What Is Happening At The Top Of The Income Distribution?

The increase of the share of those on top incomes has not been caused by market forces but is the result of their more favourable taxation regimes they have experienced since the early 1990s. 

Policy Quarterly has just published papers from a symposium on distributional inequality held last June. There are really interesting papers by Geoff Bertram, Phillip Morrison, Bill Rosenberg and Simon Chapple et al which you may want to read for yourself. This summarises my paper on pre-tax top personal incomes, and a follow-up paper on after-tax personal incomes which presents new research.

It is a tricky area because definitions are important and are frequently confused. I looked at the top 10 percent, 1 percent and 0.1 percent of all adults. (Not taxpayers because tax law affects who reports tax. In any case we want to include those who have zero incomes, especially as the proportions changed in the 1970s when more women entered the paid-workforce.) Unfortunately, only the top of the distribution is well recorded by the Department of Inland Revenue whose data I used. I’ve not used the aggregate income the IRD reports because, again, of the poor recording of those at the bottom in the past. Instead I have used the aggregates from the National Accounts. Sorry for this boring paragraph, but you would be surprised how many commentators skip these things and come to conclusions at odds with the evidence. Some don’t even distinguish personal and household incomes or income and wealth.

I can trace the share of before-tax personal income (which almost exactly corresponds to market incomes) of those at the top back to 1937. Before then the IRD data is contaminated by the inclusion of company incomes. The pattern it shows is that the share of those at the top broadly decreased from 1937 to the mid-1980s. That is similar to the conclusion I found in my 1983 book Income Distribution in New Zealand. At the time I was surprised because I began the study with the popular hypothesis that the income distribution in a capitalist economy tends to become more unequal. The evidence from the 1950s to the 1970s was that it did not always.

My response was similar to Keynes’ ‘when my information changes, I alter my conclusions. What do you do, sir?’ So the book discusses how we might explain the falling inequality of before-tax incomes over the period. I suggested the two main drivers were low unemployment and women entering the paid workforce.

From the mid-1980s the shares of before-tax (i.e. market) incomes of those at the top is broadly stable. There are year-to-year variations, and some will see a trend which others will say are not there or are too small to be worth worrying about. Given my 1983 study one might draw attention to higher unemployment and that there were not as many women entering the paid workforce flattening out the previous trend. As a broad generalisation we may collude that the forces driving the post-war reduction in inequality ended so that market shares have been broadly constant in recent years.

The same pattern is not evident in the after-tax data.Unfortunately the data goes back only to 1971. Before then there was a social security tax on incomes which the IRD data does not record.

The story of the disposable income shares is different. There is a slight fall in the share of those on top incomes from the early1970s to the mid-980s followed by a huge jump in their share between 1988 and 1992. (The size depends on which group you are talking about, but the higher the incomes the greater the proportional increase; the share of the top 0.1 percent increased to more than 2.5 times.) After 1992 the distributional shares stabilise again (subject to various caveats including on measurement and tax avoidance; read them in the paper).

Since after-tax (or disposable) incomes are before-tax incomes with income tax deducted and social security transfers added, the change that took place between 1988 and 1992 has to be the result of income tax cuts, because there was no change in before-tax incomes. (Except for New Zealand Superannuation, there are no social security transfers to those at the top.) The key changes were the major reduction in top income tax rates and the change in the way that company incomes were taxed which was very favourable to those who received dividends – mainly those in top income brackets. It follows that the big increases in the gains at the top – a major contributor to the increase in income inequality – was that taxes on them were reduced.

We were promised that reduced taxes on the rich would result in them investing more (from their higher incomes) and innovating more (because lower taxes would be less penalising to risk). The idea was that this would result in faster economic growth, and that while they would benefit most (and therefore their income share would grow faster) there would be a ‘trickle-down’ effect so that (just about) everyone would benefit.

There is no evidence this happened. Once the Rogernomics Recession came to an end, the economy grew at much the same rate as it had in the past. There is no evidence that the Rogernomic measures lifted the long-term growth rate.

What happened? My guess is that the rich did not save much of their extra income but spent it, and that they were not particularly innovative or that, possibly, in total they made a lot of bad investments. The second paper goes on to discuss how the higher income share at the top led to an increase in conspicuous consumption by the wealthy and of the power of those at the top.

You may be surprised that New Zealand’s rich do not appear to follow the international pattern which Thomas Piketty found of their increasing income share in recent decades. I suggested two reasons. First, we do not have the hyper-financial sector which has driven the Piketty identified changes. Second, our rich are hardly so, compared to the rich that Picketty is tracking. Were they so rich, the New Zealand market would be too small for them, and they would diversify offshore, at which point they could live only half a year in New Zealand (at most) and report only their New Zealand income for tax purposes. The three richest ‘New Zealanders’ in the Fortune Rich List all live offshore.

That is where the empirical research ends. Except I also detail the measurement difficulties. As best as I can judge, none of them, if totally resolved, would markedly change the conclusion about trends. Opinion is cheap, but if anyone can do the hard empirical research which would modify my conclusions, I would be delighted to acknowledge it and incorporate into my analysis.

Does Radio New Zealand Need a Television Channel?

Probably most people who regularly read Pundit are in the cyberspace equivalent of the ‘beltway’ – the term for those who live in or work in inner Wellington and are intensely interested as to what is going on there, not just in parliament but in policy-making. (OK, OK, they are interested in the gossip too.) Much of what goes on there is not transparent. One can spend hours poring over an opaque public government report not quite getting it. Mention it to a mate you bump into on Lambton Quay and a cryptic remark makes it transparent.

If I am right, you are probably disappointed by the quality of the commentary which appears in our public media. It so often seems superficial, not getting to the bottom of things. In part this is because so much of the national media is based in Auckland. True they may have staff in the parliamentary press gallery but that is only part of the beltway. Admittedly there are a handful stationed out of it. One values Brian Fallows, of the New Zealand Herald, often seen walking in a jaunty bow tie along LQ. (Tim Hunter in Auckland provides an equally valuable service to Fairfax readers.) But few of the editorial staff are inside the beltway trotting along LQ, so they are not in touch with it.

Of course, the majority of the media’s audience is not particularly into the beltway – a bit of parliamentary froth is sufficient. However beltway addicts may feel deprived (some will take a little consolation reading the Wellington local Dominion Post); Bryce Edwards’ regular summary of the blogs is great too.

There is, however, one national media institution which is of the beltway: Radio New Zealand, whose new chief executive, Paul Thompson, has certainly sharpened its coverage. You may say that is because it is public service media. That cannot be quite true. There are many overseas private-owned newspapers which provide great coverage of their ‘beltway’. Or consider Maori TV which provides a terrific public service but it is hardly of the beltway (and should not be).

New Zealand democracy would be the better if RNZ also provided a television service. I understand that they are interested but the politicians are not. Of course they are not; what politician wants Radio New Zealand on screen, even if the public does and it would enhance democracy? It is not that RNZ is anti-government, although that is the way the government – any government – may feel about it. Rather, it is a proud example of the fourth estate which, like the other estates, is part of the institutions of democracy.

I am told RNZTV is technically feasible although I do not know the details of how it might be delivered. I worried a bit whether a channel would distort RNZ’s current high quality material. It would change it of course. But the digital and cyberspace convergence means that steam radio’s website already has images including some video (radio with pictures?).

Cost? Maori TV gets about $35m a year from the public purse (as does, currently, RNZ). That suggests an advertising-free RNZTV channel could be provided for about $35m a year too – perhaps a little less given the synergies with radio provision. Could the government find the amount from the public purse? You betcha if it were, say, for the Americas Cup. It is a question of what our national priorities are.

Sadly, the polys would not be enthusiastic. Satisfied with the coverage of the theatre of parliament, why disturb the system with critical information? It will come only if the public insists.

Let me finish with a prediction. If we ever get a public service RNZTV channel you can be sure that the Auckland-based national media would relocate some editorial weight to the beltway; there will be a rise in the quality of their analysis too.

What Is The Problem With A Universal Minimum Income?

They involve tax rates horrendously high or the minimum incomes so low that the UMI is not a viable means of eliminating poverty.

The notion of a universal minimum income has had a long gestation. Some say it originated with a proposal for a ‘social dividend’ by Lady Rhys Williams as far back as 1942 but you can find precursors even to that. The American origin is Milton Friedman’s ‘negative income tax’. When Minster of Finance, Roger Douglas promised a Guaranteed Minimum Family Income but he never implemented it.

Today the notion is usually described as a Universal Minimum Income (UMI), in which the government provides everyone with a basic income which it funds by taxing market income. It is a popular idea and seems eminently sensible so why has it not been implemented?

Many advocates put the UMI forward without doing the sums. Those who do, find that the required tax rates are horrendous or the minimum income is so low that it is not a viable means of eliminating poverty. Among the latter are New Zealanders Douglas, Gareth Morgan and Keith Rankin.

What the notion falls foul of is a simple mathematical theorem. Like all economic analysis it requires some simplification but once you have got it, then the tradeoff is obvious because the simplifications do not affect the logic of the outcome.

Let me explain how it works. Suppose you set the minimum income that all New Zealanders should get as X% of the average income.

(An important aside, this is not the same as the average wage, because each wage supports, on average, other people such as children and non-earning household members. The last time I did the calculation, the average private disposable income (including investment income) was about 60 percent of the average wage before tax.)

When I have asked people, they usually suggest a minimum income of about 60% of the average income. That is X = 60%. Bingo! You have just set the average income tax rate at 60%. It is as simple as that. The average tax rate is the same ratio of the minimum income as a proportion of average income. Relax the simplifications (like the state providing public services such as education and health care) and you still get the same broad result: a high minimum income requires, on average, a high tax rate.

That explains why those on the benefits face horrendous marginal tax rates, sometimes over 100 percent. By increasing theirs we can lower tax rates on everyone else – including the rich.

I have known this result for a long time (it is obvious once you have done the mathematics) and try as I might, I cannot find a way around the logic. For instance, you could raise the tax rate on the rich to, say, 80 percent and lower the rate on the rest – but not by that much. The poor would still find about half of every dollar they earned would be taken from them.

Now to the crunch. I said there were assumptions in the mathematics. One is that there is no behavioural responses to the change in tax rates, that faced with higher tax rates, people do not work less and do not take other measures to reduce their tax burden (including moving offshore). Yeah right. At this point the modelling gets messy, but the clear result is that if people faced by high tax rates cut back their effort (and their savings), tax rates would have to be even higher for a given UMI. Ooops. (Beneficiaries currently facing ultra-high rates might work more but their additional work would not compensate for everyone else cutting back.)

Others have argued that we simply need to drop the minimum to say 25 percent of average incomes (the rate Friedman mentioned) which would reduce the average tax rate to 25 percent, close to its current one. Most advocates of the UMI would not support that because it would not eliminate poverty.

I have thought of but one way out of the dilemma. Suppose we split the community into two groups based on whether they should work (in the earning workforce) or not. (This is a thought experiment, you understand; it might be an administrative and political nightmare.) Those who should work would get nothing but they get a job and its after-tax income, those that cannot work get a guaranteed minimum income as in the UMI scheme. If the second group was only 40% of the population, then the required average tax rate for a 60 percent minimum income would be only 24 percent (i.e 60 *40%).

There are two conceptual difficulties. The first is that earners and non-earners (including children) live together in the same house so  the non-earners may not have a guaranteed UMI. The second is some of the earners will be on occasions unemployed. Bother, bother, bother.

So I ended up thinking about how to improve the current system, which kind of (clumsily) works a bit like this two group option. To me the priority is giving additional support to children and those that care for them.

The government talks about doing this in its next budget, but it seems to be very muddled. I guess I’ll be coming back to the issue of the child poverty – before and after the budget.

Trading Water Resource Consents

‘Iwi leaders and the Government have agreed on a deadline to sort out Maori interests in fresh water by Waitangi Day 2016.’ (News: 5 February 2015)

Law and economics recognises three distinct aspects of property rights. There is the ability to use the property, the ability to transform it into something else, and the ability to alienate it – that is to transfer the property rights to others.

Typically an electricity generator has a consent which allows it to use water to produce electricity but not for any other purpose. It may not transform it and it may not sell the right to any other (although if the generator is privately owned it can be bought and the consent goes with it).

The same applies for farmers who have consent which allow a draw-off from an aquifer or river for irrigation purposes. (Another consent would be needed if they wanted to use the water for, say, bottling.) They are not allowed to transfer the water to another user (say, the farmer next door). But suppose a farmer irrigates an onion patch, sells you the onion and you eat it. The water from the draw-off, now in your body, is unquestionably privatised. So we do fully privatise some water.

In summary, while the water may not be ‘owned’, there may well be private property rights associated with it, typically formalised by a resource consent issued under the Resource Management Act. In effect the consent partially – or, in some cases, fully – privatises water.

I want to raise two consequential issues – whether the resource consent should be alienable and what is the Maori entitlement.

As far as I can see, there should be no great objections to being able to transfer the usage rights of resource consent to another – there may be a payment in return. We already do this with the fishing resource with its individual tradeable quotas. The experience elsewhere suggests that typically the transfer of a property right to use water will be on a temporary basis – a lease. I do not think there will necessarily be great efficiency gains but there will be some. One farmer might find it cheaper to put in a storage dam, another might switch to a water-conserving crop, each using the revenue from the lease to fund the investment.

We should be trying to conserve our water and use it effectively. A reasonably adequate supply of water is one of New Zealand’s international comparative advantages, especially as some of our competitors are running out of the stuff. So good water management can enhance the economy.

The reluctance to make a change seems to be because of the ‘P’ word of privatisation and the ‘M’ word of Maori claims. But the water is already at least partially privatised via the resource consents while by partial privatising the state electricity generators the government brought to the fore the Maori dimension.

I shall assume, for the purposes of dialogue, that Maori have a claim to the water resource under Te Tiriti o Waitangi similar to their claim to the fishing resource. It may be that a detailed study may conclude otherwise, but let’s make that assumption. (The problem with an alternative is that Maori had possession of the water rights on 5 February 1840. When and how did they pass to the Crown?)

I shall also assume that Maori will treat existing private sector property rights as they have already with the private alienation of land. They greatly regretted the loss of the land, but they have not generally demanded back that which has been legally acquired from the Crown.

The emergency Waitangi Tribunal hearings which followed were unsatisfactory. The submissions never got their heads around how resource consents which established private property rights were at the centre of their claim; the Tribunal’s report was consequently also disappointing. I doubt the same mistake will be made a second time (which is why the negotiations may well open up to all resource consents for water).

What might be the outlines of a settlement? Probably there will be a financial compensation to iwi for consents already privatised, plus an involvement in all further issues of water resource consents. (The fishing settlement included that Maori being automatically given 20 percent of all new quota that was issued). Even so, the final settlements are likely to be complicated (and to be on a catchment by catchment basis) .

The purpose of this contribution is to clarify the issues of property rights and how to think of them in the particular context of the water resource. Additionally it cautions against hotheads – both brown and white – who will offer extreme and ridiculous responses based on shallow analysis. They will be given far more prominence than their importance – that is the way the media and the public rhetoric works.

What I expect is that men and women of goodwill – in the government and in the iwi – will negotiate a deal which will be on the whole fair and efficient (but expensive to the taxpayer).

Are We In For A Meltdown As We Tackle Climate Change?

Does it make sense to compare our climate change adaptation with Rogernomics?

(There is nothing in this column which questions the notion that global warming presents a serious challenge which will require considerable adaptation.)

Rod Carr, the chair of the Climate Change Commission, said that the shifts required to run our economy without fossil fuels will make the economic changes of the late 1980s ‘look like a trial period’.

I am not sure what part of Rogernomics Carr has in mind. Does he mean that the economy will stagnate for longer than the seven years it did then, creating record postwar unemployment, while the bottom 30 percent will experience major reductions in their living standards for even more than the twenty years that happened between 1984 and 2004.

Meanwhile, under Rogernomics the living standards at the top were protected and enhanced, funded by higher taxes and reductions in services and benefits to the bottom 90 percent, with a consequent spectacular increase in income inequality. Are they going to again  protect the rich at the expense of the rest of us?

Recall the attack on the welfare state with the marked reduction of its generosity and scope. Is another such attack on the agenda?

A particularly viscous assault was on the nation’s health system, with a proposed redisorganisation which would have commercialised the system towards an idealised version of the US one.

The attack begins with the report of the 1988 Gibbs Task Force (Unshackling the Hospitals). In 1990, the incoming Minister of Health (Simon Upton, currently the Commissioner for the Environment) appointed a Ministerial Committee on the Funding and Provision of Health Services which led to the infamous Green and White Paper Your Health & the Public Health: A Statement of Government Health Policy. (It was part green because even the National Cabinet could not stomach some of its more outrageous proposals.) And so we marched forward to an expensive redisorganisation of the health system resulting in more patient suffering and death. It almost completely failed.

The Ministerial Committee was chaired by Rod Carr, who told us then that there would be a ’meltdown’ if its recommendations were not implemented. They were not and the health system has not melted down. In fact it has done pretty well given the repressed public funding (which was an underlying feature of the Gibbs and Carr reports).

If there was a meltdown, it was support for the National Government which lost a quarter of its voters between 1990 and 1993. National’s prime minister, Jim Bolger, attributed the loss to the public’s reaction to the health redisorganisation – sometimes the public shows more wisdom than the politicians. (In fact National would have lost the 1993 election except Labour and the left was even more disorganised.) Perhaps that is what Carr has in mind for the climate change recommendations – the decimation of the Green Party.

What strikes one about the health redisorganisation is that once the momentum for commercialisation got underway, it was difficult to stop – even by the prime minister. The neoliberal ideologues led it, making outrageous claims detached from reality. But they convinced the ignorant, who dutifully did what they were told – and were well paid for their collaboration.

The ignorance was widespread. For instance, one of the lead administrators confused intensive care units with postoperative recovery units. (We may be grateful he had gone by the time of the Covid Crisis.) Some of the papers produced by the National Interim Provider Board, which was driving the changes, would have been graded a C had they been submitted for academic assessment. The NIPB was learning while it was wrecking the system.

Not that they consulted their betters. By coincidence, a number of internationally accliamed health economists were coming through the country at the time. (One was Alan Maynard who introduced the invaluable term ‘redisorganisation’). They were appalled by what was going on, but were ignored rather than approached. The momentum said that the implementers may not have know what they were doing but they were strongly committed to doing it.

A feature of the Rogernomes is that they rarely go back over the period. No doubt they would have, had they succeeded but they prefer to forget the failure. A nice illustration was that when a seminar was held on the health system changes few of of those who drove it turned up; the few that did talked about anything except what happened or their role.

The approach now seems to be to trivialise the downside of what happened under Rogernomics by comparing it with the prospects of adapting to climate change.

Mind you, we could repeat the farce by depending on  a neoliberal framework – which is typically to reduce the state and enhance the power of the rich – to implement the transition. One of the reasons that deniers of anthropogenic global warming tend to be at the neoliberal end of the political spectrum is they have not worked out how to apply their policy directions to climate change. What we can be sure of is that the more neoliberals involved, the bigger the foul up will be.

What may make the difference is that Rogernomics was done in a hurry. Roger Douglas would talk about getting it over in three or six years and that he would rather lose the next election than deviate from his policies. This time we are talking of a thirty year horizon – that is ten elections to lose. If they mismanage the carbon-emission transition in the way the Rogernomes did, the government will lose every one until it gets on a saner course.

There is an interesting parallel between Rogernomics and climate change adaptation. In each case we had failed to take sensible measures for decades earlier (market liberalisation in one case, reducing carbon emissions in the other). It is evident that the world should have been doing something since, say, the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (a.k.a. the Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit) in 1992. New Zealand also has lagged, so we have a lot of catching up to do. But that is not a case for doing it badly powered by hysterical slogans and the forgetting of history.

Just Do It

Policy announcements do not always reflect careful analysis. Too often the unstated political considerations have too much influence.

I was once involved with a ministry under pressure over the failure as the result of a very unusual accident of a piece of equipment for which it had a vague responsibility. The public wanted something done. The calls were for actions that were onerous, intrusive and would have had little effect. But the Minister had to be seen to do something, and the ministry advice was an action which looked impressive but would not do much damage.

It was not the ministry’s preferred advice which was to do nothing except put a warning on the equipment. However, loyal to the Minister, they understood the task was not the impossible one of stopping an eccentric accident repeating itself, but that the Minister to be seen to do something which gave the impression that it would not happen again. It hasn’t. In any case the Minister moved on to other things.

I was reminded of this incident when the Minister for the Environment announced changes to the RMA. Exactly what he is proposing is unclear – probably to him too – but it seemed to give the public the sense that there was a problem which was being tackled. Hooray.

One got no sense that the problem was well defined or understood. There is apparently a problem of housing in Auckland (beaten up by the local media it would seem). It is not a problem anywhere else in the country (Christchurch’s circumstances are quite different). So why does one have to change the RMA for everywhere? As far as I can gather, the peculiarity of the geography of the Auckland isthmus, with its pressure on infrastructure, means it needs to build ‘up’ rather than ‘out’. Additionally demand has been accentuated by people investing in housing for capital gains so that a house becomes a speculative investment was well as a shelter (although government policy seems unwilling to address speculative bubbles).

Perhaps there are other factors, but I doubt that they will become transparent. The Minister has taken a course of action and it will be duly shoved through. We will argue over the details, but it is unlikely that the legislators will insist on having a comprehensive analysis of the problem. That is not our way.

It may even be that amendments to the RMA may address some of the problems. (It occurs to me it may not be designed for high-density high-rise housing.) But we won’t know or, when we do, the Minister will have moved on.

We have the same problem with the government’s proposal to privatise state housing by transferring some to community institutions. The Prime Minister was so busy telling us what he was doing he forgot to tell us why he was doing it. What is unnerving is that it is being done with only the minimum of consultation, ever so reminiscent of the Rogernomics strategy of ‘crash through or crash’. (The Rogernomes managed to do both – often to the same policy.)

I suppose one might have a vision of greater community involvement in welfare provision – the British PM David Cameron had one for a while – but such a transformation requires a long-term strategy of strengthening the community sector first. It says it is not ready, but the promise to crash through remains.

So why the hurry? Is there a need for a firesale? The usual fiscally prudent reason for a fire sale of public assets is a severe deterioration in the government accounts. I have heard no hint there is a significant problem there, but does the Prime Minister know something that he has not told us?

The cynical will say that this analysis in all too rational. The RMA changes are a payoff to developers who helped fund the government’s election campaign; the housing privatisation is a payoff to the dealers who did the same. Recall the mysterious partial privatisation of the energy companies carried out without any justification, while observing the substantial fees paid to those who did the deals.

Unless the government is more open about its rational reasons it pursuing its policies, the public will conclude they do not exist and that their purpose is to support certain friends – what one person in a comment to an earlier blog described as ‘crony capitalism’. Surely not?

How Shallow is Intellectual Life in New Zealand?

It is not what Eleanor Catton said about the government, but how we respond to what she said.

Sean Plunkett’s intemperate attack on Eleanor Catton is a reminder of just how superficial is tolerance of dissent in New Zealand. I leave others to defend the exact interchange – Danyl McLauchlan was as I normally expect of him. Aside from the squall I am interested in how revealing it is about intellectual life in this country – which was, ultimately – what Catton was speaking about.

Yet while it is one thing to say we do not value public intellectuals (unless they spout the conventional wisdom) it is unusual to see so clearly how they are dealt with. Don’t expect Catton to appear on any program Plunkett is involved in. With few exceptions she will not be invited to elaborate her views elsewhere in the media and in the long run will be avoided if at all possible. That Plunkett is a senior and generally respected journalist (or he was until this outbreak), illustrates just how thin is the public tolerance that the media generally presents of itself. McLauchlan reminds us that universities are meant to be bastions of free speech, but so are they.

I’ve been struggling with these issues while I have been writing a history of New Zealand. It is normal in such texts to duck our intellectual life (a few paragraphs about our writers and artists aside). Yet at the heart of our history has been the shallowness of the role of public intellectuals. Had there been more of them and they had been more respected, it is unlikely that the extremism and mistakes of Rogernomics would have occurred to the same degree. It is an old problem. One hundred years ago André Siegfried, New Zealand’s de Tocqueville, wrote:

“[New Zealanders] outlook, not too carefully reasoned, and no doubtful scornful of scientific thought, makes them incapable of self distrust. Like almost all men of action they have a contempt for theories: yet they are often captured by the first theory that turns up, if it is demonstrated to them with an appearance of logic sufficient to impose upon them. In most cases they do not seem to see difficulties, and they propose simple solutions for the most complex problems with astonishing audacity.”

I am also struggling with the meaning of ‘neoliberal’ and its relationship to the current government. Catton said

“At the moment, New Zealand, like Australia and Canada, (is dominated by) these neoliberal, profit-obsessed, very shallow, very money-hungry politicians who do not care about culture. They care about short-term gains. They would destroy the planet in order to be able to have the life they want. I feel very angry with my government.”

I don’t think we have a ‘neoliberal’ government. Recall the short shift Key gave to Don Brash (who is definitely a neoliberal). In fact this government is, as Catton’s subsequent adjectives say, a business-oriented one. Business took on a neoliberal stance in the Rogernomic unwinding of the economic regime which Muldoon represented. But they don’t any longer. Rather they actively use the government to pursue their interests. The Sky City deal was not neoliberal.

Catton is also wrong when she says the government does not care about culture. They have a different definition from hers. They care very greatly about rugby in particular and sport in general. But as far as ‘high’ culture. Key did not cover himself in glory when he commented on ‘The Luminaries’. There may well be better New Zealand novels than it, but his nomination ‘The Lord of the Rings’ is certainly not.

Catton is right that the government’s focus is on short term gains, and while ‘they would destroy the planet’ may be an exaggeration, I think it more likely that they give such a low priority to sustainability, that they will do so by neglect.

So we should reflect on what Catton said. It would be great – if out of character – if we do so in a temperate considered way that public intellectual life should; refraining from the ad hominem approach, playing the ball not the man (to use a rugby image). As Voltaire almost said: ’I may not agree with what you have to say, Eleanor, but I’ll defend to the death your right to say it.’

The Matter With Economics?

Jeff Madrick identifies seven bad economic ideas; Alan Blinder is more cautious. What do economists actually believe, and how does it stack up against what we think economics says?

Jeff Madrick, a highly respected American economic journalist, recently published a book, Seven Bad Ideas: How Mainstream Economists Have Damaged America and the World. It was reviewed in the New York Review of Books by Alan Blinder, an even more respected (Princeton) economist. (Also here.)One of the joys of economics is its vigorous debates (although post-Rogernomics economists in New Zealand tend to avoid them, I’m afraid). Economics progresses from such debates, so it is worth following this engagement.

Blinder summarises his argument:
‘First … academic thinking and research don’t have nearly as much influence on economic policy as Madrick imagines.
Second, his characterization of what constitutes mainstream economics is heavily skewed
to the right; it’s more about conservative economics.
Third, most of what he calls ‘bad ideas’ are either good ideas, straw men, discarded doctrines, or limited to quite conservative economists.’

While none of these issues are peculiar to America, I’ll focus here on the seven bad ideas which Madrick identifies.

  1. Madrick’s first ‘bad idea’ is Adam Smith’s invisible hand, Blinder responded ‘I believe every mainstream economist sees the invisible hand as one of the great thoughts of the human mind. A “bad idea”? No, a great one.’ The difference between them is the subtlety with which one believes the notion. Economists are impressed by the miracle of the market. As a student I was impressed by how a bottle of milk arrived on one’s doorstep each morning (yes, I am that old) without any single person supervising the myriad of steps from cow to door. But I do not think the markets always operate effectively, efficiently or fairly. Nor do I think that alternatives to the market (such as central planning) always operate effectively, efficiently or fairly either. Much economic policy is choosing between some pretty unattractive options – although that is not the way it is debated in public.
  2. Blinder agrees with Madrick that Say’s Law – supply creates it its own demand – really is a bad idea. He goes on, however, to say it was mostly discarded more than seventy-five years ago following the Great Depression and Keynes’ General Theory. I hope he is right.
  3. Similarly Blinder agrees with Madrick that low inflation is all that matters is a bad idea but argues that ‘hardly any senior economist in actual policy circles acts that way’. There is a narrower version which is more pervasive: all that monetary policy can do in the long run is affect the price level. I can think of some New Zealand economists who might agree with that, but there would be a lot of caveats.
  4. Madrick says free-market fundamentalism is another bad idea, calling it ‘Friedman’s Folly’. Surely Madrick goes too far, though, when he says ‘economists in general are [Milton] Friedman’s handmaidens’ and that ‘even politically liberal economists generally argue that government must only correct what they define as market failures’. Blinder, who describes himself as a politically liberal economist, says the last proposition is nonsense. Actually it hinges on what you mean by ‘market failure’. It has a very specific meaning in economics, and many reasons which economists give when advocating particular policies – such as moderating business cycles and reducing poverty – are not usually classified as market failure.
  5. His claim that there are no speculative bubbles is another bad idea, but it is not held by most economists. Which is fortunate, since they evidently happen.
  6. The efficient markets hypothesis and that ‘faith in the rationality of free markets was pushed too far’ is another bad idea. (There is a weak form of the EMH by which an investor can only beat the market – i.e. get a higher return – by taking on more risk.) Were the strong form true there would be no extraordinary profits and incomes in the finance industry. Ironically it was used by regulators, such as Alan Greenspan, as a rationale for minimum financial regulation thereby generating extraordinary profits and incomes in the finance industry. But that does not make it mainstream. Blinder commends ‘Madrick’s wonderful chapter on efficient markets’, saying it ‘should be required reading for everyone in the financial world’.
  7. Blinder says that the last item on Madrick’s list of bad ideas, that economics is a true science, ‘is a little gratuitous, since hardly anyone ever believed it.’ But what is a ‘true science’? If you take it to mean a body of knowledge engaged with the real world which generates theories and hypotheses which are tested against the evidence and rejected when another comes along more consistent with the evidence, then parts of economics are a true science. (Blinder gives some nice examples of this process.) Of course this definition does not cover the policy dimension of economics (except insofar as one is using the best available theories – like engineers) and it certainly does not cover those ideologues and pseudo-economists who hold onto theories long after their use-by dates, ignoring the contradicting evidence.

Madrick responded that Blinder seemed to think there was nothing wrong with economics. Blinder insisted ‘I think there is lots wrong with mainstream economics. For starters, my review explicitly agreed with Madrick that (a) ideological predispositions infect economists’ conclusions far too much; (b) economics has drifted to the right (along with the American body politic); and (c) some economists got carried away by the allure of the efficient markets hypothesis. I also added a few indictments of my own: that we economists have failed to convey even the most basic economic principles to the public; and that some of our students turned Adam Smith’s invisible hand into Gordon Gekko’s “greed is good.”’

Other economists have chipped into the debate, each coming at the issue in a slightly different way, so the public gets confused. They want to be told the ‘truth’ – as if there is a simple one (like ‘you can cure cancer’).

As I followed the interchange between Madrick andBlinder I was struck that we need to distinguish ‘mainstream economics’ from ‘mainstream economists’. The former is what business people, journalists and politicians – and most people, as far as they are involved – believe and practise; what you read in a newspaper. But it is not necessarily what mainstream economists believe or what goes on in the learned journals and other professional platforms.

My reflection went on to the realisation that this distinction is also true in other disciplines: history, philosophy, psychology, theology – even climate change and medicine (otherwise how would you get beliefs in quack remedies?).

Most critics of economics criticise the mainstream of economics as if it is what mainstream economists believe. They don’t take much notice when economists say ‘it ain’t necessarily so’. After all, it is there in black and white in the newspaper and said on the screen. Everybody is saying it – except the economics profession.

Treating Capital Gains Fairly and Efficiently

How might a non-ideological capital gains tax look like?

Someone once told me that a test of being a socialist was whether you supported capital gains taxes. I pointed out that the New Zealand Treasury, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand the IMF and the OECD all supported them.

Not explicitly – perhaps they are implicit socialists – but they all share the standard economic advice that taxation on the return on capital should be neutral, that it should be the same irrespective of where the investment is made. What they are concerned with is that a tax system should not distort investment behaviour by privileging entirely for tax reasons one investment over another. To do so results in inefficient investment and wasted savings.

I am with them. I support a capital gains tax as a way of improving our investment performance. So much so, that I would support using any additional receipts to reduce taxation on savings; I think it pernicious (and unjust to small savers) that the part of an interest payment which is to cover rising prices is taxed, so the government benefits from inflation. (Incidentally it is a view I formed during the Muldoon years of high inflation.) While I am not opposed to improving the tax base, if the government wants to spend more it should raise tax rates.

Taxing the real component of interest rates means we should tax only the real component of capital gains too. But we should not tax them retrospectively. If the tax is imposed from, say, 1 April 2015, then only the gains since that date would be taxed, and gains from the past left untaxed. The purpose of the tax is to influence investment behaviour. Before the date the investment has already occurred so it cannot be influenced. Not incidentally, a retrospective capital gains tax is a very erratic wealth tax; if one favours a wealth tax, then design it properly.

It is difficult to know the precise impact of a capital gain tax. It would discourage purchases of farm land and housing by foreigners, who find New Zealand attractive because capital gains are not taxed. As far as I can, see this does nothing for the performance of the New Zealand economy other than employ real estate agents, lawyers, valuers and the like. (I see no reason why the government should be subsidising them, which is the effect of not having a capital gains tax.)

It would also reduce speculation in the housing market with investors deploying their savings in more productive areas than oversized and under-utilised houses. However, the hard logic of a capital gains tax is that one’s first home should not be subject to capital gains tax; when you sell your home you make a capital gain but when you go on to buy another one you make a capital loss and they roughly cancel out. One could evolve a very complicated regime to deal with anomalies, but nobody would understand it – even the accountants and lawyers who made a mint out of exploiting it. A simple, commonsense and comprehensible approach is what is needed. (You would not levy a capital gains tax retrospectively on a house owned by a dead person. But as it became part of an estate the tax would start to be levied.)

You might wonder if homeowners were not taxed whether there would be any dampening of capital gains in housing. Multiple house owners and speculators would be taxed and would shift their investing elsewhere rather than the practice of tax avoidance that the erratic tax regime on investment generates. That would reduce nominal capital gains in the housing market, making it easier for those without first homes to buy in. That is what is meant by ‘knocking the top off the market’.

What about farmers? Sadly, far too many of them farm for capital gains rather than for a return from farm production. That would be discouraged. (It would make more sense then to get the real exchange rate down so that the extra profitability went into farm investment and production, rather than higher farm prices.)

The list of ‘socialist’ institutions favouring a capital gains tax did not did not include the Inland Revenue Department. They are very aware of the complexities of introducing such a tax. Earlier I illustrated a principle by suggesting what would happen if it was introduced on 1 April 2015. That is far too early. We need a working party to nut out the details (in which the devil lies). The 2010 Tax Working Group muffed the challenge. Sadly, there is no independent centre of expertise which could prepare a report. Unprepared, we will muddle on, wasting savings on inefficient speculative investment and wondering why the performance of New Zealand’s investment remains disappointing.

Centralisation and Decentralisation.

Do We Need Larger Local Authorities?

The Wellington kerfuffle over whether its eight territorial local authorities and the regional council should unite into a single regional entity might at first seem oh-so-Wellington – petty parochialism with small-minded politicians keen to maintain their remuneration. But other regions are struggling with the same problem. Unnoticed is a strategic issue of how decentralised New Zealand governance should be.

In 1876 the central parliament abolished the provinces, giving the central government dominance over the localities. As New Zealand urbanised and regionally integrated the hotchpotch of local authorities made little sense. From the 1970s there were moves to rationalise them but local interests fiercely resisted. In 1989 the Lange-Douglas government blitzkrieged a major restructuring, replacing around 850 single- and multi-purpose local bodies with 86 multi-purpose local authorities, typically at two levels: regional councils with broad environmental responsibilities, territorial local authorities with a community focus.

Neither central government politicians nor the bureaucracy which advises it are enamoured by local democracy. It was not beyond the central government to pass on to the local council some tiresome tasks. But it retains ultimate power, sacking an elected board if it is deemed dysfunctional. It would replace it with commissioners rather than immediately arranging new elections (as has happened to the Canterbury Regional Council and the Area Health Boards in 1991).

The governance problems of local authorities are underpinned by the inadequacy of the funding of local bodies. Their dominant (discretionary) source of revenue is local authority rates (taxes levied on properties). Rates are not a very effective tax because they are regressive against the poorest (especially when user charges are added) and they are intrusive, requiring a regular payment by the property owner.

However, the 1989 consolidation was insufficient for Auckland, with a population of a third of the country. In the late 1990s economists’ thinking – led by Treasury – turned to the need to strengthen Auckland’s economic base, in contrast to the past preoccupation with regional development and stagnating rural areas. The underlying notion was that the existence of economies of urban agglomeration meant New Zealand needed at least one large urban metropolis in order that some industries – such as head offices, finance, biotech – had a chance to survive here rather than move offshore to Sydney:

The policy conclusion was that the Auckland metropolitan area with seven territorial councils (it had 33 before 1989) and a regional council was not functioning cohesively. In 2009 a Royal Commission on Auckland Governance recommended a unitary Auckland Council. The National Government implemented the general tenor of the recommendations, without a lot of public consultation and with differences reflecting its political preferences.

The outcome presents the intriguing possibility s that a unified political agency representing about a third of New Zealanders, and led by a mayor elected with more votes than any other New Zealand politician, may be able to contest power with central government in a manner that no local body has been able to in the past. (It will still be handicapped by limited funding.)

Perhaps the contesting is already beginning. The Auckland Council has announced it wants a ten-year agreement with central government on its development direction. The government (which is up to our necks in its funding commitments from general taxation) has rightly said it will await the public response to the proposed Council ten-year plan. But you get a sense that unlike some foolish outbursts of arrogance in the recent past, this time it is warily entering an engagement. A new minister (Paula Bennett) or an acceptance of political reality?

So Wellington, so Canterbury, so Hawkes Bay, so everywhere: are they going to leave this engagement only to Auckland and the central government? You can be darn sure that there will be no separate plans with the nine Wellington local bodies.

Instead of Wellington (and elsewhere) squabbling about restructuring they should aim for a regional authority large enough and strong enough to negotiate with the central government. The design issue is how, at the same time, to devolve the maximum decision-making to the communities of each’s region.

EUROPE WITHOUT WALLS

As Borders Fall Are Europeans Losing Their Cultural Identity

Pundit: 29 December 2014

Keywords: Globalisation & Trade;

Aside from the English Channel, Europe has hardly any significant internal natural borders. Seventy years ago the border between Germany and Poland was settled at the Oder River. At its main crossing point it is no wider than the Waikato at Hamilton, and there is not even a gorge.

On the west bank there is the German town of Frankfurt-on-Oder; on the east the Polish Slubice. Just one bridge connects the two, although it was temporarily closed to all but pedestrians when I was visiting, as they were installing a pipeline for a heating interchange across it. The towns also have a joint sewerage disposal system.

It was not always like that. The border was fully open for only two of the first 34 years after the war, when Frankfurt was in the (communist) German Democratic Republic and the Poles were a part of Russian empire too. Crossing became less onerous after the (Berlin) Wall ‘fell’ in 1989. Following Poland joining the European Union ten years ago, all artificial impediments were removed; you cross the bridge without meeting a customs officer or passport control. (Well not quite. You can take a German taxi from Frankfurt to Slubice but it may not bring you back; you must take a Polish taxi, but it is not allowed to take passenger back either. Taxi systems are sometimes beyond the best intentions of the law.)

Of course the Polish zloty is more commonly used on the east side of the river; Poland is yet to join the European Monetary Union. But they accept the euros used on the west side. Folk from the smaller Slubice go to concerts in Frankfurt, and some inhabitants live on one side and cross to work or shop on the other. Some German boys marry Polish girls (German girls go off to work in the more prosperous west of Germany.) So, as the founders of the European Union hoped, there is mutual engagement across the old border.

But from my observations when I was there as a guest of the German and Polish embassies in New Zealand, the towns remain distinct social entities. This economist was at first surprised for the artificial impediments which created the border had been largely abolished.

When I thought more about it I realised that while there may have been economic and political barriers to social intercourse, culture was much deeper. The history of Europe is of culturally distinct groups living next to one another for centuries, engaging and adapting but maintaining their identities. Poles were split between three empires for 123 years; only in 1919 they formed the modern state of Poland (to again be divided during the Second World War). There was no ‘Germany’ before 1871 but Germans had lived for a thousand years in a variety of jurisdictions whose boundaries frequently changed. While we can never forget the Holocaust and some earlier massacres, neither should we forget that Jewish communities lived peacefully with their neighbours throughout Europe for most of that time too.

Frankfurt and Slubice are even odder. The war devastated the region and all its inhabitants left. The GDR settled German refugees in Frankfurt, Poland settled Poles in Slubice. There connections with the soil are shorter than many Pakeha can claim in New Zealand. Yet those there maintain their historic ethnicities whereas New Zealand has went on to forge one of our own..

It will be a long time before the inhabitants of the EU think of themselves as a common people in the way that, say, Americans do, and Americans still celebrate a local identity and their ethnic origins.

Yet, there is a coming together. Mindful of the terrible things that the Nazis did to the Poles (as well as the Jews) during the War, I asked our Polish guide ‘Will the Poles be supporting the French or the Germans’ in the World Cup quarter finals (the Germans went on to win the cup). Unhesitatingly she said ‘the French’ and then reflectingly added ‘or perhaps the Germans – they have a couple of players of Polish descent’. Brilliant combination; great team.

(This article was made possible by support from the EU Delegation, the Germany and Polish Embassies in Wellington with travel assistance from Air New Zealand.)

WITH OR WITHOUT BRITAIN

The EU remains central to New Zealand’s destiny

 

Pundit: 23 December, 2014.

 

Keywords: Globalisation & Trade; Political Economy & History;

 

Suppose Britain exited the European Union of 28 countries. I am not recommending it; they would probably be worse off economically. Nor am I predicting it, although sometimes politics produces odd outcomes. Rather suppose ‘Brexit’ in order to explore the implications for New Zealand.

 

What would New Zealand do? We could say ‘a plague on all your houses’ but we are not an isolationist nation, nor can we afford to be. We could not go solely with an isolated Britain which would be a third rate world power both economically and politically, not least because some of its business would cross the Channel in order to remain inside the EU.

 

Of course we would retain ties of sentiment, ancestral and cultural heritage with Britain and a good number of us have friends and relatives there (although an increasing number have similar connections to other European countries including Ireland). New Zealand would try to straddle both, but if it had to make a choice it would go with the EU.

 

We’d have to. Without Britain, the EU would still be the second to biggest economy in the world and an increasingly important player in world politics. Its 2009 Treaty of Lisbon – treaties are the way that the member states set out the framework for the EU’s evolution – established a unified foreign service. Although most of its member states have a military capacity the EU has none, instead wielding soft power. That includes coordinating its member’s forces in the counter-piracy taskforce off the Somali coast. New Zealand is a part of that too so we have to interact with them (and a number of other patrolling countries).

 

Indicative of its ambition for a global reach, the EU is the second largest donor to the Pacific Islands (behind Australia). We collaborate with them, combining their muscle with our local knowledge.

 

The EU is critical in New Zealand external economic relations. I’ll avoid listing the eye-glazing statistics; the fact is that the EU is the second or third largest destination for our exports and a major source of investment. Regrettably we often separate the data into individual member states, thereby underplaying the EU’s single market. It would be as logical to categorise our exports to Australia by its six states. But no longer is Britain our dominant destination within the EU, although it can be hard to tell. A container of apples shipped to England may be transhipped to consumers on the continent.

 

The irony of all this is that when Britain joined the then EEC forty years ago, most New Zealanders objected. Ties to Britain were closer and in any case our dairy products and meat were being excluded. (It is unlikely that under Brexit Britain would reintroduce the access we had in 1973.) There was a sophisticated view that Britain should join in its best interests but that did not justify screwing New Zealand. It was especially held by those who did the superb job of negotiating a far better deal for primary product access than Australia got.

 

Four decades later, they have been proved right. It is the whole of the EU which is now important to us, and not just Britain. Not just economically either. New Zealand and the EU have just announced a deepening ‘across all aspects of [the] relationship including in the political and security sphere, science and innovation, and trade and investment.’

 

It is hoped that negotiations will begin next year including a free trade agreement which will have the advantage of lessening our economic dependence on China. Good relations with the EU also means we need not be so dependent upon the US. One shudders to think how we could respond if the US and China got into conflict. A balanced New Zealand foreign policy has a central role for the EU, with or without Britain.

 

 

(This article was made possible by support from the EU Delegation in Wellington and travel assistance from Air New Zealand. An earlier version of this article was published in ‘The Dominion Post’.)

DOES INEQUALITY AFFECT ECONOMIC GROWTH?

The OECD says yes; how do we respond?

Pundit: 15 December, 2014.

Keywords: Distributional Economics; Growth & Innovation;

A recently released OECD report concludes that economic inequality hurts economic growth, and has particularly done so for New Zealand. Some of our responses were plain bizarre. Either the non-economic commentators had not understood the issue or had not read the report.

Even the Minister of Finance, Bill English, said the research was from a ‘bunch of econometricians doing their magic’. As it happens, English’s degree is in literature, and he has as much authority to judge econometricians as I have to judge poetry (much of which is magical to me).

Almost certainly, he is referring – somewhat loosely – to the report on the research paper which the Treasury prepared for him. Because economics is a disciplined profession, other economists can infer what the Treasury analysis says. (One is not so confident in predicting their policy recommendations.)

The OECD report is based on a working paper Trends in Income Inequality and its Impact on Economic Growth prepared by Federico Cingano. It opens with the caveat ‘OECD Working Papers should not be reported as representing the official views of the OECD or of its member countries. The opinions expressed and arguments employed are those of the author(s).’ As in the case of our Treasury and the RBNZ, I have no trouble with that policy; it allows the OECD to publish research findings for public discussion without having the full imprimatur and political direction from the top.

Yes, the report is based on econometrics which involves non-experimental statistical inference; one of the hardest areas of statistics. As an introduction, consider the issue of whether unemployment causes human distress.

An experimental scientist would take a sample – it would have to be a very large sample – split it randomly into two groups, make one of the groups unemployed, and see whether its members suffered more physical sickness, matrimonial breakdown, criminal or deviant behaviour, mental breakdown, suicide and death. Not practical? Then do we just depend on opinion?

Instead we take what data there is available and analyse it as best we can. Some years ago I looked at over a hundred studies – only a few from New Zealand – which almost unanimously found a correlation between individual unemployment and personal distress. In my judgement almost every one of the papers had some technical flaw, but collectively they were so overwhelming that I think we can safely conclude that unemployment is bad for an individual – caveats, of course.(I also looked at whether inflation is bad for individuals; there is no such body of statistical evidence.)

My general conclusion, though, was never to trust a single piece of research based on non-experimental statistical inference EVEN when I like its conclusion. It may suggest further research directions, it may be indicative, it may even be helpful – but it is not definitive. I doubt that Dr Cingano would particularly disagree.

However his single piece of econometrics contributes to a major OECD (and international) research program containing many other studies. It has led the OECD to some general policy conclusions, not all of what were conveyed in the New Zealand reports.

So here they are (with the empirical findings removed for space; their embolding)
1. What matters most for growth are families with lower incomes slipping behind. This negative effect of inequality on growth is determined not just by the poorest income decile but actually by the bottom 40% of income earners.
2. This is because inter alia people from disadvantaged social backgrounds underinvest in their education.
3. Tackling inequality through tax and transfer policies does not harm growth, provided these policies are well designed and implemented.
4. In particular, redistribution efforts should focus on families with children and youth, as this is where key decisions on human capital investment are made and should promote skills development and learning across people’s lives.

So, if we want to accelerate economic growth and/or ameliorate economic inequality what might we take from the OECD conclusions?

The last two points favour carefully designed tax and transfers policies focussed on families with children and youth. That is where the foundations of the human capital investment which promotes economic growth and wellbeing are laid.

That does not mean we should ignore the government’s role in infrastructure, innovation, trade policy, directly upgrading workforce skills and so on. But if we don’t get the family foundations right they will not be nearly as effective.

I don’t think OECD economists, nor Treasury economists, would be uncomfortable with this conclusion (although they may well add a number of other things). Our politicians are more likely to put the tax and transfer revisions into the too-hard basket. That is political magic.

Let Me Not to the Marriage of True Minds Admit Impediments

How much should the state be involved in determining who are in a marriage relationship?

Pundit: 12 December, 2014.

Keywords: Social Policy;

The recently released Child Poverty Action Group’s (CPAG) report on the Complexities of Relationship in the Welfare System and the Consequences for Children tells some ugly stories. Benefit entitlement can depend upon the relationships between adults. Sometimes beneficiaries do not report their true relationship (or what it is deemed in law may not reflect how they think about themselves). As a result they claim more benefits than the law entitles them to. If found out they may have to repay excesses (not easy if you are already below the poverty line) and even be punished by incarceration.

The relentless force of the law (and the Ministry of Social Development) pursues such outcomes oblivious to the wellbeing of any children (whose welfare is often the reason for the benefit in the first case). They may suffer even more than adults. In one case I was marginally involved with, the mother was jailed for ‘benefit fraud’ and her children put in care. That alone would normally be disruptive to their welfare but in addition one was abused by their foster parents. Released, the mother had her miserable benefit docked to repay the over-spending; her children suffered yet again.

Stepping back we may ask why did it matter that she (or many other women) was in a relationship in the form of marriage? Indeed why should the state care whether someone is married or not? (And even more unfathomable why should the state actually penalise marriage?)

Historically the state was involved in marriages because in a feudal society vassals were subject to their lords and marriage between the lords and ladies themselves often involved complicated property dealings. Additionally, the state and religious authorities were deeply intertwined.

None of these issues are relevant today. A marriage is a private relationship; it is not at all evident that the state should be concerned (any more than with the private relationships you make by joining a cricket club). Practically, the state does not go hunting for couples in defacto but not dejure relationships threatening them with a shotgun.

What about children? In the past marriage meant having children. But that is no longer true. Today the public policy issue is how to deal with children (sometimes called family policy). Given that many children may not be living with couples and many couples are not living with children, marriage does not seem to have much to do with family policy.

There may be a case for allowing for a couple to register their relationship with the state. If they want to celebrate the event with their friends and relations, why not? (To be clear, your sentimental columnist is always delighted when that happens.) Many couples choose another path. Given it is a private relationship, who cares?

It appears that ‘matrimonial’ property laws are necessary when the relationship breaks down (irrespective whether it is registered with the state or not). The justification may be – as often happens – that state involvement can reduce the transaction costs; in that sense it is not too different from company insolvency laws.

I have no idea how extensive is the involvement of the state in matrimonial affairs. But as someone who researches social welfare I am aware of its extensive role in the social security regime. (The CPAG consulted me on the report, but my input was small.) Having seen the damage it does to children, one wonders why it happens and whether there is a better way.

As an aside, there is a separate issue of arrangements where children are not involved. They seem to be a carry-over from when women worked only at home and men in the market place. That is no longer true. Once we break away from that headspace, there are solutions although they may require a fundamental rethinking of the extent to which we should shift from flat-rate to earnings-related benefits.

Where there are children, any resolution is more difficult. The widespread assumption, built into public policy, is that both parents should support their children. To simplify, very often the notion is that the father provides the financial support and the mother the home-care support (although many mothers nowadays may be providing some financial assistance, while some fathers contribute to the home-care support).

At this point public policy gets very confused. It is possible for a father to walk away from his family and cease financial support. (There may be maintenance payments but often they are not enforced.) Sometimes a man gets lumbered by the law by having to support children who are not his own (and who may not acknowledge him as a father).

Trying to think these things through – and working entirely at a technical, rather than public policy, level – I have explored the option where the state provides minimum (i.e. poverty level) support for all children. That pretty well resolves the problem of determining the relationship between adults but it is very expensive (a major attraction is that it would eliminate child poverty). Even so, the analysis left me with the uneasy feeling that current arrangements are designed to minimise the cost to the state – the cheapskate state, you might say.

So congratulations to the CPAG for bringing the problem to our attention. One urges the Ministry of Social Development to read their report carefully from the perspective of whether they might implement a better regime which is less destructive to our children and to our future.

GRUMBLING ABOUT POLITICAL GRUMBLERS

It is one thing being in Opposition complaining about what has happened in government; it is another thing to have a viable policy.

Pundit: 3 December, 2014.

Keywords: Political Economy & History;

It was unfortunate that the first public issue that Andrew Little had to deal with was the Roger Sutton affair. Here was the leader of the Labour Party grumbling yet again. We’ve had six years of such grumbling; an issue comes up, the spokesperson complains it is not going right, and they (it is often unspecified who ‘they’ is) should do something about it. If the last two elections are any guide, the public has not been very impressed.

It gives the impression of a party bobbing helplessly on the tides sweeping New Zealand. I had to remind myself that Little is a very experienced employment lawyer and has expertise on the topic (which is not common among grumblers).

Shortly afterwards, Little had the Prime Minister on the ropes over his curious relationship with Cameron Slater. Bringing down a prime minister would be a political achievement (Slater himself is more likely to do that), but one cannot help noticing that the electorate has not been greatly impressed when lesser politicians – even a front bencher during an election campaign – have had to resign. The ‘Beltway’ (and the cyber-beltway) might be, but they don’t seem to have many votes or much influence on the electorate.

(‘Beltway’ is an American term for Washington officials, contractors and lobbyists, and the corporate media who cover them. They generally live inside a ring road called the ‘Capital Beltway’. They have an intense (and sometimes informed) interest in politics, in contrast to the interests and priorities of the general US population.)

Little has followed on with further beltway successes of changing the surveillance legislation and a speech setting out some of his thinking. His beltway supporters are greatly chuffed; the rest are beginning to wonder whether Labour has – at last – got an effective leader (although they are very aware that three weeks’ success does not make a prime minister).

But Labour is doomed if once more it lapses back into its grumbling mode. Sure, third-term governments tend to be tired, arrogant and bereft of ideas. But a grumbling Labour Party looks like the same party with different faces waiting to takeover. Sure, they may get into office, with its chauffeured BMWs and patronage for associates but end up meekly doing what the officials tell them (which may be no bad thing); being in power is a different matter.

There are plenty in parliament who are not capable of anything but grumbling and, in any case, what is one to do when a journalist, looking for a story, rings up and asks for a grumble about the latest government failure? (Parliament’s top grumbler is John Key, who often distances himself from a government failure, grumbles about it on our behalf, and gives the impression that something will be done.)

The grumbling can be put into a context if the party has some themes it is promoting – some vision. The Greens are an example. On certain grumbling issues they will always respond that the outcome is environmentally destructive. Everyone knows the Greens stand for environmental sustainability. What does Labour stand for?

Now of course some Labour supporters, especially if they are committed (and often uncritical), can tell you what they think their party’s themes are, or should be. Very often it is a particular policy – say a capital gains tax – but how does it fit into a coherent vision?

The rest of the country is even less clear. They would probably describe Labour in terms of its past record and a smattering of policies, much like the party members would. But this is not a vision of a progressive party dealing with the problems of the day and anticipating the challenges of the future. That is a very different from pretending to be a National Government in waiting.

What might those themes be? The way I think of it, goes like this. Someone grumbles about something – grumbling cant be stopped – but a senior takes them aside and says ‘you have left out what we are trying to do. You should have put it in context.’

The context could be
– this has increased poverty and inequality;
– this is another example of poor quality public services that the government is causing through squeezing funding;
– short term thinking has once more compromised social and environmental sustainability;
– yet another example of light-handed regulation with excessive confidence in the unregulated market mechanism which causes waste, distress and death;
– yet again the narrowness of a government which goes for increasing business profit at the expense of enhancing the quality of life.

I am not saying the above list is complete (although it cant be too long – grumblers have limited retention). Nor need all the above themes be present. The public will not seize on them immediately. But over time they’ll get a message (so will the beltway): this is what Labour is about; these are our priorities in government; we are not interested in the baubles of office, we are interested in using power to the long-run benefit of all New Zealanders.

OUR PETER JACKSON OF CHILDREN’S LITERATURE?

How New Zealand businesses succeed internationally.

 

Pundit: 30 November, 2014.

 

Keywords: Growth & Innovation; Literature and Culture;

 

One of life’s pleasure is sitting with a child on one’s lap reading a book to them: attractive – sometimes mysterious – illustrations, humorous – even mischievous – plots, rhythmic sentences and just enough eccentric words without being obscure. E-readers are no substitute. The children’s section in my local bookshop is growing.

 

New Zealand appears to have an internationally competitive advantage in children’s books. It probably arises from the strength of our primary schooling system and its commitment to literacy illustrated by our world leadership in readers, books which teach children to read. The School Journal (established in 1907) has also been important; many of our outstanding writers (and illustrators) cut their teeth contributing to it.

 

The strength of writing for children is evident in the local respect with which those writers are held: three of the twelve recipients of the Prime Minister’s Award for Literary Achievement in Fiction are children’s writers: Margaret Mahy, who also TWICE won a Carnegie Medal, the ‘Booker prize’ in children’s fiction (2005), Joy Cowley (2010) and Jack Lasenby (2014). Another three also wrote for children and young adults: Maurice Gee (2004), Patricia Grace (2006) and Owen Marshall (2013). James K. Baxter wrote poetry for children.

 

Even so it may be surprising that the children’s book publisher, Gecko Press, has been so internationally successful. Its specialty is to translate the best children’s books published in foreign languages – from France, Japan, Germany, Netherlands, Poland, Sweden and Taiwan – and sell them with the original illustrations throughout the English-speaking world. It also publishes some New Zealand writers, in turn selling their rights for foreign translation and publication.

 

It is interesting to look at the different publications – ah, the joys of browsing in a bookshop – and see the different cultures’ different approaches; presumably the listening child will imbibe that too. The books are always laced with humour; perhaps the most famous is Poo Bum about a rabbit who could only say one thing. Some tackle difficult topics ever so courageously. Swedish writer Ulf Nilsson’s All the Dear Little Animals is about death; I’m told the issue is handled so naturally, so sensitively and yet so practically that children respond very positively.

 

Given that Wellington, where Gecko operates, is so far away from the rest of the world, how come its success? (Especially as New Zealanders are not noted for their language abilities.) The strength of our children’s book industry with all its voracious readers is one reason. Another is that it is easy to start a business in New Zealand and its restrictions are not too hidebound. Gecko doesn’t have to print here, instead using Asian printers and shipping directly to its international markets. It is the publishing added value which comes back to New Zealand (the royalties accrue to offshore writers).

 

That would have been impractical a couple of decades ago but the falling costs of distance (the driver of globalisation) means that despite being at the unfashionable end of the world, certain sorts of New Zealand businesses can operate globally. (Even the constant need to go to distant trade fairs does not seem to be too big a handicap. Like many other publishers Gecko will be going the TIBE book fair (Taiwan) next February, where New Zealand is the guest of honour; English language reading seems to be opening up in Asia.)

 

A key element is that the publisher, Julia Marshall, who worked in Sweden for 12 years, returned home, saw the market niche and seized it. As the New Zealand Herald said: ‘It’s one of those “why didn’t I think of that?” ideas that seem so obvious – in hindsight.’ But Julia saw it with foresight.

 

So there it is: a rich national context; a supportive business environment; low cost, high quality international connections; a talented entrepreneur and – of course – luck. Were government business subsidies helpful? There were a few at the beginning but I understand Gecko is now standalone – an innovator which our innovation policy seems to have overlooked.

 

Has it ever occurred to you how odd the notion of Wellywood is? If two decades ago you had been told that New Zealand would become an international centre for the production of major movies, you would have said ‘absurd’. Peter Jackson did not think so.

 

Perhaps Julia Marshall is our Peter Jackson of international children’s literature.

PROLONGATION OF LIFE AND THE QUALITY OF LIFE.

How economists think about valuing life when allocating resources for healthcare purposes.

Pundit: 28 November, 2014

Keywords: Health;

A couple of comments to an earlier column asked questions about the quality of life versus the prolongation of life. It might be useful to set out an economic perspective on the broad issue, while acknowledging the economists do not have the last word. However, as a very brief account of my long-standing involvement with the topic shows, economists cannot avoid the issue because of its resource implications.

When I was young I thought the function of medicine was to save lives. With a little bit of maturity I realised that since we all die once, medicine was only prolonging life. However different treatments uses resources which may prolong lives to different extents. How are we to allocate the available resources?

A health economist hits this problem in all sorts of ways but here is an interesting example. It is well known that more deaths are attributable to the use of tobacco than to the misuse of alcohol. But tobacco deaths occur much later in life than many of the alcohol deaths. While a smoker dying at 70 may lose 15 years of life, a drinking teenager may lose 60 years in a crash. Allow for that and the total years of life terminated by alcohol misuse are much closer to the life-years terminated by tobacco use. A death count is misleading.

But even the notion of life-years is not refined enough. About 15 years ago I was working on whether a particular (costly) drug should be provided by the public health system to those with multiple sclerosis. As far as could be ascertained, it did not prolong the sufferer’s life. But it could make a huge difference to its quality, by delaying the onset of the more advanced stages of the disease and moderating its impact. A life-year only evaluation would give the nonsensical answer to never use the drug since there were no gains in life-years from using it. Yet there were people purchasing the drug for themselves; they were certainly not behaving nonsensically.

Fortunately economists had been developing a relevant measure called a QALY – quality of life adjusted year. Its value is unity for a person with good health, zero for those who are dead and a number between reflecting where there the quality of life was less than good but not as bad as death. Measuring the exact proportion for each condition is not easy, but there has been a huge effort to develop good measures.

That incorporates the prolongation of life into the quality of life, giving greater weight to years of better health. The economic analysis would value, say, a treatment which gave three years of 0.8 QALYs (a total of 2.4 QALYs) over the alternative of five years of 0.3 QALYs. (!.5 QALYs) Note that while the economic analysis may be saying that it is rational (in resource terms) to provide the treatment, it is for the patient to choose whether to take on a treatment which gives them a shorter life, but of better quality. (Others may be involved in making the decision – this is not something on which economics is well-placed to have an opinion.)

The adoption of QALYs might lead economists into further questioning the relevance of GDP (or income) in making judgements about a person’s (or group of persons’) wellbeing. I have fiddled around on the edges of this (as have some of the profession’s virtuoso violinists). Basically, QALYs work best for physical health status. (I am not sure they even work well for mental health status.) They are not designed to measure overall wellbeing or happiness. You can combine QALYs with income but the outcome is odd. But that is another story. And probably one we shall see steadily progressing.

ARE NEW ZEALAND ECONOMISTS GOING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION?

The Secretary of the Treasury appears to have doubts.

 

Pundit: 24 November, 2014.

 

Keywords: History of Ideas, Methodology & Philosophy;

 

In a speech to economics teachers  earlier this month, the Secretary of the Treasury, Gabriel Makhlouf, argued for a different approach to economics from the one which dominates the profession in New Zealand.

 

His complaint was that ‘we have allowed too much of economics, and too many economists, to rest on the laurels of algebraic certainty and not push themselves into the field of the human science that economics actually is, where choices are more difficult to arrive at and certainly more difficult to see.’

 

I put his argument a slightly different way, although in its spirit. Isaac Newton was foundational to modern science; he and his successors have the extraordinary achievement of being able to predict all sorts of physical phenomea – for example where exactly a planet will be many years into the future – using just a few principles. That success has seduced many other disciplines including economics. Adam Smith, born before Newton died, makes more references to him in The Wealth of Nations than to any other thinker. Would it not be wonderful if economics could be reduced to a similar few simple principles?.

 

But has the approach been successful in economics? Contrast that other outstanding British scientist, Charles Darwin. He also set out some simple principles to explain evolution but they are hopeless for predicting with any precision. Cutting across the processes he describes there is accident and contingency. (Otherwise how can you explain you have five, rather than some other number, of toes?) There have been economists greatly influenced by Darwin too, including Alfred Marshall who was a fine mathematician.

 

If you put physics and evolutionary theory on a spectrum then the social sciences are on the other side of biology, even further away from physics., for the world they investigate is even messier than, say, an estuary. While many who tackle social issues are hardly scientists there is a scientific tradition of social theories subject to empirical investigation which are to be rejected when they don’t stack up. It is just a bloody sight harder task to do this than for physics. (Those whose social theories are invulnerable to evidence, and who do not test them rigorously, are ideologists.)

 

What Makhlouf was arguing was that too much of scientific economics today bases itself on physics and not enough sees itself as a social science. He quoted Keynes: ‘the master-economist must possess a rare combination of gifts. He must be mathematician, historian, statesman, philosopher – in some degree. He must understand symbols and speak in words. He must contemplate the particular in terms of the general and touch abstract and concrete in the same flight of thought. He must study the present in the light of the past for the purposes of the future. No part of man’s nature or his institutions must lie entirely outside his regard. He must be purposeful and disinterested in a simultaneous mood; as aloof and incorruptible as an artist, yet sometimes as near to earth as a politician.’

 

Makhlouf went on to pose a set of questions to the teachers. Among them were

– Are you covering different schools of economic thought in your teaching?

– Are you teaching enough economic history, so that we can learn the lessons from the

past?

– Are you encouraging your students to embrace and respect the perspectives that other disciplines bring to thinking about and solving economic problems?

– How can we better understand the trade-offs between policies that improve incomes and those that improve social inclusion or environmental sustainability or our resilience to economic shocks?

– And, perhaps most importantly, are you challenging yourselves, and your students, to

think beyond the comfortable?

 

My guess is that many economics teachers posed with such questions would say neither ‘yes’ nor ‘no’, but ‘what is he going on about?’

 

Makhlouf is not a ‘heterodox’ economist. The speech is entirely within the core of economic orthodoxy, quoting approvingly many of the economic greats. He emphasises ‘Nobel Prize winners demonstrate diversity of thought among economists, a diversity that needs to be preserved, promoted and enriched. Whether people follow the classical, neo-classical, Austrian, Keynesian, New Keynesian or some other school, preserving this intellectual diversity – and in fact allowing it to pollinate – can only help to improve our understanding of the world we live in.’

 

He affirmed the need for ‘a stable and sustainable macroeconomic framework, sound monetary policy that delivers stable and predictable prices, a prudent fiscal policy and debt that’s under control’, going on ‘I also believe that a stable and well-regulated financial system matters, that properly functioning markets matter, that price signals matter and that incentives matter.’ You can’t get much more orthodox than that.

 

Even so, the Secretary of the Treasury has put up a considerable challenge to New Zealand’s economic profession; to change its balance to be more open to other social sciences, more tolerant of diversity and dissent, more robust in debate, more critical and more sceptical of fashion.

 

As much as I support Makhlouf’s analysis, I do not expect any early redirection of economics teaching and hence of economists’ thinking in New Zealand. To take a simple test, few of our university economics departments offer many courses in economic history or the history of ideas and few teachers of their other courses include a historical context in them. I can see the Treasury grappling with the challenge; I am not sure I see it happening much elsewhere.

IS NEW ZEALAND’S INNOVATION POLICY TOO ELITIST?

We should focus more on introducing and adapting the world’s innovations using a skilled workforce.

 

Pundit: 17 November, 2014

 

Keywords: Growth & Innovation; Labour Studies;

 

Our so called ‘innovation policy’, which is at the heart of the government’s growth strategy – insofar as it has one – seems to be fundamentally flawed. It overemphasises the importance of the creation of new products and services in New Zealand by an elite, and underplays the importance of adapting technologies created offshore and the role of ordinary workers in using them.

 

New Zealand is a very small part of the world economy and its creation of new technologies. To the nearest whole number, 100 percent of our basic technologies are produced offshore. Our success is dependent upon our ability to adapt those offshore technologies to our own circumstances.

 

I illustrate this with a particular technology which may be transforming the world economy: 3D printing or ‘additive manufacturing’ is a process of making three-dimensional solid objects from a digital file. A printer, under the direction of a computer, lays down successive layers of material until the entire object is created. Each of these layers can be thought of as a thinly sliced horizontal cross-section of the eventual object.

 

Additive manufacturing is likely to revolutionise industry. 3D printing’s applications include apparel, construction, electric motors and generators, firearms, and patient-specific implants and devices for medical purposes. It is claimed that it is possible to print an entire car. New Zealanders already have crowns on their teeth which are 3D printed.

 

It is not a new technology; 3D printing has been around for three decades. But it appears to have reached the stage where the development of materials, software and printers has been largely resolved and the remaining issue is cost – which is rapidly falling.

 

Its success has a couple of important implications. First, there is the possibility of a high degree of customisation. The crown on your tooth fits that tooth alone, you may also be able to specify the particular features of your car in much greater detail than you can today. Second, instead of all manufacturing moving to East Asia, with products shipped to consumers far away, they can be made on the consumer’s doorstep with only the equipment and materials transhipped.

 

How is New Zealand meeting the challenge? Private enterprise is doing its bit, bringing in printers and applications designed overseas, adapting them for New Zealand. What should the public sector be doing? There is some central government funding for developing new applications, but the vast majority of our 3D printer applications will be designed offshore. The task has to be to adapt them for our purposes.

 

The reality is that most of those working with 3D printing will be outside the narrow scientific establishment – ordinary workers, most without degrees. So a crucial part of meeting the 3D printing challenge will be the quality of the workforce. Our record of training and upskilling is poor. Recently the Chief Executive of the New Zealand-German Business Association, Monique Surges, said many German companies setting up in New Zealand find a lack of skilled labour and have to spend extra money bringing workers up to standard. She particularly mentioned poor training in building and engineering and said we needed training programmes like there are in Germany, which are stricter and longer than those in New Zealand.

 

New Zealand follows the Anglo-American tradition of emphasising the elite. In contrast the Middle European tradition puts relatively more effort in at the worker level. Their workers work smarter than the Anglo-American ones. Their economies have  higher labour productivity.

 

Our innovation policy is failing because first, we are not thinking enough about introducing and adapting overseas technologies to New Zealand; instead we pretend that promoting domestic innovation is key. Second, we dont put enough emphasis on those who will be running the technologies. Additionally, a lot of our innovation spending is on firms which pay little tax here and can easily transfer the fruits of their finding offshore without benefit to New Zealand.

 

Because innovation lead times are long it will take years for us to realise these failures. In the interim we shall pour billions of dollars into activities which hardly contribute to New Zealand’s economic and social development.

 

This is based on the third (and final) part of a presentation to the Fabian Society, 10 November.

WHEN SHOULD WE GET NEW ZEALAND SUPERANNUATION?

The case for raising the age of eligibility for NZS; and how we can do it.

 

Pundit: 17 November, 2014

 

Keywords: Retirement Policy;

 

I support raising the age of eligibility for NZS but not, primarily, for reasons of fiscal sustainability. Rather it needs to be increased for equity reasons. Longevity is increasing. When the Old Aged Pension was introduced in 1898, life expectancy at the age of 65 was 13 years; today it is 20 years, and it will continue to rise. It is a matter of equity that as the age of longevity rises, the age of eligibility for NZS should rise too. Here is how I would do it with five integrated steps.

 

  1. We should set out a target age of eligibility based on life expectation. I suggest we choose the age as that where life expectancy is 17 years (similar to the 1938 level for 65). In current terms that would set an age of eligibility of 69.That target age would rise with increased longevity.

 

  1. However, the actual age of eligibility would be raised by only 3 months every year until it reached the target age. So it would take 12 years to reach 69, and the full adjustment would only affect those born after 1958 if we started next March (2015).

 

  1. We need to recognise that there are people who cannot be expected to work in the years before the current age of eligibility, and who will have insufficient savings. They should get an early retirement benefit. Except for its name – reflecting a different status – it would be very similar to the Invalids Benefit.

 

  1. We need to strengthen private provision for retirement by making KiwiSaver compulsory and increasing its contributions. A compulsory contribution is much like a tax; but the beneficiary is solely the individual taxpayer. (This sort of approach may be a way we can get around – to some extent – the deadlock over raising income tax rates for structural macroeconomic purposes.)

 

  1. Any fiscal savings we gain from the raising the age of eligibility should be channelled into better provision for residential and domiciliary care for the very old. If we dont, we may under-provide for them or cost-shift provision onto their children – privatise it.

 

Because this is an equity-driven package, there is much in it for everyone. If you are born in the 1950s and later, you have some guarantee that there will not be an abrupt change to your retirement plans from unexpected changes in government policy and you will not find yourself financially supporting your aging parents – although they will continue to need your personal support. Nor will you be suffering impoverished care when you really need it. .

 

Some will argue that Labour lost votes in this election from their promise to raise the age of eligibility to 67. But Labour’s policy was badly explained, and was not presented as a part of a comprehensive package such as this one.

 

A side consequence of the package would be it would contribute to fiscal sustainability although, as I said at the outset, for me the prime issue is equity arising from increased longevity. Until about 2011 New Zealand was benefiting from a demographic dividend as the working population increased relative to the dependent population. Now the reverse is occurring. As a result the cost of NZS is expected to rise from 4.3 percent of GDP in 2010 to 7.8 percent in 2060. Over three-fifths of that increase occurs in the first two decades to 2030 with the remaining increase spread out more slowly over three decades. That is because of the baby boomers born immediately after the war are now retiring.

 

The demographics suggest we should have started the phasing in of a higher age of eligibility sooner, But we didn’t. That is not an excuse for further delay, especially as owe younger generations a strong and steady signal to of what will happen to their retirement. If we do not do something soon, fiscal pressures may require a sudden lifting the age of eligibility, as has happened in Europe.

 

This is based on the second part of a presentation to the Fabian Society, 10 November.