Comparing the New Zealand and United States Economies

 

Briefing to a Fulbright Orientation Panel: 7 February 2014 (Note there is a minor joke in this paper which New Zealanders may miss. Thomas Frank has written a widely discussed book about US politics entitled “What’s the Matter with Kansas?”.  

Keywords: Political Economy & History;

 

Tena koutou katoa. Welcome to New Zealand.

 

I am glad you are going to stay awhile. Coming to another country confronts you with similarities and differences but you really need to spend some time there to appreciate them. My task today is to draw your attentions to some differences between the US and New Zealand economies.

 

For starters New Zealand is smaller. In population and area terms we are closer to, say, the state of Kansas. The big difference from Kansas is that we are surrounded by sea – more like Hawaii. And we are remote from the world, even further than Alaska where a governor told us she could see Russia from her front porch. Actually we are so remote that we don’t have any real enemies.

 

That we are remote from the world does not mean we are disconnected from it. About a quarter of us were born overseas – about double the American proportion – and a big chunk of us have lived elsewhere – in my case Australia, Britain and the US, the latter as a guest of Fulbright. You will probably find New Zealand news coverage of the US irritatingly narrow, but it covers the world better, I think, and if you want to follow the US, or anywhere else, more closely it is relatively easy – with the exception of North Korea.

 

What about our standard of living? The international GDP per capita figures suggest we are about 10 percent poorer than Kansas, but I am not particularly convinced they tell you much about the real standard of living because GDP leaves an awful lot of important things out. I don’t see any rush of New Zealanders wanting to migrate to Kansas.

 

The big difference is that Kansas is a part of the United States and New Zealand is not. We don’t send anyone to Congress; instead we have an embassy in Washington. We don’t pay taxes to Washington and we don’t receive grants from it either. We have our own domestic currency although – like everywhere else in the world – we use US dollars for international transactions.

 

The lack of fiscal and monetary unity is both an advantage and disadvantage.  New Zealand was not as heavily impacted by the Global Fiscal Crisis as the US. In fact we are now in our fourth quarter of the recovery and unemployment is falling. The reasons are two-fold. Like Kansas we don’t have a large financial sector, but in our case we are not as directly hooked into the New York one. And unlike Kansas (and the economies in the EMU) we have the fiscal and monetary independence to be able to address the shock in terms of our particular needs.

 

Most of Kansas’s exports go to the rest of the United States. New Zealand exports to China, Australia, the European Union, ASEAN and the US. The rankings change. Once upon a time we exported mainly to Britain, then Australia became the leader, now it is China. More generally Asia is becoming of increasing interest to New Zealand.

 

Our main sources of imports are the EU and the US, but often they are first further processed in Australia and Asia. Our main exports are based on natural resources – the big ones are dairy products and tourism but there are a lot of other farm, fishing and  forestry exports. Many of them, though, are further processed before they leave New Zealand, so our manufacturing sector is an important exporter too. Some of its primary processed exports are quite sophisticated – like pharmaceuticals derived from meat and milk. And of course there are exports from the service sector – I’ve mentioned tourism.

 

A major challenge facing New Zealand is the vicious protection in many countries against many of our key exports. That includes the US. For instance our butter quota to there is based on our 1933 exports and amounts to half a pound of butter per inhabitant of Honolulu. It is a bit of a sore point down here, but it is one between friends.

 

Because we don’t have to agree with 49 other states we can do things differently in New Zealand. For instance, ours is a unified more publicly funded health care system. (The easy way for an American to think about it is that in New Zealand you get medicare from before you are born, and don’t have to wait until you are 65.) Our accident compensation system is also different. I’m hoping that you wont have to find out personally what the differences are.

 

There are many other differences. Most importantly New Zealanders are more likely to involve the government  when tackling economic problem. You see that in health care; you see that in the proportion of government spending (and we don’t spend as much on the military). That is true whatever the political colour of the government;  it is said that the political position of our right wing National government is closer to that of the Democratic Party than the Republican one.

 

Whether the New Zealand system is better or worse often comes down to one’s personal taste reflecting one’s country experiences. What is important is to keep an open mind when you make the comparison – to ask yourself why does New Zealand do it differently from where you come from? Doing that will enrich the experience of being a visitor.

 

Kia ora.

 

SOME COMPARISONS

  New Zealand Kansas United States Comment
Population 4.5m 2.9m 314m Louisiana =

4.6m

Proportion foreign born 25.1%   14.3%  
Area (land) 104,000sqms 82,000 sqms 3,537,000 sqms Colorado  =

104,000 sqms.

GDP per capita

(USD)

$30,400 $34,200 $45,700 Maine =

$30,300

Special industries Primary & processing, especially grass-fed dairy and meat. Tourism. Grain, oil and aerosystems Finance  
Export Destinations China, Australia, EU, ASEAN, US. Other US Canada, EU Mexico, China,

Japan.

 
Exports/ GDP 29%   14%  
Government

spending/ GDP

 

35%

   

27%

 
Public funding

of health  spending

83%   46%  

 

The figures are generally derived from the generally Wikipedia; they may be neither accurate nor up-to-date but the orders of magnitude are right.

 

Growing Pains

As our main indicator of economic growth, GDP has major limitations.

 

Listener: 30 January, 2014.

 

 

Keywords: History of Ideas, Methodology & Philosophy; Political Economy & History;

 

The expectation is for normal economic growth in the coming year. The economy peaked in September 2007 and stagnated (in per-capita terms) through to March 2013. It is now growing at its traditional rate. Even so, the new growth track is about 8% below the old one. You could say that the global financial crisis has permanently cost us around $17 billion of output every year (or about $10 a New Zealander a day) and will do so indefinitely into the future.

 

The six-year stagnation is slightly shorter than I expected. What I did not foresee was how much the strength of sales to China, especially dairy, would lift the economy; without that free-trade deal, we would be still stagnating. If the Chinese economy goes into a slowdown, we will stagnate again, because the Atlantic economies, North America and Europe, appear to be still in a long recession following the global financial crisis.

 

There is no real evidence that our growth rate will be higher than the historic one. Politicians keep promising us they are going to accelerate it, but at best they do the things necessary to keep the economy growing at its usual rate.

 

We like to pretend that the economy naturally grows without government assistance but that is nonsense. It requires judicious government action to keep it on its natural growth rate.

There is a view that the growth of the economy means the National Government will be re-elected at the end of the year. Political commentators were invented to make economists’ forecasts look good. In the context of political forecasting, GDP, our main indicator of economic growth, suffers from two major limitations.

 

First, the growth may not be inclusive, so some people – enough to swing an election? – may be left out. It looks as though unemployment is going to fall a little, so some workers will be growth beneficiaries. Interest rates are on the rise, so savers will benefit but there will be increasing grumbling from those paying mortgages.

 

There are many “inclusive” issues – like ethnicity and gender – which are not particularly economic. The big ones on which the economists have some expertise are inequality and poverty. There is certainly much (not always informed) concern about them. An important factor may be that the gains from trading with China seem to have gone almost exclusively to those on upper incomes. In any case, this Government may not be able to do much about reducing inequality (although its PR experts may be able to disguise that).

 

Another limitation of GDP is that it does not give much indication of the quality of output; it simply records what is produced, without assessing whether we really want it. Measurements of GDP growth do not account for either sustainability or environmental degradation – issues that cause enormous political tension between National and the Greens. GDP values excessive use of alcohol or gambling services exactly the same as feeding a starving child; money spent dealing with crime is as good as money spent on hip operations or opera.

 

A government particularly influences the quality of GDP by its spending on health; education; sport and recreation; arts, culture and heritage; and the environment and conservation. The National Government has been squeezing its spending, partly because it has had to fund its (inequality-increasing) income-tax cuts and partly because the 8% lower track means less spending on everything.

 

I will leave it to the political commentators to decide whether the opposition parties can provide a narrative of exclusion and inequality sufficient to convince the electorate. If they bang on with a narrow agenda on economic growth, the Government will outpoint them: better the devil you know.

 

Peripheral politics may be important. Such names as Banks, Brown, Dunne, Gilmour and Horan, and the odd relationship between the Mana and Maori parties remind us that political kerfuffles seem to occur about every two months. One just before the election could severely damage the associated party. Asked by a journalist what blows a government off-course, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan is said to have replied, “Events, dear boy, events.”

Poor Show

Why it has taken so long for child poverty to become part of the conventional wisdom.

 

Listener: 16th January, 2014

 

Keywords: Distributional Economics; History of Ideas, Methodology & Philosophy; Social Policy;

 

Corso, the Council of Organisations for Relief Services Overseas, decided in 1979 that it was wrong to ignore poverty in New Zealand while working to relieve it offshore. It made a film describing poor families here. The Government addressed the problem by withdrawing its funding of Corso.

 

In the course of the uproar, I said on TV that about a quarter of children were in poverty. The interviewer asked indignantly, “Why wasn’t I told?” I explained that the estimate was based on the 1973/74 Household Survey, which gave us the income distribution together with a poverty line set by the 1972 Royal Commission on Social Security.

 

Forty years after the initial finding, people remain surprised at the level of poverty, which has persisted near this earlier estimate, and indignant they were not told. One day someone will write up the slow but steady development of our research and understandings about poverty over the years and the various feeble policy attempts to address it.

 

However, this column is about the meta-issue: why has it taken so long for the research finding – and by implication many others – to become part of the conventional wisdom?

I am assuming child poverty is at last accepted by the conventional wisdom, but perhaps this is another flare-up of public recognition that will die away when the affluent turn to what really bothers them: tax cuts for the rich.

 

The current concern was precipitated by the Children’s Commissioner, who bravely – perhaps unaware of the fate of Corso – put child poverty high on his agenda. He commissioned an “expert advisory group”, although one may well wonder just how expert it was, for its members hardly appear in the list of research references in the group’s report. The list itself is curious, for with the exception of the report of the 1972 Royal Commission, there are no references to New Zealand poverty research before 2000. It is an Orwellian world that wipes out memory.

 

The report’s merit is that it has brought to the public’s notice the extent of child poverty and some evidence of the damage it causes. Presumably, it is the eminence of the group, not its expertise, that has given it such weight. More recently the commissioner, with assistance from the JR McKenzie Trust, has publish a Child Poverty Monitor; he will do so for another four years.

 

Both reports accept the existence of poverty and tell of some of the short-term effects on health, although we know very little about the long-term effects of poverty on health, crime, education and social distress. However, neither analyses why poverty occurs, not in the way that an economist thinks about it or in the way the earlier research investigated.

 

Why the inadequacy of the economics of both reports? It reflects a wider problem: a lack of leadership in the social sciences. Sure, there are many acknowledged leaders but most preside rather than provide intellectual leadership.

 

There are some marvellous exceptions – archaeology, demography and epidemiology, for example – but generally, those we acknowledge as leaders of our social sciences are not outstanding researchers and have no capacity to recognise quality. They may be even fearful of it; by surrounding themselves with eminence rather than expertise, their own limitations are never publicly exposed. Imagine the response if it was said some self-appointed experts had not understood the fundamentals.

 

That may be the way that governments of all colours like it, but it is destructive to the serious debate through which social science progresses and which society needs.

 

The children identified as in poverty 40 years ago have become adults. Many of their children have experienced poverty and their grandchildren are probably in poverty today. It is not only a question of justice; we underinvested in them, so society as a whole suffers.

 

Any acknowledgement of a failure to take up the issue would be an admission of failure. The eminent may have no clothes but they are happy to damn those who point to their nakedness – ask Corso.

Barry Williams (1932-2014)

Keywords: Portraits;

I last saw Barry shortly before he died. He was comfortable, cheerful and realistic about his prospects. We talked of many things; he went on to say that the hospice care was ‘marvelous’. Reflecting, he said he had decided that kindness was the most important thing. I am sure he would want me to pass that on to you. I knew Barry for a couple of decades, but I shall remember him best that last time: comfortable, cheerful and realistic. And his reflection that kindness was the most important human quality.

Barry grew up on the West Coast, graduated in music at Canterbury University College, worked in adult education and university extension and the University of Canterbury, Massey University and for the WEA and retired to continue to live his character-filled life at Paekakariki. By his own account i7 ‘he ‘marries the daughter of a communist agitator after fleeting courtship’ n 196. He and Maureen Birchfield have three children Gwyn, Meg and Frith.
Barry died on the 13 January 2014 at The Mary Potter Hospice, a few days after his 82nd birthday.

Hard Times

Literary classics from another era can tell us a lot about today’s economy.

 

Listener: 2 January, 2014.

 

Keywords: Literature and Culture; Political Economy & History;

 

This year I’ve been reading early 19th-century novels, partly for their literary quality and narrative, but also because they shed a fascinating light on English industrialisation and the social transformation that accompanied it.

 

I started with the socially stable world of Jane Austen. Not quite. Her last work, Persuasion, begins with the intimation that the rural squirearchy is dying off. The transformer is legalised piracy, because crews of the Royal Navy (fighting the Napoleonic French) got a share of prize money for capturing enemy vessels. Impoverished Sir Walter Elliot rents his house to an admiral. Ten years earlier, Captain Wentworth had been too poor for Anne Elliot to marry. Now rich from the piracy, it is a matter of true love overcoming the usual human misunderstandings.

 

You get no sense from Austen’s novels that 250km to the north, Luddites were destroying wool and cotton mills. (Charlotte Brontë’s Shirley describes one instance, also blaming it on the Napoleonic Wars because the mill owners suffered as a result of their American and European markets being cut off.) England was really two economies: traditional rural inertia in its south, beautifully described by Austen, and the industrial revolution in the north. (As an aside, our 19th-century English ancestors came mainly from the south, where wages were lower and, as one novel notes, furniture inferior.)

 

Charles Dickens was too London-based to capture the industrial turmoil well, although he marvellously describes many of the other changes going on at the time, not least the railway revolution. His only northern novel, Hard Times, lacks an authenticity, except for the mine rescue, which he must have seen. Instead it attacks utilitarianism and its denial of the imagination. Thomas Gradgrind, a headmaster of a kind of charter school run on utilitarian principles, is still remembered for his concern with cold facts and numbers. (Dickens loathed

Victorian schools.)

 

At a critical point, an unpleasant ex-pupil of the school, Blitzer, arrests a miscreant Gradgrind son, justifying his actions by self-interest. The dispute is resolved by circus master Sleary (the circus is a wonderfully Dickensian contrast to the school) overriding Blitzer because the Gradgrind family has done Sleary’s community a great favour.

 

Gradgrind abandons his failed philosophy – although only after he has greatly damaged the life of his favourite daughter – “making his facts and figures subservient to Faith, Hope and Charity; and no longer trying to grind that heavenly trio in his dusty little mills”. He becomes much despised by his political associates.

 

Despite its inadequacy as a portrayal of industrialisation, Hard Times is a thoughtful read, especially for thosewho suffer from narrow economism.

 

The best portrait is North and South, by Elizabeth Gaskell, a minister’s wife from Manchester. Margaret Hale has to leave the rural south to live in dirty, smoky, ugly and disorganised Milton (Manchester). But she learns to love it – and a factory manager. One Londoner “almost exceeded Margaret in his appreciation of the character of Milton and its inhabitants. Their energy, their power, their indomitable courage in struggling and fighting; their lurid vividness of existence”. As Brontë said, “the genius of the North”.

 

The dichotomy is still there: genteel London and its financial sector dominating the British economy, booming it in prosperity, crashing it after the global financial crisis. Britain has lost its claim to be the workshop of the world. As a German said, “We sell products, you sell assets.”

 

Gaskell does not have the reputation of the other novelists I mentioned (or of George Eliot), although I am told her status is rising. Perhaps it is a lack of appreciation of her portrayal of the working class; she must have visited so many in her pastoral duties. Perhaps the literary world is not as engaged with the industrial world as she was.

 

I wonder whether our age has been in as much economic and social transformation. Perhaps in another 150 years some economist will read today’s novels and be as gripped by the portrayal of these times. Which contemporary novelist captures the change as well as Elizabeth Gaskell did?

 

Shock of the New

Oh for leaders who cushion us from economic blows and remain progressive.

 

Listener: 12 December, 2013

 

Keywords: Growth & Innovation; Political Economy & History;

 

We might pretend economic management is concerned with accelerating growth, but it is mainly about dealing with the myriad shocks that pepper the economy.

 

The market can absorb small blows reasonably easily. If everyone switches from tea to coffee, the economy will cope, even if the tea planters are upset. But the 1966 wool price collapse, the global financial crisis and the Canterbury earthquakes all required conscious public responses, as do revolutions wrought by new technologies such as broadband and changing attitudes such as feminism.

 

Politicians don’t always respond well to change. Like the public they represent, they would prefer to ignore the shocks, hoping they will go away or pretending they are unimportant. In the 1970s, a period of great social and economic change, the Muldoon Government was so hostage to the past that it failed to respond. The succeeding Fourth Labour Government of David Lange and Roger Douglas reacted with a vengeance, with many poor and ideologically driven changes, although we tend to forget their successes in areas such as environmental reform and social liberalisation.

 

Every government, none more than the present National regime, faces the tension of responding to and trying to thwart changes. The Prime Minister tells us that a future republic is inevitable, but in the interim he reintroduces titles, signalling left and turning right. No doubt facing both ways at once contributes to his popularity.

 

Today’s business sector, unlike in the Muldoon-era, doesn’t look backwards. Twenty-five years ago, Rogernomics opened business to market forces, making it more forward-looking and dynamic. Yet, business knows – in a way neo-liberals never understood – that the partnership between commerce and government requires interventions. The collapse of neo-liberalism is nicely illustrated by a recent report published by the New Zealand Institute, child of the Business Roundtable, in which former Rogernomic Labour minister Michael Bassett and his co-authors recommend government subsidies for land developers.

 

The Key Government is not neo-liberal. It is comfortably dirigiste – interventionist – in the New Zealand tradition, deviated from only by the Lange Government and the early years of the succeeding National one. Even Bassett was strongly interventionist when he was a backbencher in the Third – Kirk-Rowling – Labour Government.

 

The present Government is pro-business. Business is only neo-liberal – demanding it be left alone – when it is not asking for government assistance. It seeks help often. Fiscal considerations aside, this Government, faced with such requests, says “yes, yes, yes”.

I am not sure that it has the balance right. Perhaps the public is not as pro-business as the Government. It is certainly not as enthusiastic about some concessions that businesses are demanding, especially where the environment is concerned. Perhaps, too, it thinks some of the largesse ladled out to business – such as the activity the financial sector has enjoyed through the sale of state assets – could be put to better use.

 

And I wonder whether the public is really keen on light-handed regulation given workplace disasters such as Pike River, poor quality construction giving rise to leaky buildings and poor performance by monopolies.

 

More fundamentally, I see no evidence that the public wants the sort of society that business drives us towards. It readily accepts that business is a part of getting where it wants to go, but it thinks it’s the engine, not the driver.

 

Harnessing business for a wider social good is not easy. This Government does not try. Its opponents don’t seem to know how.

 

With an election next year, we can expect the Government to be cheering dressed-up non-achievements as the Opposition whinges about bureaucratic failures that would be just as likely to happen on its watch.

 

It would be wonderful if both addressed the fundamental issue of what sort of New Zealand we want: one that dealt with the ongoing shocks – good and bad – that press on us while maintaining our progressive values. Let’s hope we are spared too many new shocks next year.

Economic Inequality in New Zealand: a User’s Guide: Key Points

Extracted from the full report published in The New Zealand Journal of Sociology, Vol 28, Issue 3, 2013, pages 9-66. (http://www.eastonbh.ac.nz/2013/12/economic-inequality-in-new-zealand-a-users-guide-summary/)

 

Keywords: Distributional Economics; Statistics;

 

Key Messages

 

Section 1: Why is Economic Inequality Important?

 

1. The section identifies four main issues as to why inequality may be important

– equity

– plutocracy

– efficiency

– inequality may contribute to economic instability

 

Section 2: Measuring Inequality

 

2. There is no single perfect measure of inequality. There are numerous imperfect measures which may be used for different purposes. Sometimes they contradict one another.

 

3. The exact variable which is being measured matters. Among the options for measuring income (or wealth) are that of persons (adults with or without children) or of households and, in the case of income, before or after tax and transfers. Always check definitions (and dont trust that inexpert writers have). Be aware that the measures may not be comprehensive.

 

Section 3: The Census Income Distribution (Table 1)

 

4. Total personal income of adults as measured by the census (which is – before tax – market income only to 1981 and includes social security from 1981) shows relatively stable inequality from 1926 to the 1950s and then falling to 1986, followed by rises.

 

Section 4: Household Income Inequality (Table 2,3)

 

5. There is an unequal distribution of (equivalised) household income distribution. In 2012 about two-thirds of New Zealanders were in households with an annual household income of between $29,000 and $48,400 per (equivalised) person. A sixth were in higher income households; a sixth were in poorer households.

 

6. Today New Zealand is a more unequal society than it was three decades ago. However most of the increase in inequality occurred in the period between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s. The width of the distribution (as measured by the Coefficient of Variation) increased by over a half. The trend after the mid-1990s is more ambiguous. The best interpretation is that the income distribution has remained at roughly the same level of inequality over the last two decades.

 

Section 5: Household Market Incomes (Table 4)

 

7. It is difficult to interpret changes in the household market income distribution. It probably follows much the same pattern as household disposable income. It may not be a particularly relevant indicator.

 

Section 6: Explaining Changes in the Level of Inequality: Market Influences

 

8. The rise in structural unemployment seems to have increased income inequality. Cyclical unemployment is important.

 

9. A major influence was a rise in the income share of the top 1 percent of adults. Their share rose from about 6 percent in the early 1980s (that is 6 times the adult average) to 10 percent today (10 times the adult average). Most of the shift occurred in the period between 1998 and 2003. The two major influences seem to have been a change in the tax treatment of dividends and an increase in margins for management and professionals over average workers.

 

10. There is not much evidence on the impact of prices and wage relativities (other than the margins mentioned in paragraph 9).

 

Section 7: Explaining Changes in the Level of Inequality: Social Influences

 

11. Changes in the  family and household structure and in the socio-demographic attributes of households had some impact – raising the level of inequality.

 

Section 8: Explaining Changes in the Level of Inequality: Redistribution

 

12. A major reason for the rise in equivalised household disposable income inequality between 1985 and 1993 is partly explained by the dramatic changes in redistribution between income levels that New Zealand experienced. The income tax scale was flattened and the introduction of GST imposed more heavily upon those on lower incomes. There were savage cuts to benefit levels in 1991 and more user pays for health and education so that more costs were pushed onto households, which the poorer ones found harder to bear.

 

13. While there was relative stability in the household income distribution after 1993, the relative share of the bottom quintile fell from the late 1990s. The group’s real incomes rose but less than average, probably because benefits were increased in line with prices rather than wages, so beneficiaries did not share in the rising real wages, beneficiaries were not entitled to the child tax credit, which was later expanded and called the ‘in work tax credit’ under working-for-families, and because many beneficiaries were unable to take advantage of the booming labour market.

 

Sections 9, 10.11: International Comparisons (Tables 5, 6)

 

14. New Zealand was 9th out of 34 in the OECD ranking of inequality in about 2009, after adjustment for population and per capita GDP. It was about 20th in 1985, so it moved from being in the bottom half of the OECD to the top half. (The measure used here is internationally comparable Gini coefficients.)

 

15. Over the whole three decades between 1982 and 2012 the increase in New Zealand income inequality was not the greatest.(The Swedish change seems to have been much higher.) But it had the greatest increase in income inequality in the decade to 1995.

 

Section 12: What Happened Before 1985?

 

17. We do not know what happened to household incomes before the 1980s because there are no data.

 

18. However personal market income seems to have been stable in the interwar period and declined in the early post-war period to 1981.

 

Section 13:. What Happened After the Global Financial Crisis?

 

19. The preliminary indication is that the Global Financial Crisis impacted more on top disposable incomes than bottom ones, so that there was some reduction in income inequality. This was despite the post-GFC income tax changes being biased towards the rich and despite some tightening of benefit entitlements. The probable explanation is that returns on investment fell while unemployment in New Zealand has not been too heavily affected by the downturn. (The Canterbury Earthquakes adds to the difficulties of interpreting the short data series.)

 

20. While the 1972 Royal Commission on Social Security pointed towards a notion of relative poverty, official policy since 1991 seems to be concerned with absolute poverty only.

 

Section 14: Poverty Measurement

 

21. Poverty lines based on median incomes are flawed, because poverty can be reduced by transferring income from the middle to the top.

 

22. A higher proportion of the population experienced relative poverty after 2000 than in the 1980s. – perhaps 2 to 4 percentage points.

 

23. The majority of the poor are parents with jobs and their children (although they may have had only one or two), living in their own home albeit usually with a mortgage. The proportion in poverty is higher among solo parents, those without jobs, living in rental accommodation and with a brown ethnicity (but there are fewer of each category). More women than men are poor. While the incidence of poverty is higher among Maori and Pasifika, there are more poor who are not of their ethnicity.

 

24. The salient conclusion from the research is that over 80 percent of the poor are children and their parents (and others in their households) and that proportionally more children are in poverty than adults (especially those adults who are not parents).

Section 15: Distribution by Social Groups (Table 7)

 

25. Mean Maori equivalised household incomes were 90 percent of average in 2012 and Pasifika ones were 89 percent. European/Pakeha ones were 107.5 percent.

 

Section 16: The Dynamics of Inequality

 

26. Although there is considerable dynamism in the income distribution as some people and households shift their relative locations over time, there is also considerable inertia.

27. One study found about half of those below the study’s poverty threshold at a point in time were in chronic (‘permanent’) poverty – the figure for children was 60 percent. The proportions will be higher if a higher poverty threshold is used.

 

Section 17: Income and Health (Table 8)

 

28. In any given age group, those in the lower income quintiles are in poorer health than those in the higher income quintiles. Some infectious diseases seem to be associated with poverty.

 

Section 18: Wealth

 

29. Physical and financial wealth is much more concentrated than personal income. While there is a life cycle to wealth holdings (peaking at about the age of 60), within each age cohort, wealth is also very unequally distributed. The main form of this wealth holding is housing.

 

30. The vast majority of the adult population had little physical and financial wealth. In 2003/4 6.5 percent had negative net worth, although this may be dominated by those with student debt. Conversely 1 percent of adults had 16.4 percent of total wealth, about the same share as the bottom 70 percent of the population. There is not a lot of gender inequality, but each European/Pakeha owns about 2.6 times that of the other ethnic groups. Larger families (with more than two children) have less wealth.

 

Section 19: Housing

 

31. Very little is known systematically about the impact of housing on inequality but from what is known differences in housing outgoings tend to increase effective income inequality.

 

Section 20: Inequality and Growth

 

32. While per capita National Income in constant expenditure prices rose at a trend rate of 1.7 percent p.a. between 1982 and 2012, Sen’s real national income – which is more sensitive to distributional change – rose only 1.3 percent p.a. because of the rise in income inequality. In effect on Sen’s measure the additional inequality cost New Zealand economic growth almost a fifth.

 

Section 21: Epilogue: Towards Policy Responses

 

33. While the focus of the survey is on the facts and related analytics rather than policy – on getting things right – there is a preliminary discussion of predistribution and redistribution policies.

 

34. This survey of economic inequality concludes

 

… those who command policy – whether effectively or ineffectively – have to decide to what extent reducing (or increasing) economic inequality is a policy objective. Is New Zealand satisfied with shifting from a low inequality to a high inequality society? What would its founding nineteenth century migrants have thought about the fact that, after allowing for each country’s size and affluence, New Zealand is now more unequal than the countries they left? And what would those who invited them here have thought had they known their descendants would be firmly in the bottom end of the unequal distributions?

Economic Inequality in New Zealand: a User’s Guide

Published in The New Zealand Journal of Sociology , Vol 28, Issue 3, 2013, pages 9-66. 

http://ndhadeliver.natlib.govt.nz/delivery/DeliveryManagerServlet?dps_pid=IE18625730&dps_custom_att_1=ilsdb

Keywords: Distributional Economics; Statistics;

“When inequality is the common law of a society, the greatest inequalities do not call attention to themselves.” Democracy in America, A. de Tocqueville.

 

B. Perry (2103) Household Incomes in New Zealand: Trends in Indicators of Inequality and Hardship 1982-2012 (Wellington, MSD) 242pp.

 

M. Rashbrooke (ed) (2103) Inequality: A New Zealand Crisis (Wellington, BWB) 279pp.

 

Contents

Tables

Prologue

Key Messages

1.         Why is Economic Inequality Important?

2.         Measuring Inequality

3.         The Census Income Distribution

4.         Household Income Inequality

5.         Household Market Incomes

6.         Explaining Changes in the Level of Inequality: Market Influences

Unemployment

Top Market Incomes

Prices and Wages

7 .        Explaining Changes in the Level of Inequality: Social Influences

8.         Explaining Changes in the Level of Inequality: Redistribution

9.         International Comparisons: 2009

10.       Distributional Measures in a National Account Framework

11.       Changes in Inequality Internationally 1985-2009

12.       What Happened Before 1985?

13.       What Happened After the Global Financial Crisis?

14.       Poverty Measurement

15.       The Distribution by Social Groups

16.       The Dynamics of Inequality

17.       Income and Health

18.       Wealth

19.       Housing

20.       Inequality and Growth

21.       Epilogue: Towards Policy Responses

References (preliminary)

 

Tables

1: Income Reported by Adult Deciles in New Zealand Censuses 1945-2013

2: Decile Mean of Equivalised Household Income

3: Summary Indicators of Household Inequality 1982-2012

4: Gini Coefficients for Different Measures of Household Equivalised Income

5: Gini Coefficient for Household Income Distribution: 2008-2010

6: Gini Coefficient for Household Income Distribution: 1983-1987

7: Equivalised Median Household Income by Ethnicity

8: Proportions in Quintiles Who Rate Themselves as ‘Fair’ or ‘Poor’ Health

 

Prologue [1]

 

This survey is a response to two recently published works on inequality in New Zealand. The first, a report by Bryan Perry, although published in a government department, is an extensive scholarly study bringing together much material. The second, a book edited by Max Rashbrooke, although with contributions by academics, is a popular exposition which offers a starting point for a discussion on inequality but both undersells the issue by not being up-to- date with the research, and oversells it – if we are in crisis we have been in it for over two decades.[2]

 

Reporting on either presents a reviewer with a considerable challenge. The Perry study is so marvellously detailed that one could well end up with a review as long as its 242 pages; tackling the Rashbrooke book at the same level would involve tediously correcting or elaborating a plethora of statements.

 

Instead, this has been written as a survey of what we know – and dont know – about economic (mainly income and wealth) inequality in New Zealand. The works are referred to where they are a part of the exposition.

 

A surprising conclusion of the survey is just how much New Zealand research on economic inequality there has been. The incomplete list of references at the end cites more than 70 empirical studies. It is not practical to mention them all in this survey, even if those writing on the topic should be.

 

Reading the Rashbrooke book though, one recalls the story of the drunk who uses a lamppost for support rather than illumination. So it is for too many public policy rhetoricians.[3] This survey is consciously explanatory about the underlying analytics. In each case the test is whether those who contributed to the Rashbrooke book would have benefited from having a better grasp of them.

 

Key Messages

 

Section 1: Why is Economic Inequality Important?

 

1. The section identifies four main issues as to why inequality may be important

– equity

– plutocracy

– efficiency

– inequality may contribute to economic instability

 

Section 2: Measuring Inequality

 

2. There is no single perfect measure of inequality. There are numerous imperfect measures which may be used for different purposes. Sometimes they contradict one another.

 

3. The exact variable which is being measured matters. Among the options for measuring income (or wealth) are that of persons (adults with or without children) or of households and, in the case of income, before or after tax and transfers. Always check definitions (and dont trust that inexpert writers have). Be aware that the measures may not be comprehensive.

 

Section 3: The Census Income Distribution (Table 1)

 

4. Total personal income of adults as measured by the census (which is – before tax – market income only to 1981 and includes social security from 1981) shows relatively stable inequality from 1926 to the 1950s and then falling to 1986, followed by rises.

 

Section 4: Household Income Inequality (Table 2,3)

 

5. There is an unequal distribution of (equivalised) household income distribution. In 2012 about two-thirds of New Zealanders were in households with an annual household income of between $29,000 and $48,400 per (equivalised) person. A sixth were in higher income households; a sixth were in poorer households.

 

6. Today New Zealand is a more unequal society than it was three decades ago. However most of the increase in inequality occurred in the period between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s. The width of the distribution (as measured by the Coefficient of Variation) increased by over a half. The trend after the mid-1990s is more ambiguous. The best interpretation is that the income distribution has remained at roughly the same level of inequality over the last two decades.

 

Section 5: Household Market Incomes (Table 4)

 

7. It is difficult to interpret changes in the household market income distribution. It probably follows much the same pattern as household disposable income. It may not be a particularly relevant indicator.

 

Section 6: Explaining Changes in the Level of Inequality: Market Influences

 

8. The rise in structural unemployment seems to have increased income inequality. Cyclical unemployment is important.

 

9. A major influence was a rise in the income share of the top 1 percent of adults. Their share rose from about 6 percent in the early 1980s (that is 6 times the adult average) to 10 percent today (10 times the adult average). Most of the shift occurred in the period between 1998 and 2003. The two major influences seem to have been a change in the tax treatment of dividends and an increase in margins for management and professionals over average workers.

 

10. There is not much evidence on the impact of prices and wage relativities (other than the margins mentioned in paragraph 9).

 

Section 7: Explaining Changes in the Level of Inequality: Social Influences

 

11. Changes in the  family and household structure and in the socio-demographic attributes of households had some impact – raising the level of inequality.

 

Section 8: Explaining Changes in the Level of Inequality: Redistribution

 

12. A major reason for the rise in equivalised household disposable income inequality between 1985 and 1993 is partly explained by the dramatic changes in redistribution between income levels that New Zealand experienced. The income tax scale was flattened and the introduction of GST imposed more heavily upon those on lower incomes. There were savage cuts to benefit levels in 1991 and more user pays for health and education so that more costs were pushed onto households, which the poorer ones found harder to bear.

 

13. While there was relative stability in the household income distribution after 1993, the relative share of the bottom quintile fell from the late 1990s. The group’s real incomes rose but less than average, probably because benefits were increased in line with prices rather than wages, so beneficiaries did not share in the rising real wages, beneficiaries were not entitled to the child tax credit, which was later expanded and called the ‘in work tax credit’ under working-for-families, and because many beneficiaries were unable to take advantage of the booming labour market.

 

Sections 9, 10.11: International Comparisons (Tables 5, 6)

 

14. New Zealand was 9th out of 34 in the OECD ranking of inequality in about 2009, after adjustment for population and per capita GDP. It was about 20th in 1985, so it moved from being in the bottom half of the OECD to the top half. (The measure used here is internationally comparable Gini coefficients.)

 

15. Over the whole three decades between 1982 and 2012 the increase in New Zealand income inequality was not the greatest.(The Swedish change seems to have been much higher.) But it had the greatest increase in income inequality in the decade to 1995.

 

Section 12: What Happened Before 1985?

 

17. We do not know what happened to household incomes before the 1980s because there are no data.

 

18. However personal market income seems to have been stable in the interwar period and declined in the early post-war period to 1981.

 

Section 13:. What Happened After the Global Financial Crisis?

 

19. The preliminary indication is that the Global Financial Crisis impacted more on top disposable incomes than bottom ones, so that there was some reduction in income inequality. This was despite the post-GFC income tax changes being biased towards the rich and despite some tightening of benefit entitlements. The probable explanation is that returns on investment fell while unemployment in New Zealand has not been too heavily affected by the downturn. (The Canterbury Earthquakes adds to the difficulties of interpreting the short data series.)

 

20. While the 1972 Royal Commission on Social Security pointed towards a notion of relative poverty, official policy since 1991 seems to be concerned with absolute poverty only.

 

Section 14: Poverty Measurement

 

21. Poverty lines based on median incomes are flawed, because poverty can be reduced by transferring income from the middle to the top.

 

22. A higher proportion of the population experienced relative poverty after 2000 than in the 1980s. – perhaps 2 to 4 percentage points.

 

23. The majority of the poor are parents with jobs and their children (although they may have had only one or two), living in their own home albeit usually with a mortgage. The proportion in poverty is higher among solo parents, those without jobs, living in rental accommodation and with a brown ethnicity (but there are fewer of each category). More women than men are poor. While the incidence of poverty is higher among Maori and Pasifika, there are more poor who are not of their ethnicity.

 

24. The salient conclusion from the research is that over 80 percent of the poor are children and their parents (and others in their households) and that proportionally more children are in poverty than adults (especially those adults who are not parents).

Section 15: Distribution by Social Groups (Table 7)

 

25. Mean Maori equivalised household incomes were 90 percent of average in 2012 and Pasifika ones were 89 percent. European/Pakeha ones were 107.5 percent.

 

Section 16: The Dynamics of Inequality

 

26. Although there is considerable dynamism in the income distribution as some people and households shift their relative locations over time, there is also considerable inertia.

27. One study found about half of those below the study’s poverty threshold at a point in time were in chronic (‘permanent’) poverty – the figure for children was 60 percent. The proportions will be higher if a higher poverty threshold is used.

 

Section 17: Income and Health (Table 8)

 

28. In any given age group, those in the lower income quintiles are in poorer health than those in the higher income quintiles. Some infectious diseases seem to be associated with poverty.

 

Section 18: Wealth

 

29. Physical and financial wealth is much more concentrated than personal income. While there is a life cycle to wealth holdings (peaking at about the age of 60), within each age cohort, wealth is also very unequally distributed. The main form of this wealth holding is housing.

 

30. The vast majority of the adult population had little physical and financial wealth. In 2003/4 6.5 percent had negative net worth, although this may be dominated by those with student debt. Conversely 1 percent of adults had 16.4 percent of total wealth, about the same share as the bottom 70 percent of the population. There is not a lot of gender inequality, but each European/Pakeha owns about 2.6 times that of the other ethnic groups. Larger families (with more than two children) have less wealth.

 

Section 19: Housing

 

31. Very little is known systematically about the impact of housing on inequality but from what is known differences in housing outgoings tend to increase effective income inequality.

 

Section 20: Inequality and Growth

 

32. While per capita National Income in constant expenditure prices rose at a trend rate of 1.7 percent p.a. between 1982 and 2012, Sen’s real national income – which is more sensitive to distributional change – rose only 1.3 percent p.a. because of the rise in income inequality. In effect on Sen’s measure the additional inequality cost New Zealand economic growth almost a fifth.

 

Section 21: Epilogue: Towards Policy Responses

 

33. While the focus of the survey is on the facts and related analytics rather than policy – on getting things right – there is a preliminary discussion of predistribution and redistribution policies.

 

34. This survey of economic inequality concludes

 

… those who command policy – whether effectively or ineffectively – have to decide to what extent reducing (or increasing) economic inequality is a policy objective. Is New Zealand satisfied with shifting from a low inequality to a high inequality society? What would its founding nineteenth century migrants have thought about the fact that, after allowing for each country’s size and affluence, New Zealand is now more unequal than the countries they left? And what would those who invited them here have thought had they known their descendants would be firmly in the bottom end of the unequal distributions?

 

References

 

The bibliography includes over 70 items of New Zealand empirical research plus some international ones and some of a more philosophic nature. Readers are invited to submit further New Zealand work which has been inadvertently overlooked.

 

1. Why is Economic Inequality Important?

 

Public concern over economic inequality is rising both internationally and in New Zealand. It probably reflects four main themes which are inextricably mixed together.

 

1. The Equity Argument

 

Many people judge that inequality (or, more often, severe inequality) is morally wrong per se. Their arguments as to why this is so can be tortuous or simple. One of the most sophisticated is that of philosopher John Rawls whose ‘second principle of justice’ is that social and economic inequalities should be arranged to be of the greatest benefit to the least-advantaged members of society and that offices and positions should be open to everyone under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. (Rawls 1971/1999) [4]

 

Implicit in this formulation is a belief that some inequality benefits the poorest. A simple version of it is that a society with perfect equality would give the poorest a lower quality of life than one with some inequality, because there would not be the economic incentives to improve oneself, thereby benefiting others too, while the costs of enforcing such perfect equality are high.

 

However this does not tell us how much inequality is ideal. Such evidence, as there is, indicates that inequality tends to be lower in higher income societies, while high inequality societies do not seem to grow any faster. These are but correlations; there is not a lot of systematic evidence to explain what the underlying causal processes might be.

 

There are two main subsidiaries of the equity argument. The first arises from the need for ‘social coherence’ – an unequal society is a divided one. It has an efficiency dimension since a divided society is likely to require more public spending on justice, policing and corrections and on private security measures.

 

The second argument is that while there is nothing wrong with social inequality at a point in time, it has long term consequences in terms of loss of opportunity for future generations. Sometimes it is said that the purely ethical case against inequality does not carry much weight (in the mind of the exponent) but there is a concern that children (in particular) in deprived homes will be denied life chances. (Someone who holds such a view may also be concerned about the three non-equity arguments which follow.)  Note that it also has an efficiency dimension, because arguably an unequal society is wasting talents.

 

2. The Plutocracy Argument

 

There is a concern that if there is great inequality then those at the top of the (income, say) distribution have an unfair influence in the direction of the governing of society. While the rich always have more political leverage than the poor, the amount varies depending on institutional arrangements and the degree of inequality. It is possible that while a political system may have the formal appearance of a democracy, it may in practice be a plutocracy in which its effective rulers are its rich.

 

Plutocracy undermines the claim of a democratic society. Where the economic disparities outweigh the formal structures of democracy, the practical operation of the democratic principle suffers – and with it the rights and voice of the underprivileged. The unequal distribution of national resources is consequently affected and with it the denial of opportunities for the disadvantaged sectors of the population. Stiglitz’s point about the cumulative effects through unequal media and national dialogue is especially relevant.

 

Where a particular system settles on the democracy-plutocracy spectrum is partly a matter of institutional arrangements (such as the degree to which money can influence elections) but inequality is also relevant because it affects how much various groups can afford for influencing purposes. Indeed the successful ones may use that influence to bias the institutional arrangements in their favour (such as the laws which control contributions to elections). This influence is not confined only to elections and the policies of the elected governments; it may also affect the media and the national dialogue. (Stiglitz 2012, Wade 2013)

 

The plutocracy issue is sharper in America and Britain, where the top 1 percent of income recipients have double the share they have in New Zealand. In any case any such class analysis in New Zealand has to pay more attention to offshore influence.

 

3. The Efficiency Argument

 

Recently The Spirit Level has argued that unequal societies are more likely to have poorer social performance. (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009) It finds a relationship between inequality, on the one hand, and, on the other, various variables: drug and alcohol infant mortality, educational performance, homicides, imprisonment rates, life expectancy, mental illness, obesity, social mobility, suicide, teenage births and trust.

 

Some of the relationships are empirically stronger than others. Thus far, the research provides but a correlation and every scientist knows that correlation is not causation – that two events are associated does not prove that one causes the other. There are various hypotheses about the mechanisms which might cause the social distress, but none are yet proven in a scientific court. [5] Any inefficiency would mean that a society with higher inequality has to spend more – whether publicly or privately does not matter here – on its health and justice systems to attain its desired outcomes.

 

A related issue is that the greater the economic inequality, the lower the intergenerational mobility. Even if economic inequality at a point in time were not to matter, it seems likely to affect life chances over time. A child who comes from a deprived background is likely to have poorer health throughout the rest of their life, to have less access to educational and vocational opportunities and to be more likely to experience social delinquency. The equity argument says this is wrong; for efficiency concerns it makes measures to correct the effect more expensive.[6]

 

4. The Macroeconomic Argument

 

One element of the Global Financial Crisis may have been that the increasing incomes among rich Americans were saved and lent to those below for housing purchase, which led to the sub-prime loans and the resulting financial instability. (Stiglitz 2013) This argument applies to the American economy only, and does not seem to apply to New Zealand. It is mentioned here as one part of the main issues in the world debate.

 

In summary there are a number of reasons why we might be concerned with economic equality. Aside from moral concerns, there is good reason to believe that inequality impacts on the way in which a society functions. If some of the impacts are unattractive, reducing inequality may result in some social gains.

 

2. Measuring Inequality

 

There is no unequivocal measure of inequality or changes in inequality. While what is happening to inequality is clear when only two individuals are involved – either their incomes are closer or further apart – the addition of just one extra person can lead to ambiguities. It is only possible to make unequivocal comparisons where the ‘Lorenz’ curves do not cross. [7] (Atkinson 1975: Ch 3; Easton 1983: Ch 2) [8]

 

The core of the problem is that economic distributions are typically complex and cannot be characterised by a few parameters. Students are introduced to simple statistical distributions; the commonest of which is the normal (or Gaussian) distribution which requires but two parameters (a mean and standard deviation) which may be compacted for many comparative purposes into a single parameter of the coefficient of variation – the ratio of the two.[9] Commonly there is not a sole parameter to compare two economic distributions. That is why there can be no authoritative index of inequality.

 

This is illustrated by the following simple example. Suppose there are three people who have incomes of 3, 10 and 17 respectively. If there is a transfer of one unit from the middle income person to the bottom and one unit to the top the distribution is now 4, 8, 18.

 

Observing the bottom person has had an increase in their income one might assume there has been a reduction in inequality. But, paradoxically, observing the top person has also had an increase, the conclusion seems to be there has been an increase in inequality.

 

A widely used measure is the ‘Gini’ coefficient which measures the average difference between the incomes of the individuals in the distribution (scaled by the overall average income). It ranges from 1 when there is total equality, to 0 when all the income is received by a single individual. (Sometimes it is reported as a percentage/out of 100.)

 

Because it is not well understood the Gini coefficient has a mystique. For the general user a measure of the ‘width’ of a distribution – such as the coefficient of variation – may be more intelligible.[10] A CV of 1 is equivalent to the standard deviation equalling the mean; of 2, twice the mean; and so on. A doubling of the CV is equivalent to a doubling of the width of a distribution.

 

 

Unfortunately it is rare for a research study to provide the CV. However there is a simple conversion of a Gini coefficient to a CV when the variable has a lognormal distribution – which many economic distributions approximately follow.[11] To assist understanding the magnitude of the Gini coefficient – and even more to assist understanding the meaning of a change in inequality between two distributions – whenever the Gini coefficient is reported the CV equivalent for the lognormal is also reported.

 

To add to the paradox, the Gini coefficients for the two distributions we considered at the beginning of the section are identical (GC = 0 .655; CV = 6.2), which might lead one to conclude there has been no change in inequality.

 

So the three measures tell different stories, illustrating the difficulty of judging changes of inequality (or comparing them) when the changes are small. Fortunately in practice where there have been substantial changes in the income distribution, the measures of inequality have been consistent. But when the changes in the distribution are small they can contradict one another.

The counsel of perfection is to give (income shares). Space means that is not always possible and, in any case, much of the public finds the resulting tables too complicated.

 

A recent development at the OECD has been the use of disparity indexes rather than the Gini Coefficient. Essentially a disparity index is the coefficient of variation scaled so that the mean of the group (say of countries) is unity. It is the main indicator in the OECD paper discussed at end of Section 7.

 

3. The Census Income Distribution

 

The Population Census asks respondents to report their incomes for the previous year. Until 1981 they asked only for market incomes, but from 1981 they asked for total income including social security benefits. (Conveniently in 1981 they asked both.) The request is for before tax income but it is likely some (especially social security beneficiaries ) report their after-tax income. In any case their recall is not always accurate.

 

The advantage of the series is its length, although it is less valuable since superior series have become available. Census data is also useful for tracing social groups such as Maori. The available series is shown in Table 1. (The Interwar data is discussed in section 11.)

 

Table 1: Income Reported by Adult Deciles in New Zealand Censuses 1945-2013

Percent of Reported Income

March Year

Bottom 3 Deciles

7th

6th

5th

4th

3rd

2nd

Top

Gini

Coeff

Market Incomes (Non-Maori)

1926

0.0

0.1

5.1

7.8

13.0

16.9

20.6

35.6

0.62

1936

0.0

2.2

2.9

7.6

9.5

15.1

22.4

40.3

0.59

1945

0.0

2.7

4.8

7.9

11.2

15.4

20.0

37.8

0.59

1951

0.0

.2.5

4.5

9.2

13.4

16.4

20.7

35.7

0.60

Market Incomes (Total Population)

1951

0.0

0.1

3.9

8.5

14.0

15.1

20.1

38.5

0.61

1956

0.0

0.2

3.9

8.9

13.1

15.8

20.2

38.3

0.61

1961

0.0

0.4

4.7

8.2

13.9

16.0

19.7

37.1

0.60

1966

0.0

1.2

5.2

9.4

12.6

15.4

18.7

37.5

0.58

1971

0.1

1.5

5.1

9.9

12.2

16.1

19.5

35.6

0.57

1976

0.3

1.6

5.8

9.6

12.7

15.7

19.8

34.6

0.56

1981

0.4

1.4

5.9

9.6

12.7

15.6

19.6

34.9

0.56

Total Income Including Social Security Benefits

1981

4.4

4.5

6.6

9.5

11.7

14.2

17.7

31.3

0.48

1986

6.9

5.5

7.2

9.1

11.3

13.8

17.6

28.7

0.43

1991

7.5

4.8

6.6

8.6

11.6

13.3

17.4

30.3

0.45

1996

5.9

5.1

5.9

8.2

10.7

13.7

17.1

33.4

0.48

2001

5.7

4.8

6.1

8.1

10.6

13.3

17.5

33.9

0.49

2006

5.8

4.8

6.5

8.7

10.9

13.1

17.7

32.4

0.47

2013

Sources: Statistics New Zealand Population Censuses.

Note: the 1945 Census was in September 1945. It did not include overseas paersonel. This data corrects and error in Easton (1996).

 

The inconsistencies of measurement (and inaccuracies of recall) over time mean that it is not always easy to identify exactly what is going on. However the pattern seems to have been that market income was becoming less unequal in the post war era up to 1986. (Easton 1983) An important factor was increased market income to those at the bottom of the distribution. The probable main reason is women (especially mothers) entering the paid labour force.

 

The post-1981 series is complicated by the addition of social security to market income, so some of the changes are the result of changes in in the levels of benefits and the numbers of recipients. Even so, it shows what is a characteristic feature of the post-war New Zealand income distribution. There is a very large increase in inequality between 1986 and 1996, equivalent to a 50 percent increase in the coefficient of variation.[12]

 

After 1996 the inequality as measured by the Gini Coefficient is reasonably constant and may not reflect structural change. We await the 2013 Census data (to be published in December 2013) before drawing any structural conclusions.

 

The income shares reported in this section are before taxes are levied. The next section discusses the impact of taxation but this has to be at a household level and the data is only from 1981.

 

4. Household Income Inequality

 

Inequality is a multidimensional phenomenon, including inequality of income, or wealth, or inequality of access to health care, justice and educational opportunity.

 

Moreover there are sub-dimensions within the categories. Income may refer to market income, or to disposable income, in which taxes are deducted and government transfers (generally described as ‘benefits’ in this review) are added, or it may refer to taxable income, which often adds public transfers to market income.[13] It may be on the basis of individuals, typically excluding children[14]; or it may be the income of households which include children. The population under consideration usually matters.[15] Most of the other dimensions have similar complications.

 

We shall focus here mainly on the ‘equivalised household income’ data base, which is at the centre of New Zealand analysis. The method was introduced in 1974 when the first Statistics New Zealand household survey became available. (Easton 1976) There have been steady improvements over the years, including the ability to access data at unit record level, and steady improvements in the quality and consistency of the records.

 

The basic procedure is to take the reported (annual) income – which may be adjusted for under-reporting – deducting income tax and adding government-provided benefits (if they are not included in the reported income). The income is then adjusted for the household’s composition.[16] The result is called ‘equivalised’ income. The purpose is to treat households of different size and composition equivalently. For most purposes the notion may be as if it is ‘per capita’. (A variation is to focus on spending rather than on disposable income. The income focus arises because dis-saving in one period is likely to lead to lower spending in future ones.)

 

The household equivalence scales which are used for the adjustment usually allow for the economies of scale for larger household, and often treat adults and children differently. There may be adjustments for housing circumstances (discussed later) and other differences.

 

The scales are fraught with complications not always appreciated by their users. (Easton 2004) Some will mentioned later when they become important for interpretation.

 

Since each household has different numbers of individuals and, especially, larger households tend to be poorer ones, each person (including any children) in a household is assigned the equivalised household income.[17] All individuals are then ranked by the equivalised incomes of the household they belong to into deciles.[18]

 

Table 2 shows the resulting tabulation for the 2012 year.[19] The second column shows each decile’s average equivalised income (it may best be treated as the income of a couple; in April 2012 their New Zealand Superannuation would have been at least $25,953 p.a.). The third column shows the decile share of total equivalised income.

 

Table 2: Decile Mean of Equivalised Household Income

DECILE  Average Income  $p.a.2012 prices

Share %

Top

97300

24.3

2

60200

15.1

3

49300

12.3

4

41700

10.4

5

35800

9.0

6

31400

7.8

7

28000

7.0

8

23800

6.0

9

19500

4.9

Bottom

12900

3.2

ALL

38700

100

Source: Perry (2103:238). (Negative incomes set at zero.)

 

The basic message is that there is considerable income inequality in New Zealand, with the top decile receiving about 2.4 times the average income and 7.5 times as much as the bottom decile. The Gini Coefficient is 0.306, equivalent to a Coefficient of Variation of 0.25 and a standard deviation of around $9,700. Roughly two-thirds of New Zealanders in 2012 were in households with an annual income of between $29,000 and $48,400 per (equivalised) person.

 

The income shares can also be constructed for many years since 1982. To simplify, Table 3 provides the share of the top 10 percent (decile) of households, the Gini coefficient (with CoV) and the bottom 20 percent (quintile). The third indicator reflects that estimates of poverty (discussed later) usually conclude about a fifth of the population are in poverty. Columns five and six are poverty-based estimates to be discussed later. The final column gives the average income for a couple measured in 2012 prices.

 

Table 3: Summary Indicators of Household Inequality 1982-2012

Year

Top Decile

 Share %

Gini Coefficient

(CoV)

Bottom Quintile

Share %

Absolute Poverty

%

Relative Poverty

%

Average Income

 (2012 Prices)

1982

19.9

.268 (.18)

8.9

12

12

30000

1984

20.2

.270 (.18)

9.0

13

13

29400

1986

20.3

.265 (.17)

9.2

14

14

28400

1988

20.1

.262 (.17)

9.1

12

12

28900

1990

23.1

.300 (.24)

9.0

14

14

30700

1992

23.3

.311 (.26)

8.1

24

24

27500

1994

23.8

.318 (.28)

8.1

26

26

27000

1996

25.0

.325 (.30)

8.1

20

20

29100

1998

25.0

.327 (.30)

8.0

16

15

31200

2001

25.4

.334 (.32)

7.5

16

17

32600

2004

24.5

.329 (.31)

7.7

13

20

34400

2007

24.6

.328 (.31)

7.8

11

18

36200

2009

25.8

.331 (.32)

7.9

7

18

39800

2010

24.6

.318 (.28)

7.9

8

18

39300

2011

26.7

.343 (.35)

7.6

8

16

39800

2012

24.3

.317 (.28)

8.1

6

15

40000

Source: Perry (2013) ibid. pp.70, 87, 110, 238.

 

Broadly all the indicators show increasing inequality over the three decades between 1982 and 2012. The income share of the top decile rises, that of the bottom quintile falls, while the Gini coefficient rises. The year-to-year fluctuations are generally small.[20]

 

In particular, on all indicators most of the change in inequality occurred in the period between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s. The width of the distribution (as measured by the Coefficient of Variation) increased by over a half.

 

The trend after the mid-1990s is more ambiguous. The share of the bottom quintile tended to fall, the share of the top decile was roughly stable and the Gini coefficient was probably stable, possibly declining. In my view the best interpretation is that the income distribution has remained at roughly the same level of inequality over the last two decades, although different groups experienced gains and losses.

 

5. Household Market Incomes

 

In the course of examining the impact of fiscal measures on household material standards of living, Aziz et al calculated Gini Coefficients for different measures of income for the four years for which they had data (1988, 1998, 2007, 2010). Their work is reproduced as Table 4. A comparable series from Perry (2013) is added. The researcher’s primary interest is the final row of the table, which adds to household income the services provided by the government (such as education and health) and suggests the government has been less supportive to those with low incomes in recent decades.

 

Table 4: Gini Coefficients for Different Measures of

            Household Equivalised Income

1988

1998

2007

2010

Market Income

0.42

0.49

0.54

0.52

Disposable Income (Aziz)

0.3

0.35

0.38

0.36

Disposable Income (Perry)

0.26

0.33

0.33

0.32

Final Income.

0.27

0.3

0.35

0.35

Source: Aziz et al (2012) Table 3, Perry (2013) see Table 3 above.

 

Unfortunately the four years come from two data studies which may not be exactly aligned. Crawford & Johnston (2004) provide the first two observations; Aziz et al (2012) the last two. The consistency problem is illustrated by comparing the Aziz household equivalised disposable income Gini Coefficients with the Perry calculated ones which are constructed to be consistent over time.

 

The concern here is not the different levels – which is both puzzling and disappointing – but the different patterns. The Perry series shows a leap between 1988 and 1998 and then remaining at roughly the same level; the Aziz one has a continuing rise from 1998 to 2007 and then the flattening out. This could be reconciled with the Perry pattern if we assume that the Aziz and Crawford estimates are not on the same basis. If that it true for household equivalised disposable income it must also be true for household equivalised market income.

 

But even if the series are consistent we need to be careful interpreting household equivalised market income. Economists are interested in personal market income because it reflects the factors of production held by individuals and the (factor) prices that reward them. However equivalised household market income is not as interesting from this perspective, because household formation is also relevant.

 

If a couple of workers marry that will change the distribution of household equivalised market income but not the personal market. If they have a child that again changes the household market equivalised distribution even if they continue to work. As we report below Hyslop &Maré (2001) observe one of the causes of increase in inequality is changes in household structure.

 

Ultimately is in unclear why we should be interested household equivalised market income except as a step on the way from personal market income to household disposable income.

 

Is the same true for household disposable income? No, because the variable has a meaning as an indicator of the material standard of living of the inhabitants of a household. The challenge is to explain what are the determinants of that measure. We begin with the determinants of market income.

 

6. Explaining Changes in the Level of Inequality: Market Influences

 

While it is true that income inequality has been increasing over the last three decades, almost all the significant change occurred in the first decade. This is not a trivial issue. What serious policy needs is an analytic account of what determines the inequality, preferably with an indication of the magnitude of each effect; getting the right story to analyse is important.

 

Methodologically it is easier to explain changes in the level of inequality than to explain the level of inequality itself. The latter usually needs cross-country comparisons or heavy use of theory with some microeconomic analysis (which rarely gives an indication of magnitudes).

 

The available explanations for changes in economic inequality are centred on two general economic areas. The first involves changes in the macro-economic (or market) environment – especially unemployment, remuneration and investment income.; the second, redistribution policies discussed in the next section.

 

Unemployment

 

Changes in the level of unemployment level affect just about everyone but apparently those in the second-to-bottom quintile are affected most. (Easton 1995) Unemployment rose to unprecedented post-war heights in the early 1990s, reflecting the major industry restructuring going on at the time (plus some loss of aggregate demand). It may well be half of the labour force was unemployed over four years 1988/9 to 1992/3, albeit in most cases for a short period as they shifted between jobs, but usually sufficiently long for them to register with the employment service of the Department of Labour. (Easton 1996:110-112) This suggests that part of the rise in inequality in the 1985 to 1993 period could have been due to the weaker labour market.

 

Unemployment levels fell from the mid-1990s, especially after 2000. The effect on income inequality is evident in the falling Gini coefficient (but less so in the top decile and bottom quintile which are less affected by unemployment). (Perry 2013:56, 163) However the effect is small, at most equivalent to a 20 percent fall in the width of the distribution (the CoV) between 2001 and 2011. (Moreover, some of that fall must be attributed to the introduction of Working for Families). It appears the lift in unemployment between the early 1980s and early 1990s cannot have made a major change to income inequality in the period.

 

More generally, there is a case that the structural (i.e. cyclically-corrected) rate of unemployment rose about 2 to 3 percentage points between the 1960s and the 1980s. (Easton 2012) This would have added to inequality but the shift occurred outside the period of main focus.

 

Top Market Incomes

 

What happened to top of the income distribution measured before tax? Analysis is treacherous because it is based on an administrative data base which changes over time as law and administrative practices change. (Additionally it is based on income reported for tax purposes which is subject to tax avoidance and excludes capital gains.)

 

To reduce some of these complications the analysis is based on all adults (over 15) and not those just who are recorded in the tax statistics. The income in the denominator is the primary income receivable as reported in the System of National Accounts. Four measures from 1981 to 2011 are available: the share of the top 0.1 percent, the share of the top 1 percent the share of the top 10 percent and the Pareto coefficient. The discussion below is confined to the top 1 percent. The other indicators are of different magnitudes but show generally the same pattern. (Easton 2013T)

 

The top 1 percent’s share of total income was around 6 percent of total income until 1989, or 6 times that of the adult average.. It then rose rapidly to just over 10 percent by 1993, or 10 times the average. After this jump of 4 percentage points (or two thirds) the share remains broadly constant.[21]Arguably the share increased by, say, 0.3 percentage points in the early 2000s; if so it fell by roughly the same amount in the following decade. There is no evidence of the sharply rising income share at the top since 2000 we see in jurisdictions with more sophisticated financial sector.

 

Why did the share of the incomes at the top rise? Part, perhaps a third, is explained by the ending of the double taxation on dividends in 1989 led to more being recorded as taxable income.[22] (This would mean that unrecorded capital gains probably fell.)

 

The best explanation for the remainder seems to be that margins for management and professionals (i.e. over average workers) rose both in the public and private sectors. The big shift occurred in the early 1990s (probably as a consequence of legislative change and changed private sector attitudes following the market reforms); the structural explanation is probably the opening up of the global labour market for these skills.

 

Unfortunately we cannot simply map individual adult market income shares onto households. Those with top decile incomes are likely have more adults – some of who may, or may not, have incomes in the top decile – and they are more likely to be larger and have more dependants. Even so it seems safe that perhaps 2.5 or 4 percentage points of the top decile households probably came from higher market receipts in the early 1990s.)

 

Prices and Wages[23]

 

Little is know about the effect of other changes in relative market prices. Did market liberalisation period benefit the rich more than the poor? The short answer is that there is little evidence that they had a marked effect.[24]There may have been some, but it seems to have been minor in comparison to the impact of the effects we are about to describe. (Easton 1996)

 

There is some evidence that the wage distribution became more unequal. However its impact on the household distribution is unclear.[25] (Dixon 1998)

 

7: Explaining Changes in the Level of Inequality: Social Influences

 

Dean Hyslop and David Maré (2003) carried out a careful analysis of changes in the distribution of Gross Household Income (that is before income taxes are deducted).[26] They use five indicators of inequality for three periods: 1983-6, 1989-93, 1995-98.

 

They examined five effects whose change might be expected to impact on the level of inequality: household structure, National Superannuation, household attributes employment outcomes and economic returns to factors of production. Collectively they explain about half the total change.[27] Here is (part of) Hyslop and Marés conclusion.

 

Our analysis shows that the changes in the distribution of income involved a complex set of factors which are difficult to summarise using a single measure of inequality. Examining income inequality across all households, we find that the main factors which contributed to the change in inequality were changes in family and household structure (primarily a pronounced drop in the fraction of two parent households and a rise in the fraction of sole parent households), and changes in the socio-demographic attributes of households. These factors each explain one-sixth of the total increase in the Gini coefficient [of Gross income] over the period, and up to one-third and one-half (respectively) of other measures of inequality. … our results show that changes in the employment outcomes of households had a more modest impact on income inequality. However, within household types, we find that employment changes do have a large effect on the observed change in income inequality. Finally, we find little evidence of any systematic effects of changes in the economic returns to socio-demographic attributes on the distribution of household income and inequality.

 

(The failure to get purchase from the unemployment variable may be surprising, but may reflect timing.)

 

8. Explaining Changes in the Level of Inequality: Redistribution

 

As it happens, the rise in income inequality between 1985 and 1993 is associated with some of the most dramatic changes in redistribution between income levels that New Zealand has experienced.[28] Top income tax rates were cut, while the removal of tax exemptions and the introduction of GST imposed more heavily upon those on lower incomes. Additionally there were savage cuts in benefit levels in 1991 while union power to maintain and increase real wages was weakened. These largely explain the change in inequality in that period.

 

There have been subsequent changes in tax and benefit levels, but none apparently dramatic enough to disturb greatly the income distribution. There is one exception.

 

It is clear from Table 2 that the relative share of the bottom quintile fell from the late 1990s. Their real incomes rose but more slowly than average incomes. There seem to have been three reasons. First, benefits were increased in line with prices rather than wages, so beneficiaries did not share in the rising real wages. Second, they were not entitled to the working-for-families in work tax credit, which benefited those in immediately higher deciles.[29] Third, many beneficiaries were unable to take advantage of the booming labour market of the late 1990s and early 2000 to find jobs. It is true that the level of top income taxes fell further, but apparently not enough to markedly change the after-tax share of the rich.

 

In summary, we know that the change in redistributional policies had the major impact on income inequality, but so did changes in the market income of the top 1 percent. Probably they contributed about equally to the rise in the share of the top 10 percent of households. Cyclical changes in unemployment levels had some smaller but perceptible effect (unfortunately they are most important at the very time the biggest changes in redistribution and top income rising shares happened, and they may obscure the length of the transition). We dont have a lot of evidence about the effects of market prices including wages.

 

9. International Comparisons: 2009

 

In recent years the OECD has compiled comparable Gini coefficients for all its members, although not for every year.[30] Table 5 shows the ranking for the average of the 2008 to 2010 years (recall the coefficient is not an ideal measure of inequality – none exists).[31] (The adjusting is explained and interpreted below.)

 

There is a major caveat to the tabulations for they use exactly the same equivalence scales for all countries. However true equivalence scales will reflect differences in market prices. The differences can be dramatic as I found when I valued the same basket of goods and services in New York and New Zealand prices. It generate quite different equivalence scales. The most obvious reasons for this was the cost of housing with additional rooms (for children) in New York being far more expensive than New Zealand, so that the New York scale showed weaker economies of scale for household expenditures.[32]  (Easton 1973N) We do not know what the effect of using country specific equivalence scales would be on the rankings in Table 5.

 

Table 5: Gini Coefficient for Household Income Distribution: 2008-2010

Rank by

Unadjusted

Adjusted

Inequality Country

Gini Score

Country

Gini Score

Most Chile

0.508

Chile

0.459

2 Mexico

0.471

Luxembourg

0.392

3 Turkey

0.411

Mexico

0.389

4 United States

0.379

Israel

0.369

5 Israel

0.373

United States

0.362

6 Portugal

0.345

Australia

0.348

7 United Kingdom

0.343

Ireland

0.345

8 Japan

0.336

Iceland

0.336

9 Australia

0.335

New Zealand

0.336

10 Greece

0.332

Switzerland

0.333

11  Spain

0.329

Portugal

0.333

12 New Zealand

0.317

Turkey

0.333

13 Canada

0.320

Greece

0.331

14 Estonia

0.316

United Kingdom

0.329

15 Italy

0.315

Canada

0.322

16-17 Average

0.313

Estonia

0.315

Korea

0.313

Spain

0.315

Ireland

0.312

Average

0.313

18 Poland

0.305

Japan

0.306

19 Switzerland

0.298

Norway

0.303

20 France

0.296

Netherlands

0.303

21 Germany

0.287

Italy

0.297

22 Netherlands

0.286

Austria

0.289

23 Luxembourg

0.278

Sweden

0.284

24 Hungary

0.272

Korea

0.284

25 Iceland

0.270

France

0.281

26 Sweden

0.266

Finland

0.281

27 Austria

0.265

Belgium

0.276

28 Belgium

0.261

Denmark

0.272

29 Slovak Republic

0.260

 Germany

0.272

30 Finland

0.258

Slovenia

0.260

31 Czech Republic

0.255

Poland

0.254

32 Norway

0.248

Slovak Republic

0.250

33 Denmark

0.244

Hungary

0.246

Least Slovenia

0.243

Czech Republic

0.245

Source: OECD Income Distribution and Poverty http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=IDD (1 August 2013)

 

The third column shows that in about 2009 New Zealand was 14th to most unequal among the 34 countries on the OECD list. Thus it is in the top half of the list. While the country may appear to be only a little above the average Gini coefficient score (0.317 versus 0.313), that amounts to almost an 11 percent larger coefficient of variation.

 

The ranking in the list is higgledy-piggledy, not least because the level of inequality is affected by population size (a population of one has no inequality) and affluence (high income economies tend to be more equal than low income ones). The fifth column adjusts for this – in effect assuming that all countries have the same sized population and GDP per capita.[33]

 

We can now see a pattern in the column. At the bottom are the five East-Central economies which had been in the Soviet sphere of influence before 1991.[34] Above them are the remaining continental Europeans with the ‘Club Meds’ more unequal. Scattered among them are Japan and Korea. Higher (more unequal) are the Anglos – Canada, United Kingdom, New Zealand, Ireland, Australia and United States mainly above the average and at the top in inequality terms are the Latinos and Middle East.[35] In summary:

 

MORE UNEQUAL

Latinos & Middle East

Anglos

Club Meds

Northern Continental Europeans & North East Asia

East-Central Europeans.

LESS UNEQUAL

 

New Zealand is the middle of the Anglos, more unequal than Canada and the United Kingdom. In 2009 it was certainly in the top half of the OECD (as it was in the unadjusted ranking).

 

9. Distributional Measures in a National Account Framework

 

A new, and potentially fruitful, development has been the OECD’s Working Party on National Accounts developing ‘Distributional Measures Across Household Groups in A National Accounts Framework’ published in September 2013.[36]

 

A major effort has been to ensure international comparability in income and expenditure measure by anchoring them into national accounts concept. This involves realigning the numbers reported in household surveys. The surveys are known to under-report some items (notoriously alcohol consumption).[37] National Accounts estimate usually estimate the items independently (say from production, imports and sales in the case of alcoholic beverages). They do so based on agreed international standards. In principle then the aggregates are more comparable internationally and so would be the household distributions following realignment.[38] However the adjustments probably may not have a lot of impact on domestic comparisons over time, although the may affect levels (shares).[39]

 

The preliminary work involves only eight countries: France, Italy, Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand and Slovenia (for various years between 2003 to 2010). This is really too few to make much of an assessment but the basic impression is that New Zealand’s ranking is similar to that in Table 5, a little above the middle.[40] Interestingly in the small sample New Zealand’s poor seem to have relatively high expenditures on health and housing. [41]

 

10. Changes in Inequality Internationally 1985-2009

 

Unfortunately there are Gini coefficients for only 17 countries in about 1985. (Table 6)

 

New Zealand proves to be below average among these 17 countries in about 1985.[42] Making the reasonable assumptions that those for which we have not got data behave similarly to those for which we have, New Zealand income inequality was in the bottom half of the OECD.

 

Table 6: Gini Coefficient for Household Income Distribution: 1983-1987

Rank by

Unadjusted

Adjusted

Inequality Country

Gini Score

Country

Gini Score

Most Mexico

0.452

Mexico

0.528

2 Turkey

0.434

Turkey

0.454

3 Greece

0.345

United States

0.387

4 United States

0.338

Israel

0.382

5 Israel

0.326

Greece

0.362

6 United Kingdom

0.309

Luxembourg

0.325

7 Japan

0.304

United Kingdom

0.325

8 Canada

0.294

Canada

0.302

Average

0.293

Average

0.301

9 Italy

0.287

Japan

0.297

10 Netherlands

0.272

New Zealand

0.294

11 New Zealand

0.271

Italy

0.271

12 Germany

0.251

Netherlands

0.262

13 Luxembourg

0.247

Germany

0.209

14 Denmark

0.223

Norway

0.212

15 Norway

0.222

Denmark

0.182

16 Finland

0.209

Finland

0.177

Least Sweden

0.198

Sweden

0.169

Source: OECD Income Distribution and Poverty http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=IDD (1 August 2013)

 

Perhaps we can be more precise. The likelihood is that New Zealand was about 20th out of the current 34 in the mid-1980s. Twenty-five years later it was 9th.[43] Its Gini-coefficient moved from an adjusted 0.294 to 0.336 equivalent to a 47 percent increase in the coefficient of variation. The other 16 countries moved an average of 31 percent.

 

It is true that on the available data, New Zealand had the greatest increase in income inequality in the decade to 1995 (among rich countries for which we have data), but it would be foolish to assume that was true over the next two decades. Sweden’s coefficient of variation more than doubled over the period, but this was from an exceptionally low level in 1983 to a low-to-moderate one in 2009 (when Sweden was ranked 23rd on the list, which now included the East-Central European economies).[44]

 

Indeed as already reported in regard to the 17 countries and confirmed by a more detailed OECD study, the general level of income inequality in the OECD has been trending (roughly linearly) upward over the period. (Perry 2013:171) The New Zealand income inequality (measured by the Gini coefficient) has been broadly steady since the mid-1990s. As a result its level has been converging towards the OECD mean (from above) but has yet to reach it.

 

Why the trend increase in OECD mean inequality? Three reasons come readily to mind. One is that the increasing political power of the plutocracy has resulted in blunting the application of redistributional policies. A second is that globalisation has increased the international mobility of (especially) higher paid labour and countries have felt compelled to lower top tax rates to discourage their movement. Given the middle class hunger for public goods, such as public health care, any government spending cuts consequent on the lower tax-take result in lower benefits for the poor. Additionally the financial sector boom has increased inequality in those countries with a significant international financial sector.

 

12. What Happened Before 1985?

 

We do not know what happened to the household income distribution before 1982 because there is no suitable data base.[45]

 

There is more data on the personal income distribution. The census data reported in Table 3 suggests there was a tendency for inequality in personal market incomes of Non-Maori to be stable in the interwar period (at least in the handful of years which are available for the story during the Great Depression may be different).

 

After 1951 market (and subsequently market plus social security) incomes fell through until 1981. The census data is consistent with Easton (1983) which explored a wide range of data from various sources, that concluded that the evidence points to the personal income distribution narrowing in the post-war era to 1981.

 

However, the personal income distribution does not map simply into the household distribution. Among the important complications in the postwar era are the diminishing size of households as the fertility rate fell, the greater variation in household size and composition (including the rising share of single adult with children families) and the increasing proportion of mothers in the paid workforce.[46]

 

An attempt has been made to estimate an indicator of inequality going as far back as 1921 based on the shares of income among taxpayers, especially of the top 1 percent. (Atkinson & Leigh 2007a, 2007b) Unfortunately the series is not consistent over time.[47] Not all personal income was taxed (especially before 1938), while the rising numbers of earning women in the postwar era changes the proportion of adults who are taxpayers.

 

Historical narratives based on the series can be very unsatisfactory.[48] However, as Robert Solow observed, addicted gamblers will play a roulette wheel they know to be biased because it is the only one available.

 

13. What Happened After the Global Financial Crisis?

 

Suppose that the data distortions from the Canterbury earthquakes occur only in the 2011 year.[49] The preliminary indication is that the Global Financial Crisis impacted more on top disposable incomes than bottom ones, so that there was some reduction in household income inequality.

 

This was despite the post GFC income tax changes being biased towards the rich and despite some tightening of benefit entitlements. The probable explanation is that returns on investment fell (or alternately that they were over-elevated before the crisis struck) while unemployment has not been too heavily affected by the downturn (in New Zealand, but not everywhere).

 

14. Poverty Measurement

 

Systematic studies in poverty in New Zealand began in the 1970s with Peter Cuttance’s pioneering survey of large families. (Cuttance 1974) A comprehensive survey of the state of poverty research would be bigger than this survey on economic inequality. This section focuses on the insights the measurement of poverty sheds onto economic inequality generally.

The proportion of the population in poverty below some (equivalised) income level can be thought of as a measure of inequality. It is, of course, no more definitive than any other indicator and, like each of the others, it reflects the purpose for which it is being used. If the concern is the power of the plutocracy, a measure such as the share of the top one percent is more useful; if the concern is the deprivation of opportunities for future generations, the proportion of the young in poverty is more relevant.

 

Defining the poverty threshold has not been easy, in part because of the New Zealand tendency to ignore what has gone on before rather than engage in a scholarly dialogue of research and analysis.[50] A useful foundation for discussing poverty is the report of the 1972 Royal Commission on Social Security. While it did not directly address a suitable level, its deliberations while setting the social security benefit level apply.

 

The Commission argued that the aims of the social security system should be:

(i) First, to enable everyone to sustain life and health;

(ii) Second, to ensure, within limitations which may be imposed by physical or other disabilities, that everyone is able to enjoy a standard of living much like that of the rest of the community, and thus is able to feel a sense of participation in and belonging to the community. (Royal Commission 1972:65, original’s italics.) [51]

 

The first aim is a statement that people should not be in ‘absolute’ poverty. The second is that they should not be in ‘relative’ poverty, a version of the moral argument that the need for social coherence requires that those at the bottom should share in the rising prosperity of the community as a whole.

 

A poverty threshold can be derived from the empathetic but frugal Commission’s deliberations, since it would have set the benefit level close to, if not on, the threshold. In practice early research used the benefit level for a married couple as the benchmark.

 

How to update a relative poverty threshold? Obviously it needs to be increased with inflation but what to do about changing living standards? The first known attempt to do this argued for increasing the poverty threshold as mean incomes increased. (Easton 1980) But for some reason, the median income became more popular because – it was claimed – it was more reliable when the upper tail of the distribution was poorly measured.[52] Unfortunately the resulting poverty threshold is sensitive to redistributional policy, sometimes in paradoxical ways.

 

Consider the following income distribution for three individuals: 4,10, 16. Suppose the poverty threshold (the proportion in poverty is another measure of inequality) is defined as 50 percent of the median. The median income is 10 in this case, so the poverty threshold is 5 and one of the three individuals is in poverty.

 

Now suppose that 2 units are transferred from the middle individual to the top individual; the distribution is now 4, 8, 18. The median income falls to 8, the poverty threshold is now 4 and nobody is below it. Paradoxically an increase in inequality by transferring income from the middle to the rich eliminates poverty according to a definition based on median incomes.

 

This is not just a theoretical possibility. The changes in tax and benefits in the late 1980s and early 1990s had exactly this impact so, according to the median-based measure, poverty fell – much to the public delight of the inegalitarians – despite objective evidence that New Zealand’s poor were suffering from greater economic stress as their incomes fell. (Easton 2002)

 

There have been attempts to provide other measures of poverty thresholds. One involved asking focus groups (selections of people with chosen characteristics) from lower incomes what they thought the thresholds should be.[53] One would like to report that the conclusion was a level similar to that recommended by the Royal Commission. That was true in the case of two adult-three child households but not for the one adult-two child group. In fact the proposed thresholds for the two groups were not rationally coherent. (Stephens, Waldegrave & Frater 1995; Easton 1997) This may explain why subsequently the research group seems to have abandoned the focus group approach and used a proportion of the median instead. (From the frying pan into the fire.)

 

One other significant attempt to estimate a poverty threshold, albeit implicitly, was by a visiting American scholar who used American-based methods that had been abandoned by the Royal Commission almost two decades earlier. The proposed ‘minimum adequate’ income for benefit levels, funded by Treasury, became the foundation for the savage budget cuts of 1991. (Brashares 1993; Easton 1995)

 

The cuts heralded a new way of thinking about benefit levels and hence of poverty (or perhaps a reversion to a very old way). In effect the Royal Commission’s principle of relative poverty was abandoned to be replaced by absolute poverty, sufficient to enable the sustaining of life and health (some would argue that even that is not met by current benefit levels) but not sufficient to enable people to feel a sense of participation in and belonging to the community. Since 1991 the benefit level has been increased with consumer prices but not with real incomes.[54] Inevitably, as we saw from Table 1, the income share of the bottom quintile fell.

 

To analyse this a little more closely we use the poverty threshold in the MSD study – 60% of the 1998 median which is constant in real terms over time. (Many would think this threshold is too low.[55]) The estimate is shown in column 5 of Table 2. (Perry 2013) In the 1980s the percentage below the threshold was in the low teens. The 1991 benefit cuts almost doubled the percentage to the mid-20s, but from the mid-1990s it fell back to below the 1980s level; in 2012 (the last available year) it was about 6 percent.

 

However this is conceptually an absolute level of poverty; a threshold that is fixed in real terms does not allow for the poor sharing in prosperity. Column 6 of Table 2 illustrates what happens with a relative poverty threshold which parallels changes in average standards of living. In the period from 1982 to 1997 the mean of equivalised household income was broadly flat albeit with some decline to 1994. It is assumed that in such depressed circumstances the threshold is not changed, that is, the poor do not share the pressure of a short downturn.[56] (Easton 1980) After 1997 living standards, as measured by equivalised household income, rose steadily through to 2009 (by about 2.4% p.a.) A relative poverty level assumes that the poverty threshold rose in parallel. Average incomes have been broadly stagnant since 2009 so the threshold is maintained at its 2009 level.

 

The story of proportions in poverty, told in column 6 of Table 2, remains the same until 1997 because the threshold is the same.[57] After that the relative poverty proportions do not fall as much as in the absolute poverty case, and remain in the high (rather than low) teens. One might conclude that on this measure there was higher (relative) poverty after 2000 than there was before 1990. On that measure income inequality also increased.

 

The next step is to ask whether it matters to be in poverty. In what way do those on low incomes have life experiences different from those with higher incomes? Any answer requires an analysis of the whole of the distribution. Data bases which assist answering such questions have only recently come available and are yet to be fully exploited. (Perry 2012: Sections K, L) They are likely to show that disposable income is a useful indicator of life experiences and hardship, but there are other important factors (some of which can be influenced by policy) including education, health, household assets, housing and urban/rural location,

 

15. Distribution by Social Groups

 

Social groups are not randomly scattered through income distribution but tend to cluster in particular parts of it. The New Zealand research has focussed on who the poor are and on the ethnic distributions.[58]

 

In addition to drawing attention to the poverty issue and to tracing changes in the income distribution over time, a significant analytic use of poverty numbers is to identify who are among the poor, The conclusion, first identified in the mid-1970s and elaborated since, still has not been entirely absorbed by the conventional wisdom. It tends to think of the typical poor as a brown solo mother, with many children, living on the benefit in rental accommodation.

 

In fact the majority of the poor are couples with jobs, with some – but not a lot of – children living in their own home albeit with a mortgage. (Because the New Zealand Superannuation benefit level has tended to be above the poverty threshold, the stereotype that the New Zealand poor contain a lot of elderly has almost disappeared; Overseas the minimum public provision for the elderly is often less generous.[59]) The proportion in poverty is higher among solo parents, those without jobs, living in rental accommodation; the proportion of the poor with a brown ethnicity is higher but there are fewer of them. (More women than men are poor.)

 

What the conventional wisdom has confused is that while a higher proportion of a particular category, say solo mothers, may be in poverty, the numbers of poor are this proportion times the total numbers in the category. Thus there may be more poor in a group with a lower prevalence but a larger total number.

 

The salient conclusion from the research is that over 80 percent of the poor are children and their parents (and others in their households) and that proportionately more children are in poverty than adults (especially excluding parents).[60]

 

It is well established that the brown ethnicities tend to be over represented among the poor.[61]  Mean Maori equivalised household incomes were 90 percent of average incomes in 2012 and Pasifika ones were 89 percent. (European/Pakeha ones were 107.5 percent.) However there may well be factors other than ethnicity which explain whole or part of the differences. For instance, a high proportion of the incarcerated are Maori, but this is in part of due to their younger age distribution. Allow for that and the proportion comes down (but is still higher than the Pakeha incarceration rate). The same applies to unemployment, which like incarceration is more concentrated among young adults.[62] Part, but not all, of the lower incomes of those with brown ethnicity may be due to the population being younger and having more children. This is rarely investigated.

 

There is a curious feature of income trends over time, summarised in Table 5.

 

Table 7: Equivalised Median Household Income by Ethnicity

$2012 prices

Ethnicity

1988

2012

Change

European/Pakeha

28000

35800

27.9%

Maori

23200

30000

29.3%

Pasifika

22700

29800

31.3%

ALL

26700

33300

24.7%

Source: Perry op cit, p.80.

 

Apparently over the 24 years the median income of each group has risen faster that the median for all ethnic groups. This may be a peculiarity of medians. But it also may reflect the changing shares of the categories if, say, the brown share of the population had risen relative to the Pakeha one.[63]

 

Discussions on ethnic inequality are disappointing.[64] They tend to draw attention to some aspects of the inter-ethnic inequality but do little deeper analysis.[65]

 

A particular problem for analysts arises from changes in pricing. To illustrate suppose free schooling for children was withdrawn but families were given exactly the same allowance as an income grant. They would not be markedly better off, but their disposable income would seem to have risen. Their equivalised income should not.[66]

 

Over time, the household equivalence scales should be regularly updated. They are not. (Easton 2006) An even trickier problem arises when the government subsidises the service for some groups rather than others (e.g. free visits to general practitioners for the young). Ad hoc attempts to assess their overall impact suggest the effect is not great although they matter a lot to those in need.[67] (Easton 1996, 1999)

 

16. The Dynamics of Inequality

 

Income inequality would not matter so much if for each period one was randomly assigned to an income level so that, for instance, those in the bottom decile had as good a chance as anyone else of being in the top one next time. In reality a major determinant of income in one period is the past record of income. But to what extent is this the case?

 

A study by John Creedy (1997b) based on personal income tax data came to the conclusion that ‘the present value, over the age 20 to age 65, displays less inequality than in any single year’. One would be surprised if this was not true, although it is well to be reminded. However the result arises from simulation – the data base is for only three years – whereas it is possible – if unable to be tested – that the auto-correlations of incomes involve much longer lags. So the specific quantitative results are not decisive.

 

Also using income tax data, Harry Smith and Robert Templeton (1990) found that 25 percent of those in the bottom quintile were in a higher quintile a year later, while seven years later some 45 percent were. Note, however, this includes shifts from being a low-paid student to full-time well-paid employment. It also includes those who moved from the very top of the bottom quintile to the very bottom of the second bottom quintile. The relative income gains may be trivial.

 

The Survey of Family, Income and Employment (SoFIE) followed a sample of households over seven ‘waves’ (years), so it is possible to track the change in relative income over the period.

 

Kirstie Carter and Fiona Imlach Gunasekara (2012, Table 5) measure the shifts between quintiles. Some 45 percent of those in the bottom quintile remain there six years later. Over 80 percent were below the median income. In contrast 54 percent of those in the top were still there, and 84 percent of them were above the median income six years later. Whether this is a high or low level of immobility is a value judgement but, given all the potential life events that can occur in six years which might have the potential to disturb an (equivalised) household income, one is inclined to think there is considerable inertia.

 

Bryan Perry (2013:194-197) points out the New Zealand experience is not greatly different from that of other rich countries. His calculations suggest that about two-thirds of the change occurs in the first year, and shifts over the following years are much smaller. This may suggest that while some households temporarily change quintiles to revert the following year, longer term change is not great, and often the result of a life event.

 

Perry distinguishes those in ‘current’ poverty from those in ‘chronic’ poverty with average annual income over the seven waves being below the poverty line. He concludes there is considerable persistence:

– in any wave, around half are in both chronic poverty and current poverty, the other half being only in current poverty (i.e. more temporary or transient poverty)

– the people in this more transient group change a lot over seven waves, which is why it turns out that the number in low income at least once in seven waves is more than double the number in low income at any one time

– in addition to those identified as being in current poverty in a wave there is another one in five (i.e. 3% of the whole population (20% of 15%)) who are in chronic but not current poverty

– for children, 60% of those in current poverty are also in chronic poverty, and there are another one in five in chronic but not current poverty at each wave

– very similar findings have been produced for the UK and Australia. (Perry 2013:199-201)

 

If a higher poverty threshold than the 50 percent of median equivalised income is used here (60 percent is preferred by some commentators), the proportions quoted here will be on the low side.

 

The issue of intergenerational dynamics is hardly explored. We know that children from homes with lower incomes are likely to be sicker and get inferior education and training than those from homes with higher incomes. The quantitative extent to which this translates into inferior life opportunities is not known.

 

17. Income and Health

 

Suzie Ballantyne (Carson) and the author found an association between health status and income, illustrated by Table 6.

 

Table 8: Proportions in Quintiles Who Rate Themselves as ‘Fair’ or ‘Poor’ Health

Household Quintiles

 

ALL

Age Group

Bottom

2

Middle

4

Top

15 Under Female

7.4

3.6

2.9

3.1

1.2

4.5

Under 15 Male

5.8

5.8

3.4

3.0

3.1

4.7

15-64 Female

10.7

11.0

8.7

7.2

3.9

7.9

15-64 Male

10.2

8.3

7.4

4.2

3.8

6.2

Over 65 Female

42.5

29.4

27.5

22.3

21.2

26.5

Over 65 Male

40.2

29.8

25.2

21.3

19.4

25.5

ALL

9.3

11.0

11.0

7.0

4.8

8.6

Source: Easton & Ballantyne (2002) Chapter 9.

 

The general pattern is that in any given age group, those in the lower income quintiles are in poorer health than those in the higher income quintiles.

 

Note that as age increases health status deteriorates, and that after the age of 15 women tend to report being in poorer health than do men. This generates an apparent anomaly in the aggregate pattern, with those in a household in the second to bottom and middle quartiles prone to poorer health than those at the bottom. This is because the age groups are not equally distributed through the quintiles. Because the elderly are concentrated more in the second and middle quintiles, and because they are more likely to be sick, those quintiles report the highest incidence of sickness for the population as a whole.

 

That there is an association does not prove causation. Indeed it is possible that the causation is in either direction. A history of poor health may reduce current income. On the other hand low income may cause poor health via inadequate spending on food and other health-promoting but standard consumer products (especially inadequate housing) or on health care. This data does not tell us which mechanism is working – probably both are.

 

Research at the University of Otago’s Wellington school of Medicine has observed that the incidence of tuberculosis, other infection diseases and acute rheumatic fever and TB is higher in areas (Census Area Unit) with lower incomes. (Baker et al 2008, Baker et al 2012, Jaine et al 2004)

 

18. Wealth

 

Wealth is the stock which generates the flow of income. The focus tends to be on physical assets (such as housing) and financial assets (such as shares and bank deposits). Additionally there is human capital which generates labour market income; there may also be state entitlements such as eligibility for social security and New Zealand superannuation, which also generate a flow of income for some.[68]

 

Measuring the distribution of wealth is not easy; once more it depends on the data sources. An early attempt to measure physical and financial wealth used returns of estates reported for death duties, treating the wealth of those who have died as a random sample of the living. Since wealth varies over the life cycle it is necessary to treat each age group separately; ideally there needs also to be an adjustment for those with wealth having a lower mortality than those without, although that has not been practical. In any case the growing practice of exempting the joint family home wrecked the method, since it meant the reported dead person was not representative of the living whenever there was a surviving spouse.

 

The estimates which may be least criticised give the following general conclusions for 1956 and 1966:

– physical and financial wealth is much more concentrated than personal income;

– there is a life cycle to wealth holdings, but even within each age cohort, wealth is very unequally distributed;

– the main form of this wealth holding is housing.

None of these conclusions are particularly surprising. (Easton 1983: Ch 7) [69]

 

A more recent and refined estimate came from SoFIE which in 2003/04 asked individuals the value of their assets, liabilities and net worth.[70] (Cheung 2007)

 

Again it found that the vast majority of the adult population had little physical and financial wealth – about 6.5 percent of them had negative net worth, although this may be dominated by student debt. Conversely 1 percent of adults had 16.4 percent of total wealth, the same as about 70 percent of the population.[71] Again the study shows a marked life cycle in net worth, peaking at about the age of 60.

 

There is not a lot of gender inequality, but each Pakeha owns about 2.6 times that of the other ethnic groups. One of the report’s curious findings is that Auckland wealth levels are markedly below those of the rest of the country; we do not know the extent to which age and ethnic factors drag them down. The report illustrates that a lot of material is available at the unit record level, but alas it has not been exploited, so we cannot be sure the extent to which other variables mask the true correlations.[72]

 

A subsequent publication adds to the earlier report. (Statistics New Zealand 2008) While a couple with two dependent children has higher median net worth than a family with one dependent child, those with three or more children have less than those with two. The same applies for one parent families. Because of the way the data is presented it is not possible to make an exact comparison but a family with two parents certainly averages more than twice as much net worth as a single adult family – probably four times as much. (SNZ 2008: Tables 2 & 3, pp.7 & 8) The pattern for the mean (average) is not quite as regular. However there may be intervening variables.

 

19. Housing

 

While owner-occupied housing is a part of total wealth, it is unusual because it does not generate cash income for the owner (and hence itds income effect is not directly measured). Instead it saves expenditure. Thus two otherwise identical households with the same cash income may have very different standards of living if one is servicing a crushingly heavy mortgage while the other is mortgage free. How to allow for this?

 

A common adjustment is to deduct housing costs from the income. Since one element constitutes expenditure and the other constitutes income, this must be conceptually confused. Moreover the same household equivalent scale is applied whether the measure is before or after housing costs. That is surely nonsensical since the main reason for economies of scale that the household equivalence scale is adjusting for is housing; a larger family does not need proportionally as much housing – double its size and one does not double the number of kitchens, laundries and so on.

 

Suzie Ballantyne and the author suggested an alternative conceptually robust procedure in which an income was imputed to a household reflecting the difference between average household outlays (based on household characteristics) and actual outlays. We concluded

 

… adjusting for housing circumstance reinforces the inequalities in household type, benefiting the groups who are generally better off. This is not surprising. Because of the taxation advantages – the return on capital invested in owner-occupied housing is not taxed to the extent of other investments, including rental housing – the wealthy are likely to invest in their own accommodation. Additionally, there is a life cycle effect. Households with children owning a house are likely to have higher outlays than if they were renting because they are still paying off a mortgage. The households benefit later in life on the lower outlays of freehold owner-occupier housing (by which time the children will have probably left). (Easton & Ballantyne 2002: Chs 3,7)

 

While this approach has not been generally taken up, neither have the conceptual inadequacies of ignoring differences in housing circumstances or of deducting housing expenditure for income been addressed.

 

Housing well illustrates the lamppost problem. There is considerable anxiety about house ownership, the proportion of which has been falling. Despite it being obvious that there is a home ownership life cycle, until recently there was no data. Too often researchers and commentators have been left with the lamppost of the aggregate proportion across the life cycle.

 

The historical experience has been that since the Great Depression, proportionally more homes have been owned (with and without mortgage) by their occupiers. (Schrader 2013) However the proportion has been falling off since the 1986 census. It is too easy to attribute this to the rising income inequality. However there has been demographic change and there may well have been a shift to people owning a home in one location but living elsewhere while renting. There has also been social change. The impression is that the younger generation is generally settling down later than their parents and grandparents, more often in their thirties.[73] That probably means they prefer renting to ownership in their twenties. We do not know how much this (and the changing accommodation choices of the elderly[74]) explain the falling proportion of ownership.[75]

 

20. Inequality and Growth

 

It is conventional to interpret per capita constant price GDP (or better still national income) in welfare terms, ignoring the distributional impact of any gains (or losses) of output. Thus there is exactly the same outcome if the all gains go to the very rich as if the gains are shared equally among everybody. Sen suggested an alternative measure which he called ‘real national income’, which takes into account the distributional impact of changes. (Sen 1976; 1979) Ultimately it deducts from national income a share, measured by the Gini coefficient, to reflect the degree of inequality.

 

Thus while per capita National Income in constant prices (adjusted for the additional spending power arising from improving terms of trade) rose at a trend rate of 1.66 percent p.a. between 1982 and 2012, Sen’s real national income rose only 1.34 percent p.a. because of the rise in income inequality. In effect the additional inequality cost New Zealand almost a fifth on Sen’s measure. (Easton 2013C)

 

More generally, there is little evidence that inequality generates faster growth (on the conventional measure of output or GDP). High per capita economies tend to have lower inequality although the causal processes and directions are not well understood.

 

21. Epilogue: Towards Policy Responses

 

Those who were not there may find the extremism of the New Zealand government’s economic and social policy in the 1980s almost unbelievable. It had many aspects to it but relevant to this paper was a seminal shift away from the egalitarianism of the post-war era as the basis for policy to downgrading fairness and hence accepting considerably higher levels of inequality. It is unclear how conscious this abandonment was.

 

The New Zealand way tends to be policy without analysis. As André Siegfried said a century ago, New Zealanders’

outlook, not too carefully reasoned, and no doubtful scornful of scientific thought, makes them incapable of self-distrust. Like almost all men of action they have a contempt for theories: yet they are often captured by the first theory that turns up, if it is demonstrated to them with an appearance of logic sufficient to impose upon them. In most cases they do not seem to see difficulties, and they propose simple solutions for the most complex problems with astonishing audacity. (Siegfried, 1992:54)

 

Too often the simple solution fails, but by that time the proponent has retired, been promoted or moved on to another complex problem so that no one is ever held to account for the failure (especially given that retrospective evaluation of policy is rare, so policy makers cannot learn from failure).

 

Rather than propose some simple solutions to poorly formulated problems, this epilogue draws attention to two classes of policy responses if excessive economic inequality is judged to be requiring attention.

 

The classical policy response is redistribution, that is, the use of taxation, transfers and subsidies to move resources from those with more to those with less. Since the rise in inequality a quarter of a century ago can be mainly attributed to regressive changes in distributional policy, the simple policy is to reverse those changes. It is, of course more complex than that but …

 

The second policy response is predistribution, which is the notion that the state should try to prevent inequalities in market incomes occurring in the first place rather than ameliorate inequalities through redistribution. (Hacker 2011) Although the term has only come into prominence recently, the idea is a long held one, insofar as numerous traditional interventions in education, health care, housing and training, can be seen as precursors. It can be extended to wages, as British Labour leader Ed Miliband has recently proposed; it could be applied to the current government’s proposals to shift beneficiaries into the labour force. Indeed, the term is so loose it may be used for just about any policy with distributional implications, effective or otherwise (and therefore is an ideal notion for New Zealand policy pragmatists).

 

However, we have seen that there is not a simple relationship between personal market incomes and household market incomes. The relationship is so complex that it is not impossible that reducing inequality in personal incomes could increase inequality in household incomes partly because children may not be a beneficiary and partly because higher incomes for supplementary earners which would add to already well of households.

 

Nevertheless, predistribution focuses on the options when distributional policy has been fine tuned as much as practicalities allow. Over the last quarter century we have become more alert to the disincentive and perverse incentive effects of redistribution (which seem to have been magnified by globalisation – the greater international mobility of capital and skilled labour). Other measures which shift social inequality in the desired direction should not be ignored.

 

But predistributional policies need to work with effective distributional polices not replace them, especially as they often have an investment element which makes them fiscally expensive in the short run.

 

Prior to that, those who command policy – whether effectively or ineffectively – have to decide to what extent reducing (or increasing) economic inequality is a policy objective. Is New Zealand satisfied with shifting from a low inequality to a high inequality society? What would its founding nineteenth century migrants have thought about the fact that, after allowing for each country’s size and affluence, New Zealand is now more unequal than the countries they left? And what would those who invited them here have thought had they known their descendants would be firmly at the bottom end of the unequal distributions?

 

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Schrader, B. (2010) ‘Housing – Tenure’, Te Ara – the Encyclopedia of New Zealand

http://www.TeAra.govt.nz/housing-tenure

Sen, A. (1976). ‘Real national income’, The Review of Economic Studies, 43 (1), 19-39.

Sen, A. (1979). ‘The welfare basis of real income comparisons’, Journal of Economic Literature, 17 (1), 1-45.

Sen, A. (2009) The Idea of Justice (London, Penguin)

Skeptic’s Play (2013) The Gini Coefficient of Log Normal Wealth,

http://skepticsplay.blogspot.co.nz/2013/03/the-Gini-coefficient-of-log-normal.html

Smith, H. & R. Templeton (1990) A Longitudinal Study of Incomes Statistics New Zealand

Siegfried, A. (1904, 1992)) Democracy in New Zealand

Statistics New Zealand (2001) Household Savings Survey

Statistics New Zealand (2008) Family Net Worth in New Zealand

Stephens, R., P. Frater & C. Waldegrave(1995) ‘Measuring Poverty: Some Rebuttals of Easton.’ Social Policy Journal of New Zealand 9 December:

Stephens, R., P. Frater & C. Waldegrave (1997) ‘Measuring Poverty in New Zealand.’ Social Policy Journal of New Zealand 5, December:

Stephens, R., C. Waldegrave & P. Frater (1995) ‘Measuring Poverty in New Zealand’ Social Policy Journal of New Zealand 5 December:88-112.

Stiglitz, J. E. (2012) The Price of Inequality (NY, Norton)

Stiglitz, J. E. (2013) ‘Inequality is Holding Back the Recovery’ New York Times 19 January, 2013.

Stroombergen, A. D. Rose & J. Miller J (Aug. 1995) Wealth Accumulation and Distribution: Analysis with a Dynamic Microsimulation Model (Wellington, BERL)

Wade, R. (2103) Inequality and the West (Wellington, BWB)

Waldegrave, C., S. Stuart & R. Stephens (1996) ‘Participation in Poverty Research: Drawing on the knowledge of low-income householders to establish an appropriate measure for monitoring social policy impacts.’ Social Policy Journal of New Zealand 7

Wilkinson, R. & K. Pickett (2009)The Spirit Level: Why More Equal Societies Almost Always Do Better (London, Allen Lane)

 

Endnotes

 

[1] I am grateful for helpful comments from Warwick Armstrong, Micahel Baker, Geoff Bertram, Elizabeth Caffin, Charles Crothers, Jeff Cope, Margaret Galt, Diane Owenga, Susan St John, Sandra Watson and some people who asked not to be named.

[2] Rhetoricians with policy agendas will claim there is a crisis and propose their policy as a solution or partial solution to, say, the change in the level of inequality even though there is no apparent connection between the two. The classic political analysis of crisis politics is Democracy in Crisis (Jensen & Meckling, 1983) which explains how crises are manufactured to pursue policy ends. Ironically, as their title indicates, the writers use exactly the same political strategy themselves.

[3] The comparable story about some researchers is of the drunk who looked for the car keys under a lamppost light, despite having lost them elsewhere, because the light was better there.

[4] There is a caveat. The ‘just savings principle’ requires that justice been maintained through time. The first principle is that each person has an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others. Sen (2009) presents a critique of the Rawlsian Theory of Justice which does not affect this exposition.

[5] The causal hypothesis Wilkinson and Pickett offer involves psychological phenomenon like anxiety and lower self-esteem in higher inequality societies.

[6] Even so, honesty requires acknowledging that a lot of the social expenditure on responding to inequality is not very effective.

[7] A Lorenz curve plots the cumulative share of people from lowest to highest income on the horizontal axis against the cumulative share of income earned on the vertical axis.

[8] There are many other measures than the ones used in this survey – e.g. percentile ratios, such as 80 to 20. None resolve the basic problem that no single measure can capture all the change in a distribution, while a plethora of partial measures adds to the confusion.

[9] The same applies to the log-normal distribution. A useful first approximation to many income distributions is to treat the logarithm of the income as normal. However the approximation is usually crude for actual distributions

[10] The coefficient of variation of the distribution is its standard deviation (a measure of the dispersion or width) divided by the mean (so that it is scaled).

[11] A reasonable approximation for the lognormal distribution for GC in the 0.1 to 0.8 range is CV = 0.15*exp(9.2*GC) (Easton 1983, ibid, p.22-230, Skeptic’s Play 2013) However few distributions are exactly lognormal, certainly not the ones discussed in this survey.

[12] The insert is actually greater because in 1987 most social security benefits were grossed up (NZ superannuation and its predecessors always had been). Insofar as beneficiaries report their pre-tax benefit, some of the increase in low incomes between 1986 and 1991 was spurious and the inequality increase was even greater.

[13] While taxable income has included most transfer incomes since 1987, inclusion was not as comprehensive before then.

[14] Sometimes the data base forces the treatment of trusts as individuals.

[15] In the 1970s it mattered whether the measurement of income inequality covered all adults or just taxpayers. The former showed a fall in inequality over the period; the latter a rise. This was because women who had not been earning entered the paid labour force. Because they generally worked part-time and their pay rates were lower, they were at the bottom of the taxpayer distributions which appeared more unequal, yet their additional earnings boosted lower adult incomes so that the audlt income distribution was less unequal. (Easton 1983: Ch 4),

[16] Among the complications is how to handle households with negative income (typically they are those with self -employed occupants) and what to do with households whose expenditures far exceed their income. A common practice is to eliminate households with negative incomes or to set their incomes at zero.

[17] This assumes that households share their income equally. It may not be true even in families (mothers may deny spending on themselves to protect their children). Furthermore all households are not families (e.g. a student flat) and have no reason to share income equally.

[18] Smaller quantiles (e.g. percentiles) are not generally practical because of the Household Survey’s sample size.

[19] The 2012 year refers to the year ending June 2012. From 1998 and earlier the year ends in March.

[20] There is a major fluctuation in 2011, due to the impact of the Christchurch earthquakes because insurance receipts are treated as income. This limits the ability to assess the effect of the macroeconomic turmoil which followed the Global Financial Crisis.

[21] After allowing for a blip up due to some tax avoidance in the 2000 tax year and a recovery down phase there after.

[22] Once dividends were taxed as a part of the corporation tax regime and then taxed in the hands of the dividend recipient. Tax changes in the 1980s had (roughly) the corporation tax being treated as a prepayment of income tax.

[23] See also Hyslop and Maré (2003)

[24] It might, however, be worth exploring whether there has been an increase in margins for skill and management, which have widened the income distribution.

[25] It is true that the employee share in domestic income has fallen but this is in part due to shifts between employee status and self-employment and an increasing share going to foreign owners of capital. (Easton 2010) Earlier in the 1970s, real wages had risen faster than productivity and then stagnated from about 1985. (Easton 1996)

[26] This caveat is especially important given the social security benefits were ‘grossed up’ in 1987 – that is increased so they were taxed back to the same net level. This almost certainly means that the study did not capture the reductions in the effective levels of benefits as well as the reductions in income tax on upper incomes.

[27] Measured by changes in the Gini Coefficient. The levels for the three periods were 1983-6 = 0.347; 1989-92 = 0.386, 1996-98 = 0.398. They represent a change in the CV of 43percent and 12 percent between the two periods.

[28] The other candidates for the claim are a series of incremental changes over a longish period (the Great Inflation from 1968 to 1990 might be an example) or possibly the introduction of social security in 1939. However the latter involved horizontal redistribution more than vertical redistribution.

[29] In any case it was an extension of earlier tax credits and partly compensated for their loss of value from inflation.

[30] While Israel is not a member of the OECD, it is included in the data base (and here).

[31] Rankings can be sensitive to the imprecise third decimal place of the Gini coefficient..

[32] Using the New York priced equivalence scale is the reason that some of my very early estimates of poverty in New Zealand were much higher than the refined ones.

[33] The adjustment equation is based on the equilibrium equation (standard errors are shown below) that the Gini coefficient =    0 .032 Log(Population) –          0.164 Log (GDP per cap) -0.170                                             (0.013)                                    (0.055)

[34] Estonia, which had been a part of the USSR, is in the middle of the rankings. The other two Baltics are not members of the OECD. The OECD also provides an estimate for the Russian Federation of 0.428 unadjusted, placing it third most unequal between Mexico and Turkey. Adjusting it for being large and poor its Gini would have been 0.360 or seventh, between the United States and Australia.

[35] Not quite fitting into any pattern at the top are Iceland, Switzerland and Luxembourg. Ad hoc reasons may be advanced in each case. (Luxembourg GDP per cap is always problematic because a substantial part of its workforce resides outsides its boundaries.) Note also that the Latinos, the Middle East and North East Asia are only two countries each.

[36] STD/CSTAT/WPNA(2013)10/RD

[37] While it is easier to illustrate the point with alcohol consumption, the issue also applies to income aggregates which may be more important for distributional purposes. Even so the distribution of expenditure aggregates are of interest.

[38] Not perfectly though, because it is possible that the ratio of under-reporting varies by household characteristics.

[39] For an early example of the measurement problem see Easton (2000). SNZ promptly addressed it when their attention was drawn to it.

[40] A caution about primary (i.e. market) income. New Zealand has largely a non-contributory system so its social security payments are not included in primary income with the result that its primary income seems particularly widespread. (See Op. Cit 35).

[41] Op. Cit. 43-4.

[42] The adjusted uses the same equation and variables as for the 1989 period. The population and GDP per cap will definitely have changed and the parameters may have (but probably not by much). However, given the limited number of data points it was not worthwhile doing the re-estimation.

[43] As well as New Zealand inequality overtaking that of Canada, Greece, Japan and the United Kingdom (which are in the 17), it may also have overtaken Estonia, Portugal, Spain and Switzerland.

[44] Sweden’s Gini coefficient is so exceptionally low in 1983 that Moser’s Law suggests we should be cautious when using it.

[45] The handful of spot surveys is not sufficiently consistent to enable comparisons.

[46] Much popular commentary remains, implicitly or explicitly, based on the notion of a standard household of a couple with two children. In 2006, however, only 30.8 percent of households consisted of a couple and some children.

[47] A clear indication of the unreliability of the series is the dramatic fall in the share of the top decile in the late 1930s, when the tax base was extended as a result of the introduction of social security tax. For a cleaner series – albeit it over a shorter (post-war) period, seee Easton (1983) Chapter 10.

[48] E.g. Rashbrooke (2013:25-27).

[49] As already footnoted the Canterbury earthquakes distorted measurement of household income inequality because insurance payments are treated as income receipts rather than offsets for capital losses.

[50] The Expert Advisory Group on Solutions to Child Poverty (2012) is a recent example of using a superficial definition with little attention to past scholarship.

[51] There was a third aim: ‘where income maintenance alone is insufficient (for example, for a physically disabled person), to improve by other means, and as far as possible, the quality of life available.’

[52] The standard error of the estimate of a median is larger than of a mean by about 25 percent (for a big sample from a normally-distributed population).

[53] Groups on higher incomes are likely to recommend an even higher level.

[54] This assessment is based upon work being carried out by the author, but not yet publicly available for confidentiality reasons.

[55] Because the numbers near the threshold are high, a small change in its level can change dramatically the proportions in poverty and the pattern over time. For instance, setting the poverty threshold just above rather, than below, the basic New Zealand Superannuation benefit level has the numbers leap.

[56] Of course, if overall living standards faced a prolonged decline the relative poverty threshold should decline too (to some extent). This does not change markedly the paragraph’s overall story.

[57] The proportion are estimated by the author using a linear interpolation procedure based on the numbers in Table F3 of Perry (2103:110). The method is similar to that used in Easton (1994).

[58} Perry (2012) has numerous tables which can be used to place a variety of groups in the context of the whole distribution.

[59] Because New Zealand superannuation is indexed to average wages and more adults are working, superannuitants may not share in prosperity arising from increasing labour force participation. As a result their benefit level may decline below the poverty threshold because it is set on average household incomes not average worker incomes.

[60] The effect of the working for families tax credit has yet to be assessed.

[61] This survey does not cover the ‘other’ (none of European/Pakeha, Maori or Pasifika) group which is very heterogeneous. Often the sample size is small and the estimates subject to a large standard error.

[62] Educational attainment (say PISA scores) also illustrates the point. It is affected by socioeconomic status. That Maori have a lower SES than Pakeha explains about one third of the difference between their educational attainment levels. (Easton 2013E)

[63] Ethnic identity is self-categorization, which may change over time (and is also affected by the way the statistician aggregates the various responses). If some households were to categorize themselves as Pakeha in 1988 and Maori in 2012 the medians of both groups could go up.

[64] I have looked at income inequality within Maori, finding that it was less (say measured by the coefficient of variation) than for the population as a whole. The reason seems to be that social security benefit levels for Maori are higher relative to the mean than for the non-Maori (because benefits levels do not ethnically discriminate), thereby pushing up the bottom of the distribution.

[65] Recent examples are Chapters 6 (by K. Mila) and 10 (by E. T. Poata-Smith) in M. Rashbrooke (2103) op cit. Incidentally Figure 6.1 on page 97 is mislabeled. The Pasifika unemployment rate is certainly not a third of the overall rate.

[66] The impact of the student tertiary funding in the early 1990s probably undermines comparisons of their standards of living over time using the methods described here (unless there is a specific adjustment). Rising school fees have a similar effect, but they have not been as big.

[67] Housing is particularly tricky. Housing grants are included in income but not cheap housing for state tenants. There is a separate section on housing below.

[68] None of the estimates reported below include private (including GSF) pension entitlements.

[69] It was not possible to provide estimates for later dates because of the increasing importance of joint family homes.

[70] Another source of data is the Statistics New Zealand 2001 Household Savings Survey. There is a publicly available synthetic unit-record file of 300 unit records which is not about real people, but was generated using statistical techniques to have similar characteristics as respondents to the survey.

[71] Inferred from Cheung (2007: Figure 2). The comparable figures for the 1966 adult distribution were 19 percent and about 75 percent; this might suggest the wealth distribution had become more equal over the 38 years, but the difference may reflect definitional differences and measurement errors.

[72] For instance a simple correlation between income categories and their average wealth suggests that an extra $1000 of the former (before tax) is associated with an extra $3700 of the latter (the correlation is high but not linear). However, the retired may be high in wealth and low in income, so there is a need to control for age.

[73] Between 1986 and 2006 the (media and mean) age of first nuptial birth rose 4 years. There is not comparable data for ex-nuptial births.

[74] In 2006 home ownership peaked at near 80 percent in the 60 to 74 age group (the proportion for the entire population is 53 percent) and then fell off to 59 percent for those over 85. The percentages do not cover the institutionalised.

[75] Instead the aggregate ownership and far-from-rigorous measures of housing affordability are used by policy rhetoricians to draw conclusions about accessibility to home ownership.

[76] This list is preliminary. Additions of NZ publications will be gratefully receive. Despite the popularity of the practice, it is not my intention to omit any paper because I dont like the author or cant understand it. That is why the list is on the generous side of inclusion. Those which have been overlooked will be added to a list on the author’s website when his attention is drawn to them; possibly with a note explaining how they modify the survey conclusions.

Democratic Governance and Health: Hospitals, Politics and Health Policy in New Zealand.

Miriam J Laugesen and Robin Gauld; Otago University Press, $40.00. ISBN 978 1 877578 27 4. (Review)

 

New Zealand Books: 5 December, 2013.

 

Keywords: Health;

 

I have long puzzled over the point of local democracy in the highly centralised state of New Zealand. If you dont like what your local representatives decide then you appeal to the government in Wellington, and as like as not – if you are a big enough business – it will change the rules in your favour, or even replace your locally elected representatives with commissioners.

 

Even were Wellington less authoritarian, I would still be unsure of the purpose of those we elect to our District Health Boards (DHBs). We certainly dont want them interfering with clinicians, but since funding and legislation are set from above, what discretion that matters do they have?

 

The question is progressed by Democratic Governance and Health, a narrative of the history of the DHBs and their predecessors by Miriam Laugesen, Assistant Professor in the Department of Health Policy and Management at Columbia University and Robin Gauld, professor of health policy at the University of Otago.

 

As their narrative recounts, the DHBs originated in local initiatives to provide charitable hospitals which were locally funded, first with donations, later with local rates. In such circumstances governance would be local and elected by the locals. Over time, funding came increasingly from central government; by 1952 the rates levy was abolished (and charity contributions went to auxiliary services such as ambulances). But political inertia meant that elected boards continued, although there was an ongoing struggle between the central government funder and the boards over spending (the locals and therefore their elected representatives favoured overspending). That inertia continued until 1991, and indeed to this day.

 

In 1991 parliament abolished all the elected boards. Overnight mark you, without any pretence of consultation – an extraordinary instance of just how centralised political power is here. The official reason was that hospitals were to be run by Crown Health Enterprises on corporate principles, but a consequence of the abolition of elected boards was that the institutions which represented localities were castrated.

 

Thus the period until 2000 when partial election to the boards was reinstated (about a third of each board is still appointed centrally) becomes a test of the relevance of local democracy to the health system.

 

The book does not handle the period well. This is is nicely illustrated by the references of the relevant chapter; some three-quarters of the New Zealand ones are official. It is a bit like independent scholars writing a history of democracy in the Soviet Union using KGB files. The thirteen non-official references (including the authors’) hardly cover the field. I have more (uncited) publications about the period, and I would be astonished if I contributed even a tenth of the available literature.

 

The full story of the response to the changes has yet to be written. Curiously the dismissed boards played a minimal role. One might have expected that the stood-down elected representatives would have been at the forefront of the opposition, but they generally faded out. Instead there was a public upwelling of resistance. Its leadership came from a nationally based Coalition for Public Health (I was one of the CPH economic advisers) and similar, but not as prominent, local organisations. The key players were clinicians and health policy specialists. They denied the use of the term ‘reform’ for the changes – it has a notion of progress. Following Alan Maynard – an eminent visiting British health economist whom the government chose not to consult – it was called a ‘redisorganisation’.

 

Those promoting the changes dismissed their critics as having a self interest in the status quo. Certainly the critics were deeply committed to a system of public health – many had made personal sacrifices to promote it – and rejected the proposed commercialisation (the rhetoric said ‘Americanisation’, the American system being the most commercial – and least efficient – in the rich world).

 

(There were humorous incidents although none are recorded in the book. Having been bested in a TV debate, the prime minister turned angrily on the CPH spokesperson, the doughty Peter Roberts who had fled the American health system. Moving close, the politician said ‘I know where you are coming from’ (i.e. Roberts was acting solely in self-interest). ‘If I am ever sick, I hope I dont have to rely on you.’ Peter replied ‘I hope not. I run the Intensive Care Unit’.)

 

The book’s references to those managing the change reminds one that, in contrast to the CPH expertise, the insiders knew little about the health system. Their task was the Procrustean one of forcing the provision of health to conform to the same commercial model as is used to supply baked beans. In economic terms health care is fundamentally different. Purchases are usually rare, erratic, expensive and the purchaser is not well formed.

 

Their ignorance could be amusing were it not potentially fatal. One announced that as well as the one at the base public hospital, there was a local private hospital with an Intensive Care Unit. This demonstrated, he said, that even this specialisation could have regional competition. But he had confused the private hospital’s post-operative care unit with an ICU; if he was ever in need, he should make sure he went to the right one.

 

The commercialisation was so ill-thought through that it would never have worked, but the public speeded the end, reducing the damage from the redisorganisation. Resistance came at all levels; even the cabinet. Uneasy about a proposal to fund health through private insurance (mendaciously called ‘social insurance’), it asked for public submissions which were overwhelmingly opposed and the option was dropped. Local groups demonstrated to prevent particular changes. The media ramped up the public outcry. Individuals refused to pay their hospital charges.

 

One outcome of the elimination of the elected board was that clinical failures ended on the minister’s desk. No Minister of Health can be responsible for every slip of the scalpel. Elected Boards had shielded them in the past, and do so again today. (The Health and Disability Commissioner plays a critical role too.)

 

The ultimate democratic test is that health policies were on top of the list of the reasons why despite a comfortable majority in 1990, National almost lost the 1993 election. (Its voting share fell a quarter from 47.8 to 35.1 percent.) By 1996 the National Minister of Health was arguing that the developments in the public health system were back on the 1980s’ track. Labour did not think so and made further changes in 2000. Instructively, the post-2008 National government has not made major changes and – the adequacy of funding aside together with unfortunate clinical errors – health is largely off the political agenda. But in the interim resources were wasted, while there is documentary evidence that people died as a result of generic managers and the redisorganisation.

 

Balance requires mentioning that if the book is weak on the public’s reaction in the early 1990s, some of its insider accounts are extremely valuable – including about the Gibbs report of the late 1980s which presaged the 1991 changes and the slow death of various health funding authorities a little later. It is a valuable resource for specialists in the field.

 

The authors do not come to a definitive conclusion on the role of elected representatives. On the one hand the boards – despite being partly elected – are but the local agents of Wellington providing governance and fiscal prudence. Although they contribute to the accountability of the employees, they have little influence over what is provided. People I greatly respect have had themselves elected to DHBs but stayed for only a term because they thought they had wasted their time.

 

On the other hand the elected representatives are a clear signal to the central government that locals care deeply about the public provision of health. Next year I shall vote in the national elections on the fundamental democratic principle that this is the most effective way of getting rid of incompetent governments (although sometimes we replace them with just as incompetent ones). This year I am voting to tell central government I care about the public health system (and, in the council elections, my locality). I’m telling the centre that it aint to muck health care around without proper consultation together with a suitable leavening of expertise and the avoidance of ideology.

First, Show Us the Evidence

Policymaking is too often based on what someone thinks is a good idea.

 

Listener:  5 December, 2013

 

Keywords: Governance; Growth & Innovation;

 

The Prime Minister’s chief science adviser, Sir Peter Gluckman, has called for the greater use of evidence-based policy formation. It arises out of his medical background, where there has been an increasing demand for evidence-based treatment.

 

Surprisingly, a lot of health and medical treatments are not scientifically proven. Very few alternative medicines have any efficacy but even a considerable number of standard treatments provided by doctors are not assessed as robustly as you might think; they are evaluated for safety, but effectiveness is a different matter. Even the most up-to-date doctor, when faced with a particular condition, often has to use judgment based on incomplete evidence.

 

I was struck by this some years ago when evaluating a new diagnostic instrument that cost, literally, millions of dollars. It was in fashion and everyone wanted one. But we could not get any research that showed it led to better health outcomes. Instructively, those selling the instrument did not bother to answer our queries. There were bits and pieces of research that showed that it might work, but I was reluctant to argue for one for every hospital.

 

As it happens, time has shown its effectiveness and most big hospitals now have one, although no doubt it is still sometimes misused. Understandably, doctors tend to be cautious and order tests that may not be necessary, even though they are of considerable expense to the taxpayer (or as an economist would put it, the resources could be better deployed elsewhere).

If the health sector has not got it quite right, public policy is worse. How often does one observe the implementation of policy that seems to be based on what somebody thinks is a good idea – or is in his or her private interest – but where the evidence for its efficacy is thin or even contradicts the likelihood of the policy having an effective outcome?

 

The classic example was the imposition of Rogernomics. There was plenty of evidence for the need for market liberalisation in the early 1980s. But those who drove the changes went far beyond what the evidence indicated. The outcome was that the economy stagnated and the extremist policies failed and had to be reversed. Yet moderate market liberalisation has worked much as was expected. (Of course, we do not give much respect to the social scientists who correctly warned at the time that the contradicting evidence was being ignored.)

 

Ironically for Gluckman, one of the areas where evidence-based policy hardly exists is how we treat science and innovation. This is not to criticise the science; I don’t have the expertise – although I am in awe of the ability of geological scientists to see miles below the ground and millennia back in time.

 

Nor am I arguing that “science and innovation” is unimportant. It is what comes after the “therefore” that troubles me. Rather than a careful explanation of how science and innovation articulate with our social goals, all we get is what amounts to “therefore we should spend lots of public money on me”. (Recall the Rogernome’s “market liberalisation is important; therefore make changes that benefit me.”)

 

I am not even saying we are spending too much on science and innovation. It is a question of direction and priorities. I suspect a careful analysis – almost an oxymoron in policy – would give greater priority to developing a science-literate population, to improving our ability to import and adapt foreign technologies, rather than pretending we can be a great centre of widespread original research and, reflecting New Zealand’s competitive advantage, to shifting the balance from physical-based sciences to biological-based ones.

 

Those are my interpretations of the evidence, but what relevance has that in science policy? If the advocates of the current science and innovation policy ran their scientific research the way they advocate policy, with an almost total neglect of the evidence, they would be terrible scientists. Gluckman’s call for evidence-based policy is welcome.

The Hunter Council Chamber

Introduction to paper I Gave on the Great War in the Hunter Council Chamber of Victoria University of Wellington:  29 November, 2013 The paper is at

http://www.eastonbh.ac.nz/2014/11/the-economy-of-the-great-war-and-after/

 

Keywords: Political Economy & History;

 

This is the first occasion I have presented a paper in this Chamber, I would like to acknowledge its significance. Given this is a conference on the Great War it is particularly appropriate to mention its brass plates on which are listed the members of Victoria University College who served in the War. Not all of them. Some went to the College after they returned. They were so young.

 

I know this because Sir Bernard Ashwin is not listed on the plates despite serving in Flanders and returning to become one of the College’s most eminent graduates. He was one of the four most important men running the country during the Second World War and the founder of the modern Treasury.

 

Ashwin copped a bullet over there. An inch closer and it is difficult to imagine how the Treasury would have evolved. Perhaps there was another man, another potential leader of the Treasury, who did cop a fatal bullet.

 

Counterfactuals of history are what my paper is about.

The Economy of the Great War – and After

<>Rethinking War: A Stout Research Centre Conference: 28-30 November 2013.

 

Keywords: Political Economy & History;

Introduction [2]

 

The conference title invites us to ‘rethink war’, to shift away from traditional approaches to war history. There is a tendency to think of the war as about events which occur during it. That too, but it is my contention that the Great War was not just an incident in the 600 million odd years of New Zealand’s history. It had subsequent long-term effects, not just the personal grief of those who had lost loved ones (or found them greatly incapacitated), not only the impact on the demography, but on the way we governed New Zealand. Towards the end of this paper I shall argue that Muldoonism was its grandchild. Earlier illustrations include the changes in fiscal management and the introduction of producer boards.

 

Diverting Resources for War [3]

 

The modern economic historian thinking about the Great War is handicapped by the lack of a comprehensive data base. At the heart of a war economy is that a substantial portion of the production available to the economy has to be diverted to the war effort. Unlike today, unlike that which Jack Baker had available when he wrote his history of the economy during the Second World War, there is not the standard statistical framework to analyse the extent to which resources were diverted. Hence what can be discussed is a bit sketchy

 

How much diversion of resources? We dont know with any precision. During the war the troops overseas at any time, plus those in domestic training – amounting to at least 65,000 and even 100,000 men, over a fifth of the labour force – were not available for civilian production but they were still consuming. There are no annual labour force figures at this time, so we can but conjecture the precise impact of having so many workers unavailable for domestic production. Some of the labour deficit would have been made up by running down the unemployed (although that was not a huge reserve), by drawing women into the labour force (although we dont know how many) and by working longer hours.

 

That fifth of the labour force in uniform is less than the aggregate resource diversion in the Second World War which according to Jack Baker exceeded 30 percent of GDP between 1939 and 1944. But it is a similar order of magnitude if we add in production diverted to war purposes. While the economists and politicians of the day did not have the quantities, they knew there was a challenge to pay for the war from the public purse. The essence of the economic problem was a general cut back in domestic spending.

 

Suppose the diversion to war spending was a third of aggregate output, about the same proportion as in the Second World War. In effect the goods and services available for peace time pursuits was reduced by a third. That would mean that consumption and investment levels had to be cut back to where they were in the 1880s; reducing the material standard of living to where it had been a third of a century earlier.

 

The Fiscal Impact

 

But where to cut back? Government domestic expenditure was restrained (but only a little) and probably private investment declined (we dont know because the data does not exist). So cut backs in private consumption were necessary, and the government raised taxes. Its tax revenue trebled between 1914 and 1919 including what must have seemed swingeing increases in income tax; the top rate was increased a third from 6.7 percent to 10 percent and there was a super tax of a further third; land tax went up too. A nice illustration of the broadening of the base was that the number of (income) taxpayers trebled from 14,000 in 1913/4 to 44,000 in 1919/20 (although still a small proportion of the 430,000 adult males).

 

One of the most radical changes in our tax system occurred over the six years to 1919/20. Income tax made up just 9 percent of total tax receipts in 1913/14, behind customs duties (58%), land tax (13%) and death duties (10%). Six years later income tax was the single largest source of tax revenue at 39%, with the other three behind: customs 30%, land tax 9% and death duties 6%.

 

Despite the tax increases there was a deficit in the government accounts which was covered by borrowing. In those days the public debt was allocated into categories, including an unproductive ‘war and defence’. It amounted to £6.4m in March 1914; by March 1920 it was £86.2m. In the six years there was an £80 million increase, when annual GDP was probably about £125m.

 

In the nineteenth century New Zealand had largely borrowed non-New Zealanders’ savings through the London market. From the time of the Liberals, the government began to tap into domestic savings with less recourse to London,  partly because of John Ballance’s principle of self-sufficiency, partly because London was not as generous with its advances. Access to London’s funds would become acute during a major war since Britain was also struggling to divert resources into its war effort. From 1916 New Zealand agreed to raise at home all funds for war expenditure(apart from the costs of maintaining troops in the field).

 

Inflation

 

The ideal is that the government’s borrowing soaks up domestic spending power thereby offsetting war expenditure. The reality is that the strategy was accompanied by inflation. Consumer prices rose 67 percent between 1914 and 1920, faster than at any time in recorded history before the inflation binge of the second half of the 1970s.

 

With hindsight we are not surprised that the policy response was price controls. It was not entirely a new one, but certainly at a far greater intensity than what had gone before – an intensity which was repeated even more vigorously during the Second World War and during the great inflation of the 1970s and early 1980s. An economist would say, wearily, that the purpose of the inflation – it was an international phenomenon of the times – was to reduce people’s real wealth. As the price controls did not address this, they would ultimately fail.

 

Observe that I am drawing a process of policy responses across time. It seems likely that the vigorous price controls of the 1940s reflected the experience of the Great War. They were trying to avoid a repeat of that inflation and were reasonably successful, for prices in the Second World War  rose at only one-third of the rate of those in the first. However, as the history I am writing explains, after the Second World War the suppressed inflation returned, reducing the value of savings accumulated during the war. Those savings had been used to fight the war, There was no matching investment. So they had to be written off – inflated away.

 

After the War [4]

 

There was another important aftermath of these fiscal policies. Although there were reductions in income tax rates in the mid 1920s, in aggregate taxes were not returned to their pre-war levels after the war ended.[5] Debt servicing aside, the additional revenue was used for public works and social transfers, among other things. Public works in this era are associated with Gordon Coates whose natural political abilities and energy were displayed by spending big on his portfolio.

 

We dont usually think of rehabilitation (repeated after the Second World War) of returned service personnel as a part of the transfer state. It differed from what are conventionally thought of as transfer policies because grants tended to be one-off – setting the returned up in business or in a home – and not ongoing (although veteran’s pensions are). The rehabilitation schemes after the Great War are usually thought of as a failure but, while some of the farm settlements were less than successful, the grants for home purchase were a major success.

 

This illustrates a frequent feature of policy development. There is rarely a single event which initiates what proves to be a major policy, but there can be steps which accelerate its development. Thus the rehab policies after the Great War might be thought of as starting the practice of widespread home ownership. Similarly the war’s broadening of the role of income tax was on the way to today’s dominant role of income tax in the revenue system. It seems likely, although it has not been explored, that the administration of veterans’ pensions was part of the basis for the social security one set up in 1939.

 

Note that each of these policies are remembered as First Labour government policies but their early nurturing was by the government of Bill Massey which Michael Bassett sniffily describes as ‘dirigiste’, with the central government actively involved in directing the entire economy. It was; with the exception of the government in which Bassett was cabinet minister and the one which followed, all New Zealand’s governments have been dirigiste.

 

The Development of Producer Boards

 

Not only were there profound changes domestically, but external trade relations changed. (Any account of the New Zealand economy which does not pay considerable attention to New Zealand’s external economic relations is defective.)

 

New Zealand had been a significant supplier of pastoral products – dairy, meat and wool to Britain – for some years before the Great War. When it started, Britain faced two food issues. It was cut off from some of its alternative supplers, while the shipping routes to Britain were insecure. Britain and New Zealand negotiated a bulk purchase agreement at agreed prices with the British government accepting responsibility for freight (including any losses from enemy action) and storage.

 

While at first the exporting was carried out by agents and the private and cooperative factories, shipping shortages required the coordination of transportation and hence marketing of dairy products, meat and wool. (It was said one ship took 90 days – more than the time to get to Britain – going from coastal port to port, waiting about for product to be loaded.)

 

The Imperial Commandeer – as it was called; ‘commandeer’ refers to taking possession or control of something for military purposes –  developed in the usual tortuous way of trial and error but by 1917 New Zealand had an agreement with the British Government that all the supplies available for exports would be requisitioned for the British market.

 

At the end of the war there was a considerable quantity of meat and wool in store. As more shipping became available it, plus the annual production, was unloaded on the British market, as were South American supplies at the same time. Prices collapsed. Private enterprise had seemed to fail again, and the farmers turned to the public sector – with only a little resistance from business. In February 1922 – note the speed of reaction – the government, with dirigiste (‘Farmer Bill’) Massey at the forefront, passed legislation which established the Meat Producers Board with very wide powers. A little later the Dairy Board was created almost as quickly although interrupted by the 1922 election. (The Wool Board was established in 1944. Earlier wool had been involved in the imperial commandeer and in 1921 there was the Board of Trade (Wool Industry) Regulations.)

 

We may ponder whether these producer boards would have been established as quickly – or at all – had there been no commandeer, had there been no Great War.

 

Towards Muldoonism

 

Thus far I have described long-term microeconomic responses to the war. There was a macro one too. New Zealand’s response to the problems which the economy faced during the Second World War was based upon lessons learned from the First, less than twenty-five years earlier. Sometimes the actions were a replication of the earlier war – the commandeer was reintroduced; sometimes they were lessons learned – Peter Fraser, jailed for dissent in 1917, insisted that capital as well as labour would be conscripted this time. In order to avoid the high inflation of the Great War; price controls were more comprehensive.

 

The result of this analysis is that I have had to revise my understanding of the sources of post-war economic management. I had long assumed that it had been shaped by the economic policies which the First Labour Government had been elected on in 1935. There are always continuities and evolutions, but I now think that the highly centralised economic management that was necessary during the Second World War had a major influence for the first forty years after the war. I am not sure that New Zealand was particularly more centralised than many other of the war economies but undoubtedly New Zealand was slower to unwind its interventions.

 

This was most evident in the draconian wage and price freeze which the government of Robert Muldoon introduced in May 1982. The earlier war administrations would have been admiring. Of course, perhaps in ways that Muldoon never appreciated, the economy and society had moved on. The unwinding of centralised economic control that the successor government – the Rogernomes – undertook might be said to represent the end of the centralised Second World War approach to economic management of forty years earlier, itself a response to the Great War approach to economic management some twenty-five years earlier.

 

Counterfactual history is always difficult especially when the alternative is that there was no Great War, or perhaps New Zealand did not join in. But it is possible to imagine alternative scenarios which could well have led to a very different New Zealand economic management from that we had for the following half century and more, something we might ponder on when we are rethinking the Great War.

 

Endnotes

[1]  I am grateful to comments from Elizabeth Caffin, Richard Hill and Malcolm McKinnon.

[2]Among the texts referred to in the preparation of this paper are

Baker, J. V. T. (1965) War Economy.

Bassett, M. (1998) The State in New Zealand 1840-1984

Condliffe, J. B. (1930) The Making of New Zealand

Easton, B. H (1996) In Stormy Seas

Easton, B. H. (Forthcoming) Not in Narrow Seas; A Political Economy of New Zealand. Chapters 20, 21, 30.

Hawke, G. R. (1985) The Making of New Zealand: An Economic History.

Lloyd Prichard, M. F. (1970) An Economic History of New Zealand

Goldsmith, P. (2008) We Won, You Lost. Eat That!

McKinnon, M. (2003) Treasury: The New Zealand Treasury 1840-2000.

New Zealand Official Year Book, various years.

Taxation Review Committee (1967) Taxation in New Zealand.

[3] There is not time for presentation to describe the track of the aggregate economy, not least because the data base is so problematic. The best estimates I have been able to synthesize suggest the economy grew quite quickly in the Liberal Boom to 1908, after which it entered a long period of stagnation in per capita GDP terms which ended 27 years later as the economy came out of the Great Depression (it had, of course, dipped sharply then) and went into the Labour Boom. There is little evidence of a boom in production during the Great War (in contrast to the boom of the Second World War) probably because of the withdrawal from the labour force of overseas service personnel. Given that there was not a drop in production (as far as we can tell) productivity must have risen.

[4]  There was also a loss of manpower in the inter-war period due to the deaths of the 18,500 odd service men. They amounted to over 5 percent of the male labour force while the incapacitated added to the loss. There was no corresponding reduction in those who were not directly contributing to market production – the young, the old, and women working in the non-market sector, so average market incomes across the entire population were reduced by, say, 5 percent.

[5]  Income Tax Revenue

Year

GDP

Tax Revenue

1914/15

0.55%

9%

1919/20

4.2%

39%

1924/25

2.1%

21%

 

 

Long Term Prospects for Health Spending

<>Wellington School of Medicine Seminar Series: 22 November, 2013. [1]

Keywords: Governance; Health;

 

The Public Finance Act requires the Treasury to produce a statement on the Crown’s Long Term Fiscal Position every four years. It involves projecting 40 and more years out based on current policy assumptions with some alternative policy assumptions to assist assessment of the significance of possible policy responses.

 

The latest projections were released last July 2013 following extensive public consultation. I was one of the members of an advisory panel that the Treasury consulted with while preparing the projections.

 

The Treasury was keen that their report did not disappear but would contribute to an ongoing discussion of the issues the exercise high-lighted. What I am about to say, then, is not the Treasury’s view but my own. Indeed not all of these reflections on the implications for the health sector were discussed in the panel deliberations.

 

It is not entirely clear why such projections should be required. As a matter of course the Treasury produces as a part of the annual fiscal statement – popularly known as ‘The Budget’ – projections up to about a decade out. Apparently Treasury has been worried about the demographic impacts on the economy since the 1990s. They did not show up much in 10 year projections, so they began to project longer.

 

The Fiscal Challenge the Health Sector Faces.

 

However I learned lessons other than the population implications from the exercise. I’m only really going to talk about one – the implications for the health sector. I knew before I went onto the advisory panel that there was a problem with the growth of health care expenditure. It was not until the fiscal projections, however, that I began to think about it systematically. The issue is this: as the Long Term Fiscal Projections show, the expected rising demands for public funding of health care are beyond the capacity of the existing fiscal framework to finance them in the long run.

 

The Aging Population

 

This health funding challenge is independent of population change, although it is exacerbated by the aging population. So a word about that first. We all know that longevity is rising steadily and that it is expected to continue to rise. We also know – although it is a bit more complicated – that the fertility transition from roughly two daughters per woman to one has intensified the population imbalance. With the rising longevity, the fertility transition exacerbates our aging population because the labour force is not rising as fast.

 

Less obvious – although curiously enough I discussed it, albeit in a clumsy way, in a paper published in 1979 – the initial effect of the dynamics is a so-called ‘population dividend’ in which the falling proportion of children in the population eases economic and fiscal pressures. The salutary conclusion is that we have been benefiting from this demographic dividend but it ended in about 2011. From now on population change is going to make it more difficult to manage the economy and the fiscal position. We all know this, except we may be surprised that the turnaround occurred so recently.

 

The History of Public Spending on Health Care

 

As far as public health spending is concerned the aging population is a factor in the rising pressure. The elderly require more spending than those in working ages. Children are also health-spending intensive, but the fall in their proportion of the population does not offset the rising proportion of the elderly. I can illustrate the general problem with a chart of some work I did for the Treasury and also for the history of New Zealand I am writing. [Please contact author for graph.]

 

On its vertical axis is the spending of the Ministry of Health (and its earlier agencies) measured as a proportion of annual GDP going back to 1862. This is not all government spending on health care as we shall see later. It is the part-funded from general taxation. It certainly does not cover all spending on health. I’ll come back to the private spending later.

 

There are two lines on the graph. Actual spending is in blue and red, the former for when governments of the right were in power, the latter for when there were governments of the left. The track illustrates that –aside from the expansion of spending of the First Labour Government, it is hard to argue the thesis of differential spending behaviour by political preference. [2]

 

The black line is the spending if the composition of the population had been constant. You’ll see that it hardly varies from the blue and red line until the 1980s, after which population aging meant that spending began to rise faster than the black line. (The demographic dividend comes from the opposite trend happening to public spending on educational services.)

 

The graph provides a brief history of central government spending on health care. Until 1939 it was less than 1 percent of annual GDP. Most of it was on population-based health care. There was some additional public spending from rates levied by hospital boards which went into personal healthcare, but most was funded by private fees and charity. We dont have any figures for total spending on health care but it was probably low.

 

In 1938 the First Labour Government introduced a major expansion of public spending on health care, roughly trebling the relative level. Part was a transfer from private spending to public spending funded out of general taxation, part would have been giving care to those who had been missing out because of their inability to pay but some almost certainly was for a response to advance in healthcare. While the 2 percentage points of annual GDP increase must have seemed a huge lift at the time it is not such a big leap compared to what subsequently happened and what is expected to happen.

 

Suppose we take it that by 1950 the Labour Government’s transition had finished. Over the next 60 years spending rose relatively smoothly from about 3 percent of annual GDP to 7 to 8 percent of annual GDP (depending on how you want to treat the change in population composition). There is a bit of a swelling in the late 1970s, explained by public sector wages rising faster than usual. But, other than that, the post-war rise in spending share is surprisingly smooth.

 

Note, however, the choice of measure may mislead as to just how big the spending rise was. Actual public spending on health care rose over five to six times in the sixty years above the general rise in prices.

 

Why the Creep after 1950?

 

Why did it rise an additional 4 to 5 percentage points of GDP? We can see that about a percentage point was due to the aging population, but the rest is a bit of a mystery.

 

Normally the quantitative economist would split the increase into that to be attributes to price rises and that attributed to volume increases, but we do not have useful price and volume indexes, certainly not since 1938, nor recently either.

 

Statistics New Zealand is currently engaged in constructing price indexes to reflect changes in prices of inputs into health care; a good thing but limited. Let me explain with a simple example.

 

Once upon a time the ultimate treatment for persistent peptic ulcers was surgery. Then the Australian Barry Marshall identified Helicobacter pylori as the cause which can be effectively treated by medication. This means that a patient with a peptic ulcer now gets a better quality of care, but also that fewer resources are used to treat her or him. The index constructors will treat the reduction as lower resource outlays. They are unable to measure the better health outcome. So the indexes do not capture the productivity gain from the innovation, even suggesting a deterioration in health care when, in fact, there has been an improvement.

 

If carefully interpreted, the Statistics New Zealand exercise is progress. But it does not provide a comprehensive account because it cannot address changes in the quality of life as a result of improved care, one of the most important issues in health economics, one of the hardest to analyse and, as a result, one of the most overlooked.

 

Given this lack of quantification, I am going to have to do a bit of hand-waving to tell you what seems to be driving the rising spending on healthcare in economic terms. In summary they are the demand effect, the supply effect and the Baumol effect.

 

The Demand Effect

 

The demand effect is that as we become more affluent, our demand for health care rises even faster. This is true for the individual’s demand for personal health care but it is also true for the public’s demand for government provided health care.

 

You can see this happening very explicitly by the Pharmac threshold for cost effectiveness of pharmaceuticals creeping up over the years. The threshold is a valuation on the cost of adding to the quality of life by the use of a drug. The higher it is, the more drugs the public sector is willing to fund. Very expensive drugs in terms of their improvement to quality of life are not – as a rule – provided by the public sector. The threshold is a rationing device.

 

Pharmac is a bit vague as to what the threshold is, and it insists – quite properly – that it uses other criteria before making a final decision. What is evident is that the threshold has been creeping up, which means that as we have got more affluent, we have been willing to pay for more expensive drugs. The rationing device is being relaxed with affluence. That is true for other treatments too.

 

There is nothing wrong with such rising demand. It is perfectly rational for a person to wish to spend more on health care for a higher quality of life as their income rises – indeed it may be saner than demanding more and more trivial goods. In aggregate the community has similar demands. However the provision of that care by the public sector breaks the connection between an individual’s income and the payment for the treatment. This is a persistent problem in health economics, although the problem of the broken linkage is equally true for private insurance.

 

The Supply Effect

 

By a supply effect an economist means that the cost of supplying a treatment changes – in this case falls, so that people want more of it. The most important case in health care is when a new technology is introduced – say MRI or a new more effective drug. It may seem very expensive at the time but it is better than not being able to do the treatment. So there is a continued pressure to introduce new medical technologies, although economists query whether they are cost effective, that is whether they improve the quality of life sufficiently to justify the outlay.

As time goes by the innovation may become cheaper. Nobody in 1938 could have envisaged the full range of treatments that would become available in the next 75 years; we are equally ignorant of the future possibilities.

 

The Baumol Effect

 

The Baumol effect is named after an American economist William J Baumol, who pointed out that productivity rises faster in some sectors than others but that wages have to rise at roughly the same rate in all sectors. Those services experiencing low productivity rises find that their costs are rising faster than general inflation. Let me give a simple illustration from music.

 

Beethoven famously remarked that putting on a concert costs an awful lot of money. Suppose you repeated one of Beethoven’s concert today. You would have to pay a lot more for the players – perhaps about 16 times as much in real terms because of the general rise in productivity since his day. But the audience could not be any bigger since the size of a concert auditorium is constrained by the laws of acoustics. Costs up, volumes not. That means higher prices or subsidies.

 

Baumol’s law applies in medicine which is also labour intensive. Where person-to-person care is necessary, productivity gains will be limited, yet the pay of the health worker has to rise in line with increases elsewhere in the economy.

 

A Fourth Effect?

 

There may be a fourth effect which is raising spending on health care, although it may just be a special example of the demand effect. We seem to be extending the notion of what constitutes health care. One example will do. I am comfortable with the introduction of informed consent – indeed it is a human right. However, because it takes time, it has added to the costliness of the health care system.

 

 

In summary, there are considerable and understandable pressures increasing health spending as share of GDP. Moreover it seems likely that the pressures will continue; perhaps faster, perhaps slower. For instance Obamacare may increase international cost pressures as it absorbs more resources for those Americans with little current health care cover. (I know, I know, it promised to reduce them, but given the state of the American Congress it seems unlikely that the measures necessary to do that will be taken.)

 

On the other hand, many expensive pharmaceuticals are coming to the end of their patent life and the generics are much cheaper. However that has been happening in the past, with each generation of patented drugs coming out of patent to be replaced by a further generation. But there may be fewer blockbusters in the future.

 

Projecting Future Government Health Care Spending

 

There are all sorts of future possibilities, but it would be prudent to project the future trend in health care spending trending as it has in the past, subject to a margin of forecasting error.

 

That is what the Treasury Long Term Fiscal Projection does, concluding that the health care share will rise 4 percentage points of annual GDP in the next 50 years, slightly faster than it has in the previous 60 years, because of the aging of the population. [3]

 

Public Health Spending

Year

1960

1985

2010

2035

2060

% of Nominal GDP

3.5

4.7

6.8

8.3

10.8

 

In the long run, whatever the base, there is no other item which grows as much as health care in absolute terms (although there may be smaller items such as environmental spending and culture, heritage and recreation which may grow as fast in relative terms). That is the reason why the Treasury projection gave a lot of attention to health care spending; why am I here today.

 

Can the Treasury fund this sort of increase? The projections assume that government revenue – most of it from taxes – broadly remains a fixed proportion of GDP – at about 31 percent. We can have a long argument about whether that proportion can be retained. Many of the arguments are not very compelling, but the one which is important – I think – is that capital and skilled labour is increasingly mobile in a globalising world and that mobility is sensitive to international differences in tax rates.

 

So let us accept, for the interim, that the tax take is fixed as a proportion of GDP. (I skip the discussion about the borrowing – it is long tedious but it concludes that there is not a lot of flexibility here in the long run.)

 

Reducing Fiscal Pressures

 

Is there any other way we can avoid the fiscal pressures? In particular we have to pay attention to health-care spending because of the size of its increase. We cant simply let health care funding rip, because that would put severe fiscal pressure elsewhere. So what can be done?

 

Some of the obvious responses dont help. For instance, greater preventive care need not reduce spending on health care. A couple of colleagues in Australia have calculated that eliminating smoking would increase health-care spending in the long run, because people would live longer and the increased cost of their residential care is greater than the clinical reductions.That is not a case for abandoning anti-smoking campaigns – they are about increasing the quality of life. But we must not think that prevention necessarily leads to reduced spending.

 

Another obvious response is that we should increase the productivity of the provision of health care. Of course we should. We have been doing so as long as I can remember. The assumption of further productivity gains is already built into the projections. The question is whether we can accelerate the productivity gains in the future relative to the past. A good idea were it feasible, but it would not be a good idea to assume we can.

 

Restraining Government Spending: The Age of Retirement

 

A third option is to restrain public spending elsewhere making room for more health spending in the total. Given that other parts of the public system are also demanding increases in their share of the public cake advocating such restraint is easier said than done

 

The one area where there seems considerable agreement – the Prime Minister excepted – is to raise the age of eligibility for New Zealand Superannuation. My view is that this is little to do with fiscal stress but is about how we should think about increasing longevity. The age of 65 was chosen in 1898 when life expectation for 65-year-olds was 13 years. Today it is 20 years. Suppose it was 35 years so that most 65-year-olds lived past 100. Would an age of eligibility of 65 make any sense?

 

As long as longevity continues to creep up, the age of eligibility will have to rise. What we must avoid is the raising of the age in a hurry as is happening in European countries in fiscal crisis. It needs to be signalled so people can prepare for it and there needs to be an extension of the principle that those below that age who are struggling are entitled to a benefit under the sickness and invalids provisions.

 

While the basic case for raising the age of eligibility above 65 is the rising longevity, doing so would also relieve fiscal stress. Let me put it the other way around. If we dont raise the age, the growing numbers of very elderly with their increasing health care demands we may find that their care has to be restrained. The point needs to be made in the public debate; if we dont get the age up they could all have a more miserable old age when they really need government support. Perhaps we could throw in some sweeteners – such as set maximum waiting times for hip and cataract operations. Can we also reduce the financial pressures on families who are under 65 but need to look after their elderly parents?

 

However the Long Term Fiscal Projections show that the single policy of raising the age of eligibility, would insufficient to eliminate all the fiscal stress. We must look for other measures.

 

Restraining Government Spending on Health Care

 

What about restraining spending on health care? It would be easy to misunderstand what is being proposed here, by mixing up Ministry of Health spending with total spending on health care. Here is the latest year available share of each.

 

Share of Total Health Care Expenditure

            by Source of Funds 2009/10

Source Share
Ministry of Health

72.5%

ACC

8.4%

Other Government Agencies

2.0%

Local Authorities

0.3%

Total Public Funding

83.2%

Private Household

10.5%

Health Insurance

4.9%

Not-for-Profit Organisations

1.4%

Total Private Funding

16.8%

Source: Health Expenditure Trends in New Zealand 2000-2010

 

So the Long Term Fiscal Projection was looking at less than three-quarters of total health care spending. Add in ACC whose funds come from a separate levy, and some other minor public funding and five-sixths of the total spending on health care comes from the public purse. Conversely one-sixth comes from private funding; mainly from households directly and the health insurance they pay.

 

The spending by households was in the following broad categories:

– insurance                                                                   $1000m

– medical goods dispensed to outpatients [4]             $641m

– outpatient dental care                                               $400m

– curative and rehabilitative care (inpatient)               $361m

– all other specialised health care                                $284m

– all other outpatient care                                            $129m

– long term nursing care                                              $109m

– basic medical and diagnostic services [5]                 $  84m

– curative and rehabilitative care (outpatient)             $  34m

(For an order of magnitude, $2000m represents 1 percent of annual GDP).

 

Some of the the spending is on treatments of little medical worth (placebo and attitudinal effects aside). Subtract those with unproven effectiveness and some sorts of cosmetic surgery, and the share of public provision for health care would be even higher than five-sixths. However for international comparisons this is the ratio we have to use.

 

Share of Public Funding in Total Health Spending

(2010 or nearest)

Place OECD Country Public Share %
1 Netherlands

84.7

2 Denmark

84.5

3 Britain

84.2

4 Norway

84.0

5 Czech Republic

83.4

6 Luxembourg

82.2

7 Iceland

82.0

8 Sweden

81.4

9 New Zealand

80.5

10 Japan

80.5

  OECD AVERAGE

70.6

26 Australia

69.0

32 United States

49.0

 

In 2009 New Zealand comes about tenth out of the 35 OECD countries for the share of public provision of health care. It was behind the Netherlands, the Scandinavians, Britain, the Czech Republic and Luxembourg; New Zealand ratio is well above the weighted OECD average of 71 percent.

 

The Fiscal Projection considers restricting public health-care provision to 9 percent of annual GDP in 2060. Suppose, however, total outlays – public and private – remained the same at, say, 12.5 percent with the gap made up by direct household payments, greater private insurance and even employer-based medical insurance. The public contribution to total health care falls to 72 percent (from 84%) and New Zealand government share would fall to about the middle of the 35.

Please do not get paranoiac. The Treasury was exploring the implications of restraining public outlays on health. I dont think it shows much enthusiasm for such a structural change, certainly far less than there was during the National Government’s health services redisorganisation of the early 1990s. Presumably we have learned from the experience; the Americanisation of the health care system looks even less attractive, despite the improvements of Obamacare. It is well to remember that informed US opinion admires the unified funding system which New Zealand, among others, has.

 

Alternative Funding Arrangements?

 

Instead of the current funding arrangements, one might favour a compulsory system in which individuals pay into a single national fund at a rate which reflects their insurable medical needs. This would not involve competing (private) insurers, which would end the principle of unified funding.

 

The merits of such a change from the existing system are not evident. It would be complicated to administer, there would be problems about calculating the appropriate insurable rates and individuals would fall between the cracks. It would certainly not take health funding out of politics, one of the dreams of many in the health sector. There would still be rationing, there would still be supply failures, politicians would still have to set the overall levies (as they do for ACC) and aggrieved individuals would still appeal to politicians.

 

The only advantage of switching over to a national health funding system based on insurance that I can discern is that it would be a surreptitious means of increasing taxation, since a compulsory levy amounts to a tax.

 

Raising Taxes

 

In my view there is the possibility of raising tax levels in the long run. Earlier I said that the strongest case for keeping tax levels down is to be competitive in a globalising world. But the rest of the world is facing the same pressures for additional health care spending as New Zealand does. This will put pressure on their fiscal systems too, which in part could be relieved by higher tax rates. We can follow, or even cautiously lead.

 

The resulting balance of the tax increases is an open matter. It may mean higher rates for existing taxes, there may also be possibilities for new taxes and extending the existing tax base.

 

The issue was discussed briefly by the panel, but it would have been outside the terms of reference – the implications of the existing fiscal stance – to have devoted too much time to them. That is ongoing business.

Conclusion

 

I am not too pessimistic about the future of public health spending. However it will not be easy. Of course the easy solution for those in the health sector to say that funding is not their business, they are just going to spend it. If they take that approach, they face the possibility a repeat of the early 1990s, in which some who knew nothing about health care – or even health economics – tried to redisorganise it according to a formulaic ideology.

 

What is the alternative? The first thing is to press ahead with improving the productivity of the sector as much as we can.

 

Second, are there any activities which can be better provided by the private sector? Before you say ‘nonsense’, I have long been an advocate of increasing the range of over-the-counter medicine – prudently of course. We have done some of that recently.

 

My pragmatic position is that if we could find a decent solution by transferring the health sector or a part of it to private provision, we should do so. But sadly, despite much pondering, I have never found one.

 

Reflecting, I’ve realised that much government spending is because there is no satisfactory private solution. That is why the Americans – who have sought to use market solutions more than any other rich country – have ended up with such a goddam awful health care system – inefficient, inequitable and expensive. It is also true for other spending areas, such as the environment and heritage parts of culture, recreation and infrastructure. I am also not much impressed by market solutions to the provision of education although they seem to work better for training.

 

So I dont think that the only reason for government intervention is the income distribution; too often we lapse into the distributional excuse because it is easier than thinking.

 

The difficulty is that the all spending areas I have just listed as requiring susbtantial government provision have increasing demand with affluence. The rising demand for the services creates fiscal stress which has to be met by rising tax levels with all the complications they generate. Health care is only the most prominent example because it is the largest. (Some growth sectors are better provided for by the market; fortunately personal transport, from cars to flights, requires much less government involvement.)

 

Recognising the problem is the most important thing that those in the health sector can do in public policy terms. There is no simple solution and we need to respect those who struggle with the fiscal pressure. By working with them, we are likely to end up with as good a health system as we deserve. Not working with them and New Zealanders will suffer an inferior quality of life.

 

 

Endnotes

[1] I am grateful for contributions to this paper by Rob Bowie, Elizabeth Caffin, Geoff Fougere, Alan Gray, Diane Owenga and Paul Rodwell.

[2] More generally it is hard to see fundamental differences in expenditure patterns between right and left governments, with one salient exception. Governments of the right tend to be much more restrictive than governments of the left when it comes to social security.

[3] There is always a problem with the start-up assumptions in the any long-term projection. These assume that the government’s announced spending plans to 2014/5. As it happens the government says it plans to reduce public spending on health care as a proportion of GDP, in part because there is an allowance in the forecasts for future spending which is not allocated by sector. The effect is to depress the base from which the public health spending is projected, possibly by as much as 1 percent of GDP. I shall be very surprised if, with an election looming, that the government keeps to the health spending track set out in the budget.

[4] ‘Medical goods dispensed to outpatients’ include self-medication and other goods consumed by households (which may not be on prescription). This ranges from over-the-counter pharmaceuticals and bandages to alternative medicines.

[5] Includes private payments to GPs.

 

Market Daze

Can the property companies that run rest homes provide effective care?

 

Listener: 14 November, 2013

 

Keywords: Regulation & Taxation; Retirement Policy; Social Policy;

 

I have had to visit a number of rest homes for the elderly. Such visits can be pretty draining. The one positive is the caring and concerned staff – extraordinarily so, given we pay them miserable wages and they are often overworked.

 

So I was much astonished – and shocked – when a woman visiting a rest home found, on three occasions, her 69-year-old mother covered in her own faeces. The official investigation concluded that there was a “failure to fully comply” with eight health and disability services standards. I take it there was insufficient auditing by the Ministry of Health and the district health board, which set the standards.

 

The rest-home owner promptly sacked its manager, and the authorities, I understand, have tightened their supervision of the residential homes.

 

As this outraged citizen subsided into being an economist, I realised this was yet another example of light-handed regulation in which the authorities were relying on the market and reputation to enforce their standards.

 

This column has drawn attention to many other examples, including leaky buildings, workplace accidents, telecommunications and electricity pricing and finance company collapses. Add residential care to the list – and there will be more. When the failure has become too apparent, we take action, but they keep happening elsewhere.

 

Trade Minister Tim Groser has expressed disappointment over the food safety record of the Ministry of Primary Industries. A government funding squeeze meant there were not enough resources to do a proper job.

 

That is probably a factor in other failures, too. But more fundamentally, we are lazy, or ideological, when thinking about regulating markets that lack a coherent framework.

 

My economist’s instinct is to ask why standard market regulation went wrong. We normally assume that consumers can monitor the services provided to them and respond when there is failure. That is not possible for a 69-year-old with dementia. She was lucky to have a caring daughter regularly visiting her.

 

My impression is that many rest-home residents are not so often visited – for good reasons (the family lives elsewhere or does not exist) and for sad ones. The casual way that the failing rest home recorded visitor concerns suggests that there were insufficient visitors to pose a threat. One wonders whether there are other care failures that are not picked up because of the absence of visitors and perfunctory external auditing.

 

About the same time as the rest home was in the news, the Productivity Commission released an issues paper on the design and operation of government regulatory regimes. It is a strange paper riddled with high-flown notions but bereft of any specific examples. I found it of no use for the sorts of regulatory issues I work on. Like Sherlock Holmes, I need facts. The report reminds me of the economist who read the Kama Sutra a dozen times but had never been out with a woman.

 

As I pondered further on rest-home care, I realised that – as with many health services – the consumer (the resident) and the funder (primarily the government) are different entities. That means the normal market mechanism, in which the supplier is paid by the consumer, doesn’t apply.

 

I then recalled that when I was shopping around for a rest home, one rating system listed not-for-profit organisations as the top suppliers. That may not be true of all districts. Nor does it mean all for-profit organisations provide poor quality care. I was impressed at the time by some family-run rest homes.

 

Some of the biggest residential care suppliers are essentially property companies – at least that is the way they present themselves to investors. I do not have difficulties with property companies providing property, but I am not sure they can effectively provide residential care on the side.

 

I wonder whether there might not be benefits from separating the two. It may well be that residents (and taxpayers) will get a better deal if the property companies lease their buildings to agencies with a care culture, rather than one of building management.

 

This is a tentative proposal – devising regulatory frameworks requires a lot of skill. But the elderly deserve a better deal.

Economic Integration and Global Security

<>Asia-Pacific Integration: The Economic and Security Dimensions for New Zealand NZIIA Seminar: Wednesday, 13 November 2013 [1]

 

Keywords: Globalisation & Trade;

 

My theme today is on the impact of economic integration on global security. The thesis may be illustrated by the French political economist and diplomat, Jean Monnet who should have been awarded a Nobel Prize.[2] He played a key role in the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community the precursor of today’s European Union. He pursued it because he saw that if France and Germany had an integrated coal and steel industry, they would not be able to fight one another. There has since been no devastating war in Europe comparable to the two great ones in the 60 years before the ECSC was founded.

 

Only certain sorts of integration work like this. When Britain and Germany went to war in 1914– with others – their financial systems were highly interdependent. British banks owed loans to German banks which in turn owed loans to other British ones. What the British Treasury did – Keynes was involved – was transfer the German debts to British banks, offsetting the British loans to Germany.

 

No, the sort of integration I am concerned with today is where products cross international borders and the economies become entangled as a result. Germany could not fight France if its arsenal depended on French production and conversely for France. Even a Keynes could not magic away that interdependence if the borders froze.

 

What has been happening after the Second World War is a major transformation in international trade. It has various aspects, like intra-industry trade when Germans purchase French assembled cars and the French purchase German assembled ones.

 

Another key phenomenon is value chaining in which assembly in one country uses components made elsewhere. At one stage a Honda assembled in America had more American content than did a Ford. Similarly, your jacket with a label ‘made in China’, where it was assembled, may contain components – material, threads, buttons, zips – which came from other (typically South East Asian) countries. We saw this when the tsunami which hit Japan closed down factories elsewhere because their components plants were devastated.

 

This is not the sort of international trade which is described by comparative advantage. We New Zealanders, immersed in the 200 year-old theory, need to be confronted by comparative advantage is no longer a comprehensive account of international trade. Some, of course, is absolute advantage – like oil from the Middle East. But the more recent form is sometimes described as ‘competitive advantage’. It requires thinking about international trade in quite a different way.

 

Some background before I review the limitations in our thinking. About 30 years ago, economists became increasingly aware that international trade was no longer driven only by absolute and comparative advantage. Particularly important were the insights of Paul Krugman for which he received an economics prize in honour of Alfred Nobel in 2008. I wrote a book Globalisation and the Wealth of Nations about it in 2006.

 

Some recent research illustrates this increasing complexity. Where do we get our merchandise imports from? Usually we report imports by gross value. The pecking order for 2009 is given in the following table.

 

New Zealand Imports: 2009

Gross Imports

Value Added Imports

Economy

Share (%)

Economy

Share (%)

Australia

18.4

EU27

25.2

EU27

17.3

US

15.5

China

15.1

Australia

15.1

ASEAN

13.1

China

 9.6

US

10.8

Japan

 7.4

Japan

 7.4

ASEAN

 7.3

Other

17.9

Other

19.9

Source: Statistics NZ &http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=TIVA_OECD_WTO

 

The first two columns, which shows gross imports by source, will be familiar. Australia is our biggest source of gross imports. I’ve combined all the EU into a single economy – reflecting the economic reality – it comes second. Then China, ASEAN – which is not as integrated as the EU but may be moving in that direction, the US and Japan. Between them, the big six provide New Zealand with 82 percent of its imports.

 

The third and fourth columns show the import source by where the value was added. Thus if a product is assembled in Australia from components made in the EU, the measure attributes the import to each country in proportion to the activity involved in each.

 

The biggest source is now the EU – a quarter of our merchandise exports by value are made there. It is followed by the US, Australia, China, Japan and then ASEAN. The same big six, and still contributing much the same proportion – 80 percent – to our imports. But the rankings are different. The contributions from the sophisticated EU and the US rise, Japan holds its own, and the other three fall.

 

The three whose share is lowered are at the end of the value chain, assembling from components produced in other economies. As far as we are concerned, value chaining is much more important in our part of the world, although both the EU and the US have considerable internal value chaining between members and states.

 

I am not going to do the same thing for merchandise exports. Instead I am going to look at h0w much of gross exports are made in the exporting country. A tabulation of 56 countries shows the ratio of domestic content to gross exports ranging from 97 percent value added for oil exporter Saudi Arabia to 41 percent for Luxembourg.[3]

 

Size matters: the ratio of value added to gross exports for the US and EU were 88 and 86 percent respectively. Not surprisingly the ratio for each EU economy is below its aggregate, ranging from 83 percent for Britain – large and physically isolated from the continent – down to half that for Luxembourg – small surrounded by others with similar industrial structures. The French and German ratios are 75 and 73 percent respectively.

 

There is no aggregate for ASEAN. Of the eight for which there are estimates, resource exporters Brunei and Indonesia are high (89 and 86 percent), five are in the range of 66 to 61 percent – close to the 68 percent average – and entrepôt Singapore is at 50 percent, lowest except for Luxembourg. Despite its size, China is 67 percent. Asia is heavily into value chain exporting.

 

Given it is isolated and a resource exporter of food and fibre you would expect New Zealand to have a high ratio, even though it is small. It is 13th out of the 56 with an average of 82 percent, immediately below Britain and well above the average. Australia is higher at 87 percent because of its mineral exports which, of course, are not exported to New Zealand; we get their value chain exports.

 

This data is only recent, but it emphasises that there are complicated things going on in international trade, and I have not even touched upon international trade in services. Before moving on to the profound security implications, let me add some pointers for New Zealand.

 

The first is that we need to break away from thinking that international trade is only about comparative advantage. We need to build into the national thinking the growing complexity and not be trapped by outdated thinking.

 

A particular example is the government has a goal to lift our exports to 40 per cent of GDP by 2025. (The current level is about 30 per cent.) I understand the figure was selected on the basis of comparing other economies similar to ours. But it was a crude comparison, and did not recognise our insolation nor role as a resource supplier. I doubt New Zealand is going to soon get into the middle of many value added production chains – we are not Luxembourg.

 

Third, but briefly, we have to pay more attention to the European Union because of the major role it plays in a source of our imports.

 

A final point is that perhaps we need to rethink our strategy for international trade in foodstuffs. Have we exhausted the gains from pursuing the case for comparative advantage – even though it remains true? Here’s an off the wall suggestion. The notion that a country’s food security can be based on self-sufficiency is very wrong – ask a nineteenth century Irish potato farmer. My guess is that a system in which there is free trade in foodstuffs with prudent provision for stocks and international arrangements for sharing in times of stress will provide far greater security.

 

Which leads on to the issue of general security and economic integration. We observe the tangle of the noodle bowl of free trade agreements. They reflect the greater entangling of international trade, an entangling which is making a prolonged great war increasingly unrealistic. There are some exceptions.

 

First, a quick conflict may be possible – not only sabre rattling but the occasional sabre slashing. But not for long. Sufficiently entangled economies will come to a limping halt through the automatic trade sanctions with entangled producers on either side of the border desperate for peace so they can resume obtaining necessary components.

 

This is not to argue that the international economic entanglement will contribute much to ending terrorism for terrorists are not particularly involved in international trade. Nor does it deal with isolated countries. The ideal of getting North Korea involved in international economic intercourse contradicts the strategy of isolating it through sanctions.

 

Thus I welcome India and Pakistan opening up economically towards one another. The steps are tentative but they are under way. Similarly I am glad to see India and China increasing their economic intercourse. It is probably not enough yet to prevent armed conflict, but again it is in a positive direction.

 

What is New Zealand to do about this? Our location in the international economy is more traditional but that does not mean everyone else’s is. Even if we cannot get as involved as they do, we should certainly encourage economic entanglement. To be fair, our strategy towards international economic relations is very compatible with such an approach.

 

A final summarising thought. I opened by saying that Jean Monnet should have been awarded a peace prize. There is a sense in which he was – implicitly and posthumously. Only last year – sixty years after the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community – the European Union was awarded the Nobel peace prize for ‘for [having] over six decades contributed to the advancement of peace and reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe.’

 

Sixty years of peace in Europe after two terrible wars in the previous sixty years should be celebrated. It has been a long haul. The next sixty years of such peace in the Asia-Pacific region would be worth a celebration too. Economic entanglements are making their contribution to that possibility.

 

Appendix Table: Percent Domestic Content of Exports (Selected Economies)

(Number gives ranking out of 56)

ASIA European Union Other
 

 

1. Saudi Arabia

97

5. Brunei

89

 

4. United States

89

 

 

7. Australia

88

8. Indonesia

86

.EU27

86

 

9. Japan

85

 

 

 

12. Britain

83

 

 

 

13. New Zealand

14. Chile

82

 

 

15. Canada

80

19. India

78

 

   
 

22. France

75

   
 

26. Germany

73

   
27. Hong Kong

72

 

   
34. China

67

 

   
38. Cambodia

66

 

   
40. Thailand

 

   
45. Viet Nam

64

 

   
47. Malaysia

48. Philippines

62

 

   
51. Korea

59

 

   
52. Taiwan

 

   
55. Singapore

50

 

   
 

56 Luxembourg

41

   

Source: http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=TIVA_OECD_WTO

 

 

 

Endnotes

[1] I am grateful for a grant from the Asia New Zealand Foundation which enabled me to examine some of the ideas in this paper in South East Asia.

[2] There is not the space to discuss whether the French foreign minister Robert Schuman (1886-1963) should be a joint recipient.

[3] The EU and ASEAN countries are treated separately.

Top Market Incomes 1981-2011

<>Keywords: Distributional Economics; Statistics;

 

 

Introduction [1]

 

One of the few useful sources of market income information is incomes declared for tax purposes. Even so it has limitations.

 

It is administrative data and so is sensitive to changes in statute and administrative policy. Thus the definition of income is that set by the law. In the New Zealand case the law generally omits capital gains. Coverage is affected by administrative practice. Low income recipients may not need to report their incomes (the government relying on PAYE to tax them).[2] The available data excludes trusts and companies.

 

Even so it is the best data we have. Robert Solow famously justified some statistical work he was doing, by citing the addicted gambler who knew ‘the casino wheel is crooked but it is the only one in town’.

 

In any case others have used the data.[3]This paper reports on and interprets their data in order to get a better understand what has been happening.

 

Data Sources

 

All the data used here ultimately comes from the Department of Inland Revenue. It is based on a sample of IR3 and IR5 tax returns for each of the 31 years from 1981 to 2011.[4]

 

The data consists of a taxable income band, the number of taxpayers in the band and their total taxable income.[5] The bands vary from year to year, but are narrow enough to enable the required calculations to be done with sufficient precision.

 

Defining the Top One Percent and Their Income Share

 

It was soon evident that the coverage of those reported in the data base has varied, reflecting the administrative decisions of who is required to file a return, together with the ability to reconstruct a return for those who are not required to file.

 

Taxpayers numbered in 1981 were 70.9 percent of the adult population over 15; in 2011 they were 98.2 percent.[6,7] The most important reason for the rise has been the inclusion of the PAYE record for individuals who did not file. It would be misleading to compare the one percent of tax reporters in 1981 with the one percent in 2011.

 

Instead, the one percent is defined here as the top one percent of ‘adults’ (over the age of 15)  irrespective of whether they appear in the IRD statistics.[8] That represents about 23,000 individuals in 1981 and 35,000 in 2011 with a corresponding (almost) linear growth between.

 

If taxpayer coverage varies over time, then so must the coverage of the aggregate incomes which they report. There is no uncontaminated benchmark series as for population. The best I could find comes from the Household Sector Account from the System of National Accounts of primary income receivable.[9] It does not match taxable income because ‘social security benefits in cash’ and ‘social assistance in cash’ are included in taxable income.[10]

 

The appendix table shows the resulting declared taxable income of the top 1 percent of adults, together with four other measures. as a share of aggregate income.

 

The Top Ten Percent

 

Exactly the same method was used to calculate the share of the top 10 percent. The difference between that share and the share of the one percent is the share of the next 9 percent which is also shown in the appendix table.

 

The top 10 percent amounted to 350,000 people in 2011. They reported more than $71,000 of taxable income in a year when the annualised average  wage was about $51,000. The closeness of the two reflects that there is a large tail of adults who are not full-time wage earners, including part-time workers, superannuitants, beneficiaries and other non-earners. (Only 22 percent of the adult population declared more than the annualised average wage.)

 

The Pareto Coefficient

 

Vilfredo Pareto famously proposed that upper incomes followed a power probability law which is today called the ‘Pareto distribution’. Its shape is characterised by a single parameter, the ‘Pareto Coefficient’, which he thought was universally near to 2. While practically top incomes roughly follow a Pareto distribution, the Pareto Coefficient itself is much more variable between countries and over time. In the case of early postwar New Zealand it was typically above 2.5, rising, and near 3.0 in the mid-1970s.[11]

 

The larger the Pareto Coefficient, the less unequal the distribution. (Thus the rising coefficient in the early part of the post-war era indicates that inequality was falling.) [12]

 

The Top 0.1 Percent

 

Overseas studies often report the share of the top 0.1 percent. Given the difficulties with the New Zealand data, any estimation can be treacherous. Statistically the tabulations are derived by sampling. Estimates using them will be less satisfactory where the numbers are small and the distribution highly skewed, as applies for the very top of the income distribution.

 

The issue of under-reporting for tax avoidance poses additional problems. Those with high incomes can avoid declaring offshore income for taxable purposes by using the residential rules and spending sufficient time out of New Zealand.[13] Trusts and income splitting may also be important.  (Such avoidance may also occur among those on lower incomes, although there is less incentive.)

 

As well as the reporting difficulties, the upper open interval is usually too big to enable a direct estimate. For instance in 2011 there were about the 3,500 in the top 0.1 percent of the population, but those in the upper open interval numbered 13,040.

 

Instead, the upper income tail is assumed to be Pareto distributed and the share of the top 0.1 percent is estimated from the share of the top one percent using the Pareto coefficient.

 

What Does the Top of the New Zealand Market Income Distribution Look Like?[14]

 

The Appendix Table provides statistics of the shares for the top income categories and the Pareto coefficients for each of the 31 (mainly March) years between 1981 and 2011 inclusive. Its interpretation is illustrated by consideration of the last (2011) year.

 

In 2011 the top one percent of individuals declared about 9.2 percent of the total market income of New Zealand. That means that their average market income was 9.2 times that of the average New Zealand adult.[15] The top 10 percent declared 35.4 percent share of the total income, so they averaged 3.5 that of the average New Zealander. The top 0.1 percent declared that they received (after avoidance) 22 times what the average New Zealander received.

 

How do these shares compare internationally? Such comparisons are very difficult because they may cover different populations (notably taxpayers rather than adults) and income aggregates (declared taxable income rather than the total). For the record, there is data for 18 OECD countries; their average for share of the top one percent comes to 9.8 percent, so the New Zealand share appears to be near the average of the reported OECD shares.[16]

 

The following may be useful benchmarks for the 2011 tax year:

10 percent of adults had incomes above about $70,000

1 percent of adults had incomes above about $165,000

0.1 percent of adults had incomes above about $420,000

Annualised average Wages = $51,000

 

The Pareto coefficient was 2.6; it cannot be readily interpreted for these purposes. However that the average of 17 OECD countries in 2005 came to 2.1 so New Zealand was probably less unequal on this measure, although it may be easier for rich New Zealanders to move offshore or into capital gains in order to escape the full impact of the New Zealand taxation regime.[17]

 

Inequality at the Top over Time (See The Appendix Table and Figure)

 

The four indicators change over the 31 years. There is probably not a lot to be gained from a year-to-year analysis because of sampling variability. However there are distinctive trends. Most fundamentally, the share of the top groups is higher at the end of the 31 years than at the beginning, while the Pareto Coefficient is correspondingly lower.[18]

 

Thus the top one percent had a share of 6.0 percent in 1981 and 9.2 percent in 2011. (The share of the top 0.1 percent rose from 1.2 percent to 2.2 percent in the same period. The top 10 percent from 30.1 percent to 35.4 percent.)

 

The change over time is not smooth; for all measures most of the changes occur in the early 1990s. The share of the top 0.1 percent increases by about 1.5 percentage points between 1989 and 1993; the share of the top one percent leaps from roughly 6 percent to roughly 10 percent between 1989 and 1993 (Since this includes the 0.1 percent, it means that the remaining 0.9 percent get about an additional 2.5 percentage points between them). The share of the top 10 percent shows a leap of about 10 percentage points in the same period (so the next 9 percent have a lift of about 6 percentage points). Similarly the Pareto Coefficient hovers around 3 in the 1980s (a level similar to the late 1970s) and then falls to 2.3 in 1993.[19]

 

After 1993 there seems to a mildly rising trend peaking at the turn of the century, and then falling. The lessening of inequality seems to precede the arrival of the Global Financial Crisis. Or it could be argued that the trends after 1993 are broadly flat.

 

Why the Increase?

 

Before trying to answer the question as to why there has been an increase in inequality at the top, three points need to be cleared away:

– this is a personal income distribution, it is not the same as the household income distribution, which much of the New Zealand income distribution debate has focussed on, and does not map easily to it.[20]

– this is the market distribution and, subject to the discussion on dividend imputation below, does not take into account income tax changes which, generally favouring the rich, have increased their share of after-tax incomes even further. (Almost all the discussion on the household income distribution is after-tax and with cash social assistance.)

– the dramatic change occurs in a very short period – not earlier than 1989; not later than 1993. There is little evidence in the data of a long term trend (nor – perhaps more surprisingly – of a business cycle).

 

What might have been the causes of the widening of the income distribution at the top? The main reasons seem to be two fold.

1. The Impact of the Dividend Imputation System

 

Until 1989 it was said that corporate dividends were ‘doubled taxed’. First corporate profits paid corporation tax and then, dividends paid from the tax-paid profits were treated as taxable income of the shareholder. Of course in practice things were much more complicated for there was considerable tax avoidance.

 

From 1989 there has been a dividend imputation system in which a shareholder receiving a dividend from a company is entitled to an ‘imputation credit’, which represents tax paid by the company, and is used to reduce or eliminate the shareholder’s income tax liability.[21] In effect corporation tax becomes a withholding tax for shareholders’ dividends.

 

The (intended) effect was to encourage the distribution of corporate earnings with the consequence that shareholders were less dependent on capital gains and other artifices (such as returning to shareholder their capital investment) to access their share of corporate profits. The alternatives are explicitly designed to avoid reporting personal income; a dividend imputation system does not have the same disincentive (while giving the shareholder easier access to corporate profits). In effect it puts some previously unreported income (including capital gains) on the IRD books.

 

This altered the way that dividends are recorded in the tabulation. Thus $100 of corporate profits which were taxed at, say, 33 percent and fully paid out were recorded as $67 before imputation but as $100 after the new regime was introduced. This is in addition to the encouragement to corporations to pay more dividends which get reported for income tax purposes.[22]

 

In the 1988 year, (natural) persons declared $152m of net dividends. By 1993, after the imputation was introduced and had settled in, they were declaring $691m in net dividends which grossed up (i.e. with $252m of the corporation tax paid on them added back) came to $943m. That meant that reported dividends jump from about 0.4 percent of estimated market income to 2.1 percent.[23]

 

We are unable to attribute all this increase to those with incomes in the top 10 percent since some of the other 90 percent receive some dividends. However it would appear that as a result the top one percent declared an income boost of about 1 percentage point share of total income.

 

The share of declared dividends in total income continue to rise. By 2011 they probably amounted to 3.0 percent, up about another 1 percentage point on 1993.[24] However there was an increase after 2000 in income routed through trusts. It is possible that the turn down in the share of the top 1 percent in the following decade reflects this. In which case it is possible that, had there been no acceleration in the amounts distributed through trusts in the decade, the share of the top 1 percent would have been a percentage point (or even two) higher and there would have been no fall-off after 2000.

 

Strangely there is not evidence that this later increase in dividends increased the top share of incomes.[25] In any case it only explains a part of what was going on in the early 1990s.

 

2. Rewards for managers rose relative to rewards for labour

 

It would seem that the rewards for managers (and higher professionals) rose relative to the rewards for ordinary labour. This can be illustrated by considering the ratio between the salary of the Secretary of the Treasury and average earnings.[26] In 1981 it was about 5.6 times of the average wage but in 2011 it was almost double that at about 11.1 times. The Secretary’s remuneration pattern is little different for many senior civil servants, and was justified by a similar shift in top management rates in the private sector.

 

Exactly why this happened is complicated, but how it happened is not. The 1988 State Sector Act abandoned the rigid relativities that existed in the public service, enabling higher relative remuneration to the top civil servants, while most civil servants were experiencing restricted increases (or declines). Probably the same thing was happening in the private sector. (An important factor may have been the globalisation of the market for management and higher professional.)

 

It will be noted this change just preceded the time when the share of the one percent increased markedly.

 

Unfortunately however, we cannot estimate its total magnitude to assess to what degree that explains the rest of the upshift.[27]

 

Conclusion

 

The purpose of this paper has been to use IRD data to track changes in top incomes. Although some calibration is necessary and there has to be caution over omissions it has been possible to track from the tax year 1981 to tax year 2011 (the latest for which IRD data is available).

 

The basic conclusion is that there has been an increase in inequality, in that top incomes have increased faster than incomes as a whole. However most of this increase occurred in the 1989 to 1991 period probably because of an increase in remuneration margins for management and the introduction of a dividend imputation system.

 

There is some evidence that the share of top market incomes gradually rose after 1993 through to about 2000 (albeit interpretation of the data is complicated by some tax avoidance) and then as gradually fell away. The indicators suggest that on the measures of top incomes, inequality was lower in 2011 than in 1993 but higher than in 1988.[28]

 

Calibration difficulties make international comparisons difficult, so we must be cautious about ranking New Zealand’s top income inequality with economies elsewhere. However there is no evidence of a surge in inequality in the New Zealand data in the first decade of the twenty first century, as has occurred in the UK and the US, probably because New Zealand does not have as sophisticated financial sectors as they have. If anything, the share of those with top incomes seems to have fallen slightly in that period, perhaps as a consequence of the Global Financial Crisis.

 

Endnotes

[1] I am grateful for comments on earlier drafts by Norman Gemmell, Bill Rosenberg and Sandra Watson.

[2] For instance, in the 1981 tabulation excludes taxpayers who earned less than $11,500 per annum and were not required to file tax returns.

[3] The World Top Incomes Database http://topincomes.g-mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/

[4] The data for 2002 to 2011 is on their website. I asked the Department to supply me with the data file released in 2004 to Andrew Leith and Tony Atkinson from 1981 to 2003, which they did promptly. I am grateful for assistance from Sandra Watson, Manager, Forecasting and Analysis, Policy and Strategy, Inland Revenue.

http://www.nuffield.ox.ac.uk/users/atkinson/AtkinsonLEIGH_NewZealand08.pdf, page 46.

The two sets of series overlap by two years, a comparison of which confirms they are the same series.

[5] The data covers natural persons and excludes trusts and corporations.

[6] Tax years. For most taxpayers these are year ending in March

[7] The 98 percent includes children and those earning wages for part of a year then moving overseas.

[8] Under 15s may appear in the list, but there will be very few of them in the top one percent.

[9] It is based on Table 2.11 of national disposal income, The series was kindly supplied by Jeff Cope of SNZ.

[10] We are assuming that the top ten percent receive little of these transfers. Some superannuitants do.

[11] B. H. Easton (1983) Income Distribution in New Zealand, p.181.

[12] The coefficients were estimated by using the simple relationship between the mean and the bottom income of a Pareto distribution.

[13] See New Zealand tax residence. Who is a New Zealand resident for tax purposes?

http://www.ird.govt.nz/resources/a/3/a35bbb804bbe588fbc1efcbc87554a30/ir292.pdf

The general rule is summarised by

‘You’re a New Zealand tax resident if:

• you’re in New Zealand for more than 183 days in any 12-month period, or

• you have an “enduring relationship” with New Zealand, or

• you’re away from New Zealand in the service of the New Zealand government.’

People who are not New Zealand tax residents (non-residents) are liable for New Zealand tax only on their New Zealand-sourced income.

[14] As declared for tax purposes.

[15] On the basis of the handful of countries for which there are estimates the inclusion of capital gains might add about 1 percentage point to the top 1 percent’s income share, although having no capital gains tax to speak of is likely to incentivise accruing income in that form..

[16] http://topincomes.g-mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/#Home: The denominators may not be consistent.

[17] A B Atkinson, T. Piketty & E. Saez (2010?) Top Incomes in the Long Run of History

http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/fichiers/public/AtkinsonPikettySaezOUP09summary.pdf, Table 13.1.

[18] There is a marked blip in the March 2000 year. The Labour Government had been elected in 1999 on a promise to raise the top income tax rate from April 2000. Many of the rich arranged their income flows to pull income forward into the lower tax year. However the income shares fall in the following few years and a moving average over the period shows only the most marginal peaking in 2000. See I. Claus, J. Creedy & J. Teng (2012) The Elasticity of Taxable Income in New Zealand Ne W Zealand Treasury Working Paper 12/03.

[19] Perhaps surprisingly, there is no evidence of the impact of the 1987 sharemarket boom and bust in the data.

[20] B. H. Easton (2013) Economic Inequality in New Zealand: A User’s Guide.

http://www.eastonbh.ac.nz/2013/12/economic-inequality-in-new-zealand-a-users-guide/

[21] Dividend imputation is a corporate tax system in which some or all of the tax paid by a company may be attributed, or imputed, to the shareholders by way of a tax credit to reduce the income tax payable on a distribution. In comparison to the classical system, it reduces or eliminates the tax disadvantages of distributing dividends to shareholders by only requiring them to pay the difference between the corporate rate and their marginal rate. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dividend_imputation.

[22] We could have a vigorous argument at this point as to what extent the declared increase reflected a genuine increase in market incomes and to what extent it was the result of closing a tax avoidance loophole and an accounting convention of reporting them grossed up, the effect of which was to reduce their tax liability. The second interpretation would suggest the change belongs more to a change in after-tax incomes. We leave the debate to another venue. Our purpose is of measurement.

[23] The income indicator measures dividends grossed up.

[24] Additionally 2011 may have been a low year because of changes in tax treatment.

[25] Of course some dividends are flowing through trusts.

[26] The Secretary of the Treasury was paid $61,953 in 1981 and about $565,000 in 2011.

[27] Tim Hunter of The Dominion Post kindly made available a data base he has been collecting of the pay of chief executives of 34 listed companies. It suggests that their remuneration rates increased by about 10.7 percent p.a. in the 2009 to 2012 period; the data base shows an increase of market income per adult of 1.3 percent p.a. over the same period.

[28] However post 2000 is complicated by the 39c rate avoidance -the more fungible income moved into other entities, and was no longer declared by natural persons.

 

 

Appendix Table: Shares of Income and Pareto Coefficients

TaxYear

PERCENT INCOME SHARE OF

Pareto

Coefficient

Top 0.1%

Next 0.9%

Top 1%

Next 9%

Top 10%

1981

1.2

4.8

6.0

24.1

30.1

3.1

1982

1.3

4.6

5.9

24.1

30.0

3.0

1983

1.2

4.7

5.9

24.9

30.8

3.2

1984

1.3

4.8

6.1

24.7

30.8

3.0

1985

1.3

4.7

6.0

24.0

30.0

3.0

1986

1.3

4.7

6.0

23.7

29.7

2.9

1987

1.1

4.4

5.5

23.7

29.0

3.3

1988

1.4

4.7

6.1

23.5

29.6

2.7

1989

1.3

4.8

6.1

24.2

30.3

3.0

1990

1.9

5.8

7.7

25.7

33.4

2.7

1991

3.0

7.0

10.0

28.0

38.0

2.5

1992

2.6

6.9

9.5

28.3

37.8

2.1

1993

2.8

7.4

10.2

29.4

39.6

2.3

1994

2.9

7.6

10.5

29.4

39.9

2.3

1995

3.0

7.9

10.9

28.7

39.6

2.2

1996

3.0

7.7

10.7

28.4

39.1

2.2

1997

3.0

7.6

10.6

28.0

38.6

2.2

1998

3.2

7.7

10.9

28.1

39.0

2.2

1999

3.9

8.1

12.1

28.8

40.9

2.0

2000

6.2

10.0

16.2

29.3

45.5

1.7

2001

2.4

7.3

9.7

28.4

38.1

2.6

2002

2.9

7.3

10.2

28.1

38.3

2.2

2003

2.9

7.4

10.3

27.8

38.1

2.2

2004

3.3

7.4

10.7

27.2

37.9

2.0

2005

3.8

7.4

11.2

 26.4

37.6

1.9

2006

2.9

7.3

10.2

26.3

36.5

2.2

2007

2.5

7.3

9.8

26.0

35.8

2.4

2008

2.4

6.9

9.3

25.0

34.3

2.5

2009

2.6

7.3

9.9

25.8

35.7

2.4

2010

2.5

7.2

9.7

26.4

36.1

2.5

2011

2.2

7.0

9.2

26.2

35.4

2.6

Source: As reported in text; ultimately from Inland Revenue and Statistics New Zealand statistics.

MYTH, POLITICIANS AND MARKETS:

The Truth Behind the Free Market by Bryan Gould (Macmillan, $54.95)

This review was commissioned by ‘The Listener’ but not used

 Keywords: History of Ideas, Methodology & Philosophy; Political Economy & History;

The dominant public narrative has a vision of business and the market as progressive forces, held back by unnecessary interventions from politicians and governments. Of course the market is a very old social institution; so the narrative is talking about ‘modern’ markets. But the same is true for the government, for modern government evolved to restrain the excesses of modern markets. Like any new technology it provides both upsides and downsides. Governments try to maximise the former and minimise the latter. But that is not a part of the public narrative. Neo-liberalism treats governments as a bloody nuisance, politicians as interfering old noun-deleted. Business should rule, OK.

 

Bryan Gould rejects this narrative, objecting to the way that neoliberalism undermines the democratic process, instead arguing that government is to balance what an uncontrolled market does. That is not the message the casual reader gets from the media and the ideologues (and ideologies) it promotes. So he has written a book about the neoliberal myths.

 

It focuses on the macroeconomic and financial failures of the unrestrained market while giving much less attention to the failures at the microeconomic level such as environmental depletion, waste and the impoverishing the quality of life. No matter, he faced resource limitations and made choices, but it is well to remind the reader that Gould’s is only half the critique.

 

It is a vigorous one although it will not convince everyone. Neoliberal ideologists are impervious to reason. But open-minded readers will find a compelling story. There are limitations. I often wanted to engage with or elaborate his argument page by page. Perhaps the book should not be read alone but with a vigorous book-group, a chapter a week.

 

The group will travel over many topics – financial failure, exchange rate policy, monetarism inequality … – and many examples including detailed instances from various countries – Australia, Britain, China, the EU, New Zealand the US.

 

There are numerous shrewd insights. The Clark-Cullen ‘government showed itself unable get itself off the tramlines … there were no signs of the intellectual self-confidence needed to open up a real debate about how the economy should be managed’ (from a retired British Labour MP). Or

 

‘Universities are increasingly seen not as repositories of wisdom and civilised values, underpinning the whole breadth of western civilisation and developing educated and rational societies, but more and more as mere agents of economic development, whose role is to generate technological progress which can be turned into commercial advantage’ (from a retired vice-chancellor).

 

His cri-de-coeur is that ‘very few progressive politicians have analysed their situation preferring to tell themselves that they are merely acknowledging what they have persuaded themselves is inevitable and pretending that this central concession leaves intact their political positions on other issues.’ Despite being a (retired) politician Gould has made no such concessions. He can maintain his political position honestly.

Inequality Claims

I reviewed “Inequality: a New Zealand Crisis”, Max Rashbrooke (ed) in “The New Zealand Listener” of 10 October, 2013. (<>http://www.eastonbh.ac.nz/2012/11/is-new-zealand-still-fair/).

It elicited the following letter and my reply.

 

Keywords: Distributional Economics; Statistics;

 

We welcome Brian Easton’s review of Inequality: A New Zealand Crisis (“Books & Culture, October 19) and his acknowledgement that it begins “a valuable discussion”.

However, as the book’s editor and its advisory panel chair, we question several points he raises. He claims the book is “not up to date with the research”, without providing evidence. In fact, the book drew extensively on a wide range of domestic and international sources, including the latest data from the Ministry of Social Development, the OECD and the World Top Incomes Database.

Easton also says we fail to explain that “almost all” of New Zealand’s rise in inequality is the result of tax and benefit changes. However, data compiled by the Treasury in 2012 show that market incomes – before taxes and benefits are taken into consideration – have become significantly more unequal over the past 25 years. If we adjust for household size and composition and take into account inflation, we see that market incomes have fallen since 1987 for many households at the lower end of the distribution and have not changed for those in the middle. In contrast, market incomes have increased significantly for those at the top.

This growing inequality is the result of many forces, including changes to the structure of the economy, the process of globalisation and the diminished bargaining power of many workers. Admittedly, as Easton points out, the tax-welfare system has also become less redistributive since the 1980s – which is why the book has a chapter on how benefits and taxes could be reconfigured to reduce income inequality. But we cannot ignore the role played by increased gaps in market incomes.

Max Rashbrooke & Jonathan Boston (Wellington)

 

Max Rashbrooke and Jonathon Boston complain that my review of their book Inequality: A New Zealand Crisis does not provide evidence for my statement that it is not up to date with the research. (Letters, Nov2). There was not enough space.

There is a survey of the research evidence now going through the scholarly process of evaluation. When it is released to the public, Rashbrooke and Boston and their self-appointed experts will be embarrassed by how much they left out and how much they got wrong.

However the survey confirms that New Zealand income inequality has risen in the last three decades. When once we were in the bottom half of the OECD for income inequality; we are now in the top half.

Rashbrooke and Boston cite evidence that inequality in market income has been recently increasing. They have misunderstood that research while other evidence shows the share of top market incomes has not greatly increased in the last two decades.

I too, was surprised by the conclusion. But as Keynes said when faced with a fact which contradicted a hypothesis, ‘I change my mind. What do you do?’

Brian Easton (Wellington)

 

The Survey refereed to in my letter is published in The New Zealand Journal of Sociology , Vol 28, Issue 3, 2013, pages 9-66. A summary of the paper will be found at http://www.eastonbh.ac.nz/2013/12/economic-inequality-in-new-zealand-a-users-guide-summary/

The Chains That Bind

Modern trade is seldom as simple as importing or exporting from A to B.

 

Listener: 31 October, 2013.

 

Keywords: Globalisation & Trade;

 

Your jacket label may say “made in China” but as likely as not the garment is only assembled there. Half the value of a typical Chinese export is imported. The various components of the jacket – the material, buttons, zip – may have been made elsewhere, probably Southeast Asia. It may have been designed in the US or even New Zealand.

 

There is a long history of making products on more than one site, as there is of importing raw materials for local assembly – just think of 19-century English woollen mills. Now it is increasingly common for components to be put together in different countries and transported for final assembly somewhere else.

 

This “value chaining” is transforming the nature of international economic exchange. China accounts for about a sixth of New Zealand’s merchandise imports, which include components that originate in Southeast Asian economies. Separately, those countries supply another sixth of our imports. As economies become increasingly tied together, supply chains are no longer as simple as sending wool to Europe to be processed.

 

Because of New Zealand’s distant location, it tends to be at the beginning or end of the chain, not in the middle. As a consequence, our export to GDP ratio is low by OECD standards. But on another measure – net exports to GDP, worked out by deducting imports that are processed and re-exported – we do much better.

 

It is still possible to be part of Southeast Asia and not be greatly tied into the chaining economy. Indonesia is an example. There may be three main reasons. First, it is not well located. However, falling transport costs and development of a high-speed railway from Kunming in south China to Singapore will bring Indonesia closer.

 

When completed in 2020, the line is expected to cut the 4000km journey to 10 hours rather than the present week or more by rail and truck. Economic integration is no longer merely about “free trade” but is also concerned with lifting institutional and physical barriers, which is one of Apec’s remits.

 

Second, Indonesia specialises in exporting commodities, including oil and gas, cement, wood, rubber and foodstuffs. Success in one export area tends to squeeze out others. However, with the fourth-largest population in the world, Indonesia is unlikely to be able to expand commodity output fast enough to sustain its growing number of people and bring their living standards closer to the levels of neighbours Thailand (twice the per capita income), Malaysia (three times higher) or Singapore (10 times higher).

 

Third, Indonesia is not business-friendly. It is 128th on the World Bank ranking on this measure. Malaysia is 12th and New Zealand third, demonstrating that being business-friendly is not the only thing that matters – location also helps. Cheap Indonesian labour may be able to produce lower-cost buttons than a Malaysian factory, but why would a Chinese jacket-maker tolerate Indonesia’s red tape and uncertainties when Malaysia is just across the way? New Zealand exporters to Indonesia report similar frustrations.

 

With a burgeoning population, unemployment pressures and resource limitations, Indonesia will have to address the restrictions. There will be political turmoil, for there are those who benefit from the barriers. Corruption will have to be reduced and the public service improved.

But what if – or rather when – it succeeds? Indonesia is 40% of Southeast Asia’s population. When it gets into effective value-chaining, the country will be a formidable part of the giant economy of interdependent sovereign nations to our north.

 

This is the last of a series of columns made possible by a study grant from the Asia New Zealand Foundation.