Evidence to the Waitangi Tribunal Claims to the Eastern Bay of Plenty Region (WAI 146) October 1995.
Keywords: Maori; Political Economy & History;
1.1 My name is Brian Henry Easton. My profession is an economist and social statistician. In my 30 odd professional years I have held positions at the University of Sussex, the University of Canterbury, the University of Melbourne, and the NZ. Institute of Economic Research (which at one stage I directed). I currently hold various academic positions at the University of Auckland, Massey University, Otago University, and the Research Project on Economic Planning. I have written and edited 27 books and monographs, and over 200 published articles on a wide variety of economic and social issues. (Some of my many relevant publications are mentioned in references in this submission.) Over the last nine years I have worked as an independent consultant, and appeared before the Tribunal on other occasions including WAI 26/150, 45, 153, and 413.
1.2 I have been asked by Counsel for the Ngati Awa to assist the Waitangi Tribunal by providing expert opinion on the economic and social impact on the Ngati Awa of the Raupatu (confiscation) of their lands.
1.3 As I shall explain, the task is not an easy one. The exercise of quantifying involves large margins of error, and numerous assumptions. It is therefore especially important that when drawing conclusions from this paper, its various caveats be kept in mind.
1.4 My evidence is based upon the submissions and evidence of the Ngati Awa to the Tribunal. I have also recently visited the Ngati Awa rohe on two occasions, and had a most useful discussion with officers of the Whakatane District Council about economic development prospects in their region. Behind this is my extensive work on economic development, including in the nineteenth century and as it applies to the Maori.
1.5 It is convenient here to deal with a matter of terminology. I shall need to make a distinction between the Ngati Awa as a collective entity, and the individual members of Ngati Awa. The term “iwi” can apply to both notions. Where I need to discriminate between them, I shall call the collective “iwi whanui”, and the individuals “iwi members”. “Te rohe o te iwi” is the tribal district. (The term “hapu” is used with the same meaning as in the Ngati Awa evidence.)
1.6 The Ngati Awa have made a number of claims about the confiscation of their lands, and the consequences, which they have presented to the Waitangi Tribunal in closely documented evidence. While I have read their material, I claim no expertise in judging its validity. That is a matter I leave to the Tribunal. However in order to make progress, I have to make some assumptions. Accordingly I shall assume that the claims of the Ngati Awa are fully justified.
1.7 If the claims are not fully justified, then the Tribunal may have to reduce my quantitative estimates in a proportion which reflects their opinion. I am happy to provide my expertise if the Tribunal requires further assistance, after coming to such a conclusion. At this point I mention that any adjustment will be primarily to what I shall call the “direct” estimates based on the value of the land taken, and that there is likely to be much less adjustment needed for the “indirect estimate”, based on the current situation of the iwi members.
1.8 Similarly I have no expertise to assess the cross claims. The issues of quantification of the previous paragraph apply to them insofar as they are justified.
2. The Consequences of the Raupatu
2.1 In their statement of claim Ngati Awa list a series of events which they say has occurred as a result of the Raupatu and subsequent events, and which have prejudicially affected the iwi (p.38-40). The list includes the “loss of Te Tino Rangatiratanga”. Most affect economic aspects of rangatiratanga in the meaning of the Tiriti. I propose to put the Ngati Awa list into subcategories of these economic aspects. I have kept the original lettering: inevitably some items have characteristics of more than one category, and so are allocated to both.
2.1.1 The Loss of Capital and Other Productive Resources
(a) Loss of their lands, mountains, forests, rivers, swamps and lakes.
(e) Loss of sources of food and building materials (such as the Rotoehu Forest and the Rangitaiki swamp area).
(g) Loss of water rights, mineral rights and geothermal rights.
(q) A reduction in the population of the hapu and lwi of Ngati Awa.
(r) Loss of riparian rights; in particular of the Wairaka Marae.
(s) Loss of the Whare Mataatua.
(u) Loss of access to and the use of the Rangitaiki River at Matahina.
(w) Pollution of the air and waters of Ngati Awa and consequent loss or deterioration of those resources.
2.1.2 Loss of the Ability to Regulate the Use of the Resources, the Welfare of the Community, and the Region
(c) Loss of the mana of hapu and iwi.
(d) Loss of leaders.
(h) Damage and destruction of the social structure and organisation of whanau, hapu and iwi.
(l) Loss of the mana of Ngati Awa leaders through their loss of control of Ngati Awa land, loss of authority and denial of Te Tino Rangatiratanga and as a consequence the breakdown of the Ngati Awa leadership system.
(m) Loss of political influence.
(o) The arousal of division, dissension and conflict between hapu leading to a breakdown of the alliance within the hapu of the Ngati Awa iwi.
(v) Lack of appropriate participation in major projects concerning Ngati Awa lands such as the Rotoehu and Tarawera Forest and the Matahina Dam.
2.1.3 Loss of the Ability to Organize the Use of the Resources Efficiently
(c) Loss of the mana of hapu and lwi.
(d) Loss of leaders.
(h) Damage and destruction of the social structure and organisation of whanau, hapu and lwi.
(i) Destruction of the traditional system of ownership (customary title) and possession of land and resources.
(j) The forced dislocation of hapu and the scattering of Ngati Awa people.
(l) Loss of the mana of Ngati Awa leaders through their loss of control of Ngati Awa land, loss of authority and denial of Te Tino Rangatiratanga and as a consequence the breakdown of the Ngati Awa leadership system.
2.1.4 The Loss in the Quality of Life by other than Material Changes
(c) Loss of the mana of hapu and lwi.
(f) Loss of economic independence and prosperity.
(j) The forced dislocation of hapu and the scattering of Ngati Awa people.
(k) The classification of Ngati Awa from 1866 until the passing of the Te Runanga O Ngati Awa Act 1988 as rebels or tangata hara and, as a consequence, adverse presumptions of guilt against Ngati Awa by relevant Crown officials, Courts and agents and by other iwi.
(l) Loss of the mana of Ngati Awa leaders through their loss of control of Ngati Awa land, loss of authority and denial of Te Tino Rangatiratanga and as a consequence the breakdown of the Ngati Awa leadership system.
(n) A feeling of shame and spiritual deprivation.
(o) The arousal of division, dissension and conflict between hapu leading to a breakdown of the alliance within the hapu of the Ngati Awa lwi.
(p) As a result of all the above matters the imposing of stress, anxiety and trouble upon the whanau of Ngati Awa.
(q) A reduction in the population of the hapu and iwi of Ngati Awa.
(s) Loss of the Whare Mataatua.
(t) Loss of significant sacred and cultural sites and features such as Putauaki, Awakeri Hot Springs, and the burial sites at Matahina.
2.2 The above subcategories reflect an economist’s way of thinking about these issues. What the previous paragraph shows is that the Ngati Awa claim is consistent with that thinking. Hereafter I shall simply use the subcategories, with the understanding that they are referring to such specifics as the Ngati Awa has described above. The next paragraphs examine each subcategory in turn, especially from the position of the ability of an economist to quantify any loss.
3. The Loss of Capital and Other Productive Resources
3.1 Perhaps the most vivid statement by a New Zealand economist on this topic has been made by Paul Dalziel in a survey of economists’ accounts of the Maori economic experiences.
“The most obvious weakness in the analysis is the common use by economists of psychological factors as an explanation of the Maori economic decline after 1870 and the recovery after 1920. Surely there are more powerful tools of analysis than that? In particular, between the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840 and the appointment of Gordon Coates as Native Minister in 1921, the amount of land in Maori title diminished from 66.4 million acres to under 4.8 million acres, a reduction of more than 90 percent. Imagine for a moment that the asset base of Fletcher Challenge or Electricorp were reduced by nine-tenths, with no compensation for large amounts of the asset-stripping. Analysts would not have to resort to exploring the psychological mood of the managers or the shareholders to explain why the company’s economic performances would be decimated. Similarly, economists should be able to explain the impact on Maori tribes of uncompensated land confiscations, dishonourable land dealings and unfulfilled land-sale promises, much better than they have managed so far.”
3.2 And yet even this analogy does not fully capture the impact of the confiscations. Shareholders have a portfolio of shares, so the loss of one company is not the same as the loss of their entire wealth, housing included. Nor would the collapse of a company be as disastrous to all its employees, as would that of the collectivity of an iwi whanui. (Moreover the employees are not typically the main shareholders of the company.) Nevertheless Dalziel is right to draw the parallel, as it provides some comprehension to the modern mind of the consequences to the Maori of the loss of their resource base.
3.3 It is not easy to quantify the consequential losses from the resource base. Many of the items do not even today have a ready market value. For instance, because the problem of defining and valuing the property rights of water (and parallel environmental resources) have yet to be resolved, any losses of those rights should be acknowledged, but it is inappropriate to put a quantitative on value them at this juncture. The quantification of the loss of population is so conjectural that it is difficult to imagine how they might be valued under any conceivable theory. This issue is, however, further considered in Section 8. Taonga such as the Whare Mataatua are priceless, and it seems little point in trying to put a price on it.
3.4 However we can, and will measure the loss from the alienation of the land. This is presented below as a part of the direct estimate.
3.5 It should be noted that in commercial terms a capital value (say of land) is a discounted sum of a flow of income. The conversion of this income stream into a lump sum is called “capitalization”, and requires an explicit discount rate. Economists switch between capital and income through this discounting/capitalization procedure easily, sometimes to the confusion of the public.
4. Loss of the Ability to Regulate the Use of the Resources, the Welfare of the Community, and the Region
4.1 However rangatiratanga is not merely a matter of ownership of capital and other resources. It also includes the regulation of those resources. In a modern economy regulation is typically the responsibility of government, today usually through the law (including market relations underpinned by law). In classical Maori society regulation was carried through Maori tikanga (customary ways) based upon the mana of the iwi whanui. Here are a few examples pertinent to the issue under consideration, which describe what happens when mana is diminished, and hence regulation through tikanga becomes no longer practised.
4.2 Maori tikanga regulated the environment (rather than as we do today through such legislation as the Resource Management Act). The best documented example which I know of is fish in the Muriwhenua rohe. Many other iwi will have similar examples, although they may not be as well documented.
4.3 It is evident from the historical (including oral and archaeological) record that in the times of the classical Maori the seas around the Aupouri peninsular were abundant with fish, while the beaches were rich with shellfish. Moreover the iwi whanui had a series of tikanga which conserved the stocks to a sustainable level. Today those stocks are seriously depleted. The best explanation for the depletion is that with the diminution of mana of the local iwi whanui, the practice of the customary tikanga diminished, and non-sustainable fishing took over.
4.4 Almost certainly the same thing happened to the fishing resources of the Ngati Awa, and indeed in other areas where the rangatiratanga of the local iwi whanui was depleted.
4.5 The Crown could perhaps have justified the reduction in this regulatory rangatiratanga, by arguing it was taking over the regulatory powers under its kawanatanga powers of Article 1 of the Tiriti. In my view the appropriate line between kawanatanga powers and rangatiratanga powers for environmental regulation is not easy to draw. For instance I could be persuaded that today the Resource Management Act (1991) is a more appropriate form of environmental regulation than one based on local regimes. However the historical record is that the Crown did not replace local regulation by iwi whanui by a national regime administered mainly by the central government. The effects of its actions were to destroy the local regulatory regime, but little was put in its place. Insofar as this occurred the Crown failed in its commitments under Article 1 of the Tiriti.
4.6 The result was a reduction in the management of sustainable environmental resources, which reduced the welfare of the iwi dependent upon them.
4.7 A second example is that traditionally the iwi whanui regulated relations between hapu. Loss of mana led to a reduction in the ability to regulate these relations, and a resulting fractiousness between hapu, evident enough in the hearings in front of the Tribunal. Again the government failed to put in place an alternative regime to promote the harmony between the hapu which the rangatiratanga of the iwi whanui largely maintained. Some would say the Crown promoted disharmony for its own ends.
4.8 A third example is that the iwi whanui also lost the ability to promote the economic development of the region. Again this was a role taken over by the government, and again they did this poorly in the rohe o te iwi. Even in the fifty years from 1935 to 1985 when the government ran an active regional development policy, districts on the fringes of New Zealand, like Whakatane, were poorly supported in comparison to the more central districts. Often a high proportion of those living in these marginalised districts in the North Island were Maori. As the Ngati Awa submission explains, there had been a loss of political authority. Thus the iwi whanui had neither the local authority to run their own economic development program, nor the national political authority to persuade the government to take a sufficiently active involvement in the economic development of the region.
4.9 It may seem that these three regulatory activity authorities are sufficiently different to be treated separately. Space has precluded such a treatment, but in any case the Maori approach was so holistic that separation is not as practically easy.
4.10 What we have to remember is that for most of the Whakatane area’s time of human settlement there was an effective and efficient government based on the iwi whanui. The effect of the Raupatu was to destroy that local government, and to replace it with a government based on Wellington, which was only partially as effective. An equivalent contemporary parallel would be if parliament were to abolish, over a very short period, the Bay of Plenty Regional Council, the Whakatane District Council, and some other locally based agencies (such as the police, the local courts, and the fire brigade), but to provide little to replace those institutions. The quality of the life and the economic prosperity of the area would quickly collapse. Thus it was after the Raupatu, except that in those days the majority of the inhabitants were Maori, and such alternate forms of government the central government made available tended to favour the European.
4.11 The thought experiment of abolishing the local government of an area described in the previous paragraph leads us also to conclude that it is well nigh impossible to quantify directly the impact of the parallel abolition which occurred as a result of the Raupatu. However the effects will to some extent be included in the indirect estimate provided below.
5. Loss of the Ability to Organize the Use of the Resources Efficiently
5.1 As well as being an owner of resources and its regulation of economic activities, the iwi whanui and its hapu was also a manager of resources. The quality of their management would determine the efficiency of the use of those resources, which in turn would affect the consumption resources available to the stakeholders in the economic activities – the iwi members. An obvious impact of the Raupatu, as chronicled in the evidence to the Tribunal, is that there was a loss of leadership and overall demoralization, which must have reduced the efficiency of management, and the material welfare of iwi members.
5.2 Again it is difficult to see how the effects of this loss of efficiency could be estimated directly, although they will be again incorporated in the indirect estimates.
6. The Loss in the Quality of Life by other than Material Changes
6.1 This section is to remind us that the costs to iwi members were not only a loss of material wellbeing. There were also other losses. Economists sometimes call these non-material losses “intangible”: the Maori refer to them as “spiritual”. They are difficult to measure, but no less important when we assess loss.
6.2 While the courts and the Crown have to on occasions make judgements on the value of some of these intangibles, economic analysis has only a marginal role. For instance it is not obvious what an economist can say about the penalty the Crown should pay for breaching the Tiriti o Waitangi (over and above the actual losses to those who suffered), nor what would be an adequate compensation for the unjust incarceration of iwi members. The deaths caused as a result of the Crown’s actions could perhaps be valued, had we a precise estimate of the number of deaths. But how are we to value the psychological damage of the iwi members being classified as tangata hara?
6.3 In the circumstances I think it pointless to even try to provide a quantitative estimate – even an indirect one – but by mentioning it here this economist is emphasizing that these non-material losses in the quality of life are very real, and should not be ignored.
7. Estimating the Losses Due to the Raupatu and its Consequences
7.1 The above evidence has emphasized that the social and economic impact of Raupatu was not merely a loss of land, but a loss of rangatiratanga which includes a much wider range of economic and non-economic phenomenon. The analysis has also concluded that it is difficult to estimate directly the losses, in all but some very specific cases.
7.2 First I say something about the loss of population (section 8), although no quantitative estimate of the cost is included. Then in section 9, I estimate a value for the economic loss
of the confiscated land directly.
7.3 In Section 10 I attempt an indirect estimate of the costs of Raupatu, by comparing the current socio-economic status of the Ngati Awa iwi members with that of the whole population.
7.4 It needs to be emphasized to non-economists that economists measure costs by “opportunity costs”, that is in relation to an alternative (opportunity). The alternative needs to be very carefully and transparently defined. Typically economists call this alternative a “counterfactual scenario” when it happens in real time. These scenarios will be explained as they are required.
7.5 Inevitably it is necessary to make assumptions. Often the outcomes of the counterfactual scenarios are sensitive to the assumptions. The text draws attention to specific examples of this with sensitivity analyses. Regrettably not all assumptions lead to robust estimates. Nevertheless no matter how the figures are calculated, the conclusion is the costs of the Raupatu to the Ngati Awa have been very large.
7.6 I am aware that others may challenge the specific counterfactual scenarios and assumptions. I could provide estimates based upon alternatives if it was so wished.
8. Some Remarks about Population Issues
8.1 There appears to be no demographic history of the Ngati Awa people. Here I bring together some fragments which I came across, while preparing this report.
8.2 Ian Poole reports that in 1801 the Mataatua Tribes, which include Ngati Awa, were 14 percent of the North Island iwi members, but in the 1874 Census, shortly after the Raupatu this proportion had fallen to 10 percent. I am a little uneasy about comparing these figures for they are not estimated on the same basis, but I think we can probably conclude that the Mataatua Tribes were not prospering relative to others over the period.
8.3 The 1874 definition is probably broadly comparable with the 1991 census when just under 7 percent of all Maori described themselves as having primary affiliation to an iwi whanui of the Mataatua Waka (Ngati Awa, Ngaiterangi, Tuhoe, Whakatohea, Te Whanau A Apanui). Thus that group of Maori, who appear to be among those iwi who suffered most grievously from the Raupatu, had less population growth compared to the Maori as a whole.
8.4 Comparisons within the waka are harder to make. The 1870 “Return giving Names, Etc of Tribes of the North Island”, identifies the population of Ngati Awa (including Patuatahi and Ngati Pukeko) as 24 percent of those in the Opotiki District (which covers the Mataatua Waka excluding Ngaiterangi). According to the 1991 Population Census, Ngati Awa were 22 percent of the same grouping (measured by main affiliation), suggesting their population growth had been lower (although the difference may be within the statistical error). The fall is consistent with the iwi whanui having experienced greater suffering than the rest of the Mataatua Waka, although the more important conclusion is that the entire waka suffered.
8.5 Poole provides a suggestive explanation, using child to woman ratios. In 1874 the ratio was 82 percent for Ngati Awa compared to an average Maori ratio of 112 percent. The figures for other census years are also presented in the following table. Clearly for most of the second half of the nineteenth century, the Ngati Awa ratio was below the Maori average, with the implication that a low ratio means a lower population in the long run. Poole attributes this depressed ratio, presumably reflecting a lower birth rate and/or higher infant mortality, to the confiscation, contrasting the much higher ratios for those iwi which were not so treated.
Child-Woman Ratios (Children/100 Women 15 years and Over)
Source: Poole 1991, Table 5.6, p.96.
8.6 The Population Census has had different coverage over the years. It did not collect iwi affiliation data after 1901, while measures of economic welfare, such as income were not collected until from 1951. In the course of my work, I obtained the 1926 Census, recording the situation halfway between the time of the Raupatu and today. This provides another interesting insight to the situation of the iwi of the Eastern Bay of Plenty. Respondents were asked about their housing situation, which ought to correlate with overall standard of living. Some 68 percent of Maori dwellings in 1926 were “private dwellings” in contrast to “huts and whares”, “other dwellings”, “tents and camps”, and “not specified”. However in the County of Whakatane only 43 percent of Maori households (who would be mainly Ngati Awa and Tuhoe at this time) were percent living in private dwellings (of a total of 594). The only other territorial authorities to have less than half the Maori households not living in private dwellings were Franklin (46 percent of 93), Kawhia (38 percent of 135), Piako (48 percent of 89), and Whangamomona (33⅓ percent of 3). Of the 1800 huts and whares the Maori of Whakatane had 12 percent of them. Of those in tents and camps 8.2 percent were Whakatane Maori. Yet they were only 5.5 percent of the population. This suggests the Mataatua Maori were very poorly off for housing in 1926, and perhaps also in terms of their overall standard of living.
8.7 This section is brief, if tantalizing. It suggests that it may be possible to quantify the demographic and even some aspects of the material standard of living history of the Maori at an iwi whanui level through time, by use of the Census data. The work of Ian Poole suggests it may be possible to trace the effects of different histories of land ownership and alienation through this data source. Poole appears to have no doubt that on demographic criteria those which suffered Raupatu, suffered most. The 1991 Census figures on iwi whanui shares, available after his book, support his conclusion.
9. A Direct Estimate of the Costs of the Confiscation of Land.
9.1 Ngati Awa claim that 245,000 acres of the land confiscated by the Crown by the 1 September 1866 Order in Council was in the Ngati Awa rohe. They say 77,870 acres were subsequently returned, but much of this was the poorest quality land. Some of this returned land was alienated again without full and voluntary agreement of the iwi, while some land outside the raupatu rohe was similarly alienated. As I have no estimate of the land so involved, I have not included such alienations in the total. The direct estimate is therefore likely to be an underestimate of the losses due to all land which was unjustly alienated.
9.2 I shall assume that a total of 168,000 of the confiscated acres were not returned, but confiscated without payment. How should we value this confiscation?
9.3 I estimate the land value of the 168,000 acres be around $405m today. This figure, which excludes improvements and so is not the capital value, is an estimate. Moreover the value of the land includes the effects of improvements following investment. (Examples include better transport access, drainage of a swamp, reduced risk of erosion and flooding through works, increased fertility as the result of long term pasture management.)
9.4 In any case the figure does not properly reflect the total loss to Ngati Awa because it does not allow for the accumulated return on the land over the years. Nevertheless it gives a benchmark order of magnitude. If the Ngati Awa had been able to hold on to their land, instead of it being confiscated, their holdings would appear to be valued in excess of $400m.
9.5 We may also ask what was the value of the 168,000 acres at the time of the Raupatu. A reasonable price for the sale of the land would average 5 shillings an acre.
9.6 This price is consistent with the price promulgated by Governor Grey’s Land Regulations of 1853, when he set a price of 5 shilling an acre for land with pastoral potential, and 10 shillings an acre for land with agricultural potential. Indeed it seems some of the land in the Raupatu rohe would have been agricultural potential, in which case the 5 shillings an acre may be an underestimate. Apparently the rate continued for some time after the regulations were promulgated – at least as late as 1881 if the offer for the Tawhitinui block is an indication.
9.7 If the Ngati Awa were to have voluntarily sold (at 5s a acre) all the 168,000 acres that were confiscated they would have received £42,000. Consumer prices have risen about 28.7 times between 1866 and 1995, so £42,000 in today’s consumer prices would be worth $2.4m. This is substantially lower than the current value of the land, partly because land prices tend to rise faster than general prices, but also because the current values include the effects of improvements. Nevertheless, one is left with an impression that 5 shillings an acre was cheap relative to the future value of the land, since it represents a price of about $36 a hectare in today’s prices. In comparison the average value of rural land in Whakatane in 1994 was $1470 a hectare.
9.8 Moreover the figure of $2.4m is misleading, if it were to imply an account in which the Crown used the land for 125 years, and then bought it at the past price, albeit adjusted for inflation, but paid nothing for the 125 years of use.
9.9 To calculate a realistic value for the use of the seized land, we need a suitable counterfactual scenario. Among those I have rejected are trying to write an account of the outcome if the Ngati Awa had been paid the £42,000 in 1866, and secondly an account in which the Crown had paid a fair market rental on the land to the Ngati Awa each year. Both involve great difficulties of measurement, the first horrendously so.
9.10 Instead, I propose the following counterfactual scenario. Suppose the Crown had paid £42,000 for the land in 1866, and had placed the money in a trust account where it had been wisely invested over the years, the return accruing to the trust. What would be the value of the trust in 1995?
9.11 The calculation is a straight forward one of compounding interest. However it requires an estimate of the average return a prudent trustee would have obtained over the 129 years. I know of no authoritative estimate of that figure. I shall have to derive a return.
9.12 There is a theory, albeit a far from robust one, which suggests that the average (nominal) actual return on investment should relate in the long run to the average (nominal) growth of the economy. I shall not describe the theory but pull together such evidence we have which tests it.
9.13 The longest estimated average return on all investment series I know of, is for the period from the March 1948 to the March 1974 year, a relatively short period of 26 years in comparison to the 129 years which is our concern. That shows an average return on all personal wealth of 9.4 percent p.a. The increase in nominal GNP over this period was 9.3 percent p.a. The match is as reasonably close with the theoretical prediction as we might hope.
9.14 The longest consistent series I know of for the return on a financial asset is the average rate of interest on new mortgages for the period of the March 1913 to the March 1983 year. This measure is deficient for our needs, because it includes the interest rate on mortgages subsidized by the government. Moreover the mortgage interest rate is lower than an average return for a more diversified portfolio, which would include shares, debentures, and property. The average mortgage interest rate over the 70 years was 6.2 percent per p.a. The average nominal growth of GNP over the same period was 7.8 percent. Most of the 1.6 percent difference is probably explained by the two effects mentioned earlier in the paragraph.
9.15 According to the estimates of Keith Rankin nominal GNP was £18.4m in 1866. For the March 1995 Year the official (Statistics New Zealand) estimate of GNP is about $82,500m. This gives an average growth rate of 6.7 percent p.a.
9.16 I cross-checked this figure by assuming that if on average a quarter of national income goes to return on capital and the capital to output ratio is 4 years, we would get an average return on capital of 6.25 percent p.a. This is not too different from the other estimate.
9.17 It should be noted that consumer prices rose 2.6 percent p.a. on average over this period, so the real return on the investment would be closer to 4 percent p.a.
9.18 Suppose the average return on the trust account was 6.7 percent p.a. If £42,000 had been deposited in 1866, today it would be worth $376m.
9.19 This 1995 value of the hypothetical trust is very sensitive to the assumed level of interest: an inevitable consequence of the long period involved. For instance if the rate of return had been a half a percentage point lower at 6.2 percent p.a., the value would have been $197m; if it had been the same amount higher at 7.2 percent p.a., the capital sum would have been $660m.
9.20 What the number shows is that although the initial amount was small (even after being adjusted for inflation), a prudent investment policy would have resulted in the sum being very large some 129 years later.
9.21 This calculation has made no allowance for subsequent land alienation (either of the land that was returned or outside the Raupatu rohe). Insofar as such alienation was involuntary, that is a another grievance and has to be estimated separately.
9.22 However on occasions land may have been voluntarily alienated at a fair market price, in order to provide funds to meet the immediate needs of the iwi. This would most likely have occurred because the earlier involuntary alienations (most notably the Raupatu) reduced the cash flow (and means of subsistence within the iwi), so the sales became necessary for short term survival. It would not be appropriate, however, to make an additional allowance for such alienation in the loss from the unreturned land. The voluntary alienation was a consequence of the loss of return from the earlier Raupatu, so the cost is already incorporated in the calculated sum. Including it separately would be double counting.
9.23 It is important, however, that such voluntary alienations after the Raupatu be recorded and reported to the Tribunal, because they emphasize the practical consequences of the Raupatu to the iwi. As I have already mentioned, involuntary alienations are another source of grievance.
9.24 The direct estimate applies only to the loss of land from the raupatu (and not subsequent losses from subsequent breaches of the Tiriti, either within or outside the Raupatu rohe). It does not apply to the losses of other resources (such as water property rights), nor of the other consequences from the loss of rangatiratanga. For these we have to make an indirect estimate.
10. The Indirect Estimate of Loss
10.1 The counterfactual scenario that one would really like to test is to suppose the Tiriti had not been breached, in letter and/or spirit, and that commercial transactions had proceeded on the basis of the fair trading intentions of the signatories. What would be the state of the Maori today under that scenario? We could then compare their actual state, and the difference would be the loss from the breaches of the Tiriti.
10.2 Attractive as that scenario is, it is practically impossible to elaborate, even if we confine it to a single iwi such as Ngati Awa. However we can simplify the scenario as follows, and thereby calculate an indirect estimate of the damage.
10.3 We know that the standard of living of the Maori before the land wars was generally similar to the European settler. While there are no quantitative estimates of the material consumption, the overall impression I have obtained of the historical accounts is that the Maori material welfare was about the same as that of the settlers, although their consumption patterns and way of life may have been different. If there was a difference in absolute material standards it must have been small, and irrespective of whether the European was better or worse off we might have expected the gap to have converged to zero had the wrongs not occurred but normal commercial activity continued.
10.4 This suggests the following counterfactual scenario. Suppose the Maori economic progress had been at the same rate as the non-Maori path. Then today the Maori would have had broadly the same socio-economic outcomes as the non-Maori. They have not. What would be the cost to bring the Maori up to the non-Maori standard of living? That cost might be said to be a measure of the loss the Maori has suffered as a result of the breaches of the Tiriti. (Note this measure will include losses from all the breaches, and not just the Raupatu and its consequences.)
10.5 In effect we are saying that we cannot describe the detail of the path through time of the elaborate counterfactual scenario described in 10.1, but we can examine the difference in the outcome between it and the actual scenario at a point in time.
10.6 In order to measure the gap between the iwi members of the Ngati Awa and the people of New Zealand as a whole, we use the Iwi Census Data Base of the Waitangi Tribunal. This contains data collected during the 1991 Census on an iwi whanui basis.
10.7 Before going further an issue of data protocol needs to be raised. The information in the data base on a particular iwi is personal to the iwi whanui. It should be explained that the data is not personal in the sense that it is a record of each individual census form. However there is a sense in which the iwi whanui has a personality of its own, which is in part the aggregation of its separate iwi members. Thus the data has an element of confidentiality similar to an individual record.
10.8 The Tribunal restricts access to the information in the Iwi Census Data Base in recognition of this. It has made the relevant data available to me, following approval from Te Runanga o Ngati Awa. However it has not made available to me the data from any other specific iwi, including those which are cross-claimants. The complete data set which I have used is not attached to this report, because of the element of personal material.
10.9 The 1991 Census provides socio-economic measures of the members of Ngati Awa. Some 7062 New Zealanders reported Ngati Awa as their main iwi affiliate, while 9,795 gave Ngati Awa as one of their three main affiliates. (Thus 2733 gave the iwi whanui as their second or third affiliate.) In addition there would be some of Ngati Awa descent who are not recorded because they nominated three other iwi for affiliation, because they did not record (or even know) of their descent, or because they were overseas (perhaps living there permanently). The total of Ngati Awa descent must be over 10,000. Of the total Maori who could identify at least one iwi, 2.0 percent gave Ngati Awa as their main affiliation, and 2.7 percent mentioned it as some affiliation. Ngati Awa is the 12th largest recorded iwi. The figures reported below are based on any iwi affiliation, unless otherwise stated. this being the concept which seems most relevant to the Raupatu issue.
10.10 The Ngati Awa age distribution is significantly different from that of the entire population. This is summarized by the fact their average age in 1991 was 25.3 years, while that for the population was 34.1 years. Even the adult (over 15 years) age is lower, averaging 35.4 years for Ngati Awa as against 42.3 years for the entire population.
10.11 Ngati Awa adults are less vocationally qualified than the population as a whole, with 51.3 percent having no school qualification, contrasting with 40.7 percent of all adults. Moreover 68.6 percent of those not at school have no tertiary qualifications, compared with 61.6 percent of all adults not at school. This figure underestimates the gap because an older population should be less qualified, as younger generations obtain proportionally more qualifications.
10.12 It is also no surprise that the Ngati Awa adults are less likely to be employed, with only 43.3 percent reporting being in employment, compared to 53.5 percent of all New Zealanders. Again differing age profiles of the two groups mean that the age adjusted gap is larger.
10.13 The last few paragraphs illustrate the well known proposition that relative to the whole population, the Ngati Awa – like other Maori – are deficient in the qualifications, skills, and experiences that generate market incomes. Economists call these characteristics “human capital”, but because the expression sometimes seems to imply that it is a measure of human worth, I shall use the expression “human market capital” to refer to the characteristics which facilitate the earning of income in the labour market. In summary the Ngati Awa are deficient in human market capital relative to the population as a whole.
10.14 The information on the 3189 houses which the Census associates with the Ngati Awa suggests that the iwi members probably have inferior housing compared to all New Zealanders. They are more likely to rent or lease (31.3 percent against 22.7 percent), and the rent is lower ($116 per week against $126 per week). Where the Ngati Awa do own their houses, they are more likely to have a mortgage (69.6 percent against 53.6 percent), although this may partly be an age effect.
10.15 The average income (i.e. all income including market incomes and benefits, before taxation and abatements) of Ngati Awa adults reported in the census was $15,593 in 1991. In contrast the average for all adults was $18,986. However this is affected by the different age structures. If the New Zealand population had had the same age distribution as the Ngati Awa their average income would have been $18,233 in 1991. Thus the Ngati Awa adult incomes could be said to be 85.5 percent of the national average (on an age adjusted basis).
10.16 In terms of the counterfactual scenario the relevant comparison is not with all New Zealanders, but with non-Maori New Zealanders. With the same age distribution non-Maori New Zealanders would have had an average income of $18,721 in 1991 (higher than the all New Zealand figure, because they are not dragged down by the low income Maori).
10.17 Under the counterfactual scenario of this indirect estimate the Ngati Awa adults would have had an average income in 1991 of $18,721 rather than $15,593 or $3,228 per adult (20 percent) higher.
10.18 Accumulated across the 6279 adults of Ngati Awa, that comes to a total of $20.3m in 1991. Thus if the average Ngati Awa adult had had the average income of the average non-Maori, the iwi members would have had an extra $20.3m of income in 1991.
10.19 The scenario attributes this deficit of $20.3m in 1991 to the wrongs that the iwi suffered as a result of the Raupatu and its consequences, plus other breaches of the Tiriti o Waitangi.
10.20 This figure represents the income deficit for a year. To compare it with the earlier estimates it needs to be capitalized. Using a real discount rate of 4 percent p.a., the deficit is equivalent to a capital sum of $507m. In effect, and subject to measurement errors and the various qualifications in the text (and footnotes), that is the amount the Crown would have to give the iwi members to compensate them for all their grievances if the counterfactual scenario on which it was based was true.
10.21 This approach converts the past wrongs into a sum equivalent to cash (or other physical and financial assets). However as we drew attention to earlier, part of the deficiency is of human market capital. The expenditure to remedy the human capital deficiency would probably be capitalized at a higher return than 4 percent p.a., and thus have a lower capital value. However, as I shall explain, it cannot be transferred instantaneously, but over many generations.
10.22 The sum of $507m needs to be thought of as an amount which reflects the failure of the Crown to ensure the Ngati Awa people prospered in line with the non-Maori. Not only did the Crown fail in this duty but some of its actions (most notably the Raupatu) were detrimental to the economic and social welfare of the iwi. One can think of the detriment accumulating each year until eventually in 1991 it reaches a capital sum of $507m, evident in the $20.3m deficit in income.
10.23 The estimate applies for the year to March 1991. About this time the government instituted a number of measures reducing social assistance, which appear to have fallen more heavily upon the Maori than average (more precisely they impacted more heavily upon the poor than average, and the Maori are more likely to be among the poor).
10.24 This estimate includes the effects of land losses from the Raupatu, the other land losses, and other consequences, including the loss of rangatiratanga. However it does not include any allowance for the diminished population, for losses to the iwi whanui (such as under the counterfactual they might expect to have more marae, and in better condition), for intangible losses other than those reflected in material measures, and for the inferior housing circumstances of the Ngati Awa members. It applies to 1991, and does not allow for subsequent changes.
11. Compensating for the Raupatu and Other Breaches of the Tiriti o Waitangi
11.1 The above analysis has demonstrated that, subject to various assumptions being correct, the Ngati Awa are entitled to a substantial compensation for the breaches of the Tiriti which they have suffered from, most notably as a result of the Raupatu of their lands, and the consequences which followed. To better assist understanding of the estimates, I relate them to the elements of what might be included in an appropriate compensation package.
11.2 As explained earlier, I have not tried to assess the intangible (on non-material, or spiritual) losses of the Ngati Awa. However any compensation package from the Crown must address them. It is outside my competence to list what might be in this part of the package, but I would not want it thought that I ignored it.
11.3 In regard to the part of the package which focuses on the narrower part of the losses which I have addressed here I divide it into three components: iwi whanui, iwi members, and rohe o te iwi
11.4 Iwi Whanui
i. The collective authority of Ngati Awa, currently institutionalized in the Runanga, has lost the rangatiratanga guaranteed under the second article of the Tiriti. This covers, for our purposes here, both assets and authority.
ii. Compensation will require a return of as much of the land and other seized assets within the rohe o te iwi as the Crown may be able to return. Obviously the iwi whanui may choose not to have some of the potential assets, because it sees no use for them, but it must be given the opportunity to make that choice.
iii. In addition the Crown will need to pay the Ngati Awa a sum of money to compensate for the assets it is unable to return, perhaps because they have gone into private hands, or perhaps because it requires them for other purposes.
iv. It is for the iwi whanui to decide what to do with this cash. It may use some to purchase private land and other resources significant to the iwi when they come on the open market, and it may use some to invest in a financial portfolio, using the revenue for its purposes. These purposes will include the administration of the iwi, the upgrading and establishing of marae and other cultural artifacts and practices, the investment in the human market capital of its iwi members, and perhaps taking a more active role in the exercise of its authority in the rohe o Ngati Awa.
v. Because it has been raised with me by some members of Ngati Awa I need to deal briefly with the issue of various reserves of environmental significant to New Zealanders, and spiritual significance to the tangata whenua. It is understandable that the iwi wish these reserves to be returned to them, while there is considerable anxiety among some Pakeha that such a return will result in the commercial exploitation of the reserves. That is unlikely to be the intention of the tangata whenua, but they could be driven to this if the reserves were to be transferred on inappropriate commercial terms. The sensible approach might be that the reserves be transferred with appropriate covenants restricting their use. In that case the Crown when it is calculating the cost to itself of its compensation should charge such reserves at their value with the covenant, and not at the commercial value. Very often that would mean the environmental reserve would have a commercial value of zero (that is it generates no market income), or even negative (if it requires market income to maintain it in the covenanted state – in which case the iwi whanui will need a cash grant to look after the reserve). The Crown needs to assure Maori and Pakeha that it is not its intention to force the inappropriate commercial development of these reserves, especially by off-loading them in the compensation deal.
vi. It should be mentioned that part of the investment portfolio of the iwi whanui is likely to be in local projects to develop the rohe o te iwi (discussed below), but that because the iwi whanui will pursue a prudent investment policy, and not expose itself to excessive risk by investing in only one enterprise, industry, or region some of the portfolio may well be invested outside the rohe.
vii. Traditionally rangatiratanga did not explicitly include the right to tax. That was because it was unnecessary in the traditional Maori economy (as it was also unnecessary in the European economy when it was at an equivalent stage in its political economy). I mention this because the iwi whanui does not have any right today to tax the local economy (as it might have had, had there been a different course of development). Insofar as the iwi whanui is involved in expressing its authority in the activities of the local area, it is necessary for there to be some recognition of the resources involved. For instance, a meeting between a district or regional council and the tangata whenua will have both the councillors and the officers paid, but the Maori representatives may not be similarly renumerated. There are various means of resolving this, one of which is the Crown compensation should include an element to enable the iwi whanui to fund the effective participation of the iwi in the local activities, as a sort of compensation for their lack of the right to tax.
11.5 Iwi Members
viii. Earlier I pointed out that the major reason for the substantial deficit measured by the indirect estimate was the deficit in the human market capital of the iwi members. That is not a matter which can be addressed overnight. The pessimist might argue that it has taken us 155 years to get to where we are, so it will take another 155 years to return to the situation where the Maori has a similar standard of living to the non-Maori. Even an optimist might think an effective strategy to bring the Maori human market capital to the average will take generations rather than years.
ix. Nevertheless the Crown has a duty as a part of its compensation for breaches of the Tiriti to provide as much effective assistance as possible to the iwi members to remedy their deficit in human market capital. I do not here discuss how to do it, except to note that insofar as the iwi whanui is well funded it will be able to support its iwi members though educational and training assistance (and job creation – discussed below), and to improve their human market capital. However if the Crown fails to provide the iwi whanui with sufficient financial resources to do this, the Crown will need to take further measures to enhance the individual’s human capital. Probably these measures will have to be on a nation wide, rather than iwi, basis.
x. I identified, but was unable to quantify, the inferior housing situation of the Ngati Awa iwi members. Addressing this, except via improving human market capital, will not be easy, especially as the Crown has been withdrawing from housing assistance. Again if the iwi whanui has sufficient financial resources it may be able to offer financial support to its iwi members to purchase or upgrade their housing (perhaps by way of a second mortgage secured on dividends from Maori trusts). If the Crown fails to fully compensate the Ngati Awa financially it will have a Tiriti obligation to find other means to support the iwi members in their housing needs.
11.6 Rohe o te Iwi
xi. In 1991 only 30 percent of Ngati Awa lived within the rohe of their iwi. (Another 19 percent lived in the rest of the Bay of Plenty, 19 percent in the City of Auckland, and the rest were dispersed mainly through other parts of the North Island.) This diaspora is well captured by the fact that two of today’s 22 hapu are Ngati Awa-Ki-Tamaki-Makaurau and Ngati Awa-Ki-Poneke.
xii. The Ngati Awa have expressed a desire that more of their people should live in the rohe, although they recognize there are many practical reasons why some of their iwi members may want to live outside the rohe. Nevertheless the neglect of the region in economic terms, relative to other regions, in part reflects the loss of rangatiratanga to the Crown, and its failure to replace adequately the authority with agencies which would have pursued regional development as diligently and with as effective means as would have the iwi whanui with full rangatiratanga.
xiii. Increasing the numbers of Ngati Awa in its rohe ultimately involves job creation within the region.
xiv. Some of the actions that a properly funded iwi whanui will take will contribute to job creation. They would like to encourage kaumatua and kuia living outside the rohe to retire within it; they would like to encourage their mokopuna living outside the region to spend time in the region, perhaps as a part of their education or on holiday; their program of marae refurbishment and cultural development will generate jobs in the region; so will the human market capital enhancement plans they have in the education and training area. However the iwi cannot create sufficient jobs by themselves, for they have not got sufficient authority to do so.
xv. The Whakatane District Council is in the process of creating its own economic development strategy. It is likely to focus on some key growth industries which the Maori have identified as central to their development and job prospects for their people: forestry, horticulture, tourism.
xvi. Insofar as the Ngati Awa Iwi Whanui has an investment portfolio, some will be invested in new ventures in the region. For instance I would think it would look carefully at the opportunity to invest in a quality tourist hotel, which must be a part of the region’s economic development strategy.
xvii. However the iwi whanui and the local authorities are unlikely to have enough resources to promote the region effectively. The central government must play its part. Again it is not appropriate here to detail the possible initiatives it might undertake. However it would be unacceptable for the government to say that, having actively and successfully promoted other regions’ economic development, it will not make the same commitment to the Whakatane area.
12.1 This submission has demonstrated that the economic and social impact to the Ngati Awa as a consequence of the Raupatu, of consequent events, and of other grievances is substantial in quantitative terms.
12.2 The best direct estimate, which covers only the loss of land from the Raupatu, is a sum of $376m, but it is subject to a margin of error. The indirect monetary estimate, based on the gap between Ngati Awa and non-Maori incomes give an estimate of $507m, again subject to a margin of error. As the text explains, both estimates are dependent upon numerous assumptions, but are probably on the conservative side.
12.3 The larger of the two estimates – the indirect estimate – omits the following:
– the loss of population;
– the inferior housing of the Ngati Awa iwi members
– the inadequate facilities of the Ngati Awa iwi whanui;
– events after 1991.
In addition it treats the greater propensity of some Maori to be on social security benefits and other government assistance as a part compensation for the past wrongs. (Indeed it is implicit in the argument that the higher rates of government social assistance are a consequence of those wrongs).
12.4 These figures are indicative, but they suggest the Crown has to make a substantial commitment if it wishes to compensate fairly the Ngati Awa for past wrongs.
1. This is item (b) of the Ngati Awa list. It does not appear in the lists below, because it overarches them.
2. Dalziel, P. (1991) “Economists’ Analysis of Maori Economic Experience: 1959-1989”, Society and Culture: Economic Perspectives, Proceedings of the Sesquicentennial Conference of the New Zealand Association of Economists, Vol I, June 1991, New Zealand Association of Economists, Wellington, p.212-3.
3. I am aware of, and am indeed working on a project involving, the valuation of human life. However we are some distance from being able to apply the approach to an instance such as this.
4. Reported to the Waitangi Tribunal in Wai 45.
5. It may seem that Paul Dalziel is in conflict with this analysis since I appear to be returning to the demoralization explanation of the economists he criticizes. However I am arguing that this is only one aspect of a totality of deterioration of economic performance attributed to a loss of rangatiratanga, which is the fundamental issue. What I have done is trace a number of mechanisms by which that loss led to a deterioration in economic prosperity. Thus I have taken up Dalziel’s challenge that economists use the tools available to them more powerfully than in the papers he reviewed.
6. A detailed account from a sociologist’s perspective will be found in E.M.K. Douglas, Report to Te Runanga o Ngati Awa on the Social Impact of Confiscation and Associated Crown Action, Research Report 12, the Waitangi Tribunal, Wai 46:B22, 1994.
7. Pool, I. (1991) Te Iwi Maori: A New Zealand Population Past Present and Projected, Auckland University Press, Table 3.4, p.52.
8. The 1801 figure comes from D. Urlich, Maori Population and Migration, 1800-1840, MA Thesis, University of Auckland, 1969. The shift of the Kahungunu proportion from 3 percent to 14 percent over the period looks especially suspicious.
9. The denominator includes South Island Maori, and also those of Maori who are unable to identify an iwi of affiliation. Both groups would have been very small in 1874.
10. AJHR, A11, p.6-7.
11. ibid, p.96-7, especially Table 5.6.
12. These demographic factors may not be the only reason for the falling share of Mataatua in the Maori total. Some Maori of Mataatua descent may have identified another confederation or iwi whanui, because of such factors as the shame which the Ngati Awa evidence so vividly describes.
13. A summary of the contents of Population Censuses up to 1986 is in the 1990 New Zealand Official Year Book, p.130-1. Generally there is little socio-economic material about the Maori before the 1921 Census.
14. 19 households in the Borough of Whakatane are not included in this proportion, but would hardly change it.
15. It is possible that the census enumerators in the Whakatane County were sterner in their definition of private dwellings than elsewhere.
16. para 5.4 of the Statement of Claim.
17. Paras 6.2 & 6.4 ibid.
18. The figures are made up as follows:
Notes: Data from Whakatane District Council Handbook: 1994 (Kawerau data from Valuation Department).
Rural Residual calculated from “rural portion of the district” averages $572 per acre ($1470 per hectare).
19. There was an “offer to sell the Tawhitinui block for 5 shillings per acre” in 1881 reported in the evidence of Huia Pacey Crown Acquisition of Parish of Matata, Lot 31 and part of Lot 39; A further breach of the Treaty of Waitangi, (Wai 46/62; I6) (p.10). However if there had been pressures on one group of Maori to sell, in order to preempt another from offering the block for sale (as occurred in other land transactions) the figure of 5 shillings an acre would be too low. The evidence quotes various other transactions involving prices in the 4s to 6s6d per acre range.
20. Calculated from M.A. Arnold, A Long Run Consumer’s Price Index for New Zealand for March years 1862 to 1983, VUW Department of Economics, 1983(?), and official data since 1983.
21. See footnote 3, page 17.
22. We are implicitly assuming that the iwi were not told of this trust, so that their behaviour in the counterfactual was no different than what it was in actuality.
23. B.H. Easton, Income Distribution in New Zealand, NZIER Research Paper No 28, Wellington, 1983. The series is the sum of the nominal capital gain series and the market return series using the aggregate wealth series shown in Table 9.1.
24. This comes from official estimates of GNP, recorded in the 1990 New Zealand Official Year Book, Table 26.3.
25. Tabulated in various New Zealand Official Year Books between 1962 and 1985.
26. This compares the Rankin estimate of GNP, referenced in the next footnote, with the official estimate referenced in the previous footnote.
27. K. Rankin, (1992) “New Zealand’s Gross National Product:1959-1939” Review of Income and Wealth, Series 38, Number 1, March 1992, p.49-69.
28. If the rate still seems high it should be noted that the return on investment in human market capital, which would almost certainly have been a priority for iwi had they the cash is usually thought to be over 20 percent p.a.
29. Arithmetically the figure can be derived by assuming that the trust account is a constant ratio of GDP.
30. There is a subtlety in this approach which belongs to a footnote. In order for the counterfactual to make sense we have to assume that the superior progress of the Maori under the counterfactual does not affect the overall level of economic progress. There are some who would argue that the economy would have benefitted from better Maori progress, some who would argue that if the Maori had been more dominant, there would have been less progress. This issue will not be readily resolved, if we insist that the disputants put quantitative estimates to their claims. What is done here to avoid the problem, is that we are applying the scenario only to Ngati Awa, but not necessarily assuming that other Maori were treated in a similar way.
31. Note also we have made no attempt to estimate the consequences of the smaller population as a result of the breaches. Moreover, and as explained there is no attempt to assess the non-material losses.
32. B.H. Easton, A Data Base of Iwi, report (and files) to the Waitangi Tribunal, May 1995.
33. Some is already in the public arena.
34. Some 30.3 percent of those who reported Maori descent said they did not know their iwi, or gave a difficult to identify classification, or some such unspecified category. In addition there would be those of Maori descent who did not know of their decent, or did not record this in their Census form.
35. This comes from the census, which combine some groups (e.g. four groupings of Tainui). The ranking may not be entirely meaningful, since some of the iwi whanui are more characteristic of Waka, and comparable to Mataatua than to an iwi such as Ngati Awa. The point to be made here is that in that Ngati Awa are by no means an insubstantial iwi whanui.
36. Or could not specify any qualification.
37. The unemployment rates are 23.7 percent and 10.5 percent of the labour force respectively, but these figures are misleading because they dont allow for greater Maori disguised unemployment. See B.H. Easton, The Maori in the Labour Force, A report commissioned by Te Puni Kokiri, 1994.
38. See Easton ibid (1995) for the precise definition of the association.
39. For the purposes here, “non-Maori” are those who