are happy to have the data without the personal details or, often in my case, aggregated up so they don’t even see a unit record. We are happy because too much detail clogs the computer (and the mind of the researcher). Moreover, the Government Statistician could withdraw access to the database, wrecking an entire research programme. (To see some of the valuable results from the HIRP, go to www.uow.otago.ac.nz/hirp-info.html .)

 

What will happen in 100 years’ time when we are long dead? In the UK, 100-year-old census records are available to genealogists – descendants curious about their ancestors’ lives. I was able to use a household record from the 1901 English census to sort out a small confusion in one of my family lines. Sadly, our census records have not been kept from back then. Our descendants may be able to access ones as old as that in a century’s time, but they certainly can’t now.

 

A census enumeration is expensive and has to be run like a military campaign. It is more than justified by the uses we make of it. From this researcher, from all social researchers and perhaps from genealogists in 100 years’ time, thank you for your co-operation.

Albert Hirschman (1915-2012)

 

It is said social scientists don’t live dangerously, but here’s one who did.

 

Listener: 16 February, 2013.

 

Keywords: History of Ideas, Methodology & Philosophy; Political Economy & History;

 

Miraculously, all four Jewish schoolboys in the picture (which accompanied the column)  taken in Berlin in about 1930 escaped the Holocaust, which killed six million of their  compatriots. Marvellously, all became significant social scientists.

 

On the left is a youthful Wolfgang Rosenberg (1914-2007), much loved in the New Zealand economics profession for his Old World courtesy and charm, despite taking a different view of how economies worked. Next to Wolf is Helmut Mühsam (1914-1997), who became a prominent Israeli demographer; on the far right is Peter Franck (1914-1989), an American trade economist. Between the two is the even more exceptional Albert Hirschman.

 

It is said social scientists don’t live dangerously, but Hirschman did. Escaping Germany, he fought in the Spanish Civil War, smuggled refugees out of Vichy France (including artists Marc Chagall, Marcel Duchamp and Max Ernst), worked in the Office of Strategic Services (the wartime precursor to the CIA) and was an interpreter in early warcrimes trials. Then to the board of the Federal Reserve (the US reserve bank) and a stint in Latin America (later he supported social scientists in peril from dictatorships). In 1956, at 41, he settled down to appointments at Yale, Columbia and Harvard universities and, from 1974, at Princeton’s Institute for Advanced Study.

 

But his thinking never stagnated. I first encountered him in his 1958 book The Strategy of Economic Development. In those days, conventional wisdom favoured balanced economic growth (which typically meant stimulating importsubstituting industrialisation). Hirschman’s unbalanced economic growth had a dynamic leading sector that dragged the rest of the economy along. That is closer to today’s conventional wisdom.

 

Then I came across the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, an elegant way of measuring an industry’s structure (and other things; I’ve used it for ethnicity).

 

His seventh book, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (1970), argued that people respond to institutional failure either by exiting and “voting with their feet”, or by staying on and voicing their dissatisfaction. Loyalty to the institution may determine the choice. Too much disloyalty can result in inferior outcomes. If dissidents in an oppressive dictatorship leave, those left behind will be even worse off. The exit option works where there are competitive markets; the failing firm goes bust (or raises its game).

 

Between these extremes are sectors – such as the education and health systems – that require a judicious balance of exit and voice. If there is no exit and little voice, they are likely to perform badly. Too much exit and they lose the voice of the articulate complainers and fail, even when they have a central role in the welfare of society.

 

Hirschman published his 16th book at 76 in 1991. Another tour de force, The Rhetoric of Reaction: Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy argues that the conservative opposition to social change – the narratives of perversity, futility and jeopardy – is simplistic and flawed, and cut off debate. But in its last chapter, he switches to arguing that the progressive narratives – the synergy illusion, the imminent danger and that “history is on our side” – are equally simplistic and flawed.

 

As well as 18 books, he wrote dozens of illuminating essays providing critical commentary on economic change and growth in Latin America and the shifting landscape of the social sciences. (He could write better in his third language than most economists can in their first.)

 

Among his awards was the prestigious Leontieff Prize for advancing the frontiers of economic thought. (New Zealand economist Robert Wade has also received it.) The American Social Science Research Council’s highest award – for academic excellence in international, interdisciplinary social science research, theory and public communication – is named after him.

 

Why was he never awarded the economics prize in honour of Alfred Nobel? Sadly, its selections have been confined to a narrow notion of economics. Hirschman’s vision was so much broader. Throughout his life, he was fiercely loyal to the idea of a reasoned, reform-minded yet humble social science committed to improving the human lot. When

necessary he publicly defended this cause. Wolf would have agreed.

Acts of God and Government

Sarah Miles:<> The Christchurch Fiasco: The Insurance Aftershock and its Implications for New Zealand and Beyond. Dunmore Publishing, 2012 ($37.99)

 

New Zealand Books: Volume 23, No1, Issue 101, Autumn 2013.

 

Keywords: Business & Finance; Political Economy & History;

 

Given New Zealand’s reputation as ‘The Shaky Isles’, together with its accompanying history of deluges, hurricanes, landslips, tsunamis and volcanoes, you might have expected the country to be reasonably well prepared for natural catastrophes. The response to the Canterbury earthquakes might suggest otherwise.

 

The main Canterbury shocks were not the largest in our known history; the Wairarapa earthquake of 1855 had a magnitude of 8.2 compared to their main shocks of 7.1 in September 2011 and 6.3 in February 2011. But they were in a damned inconvenient location (so was the 1931 Hawke’s Bay one, magnitude 7.8, with more deaths) and the severity of the Canterbury aftershocks was exceptional.

 

Whatever, the Canterbury earthquakes exposed poor building standards, inadequate preparation for rescue, a government unable to relate to a community, and serious deficiencies in the insurance industry.

 

Books (and e-publications) on the earthquakes have proliferated. Thus far they have mainly illustrated the region typically before and after, or are memoirs of those involved. No one has yet incorporated the experience into a novel (the Shaky Isles do not have a large literature of natural catastrophes). Aside from various official reports, Sarah Miles’s The Christchurch Fiasco is the first to explore some of the underlying issues.

 

Miles is a resident of Christchurch who has suffered, like many others, from frustrating interactions with insurance companies. However the book makes good use of Miles’s training as a lawyer. Because it is early in the publication cycle it also provides a background to her focus on insurance. Perhaps inevitably, the second chapter on the political response is disappointing; there is much to learn about the nature of New Zealand governance from the way it has responded. One day a political analyst will do that. Miles looks only at how the insurance system worked (or not) for householders. (The insurance experiences of businesses and commercial buildings are not covered.)

 

Her central theme is that while the insurance industry promised much before the shocks, afterwards their performance has been dreadful: cash-in with a smile; cash-out with a grumble – or not at all. Numerous reported anecdotes from individuals illustrate just how lacklustre the insurers have been. (Reflect on that, as your insurance premium rises.)

Miles did not approach the insurance industry for their explanation. It grumbles about more than 11,000 earthquakes over most of the past two years resulting in more than 450,000 different claims (apparently a 1989 industry review predicted 150,000 for major shock in Wellington), the difficulties of getting the data they need, that the size of the devastation has created enormous logistic challenges and that ‘a co-insurance model not designed to meet multiple events’ (sic).There are also all sorts of unforeseen legal complications, while the recovery program itself is adding to them. Moreover satisfied customers – such as the many dealt with promptly by the Earthquake Commission (EQC) – are unlikely to record offsetting favourable anecdotes.

 

Some of the customer grumbles – but certainly not all of them – are almost certainly unreasonable, based on excessive expectations about what they think should be (or had been) covered. But there are sufficient of the insured with what appear to be legitimate complaints, especially from delays, to suggest there are some deep structural problems, which the insurance industry acknowledges – in part – in its reference to the ‘coinsurance model’. As it happens the private insurers are involved with the biggest claims, where houses are the most munted and often in the worst hit areas where new legal and building standards have been introduced by government. Perhaps insurers should have been better prepared, but even if they had had a fool-proof plan, any repair/rebuild would have taken a long time.

 

The coinsurance problem arises because most householders – some were not insured at all – were covered for the first $100,000 of damage by the EQC and the excess by private insurers. (In practice this affected only about 20,000 houses out of some 140,000 affected.) The interface between the insurers has hardly been seamless. It took a remarkably long time to introduce the practice of their assessors visiting a damaged site together, so that at least there was some agreement on the facts.

 

Miles does not explain the origin of the co-insurance but it is relevant to the current mess and her proposed reform. In 1989 the Labour Government put forward a sensible reform of the existing provision based on the Earthquake and War Damage Commission (EWD). The new agency, the EQC, would no longer cover business insurance which would obtain its insurance from private insurers. (The justification was that they had diverse and specialist needs best met by a multitude of competing suppliers.) Insurance for households was more routine and a monopoly supplier would be more effective. The following National Government capped the exposure of the EQC (and therefore the Crown) to $100,000 (about $200,000 in today’s prices but devalued by inflation) and left the rest to be provided by private insurers. Hence two insurers per (insured) household, although this affects only about 20,000 houses from the Canterbury shocks.

 

A second principle was that the EQC would be an actuarial insurer – that is, set its premiums on the assessed risks, like a private insurer. It would build up a reserve and also purchase reinsurance for the possibility of the big one. Unfortunately this objective was never properly obtained, in part because other parts of the government did not let the EQC  pursue it vigorously.

 

The effect was to reduce the Crown exposure, since it was no longer covering businesses and its exposure for each house insured was limited to $100,000. Instead the exposure was shifted to private insurers – who would charge for their risk – and to the private sector (including households) where it was inadequately insured. All very neoliberal. (The total cost to the Crown of the Canterbury earthquakes is estimated as $13b, of which $7.5b comes from the EQC reserves. Most of the remaining public costs – such as infrastructure replacement – were not intended to be covered by the EQC.)

 

Miles wants the government to be the provider of insurance largely as it was under the pre-neoliberal regime and for houses under the Labour scheme. She underestimates the risk, and – it seems to me – the need for global reinsurance to spread it across the whole world.

 

The 1988 EWD minister, Peter Neilson, gave an assurance that ‘this [Labour] Government will always be compassionate in its approach to providing relief to disaster victims’. The issue is not simply the insurance system, which is necessarily contractual, but the way that the government would handle the entire catastrophe. Arguably neoliberalism (and contractualism) got in the way in Christchurch of the compassionate response that Neilson promised and the public expected.

 

The issues remain. In the 70 years between the Hawke’s Bay and Canterbury earthquake there have been three earthquakes of similar or greater magnitude to the first Canterbury (Darfield) shock of 7.1. Fortunately they were in rural locations unlike the second major Canterbury shock: in the Wairarapa in 1942 (7.2), Inangahua in 1987 (7.1) and Fiordland in 2009 (7.8). (There has also been a number just offshore.) There is no certainty that the next big shock, due in a couple of decades, will be rural.

 

There is to be a white paper on the future of EQC later this year. It is unlikely to address the wider compassion issue and may well be founded on the neoliberal preoccupations of reducing the Crown exposure and the further privatisation of insurance provision. (It will also address a lot of technical-legal issues which the Canterbury experience has raised.)

 

The public reaction will be interesting. My guess is the weight of its sentiment is with Miles. Will it will be able to reverse any neo-liberal proposals? If the social democrats are successful the future of the EQC may be a central issue in the 2014 election, not just because of its importance, but because it may symbolise two distinct political approaches. If the Shaky Isles has a healthy public debate, Miles’s book will be a part of it.

Writings on Earthquakes (Index)

This index, first compiled in January 2013 and subsequently updated, is a list of article on the website which have a substantial content about earthquakes and other natural calamities. They were not a focus until the Canterbury Earthquakes, which I began writing about as “Listener” columns to illustrate general issues. However, they are acquiring a life and interest of their own; hence this index.

They grouped together as follows:

  • History and Personal;
  • Macroeconomic Implications;
  • Sharing the Costs;
  • The EQC and Related Issues.

Within each group the order is usually in that which they were written.

History and Personal

The 1855 Wairarapa Earthquake

This is an extract from the history I am writing: Not in Narrow Seas: A History of New Zealand from an Economic Perspective)

www.eastonbh.ac.nz/2013/01/the-1855-wairarapa-earthquake/

I am also working on the 1931 Hawkes Bay Earthquake as a part of the history.

“The Big Wave” Listener: 7 November, 2009.

Tsunamis are also a part of our history. The 2009 Samoan one enabled me to write about some of this work in

www.eastonbh.ac.nz/2009/11/the-big-wave/

For Paul

Among the losses from the Christchurch after Shock of February 2011, was a friend from school days. Shortly after I attended a memorial service for him.

www.eastonbh.ac.nz/2011/03/for-paul/

The Canterbury Public Library and Me

(Christchurch City Libraries’ Digital Library, 24th March 2011; an extract was published in Christchurch Heritage: A Celebration of Buildings and Streetscapes by Bruce Ansley)

I also lost a part of my heritage. (When later I visited Christchurch, I was reasonably well prepared for the devastation. However, I shed a tear when the bus went past the vacant section which was once my library.)

www.eastonbh.ac.nz/2011/03/the-canterbury-public-library-and-me/

The Role of the Environment In History

In 2012 I twice prepared a presentation in which earthquakes were a central part about the environment in history.

www.eastonbh.ac.nz/2012/08/the-role-of-the-environment-in-history/

www.eastonbh.ac.nz/2012/10/the-role-of-the-environment-in-history-2/

Macroeconomic Implications

The Canterbury Earthquake and the South Canterbury Meltdown

Shortly after the primary shock I was asked to prepare a note on the macroeconomic impact. I wrote this on 14th September 2010. We had no idea of the damage from the shocks to come.

www.eastonbh.ac.nz/2010/09/the-canterbury-earthquake-and-the-south-canterbury-meltdown/

“Quakenomics” (Listener: 19 March, 2011)

My initial Listener foray after the February Christchurch shock was to point out the stupidity of some the commentary, and to set out how the National Accounts constructed GDP. The impatience has had to be repeated.

www.eastonbh.ac.nz/2011/03/quakenomics/

“Infrastructure Problems in New Zealand” (Listener: 17 September, 2011)

I had always wanted to write a column on the importance of sewerage and other prosaic bits of the infrastructure.

www.eastonbh.ac.nz/2011/09/infrastructure-problems-in-new-zealand/

“The Future of the South Island” (Listener: 18 February, 2012)

Again using the Christchurch experience to illustrate some central principles of the role of regional nodes in economic growth.

www.eastonbh.ac.nz/2012/02/the-future-of-the-south-island/

Sharing the Costs

I have taken quite a different view from the government as to how the public costs of the Canterbury earthquakes should be funded and ultimately shared. I had not realised just how frequently I returned to this issue until I set out this section. First, four columns which develop the argument:

“Consensus Rebuilding” (Listener: April 2, 2011)

www.eastonbh.ac.nz/2011/04/consensus-rebuilding/

“Jolt Cost Must Be Shared” (Sunday Star Times: 3 April, 2011)

www.eastonbh.ac.nz/2011/04/jolt-cost-must-be-shared/

“Christchurch Earthquake Tax” (Listener: 9 May, 2011)

www.eastonbh.ac.nz/2011/05/christchurch-earthquake-tax/

“A Canterbury Earthquake Levy Would Be Prudent” (Listener: 3 March 2012)

www.eastonbh.ac.nz/2012/03/a-canterbury-earthquake-levy-would-be-prudent/

“Blast from the Future” (Listener: 21 July, 2012)

The government chose to ignore this approach, so all that was left was to satirise them. (I could not have written this, had I not spent a bit of time studying volcanoes as a part of the history I am writing; even so, I consulted.)

http://www.eastonbh.ac.nz/2012/07/blast-from-the-future/

The EQC and Related Issues

“Seismic Shift” (Listener: 15 November, 2012)

I had this story drawn to my attention; thankyou to the informant. It has set me down a path thinking not just about earthquake insurance, but the wider issue of government responsibilities in circumstances where there are risk (hinted in the last sentence). I have already written one yet-to-be-published article down this path; I expect there will be more.

www.eastonbh.ac.nz/2012/11/seismic-shift/

Tangled Up in Red

A Government surplus means little when private sector borrowing is rampant.

Listener: 30 January, 2013.

A little complacency seems to have crept into the latest Government economic forecasts. In its December outlook, the Government promised to get its books into surplus in the 2014-15 year, the first time in seven years. It might just make it.

But many people are sceptical, arguing that the forecasts are optimistic. And even if the numbers come out as projected, the economy as a whole will be in a far worse state in 2014 than the Government’s accounts will be.

Having satisfactory public accounts is a consequence of growth in private spending, much of it funded by borrowing. The resulting additional revenue from GST and income tax is the source of the fiscal surplus. Sure, there are also a couple of tax hikes, increases in fuel excise and road user charges, but you don’t think you can run a Budget surplus without tax, do you?

To keep the tills ringing, the economy has to borrow an additional $33 billion over the next three years. That will mean a rise in the net international investment position (how much we owe overseas) from 72% of annual GDP in March 2012 to 77% in March 2015. By March 2017, it is expected to rise to 84%.

The Government can say it is doing its bit to restrain overseas borrowing, but it is not that simple. Ultimately, its record looks good only in contrast to the heavy-borrowing private sector. Those who lend to us, whose views are articulated by the credit rating agencies, will see our rising overseas debt as increasingly unsustainable. We can then expect a credit-rating downgrade, which will raise the interest rate we are charged. And in the longer run, the lenders may require us to take unpleasant measures to cut spending, but that is probably a few years off.

So, why the complacency? It comes from a view that the Government’s primary responsibility is to keep its own house in order and that it has little responsibility for the private sector. Would that were true. The fates of the public and private sectors are inextricably linked.

During the peak of the global financial crisis, private sector exposure was shifted to the public sector. Remember the guarantees the Government gave on bank deposits? Had they not been given, the Government would have had to find other means of bailing out the financial sector to avoid a collapse of the payments system.

Public-private linkage was demonstrated again shortly after, when the new National Government cut tax to ease the economy through the downturn. That was possible because previous governments had built up significant reserves on the public balance sheet.

As it happened, the cuts were not big enough because the private balance sheet was so weak. With hindsight, in fact, this column warned ahead of time, there is now a consensus that we were insufficiently concerned about the risk our high offshore borrowing carried. Yet we are still borrowing.

The public want an even deeper interrelationship between the state and private sectors. When Christchurch was shattered by earthquakes, New Zealanders did not expect the private sector to rebuild the city on its own. We looked to the Government to lead and contribute to the reconstruction. It is. The Treasury is expecting a net Crown financing contribution of $13 billion through to 2017.

The bill is being paid from taxes. We cannot treat the Crown as if it is a separate entity from us. The Government might like to see it otherwise, but that is not how the typical New Zealander thinks about the Crown. For the public, the Government is a means of pursuing their personal and community goals more effectively. There is no “them” and “us”, with the public and private sectors independent of one another. We are in this together.

A healthy public sector requires a healthy private sector. The Treasury forecasts say the private sector accounts are sick. The Government accounts, therefore, are not in good shape, even when it is running a Budget surplus.

The 1855 Wairarapa Earthquake

<>This is an extract from the first chapter of the history book I am writing.

In early 1855 there was an earthquake in the centre of Cook Strait, thought to be of a magnitude of about 8.1-8.2, the largest in human memory. [1] (Maori elders said there was no record in their traditions of an earlier shock which was as great.) There have been a few subsequent earthquakes of just under magnitude 8 including the Hawke’s Bay earthquake of magnitude 7.8; there were 258 fatalities. The 2010 Glendale earthquake was magnitude 7.1 and the largest 2011 Christchurch aftershock was magnitude 6.3 with 185 deaths. [2] One additional unit of magnitude represents about 30 times the energy.

The violence of the 1855 shock was recorded by the small and scattered population, especially in Wellington where it had a major impact, although it was severely felt throughout the bottom half of the North Island and the top half of the South Island. It was a consequence of the westward descent of the Pacific Plate beneath the southern part of the North Island (the eastern edge of the Australian Plate).

The earthquake fault or fissure in the earth running north east from the middle of Cook Strait through the Wairarapa was about 140kms long, while the aftershocks lasted for about nine months (although there was no systematic seismic measurement in those days; the first seismograph arrived in 1880). The quake was of international interest to the extent that the eminent geologist Charles Lyell seized on it as illustrating his thesis that the earth moved incrementally along geological fault lines during earthquakes. (The popular explanation for the 1855 earthquake was an eruption from an underwater volcano.)

Some of the ground shifted 12 metres horizontally along the fault, while on the western (Rimutaka Range) side of the fault, the land was lifted by as much as 6.5 metres. Earlier earthquakes in the region are identifiable at Turakirae Head marking the western headland of Palliser Bay, where the Wairarapa Fault runs offshore into Cook Strait, by three stranded gravel beaches between strips of rocky ground. The second to lowest (i.e. the beach uplifted during the 1855 earthquake) is about 9 metres higher (that is, 16 metres above sea level) occurred about 250 BCE (2200 BP). The next stranded beach, another metres higher, seems to have been uplifted about 2850 BCE (4800 BP), with an even earlier uplift of 7 metres in about 4850 BCE (6800 BP). These radio carbon ages (from shells and woods) are subject to a margin of error of plus or minus several hundred years, and there also seems to have been two large earthquakes which impacted in the Wairarapa in about 1050 CE and 1450 CE (900 and 3400 BP) which did not cause any recognisable uplift at Turakirae Head. Collectively the geological evidence suggests there have been earthquakes big enough to cause surface rupturing along the Wairarapa Fault every 800 to 2100 years. (This does not mean Wellington has no significant earthquake worries in the next millennium. There are other major fault lines.)

There were enough humans recording what happened in 1855 to get a sense of the effect on the biota. A tsunami swept around the coast including inundating the Rongotai isthmus (Kilbirnie) into Evans Bay. The wave was almost nine metres high in Palliser Bay. There was considerable devastation to plant life, and extensive landslips (especially from the Rimutaka Range) but none fatal. Bottom living fish (notably ling) suffered rapid vertical movements due to the submarine slumping in Cook Strait and floated dead in Cook Strait; inshore fish were swept onto the land by the tsunami. One can’t help wondering whether that explains part of the substantial depletion of the rich fishing stock which the first Wellington settlers came across (in which case subsequent fishing practices reduced the recovery).

Some of the shellfish stranded by the coastal uplift had no chance. Certainly there is little evidence today of the rock oysters that were common around Wellington before the earthquake. (However Manukau Harbour has also suffered severe depletion despite there being no earthquake, suggesting both stocks may have been eaten out.) More illustrative a rock-boring mollusc (Anchomasa Stimulus ) is now very rare; they certainly were never eaten by humans.

There was widespread destruction of human supplied physical capital especially brick chimneys but it unclear to what extent that was because of their flimsy construction. Settlement was only fifteen odd years old and earthquake robustness was a still evolving consideration. (A cluster of strong earthquakes in 1848 had also led to widespread building damage.)

Estimates of how many humans died from the earthquake are put between 5 and 9; one settler in Wellington, four to six in Maori in the Wairarapa and possibly two others in the Manawatu, a rate of between 5 and 9 per 100,000 (for the population across the whole country). In contrast the 256 deaths of the 1931 Napier earthquake were 17 per 100,000 and the 185 deaths from the February 2011 Canterbury earthquake was 4 per 100,000.

Notes

[1] This section is based on R. Grapes (2000) Magnitude Eight Plus: New Zealand’s Biggest Earthquake, with subsequent updatings by the author, pers. com. The Visitation. Rodney Grapes subsequently kindly updated the study for me. (The earlier 7.5 1848 Marlborough Earthquake is described in R. Grapes (2011).)

[2] A useful comparative source is http://www.mch.govt.nz/perspectives/earthquakes/.

Economics for New Zealand Social Democrats

Young Labour Summer School; January 26, 2013

Today I want to talk about social democracy, especially its economic aspects. There are many who have narrowed down their vision of social democracy to social justice, including in international affairs. That is not the comprehensive heritage of social democracy, nor do social democrats have any special claims to justice issues. They may think they do, but conservatives talk of justice too. You may disagree with them; when conservatives talk of justice their ideas may be fuzzy; true for social democrats too. If social democrats want to focus on justice issues they will be relegated to the margins of the political debate.

The heritage of social democracy is quite different and far more based on economic analysis. After centuries of slowly building up, the economic forces unleashed in the nineteenth century transformed much of Europe from an agrarian and rural society to an urban and industrial one with consequential economic, social and political turmoil.

There were two sorts of interdependent responses. One was the Left-Right dimension. The Left wanted to use democratic institutions and therefore collective ones to respond to the new economy, while the Right preferred to leave these matters to individual initiative, which is, of course, biased towards the rich.

The other dimension was modernisation versus conserving traditional society. This was not just an issue for the Right. There was a strong but now almost forgotten Left approach to returning to a rural agrarian Arcadia of an idealised eighteenth century. Many socialists did not think this was either practical or desirable. There is not time to detail that debate, but even today that division remains.

We saw the Left’s split between modernisers and traditionalists in 1984. Muldoon was a conservative traditionalist. The majority of the Left broadly agreed with much of his economic philosophy, which was that the First Labour Government under Savage and Fraser had resolved the problems that nineteenth century industrialisation had caused New Zealand. Admittedly there was still some fine-tuning to be done, and if you were a left-traditionalist you were keen to pursue social justice too. Fundamentally, though, the Labour Party traditionalists sought a kinder, gentler Muldoonism.

But the world had not stopped evolving in 1935. The drivers may have been different from those of nineteenth century industrialisation but they were no less titanic. Perhaps the most important was globalisation and the changing international structure, although technological change and environmental depletion were significant even in the 1970s; more recently the dominance of financial capitalism has added to the ongoing transformation.

One way to identify traditionalists is by their attitude to globalisation. They dont analyse it but instead hope it will go away.

Another useful test is what is called “whining”. When something goes wrong, traditionalists complain, saying they would do better once they are in office. But there is no underpinning analysis to the complaints and when they are in office things still go wrong.

Muldoon also hoped the problems would go away. As a result there were a myriad of modernising issues which he did not address, leaving a huge challenge to modernisers when Labour came to power in 1984.

The traditionalists had no answer other than to be kinder and gentler. But sadly the Labour Government had no social democratic answer either, and went down the road of neo-liberalism. To do this they had to crush the modernising social democrats.

The cost to the Left can be seen in the fate of the Clark-Cullen government. It was elected on a platform of rolling back the extremism of the neo-liberal policies. It largely but not wholly did so without reversing the modernisation elements of those changes. Even so, there was still much modernisation to be done, there always is change so there is always a need for modernisation but in the end Labour did not know how to do it.

There were two reasons. The first was that its intellectual firepower had been undermined by the neo-liberals. The social democratic tradition had always been based upon debate, analysis and empirical research. Not only did the neo-liberals repress intellectuals, they undermined research after all it showed that they were wrong replacing careful analysis with opinion.

Second, Labour had no mandate for further modernisation. Its support base was largely the traditional focus on social justice, while the rhetoric of modernisation remained largely neo-liberal. Keynes pointed out that practical men and women are slaves of defunct economists. When critics red, blue or green say that the macroeconomic problems New Zealand faces can be resolved by the Reserve Bank fiddling around, they are unconscious slaves of that defunct economist, Milton Friedman, who said monetary policy was all important. Yes, many of our lefties are monetarists.

Historically modernising social democracy and the empirical social sciences were intertwined because they were looking at the same thing, the process of economic and social change. That is why the neo-liberals had to attack the social science profession, replacing it with the insipid alternative which dominates today.

Despite the lack of support for the empirical sciences, despite the rewards going to neo-liberals and the repression of alternative viewpoints, despite the lack of venues for discussion and debate, a handful of economists have persisted with the social democratic project. Rather than list them and make some egregious omissions, I am going to finish by talking about some of my work.

First, a word of caution. My work is about analysing the processes of change. Only sometimes is the result is innovative policy. This is not the New Zealand way of “we know the answer; who cares what the question is”. (More crudely “bugger the analysis; let’s get on with the policy”.) While one may not always know what a good policy response is, good analysis can often tell you why the conventional wisdom is wrong and, sometimes, even stupid.

So, for instance, I wrote a book on globalisation, which poses an enormous challenge to modern New Zealand. The analysis tells you why the answers of the left-traditionalists who wish it would go away or of the neo-liberals who uncritically embrace free trade, are both wrong.

Similarly I have studied economic growth as much as any New Zealand economist. There is not a skerrick of evidence that governments are able to accelerate sustainable economic growth, despite that claim being central to our economic debate. In practice each side advocates policies which favour themselves saying they will benefit the economy as a whole.

So what is the purpose of the economy and of economic growth? The empirical evidence is that economic growth does not increase wellbeing generally, although some kinds may be of greater value than others. What this means in policy terms is that we should not pursue economic growth at all costs. Once more the conventional wisdom is wrong.

What about macroeconomics? I was one of the first New Zealand economists to recognise we were in for a long recession only months after the Lehman’s crisis of September 2008. I did not predict the exact form of the Global Financial Crisis before it happened, but you will find me thoughtfully discussing the possibility.

There are numerous problems in managing an economy during a long recession. While we should follow the international debate closely, my work has primarily been about the particularities of a small, open, multi-sectoral economy like New Zealand. They are quite different from those of a large economy, although too often we treat our economy as if it was as large and as powerful as the United States which issues an international currency; thus the foolishness of advocating quantitative-easing. It is an example of those who know the answer but have no idea what the question is. A particular conclusion of the research is that at the heart of our macro problem is the lack of domestic savings. That is an entire paper in itself.

Another research area is how markets work. Last year I contributed to a Fabian series which critiqued light-handed regulation. That is a good way to distinguish social democrats from the neo-liberals who uncritically support light-hand regulation with its deaths, human misery and economic waste. Go to the Fabian website to read the lectures.

Since the series finished I have been extending the alternative. The work focusses on prevention to minimise the consequences of catastrophic events and unified responses afterwards to minimise the transaction costs of remediation. An excellent example is our world class Accident Compensation Scheme. A Building Performance Guarantee Corporation, like we had in the 1980s before the neo-liberals hatchetted it, would have mitigated disasters like leaky homes and buildings which failed during earthquakes. Currently I am thinking about the Earthquake Commission again neutered by the neo-liberals, to the detriment of those who live in Canterbury. The white paper on the future of the EQC may well be based on neo-liberal principles. There will be the usual whining from the traditionalists; will there be a constructive response from the modernising social democrats?

The final research area to be mentioned today, there are others, is distributional economics. In the 1970s I was one of the pioneers who set out the paradigm to study the economics of poverty. You are warned against those who talk about poverty but avoid discussing the need for supplementing the poor’s income.

Today’s coverage has had to be brief, but it finishes with the following thought. Suppose you go back thirty years. Look at the public commentary of 1983. Much was traditionalist and whining; with hindsight it was also irrelevant.

The modernising social democrats got much wrong too, but they did provide a framework to respond to the future. Sadly the Lange-Douglas government did not take it up. Subsequent history has shown that the social democrats were broadly correct. Many of Labour’s failures were because it ignored their analysis; many of its achievements has been the result of listening to them. That is why modernising social democracy has to be at the heart of a future oriented Labour movement.

Money Can’t Buy Me Love

It was true in Shakespeare’s time and still holds today: money can’t buy true friendship.

Listener: 16 January, 2013.

The available text of Shakespeare’s Timon of Athens is a bit of a mess. It was all the compilers of the 1623 Folio edition of Shakespeare’s plays had when it was published, but it is almost certainly an early draft by its two playwrights (Thomas Middleton wrote about half of it), replete with inconsistencies that would have been dealt with when the play was staged. This may justify more freedom than modern directors regularly take with Shakespeare; the British National Theatre seized the opportunity last year with a stage production (right), also on film, located in London after the global financial crisis.

Timon is rich and even more generous. He endows a room in London’s National Gallery (its El Greco of Christ Driving the Money Changers from the Temple hangs on a wall). He gives gifts to those who fawn around him, considering he is “rich in friends”. In the Folio version, Timon mortgages his lands to the hilt to fund the gifts. Perhaps the modern Timon borrowed to leverage his assets and his net wealth collapsed in the financial crash. In dire straits he turns to his “friends”, who refuse to help him. (An unexplored possibility is that their balance sheets have also been wrecked by the global financial crisis; even so, they could have helped him but they don’t.) He may have thought his real wealth was that he had friends, but events prove that he had these friends because of his wealth.

Demoralised, he flees to an abandoned construction site piled with urban waste, all his possessions in a shopping trolley. People visit him, including the Athenian mob reinterpreted as the Occupy London movement. He has a cracking good debate with a philosopher, Apemantus, which contrasts Timon, now a hater of humankind, with a realistic cynic, who believes people are untrustworthy. (The philosophy of cynicism, and dogs, pervades the production; the word “cynic” has links with the Greek for “dog”.) Touching is the interchange with his steward Flavia. (Shakespeare had a man, Flavius), who proves to be an honest person (contradicting the view of the most famous cynic, Diogenes, that there are none, only rascals and scoundrels).

The deus ex machina plot device is that Timon finds some hidden gold. (Perhaps he found a forgotten hedge fund that had made a mint from other people’s sufferings.) Unsurprisingly, his fair-weather friends turn up, asking for funds to stave off the Occupy mob. When Timon denies their request, their solicitous interest evaporates and they depart.

Timon, who is very hungry, reflects that you cannot eat gold, concluding that money corrupts the world, a notion nicely illustrated by an exchange with whores whom he encourages to pollute the world with venereal diseases. In a lengthy tirade, he says money can make “Black white, foul fair, wrong right/Base noble, old young, coward valiant”.

Meanwhile, the Occupy mob, funded by some of Timon’s gold, march on London, and their leader, Alcibiades, takes over the chairing of the City of London. But the production leaves the impression that nothing has really changed, that the Occupy movement has been betrayed.

This part of the story is different from Shakespeare’s, in which Alcibiades is a general who has been exiled for loyalty to one of his soldiers. Increasingly depressed, Timon dies, leaving a bitter epitaph.

Ultimately, Timon of Athens is a meditation on materialism, the human condition (as always in Shakespeare) and what is important in life. Marx saw his favourite Shakespearian play illustrating the transformative power of wealth on society (as was occurring when the play was written and today).

There are parallels with King Lear, written about the same time, but Timon does not have a family as Lear had. All he has is wealth; when he loses that he has nothing. Timon thought he could buy friendship; he could not buy the real thing.

The Global Financial Crisis iii (Index)

Writings on the Long Recession from October 2010 to December 2012

This is the third entry which summarises the Global Financial Crisis and its aftermath.

The first index (www.eastonbh.ac.nz/?p=1351) covered the period from August 2007 to March 2009 The trigger was in the US sub-prime market crisis in August 2007, about a year before the September (‘Lehmans’) crisis which ended all doubt there were deep problems. (New Zealand’s economic production also peaked in mid to late 2007, but I was not aware of this at the time.)

The second index (www.eastonbh.ac.nz/?p=1353) covered the period from April 2009 to September 2010, when it seemed that not only had we had a major financial crisis in September 2008 but that the effects would be prolonged.

By now the GFC had morphed into what may be called ‘The Long Recession’. On reflection it is surprising that I gave so little weight to the possibility of a Second Great Depression. From the beginning I had thought the best analogy – although of course none are perfect – was the Long Depression of the late 1880s to the mid 1890s (although the US and Australian story is a little different).

Little happens in economic terms during a Long Recession although of course there is lots of politics. (Much of which is avoiding addressing any issues) So the third index in this series has a different structure. It has three sections. The first, labeled by an H, brings together the relevant historical research I was pursuing (at the time I was – and am – writing a history of New Zealand from an economic perspective). The second, labeled by a T, sets out some theoretical concerns which were troubling me and, I hope, evolving. Only the third section, labeled by a C, is like the earlier indexes and sets out the sequence of my contemporary writings during the period.

Some History

[H1] The earlier indexes include historical material too, and much of what I report here is a continuation of that research. Growth and Recessions of Economic Output: 1861-1939 (www.eastonbh.ac.nz/?p=1403) is an appendix for the history I am writing. It was published on the website so that people can access the technical material.

[H2] Imbalances in a Small Open Economy: New Zealand and the Great Depression (www.eastonbh.ac.nz/?p=1456) was a paper to the Asia-Pacific Economic and Business History Conference, San Francisco, February 2011. As well as presenting a paper on the conference theme, I was exploring the relevance of the Great Depression to contemporary circumstances.

[H3] I gave Five Great Stagnations (www.eastonbh.ac.nz/?p=1515) to a Treasury seminar in July 2011. It points out that the New Zealand (market) economy had already experienced five long recessions in which there had been no substantive economic growth for seven and more years. (The longest stagnation had been in the pre-market economy in the 500 odd years from the Polynesian arrival to the European arrival.) Virtually every economist alive today has grown up in an environment dominated by the post-war growth models and takes the growth process for granted. Moreover, there have been three major economic stagnations since 1945.

I am not saying the paper was decisive but I have the impression that shortly after it was presented the serious part of the economics profession gave up the notion of an early recovery and began working on the assumption that we were in for a long recession. Of course many had come to that conclusion earlier – well it was nearly four years since the economy had peaked – but afterwards there were few who thought of a recovery before the second half of the current decade while some talk about the early part of the next one (i.e. after 2020). That does not mean the non-serious have been converted; business, politicians and superficial commentators continue to talk about an upswing soon. If there is one, the informed expectation is that it will be a period of very slow growth.

Theoretical Preoccupations

There have been a number of theoretical preoccupations which influence the general framework of my thinking, but also appear in some of the commentary (where however confident I may be, I may be working them through as I write). Here are a few which had a more independent life.

[T1] Debt and Equity in NZ’s International Investment Position (www.eastonbh.ac.nz/?p=1405) is a note I wrote to myself in December 2010, indicating my continuing preoccupation with our overseas debt. I think one of the things that came out of it (or may have happened anyway) was the separating out related party debt in the official measures. I am sure I was not responsible for the change in tax laws.

[T2] I was asked to be on a panel in June 2011, and prepared the following note: Sectors and Prices: Exportables and the Real Exchange Rate (www.eastonbh.ac.nz/?p=1496). As it happens the panel took a different direction, and it was not used. But it is a useful summary of my thinking at the time – despite the self-mocking style – and informs much of my commentary about this time.

[T3] I was on another panel and presented Concluding Comments to the Macroeconomic Imbalances Conference: June 24, 2010 Wellington (www.eastonbh.ac.nz/?p=1499).You can see here my preoccupations not unrelated to T2, but in the context of the conference.

[T4] What Are Our Economic Priorities? (www.eastonbh.ac.nz/?p=1549) was presented in Nelson, Wellington and Takaka between August 2011 and February 2012. It may seem to be some distance from the Long Recession, but it is mulling over the following question. Politicians have built economic policy objectives around economic growth; what are we to do if there is a period of economic stagnation (other than promise – and fail to deliver – the growth)?

[T5] I was asked to present to a series on ‘uncertainty’ and economic perspective. Hence Economic Uncertainty (www.eastonbh.ac.nz/?p=1707). Aside from setting out the economic distinction between risk and uncertainty, the analysis has considerable relevance to explaining how the financial system created the Global Financial Crisis. It knew a lot about risk, very little about uncertainty and even less about the distinction.

[T6] Some time in 2012 I saw my way through a problem that had been puzzling me for three decades: how to model an open economy with three sectors. (The conventional models have two – exportables and importables – and so lack a non-tradeable sector.) Satisfyingly the model leads to a a locus – a formal mathematical relationship – between Net National Savings and the Real Exchange Rate (www.eastonbh.ac.nz/?p=1773). Basically the more a country borrows overseas the higher its real exchange rate. I had known this before – see Boom Time Rats (http://www.eastonbh.ac.nz/?p=1033) for a verbal account – and knew savings was crucial in macroeconomic management. But now I could formally model it all. Its implications are wide, and informed my economic commentary through much of 2012 (and earlier). It is a great challenge to the conventional wisdom which focuses on interest rate manipulation to reduce the exchange rate. It wont work unless it also addresses national savings. [C29]

Commentary

The commentary is an ongoing dialogue. Picking it up in October 2010 means omitting the continuity in the earlier dialogue (detailed in the two previous indexes).

[C1] A Feudal Future? (www.eastonbh.ac.nz/?p=1376). Once more I am going on about New Zealand’s foreign debt. That and related issues do not go away for the next two years. Come to think of it, it has been a problem for the previous 170 years, and is likely to be a challenge in the next 170. (Listener, October 2010)

[C2] Flatter and Flatter (www.eastonbh.ac.nz/?p=1378). Reporting to the public the likelihood of a long recession. Some commentators still dont get it. (Listener, October 2010)

[C3] Growing Pains (www.eastonbh.ac.nz/?p=1380). A continuation of the previous column, a little more prospective . (Listener, November 2010)

[C4] Time for a New Strategy (www.eastonbh.ac.nz/?p=1382). A follow up of the previous three columns, with a focus on policy alternatives. (Listener, November 2010)

[C5] Bring out Your Dead (www.eastonbh.ac.nz/?p=1384) A review of the Governor of the Reserve Bank’s book on the Global Financial Crisis. Terrific account of how it happened – in New Zealand anyway – and how close we ran to a domestic financial crisis. The second edition has an endorsement by myself and Don Brash on the front cover – that two such contrasting economists could do so says a lot about the book. (NZ Books, Summer 2010)

[C6] Possums in the Headlights (www.eastonbh.ac.nz/?p=1428) The subtitle ‘We need to do what is necessary now, before we head down Greece and Ireland’s path’, says it all. It is interesting that at this stage I was coupling the Greek and Irish situations. Later I focus on Greece. (Listener, February 2011)

[C7] Who Wants Asset Sales? (www.eastonbh.ac.nz/?p=1461). Yes it is about macro, because of the need to think about savings policy. (Listener, March 2011)

[C8] Consensus Rebuilding (www.eastonbh.ac.nz/?p=1476). Responding to the Canterbury Earthquakes and the run up to the budget. (Listener, April 2011)

[C9] Will the Budget Be Fair? (www.eastonbh.ac.nz/?p=1480). Pre budget review. It was not particularly. (Listener, April 2011)

[C10] Christchurch Earthquake Tax (www.eastonbh.ac.nz/?p=1482). Probably the greatest missed opportunity of the government. The tax would have contributed to the fiscal position and national savings and it would have enabled the government to share the burden of the destruction and reconstruction of the earthquake more fairly. That is why I kept coming back to the issue [C8], [C20]. (Listener, May 2011)

[C11] Not in Denial (www.eastonbh.ac.nz/?p=1484). This was a note I wrote – ‘Listener’ style – in response to the popular critics of the 2011 budget. (May 2011).

[C12] Our Big Lean Greek Wedding (www.eastonbh.ac.nz/?p=1490) Reviewing the budget. The theme of the last four columns (and the note) has been that prudence requires a reduction in the fiscal deficit but it should be done fairly. The government followed only half my message. (Listener June 2011)

[C13] US Debt Default – Where to from Here? (www.eastonbh.ac.nz/?p=1527). When I was studying in America in 2005 I came to the view that the US political system was dysfunctional (see also [C3?]). This gave me the opportunity to illustrate to Listener readers. There is a lot in the column about the global financial system too., for it is so dependent upon the US’s one (Listener, August 2011)

[C14] Households Cause Balance Sheet Problems (www.eastonbh.ac.nz/?p=1545). I believe that the GFC was a balance sheet problem, and that the Long Recession will not be over until the balance sheets of the world are in better balance. (Many other apparent economic paradoxes – such as the meaning of money – are best explained with balance sheets.) I have never had the opportunity to elaborate this analysis; for various reasons the ability of a Listener column/essay to do it is limited. This is as close as it gets. (Listener, October 2011)

[C15] Loose Regulations Sink Economies – and Buildings (www.eastonbh.ac.nz/?p=1547). Linking light-handed regulation – using a New Zealand example – to the causes of the GFC. (Listener, October 2011)

[C16] Stopping the Credit Crunch (www.eastonbh.ac.nz/?p=1618). Surveying both the government’s economic forecasts and strategy in the context of international lending. Fortunately the international monetary pressures turned out to be not as severe as I expected. (Listener, December 2011)

[C17] Europe’s Economic Struggle (www.eastonbh.ac.nz/?p=1620) An end of the year review which focused especially on the difficulties the Greek economy was facing, linking back to New Zealand. ‘It’s a bit like watching a motorway pile-up in slow motion. The roads are wet, the vehicles too close, no one is giving way and – egged on by their passengers – the drivers are being irresponsible.’ (Listener , December 2011).

[C18] The Too Hard Basket (www.eastonbh.ac.nz/?p=1625) Opening the 2012 year with the view that the government was avoiding making the hard decisions, with the consequence that we were piling up future troubles. I got an unusual amount of strong positive feedback on this one. I guess I’ll be saying much the same thing in the 2013 opener and the 2014 one too – except the cliff will be closer. (Listener, January 2012)

[C19] Germany Must Make Adjustments Too (www.eastonbh.ac.nz/?p=1627). While most of the attention is on those countries running serious savings deficits, this column pointed out that there had to be adjustments by the surplus countries too. Keynes would have approved. (Listener, February 2012)

[C20] A Canterbury Earthquake Levy Would Be Prudent (www.eastonbh.ac.nz/?p=1645).The last chance for the earthquake tax was looming up – repeating C10. It was left in the too hard basket. (Listener, March 2012)

[C21] New Zealand Should Tax Financial Transactions (www.eastonbh.ac.nz/?p=1647). A financial transactions tax is popular, but far more complicated than the public thinks. I finally got around to setting out my position; that we should be a ‘fast follower’. I may say that some of the informed feedback was more cautious, although there is considerable agreement on the follower strategy (let others make the implementation mistakes first). The financial sector is, of course, opposed. (Listener, March 2012)

[C22] NZ Government’s Influence on Economic Growth (www.eastonbh.ac.nz/?p=1655). It is common to lambast the government for failing to promoted economic growth in order to purse one’s policy agenda – which is usually riddled with self-interest. When a prominent Rogernome had the audacity to do so – given the poor record of their management – matters had to be corrected. But just beneath the surface of the column is the likelihood that governments cant accelerate economic growth by much anyway. (Listener, April 2012)

[C23] Issues New Zealand Faces: the International Context (www.eastonbh.ac.nz/?p=1666).

It is not often that one gets a good opportunity to do a pre-budget review; I seized it to talk to the NZIIA about the international context. Most pre-budget commentary assumes that a budget can be made without reference to overseas trends – a serious blindness when the country is borrowing heavily. (Address to the NZIIA, May 2012)

[C24] Could Auckland Have a Greek Crisis? (www.eastonbh.ac.nz/?p=1676). I had done some consulting work on the Auckland Council Plan, which showed that it was very dependent on future heavy borrowing. (See http://www.eastonbh.ac.nz/?p=1664 for my report.) I wrote this as an article for the New Zealand Herald, submitted it, but they did not even acknowledge receiving it. If Auckland’s local paper is so insensitive to the issue, the answer to the question has to be ‘yes’. (Unpublished paper, May 2012)

[C25] Government Budgets: The Ceremony and the Reality (www.eastonbh.ac.nz/?p=1672). The post-budget review focusing on the fiscal strategy; it seemed to me to be over-optimistic. Could not resist quoting from Yeats’ ‘The Second Coming’. (Listener, June 2012)

[C26] Chartering Through the Long Recession (www.eastonbh.ac.nz/?p=1680). As I mentioned earlier, there is a tendency to use a crisis such as the Long Recession to pursue goals which are ideological and self-interested, but which do not address the real issues. (Listener, June 2012)

[C27] Lifting the Age of Retirement (http://www.eastonbh.ac.nz/?p=1682). Although not strictly an macroeconomics column, it is included here to illustrate my continuing preoccupation with fiscal prudence and savings. (Listener, July 2012)

[C28] Another Financial Crisis on the Rise? (www.eastonbh.ac.nz/?p=1725). China has been central to New Zealand’s weathering of the Global Financial Crisis. How sound is the Chinese economy. All economies have problems but careful observers of the Chinese one have concerns which could result in it collapsing – a second shock in the Global Financial Crisis. It hasn’t happened yet, but the possibility cannot be dismissed. I mention that I supervised a thesis on the (South) Korean economy during the Asian economic crisis, and learned much which has relevance to China (particularly the close relations between banks and industry). One lesson is that a Chinese economic collapse – since all economies suffer crises the issue is ‘when’ not ‘if’ – is likely to happen differently from a Western collapse at the particular level, but be much the same at the general level. (Listener, September 2012)

[C29] The Power Myth of the Reserve Bank (www.eastonbh.ac.nz/?p=1737) There is a well known saying that to every problem there is a solution which is simple, easy to implement and wrong. Thus is New Zealand’s conventional wisdom on the over-valued exchange rate. This may be the first time I was explicitly referring to the model described in T6. Some statements by the new Governor (Graeme Wheeler) shortly after suggested the RBNZ is not too uncomfortable with this analysis. I should confess however, that the proposal that the RBNZ should think about how to regulate the banks to encourage savings is not the wisdom of all the informed. (Listener, October 2012)

[C30] Housing: a Pricey Problem (www.eastonbh.ac.nz/?p=1741). To repeat the previous point. The popular solution to the price of housing is simple, easy to implement and wrong. Here I set out a more comprehensive analysis, anchoring the housing market into the Global Financial Crisis, the Long Recession, and New Zealand’s savings shortage. Balance sheet analysis in working undereanth this, of course. C14. (Listener, November 2012)

[C31] US Cliffhanger (www.eastonbh.ac.nz/?p=1743). Given this was written in November, it proved prescient about the goings on at the end of the year. The punch line is in the last sentence and repeats the forebodings in C13. (Listener, December 2012)

[C32] Party Till We Drop (www.eastonbh.ac.nz/?p=1721). It was only doing this review that I realised that the final 2012 column repeated the first one – and indeed that of many other columns for the year – that New Zealand is avoiding making the hard decisions with the likelihood of compromising its viability in the future. Sigh. (Listener, December 2012)

Published Work 2012

The following is a list of the 2012 publications on my website. Some consultancy work and most of my writing on the history of New Zealand is not there. The publications are grouped into research topics (which means there is some doubling up) and are itemised in the order of publication.  There is a a short contextual introduction for each topic.

  1. Economic History and Political Economy (includes Demography): 15 Items
  2. The Purpose of the Economy: 5 Items
  3. How Markets Work: 8 Items
  4. Policy Initiatives (includes Poverty): 9 Items
  5. Macroeconomics: 14 Items
  6. The International Context: 6 Items
  7. Critiquing Public Policy: 12 Items

1. Economic History and Political Economy (*Demography)

The big effort remains the history of New Zealand For which I wrote about 60,000 words (in addition to revising chapters) and am up to the late 1970s. Most of this material is not on the web, although I am thinking about publishing the quantitative appendices in web form in 2013.

The list includes some material based on the history, and some articles which amount to notes for future chapters.

Only indirectly mentioned in the list is that I have been on the independent panel assisting the Treasury in their Long Term Fiscal Projection to be published at the end of 2013. I guess it is for them to rate my contribution, but I have thought that my historical work was of value; you cannot really project fifty years out on the basis of knowledge of the last few. I’d hope my modelling and policy skills have been useful too.

I have also been doing some work as a social statistician on ethnicity, social class and educational achievement. The report is not quite ready for publication. I am not sure if the work is important, but it is enlightening to me.

(I have separated out demography because this year I was appointed an honorary fellow of the National Institute of Demographic and Economic Analysis at Waikato University. This adds to fellowships at the Institute of Public Policy, AUT; SHORE, Massey; Stout Research Centre, VUW and the University of Otago’s Wellington School of Medicine).

2. The Purpose of the Economy

Ever since my first economic teacher, Alan Danks, warned the class against treating GDP and such as being ultimate measures of welfare I have been concerned with the purpose of the economy and how it relates to a holistic human life. Wellbeing research in recent years has made it possible to progress the issue. Occasionally I have been given the opportunity to ponder on the issue in public. (Like almost all of my work the new material is based on previous research.)

3. How Markets Work

One of the central themes at the University of Sussex where I taught in the 1960s was how markets worked and how they could be harnessed for social outcomes. It has remained a persistent research theme of mine. This year I began bringing together a critique of light-handed regulation while providing an alternative policy framework of social market regulation. This may well be influential in New Zealand economic management in the future, but only because New Zealand has got so far out of line with conventional economic practice.

4. Policy Initiatives: (*Poverty)

As I have often grumbled, I am not into the ‘bugger the analysis; let’s get onto the policy’ approach which is riddled through the New Zealand public dialogue. Focusing on analysis and how policy occurs means I focus on policy frameworks (such as light handed regulation and its alternative) and dont always get into detailed policy prescriptions. But sometimes I write about policy to illustrate analysis, and sometimes in the depths of analysis one sees amazing policy options.

Towards the end of the year as a part of the light-handed regulation theme, I began seeing a set of public institutions which seem quite diverse and yet are organised around the same core analytics – ACC, BPGC; EQC, probably some others including part of the health system – with the purpose of encouraging prevention and early identification before the event and reducing transaction costs after, I am not sure where the analysis will go; I shall be watching this space too.

I’ve separated out poverty research. Although there is not much recorded here I did one major project in 2012 which should be published in 2013. Poverty (and income inequality) is becoming fashionable but far too much is analytically less sophisticated than what I did when I set up the paradigm forty years ago – as nice illustration of the ‘bugger the analysis’ approach. The consequence is most of the policy discussion does not address the real issue.

5. Macroeconomics

My macroeconomic work over the year, has centred on anxieties that we could let our debt situation get out of control with a Greek outcome. One of the constant themes in Listener columns has been the need for fiscal restraint (although I am much more willing to contemplate raising taxes that the government) but also we need to worry about private debt as well as public debt. (There has been much less work this year on economic growth – the Long Recession continues.)

Amazingly this year I solved a theoretical problem which has been gnawing at me for three decades: how to characterise a three commodity economy. It leads to an amazing – and yet so simple – conclusion. There is a locus – a formal relationship – between net savings and the real exchange rate. In simple terms we cannot get that exchange rate down unless we increase national savings. To be frank the result is so simple, so elegant that someone must have identified it earlier – or else I have made an analytic error ☺. In my view the result suggests both quite a different view of macroeconomic management in a small open economy, and yet – strangely – one which is not too different from that which I have been developing in the past.

6. The International Context

Not much this year, because I was not asked to do much. Most are Listener columns concerned about the state of the world economy. In 2013 I am planning to travel to Malaysia and Indonesia with a grant from the Asia New Zealand Foundation.

7. Critiquing Current Public Policy

It has not been a good year for the government with its lack of depth becoming increasingly apparent in terms of serious public mistakes. Criticising it is for the politicians (including those who disguise themselves as commentators). On occasions I join in with critiques. Sometimes it is where the government has got itself into a muddle and where a bit of hard-headed analysis provides some insights; sometimes it is a thought-piece trying to set out a framework to think about the government’s problem.

It is surely not coincidental that the last item for the year was a Listener column around the themes of the meaning of wellbeing, the existence of social change and the need for prudence.

Party Till We Drop

Our national appetite for living it up doesn’t quite match Greece’s, but it’s still a bit of a worry.

Listener: 27 December, 2012.

During Rugby World Cup 2011, historian and editor of online encyclopedia Te Ara Jock Phillips searched for the “real New Zealand”. He trotted around museums and other earnest alternative exhibits, often rugby-related, reporting on what the non-rugby elite thought was important.

And – perhaps to his mild surprise – he found the real New Zealand was in the street celebrations that accompanied the tournament, rather than in the stadiums and galleries, as he reveals in a lecture that can be found online at http://www.museumsaotearoa.org.nz/Site/conference-2012/programme/MA_Lecture/MA_Lecture.aspx

The Rugby World Cup is not the only example of national life spilling out on to the streets. Public festivals do not happen every week, but they seem to be increasingly frequent. In the run up to Christmas we had one for The Hobbit, and there were numerous other end-of-year occasions. Wellington has the Sevens in February, and most other centres have similar festivals.

There are always consultants’ reports saying these events generate huge numbers of dollars of economic activity, but do we really believe them? If we add the figures up, we could almost expect a doubling of GDP. Let’s be honest, the festivals are about spending public money for public enjoyment. That need be no bad thing, but it is quite a contrast with New Zealand life 60 years ago when poet and English professor MK Joseph wrote Secular Litany, in which he satirised New Zealand’s narrowness of spirit. The poem pleaded that New Zealand be defended:

From the vicious habit of public enjoyment

From kermesse and carnival, high day and festival

Joseph’s indignation about the national stolidness came out of his wartime experiences in Italy where he saw a more relaxed approach to public life. Of course people partied in the 1950s, but that was about “serious drinking”, not public enjoyment (other than at rugby matches). Public attitudes have gone through an enormous change since, although we have not abandoned drinking alcohol to excess.

The shift to partying is not confined to New Zealand. Although former Italian prime minister Silvio Berlusconi and former French president Nicolas Sarkozy come to mind, our partying tends to involve the general public rather than just the political elite. A better parallel might be Rome’s bread and circuses, which continued until the funds ran out. Or, perhaps, today’s Greece. Greeks have been partying up large over the years – not paying their taxes and spending public money lent by others.

Now the money has run out, the creditors are asking for it back – or, at least, for the Government to stop borrowing more – and Greece is suffering a whale of a hangover. The public partying has prepared them well for some ugly street protesting. Our partying is nowhere near Greece’s excess, but still worrying.

You may have finished the year with an improved balance sheet – with an increase in assets over debt – but many other New Zealanders did not. Neither did the Government. Its net worth is expected to have fallen over the current year by about $9 billion. That means this year it is borrowing about $2000 for every New Zealander to fund spending; since the global financial crisis struck in 2008, it has borrowed about $13,000 a head.

New Zealand’s original motto was “Onward”, indicating, one supposes, an earnest (early-20th-century) commitment to progress. The exhortation was on our coat of arms until 1956. On the shield of the coat of arms are the symbols of New Zealand’s trade, agriculture and industry, reminding us that while kermesse and carnival may be ways to enjoy life, the economy is integral to sustainable enjoyment.

This is the time of the year to party – privately or publicly – or at least to enjoy the beach or whatever with family and friends. While we are away, however, the Government will be borrowing another $350 million or so to spend on our behalf. Some day that will have to be repaid. Instead of “Onward”, perhaps our motto should be “Let’s Party”.

The Politics Of NZ (Inc)

Published in “Foreign Control  Watchdog” 131, December 2012: p. 22-27.

In a feature article in the Christchurch Press John McCrone argues that the rebuild of earthquake-shaken Christchurch and its future development was being dominated – and distorted – by the Key Government’s approach of New Zealand Inc. (‘The Business of NZ Inc’, 8 September, 2012). It would be equally valid to argue that NZ Inc applied to the entirety of New Zealand politics.

A business-oriented approach is a relatively new style of government here. Although there were calls for it in the past – especially in the business pages – the notion that New Zealand should be run as a business, in the interest of business, using business methods and, as far as possible, by business men and women has never before been so dominant in the management of government.

NZ Inc was certainly not the way of past centre-right progressive-conservative governments such as those of Atkinson in the 1880s, Coates in the 1920s and 1930s, and Holyoake in the 1960s and 1970s, or even Bolger after 1993 when he was not hounded by neoliberal demons. (Muldoon’s autocracy was a marked deviation from them.) For a while it seemed the successor phase to the right’s politics was neoliberalism, which began in the middle of the 1980s and which Jim Bolger never really eradicated (Jenny Shipley did not want to). With hindsight, the defeat of the Brash National party in 2005 was its death knell, although it was struggling well before then, for in fundamental ways the Key government is not neoliberal, even if it unquestionably is a government of the right.

The danger is that the opposition – the left in all its manifestations – may continue to interpret New Zealand politics as if neoliberalism is still dominant. Even generals of the left fight the last wars, thereby losing the next ones.

Neoliberalism, ACT and the BRT

The key elements of neoliberalism in New Zealand have been the Business Roundtable (BRT) as a lobbyist and ACT as its political voice (and as close as New Zealand has to the saner end of the American Republican Party), a connection neatly symbolised by the chief executive of one having been married to the president of the other. For over a decade both organisations have been struggling to maintain an impact.

Despite the demise of ACT having reached the farcical stages, there were premonitions of its end even in the 1990s when Richard Prebble realised that, despite generous funding from rich ideologues, there was insufficient public support to provide a truly independent party as distinct from an acolyte of National. He enlarged its mandate to include conservative moral values; some of its more libertarian supporters had difficulty swallowing that rat. The latest stage of the demise is the Libertarianz and the (fundamentalist Christian) Conservative Parties scrapping over the ACT carcass, while others try to resurrect it. (Observers of left splinter parties will find a droll humour in seeing the disease on the political right too.)

The BRT slowly died too. It had repeatedly renewed itself. Before Roger Kerr took over in 1987 it was a coalition of the chief executives of large companies who met to discuss matters of common interest (in smoke-filled rooms, no doubt). Kerr took it in a neoliberal direction which led some of the founding companies to withdraw (or to stay on with lukewarm support) and others to collapse as a result of the BRT’s policies in a less than ceremonial hari kari. By the 1990s the BRT became dominated by the finance industry, but they too began to withdraw as it became increasingly irrelevant to their needs, while public distaste for the BRT meant others thought it better to distance themselves from an increasingly ineffective, but no less prominent, lobbyist.

About a decade ago the BRT had largely become a group of rich ideologues, cut out from an effective public contribution by being ignored by the Labour Government but desperately hanging on in the hope that the public would see the light (it had many years earlier, but what it had seen did not now attract it).

It would be easy – but wrong – to see the BRT ending with the death of Roger Kerr. Wrong because it was already dying; wrong, because it has resurrected itself as the New Zealand Initiative. The new organisation was presented as merger between the BRT and the New Zealand Institute (of which more anon) but, name aside (for the BRT wanted to rebrand its public image), it was a takeover. If its website – and its public impact – is any indication it is doomed to an insipid irrelevancy, with a director whose main interest seems to be offshore. Thus far Oliver Hartwich’s most salient contribution to the national debate has been a Dominion Post article that argued the left versus right division is ‘really so eighteenth century’, apparently because the ‘right’ are racist in Germany. As it happens, New Zealand neoliberalism has not been particularly racist – Roger Kerr marched against apartheid and one chairman of the BRT was a Maori. But imposing a German definition on New Zealand (albeit by someone who grew up there rather than here) seems odd, especially as Germany may be the only country in the world with a significant party which calls itself ‘left’ (Die Link).

Unlike either of its predecessors, NZI does not publish its membership, but it may well be poorly funded given the thinness of its public contributions and poverty of its website. Have the rich ideologues given up on it too?

The Rise of NZ Inc

Business certainly has, but that happened a decade or so ago. The shift was incremental. Some had given up in the 1980s – or never believed in neoliberalism anyway. Others began to realise by the mid 1990s that the economic prosperity the policies promised was never going to be realised. Certainly by the early 2000s senior businessmen were describing the BRT as an organisation of the past. (A couple once regretted to me that a particular policy they supported was also supported by the BRT, which made it much harder to sell to the public.)

At least two counter organisations – the New Zealand Institute and the Business Council for Sustainable Development – were set up. Neither lasted a decade, partly because business found itself squeezed for funds following the Global Financial Crisis, but also because the election of a National Government seemed to make them unnecessary. (The Left also abandons its ‘think tanks’ once it is in power; rather than strengthening them for the time when it is back in opposition.)

The abandoning of the BRT by business reflected a deep divergence between the way they function and the way that neoliberalism said they should function. Throughout history there has been a symbiotic relationship between New Zealand business and the government of New Zealand. Even big business; the majority of the largest companies owed much of their growth and existence to government. Perhaps they are the result of privatisation of a state owned enterprise, perhaps they had at some stage in their past – or today – had vital government contracts; perhaps some government policy had given them, or gives them, a benefit or a subsidy.

There is nothing in principle wrong with this. Business can rarely operate independently of government, especially in a small economy. But the neoliberal message was that government was, if not inherently evil, the problem rather than a part of the solution.

As it happens, the Muldoon government style had been so intrusive that business and neoliberalism could cooperate in its unwinding but eventually their paths parted. Today we have a business-led government repeatedly involving itself in economic activity to support business rather than withdrawing from it. While businesses expressed enthusiasm for the broadband roll out – over which government presides and which it funds – the neoliberals grind their teeth. Similarly the neoliberals had never worked out how to extend the road network without government involvement and so the roading program stagnated, while business was desperate for enlarging it for their trucking.

Enhancing Business

So what does business want? It is a very heterogenous group so any summary is necessarily a simplification. But basically business seeks profits so it wants policies which increase them.

There is a complicated economic theory which says that under certain conditions the pursuit of profit maximises economic output (of GDP). We may argue how realistic these conditions are – whether they are near enough to true – but that avoids the more fundamental issue as to whether we really want to maximise GDP.

This is an ethical debate which neither business – nor economics – is very good at. For what it is worth, the empirical evidence suggests that above a threshold which New Zealand reached many years ago, people’s happiness is not well correlated with per capita GDP and that their wellbeing is more greatly affected by many other things such as their community, the environment, education, family life, health, jobs, recreation and cultural facilities and public and work safety. Pursuit of profit may enhance some of these, but it can also damage them. This evidence is so subversive to the mantra of growth of GDP that it is rarely referred to; certainly not in polite company. (For a brief survey of this see my What Are Our Public Priorities?http://www.eastonbh.ac.nz/?p=1670.)

How to go about increasing profits? One group of policies involve reducing costs – including wages. In the early 1990s the neoliberal Employment Contracts Act was said to increase productivity, that is, to generate more output for the same inputs. There is no significant evidence that happened. Rather, it cut wage costs and raised profitability, which business interpreted as a productivity increase – a quite different thing.

There is ongoing – and understandable – pressure by businesses to cut their costs, not only by reducing wages (the introduction of youth rates is recent example of a public policy intervention in their interests) but also by cutting government impositions such as those which enhance workplace safety. Essentially the cost cuts for businesses transfer the burden of the costs onto others – workers, consumers, the government coffers and the environment; the Resource Management Act is especially disliked and measures for effectively moderating climate change have been successfully undermined.

Another way to increase profitability is for the economy to grow, although that is not easy in a long recession. A common strategy – central to New Zealand’s economic history – is ‘boosterism’, which tries to entice a substantial outside business to establish in a region, with its spinoffs benefiting local businesses. Thus the encouragement of overseas investment and the attempts to open up natural resources to commercial exploitation even where it seems environmentally imprudent.

A variation of boosterism is getting the government to come in and invest itself – a complete no-no to neoliberalism but attractive to real businesses. Examples are infrastructural investment such as roads and cables, but stadiums also seem to be fashionable at the moment; they temporarily boost the construction industry, although ratepayers suffer the hangover of debt (as those in Dunedin will explain to you).

Business also likes the government to start up trading undertakings, or at least to provide subsidies to make private ones viable. Once they are up and running, the businesses are privatised and the subsidies written off, as in the partial privatisation of state assets. Privatisation will also generate profits for those firms advising and marketing while adding listings to New Zealand’s ailing stock exchange and those who depend upon it. The financial sector greatly benefited from the privatisations which followed the 1987 share market crash; without this public contribution it would have been an even greater struggle to get through the mess it left after its stupidity of the mid 1980s.)

Privatisation comes in many forms. The government may undertake the hard yards with the private sector profitably topping up. That happened in the financial sector when the global financial crisis threatened a run on the banks. The government shifted the risk to the taxpayer with deposit insurance; the bank shareholders sighed with relief. Twenty years ago the private insurance industry said it was keen to share the risks of earthquakes with the government. Certainly they shared the revenue from the levies, but come the Big One and the citizens of Christchurch found they were reluctant to assist them – or to assist them promptly. The insurance industry attempted to do the same to ACC, but businesses who pay the levies found that it was just adding to their costs. (In addition the Accredited Employers Scheme introduced by the Fifth Labour Government had already given the biggest employers what they required.)

Another way of increasing profits is to reduce the size of the non-profit sector (the largest component of which is government), making the non-profit sector smaller by restraining and reducing government expenditure (whatever the public’s preferences for it) and the profit sector larger (even if that is more inefficient). Where this is not possible, outsourcing public activity to profit-driven businesses has a similar effect.

It does not follow that what business is demanding for itself is wrong. Not only may some – but not all – of their policies make New Zealand a better place, in a democracy everyone is entitled to pursue their own interests, although one always hopes there is also some commitment to a community interest. But democracy also says that no group should dominate outcomes. What John McCrone was arguing was that the government’s policy is dominated by business interests – by New Zealand Inc.

NZ Inc does not have it all its own way. Once upon a time the dominance of any political culture was restrained by the three-yearly election. That worked pretty well until the 1970s but first Muldoon and then the neoliberals who followed broke away from a consensus approach. The public reacted by choosing MMP, which limits the authority of the largest party in parliament. We’ll come back to that when we discuss NZ Inc’s attitude to democracy. .

John Key

It is necessary to say a little about the current prime minister, if only to explain he is not a very good representative of the business sector. Some of his defects – such as inattention to detail, lack of a strategic foresight, inability to anticipate and excessive casualness are sufficiently evident to raise a question as to whether he would even be a good chief executive. (On the other hand most of his prime ministerial predecessors had elephantine memories, whereas his is reminiscent of a business man in front of the Winebox Inquiry.) He would be more liked as a Chairman of the Board, because his supervision of the firm’s chief executive would be light handed – although he would be Teflon if the firm got into trouble.

Key may well be the least prepared prime minister in New Zealand’s history, certainly since party politics was established in the 1890s. His time in parliament before his premiership was briefest, and his previous working life experiences – in business – probably the leastadequate.

Prime-ministership involves quite different skills and experiences and preparation, including a political apprenticeship. Our best post-war ones all spent long years in parliament before taking the job. (Peter Fraser 22 years; Keith Holyoake 21 years, Norman Kirk 15 years; Jim Bolger 18 years; Helen Clark 18 years – and oh, yes, Rob Muldoon 15 years, which shows that longevity is not a guarantee by itself. Most had years of community political involvement before entering parliament too; a degree in political studies and time in a minister’s office doesn’t count.) By these standards, Key’s six years in parliament hardly amounts to a preparation for premiership at all..

Business experience is not a good preparation. Farmers aside, it is hard to think of a successful instance in New Zealand history and there are not too many examples from elsewhere. (Our most notable business prime ministers – Julius Vogel and Joe Ward – were both near-bankrupts or bankrupts.) Actually there are few occupations which seem to inevitably provide good preparations. Even a talk-back host like Pam Corkery found parliament difficult; more recently Hekia Parata has struggled as Minister of Education, despite an extensive career as a public servant.

While he may be a poor practitioner of political management Key is attractive to NZ Inc, because he believes in it, while connecting better than they do with the public. Indeed his ignorance of the political system aligns him with them. There are some parallels with David Lange who was promoted by the Rogernomes as their frontman because they had no public charisma. The difference is that while Lange was a moderniser, his Methodism meant he could not ultimately buy into the neoliberal agenda (and his raport with the public told him they could not either). In contrast Key is a true believer in NZ Inc.

Business and Government

Historical experience does not loom large in business thinking, which assumes that running a country (or a government department) and running a firm are similar tasks. (A common fallacy of public life is the belief that success in one dimension – say business – is correlated positively with success in all others ranging from aesthetics and politics to economics and authorship.) It escapes them that the reason for politics is because there are parts of the human experience which cannot be run like a business – at least for democratic politics; there are colonels who are expert at running dictatorships – usually badly.

Businesses are hierarchical organisations in which the chief executive appoints the underlings. In contrast parliament (or one of its party caucuses) appoints the prime minister. (The leaked emails reported in Hollow Men are fascinating about how little correspondence Don Brash had with his caucus.) The prime minister has to continually judge the impact of political decisions on the electorate. The closest business gets is when they sell their products, but that only provides them with a perspective of the human as a customer, not as a holistic political and social animal.

Like most people, those in the business sector have little understanding of how government works. It is no surprise that the subtleties of constitutional arrangements including the proper relations between minister and ministry have eluded Key. When the issue of ministerial responsibility arises he is likely to criticise the ministry as though he was a talk-back show host or – more recently – claim that he had not bothered with the details. Yet ministerial responsibility is vital in a parliamentary democracy, especially from a prime minister.

The hierarchically organised business sector is impatient with democracy, especially when it overrules the profit motive as when greenies want to preserve an environmental resource or nationalists are reluctant to sell off their heritage. However democracy cannot be avoided without considerable social turmoil, which may not be in anybody’s interests including that of business. Instead NZ Inc captures democracy to run the country in business interests.

That capture – perhaps for different objectives – occurred under Muldoon and under the neoliberals – in a form of parliamentary democracy known as ‘elected dictatorship’. It is attractive to business and other pressure groups which cannot get the backing of the public, for under Winner-Takes-All (FPP) they can accumulate enough seats in parliament to impose their agenda without the public’s consent. After almost two decades of its abuse the public switched to MMP.

Today new laws (and amendment to old laws) require a much higher standard of parliamentary consensus, while the smaller caucus of the lead party gives more leverage to its parliamentary dissidents. The government can still ram through legislation – as it did with the bill to partially privatise state owned enterprises – but the political cost is much higher. It is not obvious that every National MP is disheartened by the inability of the government to implement the sell-off. No doubt business is.

(Almost as an aside, Key’s cavalier offers of ‘bonus shares’ for New Zealand purchasers and ‘shares plus’ for iwi may be consistent with business practices but, instructively, Treasury appears to have insisted that the deals conform to standard accounting practices, which expose the that such deals provide subsidies to select interests.)

But while subject to the law the government has considerable discretion in its implementation. One does not need to change the statutes protecting worker safety in order to reduce their effectiveness – instead cut back resources and ease off the vigour of enforcing the details.

The Canterbury Experience as an Example

On occasions the government can use a crisis to panic parliament into passing legislation which gives it more power than what democrats may think reasonable. Thus it was with ACC with claims of the threat of future bankruptcy – which miraculously disappeared shortly after the legislation was passed. Another panic enabled the replacement of the elected Environment Canterbury with a Wellington appointed board (reminiscent of what an earlier National government abolishing elected Area Health Boards one night in 1991). A genuine crisis like the Canterbury earthquakes enabled the government to impose a centrally administered regime on the Peoples Republic of Christchurch (deeply disliked by both Wellington bureaucrats and business). Never waste a crisis.

There was an obvious need for something like the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority as an operational agency to clean up the immediate mess. But its remit has been widened. As John McCrone wrote, the result has been a naked display of NZ Inc in action with priorities being set to meet business needs and shaped by business interests. It is not obvious that so little attention should be given to housing the populace, but the corporations find it harder to build houses than to construct commercial and public buildings. Imposing a plan on the central city with barely any consultation is insulting to a democracy – and those of Christchurch who cherish their city. Including a stadium so close to the city surely reflects businessmen’s fetish for (publicly subsidised) sporting spectacles rather than any realistic assessment of needs and urban forms.

The outcome has been weakened by an unusually inept minister – who repeatedly resorts to bullying. He was recently awarded zero out of ten for his ministerial performance, recalling the 1952 Springbok 44 to 0 massacre of Scotland, in which one commentator wondered how the losers scored the zero. Even the Minister of Education announced a plan for Christchurch schools without consultation; she backed down after the outcry, but it is indicative of a government mind-set in which people’s preferences are irrelevant (but they are still needed as consumers).

The Canterbury experience is not unique. Unquestionably Aucklanders needed to reform their local governance, but NZ Inc wanted an outcome more favourable to business. They did not get their way, when in the 2010 local body election a council was elected which was not as business aligned as they had hoped (bequeathing the previous pro-business Mayor of Auckland to ACT, generating another parliamentary farce). If the Peoples Republic of Christchurch can find a quality leader they may see the same thing in 2013. The government was wise to extend the term of its ECAN dictatorship to 2016 (by which time even Fiji may be a democracy).

The Future of Business in Politics

It is a rule of life is that all things shall pass – often in unexpected ways. What will replace NZ Inc when it has exhausted its goodwill? The question appears not to have occurred to the business sector, nor to those who may succeed the current government.

A couple of points can be made. First, it would be very wrong to conclude that Key, with all his evident inadequacies as a prime minister, was representative of the best of our business community. I have met many of our top chief executives. They are able decent people; perhaps the process of government is a mystery to them, but they run their businesses effectively. It would be most unfortunate if the reaction against NZ Inc was to limit their ability to do this.

For, and second, New Zealand needs high quality businesses to provide the goods and services which contribute to the nation’s wellbeing. Not necessarily all that they produce today; the government’s craven servility towards suppliers of alcohol and gambling services and emitters of carbon illustrates that not all business output should be fostered.

In the future business has to return to its traditional role of serving the community. When it is doing that it should be recognised and respected. But service is not the same as domination. NZ Inc is flawed by its desire to dominate and its lack of respect for other decision-making systems – especially government-based ones. Despite its wealth and despite its power it too shall pass.

In Praise Of Social Markets:

What is to be Done about Light Handed Regulation?

Paper to the Fabian Society, December 14, 2012.

For Regulation and Leaky Buildings see http://www.eastonbh.ac.nz/?p=1686.

This lecture was originally advertised as illustrating the deficiencies of light-handed regulation by failures in the building industry, particularly leaky buildings and those not robust to earthquakes. The intention was the lecture would complement three earlier lectures in the series which illustrated other failures – on energy policy by Geoff Bertram, the financial sector by David Tripe and occupational health and safety by Hazel Armstrong.

But as the series progressed it became evident that the need was not just a matter of illustrating yet again what has gone wrong, but setting out what should be done instead. As the final thesis of Feuerbach says. it is not just a matter of understanding the world; the point is how to change it. The four examples are so diverse – I shall shortly add some more which extend that diversity – that it is not simply a matter of attending to this failure or that one. Light-handed regulation has been a policy framework, and it needs to be replaced with an alternative framework.

Although the term was not used until the early 1990s, ‘light-handed regulation’ first began appearing in New Zealand in the 1980s with the early flush of Rogernomics – New Zealand’s neo-liberal approach to the economy. Neo-liberalism is underpinned by an extreme distaste for state activity. It comes from a particular strand of American thinking,

However it is only a part of American thinking, often associated with the Chicago School of Economics with its project to minimise the role of the state. It has been rarely dominant in American economists’ thinking, although sometimes under Republican Presidents it was relatively more influential on policy. As we have seen in New Zealand, policies pursued by the conventional wisdom do not always reflect best practice.

Why did neoliberalism became so dominant in New Zealand, especially as the state has been an integral part of its development? One explanation is that it was reaction to the Muldoon era with its over-emphasis on the role of the oppressive state. Some people’s thinking jumped to the other extreme, not aware that there were options between the two.

A hundred years ago the French observer Andre Siegfried thought New Zealanders’ outlook “not too carefully reasoned, and no doubt scornful of scientific thought, makes them incapable of self distrust. Like almost all men of action they have a contempt for theories: yet they are often captured by the first theory that turns up, if it is demonstrated to them with an appearance of logic sufficient to impose upon them. In most cases they do not seem to see difficulties, and they propose simple solutions for the most complex problems with astonishing audacity.”

As I have put it, the New Zealand way is “bugger the analysis; let’s get on with the policy”. Certainly New Zealand’s Rogernomes were hardly affected by careful analysis. Instead they imitated American neo-liberal thinking, insensitive to the differences between the two economies and to New Zealand aspirations. As Siegfried might have said, the American logic was sufficient. They did not seem to see the difficulties, and proposed simple solutions for the most complex problems with an astonishing audacity.

Once the handful of Rogernomes were in power, practical New Zealanders – not too carefully reasoned, and no doubt scornful of scientific thought – were captured by the theory, relying on a confidence that the conventional wisdom was right. It was not, and over the following two decades almost all of the extremist policies of Rogernomics have had to be unwound – that is perhaps the proudest achievement of the Fifth Labour – Clark/Cullen – Government. The windback was not simply a matter of political taste; very few of the Rogernomes’ promises of greater prosperity and performance were fulfilled. Indeed, any realistic assessment of their policies suggest they broadly failed. As a result the majority of the elite no longer overtly endorse Rogernomics; many prefer to have their past enthusiasms overlooked, rather than forgiven. But, crucially, they still implicitly carry a lot of the Rogernomics baggage. They would be appalled to be told so, but the conventional wisdom knows of no alternative. Social democrats have notably failed to articulate an alternative plausible paradigm and get it into the public domain.

There is a deeper lesson here. The speed at which the elite adopted Rogernomics tells us, as Siegfried foresaw, that it is intellectually fickle and will seize on an alternative approach if the circumstances are right. At issue is that they are not yet offered an alternative.

Perhaps New Zealand’s first outbreak of light-handed regulation was over competition policy. The Chicago School, for whom the state can hardly do anything right, concluded it was better not regulate monopolies. However the Fourth Labour – Lange/Douglas – Government largely ignored the argument when it reformed the Commerce Act in 1986. The Rogernomes persisted with their attempt to undermine it right through the 1990s, and even got cabinet to agree to an amendment which would have neutered its merger provisions; but it was never put to parliament. But there are other ways of neutralising legislation. Special legislation can ignore the principles of the promotion of competition.

Possibly the worst example was the privatisation of Telecom, which paid no attention to the fact that it was a monopoly, both by virtue of its ownership of the single line from exchange to the user’s phone, and because it had such a large share of the telecommunications market. The inevitable result was that the owners were able to exploit their monopoly power for high profits which they transferred to themselves, adding to New Zealand’s overseas debt. Moreover, without competitive pressures they were not particularly innovative and the New Zealand telecommunications industry got behind the rest of the OECD.

Fortunately, the Fifth Labour Government, led by minister David Cunliffe, began addressing the Telecom monopoly, which is the reason why telecommunications has not been a topic in this series. Instead, Geoff Bertram described what is happening in the electricity industry. It has a more complicated market structure – an oligopoly with a number of big players. The story which Geoff told of rising profitability showed that it is not properly competitive.

Given the nature of the electricity sector’s production it may well be that the most efficient form for our electricity generation system is a state-owned monopoly supplier subject to a regulatory framework and allowing feed-ins from private suppliers. Instead the government is proposing to privatise even more of the industry, without – you will not be surprised to be told – a careful review of the regulatory framework. What Geoff is suggesting is that the private buyers may make another mint, as they did in the case of Telecom.

The Rogernomes also promoted the privatisation of natural monopolies like seaports and airports. There was considerable local resistance, and not all have gone into total private ownership. However the chaotic form of port ownership has serious implications for economic efficiency, because they cannot be simply rationalised. The question of the charging of airports is an ongoing problem, with landing fees seemingly being hiked with little restraint.

Before finishing with these examples of a casual approach to monopolies and oligopolistic markets. I note that where some restraining measures have been introduced, it has often been at the behest of other businesses who are also paying for the high prices and suffering inferior services. It was they, not consumers, who pressured most effectively for a change of telecommunications regulation; it is the carriers who are resisting the landing charge hikes. Consumers are not well organised to deal with market power, which is why they need a Commerce Commission.

Having said that, I admit that our consumer protection laws do not seem to be as far behind international best practice. Even miraculously, the Consumer Guarantees Act was passed in 1993 by a National government. I attribute the success to an effective Ministry of Consumer Affairs, established by the Fourth Labour government, although I worry that it is becoming less effective as it is increasingly submerged into the new super-ministry for business.

Other early forms of light-handed regulation appeared in the 1980s. As David Tripe recorded, debate on the financial investment sector presaged a major failure 30 years later. In essence big investors claimed privileges relative to small investors, including that they wanted to paid more for their shares following a takeover and that there should be no restrictions on them practising insider trading. The privileging reflects the rarely mentioned fundamental feature of financial capitalism; one of the sources of the rich financiers’ profit comes from expropriating the savings of those lower in the hierarchy. We saw this again recently when the financial companies collapsed with substantial loss of the wealth of the small investors. Where did that go? The bit that was not lost in inefficiency ended up with the rich investors.

We had a Financial Services Commission from the 1970s, but it proved remarkably ineffective, because it got seduced by the rhetoric of light-handed regulation, with its assumption that small investors can largely look after themselves. Thus there was an institution which appeared to be helping them, but in the most important way it did not.

We were very lucky that from 2002 the Reserve Bank took a more rigorous approach to the banking sector for which it was responsible, so that the monetary system survived the Global Financial Crisis of 2008. For its pains, responsibility for the non-bank sector has been transferred to the Reserve Bank. However small savings will remain vulnerable to predation from the rich.

By the early 1990s, the notion of low state involvement in the regulation of business and market became consolidated in the rhetoric of light-handed regulation with its framework pervading public policy thinking. Had it not, the Financial Services Commission would surely have been more effective.

Hazel Armstrong showed the consequence for work and safety. Workers died. Not just at Pike River; Hazel showed they died on the railways too, until the Fifth Labour Government took action. No doubt close attention to other industrial sectors would find similar instances. Apparently our death and injury rate among workers is about double the OECD average.

There are at least two further lessons from the Pike River disaster. The first is that the legislative weakening of unions meant that worker safety concerns were not properly represented.

The second was there is a national habit of quarantining a systemic failure to the particular instance and not seeing it as an example of a wider phenomenon. The Department of Labour has belatedly responded with its High Hazards Unit, but there is insufficient attention to the wider problem of inadequacies of our occupational health and safety system.

This fallacy is repeated in the leaky building fiasco. Historically, the construction system was based on a prescriptive regulation which described how buildings should be constructed. By the 1970s there had been increasing concern that the prescriptive regime was preventing the introduction of new – higher productivity – building technologies.

So the regulatory system was switched over from a ‘prescription-based’ approach to a ‘performance-based’ one. No longer were particular house building methods and material specified. Instead structures were required to last 50 years, the cladding 15 years, and the walls and roofs were to be impermeable to water. Nobody seems to have thought much about what happens if the cladding falls off after 14 years. Would the builder, architect or materials supplier be around, could they afford the remediation?

Let me not go through the detail of how the regulatory system for housing construction was inadequate, but mention that there were also some related issues such as the deskilling of the sector, the introduction of technologies without a proper understanding of their import while the reorganisation of the local government sector undermined many of their building sector services. Suffice to say they all greatly contributed to the leaky buildings disaster, which may have built 110,000 seriously damaged houses plus more commercial and public buildings, at considerable cost for remediation and much family hardship, including suicides.

In many ways, given the introduction of new technologies, some failures were inevitable. What is concerning is that when the problem became apparent in the 1990s, very little was done and we just kept constructing leaky buildings. I am told they still may be being built or, at least, there are still buildings being constructed which eventually will prove as faulty. Moreover, where the failures have been identified there proved to be no simple (and cheap) remediation process. (Incidentally here is an example of where consumer protection legislation – the Consumer Guarantees Act – does not apply, because a built house is not legally a single product.)

The regulatory failure in the construction industry has not been confined to leaky buildings, as demonstrated by the collapse during the Christchurch earthquakes of commercial buildings constructed in the last quarter of a century. While some of the failures were the result of a general lack of technological knowledge, in at least some cases there were failures due to poor quality construction. Why was it allowed to happen? More fundamentally there must be similarly poor quality buildings elsewhere in New Zealand just waiting for an earthquake to demolish them.

Once more we have quarantined the problem. We ignore a general problem of regulating the construction industry better, focussing on the specific problem of leaky homes. We admit there were some badly built offices in Christchurch, but since they have fallen down, it is now no longer a problem.

I want to go a step further. There is not just a general problem of regulating the construction industry, and not just a problem of price gouging by electricity generators and firms in concentrated markets, and not just a problem in occupational health and safety, and not just a problem in small savers getting a fair deal. There is an overarching problem of failure to regulate private markets. It applies in other markets too. Among the others are the supply of alcohol and gambling services, and some environmental areas – “dirty dairying” is a slogan associated with the failure of relying on industry monitoring its water pollution.

Each of these problem areas could be tackled separately but it will be in a context in which there is a bias towards light-handed regulation. As Pierre Bourdieu, the French sociologist and intellectual, observed in his seminal work Outline of A Theory of Practice, the way that an elite typically stays in power in almost any society is both by controlling the means of production, and also by shaping the social discourse (that is, the way a society describes the world around it). What matters not just what is discussed in public, but what is not discussed because those topics are considered boring, irrelevant, taboo or just unthinkable. He wrote: “the most successful ideological effects are those which have no need of words, but ask no more than a complicitous silence.”

Yet, some topics about which silence would be preferred are so compelling that they cannot be ignored and so there is a backup strategy of quarantining them by not exploring generalisations, inter-relationships and linkages.

For example, in May 2006 National Finance fell over. The public reaction was this was a one-off rather than indicative of some underlying problem. Then more finance companies fell over. Each case was treated as a one-off. There were 40 failures up to July 2008, just before the Global Financial Crisis hit. The list is currently 67 involving $9 billion of New Zealanders’ savings. It is hard not to conclude there was a systemic failure. But even here there is a tendency to quarantine by suggesting the failures are the result of criminal behaviour. Of course some has been, but the problem is more fundamental: incarcerating financial criminals does not provide a remedy for the small investors, nor recover the associated economic waste.

More generally, do you really think that failures from light-handed regulation stopped on, say, 14 December 2012? Do you think there will not be more – even disasters as big as those that have already happened? Hasn’t our approach been patching up again and again a Heath Robinson machine in the hope that this will be the last one. It hasn’t been and it won’t be.

The conclusion from Bourdieu is that in order to prevent these repeated failures we have to change the discourse – both the explicit one which a society describes its world, but also to expose that which it is silent about. In particular we need to replace the belief in light-handed regulation with an account of the world – a discourse – in which the state has an active responsibility for enabling markets to pursue the social good.

What we need is an alternative policy framework, one of those higher conceptual notions which Siegfried says we are not very good at. Let me illustrate this with the report out this week on child poverty commissioned by the Commissioner for Children. It is right to say there is widespread child poverty and that it compromises the nation’s future. It has also some worthy policy recommendations. But before we get overwhelmed with the latest report – for over forty years there have been many such reports – we need to ask whether something is missing for ultimately the report does not explain why there has been this continuing failure.

Suppose we looked for an overarching principle. The report does not have one. It might be that we should have a child-centred approach to child policy, a simple notion, but it challenges the conventional wisdom. Observe that the Bennett changes to the treatment of social security beneficiaries is hardly child-centred – many will make children worse off. And if the changes are not child-centred, what are they? I leave that answer to another venue. To offer a conceptual framework as to why child poverty occurs, and why we dont address it is a far cry from the ‘bugger the analysis, let’s get on with the policy’ approach in the Commissioner for Children’s committee’s report. For tonight’s purposes it sufficient to point out that because the committee was superficial, failing to challenge the conventional wisdom – offering an alternative view – it will have very little impact.

Similarly, it is insufficient for those who want to dismiss light-handed regulation to have only a list its failures; they have to offer a coherent alternative policy framework. I am going to devote the rest of this lecture to beginning to elaborate one.

(Before doing so I need to deal with the immediate objection from the elite’s conventional wisdom. This is not to go back to the Muldoon era. As I explained in my previous lecture, Muldoon’s regulatory framework was as much an anathema to social democrats as is the current one. There is spectrum of options between the two extremes.)

I begin by insisting that the purpose of an economy is to maintain and increase the wellbeing of its members. It is not simply to maximise output (GDP), a point to remind economists that per capita output is not the ultimate purpose of the human condition.

A social democrat pursues this goal by the social control of the means of production, distribution and exchange. Observe it does not argue that public ownership is necessary, accepting that sometimes transactions can be better left to the market – a properly regulated market. On the other hand it does not rule out public ownership as a means of enhancing social control.

The reason why we use the market is that a fundamental principle of social democracy is ‘subsidiarity’, that decisions should be taken at the lowest effective level, as close to those who are affected as possible, thereby avoiding the oppressive state. The market is a means to do this. Just as the state should not be in the bedrooms of the nation, it should stay out of private economic intercourse as much as possible.

One way of thinking about the market is that it is a voting system, except instead of being one-person one-vote it is one-dollar one-vote. To work properly we must ensure that everyone, or their guardians, has the right number of votes. Distributional policy belongs to another occasion, but once there is a fair distribution of the dollar votes, we allow people to exercise them with a minimum of state involvement.

However markets do not always operate effectively. They typically need a framework of laws and enforcement to work effectively.

1. To work really well, markets require many suppliers and purchasers. Where there are only handful, the resulting competition is likely to be inefficient and to involve price gouging. In such circumstances we need what economists call workable competition.

Social democrats are is not afraid of monopoly; in some circumstances they will use it because it gives the best outcome. A particularly chaotic market is the provision of health care. This is a topic in its own right, but let me just note that there is a very wide international consensus that it works best with a single dominant public funder.

A particular reason for a poor market structure is economies of scale. Not only does that often mean there is only a sole supplier – a natural monopoly – but it is difficult to get a sensible pricing structure. A relatively new form of natural monopoly occurs where there are networks. Often the best way of handling it is by public ownership – Transpower is but one such example. Almost always natural monopolies require very close supervision.

2. Markets do not serve us well where decision-makers do not take into consideration any of the important impacts of their actions. Economists refer to these as ‘externalities’. Such market failures are most evident in the way we interact with the environment. But there are many such others – for instance, excessive drinking rarely involves the abuser thinking about the consequences to others or to her or himself in the long run.

One of the ways of dealing with this failure is to incorporate the economic resource into a market framework. That is why we have a Individual Transferable Quota scheme to sustain the stock of fish, and why I support one for water.

But you cannot always do this. A nice example is that future generations may have an interest in the current resource usage, but they can no direct say. That is one reason why the Resource Management Act has a requirement for sustainability – in effect the it gives the future a vote in the current resource decision.

3. Joe Stiglitz argues that information asymmetry is a crucial market failure and argues that it was the cause of the Global Financial Crisis. The logic of his argument applies more to overseas financial institutions but clearly we need to ensure that ours are transparent, and it may be necessary as, say, the Volcker report argues, to separate the various function of banks so that in the next financial collapse the protect the payments system without having to bail out every investment failure.

Informational asymmetry is more pervasive than just banking. Much consumer protection law aims to reduce the informational advantage that the seller has over the consumer. This occurs up front by requiring the supplier to provide better information, and after sales via the Consumer Guarantees Act.

Provisions to reduce conflict of interest – when the adviser may not be operating independently, but is pretending to be – is another example where the state intervenes to reduce the asymmetry of information.

4. Another crucial asymmetry in the market is the asymmetry of power in a transaction. That is why it is common in most democracies for the law to privilege unions in an attempt to reduce the advantage a corporation has relative to the individual worker.

5. Related to informational asymmetry is the fact that sometimes individuals make economic decisions which they subsequently regret. A social democrat does not generally favour the paternalistic state, which is not well placed to make decisions on others’ behalf, but there are instances of intervention which allow the individual to modify a hastily taken decision. The cooling off period for door-to-door sales is a well known one. One dimension of alcohol control policies is to help people make wiser drinking decisions.

There are occasions in which the state has to be paternalistic because common sense says that the individual may not make good decisions. Children are an obvious case. Our practice is to leave the guidance in the hands of guardians –usually their parents – but the state may set standards – as in compulsory schooling. And the courts have the right to over-rule the parent where the guardian manifestly fails. Another example, yet to be addressed, is that in my opinion children should not have irreversible cosmetic surgery without a careful screening by the medical profession supervised by the courts. Fortunately breast enlargement for early teenagers is not common in New Zealand, but in American it is claimed that some girls get it for their fifteenth birthday. Notice that the question of reversibility is critical here. We’ll come back to that in the tenth reason.

Even though we reject the paternalistic state, we may accept that there are merit goods, which require some extra intervention in order to promote them. Education is perhaps the most important merit good. John Stuart Mill famously said it was better to be an unhappy philosopher than a happy pig. Regrettably the market tends to promote piggish ambitions.

6. Related to making decisions which are subsequently regretted is the so-called ‘nudge’ approach. What behavioural economists have found is that the way a question is asked affects the response. If you ask whether to opt in to an organ donation scheme – as the Austrians do – few offer their parts after death. On the other hand if you ask them to opt out – the German practice – most people say ‘yes, of course use my body parts’. A New Zealand instance of this was in the Kiwisaver scheme where new recruits have to opt out.

How such questions are framed is thought to be sufficiently important for both the Obama government in the US and the Cameron government in Britain to have a unit addressing the issue. It has not occurred to the New Zealand government that there is even a problem.

7. The state can make the market work better by reducing transaction costs. A simple example is the small claims court, thereby avoiding lawyers’ fees which would overwhelm the settlement. Standardising consumer information makes it simpler for consumers to choose. The crux of the Woodhouse revisions for the reforming of the old fault-based accident compensation was that it was chewing up forty percent of levies in litigation. Switching to a no-fault system reduced those costs to 10 percent.

8. Sometimes the market fails to supply sufficient of a good or service because it cannot price properly or generate sufficient revenue. Certainly we should try to introduce pricing as much as possible. I would favour metering vehicle use of roading if there was a cheap and effective means to do it. There are many other instances where a subsidy is required because there is no effective pricing regime. An orchestra may be worth more to its audience than what they pay, but the logic is to keep the price of seats down to use them all including attracting those who are not the regular customers.

9. One strength of the current scheme is that it gives a strong incentive to the ACC – the monopoly provider – to campaign to prevent accidents. Remediation for failure may sometimes be necessary but prevention is often a better strategy, especially where the remediation is expensive, erratic and unfair.

10. Sometimes there is simply no remediation, no means of reversing a profound regret. No one can bring back those who died in the Pike River Mine nor in the CTV building in Christchurch, or in many other instances. (Extinction of a species is forever.) We cannot prevent all deaths through misadventure but good regulatory design can reduce them. It should not be a matter of pride that we have so many who die on the job.

From this list of ten reasons for intervening in the market you may well conclude that the market is not a very good way at delivering what we want. Many of the interventions are minimal – so sensible that no one contests them (other than extreme right wingers). Given the trillions of market transactions that occur it is remarkable how few transactions are really problematic. Such are the strengths of the market that a social democrat, knowing their weaknesses, designs any intervention to be as consistent with market principles as possible.

On the other hand, the interventions should not be used for doing things that they are not capable of delivering. As a general rule, dont use these market interventions to affect the income distribution – such as trying to lift people out of poverty. The best way to assist the poor is usually to gave them cash. (The caveat occurs because free health care and education and training may be helpful). There is a tendency to say that we cant do this or that because it would make the poor worse off. If it does, supplement their incomes to compensate them.

How to go about replacing light-handed regulation? First, it is necessary to redirect the public rhetoric by emphasising that the old ways have too frequently failed, that the failures are not isolated but they are systemic, and that there is a better way. It is sad that some of the failures have been so catastrophic to people’s welfare, but the least we can do to honour those who have died is by offering a better way for the future. The approach needs a short snappy phrase. I am not into marketing, and at this stage can only suggest ‘social markets’ with its references to the Europ4ean social democrat tradition. .

Second, the rhetoric of ‘social markets’ needs to be underpinned by some practical proposals for an alternate regulatory regime. Are we really satisfied with the current alcohol consumption outcomes, do we have to put up with further building failures? Effective design of alternatives is not easy. It is important to be sensitive to people’s ambitions. It would be very easy to design an alcohol regime which was onerous upon moderate drinkers. It is also important to be humble. An effective alcohol regime will not eliminate all abuse – certainly not in the medium run; no matter what one does there will be building failures – the aim is to reduce their number and the magnitude of the resulting damage and to respond quickly when there is a failure.

Changing the public rhetoric and offering alternative approaches can be pursued while Social Democracy is in opposition. One hopes that by the time its politicians get to power they will be committed to the alternative approach. They should establish a social markets unit whose focus is better market regulation and which supervises and co-ordinates the myriad of government agencies involved in regulating the market.

(Let us be clear that often there will be considerable resistance to the change from industry who sees its interests being compromised. I am not opposed to industry self-regulation but it does not apply everywhere. The record is it did not prevent a single leaky building.)

New Zealanders do not want the failures of light-handed regulation – deaths, suffering and economic waste – to be repeated in other arenas. They desperately desire a leadership to enable them to attain their goals.

A social democrat knows that the state is not perfect but neither is the market. An integration of the two does not give perfect outcomes either. But they can be better than the extremes of Muldoonism or the neoliberals. The challenge social democrats face is getting that balance right. In today’s circumstances that is a commitment to strengthening the role of the state, while respecting a properly functioning market – and yet maintaining a scepticism toward each of them. That is what workable markets is about.